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214,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/214,"Box 102, Item 1: Working of draft of Culture and the roots of political divergence: a South Pacific perspective with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast","Working of draft of Culture and the roots of political divergence: a South Pacific perspective with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast","Letter redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 102, Item 1","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[117] leaves + 1 letter. 272.58 MB. ",,Text,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:3a82e56",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 102: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics","https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/bcd4c977aeb45ad24a2b0192d33d4e5f.pdf,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/eaad4ca4a41c9575562add5e549477b6.pdf",Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
208,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/208,"Box 103, Item 1: Correspondence and drafts of Culture and the roots of political divergence: a South Pacific perspective with emphasis on the Australian/American contrast","Printout of various drafts with handwritten emendations, and handwritten notes, undated. Includes correspondence from Alan? (Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta) to Richard Sylvan, 9 June 1988 (typescript, 4 pages) re feedback on paper; Richard Sylvan to Alan, 13 July 1988 (handwritten, 2 pages) re: feedback on paper; Alastair (University of Waikato) to Richard Sylvan, 17 April 1985 (handwritten, 4 pages (2 leaves)) re feedback on paper; Tom (Philosophy Department, Massey University) to Richard Sylvan, 10 Jul 1985 (handwritten, 3 pages (2 leaves)) re feedback on paper.","Letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 103, Item 1","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[157] leaves. 357.51 MB. ",,"Manuscript ","https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fbf70d1",,"7t?
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patterns not emulated
(and
mostly not wanted) in North America.
It has been suggested, but on slender grounds and by Americans, that such
as
action
green
undesirable
legal
heritage.
And
environmental or other.
important
redressing
for
like those concerning constitutional rights, in a
Mhile
the
in
difference
of
channels
action is,
to
access
Mithout
the
from
the
courts
doubt,
an
American
and
Australia and in NeM Zealand,
that
it cannot account for the differences.
the approved channels sufficient,
in
as many American failures make
many important cases,
to
extremely
difference betMeen the environmental situation in USA and
end,
Mith
The sources of this evidently
and constitutional inheritance
history
politically-approved
approach,
class action cannot be brought in the public interest
situation lie,
different
the
But the most that rings true in this is that,
minor recent exception,
to prevent vandalism,
of
militancy
and
strength
be accounted for by the relative weakness of 1ega1 means
environmental vandalism.
the
the
Mith
movement in Australia and its often confrontational
environmental
can
along
bans,
in
Nor are
in
plain:
there is no alternative but recourse
to
direct action, to the streets and forests.
Like
most
of the Australian unions and universities,
both Morkers
greenies (those active in environmental movements) remain influenced
sometimes inspired
by,
and
certainly linked by,
socialist
by,
ideals.
and
and
The=e
influences, overt in Australia, have largely been Miped out oygone underground
in USA,
being incompatible Mith advanced capitalism,
the American establishment.
as communistic inspired,
the
communist
politicians
can
folloMing
confusion of communism,
Indeed socialist themes are commonly disposed of
or as,
has been
and seen as inimical by
Mhat they are not, ..iust communism.
kicked,
regularly,
and
hard,
by
leads and encouragement from North America,
state socialism,
Although
Australian
a
simple
democratic socialism, and so on has
been made in Australia in the Midespread and crude May that has occurred
in
North America.
Socialism and a Mel fare state approach Mere adopted
long
ago in NeM Zealand (about the beginning of the Century) and only shortly later
whereas there is little sign of their gaining much ground
in Australia,
no^.'
in North America.
even
Socialist principles are regarded w i t h suspicion even
except for a small minority.
bv more educated North Americans,
Right-leaning
attitudes have a prominence in US that they (rightly) do not enjoy
81
Australia.
In several respects, then, Reagan and his substitutes are
political
in
representative of the mass of America people.
The
double
(Christianity vs.
standards we have
seen
exhibited
American
in
economism) and foreign policy (rights vs.
religion
domination)
and
could have been displayed in trade policy (free enterprise abroad vs. American
82
subsidies and protection) and elsewhere
— contradictions engendered not by
mere
between
practice
and
ideologies
— extend
to^much acclaimed Amt erican
conflict
incompatib 1 e
pragmatism.
ideology
but
threaten ideological fundamentals are not tolerated;
""dangerous""
elements
of
p1ur a 1ism
and
These operate in an unambivalent way only in a narrow ran%e where
ideological fundamentals are not seriously threatened.
to
through
viens are often excluded,
more difficult times at least,
toleration is hardly remarkable,
Thus parties
thought
and foreigners
nith
while natives nith such views are,
83
suppressed.
While the Australian record
in
on
and the society was until recently mu<-h more
uniform in character than American,
the room for political variety and spread
of political parties is greater.
81.
They are reflected in such small things as. the form of anarchist
movements - always strongly individualistic in North America, but mostly
pluralistic and socialistic, and sometimes communistic in Australia.
Even Alternative American remains staunchly individualistic; only in the
quite minor US commune movement do the contrasts begin to break down a
bit.
The differences are important in political philosophy and theory,
where Americans and Antipodeans tend to operate on different wavelength?.
32.
Thus, for
instance, the
policy, which combines a
substantial subsidies and
produce.
83.
See again Goldstei,
for example.
narrow pluralism of capitalist
chapter of 00.
doubl/ standards of American agricultural
free enterprise image with allowance for
discounts #4, American, but not foreign,
Worthwhile proposals for widening the
democracy may be found in the final
extent of toleration noM evident in Australia is not simply a result
The
of a strong British heritage (from an England that Mas) but OMes something
appear
markedly
multiple
the level of personal
features as Mell:- Firstly,
indigenous
roots,
in
is
in the industrial North
than
egalitarianism,
and
the
encouraged
by
a strong
to
tendency
of vieMS (an infuriating feature for
relativisation
(a
dielike
in the educational structure,
people,
overassertive
toleration
loMer
assertiveness
that
has
overbearing
and
feature
of
to
and so on).
personal
secondly,
in-group
or
teachers).
Ideological
argument and competition is avoided not so much by general pluralism of vieMS,
but by personal relativisation of positions (Mhich looks foolish at first Mith
questions such as God's existence, though not Mith matters of religious belief
and
political opinion).
action is not required.
as
lonq
But it noM looks (Mith
increasing
reorientation of the society and belated introduction of
cultural
methods into social discussion) as if
other
and
this sort of strategy succeeds only so
To be sure,
advance
to
an
- if
consensual
can
relativism
Australian
intellectually respectable pluralism
multi
Northern
control
perfni ts.
*F.
Leisure time activities, eating, drinking, sport and gambling.
retailing
and consumerism,
culture,
that
Australia is
the
it is here,
Americanisation
of
Apart from
in surface elements of more
significant
features
of
popular
life
in
most conspicuous, especially in food and entertainment, but also
in sport.
Take food, for example. American impact and control occurs primarily Mith
fast
foods (Mhere most of the larger chains are American) and in prepared and
highly
processed foods (Mhere many of the companies involved,
larger
biscuit
and snack food companies,
concerns having been bought out.)
ready
are
ultimately
e.g.
all
American,
Significant features of these products
the
local
are
or immediate gratification from largely already-made or -prepared mass-
produced items,
Mith consumer attractiveness achieved through a high level of
The technology involved is imported from USA (though
fancy packaging.
may
the patents are American,
be some minor local adaptions),
so
involved,
are
skills
local
cheap
adolescent)
(often
there
and feM or no
labour
can
be
exploited.
This pattern applies of course to American penetration of the food
industry,
and tourist industry, in many countries other than Australia; it is
part
incorporation of the ""free Morld"" into
the
of
the
flagging
American
^'or Id-system, the American imperium as it is sometimes called.
features are involved in the American influence on entertainment
Similar
again designed to Min acceptance by a mass market,
and sport,
immediate gratification,
or
term
action
(or
bright
or
professionalisation.
containing
Take
the
short
achieved for instance in the form of
violence) for passive audiences,
colourful
namely
and
effect
skilful packaging
many
changes
much
by
achieved
set,
of
and
on Australian cricket - formerly
a
very leisurely and, for spectators, often boring game - of American infusions,
dra'A'n
especially
uniforms
The
baseball.
has
game
become
substantially
there are many one day matches, Mhere the players appear in
professionalised,
gaudy
from
and lots of safety gear (noM necessary Mith the
increase
of
pace and stop-start action), and the game proceeds at a much greater pace Mith
lots of croMd pleasing action.
There
is
an American overlay also to more recent forms of
slot machine gambling and,
Australia,
more important,
overlay exhibits the same surface features,
as
in
sport
gratification
and
food
- and underlying these,
casino gambling.
designed to appeal to
action,
- colour,
gambling
professional
commercialism,
in
The
consumers,
quick
polish,
professional
control,
multinational organisation, and repatriation of profits to the North.
But
plausibly
the
in
each of these cases,
especially sport and gambling,
argued that the American influence is superficial - a
single bricks Mall of the Californian brick veneer,
appearance
of
masonry solidity to Mooden houses,
it can
veneer
be
like
designed to give the
a style noM ubiquitous
in
building
that is on to a
but grafted onto a ecualypt Mood frame structure,
Australia,
evolved,
that
though
antecedents
Mith
Northern
In the building industry (as to some extent in the
in Australia.
influences,
Northern
from
food industry) the distinctively Australian basic house structure is beginning
to
in
disappear
plantation-groMn
places like Canberra Mith the replacement
pine,
Honterey
of
by
hardMOod
the adoption (again from America) uf
light
timber framing codes, and so on.
It
indeed
is
in the spraMling suburbs of Australia that
veneer is most strikingly exhibited,
American
the
and
not just in the housing and streets
styles of automobiles (all local manufacturing companies being American,
a Japanese exception,
Mith
and the predominantly Japanese imports largely American
copies), but in the shopping centres, their supermarkets (American in style of
and
retailing
lots.
parking
increasingly in oMnership or control) and petrol stations
Nonetheless
Davidson is deliberately
and
Mhen
exaggerating
he
Mrites (Mhile ruminating on the film and entertainment situation) that
... Me need all the cultural consciousness Me can muster to delay - if
only
by
the tactic of infinite postponement
- our
complete
incorporation into the American Mgfld-systenr (p.21).
For
merely is there evidence t^fjt the American imperium has
not
i t-
pa = =ed
zenith, but again the American encroachment and influence is superficial.
Despite
the overlay,
the main structures of institutions such as
and gambling remain basically Australian,
of
Australian
forms.
history,
from European,
local adaptions, evolved
and particularly British and
Iri=h,
=o it
so it is Mith home '-ooking.
These
institutions
Mould
and club gambling;
remain substantially intact even if recent
other overlays Mere entirely removed.
Nhat is more,
and
quality of life not readily available,
The
community
afford good examples.
American
these institutions
and Mith further local adaption could to a much greater extent,
America.
over much
So it is Mith the main forms of football, Mith amateur cricket;
is Mith pub drinking,
style
sport
or available
and club structures of much gambling
and
can,
provide for a
at
and
all,
in
drinking
cA,
g in
mith such content requirements has been that there is insufficient
But
materia!.
rise
the
tota!
reduced.
domination
other
of the Australian and
there is nom much more regiona! materia!;
industries,
former
mith
and,
of Australian cinemas by American
Australian
regions!
as a result, the
has
films
the variety of television material nom available from
Given
an end to American domination of local television programs,
sources,
fi!m
been
morld
and
of
this part of Australian leisure culture, could also be achieved.
and gambling form a mutually supporting trio of immense
drinking
Sport,
importance in the popular culture of Australasia,
the
to grasp or explain.
outsider
('Much American sociological
gambling deals mith it as a deviant activity"":
historical
on-going
influence
population is of Irish descent).
brought
and
activities,
writing
A
p.421.)
in Australia is undoubtedly Irish
(in
on
main
early
nomaday about 17X of
the
Nith their blanketing Catholicism, the Irish
propagated rather successfully a religion liberal
masculine
in
but exceedingly narrom in intersexual
such as those of the trio,
enterprises.
mas out;
Caldmell 77,
one quarter of the population mas Irish;
Australia
for
to an extent difficult
Drinking mas in, contraception mas out; gambling mas in, divorce
sport mas in,
lomer-church
homosexuality mas out ...
Catholicism
and
more
Catholicism mostly men in Australia,
purjit/nical
.
In the play-off betmeen
forms
o^
Protestantism,
mhereas in eastern USA more
puritanica!
forces prevailed, and these mere subsequently reinforced by Judaism.
is a central part of Australian social life and so of
Drinking
(Nhile it is important in Nem Zealand also,
social
momen.
life.)
For
it is a less dominant feature
of
It bears on the connected issues of mateship and attitudes
to
matesh ip
relationship,
and
is
mateship
often based upon,
is
(cobbers) mhich excludes momen.
North
culture.
America,
that to his mife.
or groms
characteristically a
Indeed,
out
of,
relation
a
drinking
betmeen
men
in contrast to the apparent norm in
a man's relations to his mates,
or mate,
may be closer than
The
mateship
mates, first and foremost, through thick and thin.
A first corollary is a
or less rigorously some ambivalence about, social and career
limitation upon,
because
mobility,
may involve leaving one's mates
any transfer or promotion
or distancing from them.
A related corollary is a restriction on competition
because one does not compete seriously Mith one's mates.
similarly
also
mateship engenders,
The mateship
ethos
because mates are treated
requires local egalitarianism,
Thus
equals.
his
Mith
ethos strict!;/ requires that a man should stick
especially given a
little
as
transitivity,
egalitarian and non-competitive features, also encouraged by other elements of
Accompanying aspects of mateship are that
mainstream culture.
the
identity
success are sought,
and
concerns such as a job or career,
serious
and
energy
in leisure,
Mhere they are,
personal
not in
more
and that often a greater level
interest is di rec ted at leisure ac t iv i t i es and pas t imes
than
Excellence in serious things tends to be deflated or denigrated.
Mork.
of Antipodean socialism.
at
Hates
however are supported, and so by extension are those Mho Mould be mates.
mateship is one of the props
of
Thus
A less expected aspect
of mateship, Mhich is after all a communitarian relation of an important type,
is
diminished involvement Mith social (and also sometimes political)
is because mates afford a secure social framework Mhich
this
Perhaps
issues.
unnecessary to look beyond.
it
is
Hates naturally get together frequently, commonly
for sport, gambling or drinking.
The
main
setting
uncomfortable
and
for
drinking
is
pub
the
degenerate form of the English pub.
important public setting for drinking is the clubs,
as the Australian barbeque.
- though
some
city
The hotel Mas,
pubs
have
occasionally invaded by groups of Momen.
the
development
serves,
not
_urious!y
hotel,
a
But an
increasingly
Mhich also commonly cater
Among private group settings, for drinking are such institutions
for gambling.
haunt
or
only
and remains,
been
liberalised,
essentially a male
and
others
are
Thus the hotel is a main setting for
and continuation of mateship.
to reinforce male chauvinism,
The hotel
has
served,
but also to foster
and
racism.
Until very recently,
and still in some places,
hotels excluded or segregated
and perhaps other groups such as Orientals uho fall towards
Aboriginals,
the
bottom of the caste ladder.
do the places of drinking differ in significant respects
only
Not
those in USA;
extent it is in USA,
and is not a major form for the drinking bout;
nor are
Beer is the mainstay of
is the main alcoholic drink consumed.
and
hotels,
is not consumed to anyuhere near the
given the same prominence as in USA.
cocktails
Hard liquor,
so do the styles of drinking and uhat is drunk.
uh 1 ch is nou heavily taxed in Australia,
from
drinking
But Australian
patterns have changed markedly in the last twenty years;
the
and nine has become
an everyday drink in the clubs and often for lunch.
the feu older clubs can be exclusive in their membership
Nhile
American country clubs carry exorbitant fees,
or
the neu clubs have very
like
modest
joining fees and represent an improvement on the hotels in many respects;
for
they are not aluays, predominantly drinking establishments and dominantly male
but they are more sociable and comfortable, and they carry a range
preserves,
including commonly gambling (on uhich their
of other programs and activities,
depends)
financing
nonprofit associations)
sort
importance,
and
consumer
greatly
Hales).
golf);
but
there
notably returned servicemen's clubs,
and ethnic clubs,
religious
These
interests.
of the
are several
clubs
(community
types
other
catering
for
uhich function in all respects like
are a major post-Har social
country touns,
of
minority
phenomenon,
uhich
altered leisure patterns in parts of Australia (especially Neu
'In
one
political and labour clubs,
and there are many
neu registered clubs,
cooperatives,
registered
are indeed sporting clubs in origin (football of
bouls,
another,
of
Hany
sport.
and
have
South
clubs have replaced churches as the centres for
sociability and recreation; in the metropolitan areas, they have decentralised
leisure facilities providing nightclub, restaurant, gambling and entertainment
outlets
in
leisure
sophistication'*.
the
suburbs;
and in the coastal touns they
And
in these
very
successful
have
brought
some
gambling-financed
cooperatives,
'sport,
gambling
and
drinking
of
- the pillars
Australian
leisure culture - have found common ground' (Caldwell 77, pp.424, 425).
Sport is the opiate of the masses in Australasia, a main leisure activity
and entertainment form, a major (male) topic of conversation both socially and
and it takes up a significant chunk of the ""news""^newspaper coverage
at work,
it is now relegated to the back pages^with local politics occupying
(but
front
It
pages).
is also a major reservoir of chauvinism,
with
'Sport
competitiveness.
its
long traditions may
the
and
conformism
more
m^ifest
male
chauvinism than many other forms of popular Australian culture' (Caldwell
p.41'7');
racial and cultural.
as
such
j^-also manifests and often encourages other forms of
it
Even in sport reevaluation is
77,
chauvinism
place,
taking
including reassessment of the competitive principle, and there is a shift away
from
bureaucratic
Fortunately,
sport,
controls
however,
to
freer
environmentally
forms,
damaging
especially
sports.
vertigo
machine-dependent forms
have not caught on to the same extent as in America;
or art,
nor
of
do
forms such as hunting enjoy a% similar following or so little criticism.
important component of Antipodean newspaper sport,
An
racing
anima!
distinct
as
""sport"",
especially,
from
professional,
predominantly
gambling purposes.
integrally tied to gambling.
is
the
type
younger
people
In the participant sports there is,
other
and
This
participate
and now essentially designed for
North, a heavy outdoor emphasis.
but
horse
form
of
in,
is
spectator
and
in contrast with the
This emphasis is partly a New Norld feature,
partly a matter of extensive open space and a favourable outdoor climate.
Explaining
the
separating
sport
sheer extent of sport is a complex matter, best approached by
into
its
different components
looking
and
at
what
is
distinctive in the new world, and what in the Antipodes (at the same time this
reveals
e.g.
the
that
ritualised
limited applicability of psychological substitutibility
sport,
national
substitute
sport
for war).
especially,
is
a
socially
claims,
acceptable
And one thing that is distinctive
is
the
and
amount
style of gambling-linked sport.
Explaining that is
inseparable
from explaining gambling itself.
have been several attempts to explain the extent and diversity
There
in Australia as compared Mith that in the North,
gambling
smoothly into the culture.
it
according
Morld,
various
and to incorporate
Australians are the heaviest gamblers in the
88
surveys.
Some of the main explanations
to combine the following elements:
try
suggested
to
of
the
of
influence
Irish
Latholicism in overriding the restrictive puritanism, the comparative Meekness
the
of
ethic
Mork
bother?""),
the
the drive to accumulate
and
entrenched
belief
in
gambling
a
strand
form
of
(Mith
as
a
positional
improvement (Mhich appears to date back, like distinctive Australian
games
as 2!-up,
such
together,
to convict times).
gambling
Not all these elements sit
easily
not all of them, such as the Mork ethic, are relevant on their oMn.
The Mork ethic becomes relevant because it Mas Midely believed by
that gambling damagingly undercut Mork,
improvement,
positional
to Meal th,
Mork
""Mhy
of
Protestants
both because of the popular legend of
that gambling offered an alternative route than hard
and because gambling Mas an absorbing leisure-time
activity
Mhich competed successfully Mith (often alienating) Mork.
Moreover,
acommodated.
gambling,
there
are
some
important
complicating
factors
to
be
One is that Mhat is more extensive in Australia is smaller-scale
social
gambling,
entrepreneurial gambling.
not
heavy
punting,
professional
gambling
or
Australians are, by and large, very security minded
and are not large-scale risk takers: hence one of the reasons for the shortage
8'?
of venture capital in Australia .
Despite the risk-taking image, there is
then a strong emphasis on security,
- the
suburban
both in the (home) OMnership expectations
a-cnd—a-s— hegsr-de--
------------------------ 88. Thus e.g. R/deen.
On the extent of Australian gambling, see also
CaldMell 74. Like drinking, gambling is less extensive in NeM Zealand.
8'?.
The extent of gambling in Australia contrasts sharply Mith risk-taking in
investment.
'Risk aversion seems to be endemic in Australia at least as
far as investment in innovative products is concerned'* (S. Macdonald).
block, the private home, the car, and as regards defence (whence the appeal of
an
American
second
6
gambling.
Australian
complication
concerns
the
'is marked by a heavy reliance on
It
character
of
and
so
chance
But Caldwell's attempt to explain
on skill'* (Caldwell/^ p.20).
little
this
features of the Australian character which deemphasize excellence
through
less
shield).
partly
satisfactory,
than
from sport,
differently
where,
because
it
as he admits,
involves
treating
'excellence ...
is
gambling
is
[almost]
fact the preferred explanations of the characterisatics and
puzzling
always approved of'*.
In
aspects of Australian gambling are unsatisfactory. In several places, Caldwell
has
appealed
in possible explanation'* 'to features of Australian
specifical 1y
to egalitarianism,
concen trates
on
r e1qu i s i t e
trying
to
what these are,
Fatalism,
explaining.
fatal i sm/
mateship and a sense of
say
for example,
character,
not on
how
they
But
he
do
the
apathy,
is said to involve
putting up with unfavourable conditions, and accepting the outcomes of fortune
but with good fortune attributed to luck,
hardly a fatalistic theme,
fatalism might explain a certain dourness or resignation,
Australian,
unclear
with
along
some more typical Australian
Caldwell
since
really
the
extent
makes no difference to
in
disclose
success
that
by luck.
marginally
what
for
this
the bulk of Australian gambling is social
better
than
fatalism
it
remains
i^
Hhat
fated.
that things
surveys
suggestion,
gambling
in
And mateship and egalitarianism only
in
will
but a ^^rious (nonmarket) optimism, a
Unfortunately
do not expect to succeed.
especially
rather than little
seems to be appealing to is not fatalism,
happen as they are already fated to do,
people
features,
how it is supposed to explain extensive gambling,
gambling,
belief
neither
klhile
their
intended
explanatory
which
fare
roles;
egalitarianism does, as will appear, have a minor role.
8^.
(From previous page) The extent of gambling in Australia contrasts
sharply with risk-taking in investment.
'Risk aversion seems to be
endemic in Australia at least as far as investment in innovative products
is concerned* (8. Macdonald).
^^7
/s*
By contrast,
Inglis attempts an historical explanation,
he sees as the social sources of gambling.
He claims to uncover the following
speculative character of business in a neM country (but unless
the
factors:
looking to Mhat
specially
difficult and distinctive character of the neM country is also
the
invoked
does not distinguish Australia from the rest of the neM
this
that life Mas a gamble in early Australia (but this does
including USA);
explain Mhy social gambling took off,
Irish
heritage
subsequent
mining
persistence
the
and does not account for
the
of
the
of social gambling in Australia);
the role
Mith heightened discovery and rapid riches (but
again
this
to California Mhere gambling practices are different, and are
e.g.,
not concentrated on social gambling).
particular
not
or the augmentation of gambling);
(but this applied also to USA,
industry
applies,
Morld,
These sorts of factors may explain
inherited forms of gambling in Australia,
for instance the
the
Irish
contribution no doubt helps account for the prominence of horse-racing and its
egalitarian betting patterns in Australia (though horse-racing is as important
in
NeM Zealand Mhich had no comparable influx of Irish catholics).
But they
do not explain the persistence and styles of gambling in Australia, as opposed
to
USA.
to
delegated
the
to
extent that it Mas in Australia,
the
Inglis
favours,
hoM Mas it that gambling Mas integrated into
emerges:
question
order,
up in the historical fashion
set
Nhen
rather
commercial and criminal sector as in
than
USA?
a
the
major
social
substantially
question
The
fetches its OMn complex ansMer - in terms of the differing religious pressures
for
the
suppression
and regulation of gambling,
the
respective
gambling and their possible exploitation by capitalistic methods,
types
of
illegal
or
legate and the comparative commitment to market and commercial methods
- once
the features of Australian gambling are explained.
In trying to explain Australian gambling and its distinctive features, it
is
most
important^first to divide gambling into types.
Australian
pursuit
gambling is social,
of Meal th.
A salient feature is that
for ""fun"", as opposed for
instance
But professional and heavy (and plunge) gambling
to
appear
be greater in Australia than elsewhere (and
to
not
gambling
than
less
are
in USA,
investment
the
reflecting again
of non-social
Bayesian theory (i.e.
gambling
be
can
gambling can be explained in the
people).
improvement
remains
it
given a largely psychological explanation,
positional
an undoubted consideration in such forms as lottery
is
to
social gambling.
For example-substantial
A
through
Since compulsive
subjective expected utility theory).
here some divi = i'*sn of types helps.
These
May
standard
explain Mhat _i_s distinctive in the Australian scene, broadly
Even
venture
security-
supposed
mindedness of Australians and the timidity of their business
types
and
art
and
union gambling but not in poker machine gambling.
main
The
forms
of
social
such
gambling,
club
as
rather undemanding leisure-time-fillers of
unintellectual
gambling,
acceptable
More ordinary Australians have a good deal of leisure time to fill;
are
types.
and given
the prevailing relatively uncompetitive ethos and general anti-intellectualism
of
the society,
activities
(e.g.
intellectual
or
this time is not often occupied by additional Mork or
for
positional improvement of one sort or another)
higher cultural activities,
But
by
gregarious
television Matching has to some extent substituted in recent
years.
or
direct
television
does
not
the same
offer
stimulation that gambling affords.
established,
socially
acceptable,
activities (like pip? smoking),
and
neMspapers^,
setting;
offering
iKti.
it
social
opportunities
Still, Mhy gambling rather than other time
It is not simply that it Mas and remains an
fillers and entertainment forms?
social
undemanding
or
For both of these more passive and
activities, such as drinking and gambling.
solitary
but by
hobby
form,
Mell
surrounded
Mith
associated
such as ^11 ec ting .snd reading^ + orm guidey
social
contacts and opportunities or at
also^afforde^
uncompetitive?^ form of stimulation, aec
a/, approved
least
funintellectual
a
and
Mhere^excitement could be directly
exper i encecL
tends
to
be extraverted;
leisure time activity
in
Australia
and Mhen it is not directed toMards the
notorious
the gambling situation reveals,
As
trie,
it is usually practical or- material,
mainstream Australian culture is,
not educational or artistic.
The
to understate matters, neither cultured nor
intel 1ectual,
communication,
Education,
the intellectual
patterns in Australasia are Northern,
England and Scotland,
imported almost entirely,
from
mainly
As a result
very recently, some local adaption.
significant surface educational differences between Australia
are
(though the differences do not touch the
America
North
Mith,
The
life and practicality.
underlying
and so are not of great ideological depth?.
social paradigm,
and
Northern
surface
These
differences bear directly on the continuation of the cultural traditions.
Austral ia
countries.
t^or st
the
has
There
educational record of any
for example,
are,
the
of
three times as many people going on to
higher science studies proportionally in USA as in Australia.
23
to
this
recorded.
Australia.)
better
including 50 per cent
level,
(There
is
up the ladder,
doubt
to
and
different.
similar
ethnic
of
the
blacks,
differentiation
students at more average American
different,
attitudes
to
lowest
in
Not only
educational
segment
education
universities
reflecting the
but are generally nor-se in quality,
the more generous intake of students.
styles
In USA however 83 percent go
than their Australian counterparts,
drive
levels
a
University
motivated
5
In Australia about 20 per cent leave school at 15, and only
3'? percent proceed to higher school certificate.
on
Nhereas in UbA
in Australia only
percent of science students eventually obtain Ph.Ds,
per cent do, etc.
developed
oning in
are
in
are
social
part
no
educational
institutions
are
In North America universities are much more business, and there is
The details of general intellectual life,
differ material 1y.
extent of reading,
etc., al so
It is in intellectual and educational life, especially in the extent of
book reading, that Ne'.-j Zealand culture differs, perhaps most strikingly,
from Australian.
The anti-intelleptu_al charges regularly hurled at
Australians are not often directed at Neu Zealanders, t^h^je traditions
remain much more British.
not
the
degree
separation of the university
of
business
commun i t i es
evident in Australia.
Education in Australia encounters, and has to combat, the practicality of
the mass of people, the widespread impatience with theory and ideas, and anti
The impatience with theory,
intellectualism.
theory into action,
blue
the demand for translation
the concentration on the practical,
collar (working-class) people,
of
appear not only with
for instance in adult education
but in groups drawn from virtually all strata of the society,
and
groups,
even,
and
perhaps or especially, in groups concerned with changing social consciousness.
The
anti-intellectualism
feature,
striking
locals.
Thu
to
of
Australia is a
widely
cultural
European visitors^and admitted or even insisted on
'sheep-culture,
agriculture,
by
physical culture have reached
standards in Australia but intellectual culture has
high
remarked
been
neglected* .
'Especially important in affecting the output of govenments and the quality of
our political life ...
[is] a suspicion of debate and reason, combined with a
profound anti-intellectualism'.
13
Rnti-intellectualism has however two levels (like anti-theism):
or,
differently, hostility to things intellectual.
though
the
Both appear in Australia,
neglect is far more widespread than hostility (which
restricted
neglect
appears
to a few older class-differentiated cultural groupings),
vast and amorphous middle class vaguely approving of things
largely
most
of
educational.
Note also the role of private schools in Australia, as in USR, as opposed
to New Zealand, where quality secondary eduction is not so privatised.
The whole style of ranking educational institutions in fact differs from
culture to culture.
Stephenson^s ""words ring as true as they did the^' 30
writes Dunlevy (Canberra Times l'?84).
years
ago,
so
The other two 'characteristics [which] infect our public life'*, and also
stand in the way of 'a better society in this country"", listed by Aitkin
in his cynical and pessimistic conclusion (p.28) are worth recording
also,
namely
widespread authoritarianism and
majoritarianism
in
government, and primary group loyalty (and therewith partisan and even
confrontational practices) in public affairs, i.e. narrow non-pluralistic
matesh i p.
this
In
does
Australia
neglect,
not differ
from
situation may be Morse in rural USA than it is in rural
the
highly
other
Indeed there are grounds for supposing
materialist cultures, such as the USA.
that
markedly
Australia,
Mhere people commonly have access to public libraries and a variety of
public
c ommun i c a t i on ne tMorks,
terms
In
furnished
America
relative
of
population
Australia
corresponds
perhaps
is
to community radio stations like Canberra's
could Mell adapt, is different.
better
Nothing in
cultural communication netMorks than USA.
Mith
2XX
North
to
or
The US PSS arrangments, Mhich Australia
ethnic radio in most state capitals.
by
size
For Mhat it is Morth (for they are controlled
capitalist right and carry a heavy Northern ideological message)
the
the
main Australian neMspapers also compare favourably Mith American neMspapers
at least on a circulation-size basis
Many
Americans
have
'America's
for
conservatism'
(p.345).
Mhich,
Australia,
remarked,
in a similar
parochialism,
The
though
- and tend to be less parochial.
fashion
to
anti-intellectualism
Merrill,
sc i en t i sm
ano
smoothly
for
same ingredients do not blend so
certainly
instantiating that
on
initially^_starting
coupling of scientism Mith an t i - i n t e 1 1 ec t u a 1 i sm^s^^Can d n a t i on a 1 i sm)^ i s neither
so
conservative
(especially
politically) nor nearly
as
parochial
(perhaps because much further from the centre of things than USA).
there is some significant overlap,
are,
like
Moreover,
of
'P%.
though
because both mainstream cultures are male-
dominated Mith a heavy practical get-things-done orientation.
Australasian
USA
Nor do the
of Australian anti-intellectualism look the same as American,
sources
as
For example, in
male preserves it is still considered that intellectual pursuits
artistic
endeavours,
for practical men,
unmasculine
and
effeminate
(""sissy"").
ideas and intellectual activity, except as part
a narroM practically-directed result-oriented science,
are an impediment,
Looked at differently things are not so good.
Australia's capital, for
example, hardly turns out, in the form of the Canberra Times, a product
Mhich compares favourably Mith the Nashing ton Post
an effete luxury.
in
that
Inhere Australian culturet&e3±±s^diverges from American
anti-intellectualism,
culture and thought, ^deriv
the
connected mediocre standards
and
opportunities
various
furthermore,
to
higher
from egalitarian and levelling down elements
culture (for intellectual activities,
serious
of
to
and
excel,
like high culture,
surpass
is
in
offer too many
There
mates).
are,
connected mediocre-maintaining mechanisms in Australian
for example ''social penalisation of deviance from certain ""middling""
society,
intellectual
other
norms'* (Ely),
a lopping off
cultures
do share is a
heavy
and
of
intellectual
tall
poppies.
the
Nhat
as
misrepresented
Americans,
a
practical
practical
utilitarianism.
and unlike most Europeans,
orientation,
Australians
are,
often
like
practical do-it-yourself people, proud
But for the most part,
of their fix-it make-do and improvisational abilities.
Australians have strong group loyalties and do not treat those outside primary
groups
with
sense;
nor
aiming
at
sufficient impartiality to count as utilitarians in
they,
in appropriate utilitarianism
greatest
happiness of the greatest
are
'the
societal maximum.
educational
and
or
number'
strict
maximizers,
any
other
They are utilitarian only in the vulgar sense of utility-
focussed and practical,
experimental
fashion,
any
in the sense that theory,
statistical
work,
gets
and research institutes (as e.g.
a low
as opposed to practice and
even
in
higher
the Research School
of
Social
ranking,
Sciences, Australian National University).
The
practical
capabilities of Australians are by no means
directed but include group and social organisation.
individually
Particularly significant
The utilitarian theme was a hare-meleased by Hancock, in his attempt to
reconcile Australian 'individualism with ... reliance upon Government'
(p.55).
In fact utilitarianism is inessential to the style
of
reconciliation Hancock attempts, several sorts of accounts of collective
poster at the service of integrated individual interests serving as well or better in the Australian case.
Even in the academies utilitarianism
hardly predominates;
and it has had little historical importance in
Australian philosophy, though it has regrettably become a position to be
reckoned with in recent years.
By contrast, pragmatism has almost no
foil owing.
is
australian
'the
organisations
zest for starting,
joining
of all kinds' (aitkin p.26).
and
maintaining
voluntary
This has proved important for
a
long time in the provision of Melfare services in australis, and more recently
40?% n
in the case of the environment.
The pattern of Melfare^in australia, for long
self-provisioning (as distinct from provided by local
largely
elseMhere
),
a ""Mel fare partnership"" Mith government
into
merged
espec i al 1 y in brick-and mortar- grants and the like,
and
other
organisations.
environmental
a
The
concerns.
government
similar
pattern
funding,
for voluntary,
is
re! igious
as
emerging
as
regards
size of the nongovernmental Melfare sector
in
Rustralia,
an important part of the informal economy, remains extremely large
(est ima ted
9. S
p.26^/
for
equivalent in unpaid mages alone to 1.5'< of GDP,
de t ai 1s);
the informal economy bound up
and
see
Mith
aitkin,
environmental
issues is no longer negligible though governmental assistance is
siight.
But the success of nongovernmental organisation and the informal
economy
up a latent paradox concerning political organisation in australia
throMS
for Mhat i s
paradoxes tied to the already noticed authoritarianism paradox;
afxa poMer+ul authoritarian government doing in self-reliant communities?)
the
one
hand,
there
political culture',
is
'an important self-reliant
in
strain
(a
On
australian
Mith do-it-themselves groups Mhich substituted for
local
government; it is 'a political culture in Mhich voluntary organistions have an
honoured place' (aitkin,
apathy,
though
populace
Mhich
p.26).
But, on the other hand, there is a political
are not as marked as formerly or as- in the USa;
has
by
and
large 'not sought
profound
there
changes
in
is
problems
a
reliance on government to provide and
(this in complete contrast Mith
america)
to
deal
.
a
Mith
and
political
difference-in-size
In contrast Mith USa, for instance, local government Mas
development in australia, and remains Meak: see aitkin, p.23ff.
?7-
a
their
political or social structure for several generations noM"" (aitkin p.23);
there
is
a
late
""So australians faced Mith a political problem learned to respond Mith
""Mhat Mill they (= the government) do about it?"", Mhereas americans in a
similar situation could be heard to say ""Hhat Mill Me do about it?'""
(aitkin, p.23).
ar
^6
theory,
both lessons for Australian political decentralisation and^some
Mith
expI anatory
0! son' s
Mould appear to resolve the paradox (a theory
pOMer,
individuals,
action,
collective
of
bogie
but
Mhich
initial
the
groups or factions to Mhom
primary
within Mhich mateship^ bonds operate).
in
but Mith
elements
not
attach
and
loyalties
Nhat holds for the smaller local group
individual is directly involved does not
the
resembling
to
transfer
larger
political arrangements? tsri on the contrary, local loyalties act against larger
groups struggle and compete for their OMn
organisation^
enter ^nto a-v^ricty""'of partisan and rent-seeking behaviour.
Australians
political
are
self- or
problems
they
hardly
and
Similarly Mhile
problems,
group-reliant Mith smaller
appeal to government,
interests
larger
for
surprisingly^ to
authoritarian government (for though authoritarianism is not essential,
an
it is
likely in the circumstances).
.The
1
open
times may be changing Mith the serious attempt to apply
""
methods
secretive
to
large group decision making,
games,
numbers
instead
of
group
'a perversion of the majority principle
old
Mhich
in
HoMever the
of more satisfactory and rational decision making methods into large
organisation and choice practices have a long May to go
political
the
simply
getting the numbers is a surrogate for persuasion'* (Aitkin p.28).
adoption
consensual,
J
life,
in
Australian
in such less anti-intellectual (but still often
even
anti
theory) cloisters as the universities and other educational institutions.
Approaches
to the environment.
the frequent presentation of USA as the heartland
An t i podes, despi te
environmental
movement.
proportionately,
the Morld.
of
There
are,
as
Australian
for
example,
more
paid-up
the
of
members,
environmental groups in Australia than anyMhere else
in
Apparently blest Germany, Northern homeland of green politics, noM
comes second in this sort of statistic,
Mell
Ecological aMareness is greater in the
easily ahead of USA and
Canada.
a quantitative difference there is a qualitative difference
and Northern environmentalism.
The Australian movement
As
betMeen
is
much
A
and
active
more
ecological
auareness
communities.
The
involved.
not
mi th
permeated
Antipodean culture is
encountered in North America
in
except
an
isolated
These are subjective impressions from informants, but there are
some more objective matters to back them up, such as
The
P
issue
Tasmanian
dam issue,
uhich could not have figured as
election
an
in the same sort of uay in North America (though perhaps it could
have
in Noruay);
level of political commitment on such environmental matters
neu
The
9
the preservation of rainforest in NSH.
as
(For details, and other examples, see
Dunphy).
?
for example,
Responses to questionnaires on rainforest and uoodchipping,
uhich indicate uide community concern in Australia on these issues.
impressions
The
quantitative
can,
uay,
by
moreover,
be
backed
up to some
dividing environmental groups into
(conservative) and neuer (post l'?65, more radical).
extent
in
tuo
types:
more
a
older
The overwhelming majority
of people involved in environmental groups in England, for instance, belong to
organisations of the former type,
National
mostly founded last century, especially the
Trust (see Loue and Goyder).
By contrast the
consists predominantly of more recently formed groups.
Australian
The Australian groups
differ in character from those in USA in important uays;
also
for
and less inclined to compromise. For instance, there has never been a
action,
(such
deal
as
as the Sierra Club
made)
uith. organisations
supporting
there has never been a uorking alliance uith shooters or
pouer,
nuclear
clubs
they are,
more active, more radical, more left-leaning, more inclined to
the most part,
major
movement
is commonplace in USA,
or an easy alliance uith
off-road
gun
vehicle
c1ubs.
USA
can
Emerging),
much
in
be
very
roughly seen,
as dividing into tuo parts,
the
uilderness),
uay
as Callenbach
sees
(in
Ecotopi a
Eastern part, uithout
the Old Norld,
of deeper ecological concerns (or
it
of
national
parks
or
and a Neuer Norld, Nestern part, uhich is much more ecologically
There
concerned.
is
little
doubt however that
the
metropolitan
eastern
industrial part of USA (the Boston-Neu York-Hashington conglomeration) is Mell
and truly in control of things.
in
the
places
uhere
again roughly,
The division gets reflected,
environmental philosophy or
features in university programs,
equivalent
an
seriously
not at the
namely the south and uest,
more
richly-endoued higher-ranked universities in the east.
Jeuish prominence in eastern American universities has something
The
to
There is a significant Jewish element in
do Mith this educational situation.
contemporary US thinking and philosophy, but not to any extent in Australian
American.
The
evident Jewish influence on American economic and political life extends
into
except
insofar as it (increasingly) serves as a Meak copy of
philosophy
and
Nalzer
political theory,
in
elements.
ideology:
This
long
the Mork of Nozick
for instance,
Mhich is overtly infused
influence
exploitation-disrupted
the
Consider,
has
a
substantial
Mith
Jeuish
effect,
Jeuish record is exceedingly disappointing,
Hebraic
especially
arenas like peace and the natural environment
both in
and
in
- Mhere
practice
and
theory (occasional rebels excepted).
The
features
strength of Australian environmentalism arises from a combination of
of
the
land
and
the culture:
the
presence
pouer
and
of
the
surrounding natural Morld, the conspicuousness and the resilience of many more
familiar
Mhich
close,
parts of the environment,
together
the outdoor barbeque-and-beach lifestyle,
Mith a variety of outdoor activities brings
the secular earthiness of the culture,
the
its naturalism,
environment
the
doMn-to-
earth practical character of the people, the do-it-yourself approach to things
like
housing,
repairs
and
so
forth
Mhich
often
frustrating, details of the natural Morld close again.
brings
the
messy,
if
Nhile Hestern American A.
9^.
There are hoMever some European emigres, Mith right-leaning or even
reactionary political vieMS, Mho have an influence on political thinking
in Australia, especially as regards defence and communism.
NeM Zealand
is, by contrast, relatively free of such immigrants.
%?.
Nain reasons Mhy are in fact nicely explained in SchMarzschild.
these things it does not share all of
of
many
shares
them
by
means,
any
in particular not the areligious character or the style of naturalism.
Despite Australia's frequent inclusion as an industrialised nation, it is
not
industrialised,
highly
mining,
and
agriculture
and
of
much
the
export
in their different Mays quarrying
both
Other Antipodean countries are even less industrialised.
there
the level of Old Norld
yet
isn't
transformation
industrial
land.
the
the
The
European
still
environment
even in most parts of the largest
reaches through conspicuously,
from
And in the Antipodes
control,
the total inhabitable landscape.
of
comes
wealth
cities.
survey of cultural media such as films Mould shoM this clearly enough.
a
rare
(or NeM Zealand) film that doesn't include
Australian
bushdrop,
many
Mhereas
US
exclude
productions
the
some
A
It is
natural
environment
natural
entirely, and even Mhen sequences are shot outside it's often all concrete and
and
glass,
neon
lights and automobiles and
pools
sMimming
- metropolitan
""cu1ture"".
Certainly these sorts of urban effects, taken from noMhere in particular,
could
be achieved in parts of the older Australia state capitals,
becoming
(less
very
freeMay
cities in the American-influenced
much
systems hoMever),
Melbourne,
noisy
and
As a result,
older
mode
structures
the largest, Sydney and
are not .just sprauling and mostly unplanned but heavily congested,
polluted,
Mith
nature blotted out in many of
despite
its impressive monuments,
the
inner
poorer
In this they resemble Hashington,
suburbs by red brick and Mires and asphalt.
Mhich
are
free-enterprise
overlaying and expanding
copied from British provincial cities.
Mhich
has only little
planning,
and
is
mostly the American adaption of the European city - an adaption Mhere the city
is
treated as if at first space didn't matter,
structures,
fortunate
al) being,
to have,
so to say,
by contrast,
nor any unity of
better integrated into and less imposed upon,
(the
Australia is
isolated individual ones).
in Canberra a much more
style
holistic
capita),
/
the environment.
Moreover it
is
hard
not to see and to some extent appreciate the natural environment
on the hills,
especially
Canberra,
neatly planned and in places so green,
between,
lands
even if the flatter
in
so
exhibit (though as cities normally do)
so much artifice.
The
prospects for the environment look rather brighter in Australia than
in USA,
and
for several reasons,
some physical and structural,
much
smaller proportion firmly
population,
and
agriculture
or to industrialist activities.
matter
possibilities
technological
and
a
of good luck than good management;
America
much
For a similar land area Australia has a
cultural.
have been lacking.
some ideological
human
smaller
committed
to
intensive
In large measure this is more a
for both the time and physical and
for a such colossal business
investment
as
in
But cultural reasons have also made a difference
Mill likely become increasingly important:
contrasts
cultural
already
observed, that is.
In
had
Australians came increasingly godless to a land God
the first place,
supposedly forgotten about;
for them there Mas no mandate or
such as the Americans operated under,
in
Australian
life
not merely to multiply and be fruitful,
and exploit it to their oMn ends.
but to dominate the land,
and
approaches
directive
to
the
environment
Nor is there noM
the
extent
of
religiously-reinforced human chauvinism that operates in the industrial North,
and
Mhich
sciences.
informs
the
Secondly,
precedent-bound
foundations
American adulation of,
of
Northern
social
and ideological commitment
. (From previous page) So it is to be hoped that Griffin's environmental
vision, from Mhich Canberra took shape, can be sustained. H.B. Griffin a naturalised Australian Mho greM up in USA - has a significant place in
the groMth of environmentalism in Australia. His role in this regard has
been largely neglected;
for he is usually portrayed .just as an
arch i tec t.
/P/ . On the May in Mhich human chauvinism is Mritten deep into mainline social
sciences, see EE, pp.183-'?.
About the social theory involved, many
Australians are fortunately sceptical - those that bother Mith theory,
that is.
/%%. The practice of government**assisted capitalism of
differs of course from the ideology.
advanced
capitalism
to,
market arrangements and market-based minimally-regulated
profit-directed
competition is not shared in Australia,
American commitment to the Big,
and,
to big business,
to put it all more theoretically,
capitalism,
controlled
is substantially opposed.
but
to tall poppies, to genius,
to maximization.
extraordinarily bad neMS for the environment.
general
and
documented,
reasons for their damaging effects are sufficiently
theoretical
the
understood.)
such commitments and themes, though influential enough and
In Australia,
and advertised daily through the commercial media,
pushed
in
are
(The damaging effects of these
in practice are quite evident enough and Mell
3-Bad-lTs
But such minimally-
maximization,
and
markets,
So is
do
not
dominate.
For there is a different mainstream ideology Mith a different agenda - such as
social
social
regulation,
and
intervention,
so
arbitration,
consensus,
group
government
The land and the people are not open
forth.
American-style markets in the same '.jay (though there are increasing
ill-considered
pressures
forces"",
dairy
market,
e.g.
expose
farmers
in a subsidized and
also
Morks
in favour of
the
environment.
natural
and
are
entitled to fair treatment,
oppressed or poor Australians,
rather
to a ""fair go"" and assistance.
growing reluctance to see local environments,
especially
and,
by foreign companies.
Fourthly,
Australian environmental movement itself,
Morld
Australian
Thirdly,
are to an increasing extent considered as honorary or even
Australians,
""market
heavily-controlled
markets).
the
and often
to
population
sectors of the
adolescents in over-supplied labour
egalitarianism
animals
to
to
Native
exemplary
like
other
And there is a
like small people,
ripped off,
there is the live and expanding
some of it manifest in
Alternative
Australia.
5.
Formulating and takinq different directions
The
distinctive
features of Australian culture both point
change and supply main parts of an engine for change.
is,
houever,
the
May
to
The standard complaint
that proposals for radical change noM lack,
Mith the demise of
revolutionary aspirations in the oppressed c 1 asses, any engine for change.
In
more friendly form, the complainfis elaborated along the foliating lines:-
It is easy enough to formulate different directions for the South Pacific
it is far harder to see how such an appropriately different course
countries;
It is not merely that the main countries in the
can be adopted and followed.
region,
European
transformed
descent.
by Europeans,
There
are
are much influenced by people
inevitably,
then,
strong
recent
of
pressures
for
conformity, for similarity to the North, and for cultural anonymity, and there
is much pressure for increased assimilation within the !JS6 sphere of influence
These Northern pressures comprise a familiar package, notably
and control.
*
Domination
popular
media
Northern,
of main forms of communication and education - especially the
such as T'-.J,
especially
books
- by
features
and
missionaries of Northern culture
and
but also intellectual media such
American
but
also
British,
programs,
as
products.
*
Cultural
propaganda.
travelling
ambassadors,
Surprisingly, these people are almost invariably welcomed, their
loaded messages eagerly sought.
reinforce the missionaries.
from,
On a lesser scale,
North
tourists from the
They see the North, generally the areas they come
as ^zi.tmg the standards,
as providing the sort of cultural ideals the
backward Antipodes should be seeking to attain.
*
Top-down
directives
from
aligned with Northern interests.
local
both
private and public
companies,
metropolitan skylines).
which
are
These include not merely the manaoements of
branches of multinational companies,
insurance
sources
and so on (roughly,
but those of a variety of
banks,
those whose buildings now dominate
Etc.
103
Even the most powerful and populous states in the South Pacific region
are
becoming
increasingly
locked into a dual system
of
Northern
control,
namely through
103. Those which operate their own limited imperialism in lesser states of the
region, e.g., Australia in Papua New Guinea and New Zealand in Samoa.
The
1.
organisation
American
104
The most important of these arrangements in Australia's case
is
hegemony.
of industrialised capitalist states,
under
perhaps the Pacific rim strategy, masterminded by the USA Mith assistance from
and fitting within the world arrangements envisaged by the
Japan,
Trilateral
Commission.
2.
of the economy by
penetration
The
many of them ultimately American controlled.
Northern,
mostly
corporations,
transnational
of
(For the effects
this framework of control in Australia's case, see Crough and Wheelwright.).
A very significant net result is that local economic control is diminishing or
and therewith,
being lost altogether,
local
control
political
in these economically-dominated times,
is diminishing.
National
economies
increasingly
respond, and are seen as obliged to respond, to so-called international forces
""international market"" forces in state-rigged markets with
(or
and highly concentrated participants).
effort,
of
much
(unmarketable)
it
intentional,
At the same time there is a concerted
to
reduce
and
remain,
remove
substantially
cultural differences in the contemporary world,
mass consumer society and worldwide markets.
differences
unequal
very
a
to produce
Notwithstanding, major cultural
even in the more industrialised
With
countries.
some
A
care, some fostering, the differences cou1be accentuated in worthwhile ways,
though
the
especially in the industrial
trend,
main
nations,
in
is
the
opposite direction, to almost complete cultural convergence.
On the other side,
forces,
mainly
local,
there are in the South Pacific some
in
counterbalancing
favour of some distancing of Australian
and
New
Zealand cultures from the USA, and of looser relations, especially, presently,
in
matters of (nuclear) defence.
If change is to occur,
it is important to
encourage worthwhile components of these forces,
particularly those
in regional culture
interconnected ways, through
ideas
that regional
and
action.
grounded
cultures
104. For Third World southern countries, financial arrangements through
US-dominated INF and World Bank loom much larger.
and
the
their
do
conventionalism
and
important.
shape
a
are
There
culture,
undoubted!;/
pragmatism
as
American lifestyle or Australian naturalism
(and
and
Sydney
However what
Russell
that culture determines the shape of the dominant philosophy,
to think,
qualification.
major
philosophy;
dominant
are
and realism a main strand of Australian.
materialism)
requires
reflect
that
philosophies
came
elements
philosophical
but
Certainly,
conversely,
105
culture affects
philosophical
and
constrains
input
can
affect, or even alter, culture.
Genuine
differences
implementation
(as
of
a few very simple
ideas
could
make
major
the 1884-5 stand of the New Zealand government on visits
of
namely that significant principles (of morality)
or
nuclear ships reveals);
features of local culture or regional environments are not sacrificed,
in
jeopardy,
such things as trading advantages or
for
distributed economic benefits.
economism
narrowly
There is a powerful basis for defeating
in Australian and Antipodean cultures,
egalitarian approaches;
short-term
or put
such
in the shape of anti-market
and these and other complementary cultural features
could serve more widely to halt or subvert Northern incursions.
The
South
uncritical
Pacific
Enlightenment
and
for
uncontrolled extension of European culture
take one lesser instance of
that
world-wide
to
spread
and disease) has been very damaging both to indigenous
the lands and seas,
extinction.
mistakes.
(to
and
the
of
peoples
even pushing some of the former inhabitants
to
Nodern people are supposed to learn, if from anything, from their
Among
mistakes of civilizations,
environmental mistakes
are
as
105. Russell 'connecttsl'* philosophies with the social environments of the
philosophers concerned' p.824). Elsewhere, however, Russell only claims
social influences, not determination (e.g., p.827). His working example
is the connection of Dewey's philosophy 'with American enterprise;
in
particular there is the belief in human power, and an unwillingness to
admit ""stubborn facts"".'*
'His philosophy is a power philosophy.
Russell then proceeded to consider the very real dangers of human power.
Dewey, for his part, contested the connections Russell alleged, as well
as the dangers.
There is much more, however, to the interrelations of
dominant philosophies with cultures and their environments than Russell
unear thed.
conspicuous as any (sea e.g,
hanger
no
though
beyond
Hatt) .
the reach of a Northern Mar - to
of Northern civilizations,
mistakes
Thors is sti 1 1 time for* the Antipodes
avoid
the
beginning Mith human overpopulation
many
and
environmental impoverishment (as differently illustrated by Italy and Lhina).
There
that
grounded in regional
are various different directions,
a country or place can attempt to take.
There are,
for
features,
example,
tMO
extremal economic directions a contemporary state or region may try to pursue,
as illustra ted:-
other reliance, e.g. upon
i n ternat i onal economic
forces
al ternative
fort-jard May
present
se 1 freli ance
At
the
one
end
lies local self-reliance
and
control,
substantially excluded Mhen it comes to essentials;
(as Mith the Meather of an island),
regulation
largely controlled from elseMhere,
(but
direction.
dominated)
by
the
is
It
or directed through some
toMards- the
dashed arroM,
points
this
direction
general
economy
and control Mith the
for instance at the mercy of international
Northern dominated) economic forces,
shoMn
outside
the
at the other lies outside
patron (as Mith Australia's, defence or Tibet's economy).
that
Mith
that
poMerful
A typical direction,
latter
(backMards)
international
(American
financial institutions such as the INF and the Horld Bank
try
to
impose on client states.
Unfortunately
bent
on
indicate
Mritten
pursuing
given
all likely governments in countries like Australia
the Mrong direction.
the May poMer,
The reasons are
privilege and influence
into the control of societies - lie.
not
appear
difficult
- Northern
to
features
But it does not have to be
or
stay that way.
difficulty for all suggestions for extensile
major
A
normal governmental procedures,
through
effect
constraint
for change.
is a
change,
severe
For governmental procedures are st on,
put
into
apparent
time
piecemeal
and
whichever
usually reactive (this is even how successful governmental methods,
these are,
vastly
sages
successful)
and
(among
But time is running out for the present (.not
are supposed to be) .
human experiment it is now everywhere
sound men and women of common sense,
from
crackpots
will
1'lhatever is done for change may have to be done with more rapidity
is customary in grander human affairs,
except with war itself (which is
of the main prob 1ems and a likely outcome of
one
as
from
whose numbers are those most confident that present arrangements
persist).
than
as well
said,
heard
socio-economic
catastrophe
ensuing from other problems).
In the present conditions of uncertainty,
a
strategy relevant to both outcomes,
concentrating
upon
imme^d^ate
paths
it would seem wise to plot out
catastrophic breakdown or
to
change
aimed
avoiding
at
while
not,
socio-
env i r onmen t a 1 break down.
Both the deeper American environmentalists and leading German Greens,
unlike
many
thinkers and leaders take the problems with deadly
hope
for a way out of present massive socio-environmental
main
nuclear impasse particularly,
change will take the form of a
This
spread
like a religious revival,
by way of democratic channels.
the
through a mass change
seriousness,
difficulties,
of
spiritual
who
and
consciousness.
conversion,
and
to alter political decisions and directions
These ideas,
while by no means ridiculous in
fashion of new-born Christians' views about their individualistic
escape
from nuclear Armageddon,
and while offering a clear ray of hope, leave most
106
Australians who have encountered them duly sceptical.
That type of massive
change
a
of consciousness (which may not be politically effective) will require
miracle,
and
miracles are not credible.
More important,
that
sort
of
conversion i_s ruled out culturally in Australia,
spiritual
according to
the
prev i ous ar gumen t.
A drastic and massive change of consciousness,
or religious
is neither likely nor necessary (nor Mould it be sufficient).
Antipodes,
the
someMhat
Mith
isolated
favourable location in
its
Fortunately in
Southern
the
conversion,
Hemisphere,
there are different and
from the belligerent North,
more
These are social Mays
promising routes to change and regional nuclear escape.
and locally self-reliant Mays deeply rooted in the culture. Instead of seeking
to
change
consciousness,
then,
the
and through elements of,
the culture.
lines of religious conversion,
picture
through
of change.
in
But
many
and
those
involves
rather
is
as amended;
straightforwardness,
aMay
than
from
dominant
It encourages many
so to say).
for example those
as interfering Mith crucial features of
running counter to enterprise,
orderliness,
change
not
re-conditioning
counter-cultural,
deplored features of Australian culture,
culture,
of,
Mhat is being offered is a very different
this
respects the route
acquisitive capitalist virtues.
the
in the form
a
The route is thus cultural, not in this respect counter-cultural.
considered
been
Mith
Instead of the picture of change along
Northern paradigms (counter-Northern-culture,
often
Mork
to
is
The main path to change is through culture,
consciousness;
conversion.
idea
that is already there or in the background,
""consciousness""
the
leading
market
that
capitalism,
selfishness and the
initiative,
have
other
It encourages instead traditional virtues of
for instance Midened
generosity,
egalitarianism,
permissiveness,
pluralism,
unsubtlety,
spontaneity,
authenticity, sociaSbility, reliability, anti-authoritarianism,
group-reli^ance, resourcefulness, moderation, leisure!iness.
The main environmental route aMay from Northern social paradigms has been
10^. (From previous page) Host, but of course, not all.
The change-ofconscicusness idea has its adherents, e.g. Cairns, some in Alternative
Australia. Naturally it is not being denied that change-^f-consciousness
(e.g. in the form of ecological conversion) does occur^aac^is an important h
happening. Hhat is at issue is the likely scale of such change.
and Mhat it involves indicated (e.g. in RP).
t-lhat is
the extent to Mhich elements of mainstream Australian
culture
reconnoitred elsewhere,
is
remarkable
Indeed in Australasian culture there
fit with that divergence from the North.
is
at
best
dominant
social
There is already in the cultures
paradigm.
for a marked SMing aMay from the dominant Northern
basis
vieMpoint,
demagogic
of
ambivalent subscription to major facets
only
is
it
mainly a matter of tipping
Northern
the
a
substantial
paradigm.
an
From
already
a
poised
balance aMay from Nor them-influenced control.
break-aMay
This
involve
first
control has tMO political facets
arrangements
part
Mhich
of
part
relevant
is breaking free from Northern hegemony, control,
alignment
of
The
and
from the influence of foreign states and the grips of transnational
Some
companies.
recovering
Mays
connected
of the Mays this can be accomplished have
local control of media output and messages,
are knoMn,
e.g.
escheMing a false internationalism,
and,
into line Mith
both
so that political arrangements reflect these parts of culture.
reliance,
e.g.
political
bringing
culture,
from
sMeepingly,
more
dropping
moving to greater
regional
been
indicated,
and many
other
self-reliance,
modifying limited liability of companies,
out
of the
international
abandoning the race to keep up Mith the Singaporian
rat-race
Jones and the
(e.g.
E/i^shoMas,
Host of these Mays could
107
The second
designed to strike resounding chords in mainstream culture.
in demolishinq their oMn and others'* environments).
be
rtA""' ccbLt
subsidizing
transnationals,
A.?
providing
hand-outs and undue
shelter
to
big
business or monopolistic professions, cutting assistance to the disadvantaged,
exposing
local small-actor sectors (in difficulty) to the icy Minds of
Morld
107. And Mhere not it is a matter of removing false beliefs, such as that
Australia is currently threatened militarily by hostile states.
These
sorts of beliefs could be altered, at least for many Mho hold them, by
appropriate
persuasion by credible popular figures on mass media
channels. In fact it has suited both government and opposition, hitherto
committed to an essentially bipartisan defence policy, to let false
beliefs about defence, for instance, stand, or even to encourage and
reinforce them.
market forces, and so on.
such
Tipping the balance involves both positive measures
promoting the valid features in
as
as^
such
measures,
counteracting
freely flowing in from the North,
Australian
culture,
counter-
and
images
and removing damaging impacts and
e.g.
by cutting doMn the floM,
making
it
more expensive, and introducing rivals.
Governments cannot be relied upon
even
Mhere
motivated to do so (e.g. as Mith defence they may
support, because of false beliefs).
rolehas
never
to make requisite changes on their OMn,
been active
in
lack
popular
Apparently, and surprisingly, the State's
Australia,
but
a 1 Mays
reactive.
State
intervention and regulation is and has alMays been in reaction to Mhat
108
happens.
Since governments can not be relied upon to initiate action, it
is important to move for change,
for
such
possible,
change
early
and Mhere possible to obtain popular support
10?
on in movements.
It is important also, Mhere
to bypass government,
building alternative social arrangements and
enlarging the informal economy (see e.g. Nartin).
There is further a component to be exploited in tipping the balance
from the
mainstream
dominant
Northern paradigm, apart from the
Australian
authoritarianism,
culture
(as
e.g.
components
egalitarianism,
of
anti
anti-marketism, satisization, environmentalism, and so on).
That is anti-Americanism.
There
developed
leading
aMay
The attitude in the Antipodes to USA is ambivalent.
is a love-hate relationship in Australia (e.g.
mutual admiration
from
perceived cultural similarities, gratitude from older Australians for American
108. This major theme is advanced, illustrated, and defended in Gilbert,
p.?ff. One important example concerns squatting, other aspects of social
Melfare.
But the theme is liable to be contested, e.g. by Aitkin, Mho
sees 'nearly tMo centuries of reliance on ... omnicompetent initiating
goverment behind us'
(p.27).
HoMever Gilbert seems to be correct;
Australian governments are hardly omnicompetent or 'omnipresent'*, and
they rarely appear to initiate.
10?. That support may be enlisted from culturally unexpected sources, e.g.
Momen in the case of the peace movement, as opinion polls clearly reveal.
The peace movement has not undertaken sufficient political foot-uork,
e.g. grass roots activity such as door knocks, in increasing and
mobilizing this potential support.
in Morld Mar II;
action
ugly American abroad).
dislike of American blustering,
the Antipodes.
independence,
trying
to
The distaste for being visibly pushed around is strong in
A striking feature of established Antipodean peoples is their
elements
or to be
unwillingness to put up with nonsense,
their
manipulated^ especially by foreigners.
cultural
There is now much anti-US-
in New Zealand since USA made the tactical error of
New Zealand.
bully
the
There is much anti-Americanism in Australia as well as
widespread opposition to the American government.
governmentism
opposition to
as
pushed*
Ao
Of course, the tactic of appeal ingj^such
practices
opposition to the American political
is
a
dangerous one, owing in part to politicians' dishonest penchant for conflating
opposition to a foreign government with opposition to people that goverment is
supposed
to represent (or perhaps on rare occasions does),
easy
the
by
above).
neutralised.
practice
ambiguity of terms like anti-American (an ambiguity
The tactic opens the way to charges of racism,
and the like.
a
But the charges,
For
it
is
on
national chauvinism,
if they can be got at, are straightforwardly
largely a matter of removing
institutions (and cultures) to their individual members,
institutions devolves,
traded
made
fallaciously, into criticism of
crude
reduction
of
so that criticism of
each and every one of
the members.
no
Richard Sylvan
110. This paper had a long and difficult gestation and growth period, before
ye'idling a result that still leaves its author uneasy most days.
He
cehtainly hopes that those who commented on the paper or assisted on the
labour in its earlier days now only dimly recognise it.
Among those to
be thanked are Brian Hartin, Jean Norman, Louise Syvlan (who was
responsible for the monster in the first place), David Bennett, ... .
On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
unfortunately, with very few exceptions,
Definitions of culture abound;
Hany are too narrow,
are bad.
all
for example chauvinistically restricting
culture to human groups (as Kamenka's appalling motto, 'nothing human is alien
p.7.); some are too broad, for example making any sort of organisation
to me',
as a trade union or a local brass band.) a culture.
such
serve
to
connect
problems:- High
redefinitions
of
cu1ture
with [a peoples'] artistic achievement or, even more
111
with (their) literature.
This is h1 on culture, at least insofar
culture
LaJ
narrowly,
as
the types of
indicate
Pt fen examples will
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
Hhile high redefinitions let in too little,
So
is with the definition of culture as 'the transfer of
it
behavioural means,
(Bonner
with
low redefinitions admit too much.
p.ltj),
culture.
information
most particularly by the process of teaching and learning*
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
For
by
example,
number of bricks on a site,
relaying a weather forecast or passing on
transfers information by behavioural
means,
do
the
but
information of no particular cultural relevance.
By
contrast,
culture.
For
Herskovits:
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
example,
culture
Awa
'settletsJ
for
the
offered
definition
is ""the man-made part of the environment""
...'
by
(p.2'?).
Not only is this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
as
Bonner
writers
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
worse,
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
render
a
ill. Thus, for example, Stephenson
throughout his iconoclastic book on
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of a
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
materia!
representation of a culture. For there is something solid that can be
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars,
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
deserted
town or ancient ruins a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
past culture) while excluding a system
physics!
the
than
and
beliefs
of
values as a culture (.unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
In
invoked).
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn' s identification of a text-book with a paradigm.
there is much m common between the notion of culture and
Indeed
libera! extension of the notion of paradigm,
one of uh 1 ch gained currency
&ng!o-ffmerican thought about a hundred years Later than the other.
have
in
Both terms
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
or
Kuhn's
and both do this in rather simitar
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
parallels
suggest
- certainly once the usefu! notion of a
widely adopted in sociology,
Mays,
Nhat is more the
paradigm,
soc1 a 1
been encountered and worked Mith - a common
has
notion.
Mith but little reflection,
from
advantage of this definition,
involved
and
para!tel
in
a rather different account of culture
the run of anthropologies! definitions straightaway emerges:- P) cu!ture,
or more exact!y a pure culture,
BP)
then,
P great
is that the hard
and part of its appeal,
thus
does not have to be repeated;
the
supplied
a
logical sense;
generous
by
but
the
c!ean-up
Mould
that is,
an elaborate interpretation
relational
structure.
it
is
function
Naturally it is
a
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
propositional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
take
theoretical
on
a
required
f aithfu1 to Mhat (the social forms, activities and so on) it models.
in
in
Recall that a paradigm is explicated as a model,
form for culture.
system, i.e. on
paradigm,
Mork
in rectifying the notion of paradigm has already been done (e.g.
precisely
structure
is a comprehensive socia! paradigm.
is a paradigm
genera!
to
be
6 social
where
the
the political themes and value judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups with distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
explanation
goes
structure.
The
and
deeper
depends on features of
the
of propositions! structure delivered
types
mode!
underlying
in
shoMn,
are
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
American and Philippine cultures;
other more detailed examples are reproduced
in theoretical Mork on social paradigms (e.g. RP, CPE, Cotgrove and references
cited therein).
dust
the
as
of
explication
May
by
paradigm
of
enabled
models
a
clarification and unification job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
facilitates a pleasing and simplifying synthesis.
the
hc""-j
complains
diffusion by pointing to the
about
complaint
his
Consider,
about,
in
definitions of culture to similes and metaphors,
desperation,
as
...
a
map,
as a sieve,
resort
cu1ture
illustrate,
to
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
Geertz
diffusion'
'theoretical
of
so the parallel explication
in
attempted
to the analogies 'perhaps in
and as a matrix',
before a
mere
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a. Meb of significance
or interpretation (and mode 1 too,
its
in metaphor),
roots
though here an exact technical notion,
Prs it happens,
Geertz's account is not too
has
bad
a
picture of the sort of logical model involved, that is of a system, a Meb**l ike
structure, Mith an interpretation
matrix
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
on it.
imposed,
can
function, supplying significance or meaning
models (though not
as
function
usually
both a map and a
social
ones),
a
map
typically modelling a landscape.
take up Kluckholn's elaboration on culture (not
to
Furthermore,
really
^definitions' as Geertz suggests), a model is indeed '(4) ""an abstraction from
Mhich,
behaviour""',
feeling
thinking,
hoMever
is
not
prescript i v e 1 y
Mhere
and
it is a social paradigm,
believing""'* in terms of items
merely descriptive,
as,
supplies
'('?)
""a
validated.
but Mill be applied
mechanism
for
the
(3) ""a May of
and
normative
can
The
model
be
regulation
read
of
(ID? ""a set of techniques for adjusting both to the externa!
and
behaviour""'
environment and to other men""'. Such a mode!, which does correspond to '(5) ""a
the part of the anthropologist about the '..'jay in which a
on
theory
peop!e in fact behave""' and their view of the wor!d,
orientations,
Since the social paradigm evolves over time,
'(11) ""a precipitate of history'"",
of
certainly affords '(6) a
structure of pooled learning""' and '(7.) ""a set of standardized
to recurrent problems"" .
group
it is
and it does record '(2) ""the social legacy
the individual [in the society] acquires from his group""'.
three parts or levels of a culture that Conga!ton and David
The
*--P*22 ff.) are similar to those Kuhn includes within a paradigm,
readi1y
supplied
by
a model.
They
are,
first,
the
discern
and likewise
genera!
rules
and
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
the ideas and vatues.behind these beliefs and procedures; thirdly the products
materia!
and
exemplars
resulting,
e.g.
textbooks,
interpretation function validates both themes and ru!es;
domains
as wel! it
including values and ideas (on both see
of objects,
connection with exemplars and artefacts is less direct,
The
The
newspapers.
RP,
delivers
pp.12-16).
and of more than
textbook may present a paradigm or, more likely, part of one; or
112
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial modelling of the paradigm.
one kind.
remaining
The
to
order
culture
reflect
has
life-forms
done.
Ihus
to
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
some of the slackness of the
deliberately
notion
of
Abraham,
styles
there are varying degrees to which this
for one,
can
112.
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of culture
(PP* 12-13) before opting for the most inclusive, under which 'culture is
113
common life of the people
and 'includes the whole of the knowledge,
arts,
in
Hhile
culture.
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
vague
th<=
the
science, technology, religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature,
theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
which bring out al! that holds in the theory but not only what holds
there;
and, more sweepmgly still, it has partial models, which
accurately depict part of the theory.
etiquette
even
compr eh ensi ve,
includes
use of t he.t erm hot'je ver
mastery
a
sculpture,
.
of
a
seventeenth
(p. 12) 114
...""
-fashions
Under
a
all
of
process
literature,
Abraham
(p.13).
of
and could knoM (p.13).
history,
culture!,
music,
pauperisation of Mhat
the
culture
and
painting
conjectures that this use evolved
and eighteenth centuries,
! ess
narroMer,
cu 1 ture i s limited to Mhat are called
In this use [that again of ""higher""
of the mind.
things
result
and
educated
the age of enlightenment,
man
'as
in
a
the
stood for',
Such a person could reflect the Mhole culture in
the
more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:113. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of this very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: 'f) culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people'
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn'-s eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total May of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Conga)ton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
c u 1 t u r e.
114. H fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledqe, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mi thin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich includes
knoMledge, belief, art, morals, la.M, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civi1ization, hoMever, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
PRIMARY CULTURE DlnGFWl
sense
'culture',
of
and
intellectual
sociology,
in
Mhere
order
culture.
artistic
the
practice
dictionaries,
takes up the primary
namely
Con c i se En q1i sh D i c t i on ary),
consists
in
put]
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
state
'the
as it is
lor development,
of
a
in
shared
'the
It is important to separate off -
in
or people Mith,
and the education-derived sense,
the training or discipline in or
group-
particular, the
in Mhich the culture comprises the community,
leading
in Mhich the
to
Evidently the explication, Mhich makes the product primary
a
given
reverses
the culture. like agriculture, viticulture, and
115
Mas first and foremost a process
, a ""cultivation"" of intellect and
the historical order,
so on,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs' of the society.
derived sense,
or
as
or people' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so far,
The
Mhere
115. Pts Hilliams explains, the ear 1 y meaning of 'culture' Mas as a process;
and the 'culture of the mind' Mas vieMed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use 'culture' became, like
'civilized', a condition. Only Mith the 'fourth modern development did
culture appear as ' the Mho 1e May of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society' (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm. The other forms, the first three developments, Mere restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
To invert the ahistorical explanatory patte^,
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science?
scientific paradigms are,
However the reversal makes it easier to qet some grip on
art and technology.
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
Bonner,
for
'culture'* allied
to the education-derived sense: 'By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
most
means,
behavioural
by the process
particularly
of
teaching
and
Hhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning*.
including animal culture^,
it is, as already remarked, a quite excessively low
redefinition,
such
accounting
things as semaphoring between boy
scouts
as
c u 1 t u r e.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
1-lhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
of peoples.and cultures.
represented
More generally,
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
6
multi
6
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society where n is
cultural
society
may
simply
Australia,
not
include
however be
very
many.
it
pluralistic;
may,
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture which controls
in one region
together
is
as
in
brought
the
main
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
political institutions.
involved, on how the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Ft
society
nil!
function
(cf.
Abraham,
p.lbff.,
incompatible with extreme individualism').
a variety of subcultures.
Mhich
is
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
always have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
who remarks that 'culture
is
Ft society wi 1 1 also typically have
f) subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions with some
culture.
larger
culture except where they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and America
can
be
as having tree structures.
represented
a
is
there
Subcultures
mainstream
century
gentry
Protestant
many
subcultural
long played significant parts in
have
last
example,
Mi th
culture,
differences
the
terms,
116
tributaries.
Transposing to river-network
between
Catholic,
extensive immigration program,
substantial social tolerance,
with
and
chai 1enged.
Alternative
critical
important
an
As a result
assumptions
along
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
are
not
those
of
Australia) do however is to criticise and challenge themes of the
accommodate,
These
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
no
can
real
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
power
of
complex
permit the relatively easy formation
rival and al ternative social paradigms (such as
Hhat
culture.
dominant
and
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
subcu1tures
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
of ethnic subcultures.
pattern
for
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis).
its
history;
Australian
change;
rival river networks are bound to alter the cultural landscape).
like
Cultures,
explaining
illustrated
that
and
paradigms,
social
inducing social change.
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature',
important
role
on
the
that is,
For example,
in RP).
It is worth
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
consistent
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
'his
an
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
they
social
have
in
for
human
directed
116. A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigmatic)
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
then technically to a culture as a subalgebra stands to an algebra, etc.
4^
resistance or social struggle for the better.
explain
a
and justify such resistance 'requires that Me make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vieM of
nature and human subjectivity'*.
the
to
social
good
as
human
a.May;
The modifier 'usually' gives the game
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
Accordingly to Philp t.p.17.!, to
discerned
under
a
The struggle
regional
can
paradigm;
be
the
commitments can be cultural.
The
main real Mork of this paper,
descriptive
some
attempt
of relevant features of the different cultures
at
explanation
has
been
contrasted,
Mith
like much Mork on culture,
of more unexpected features
of
the
cultures,
concerned, some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cultural traits in
terms of others.
enterprise,
cultures
only
This, like the modelling account, points to a more difficult
broached:
investigated,
namely,
the
task of providing theories of
and so perhaps explaining Mhat pulls
them
the
together,
makes them tick, gives them their distinctive shape and grip, and so on.
APPENDIX 2:
Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
attempts of this sort are based on the modern evolutionary synthesis, and
in
appear
extreme
most
form
in
sociobiology.
t'jas
it
However
quickly
recognised that (opportunistic) sociobioligical attempts, such as Nilson's, to
to rule out significant political
117
narrow social alternatives fail.
redeploy
nature
human
underlying characterisation of human nature is
Nilson's
from the main socio-political tradition.
the
[is!
of
set
full
behavioural
possibilities
innate
Li.e.
very
and
different
'In the broader sense, human nature
genetic
or
genetically-determined]
predispositions that characterise the human species;
and in
the
narrower sense, those predispositions that affect social behaviour' t.pp.217-8,
mith
It is not constant or static,
rearrangement).
It is certainly ahistorical,
(sub)species
read
disease
patterns
conjunctively
however the ambiguity in the characterisation of
is resolved.
nature - hardly a set,
disjunctively it
only
n'ill include the full
humans
since genes may mutate.
are liable to
set
suffer;
For if the definition
of
if
is
genetically-determined
read,
those every (normal) human is bound to
less
undergo
plausibly,
at
some
stage.
In any event, such sets are remote from Enlightenment political concerns,
thouph, like health and disease more generally, socially relevant enough;
they
hardly
alternatives.
appear
to
Moreover,
impose
they
significant
offer
constraints
on
no bulwark against racial or
and
political
cultural
and since by no means
118
everything is determined genetically e.g. languages of some cultures.
relativity,
since
races have separate gene subpools,
117. f^s this is a commonplace vie^j,
Singer and especially Pigden.
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
determinism is simply one, and perhaps even the weakest, of
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce
cultural
variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively, but helps
himself to other incompatible forms of determinism as suit^: see p.207.
118. Genetic
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W.E. Abraham, The Mind of Africa, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1362.
D. A. Aitkin, 'Where does lustra 1ia stand?', in Pothers, pp.13-31.
A. Alpers, Maori Myths and Tribal Legends, Longman Paul, Auckland, 1384.
N.E. Awa, 'Culture and credibility', Ceres 13 (5) (1933) 28-32.
E. Best, The Maori., Col. 1, Tombs, Wellington, l'?24.
R. Birrell, 0. HiU
Sydney, 1384.
J.T, Benner,
1380.
.^nd J.
Neville,
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in
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and 'J. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Hannison;
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problems', in Hannison.
theor i es,
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management
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Papers in Environmental Philosophy # 3,
Research
//y
and
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Veblen, An inquiry into the Nature of Peace, Viking, New fork, 1945.
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H i1d
R.
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1982,
1
On the notion of culture and cultural pluralism
APPENDIX 1:
Definitions of culture abound;
all
unfortunately, with very few exceptions,
Many are too narrow,
are bad.
for example chauvmistica! ly restricting
culture to human groups (as Kamenka's appalling motto, 'nothing human is alien
p.7); some are too broad, for example making any sort of organisation
to me' ,
as a trade union or a local brass band) a culture,
such
to
serve
connect
problems:- High
redefinitions
of
cu1ture
with [a peoples'] artistic achievement or, even more
lil
with (their) literature.
This is nion culture, at least insofar
culture
EaJ
narrowly,
as
the types of
indicate
A few examples w 11 1
what is included is class restricted,
to certain class-approved
products
and performances (e.g. opera, ballet, drama as opposed to reggae, punk, etc.).
Mhile high redefinitions let in too little,
So
is with the definition of culture as 'the transfer of
it
behavioural means,
(Bonner
Mi th
low redefinitions admit too much.
p.l'J),
culture.
information
most particularly by the process of teaching and learning'
because that includes much that has nothing especially to
For
by
example,
number of bricks on a site,
relaying a weather forecast or passing on
transfers information by behavioural
means,
do
the
but
information of no particular cultural relevance. .
By
contrast,
For
culture.
Herskovits:
most definitions mark out something which roughly overlaps
example,
culture
Awa
settleEsJ
for
the
definition
is ""the man-made part of the environment""
offered
...'
by
(p.2'?).
Not only is this inadmissibly anthropocentric, excluding animal cultures (such
as
Bonner
writers
studies)
imagine);
and extraterrestrial cultures (such
but
worse,
as
science-fiction
this twisted definition appears to
render
a
ill. Thus, for example, Stephenson
throughout his iconoclastic book on
Australian culture.
The equation, with literary texts, like that of a
paradigm
with central texts,
is useful in offering a
material
representation of a culture. 'For there is something solid that can be
grasped and presented.
Similary, money, newspapers and motor cars,
afford material artefacts and museum exhibits of wider popular cultures.
deserted
toMn or ancient rums a culture (rather
mining
of
manifestation
a
than
past culture) Mhile excluding a system
the
of
physical
and
beliefs
values as a culture (unless an erroneous theory of systems of propositions
invoked).
In
is
latching onto the physical exemplification it is moreover like
Kuhn's identification of a text-book Mith a paradigm.
there is much in common between the notion of culture and
Indeed
liberal extension of the notion of paradigm,
one of Mhich gamed currency
^nglo-Psmerican thought about a hundred years later than the other.
have
in
Both terms
been used to cover an apparently diverse range of things (and criticised
dismissed for doing just that),
or
Kuhn's
and both do this m rather similar
because both attempt to capture types of conceptual schema.
parallels
suggest
- certainly once the useful notion of a
Midely adopted m sociology,
Mays,
Nhat is more the
social
paradigm,
been encountered and Morked Mith - a common
has
notion.
Nith but little reflection,
from
then,
a rather different account of culture
the run of anthropological definitions straightaMay emerges:- & culture,
or more exactly a pure culture,
advantage of this definition,
is a comprehensive socia! paradigm.
and part of its appeal,
R great
is that the hard
Mork
involved
in rectifying the notion of paradigm has already been done (e.g.
RP)
thus
and
parallel
m
the
supplied
system, i.e. on
a
logical sense;
generous
by
but
the
clean-up
Mould
that is,
an elaborate interpretation
relational
structure.
it
is
function
Naturally it is
a
theoretical
on
a
required
fai thfu1 to Mhat (the social forms, activities and so on) it models.
paradigm,
m
contrast
to
a scientific paradigm,
propositional structure delivered,
is
many
that of a social group.
sketched
take
Recall that a paradigm is explicated as a mode!.
form for culture.
precisely
structure
does not have to be repeated;
m
is a paradigm
general
to
be
Ps social
Mhere
the
the political themes and value judgements,
Group cohesiveness in fact is guaranteed in
examples of such social paradigms (several reproduced
in
the
RP)
because actual groups Mith distinctive cultures are taken; but the theoretical
explanation
goes
structure.
The
deeper
and
depends on features of
underlying
the
of propositional structure delivered
types
are
model
in
shoMn,
capsule form, in the first table of this paper contrasting parts of mainstream
other more detailed examples are reproduced
American and Philippine cultures;
in theoretical Mork
social paradigms (e.g. PP, CPE, Cotgrove and references
cited therein).
Just
expl 1 cat ion
the
as
of
paradigm
of
May
by
models
enabled
a
clarification and unification .job to be done on the giant conceptual mess that
the
of paradigm had become,
notion
facilitates a pleasing and simplifying synthesis.
how
complaint
his
Geertz
to
Consider,
about,
complains
diffusion by pointing to the
about
in
definitions of culture to similes and metaphors,
desperation,
as
...
map,
a
resort
Kluckholn
Geertz Minds
in
attempted
to the analogies ''perhaps in
mere
before a
and as a matrix'*,
as a sieve,
cu1ture
illustrate,
but in anthropology more generally, can be reduced.
especially,
up
diffusion'*
'theoretical
the
of
so the parallel explication
paragraph later, offering his OMn metaphor of culture as a web of significance
or interpretation (and model too,
its
in metaphor).
roots
though here an exact technical notion,
Rs it happens,
Geertz""'s account is not too
has
bad
a
picture of the sort of logical model involved, that is of a system, a Meb-like
structure, Mith an interpretation
imposed,
matrix
both a map and a
The other similes are hoMever more exact:
on it.
function
can
function, supplying significance or meaning
as
models (though not
usually
social
ones),
map
a
typically modelling a landscape.
Furthermore,
take up Kluckholn'* s elaboration on culture (not
to
really
'definitions' as Geertz suggests), a model is indeed '(4) ""an abstraction from
behaviour'""',
thinking,
hoMever
Mhich,
and
feeling
is
not
prescriptively
Mhere
believing'"" in terms of items
merely descriptive,
as,
supplies '(3) ""a May of
it is a social paradigm,
'*('?)
""a
validated.
but Mill be applied
mechanism
for
the
and
normative
can
The
model
be
regulation
read
of
and ""(10) ""a set of techniques -tor- adjusting both to the externa!
behaviour'""'
environment and to other men""''. Such a mode!, which does correspond to '(5) ""a
theory
the part of the anthropologist about the way in which a
on
peop!e m fact behave'""' and their view of the world,
orientations,
it is
. Since the social paradigm evolves over time,
'(11) ""a precipitate of history'""',
of
certainly affords '(6) a
""structure of pooled learning'""' and '(7) ""a set of standardized
to recurrent problems'"".
group
and it does record '(2) ""the social legacy
the individual Ein the society! acquires from his group""'.
three parts or levels of a culture that Conga!ton and David
The
(p.22 ff.) are similar to those Kuhn includes within a paradigm,
by
supplied
readily
a model.
They
are,
first,
the
discern
and likewise
general
rules
and
procedures characterising and controlling the behaviour of adherents; secondly
the ideas and values behind these beliefs and procedures; thirdly the products
and
exemplars
material
resulting,
e.g.
interpretation function validates both themes and rules;
of objects,
domains
The
The
newspapers.
textbooks,
as well it
including values and ideas (on both see
connection with exemplars and artefacts is less direct,
RP,
delivers
pp.12-16).
and of more than
Pt textbook may present a paradigm or, more likely, part of one; or
112
it may, like an artefact, supply or be a partial mode!ling of the paradigm.
one kind.
The
order
culture
remaining
reflect
to
has
life-forms
done.
Thus
to
of
qualifying term comprehensive is
some of the slackness of the
notion
of
culture.
cover a sufficiently comprehensive part of life
a community,
Abraham,
vague
deliberately
for one,
klhile
styles
there are varying degrees to which this
can
and
be
explains various inclusive levels of culture
(pp.12-13) before opting for the most inclusive, under which 'culture is
113
common life of the people'*
and 'includes the whole of the knowledge,
arts,
in
the
the
science, technology, religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature,
112. 6 theory normally has many models, some exact and canonical, some of
which bring out all that holds m the theory but not only what holds
there;
and, more sweepingly still, it has partial models, which
accurately depict part of the theory.
even
etiquette
and
of the mind.
includes
le
narroMer,
In this use [that again of ""higher""
mastery
a
'*
scu1pture,
a
seventeenth
a
Under
use of the term however ''culture is limited to Mhat are called
comprehensive,
things
(p.12)114
'
-fashions
Abraham
(p.13).
process
of
conjectures that this use evolved
pauperisation of Mhat
and eighteenth centuries,
and could knoM (p.13).
the
educated
the age of enlightenment,
man
'as
in
a
the
stood for',
Such a person could reflect the Mhole culture in
the
more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
so
it has been argued, namely attitudes to and approaches to the environment, and
so natural environments largely devoid of man-made features and influences
particular.
in
& fuller picture of environmentally-sensitive culture looks like
this:-
113. (From previous page) See p.21.
Accounts of culture of this very
inclusive, but still unnecessarily anthropic, form are common in the
literature.
Thus, for example, Harris: ''Ft culture is the total socially
acquired life-May or life-style of a group of people
(p.144), their
patterns of behaviour and thought.
Thus, Mith even less qualification,
the first of Kluckholn's eleven definitions of culture (as listed in
Geertz pp.4-5), 'the total May of life of of a people', a definition
repeated in Congalton and David, p.22.
The intended model accordingly
provides a complete representation of life-Mays of members of the
culture.
114. Ft fuller and better account Mhich gets very close to the model-theoretic
analysis, is Kumer's analogous definition of culture:
The
shared
symbolic system Mhich gives meaning
to
human
interactions in a society.
It refers to a society's May of
perceiving, interpreting and expressing things ... it includes
knoMledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is alMays perceived Mithin an evaluative
frameMork.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex Mhole Mhich includes
knoMledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civiliza11on, hoMever, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities'.
PRIORY CULTURE DIRGRRH
sense
of
""culture""',
and
intellectual
where
sociology,
in
order
culture.
artistic
the
practice
takes up the grimary
namely
dictionaries,
Concise English Dictionary),
consists
in
putJ
of
and as presented
culture of a society is said to comprise
a given culture,
state
the
as it is
tor development,
' the
of
a
in
shared
It is important to separate off *
particular, the
in
in which the culture comprises the community,
and the educa11on-der1ved sense,
the training or discipline in or
groun
or people with,
leading
in which the
to
Evidently the explication, which makes the product primary
the historical order,
so on,
in
to set aside - some derivative senses,
sharing,
culture
offered
values and beliefs' of the society.
der ived sense,
or
as
or people' (cf.
community
norms,
through social paradigms,
explication so -far,
The
a
given
reverses
the culture, like agriculture, viticulture, and
115
was first and foremost a process
, a ""cultivation"" of intellect and
where
115. Rs Williams explains, the early meaning of 'culture'' was as a process;
and the ''culture of the mind' was viewed as a process rather than a
product or achieved state.
In (early) modern use 'culture' became, like
'civilized'', a condition. Only with the 'fourth modern development did
culture appear as 'the whole way of life, material, intellectual and
spiritual of a given society* (p.273), i.e., as a comprehensive social
paradigm. The other forms, the first three developments, were restricted
versions of this, to respectively the individual, intellectual and moral
parts, and arts and intellectual areas.
To invert the ahistorical explanatory patten^
so to say, the inherited cu1tures of science.
scientific paradigms are,
art and technology.
However the reversal makes it easier to get some grip on
the very rich process-product complex that a culture comprises.
example, goes astray in settling for a process definition of
Bonner,
for
allied
'culture
to the education-derived senses ''By culture I mean the transfer of information
by
behavioural
particularly
most
means,
of
by the process
teaching
and
Nhile the definition certainly achieves its intended objective of
learning*',
it is, as already remarked, a quite excessively low
including animal culture^
accounting
redefinition,
such
things as semaphoring between boy
scouts
as
culture.
There is a further dimension of complexity so far largely omitted through
restriction
pure
most contemporary states are far from culturally pure, comprising a
cultures,
mixture
Mhile tribal groups may have relatively
to pure cultures.
More generally,
of peoples and cultures.
represented
an n-cultural society
by a system of n paradigms adhered to in the society.
&
multi
ft
multi
cultural
society
is thus an n-cultural society where n is
cultural
society
may
simply
Australia,
not
include
however be
very
many.
pluralistic;
it
as
may,
groups of people from different cultures
under some dominant culture which controls
in one region
together
is
in
brought
main
the
Much depends then on the type of system of paradigms
poli tical institutions.
involved, on how the paradigms are themselves interrelated and structured.
Ps
society
will
function
(cf.
Abraham,
p.lbff.,
incompatible with extreme individualism').
a variety of subcultures.
which
is
not
Characteristically
and
commonly
For culture is the glue of a group;
competing cultures.
integrative
always have a culture,
several
perhaps
it has an important
who remarks that
culture
is
society will also typically have
R subculture is a paradigm, included in a culture,
sufficiently
subcultures
comprehensive
to
rank
as
a
share norms and assumptions with some
culture.
larger
culture except where they diverge.
The
dominant
cultures
in countries like Australia and America
can
be
is
there
Subcultures
with
many
century
gentry
the
differences
terms,
11.S
tributaries.
subculture!
hong played significant parts in
have
last
Protestant
culture,
mainstream
a
example,
Transposing to river-network
as having tree structures.
reoresented
between
Catholic,
extensive immigration program,
pattern
of ethnic subcultures.
important
As a result
complex
accommodate,
and
that is, the cultural streams remain
of the
mainstream
culture
are
not
those
of
These
within
too a pluralistic (a plural paradigm) society
provided the social paradigms present
limits,
can
no
real
to overarching socio-political arrangements and the prevailing type of
threat
structure (if they should however things would have to give or
power
along
permit the relatively easy formation
assumptions
of
Australia) do however is to criticise and challenge themes of the
culture.
dominant
an
rival and alternative social paradigms (such as
k-lhat
chai 1enged.
Al ternative
critical
and
and
Australia now boasts a much more
persistence of subcultures - so long as,
subcultures
Protestant
Flexible multi-cultural arrangements,
substantial social tolerance,
with
for
of Australian colonial culture had
streams
bearing on leisure activities such as gambling (see Inglis),
its
history;
lustra!ian
change;
rival river networks are bound to alter the r*.;Xural landscape).
Cultures,
explaining
and
illustrated
that
like
paradigms,
social
inducing social change.
explanatory roles.
repudiation
nature"",
important
role
on
the
that is,
For example,
in RP).
It is worth
that
it
noticing
to
Philp criticises for Foucault
prevents
him
from
consistent
explaining
in
and
human
culture can replace nature
of the human subject and the denial of a
ground
both
So much has already been shown
as regards social paradigms (e.g.
nature have been supposed mandatory;
'his
an
can also afford explanatory roles in cases where appeal
they
social
have
in
for
human
directed
IIS, A subculture of a given culture is itself a culture (i.e. a comprehensive
social paradigm) applying to a subgroup of the given wider culture,
which agrees with the wider culture on characterising (paradigmatic)
features but which may diverge, and typically does, by virtue of further
cultural features, i.e. features in its paradigm.
A subculture stands
then technically to a culture as a subalgebra stands to an algebra, etc.
resistance or social struggle tor the better,
explain
a
and justify such resistance 'requires that ^e make some commitment to
conception
of the human good and this usually rests on some vie^j of
human
The modifier 'usually* gives the game
a^ay;
nature and human subjectivity'*.
the
route can circuit through culture.
justificatory
directed
accordingly to Philp (p.17), to
to
social
good
as
under
discerned
a
The struggle
can
paradigm^
regional
be
the
c ommitmen t s c an be cultural.
The
main real ^ork of this paper,
descriptive
some
attempt
like much Mork on culture,
of relevant features of the different cultures
at
explanation
of more unexpected features
has
been
contrasted,
^ith
of
the
cultures
concerned, some criticism, and some attempt to explain some cultural traits in
terms of others.
enterprise,
cultures
only
This, like the modelling account, points to a more difficult
broached:
investigated,
namely,
the
task of providing theories of
and so perhaps explaining ^hat pulls
them
the
together,
makes them tick, gives them their distinctive shape and grip, and so on.
Contemporary scientific redeployment of human nature
APPENDIX 2:
attempts of this sort are based on the modern evolutionary synthesis, and
most
in
appear
extreme
form
in
sociobiology.
However
it
Mas
quickly
recognised that (opportunistic) sociobiol^gical attempts, such as Nilson's, to
nature
human
to rule out significant political
117
narroM social alternatives fail.
redeploy
underlying characterisation of human nature is
Nilson's
from the main socio-political tradition.
[is]
of
set
full
the
possibilities
[i.e,
innate
very
different
'In the broader sense, human nature
genetic
genetically-determinedJ
or
predispositions that characterise the human species;
behavioural
and
and in
the
narrower sense, those predispositions that affect social behaviour'* (pp.217-8,
Mith
It is certainly ahistorical,
read
disjunctively it
disease
hoMever the ambiguity in the characterisation of
nature - hardly a set,
(sub)species
patterns
conjunctively
only
since genes may mutate.
It is not constant or static,
rearrangement).
Mill include the full
humans
For if the definition
is resolved.
are liable to
set
suffer;
of
if
is
genetically-determined
read,
those every (normal) human is bound to
less
undergo
plausibly,
at
some
stage.
In any event, such sets are remote from Enlightenment political concerns,
though, like health and disease more generally, socially relevant enough;
they
hardly
alternatives.
appear
to
Moreover,
impose
they
significant
offer
constraints
on
no bulMark against racial or
and
political
cultural
and since by no means
118
everything is determined genetically e.g. languages of some cultures.
relativity,
since
races have separate gene subpools,
117. Fss this is a commonplace vieM,
Singer^, and especially Pigden.
there is no need to labour it:
see Ruse,
118. Genetic determinism is simply one, and perhaps even the Meakest, of
several
forms of determinism intended to vastly reduce
cultural
variability.
Nilson does not rely on that form exclusively, but helps
himself to other incompatible forms of determinism as suit^: see p.207.
REFERENCES
W.E. Abraham, Ths Mind of Africa, University of lilinois
ess, Litica^o, i-S2.
D, A. Aitkin, ''Mhere does Australia stand?', in Withers, pp.18-31.
Pipers, Maori Myths and Tri ba' Legends, Longman Pau], Auckland, 1984.
N.E. Awa, '""Culture and credibility'"", Ceres 16 (5) (1983) 28-38,
E. Best, The Maori, Vol, 1, Tombs, Wellington, 1924,
R. Birrell, D. HiH
Sydney, 1984.
J.T. Bonner,
1980.
.^nd J,
Neville,
Populate and
Perish?,
Fontana/AFC,
The Evolution of Culture in animals, Princeton University Press,
B. Bonney and H.
1983.
Australia's Commercial Media, Macmillan, Melbourne,
Wilson,
8.J. Berry, Human, Hegel and Human Nature, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982.
J. Cairns, The Quiet Revolution. Widescop^e.^Camberw.elJ^J-Jiotg^^a. 1975^.
8.T, jCald/wel.l., '""The gambling AustraTian.'L^_in Change in Australia (ed.
Edgar), Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974.
D.L.
G.T. Caldwell, '""Leisure', in Davies et.al., pp.410-439.
G.T. Caldwell, '""Some historical and sociological characteristics of Australian
gambling', in Caldwell et.al.
G.T. Caldwell, M. Dickerson, B. Haig and L.
Australia, Croom Helm, Sydney, 1985.
Sylvan (eds.),
Camb' ing—ijl
F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Poli tics, Hutchinson, London, 1984.
R.E. Caves and L.8. Krause, The Australian Economy:
George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984.
N. Chomsky and E. Herman,
Press, Boston, 1979.
A M1ew from the North,
The Political Economy of Human Rights,
South c.nd
P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Quartet Books, Melbourne, 19/9.
J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984.
David,
The Individual in the Making, Wiley, Sydney,
A.A.
Congalton andA.E.
1976.
R.W.
Connell, 'Images of Australia in Social Change in Australia
Edgar), Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974.
(ed.
R. W. Connell, Ruling fl ass, Ruling Culture,
S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New
knowledge, belief-systems, values, norms and ideologies Mhich
enable the members of a society to perceive, organise and interpret
reality ... reality is always perceived Mithin an evaluative
framework.
Similar too is Tylor's definition of 'culture' in terms of a structure
again: 'Culture or Civilization ... that complex MholeMhich includes
knowledge, belief, art, morals, laM, customs, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. (Primitive Culture
vol. 7, p.7).
So all human societies have a culture, a generalised
paradigm.
It is better to separate out civi1ization, however, and link
it to its 'root meaning of living in cities .
religions, morality, ritual, politics, literature, even etiquette and fashions
is
'culture
use
limited
to
Mhat
are called
things
of
mind.
the
In
this
[that
history,
con.jec tures
that
music,
this
painting and sculpture,/^..' (p.13),
use
evolved
'as
a
result
of
Rbraham^.
of
a / process
^7 /J
cen turles,
he age of enlightenment, stood for'', and could knoM (p.13).
Such
a per son could reflect the Mhole culture in the more comprehensive use.
The European vieM of culture, Mhich tends to concentrate on high culture,
is insufficiently comprehensive,
it
has been argued,
natural
environments
leaving out a crucial aspect of culture,
namely attitudes to and approaches to
the
largely devoid of man-made features and
so
environment,
influences
in
/Recounts of culture of this very inclusive form but still unnecessari
an thropic form, are common m the literature* ^hus^for example^Harris:
For the aLr o^ paradox derLves from competLng maximization crLterLa.
R good exampLe is provided bg NeMComb's paradox, Mhich is supposed to arise
in the foLLoMing situation^:
There are tMO boxes before gou: one transparent and one opaque. You
can see that there is $1,000 in the transparent box, and gou knoM that
there is either $1,000,000 or nothing in the opaque box. You must
choose betMeen the foLLoMing tMO acts: take the contents onig of the
opaque box or take the contents of both boxes. Furthermore, there is a
being in Mhose predictive poMers gou have enormous confidence, 3nd gou
knoM that he has aLreadg determined the contents of the opaque box
according to the foLLoMing ruLes: If he predicted that gou Mouid take
-9-
A
Take the list of characteristics Gilson considers for instance (Mhich forms in
a
curious May part of his attempt to rehabilitate a particular partisan
of humans on the strength of sociobiology:
p.22).
The list
has to be pruned
if""it is to cover the spread of knoMn human races and cultures,
vaguer
and less question-begging (e.g.
removed);
but
then
vieM
and
rendered
Mith reference to relations to numan-=>
it ceases to separate tribes of humans
from
tribes
primates or other nonhumans. [Detail and adjust.]
/f2'
7
o+
The NeM Zealand comparison:
APPENDIX 3.
Preliminary notes towards
or New
qualitative rating of mainstream New Zealand culture,
A
Zealand
data, as against an Australian (and sometimes other) goes as follows:but still high for Angloceltic world (presumably per capita
less,
Drinking:
patterns similar except for club phenomenon in Australia,
figures available);
and dry areas and prohibition proclivities in New Zealand.
Gambling:
significantly
but
less,
for
patterns similar except
important
matters of clubs and casinos.
Sport:
but less variety in New Zealand, owing to greater
similar addiction,
New Zealand emphasis on tramping,
uniformity of culture.
trail systems, not
matched in Oz.
Permissiveness:
variety.
less,
markedly
especially
concerning
sexual
issues
and
But Polynesian alternative increasingly influential in New Zealand.
Plural ism:
a
less,
more
uniform society,
with few ethnic
groupings
and
strata.
stronger, but still less so than UK.
Authori tarianism:
It is hypothesized by
Sinclair that older authority patterns in New Zealand arise from child rearing
especially
techniques,
in Oz.
counterpart
are,
the
famous
Plunkett
method,
The result was a rather up-tight
the suggestion is, more laid-back, easy-going.
which
no
had
product.
real
Australians
Vet the matter is not =o
simple, as the next items reveal.
Policing
and
opposition among the younger in New Zealand.
increasing
bushrangers,
cultural
Long-standing opposition to police
coercive methods:
etc.,
mythology.
in
New
Zealand,
in
Oz,
But no adulation of
and no Eureka Stockade
Violence perhaps less in New Zealand,
or
associated
though (at home)
neither society is very violent by American standards.
Egali tarianism:
slightly more in New Zealand, despite the Australian image.
In both Jack is as good as his master.
Pace of Life:
slower in New Zealand.
1
less in NeM
Poverty:
in NeM Zealand.
Distrust of markets
simi1 ar
less than Oz
Fraternity and mateship:
Hale chauvinism:
margina11y less (?)
Unionisation:
Mith
no
environmen tai actions.
Environmen t:
communi ties
mixed
Extensive
NeM Zealand to many i ssues
in
even
sympathy,
public
among
rural
the
An issue breakdoMn is
required
here:
better
Chemicals and Maste management:
Parks and reserves:
National ism:
(Inglis)
margina11y better,
excessively
in
Morse
both places
strong in both
It is taken as validating
consider the many memorials Mith 'they
their country' scattered around small toMns.
national ism
(or stateism)
as
a
means
and
Hi th
by political leaders).
It can be
Mar and sport
of social and national cohesion,
purpose (e.g.
died
It is sometimes suggested
is the neM secular religion
operation in those tMo related enterprises,
death
for
that
seen
in
Both have served
and have been
used
for
that
(Hars Mere a common method of obtaining
maintaining integration of large states,
improved
communications
perhaps fall into disuse)
and propaganda
netMorks,
that
method
Divisive national sport is interesting from
could
this
angle also.
Federalism
and
Australian
idea
federation:
of
adding
No experience in
NeM
NeM Zealand as a further
sympathetic consideration in NeM Zealand.
2
Zealand.
state
The
obtains
frequent
little
There Mas, and is, no loyalty to an
Australasian nation.
Communications:
Broadcasting less commercialised in Ne^j Zealand.
As a result
less H) violence, etc.
Reading:
more in Neu Zealand.
Education and Research:
opposition to theory.
(HoM much more?)
Little research done in Ne^ Zealand, but less
mixed.
Public school system better.
3
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
Letter, Alastair (University of Waikato) to Richard Sylvan, 17 April 1985 re feedback on
paper. (4 pages (2 leaves))
Letter, Tom (Philosophy Department, Massey University) to Richard Sylvan, 10 Jul 1985
re feedback on paper. (3 pages (2 leaves))
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 103: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/74d46ccc038115c6bd0d20b0ef9d25e7.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
115,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/115,"Box 106, Item 1: Abstract on deeper nuclear and miscellaneous notes","Typescript and miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper.","Verso of leaves not digitised. Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 106, Item 1","Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[5] leaves. 2.51 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:85b7938",,"/
7
DEEPER NUCLEAR
roots of the arms race lie in the character of science and technology:
such R & D drives the arms race.
science.
But it is disguised by myth of neutral
Deeper still the drives lie in maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
—————
4
the ""newer"" virtures, Enlightenment but Faustian virtues.
But the attainment of these even approximately is impossible, because of limitations, because for instance ultimate power means loss of power (for power
becomes go great it goes out of control).
This is a variation on the paradox
For these Enlightenment ends there is no maximization ///
because of limits and associated paradoxes, only an illusion of attainment.
A
of
omnipotence.
Thus maximization is here irrational.
and Gods;
In earlier times the drive le^d to God,
later defter the Enlightenment i’£ led to science -
a new, much more
effective God since it delivers so much cargo.
In the same framework, recast Foley's paradoxes of unlimited power:-
1.
Omnipotence leads to impotence
2.
Omniscience leads to ignorance
3.
Total rationality becomes total irrationality:
[becomes?]
and technicized our means, the more irrational our ends.
/
z
the more rational
sr
X>£. e &
f
c/~lu
cr-t/^ J
'7
I
r/^e wl-
_ -O'- rf
Jo-d
, « sT-rf
; 7^/?/°;
#
t
/
( e^^/ /7-
a JAw/kJ
^J.J. 4/r7/e>*’2S /^t/') /ru^. i^o-fr^a/ S(^,,-/Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 106, Item 2","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[6] leaves. 1.91 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:d6f1b48",,"ps re Walzer’s discussion of obliteration bombing of German cities
in WWII, have you seen Stephen E Lammers, ’Area Bombing in
World War II: The Argument of Michael Walzer’ (Journal of Religious
Ethics, Vol. 11, Spring 1983)? Lammers offers a much better critiaue
of Walzer’s argument than mine.
The 'alternative defence systems' have, in fact, a much longer history
th^n you let on, and have been studied more intensively than you suggest.
There's a st^ongish pacifist tradition: £.g. in a number of works
by Tolstoy mi 1900-1910 (e.g. The Law of Violence and the Law of Love,
Engl, transl. 1959; ak masses of smaller pamphlets), also Gandhi'is
work (esp. Non-violence in Peace and War, 2 vols. 1942, 1948), and
some work done by Allied pacifists during World War II and slightly
earlier (e.g. J.W. |(ughan, Pacifism and Invasion, published by War
Resisters' League, 19^2). Perhaps most relevant however, are two
post-nuclear collections: Adam Roberts et.al. Civilian Defence
(1965) and Quincy Wright et.al., Preventing World War III: Some
Proposa1s (1962). As I recall, these take one outside a purely
pacifist tradition. Ar^e NaEss has written on the topic - e.g.
'Nonmilitary defence' in Wright, op.cit.; 'A systematization of
Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution' Jrul of Conflict Resolution
(1958). Gene Sharp, who^you cite, has written very extensively on the
topic. But presumably you don't want to get too involved in this
issue - not in this paper anyway.
Notes
1
Aldridge Bob, The Counterforce SyndromeiA Gu^de__toU^
NuclearrWeapons aAd-^-Sn^egTc-^rine.
Washington, D.0..
Barnet, Hlchard, The Giants.
TransnatTonal Institute, 19?87.
Simon and Schuster, 1977» Barnet, Richard, Real^^Z
New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981J Ellsberg, Lanlex, **}ter
New York:
See also Sidney Lens, The Day Before
in Current, June 1981.
An Anatomy*of the Nuclear Arms Race.
Bostont
Beacon
Doomsday:
____________ ______
Press, 1977 •
j
Lens, Op. Cit.
2.
3.
""Challenging the Myths of National Securl y , y Rl-h
3.
Barnet, in New York Time_s_Masazln£» Apr^ X’ ^79. Cited ar
elaborated T7I Questions and_Answers_orLthe Sovlet_Threatand
National SecurVtyT^ubilihed by the Disarmament Program of
^Tta^i^TFH^nds Service Committee.
(1501 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia Pennsylvania.)
“Interview**, in Current, June, 19^1*
T
1
Tv-rnnnv
New York: Warner Books, 1979*
5.
See Robert Jungk’ ^^^TcK^topher Trump); Richard Rashdie.
(Tvonoi nted from the German by onrisuopn^x
. r T*
1077
industry.
6. meh.ed Pelt. ■""“^“.r'^rSo^J^rKd.SVr^S!""12""1”’
New York 10036.
Hovt, ""The Bishops and the Bomb"" (Christianity and
7.
See Robert G. 1982.)| Michael Novak, ""Nuclear Morality and
Crisis, August 9»
Man’s Primer on Nuclear Morality"" (AmerJ^.
J.A. C’Hare, ’’One 1982); Francis X. Winters, ""Catholic Debate
June 26 - July 3#
and Division on Deterrence ' ~merl
_ °christian Century, March 3, 1982.)
Walter Wink, ""Nuclear Paralysis
8. John Leslie of the University of
who has reflected
™ preseSte w
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of three pages (65-67) from unidentified publication, on Peace, war and philosophy,
and Peano Giuseppe. (3 leaves)
/A/rzw
)(/>
I
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8834aaf1b324714f2e3774aef33d071c.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
116,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/116,"Box 106, Item 2: OED definition of nuclear deterrence","Handwritten note on scrap paper.","Verso of leaf not digitised. Note housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. Note, one of three notes/papers digitised from item 2.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 106, Item 2","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[1] leaf. 340.18 KB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8897af0",,"1
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/782aa830b37f3c3af3eaa08c7a828de3.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
197,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/197,"Box 106, Item 3: Early drafts, notes and cuttings on big nuclear","Various typescript and handwritten early drafts and notes on big nuclear, undated. Includes cuttings on nuclear power and photocopy of Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981 of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ? 1981, Farewell Address to the Nation.","Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Cutting redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Papers housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. One of four papers digitised from item 2.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 106, Item 3","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[26] leaves. 10.28 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:88d3475",,"<%///# /(V?fac/
’
Nuclear energy and obligations to the future.
.. .discussion of values and goods may seem
fuzzy and unscientific, but it is the beginning
and end of any energy policy ... . (Lovins, 75, xxii).
Important ethical issues concerning obligations to the
future and evaluative issues as to what sort of world we want
to see are raised by proposed nuclear development, but have been
largely neglected in current technologically oriented discussion
of the development.
The first part of the paper considers the
arguments of a number of philosophers
philosophical positions
(e.g.
obligations to the future
we do have practical,
(e.g. Passmore)
and
c
social contract theories)
and rejects them.
concerning
It concludes that
and not merely theoretical, moral obligations
to the non-immediate future, and that these are not made void
by temporal remoteness or some degree of uncertainty about the
effects of our nations.
The second part of the paper considers
a number of examples of crimes against the future and sets the
more comp ex nuclear energy case against this background.
One
philosophical corollary which emerges is the falsity of the still
common view that philosophical analysis of moral concepts,
meta-ethics,
or
is neutral with respect to practical moral issues.
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control by people over the social framework and over their own
lives?
The approach to all these questions depends crucially on
how the underlying elements of social interaction are conceived are these basic elements pure individuals, are they social wholes,
or do we need to assume both, distinct and irreducible, as we shall
argue ?
R. and V,. Rout ley
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I£ nuclear energy is unacceptable on moral grounds, what of
Australia s role in cooperating in its development overseas?
Is its development
inevitable, as some say, so that others would sell if we didn’t and Australia
would simply profit from the folly and immorality of others?
assumption is false.
This inevitability
Most countries considering nuclear energy are not yet
irreversibly committed to it, and have other options.
Australia has a good
percentage of the world’s high-grade reserves of uranium and is regarded by western
powers as a stable and reliable energy source.
In so far as there is an economic
case for nuclear energy development, the relative cheapness of its fuel and
reliability of its source is a major part of it.
It seems likely that by with'
holding its uranium Australia could shake this assumption and thus be influential
in directing attention to alternatives.
Nuclear energy development is not
inevitable, but even if it were, inevitability does not cancel moral responsibility.
Few would accept the argument of the hired assassin that if he did not do the job
someone else would be found who would perhaps make a messier job of it.
Australia
does not evade moral responsibility by arguing in a similar way, that other, possibly
even less responsible, suppliers would emerge.
Other arguments are presented to excuse Australia’s collaboration in nuclear
development, that by selling its uranium Australia will help prevent nuclear
proliferation and the development of the breeder reactor.
The argument that widely
exporting the basic means of making nuclear weapons is the best means of preventing
nuclear proliferation compares, in its twisted logic, with the all too familiar
6,,-vvA
claims that war is the best means of promoting peace, that the best way to assist
the poor is to increase the power of the wealthy^and so on.
help prevent development of the breeder reactor?
Will uranium export
That seems, at least, unlikely,
since the most important potential customers, in Europe, have already announced
their determination to proceed with it, while the other most important customer,
Japan, has made no secret of its interest in it.
faulty too.
But such an argument is logically
The fact that the breeder creates even worse problems, for present
people, than conventional fission reators hardly shows that conventional fission
A
is acceptable or ought not also to be opposed.
These are not exhaustive options,
and the case against even conventional fission energy is a sufficiently strong one.
The strategy of the argument here is to suggest that rather than opposing or
resisting something immoral, one should collaborate in it in order to use one’s
influence to secure improvements;
this would justify, for example, assisting in
fabricating evidence against an innocent man in order to use one’s influence to
ensure minimum suffering, a speedy trial and humane execution.
These arguments to excuse Australia’s participation are sad and threadbare,
exhibiting the morality of the market.
There seems little doubt that Australia’s
collaboration will assist and encourage the development of nuclear energy as
opposed to alternatives.
Thus Australia’s uranium export policy makes it an
important accomplice in this crime against the future.
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
•
Cutting (photocopy), 'Letters' (24 November 1978), Science, 202: 818, 820-821. (3 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'The World: Europe' (13 November 1976), The Economist, 261: 6364. (2 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'Nuclear man at bay' (19 March 1977), The Economist, 292(2): 12-13.
(2 leaves)
9
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Typescript (photocopy), Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981
of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ‐ 1981, Farewell Address to the
Nation. (5 leaves)
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/35e9d8df917f7d8ae32e0943d5ebd99b.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,1
204,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/204,"Box 106, Item 4: Draft of Nuclear power - ethical and social dimensions ; Draft of Nuclear power - ethical, social and political dimensions","Two draft papers. First paper, typescript, corrections with whiteout, undated. Second paper, typescript (photocopy) of draft, with handwritten emendations, undated. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'Nuclear power—some ethical and social dimensions', in Regan T and VanDeVeer D (eds) And justice for all: new introductory essays in ethics and public policy, Rowman and Littlefield.","Papers housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. One of four papers digitised from item 2.","Richard Routley^^Val Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 106, Item 4","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",1982-01-01,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[62] leaves. 51.91 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f644a2a",,"issue of nuclear power raises many basic issues in ethics.
The
By means of an example,
we argue
sorts of
transfers of costs,
benefits
from a
illegitimacy of certain
the
for
transfers
from one party who obtains
given course of action,
onto other parties who do
The inadequate methods currently available
not.
nuclear power
wastes mean
that
transfer of
serious
could permit
risks onto
costs and
the arguments
for
future
these crucial ethical
ignore
the i)7pra 1
to
Social Dimensions
Ethical and
Nuclear Power
are
not
the acceptability of
by
the
fact
such an illegitimate
future people.
that
Many of
such risks on
imposing
transfer
the
We argue
issues.
that
transfer principles give rise
constraints on action such
removed
for storing nuclear
those affected
future and
are
not present people.
The nuclear
issue and associated arguments also raise in a
highly
topical w3y
really
’need'
allow for,
or are
and
all
is
such needs
framework?
many basic issues in
the consumer
in part
theory.
items nuclear power is
it authoritarian or wrong
to
Are existing democratic mechanisms
framework adequate,
and
excessive
question
prevent
what
lives?
The approach to all
are
these basic elements pure
or do we
need
to assume both,
alterable social
the answer to
kinds of social
changes would
framework and over
social
their own
crucially on
intera ction are conceived
they social wholes,
individuals,
are
distinct and
irreducible,
argue?
R.
the
allow for more adequate
these questions depends
how the underlying elements of
to
If
such.concentrations of power and
control by people over the social
supposed
they give inadequate control
or do
concentrations of power?
is affirmative,
people
for control over
I
last
Do
frustrate such needs,
imposed by a particular,
the social
permit
social
Routley
as we
shall
NUCLEAR POWER - ETHICAL,
■•MB
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ptMENSIONS
Wl/,
I.
COMPETING PARADIGMS AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE.
One hardly needs initiation into the dark mysteries of
nuclear physics to contribute usefully to the debate now
widely ranging over nuclear power. While many important
empirical questions are still unresolved, these do not really
lie at the centre of the controversy. Instead, it is a
debate about values ...
many of the questions which arise are social and ethical ones.
Sociological investigations have confirmed that the nuclear debate is primarily
one over what is worth having or pursuing and over what we are entitled to do
They have also confirmed that the debate is polarised along the
2
lines of competing paradigms.
According to the entrenched paradigm discerned,
to others.
that constellation of values, attitudes and beliefs often called the Dominant
Social Paradigm (hereafter the Old Paradigm),
economic criteria become the benchmark by which a wide range of
individual and social action is judged ahd evaluated. And belief
in the market and market mechanisms is quite central. Clustering
around this core belief is the conviction that enterprise flourishes
best in a system of risks and rewards, that differentials are
necessary ..., and in the necessity for some form of division of
labour, and a hierarchy of skills and expertise.
In particular,
there is a belief in the competence of experts in general and of
scientists in particular. ...
there is an emphasis on quantification.
The rival world viewT, sometimes called the Alternative Environmental Paradigm
(the New Paradigm) differs on almost every point, and, according to sociologists,
in ways summarised in the following table
A
Dominant Social Paradigm
CORE VALUES
Material (economic growth, progress and development)
Natural environment valued as resource
Alternative Environmental
Paradigm
Domination over nature
Non-material (self-realisation)
Natural environment intrinsically
valued
Harmony with nature
ECONOMY*
Market forces
Risk and reward
Rewards for achievement
Differentials
Individual self-help
Public interest
Safety
Incomes related to need
Egalitarian
Collective/social provision
POLITY
Authoritative structures (experts influential)
Hierarchical
Law and order
Action through official institutions
Participative structures (citizen/
worker involvement)
Non-hierarchical
Liberation
Direct action
SOCIETY
Centralised
Large-scale
Associational
Ordered
Decentralised
Small-scale
Communal
Flexible
NATURE
Ample reserves
Nature hostile/neutral
Environment controllable
Earth's resources limited
Nature benign
Nature delicately balanced
KNOWLEDGE
Confidence in science and technology
Rationality of means (only)
Limits to science
Rationality of ends
State socialism, as practised in most of the ""Eastern bloc"", differs
as to economic organisation, the market in particular being replaced
system by a command system). But since there is virtually no debate
confines of state socialism,
that minor variant on the Old Paradigm
from the Old Paradigm really only
by central planning (a market
over a nuclear future within the
need not be delineated here.
2
No doubt t’ne competing paradigm picture is a trifle simple
(and
subsequently it is important to disentangle a Modified Old Paradigm, which
softens the old economic assumptions with social welfare requirements:
really
and
instead of a New Paradigm there are rather counterparadigms, a
cluster of not very well worked out positions that diverge from the cluster
marked out as the Old Paradigm).
Nonetheless it is empirically investigable,
and, most important, it enables the nuclear debate to be focussed.
Large-
scale nuclear development, of the sort now occurring in much of the world,
runs counter to leading tenets (such as societal features) of the New Paradigm.
Indeed to introduce ethical and social dimensions into the assessment of nuclear
power, instead of or in addition to merely economic factors such as cost and
efficiency, is already to move somewhat beyond the received paradigm.
For
under the Old Paradigm, strictly construed, the nuclear debate is confined to
the terms of the narrow utilitarianism upon which contemporary economic
practice is premissed, the issues to questions of economic means (to assumed
economistic ends) along with technological, social engineering and other
instrumental details:
whatever falls outside these terms is (dismissed as)
irrational.
Furthermore, nuclear development receives its support from adherents
of the Old Paradigm.
Virtually all the arguments in favour of it are set
within the assumption framework of the Old Paradigm, and without these
assumptions the case for the nuclear future the world is presently committed
to fails.
But in fact the argument for a nuclear future from the Old Paradigm
is itself broken-backed and ultimately fails, unless the free enterprise
economic assumptions are replaced by the ethically unacceptable assumptions of
advanced (corporate) capitalism.
The two paradigm picture also enables our case against a nuclear future
(a case written from outside the Old Paradigm) to be structured.
main parts?:-
There are two
It is argued, firstly, from without the Old Paradigm, that
nuclear development is ethically unjustifiable; but that, secondly, even from
within the framework of the ethically dubious Old Paradigm, such development
is unacceptable, since significant features of nuclear development conflict
with indispensible features of the Paradigm (e.g. costs of project development
and state subsidization with market independence and criteria for project
selection).
It has appeared acceptable from within the dominant paradigm only
because ideals do not square with practice, only because the assumptions of the
Old Paradigm are but very rarely applied in contemporary political practice,
3
the place of pure (or mixed) capitalism having been usurped by corporate
capitalism.
It is because the nuclear debate can be carried on within the
framework of the Old Paradigm that the debate - although it is a debate about
values, because of the conflicting values of the competing paradigms - is not
just a debate about values; it is also a debate within a paradigm as to means
to already assumed (economistic) ends, and of rational choice as to energy
options within a predetermined framework of values. (In this corner belong,
as explained in section VIII, most decision theory arguments, arguments often
considered as encompassing all the nuclear debate is ethically about, best
utilitarian means to predetermined ends.)
For another leading characteristic
of the nuclear debate is the attempt, under the dominant paradigm to remove it
from the ethical and social sphere, and to divert it into specialist issues -
whether over minutiae and contingencies of present technology or over medical
8
or legal or mathematical details.
The double approach can be applied as regards each of the main problems
nuclear development poses.
There are many interrelated problems, and the
argument is further structured in terms of these.
For in the advancement and
promotion of nuclear power we encounter a remarkable combination of factors, never
before assembled:
establishment, on a massive scale, of an industry which
involves at each stage of its processing serious risks and at some stages of
production possible catastrophe, which delivers as a by-product radioactive
wastes which require up to a million years’ storage but for which no sound and
economic storage methods are known, which grew up as part of the war industry
and which is easily subverted to deliver nuclear weapons, which requires for
its operation considerable secrecy, limitations on the flow of information and
restrictions on civil liberties, which depends for its economics, and in order
to generate expected profits, on substantial state subsidization, support, and
intervention.
with problems.
It is, in short, a very high techological development, beset
A first important problem, which serves also to exemplify
ethical issues and principles involved in other nuclear power questions, is
the unresolved matter of disposal of nuclear wastes.
II. THE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM, AND THE TRAIN PARABLE.
A long distance country train has just pulled out.
crowded carries both passengers and freight.
The train which is
At an early stop in the journey
someone consigns as freight, to a far distant destination, a package which
contains a highly toxic and explosive gas.
This is packaged in a very thin
container which, as the consigner is aware, may not contain the gas for the
4
full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the train
should strike any real trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the
interior of the train becomes very hot, if the train should be derailed or
involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interefere inadvertently
or deliberately with the freight, perhaps trying to steal some of it.
All of
these sorts of contingencies have occurred on some previous journeys.
If the
container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some
of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while others could be maimed
or incur serious diseases.
Most of us would roundly condemn such an action.
consigner of the parcel say to try to justify it?
What might the
He might say that it is not
certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it
will, that the world needs his product and it is
his duty to supply it, and
that in any case he is not responsible for the train or the people on it.
These
sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous when set in this
What is worth remarking is that similar excuses are not always so seen
I
when the consigner, again a ’’responsible” businessman, puts his workers’ health
context.
or other peoples’ welfare at risk.
Suppose he ways that it is his own and others’ pressing needs which
justify his action.
The company he controls, which produces the material as a
by-product, is in bad financial straits, and could not afford to produce a
better container even if it knew how to make one.
If the company fails, he and
his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look
for others, and the whole company town, through loss of spending and the
cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off.
The poor and unemployed
of the town, whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer
especially.
Few people would accept such a story, even if correct, as justification
Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom
one is concerned one is usually considered not to be entitled to simply transfer
the heavy burden of those risks and costs onto
other uninvolved parties,
especially where they arise from one’s own, or one’s group’s, chosen life-style.
The matter of nuclear waste disposal has many moral features which resemble
the train case.
progresses.
How fitting the
analogy is will become apparent as the argument
There is no known proven safe way to package the highly toxic
wastes generated by the nuclear plants that will be spread around the world as
9
large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.
The waste problem will be much
more serious than that generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, with
5.
each one of the 2000 or so reactors envisaged by the end of the century producing,
on average, annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the
Hiroshima bomb.
Much of this waste is extremely toxic.
For example, a
millionth of a gramme of plutonium is enough to induce a lung cancer.
Wastes
will include the reactors themselves, which will have to be abandoned after
their expected life times of perhaps 40 years,
may require
and which, some have estimated,
million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.
Nuclear wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for
their entire active lifetime.
For fission products the required storage period
averages a thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include
plutonium, there is a half to a million year storage problem.
Serious problems
have arisen with both short-term and proposed long-term methods of storage,
even with the comparatively small quantities of waste produced over the last
twenty years.Short-term methods of storage require continued human inter
vention, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human inter
ference and risk of leakage through non-human factors.
No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic
history of the earth over the last million years, a period whose fluctuations
in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice
Ages, could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be
provided for the vast period of time involved.
Nor does the history of human
affairs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by
methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years.
Proposed
long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formations or in salt mines,
are largely speculative and relatively untested, and have already proved to
involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice.
Even as
regards expensive recent proposals for first embedding concentrated wastes in
glass and encapsulating the result in multilayered metal containers before rock
deposit, simulation models reveal that radioactive material may not remain
suitably isolated from human environment.^ In short, the best present storage
proposals carry very real possibilities of irradiating future people and
damaging their environment ,
Given the heavy costs which could be involved for the future, and given
the known limits of technology, it is methodologically unsound to bet, as
nuclear nations have, on the discovery of safe procedures for storage of wastes.
Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on
present proposals, and subject to the same inadequacies.
For instance, none of
the proposed methods for safe storage has been properly tested, and they may
well prove to involve unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made
to put them into practice on a commercial scale.
provide a rigorous guarantee of
Only a method that could
safety over the storage period, that placed
safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable.
It is difficult to see
how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological
or future human factors.
But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe
long term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing
that it would be universally and invariably used.
The assumption that it
would be (especially if, as appears likely, such a method proved expensive
economically and politically) seems to presuppose a level of efficiency,
perfection and concern for the future which has not previously been encountered
in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nuclear industry.
12
Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long term storage
sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weapons-
grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million year
storage period, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it.
The assumption that a way will nonetheless be found, before 2000,
which gets around the wastestorage problem (no longer a nere disposal problem)
is accordingly not rationally based, but is rather like many assumptions of ways,
an article of faith.
It is an assumption supplied by the Old Paradigm, a no
limitations assumption, that there are really no (development) problems that
cannot be solved technologically (if not in a fashion that is always
immediately economically feasible).
The assumption has played
part in development plans and practice.
technological optimism (not to say hubris
an important
It has not only encouraged an unwarranted
), that there are no limits to what
humans can accomplish, especially through science; it has led to the embarcation
on projects before crucial problems have been satisfactorily solved or a solution
is even in sight, and it has led to the idea that technology can always be suitably
controlled.
It has also led, not surprisingly, to disasters.
There are severe
limits on what technology can achieve (some of which are becoming known in the
form of limitation theorems^); and in addition there are human limitations
which modern technological developments often fail to take due account of (risk
analysis of the likelihood of reactor accidents is a relevant example, discussed
below).
The original nuclear technology dream was that nuclear fission would
provide unlimited energy (a 'clean unlimited supply of power').
shattered.
and nuclear
That dream soon
The nuclear industry apparently remains a net consumer of power,
fission will be but a quite short-term supplier of power.
The risks imposed on the future by proceeding with nuclear development
are, then, significant.
Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for
a million years, but even with the (suspect) breeder reactor it could be an
energy source for only perhaps 150 years.
It will do nothing for the energy
problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be seriously
affected by the wastes.
Thus perhaps 40,000 generations of future people could
be forced to bear significant risks resulting from the provision of the
(extravagant) energy use of only a small proportion of the people of .10 generations
Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive
materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future.
Because
the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable
that in due course the same problem, that of making a transition to renewable
sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will
probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope
For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an
with it.
over-populated world
not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes,
but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents’ dreams of global
industrialisation are realised, more and more of the global population will have
become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy
resource use and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it.
It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable
resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain,
resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life,
are in a run-down condition.
Such points
tell against the idea that future
people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least
indirect beneficiaries.
It is for such reasons that the train parable cannot
be turned around to work in favour of nuclear power, with for example, the
nuclear train bringing relief as well as wastes to a remote town powered (only)
by nuclear power.
The'Solution"" then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society
at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which
reduces their ability to cope with those problems.
Like the consigner in the train
parable, contemporary industrial society proposes, in order to get itself out of a
mess arising from its chosen life style - the creation of economies dependent on
an abundance of non-renewable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on
costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding
benefits.
The ’’solution” may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes
8.
in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as
the consigner’s action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate
surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved
parties, whose opportunity to lead decent lives may be seriously jeopardised.
Industrial society has - under each paradigm, so it
will be argued -
clear alternatives to this action, which is taken essentially to avoid changing
corporately-controlled patterns of consumption and protect the interest of
those comparatively few who benefit from them.
If we apply to the nuclear situation, so perceived, the standards of
behaviour and moral principles generally acknowledged (in principle if perhaps
often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it is not easy to avoid the
conclusion that nuclear development involves gross injustice with respect to
the future.There appear to be only two plausible moves that might enable
the avoidance of such a conclusion.
First, it might be argued that the moral
principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and
the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of the nuclear parcel
are in the non-immediate future.
Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal
to overriding circumstances, for to reject the consigner’s action in the circum
stances outlined is not of course to imply that there are no circumstances in
which such an action might be justifiable, or at least where the matter is less
clearcut.
It is the same with the nuclear case.
Just as in the case of the
consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying
circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case.
We consider
these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development in turn,
beginning with the question of our obligations to the future.
Resolution of
this question casts light on other ethical questions concerning nuclear develop
ment.
It is only when these have been considered that the matter of whether
there are overriding circumstances is taken up again (in section VII).
Ill
OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE.
The especially problematic area
is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, the future with which
people alive today will have no direct contact: by comparison, the immediate
future gives fewer problems for most ethical theories.
In fact the question of
obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories
fail to pass, and also has serious repercussions in political philosophy as
regards the adequacy of accepted (democratic and other) institutions which do
not take due account of the interests of future creatures.
9.
Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on the issue.
A good
many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down
in favour of the same considerations being given to the rights and interests of
future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people.
Other
philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge
obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them
a lesser weight, those who deny or who are committed by their general moral
position to denying that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate
future, and those who come down with admirable philosophical caution, on both
sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view
underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no
moral obligations to the future beyond perhaps those to the next generation.
According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations
to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained,
there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the
effect of our actions on
future people.
Of those philosophers who say, or
whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate)
future, who have opted for the unconstrained position, many have based this view
on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose
some temporal or spatial contiguity.
Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded
on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people
widely separated in time (or sometimes in space).
For example, obligation is
seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also
non-transitive.
Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or
requirements on moral obligation, which would rule out obligations to the nonimmediate future are these:-
Firstly there are those accounts which require that
someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or
entitlement.
People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and
entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing effective to
enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us.
Secondly, there
are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention,
for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least
some kind of social enforcement.
But plainly these and other conventions will
not hold invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and
so will not be invariant over time.
Also future people have no way of enforcing
their interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any
contemporary institutions would do it for them.
10.
Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral
community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out the
distant future as a field of moral obligation as they not only require a
commonality or some sort of common basis which cannot be guaranteed in the case
of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity
of action which cannot apply to the future.
Where the basis of moral obligation
is seen as mutual exchange the interests of future people must be set aside
because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract.
The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from
those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive relations
of short duration such as sympathy and love.
As well there are difficulties
about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about
whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who
may well be committed to a life-style for which one has little or no sympathy.
On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to
conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future
people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary people had
no obligations concerning future people and could damage them as it suited them.
What all these views have in common is a picture of obligation as
something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which
is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating
in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can
fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).
Because obligation therefore
becomes conditional, features usually (and correctly) thought to characterise
obligation such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding
features) are lost, especially where there is a choice whether or not to do the
thing required to acquire the obligation, and so as to whether to acquire it.
The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the
distant future.
The view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future
people, that one is free to act however one likes with respect to them, is not
however sustainable.
Consider, for example, a scientific group which, tor no
particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places
in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several
hundred years from the time of its despatch.
No presently living person and
none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of
the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a
result of the action.
direct and predictable
The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is
an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately
criticize in the scientists’ experiment, perhaps its being over-expensive or
badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do
to future people.
the following sort
The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable
of policy:-
A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit
from mining, processing and manufacturing a new type of material which, although
it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendants,
will
over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an
enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time.
According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests,
without any consideration for the harm it does remote future people.
Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view, which are easily varied
and multiplied, might seem childishly obvious.
Yet the unconstrained position
concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not
only have several philosophers endorsed this position, but it is a clear
implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as
well as of prevailing economic theory.
It seems that those who opt for the
unconstrained position have not considered such examples, despite their being
clearly implied by their position.
We suspect that - we would certainly hope
that - when it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such
counterexamples, that being free to act implies among other things being free to
inflict pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for the unconstrained
position would want to assert that it was not what they intended.
What many
of those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in
mind in denying moral obligation is rather that- future people can look after
themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives.
The popular view that
the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally
independent of the present.
But it is not.
It is not as if, in the counter
example cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone
to take care of itself.
Present people are influencing it, and in doing so
thereby acquire many Of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in
causally affecting the present and immediate future, namely the obligation to
take account in what they do of people affected and their interests, to be
careful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probability of their
actions causing harm, and to see that they do not act so as to rob future
people of the chance of a good life.
12.
Furthermore, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future
people does not amount to the same thing as saying that we are free to do as we
like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action
involving them.
In just the same way, the fact that one does not have or has not
acquired an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved, that
one has no responsibility for his life, does not imply that one is free to do
what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some
course of action of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him.
These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the
(sometimes deliberate) failure to make an important distinction between acquired
or assumed obligation toward somebody, for which some act of acquisition or
assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and moral constraints, which
require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone,
and for which no act of acquisition is required.
There is a considerable
difference in the level and kind of responsibility involved.
In the first case
one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g.
have loves, synpathy, be contracted.
In the second case responsibility arises
as a result of being a causal agent who is aware of the consequences or probable
consequences of his action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or
assumed.
Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints,
can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible
for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied.
They apply as a result
of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably
predictable nature.
Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not
(yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist.
While
it may perhaps be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed
obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make
special sacrifices for future people of an heroic kind, or even to help them
especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained
from harming them.
Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigner cannot
argue in justification of his action that he has never assumed or acquired
responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no
love or sympathy for them and that they are not part of his moral community, in
short that he has no special obligations to help them.
All that one needs to
argue concerning the train, and the nuclear case, is that there are moral
constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations
to take responsibility for the lives of people involved.
There has been an attempt to represent all obligations to the distant
future in terms of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be
morally required.
But in view of the distinctions between constraints and
acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation this is just
13.
to misrepresent the position of these obligations.
For example, one is no more
engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable
life position or by refraining from causing then direct harm than the consigner
is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from placing his dangerous
package on the train.
The conflation of moral restraints with acquired obligation, and the
attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off nonacquired
constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term ’moral obligation’ both
to signify any type of deontic constraints and also to indicate rather something
which has to be assumed or required.
The conflation is encouraged by reductionist
positions which, in attempting to account for obligation in general, mistakenly
endeavour to collapse all obligations.
Hence the equation, and some main roots
of the unconstrained position, of the erroneous belief that there are no moral
constraints concerning the distant future.
The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counter
examples, to more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent, positions, for example
the position that
our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to
improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to
our immediate successors in a better condition, and that is all;
there are in practice no obligations to the distant future.
17
A main argument
in favour of the latter theme is that such obligations would in practice be
otiose.
Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through
the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which
each generation has obligations, based on loves or sympathy, only to the
succeeding generation.
account.
There are at least three objections to this chain
First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future
as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of
constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations, since individuals
can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create
individual responsibility, and which often cannot be sheeted home to an entire
generation.
Nuclear power and its wastes, for example, are strictly the
responsibility of small groups of power-holders, not a generational responsibility.
Secondly, such chains, since non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to
the distant future.
But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be
adequate, as examples again show.
For the picture is unable to explain several
of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed
which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without
affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to Influence matters.
14.
Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense of
disadvantages to people of the more distant future.
Improving the world for
immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstances
be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors.
Such
cases can hardly be written off as ’’never-never land"" examples since many cases
of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type. e.g. not just
the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the
long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through
overuse.
If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the
favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided,
obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly
distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in
the way the chain picture suggests.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUTURE : ECONQMISTIC UNCERTAINTY
AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS.
While there are grave difficulties for the
unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position.
According to the main qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained
with respect to the distant future, there are obligations, but these are not so
important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people
cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate
future.
The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for
very much less than the interests of present people.
Hence such things as nuclear
development and various exploitative activities which benefit present people should
proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewhat) disadvantaged by them.
The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in
prevailing economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future
costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over
time of a discount rate, so discounting costs and risks to future people.
The
attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming
increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position.
objectionable in such an approach is that
What is
economics should operate within the
bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within
legal constraints, not determine what those constraints are.
There are moreover
alternative economic theories and simply to adopt, without further ado, one
which discounts the future is to beg many questions at issue.
15.
Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting
the future, the most threadbare is based on the assumption that future
generations will be better off than present ones, and so better placed to handle
18
the waste problem.
Since there is mounting evidence that future generations
may well not
be better off than present ones, especially in things that matter,
no argument for discounting the interests of future generations on this basis
can carry much weight.
Nor is that all that is wrong with the argument.
For
it depends at base on the assumption that poorer contemporaries would be making
sacrifices to richer successors in foregoing such (allegedly beneficial)
developments as nuclear power.
sacrifice argument.
That is, it depends on the already scotched
In any case, for the waste disposal problem to be
legitimately bequeathed to the future generations, it would have to be shown,
what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will
be, not just better off, but so much better off and more capable that they
can duly absorb the nuclear waste burden.
A more plausible argument for discounting is directly in terms of
opportunity costs.
It is argued, from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth
much more than a dollar received in the non-immediate future (because the first
dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is
required to obtain equivalent monetary values, and so for efficient allocation
of resources.
Similarly it is argued, by virtue again of equalization of monetary
value, that compensation - which is what the waste problem is taken to come to
economically - costs much less now than later.
Thus a few pennies set aside
(e.g. in a trust fund) now or in the future, if need be, will suffice to
compensate eventually for any victims of remote radioactive waste leakage.
There are, presently at least, insurmountable practical difficulties about
applying such discounting, e.g. how to determine appropriate future discount rates.
A more serious objection is that applied generally, the argument presupposes,
what is false, that compensation, like value, can always be converted into
monetary equivalents, that people (including those outside market frameworks)
can be monetarily compensated for a variety of damages, including cancer and loss
of life.
There is no compensating a dead man, or for a lost species.
In fact
the argument presupposes a double reduction neither part of which can succeed:
it is not just that value cannot in general be represented at all adequately
19
monetarily,
but (as against utilitarianism, for example) that constraints and
obligations can not be somehow reduced to matters of value.
It is also
presupposed that all decision methods, suitable for requisite nuclear choices,
16.
are bound to apply discounting.
This is far from so : indeed Goodin argues that,
on the contrary, more appropriate decision rules do not allow discounting, and
discounting only works in practice with expected utility rules (such as underlie
cost-benefit and benefit-risk analyses), which are, he contends strictly
inapplicable for nuclear choices (since not all outcomes can be duly determined
and assigned probabilities, in the way that application of the rules requires.).
20
As the preceding arguments reveal, the discounting move often has the same
result as the unconstrained position.
If, for instance, we consider the cancer
example and reduce costs to payable compensation, it is evident that over a
sufficiently long period of time discounting at current prices would lead to the
conclusion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no
constraints.
In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off.
One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the application of
discount rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no
21
more than about 15 years,
and application of such rates would simply beg
the question against the interests and rights of future people.
Where there is
certain future damage of a morally forbidden type, for example, the whole method
of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would violate moral
constraints.
Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections
from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.
The distant
future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate
future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching
or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.
But
then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying
them against costs and benefits , it is evident that the interests of future
people, except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty,
must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people
where (much) higher probabilities are attached.
So in the case of conflict
between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain
benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much
lower probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant
future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present,
assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved.
But of course
it cannot be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits
are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking
poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent
risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to
obtain doubtful benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportunity
to maintain corporation profitability or to continue unnecessarily high energy
use.
And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or
evenly weighted,
17.
such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show
that the consigner’s action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the
profit, he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was
sufficiently large.
Such a cost-benefit or risk-benefit approach to moral and decision
problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where
different parties are concerned or to deal with cases of conflict of interest
or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly
yields counterintuitive results.
For example, it would follow on such principles
that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some,
innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from
it.
But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any simple or
general way from one party to another .
Transfers of this kind, of costs
and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g.
is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs on y - which are not
susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted in promotion
of nuclear energy, where costs to future people are sometimes dismissed with
the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits.
The limitations of transfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison,
heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear
risk, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel
or cigarette smoking.
In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the
activity are also, to an overwhelming extent, those who bear the serious health
costs and risks involved.
In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries
of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives
and health, but also that of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be
spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way
related to a person’s extent of use.
The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's
(happiness) sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties,
and the introduction of probability considerations - as in utilitarian decision
methods such as expected utility rules - does not change the principles involved
but merely complicates the analysis. One might further object to the probability
argument that probabilities involving distant future situations are not always
less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes,
and that the outcomes of some moral problems do not depend on a high level of
probability anyway.
reveals,
In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the train parable
that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically
on high probability assignments.
18.
Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important
ones used by philosophers, economists and others to argue for the position that we
cannot be expected to
distant future.
take serious account of the effects of our actions on the
There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of
separation, but frequently tangled up.
Both arguments are mistaken, the first
on a Priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds.
The first argument
is a generalised uncertainty argument which runs as follows:-
In contrast to
the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can
obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable,
fuzzy and highly speculative.
But we cannot base assessments of how we should
act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtain
able about the present which would indicate different action.
Therefore we must
regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future.
More formally and
crudely:
One only has obligations to the future if these
obligations are based on reliable information at present as regards the
distant future.
Therefore one has no obligations to the distant future.
This
first argument is essentially a variant on a sceptical argument in epistemology
concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace ’obligations' by
'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument above).
The main ploy is to
considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with
respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which
is required as the basis for moral consideration with respect to the present
and with respect to the future.
Associated with this is the attempt to suggest
a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future
on the one hand and the distant future on the other.
We shall not find, we
suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant
future and the adjacent future and the present, at least with respect to those
things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints.
We can
and constantly do act on the basis of such ""unreliable"" information, as the
sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels ""uncertainty""; for sceptic
proof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the
present and immediate future.
In moral situations in the present, action
often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities.
Consider again the train example.
We do not need to know for certain that the
container will break and the lethal gas escape.
In fact it does not even have
to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for
us to condemn the consigner's action.
risk of harm in this sort of case.
It is enough that there is a significant
It does not matter if the decreased well
being of the consigner is certain and that the prospects of the passengers
quite uncertain, the resolution of the problem is nevertheless clearly in favour
of the so-called ""speculative"" and ""unreliable"".
But if we do not require
certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why
should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future?
Why should
we require for the future, epistemic standards which the more familiar sphere of
moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet?
The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration
can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an eipstemic double standard.
But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference
between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples
interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences,
since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to
each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification.
The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument,
that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice
take the interests of future people into account because uncertainty about
the distant future is so gross that we canmot determine what the likely
consequences of actions on it will be and therefore, however good our intentions
to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to
ignore their interests.
Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible
hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for
choosing between them.
this way:-
The second uncertainty argument can be put alternatively
If moral principles are. like other principles, implicational in form,
that is of such forms as ""if x has character h then x is wrong, for every
(action) x”, then what the argument claims is that we cannot ever obtain the
information about future actions which would enable us to detach the
antecedent of the implication.
So even if moral principles theoretically
apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear
conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action action of the
It is
wrong to do x” type.
Many of the assumptions of the second argument can be conceded.
If
the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is
impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of
present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future
people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the
future, will in practice not be applicable to obtain any clear conclusions about
how to act.
on action.
Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints
However the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the
future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate.
Admittedly there is often
a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of
(contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the
20,
argument has to assume.
There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as
to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point,
which was noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty
is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in
some cases is the creation of a significant risk.
Again there is considerable
uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant,
but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance
to moral issues.
For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be
in a hundred years in names or footwear, or what flavours of ice cream people
will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially
if we consider 3000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred
years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own,
that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will
not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high
incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the
elimination from the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at
present makes it such a rich and interesting place.
For this sort of reason,
the second uncertainty argument should be rejected.
The case of nuclear waste
storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area
where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude
moral constraints on action, where we can ascertain if not absolute certainties
at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for
the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, 'especially
where spatially remote people are involved.
In particular there is not gross
indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses
about what may happen are as good as each other.
It is plain that nuclear waste
storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as is
evident from the train example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases
of this type to make moral constraints applicable.
In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can
see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to
write off probable or possible harm to future people as outside the scope of
proper consideration.
Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty
arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again
reminiscent of sceptical moves.
For example, we may be told that we cannot really
take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or
that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the
point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the
21.
things that would affect us.
But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a
sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there
is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are
morally committed to.
Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that
future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be
Even if one is
morons or forever plugged into enjoyment or other machines.
prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed -
according to which
only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are
eligible for moral consideration — what we are being handed in such arguments
as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility like the sceptic who says that solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a
facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he
hasn't looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. etc.
Neither the
contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing
that a lapse into universal moronity or universal—pleasure-machine escapism is
a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility.
We can contrast with
these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks
of escape of nuclear waste or decline
of a civilisation through destruction
of its resource base.
The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of
sceptical character are not real possibilities.
Another argument which may
consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is
acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future
people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case.
This is the argument that
future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for
nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material.
Let us grant
for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical
arguments may show that it is not).
This still does not affect the fact that there
is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant
risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible.
In just
the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer: that this appears to
be a live possibility, and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the
action of the firm earlier discussed, of producing a substance likely to cause
cancer in future people, morally admissible.
The fact that there was a real
possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show
that actions of these
sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty
of harm or a very high probability of it.
In such cases before such actions could
22.
be considered admissible what would be required is far more than a possibility,
22
real or not
- it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and
rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something
that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves.
The strategy of these and other uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then,
and may be brought out by looking yet again at the train example where the consigner
says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on
the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or
some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the train may break down and they
may all change to a different transport leaving the parcel behind, or the train
may crash killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak.
These are all possibilities of course, but there is no positive reason to believe
that they are any more than that, that is they are not live possibilities.
The
strategy is to stress such remote possibilities in order to create the false
impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real
possibility that the container will break should be treated in the same way as
these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great
as to preclude the consigner’s taking account of the passengers’ welfare and the
real possibility of harm from his parcel and thereby to excuse his action.
A
related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for
cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints.
This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty
of harm, or at least a very high probability of harm is required before an action
can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility
of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of
certainty or probability cannot be attained.
That is, the strategy draws
attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the
application of moral constraints.
But, as we have seen, this is often not so.
Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the
indeterminacy of the future.
In particular it is argued that the indeterminacy,
for example, with respect to the number and exact character of people at future
times, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into
account where there is a conflict with the present.
Since their numbers are
indeterminate and their interests unknown how, it is asked, can we weigh their
competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this
information is available in a more or less accurate form?
The question is raised
particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present
and future people, for example oil, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate.
Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the
claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take
account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by
23.
ignoring such factors.
Nor are distributional problems as large and
representative of a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency
to focus on them would suggest.
It can be conceded that there will be cases
where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very
difficult to resolve
or indeed irresoluble - a realistic ethical theory will
not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict
cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue,
e.g. the train example which is a conflict case of a type.
In particular,
there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of
interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general
probable characteristics of future people.
The crucial question which emerges is then:
are. there any features of
future people which would disqualify them from full moral consideration or
reduce their claims to such below those of present people?
principle None.
The answer is :
in
Prima facie, moral principles are universalisable, and lawlike,
in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example.
But universalisability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories
which are capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present:
in other words, a
theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects
as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people,
e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup, such as (white
skinned) humans, etc.
The only candidates for characteristics that would fairly
rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, such
as uncertainty and indeterminacy; but, as we have argued, it would be far too
sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a
general way.
These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g.
the determination of best probable or' practical course of action given only
present information).
In particular, they do not affect cases of the sort
being considered, nuclear development, where highly determinate or certain
information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be
harmed is not required, nor is certainty of damage.
To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability
principle is not required : it is enough that the temporal position of a person
cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral
24
consideration;
inversely, that it is without basis to discriminate morally
against a person in virtue of his temporal position.
As a result of this
23a,
universalizability, there are the same general obligations to future people as
to the present;
and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them
and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take
account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing
harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so
as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life.
and indeterminacy do not relieve us of these obligations.
Uncertainty
If in a closely
comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is
enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds
for requiring greater certainty of
harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not
provide, adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating
against future people.
Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to
futurity, the conclusion already tentatively reached, that proposals for nuclear
development in the present and likely future state of technology and practices
for future waste disposal are immoral.
Before we consider (in section VII.) the remaining escape route from this
conclusion, through appeal to overriding circumstances, it is important to
pick up the further case (which heavily reinforces the. tentative conclusion)
against nuclear development, since much of it relies on ethical principles
similar to those that underlie obligations to the future, and since it too
is commonly met by similar appeal to extenuating circumstances.
V. PROBLEMS OF SAFE NUCLEAR OPERATION: REACTOR EMISSIONS, AND CORP: MELTDOWN. The
ethical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to future creatures.
Just as remoteness in time does not erode obligations or entitlements to just
treatment, neither does location in space, or a particular geographical position.
First of all, the problem of nuclear waste disposal raises serious questions of
distributive justice not only across time, across generations, but also across
space.
Is one state or region entitled to dump its radioactive pollution in
another state’s or region’s yard or waters?
When that region receives no due
compensation (whatever that would amount to, in such a case), and the people
do not agree (though the leaders imposed upon them might)?
The answer, and the
arguments underpinning the answer, are both like those already given in arguing
to the tentative conclusion concerning the injustice of imposing radioactive
wastes upon future people.
But the cases are not exactly the same: USA and Japan
cannot endeavour to discount peoples of the Pacific in whose regions they propose
to drop some of their radioactive pollution in quite the same way they can
discount, people of two centuries hence.
(But what this consideration really
reveals is yet another flaw in the idea that entitlement to just treatment can
be discounted over time .)
Ethical issues of distributive justice, as to equity, concern not only
the spatio-temporal location of nuclear waste, but also arise elsewhere in the
assessment of nuclear development; in particular, as regards the treatment of
those in the neighbourhood of reactors, and, differently, as regards the
distribution of (alleged) benefits and costs from nuclear power across nations.
People living or working in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor are subject to
special costs and risks: firstly, radioactive pollution, due to the fact that
reactors discharge radioactive materials into the air and water near the plant,
25
25.
and secondly catastrophic accidents, such as (steam) explosion of a reactor.
An
immediate question is whether such costs and risks can be imposed, with any
ethical legitimacy, on these people, who frequently have little or no say in
their imposition, and who have mostly not been informed of any choices regarding
the ""risk/benefit tradeoffs” of nuclear technology.
That they are so imposed,
without local participation, indeed often without local input or awareness as
with local opposition, reveals one part of the antidemocratic face of nuclear
development, a part that nuclear development shares however with other largescale polluting industry, where local participation and questions, fundamental
to a genuine democracy of regional determination and popular sovereignty, are
commonly ignored or avoided.
The ’’normal” emission, during plant operation, of low level radiation
carries carcinogenic and mutagenic costs.
While there are undoubtedly costs,
there remains, however, substantial disagreement over the likely number of cancers
and precise extent of genetic damage induced by exposure to such radiation, over
the local health costs involved.
Under the Old Paradigm, which (illegitimately)
permits free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the ethical
issue directly raised is said to be: what extent of cancer and genetic damage,
if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nuclear power, and under
what conditions?
Under the Old Paradigm the issue is then translated into
decision-theoretic questions, such as to ’how to employ risk/benefit analysis
as a prelude to government regulation’ and ’how to determine what is an
26
acceptable level of risk/safety for the public.
The Old Paradigm attitude, reflected in the public policy of some countries
that have such policies, is that the economic benefits conferred by allowing
radiation emissions outweigh the costs of an increase in cancer and genetic
damage.
An example will reveal that such evaluations, which rely for what
appeal they have on a dubious utilitarianism, will not pass muster.
It is a
pity about Aunt Ethyl getting cancer, but it’s nice to have this air conditioner
working in summer.
Such frequently trivial and rather inessential benefits,
which may be obtained alternatively, e.g. by modification of houses, in no way
compensate for the agony of cancer.
The point is that the costs to one party
are not justified, especially when such benefits to other parties can be
alternatively obtained without such awful costs, and morally indefensible, being
imposed.
People, minorities, whose position is particularly compromised are those
who live within 50 miles of a nuclear plant. (Children, for example, are in a
26.
particularly vulnerable position, since they are several times more likely to
contract cancer through exposure than normal adults).
In USA, such people bear
a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the
population at large.
A non-negligible percentage (in excess of 3% of those
exposed for 30 years) of people in the area will die, allegedly for the sake
of the majority who are benefitted by nuclear power production (allegedly,
for the real reasons for nuclear development do not concern this silent
majority).
Whatever
charm the argument from overriding benefits had, even
under the Old Paradigm, vanishes once it is seen that there are alternative,
and in several respects less expensive, ways of delivering the real benefits
involved.
There are several other tricks used in showing that tiie imposition of
radiation on minorities, most of whom have little or no genuine voice in the
location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serious
losses, is quite (morally) acceptable.
One cheaper trick, deployed by the US
Atomic Energy Commission,^ is to suppose that it is permissible to double,
through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) radiation that a population
has
received with apparently negligible consequences, the argument being that
the additional amount (being equivalent to the ""natural” level) is also likely
to have negligible consequences.
The increased amounts of radiation - with
their large man-made component - are then accounted normal, and, of course,
so it is then claimed, what is normal is morally acceptable.
in this argument is sound.
None of the steps
Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no ill-
effects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affect a person s well-being,
and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger
one will, under such conditions, not be.
Finally, what is or has become normal,
e.g. two murders or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptable
In fact, even the USA, which has strict standards by comparison with most
other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits radiation emissions very
substantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is
worse than mere consideration of the standards would disclose.
Furthermore, the
monitoring of the standards ""imposed"" is entrusted to the nuclear operators
themselves, scarcely disinterested parties.
Public policy is determined not so
as to guarantee public health, but rather to serve as a
private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered.
public pacifier
while
27.
While radioactive emissions are an ordinary feature of reactor operation,
breakdown is, hopefully, not: an accident of magnitude is accounted, by official
definition, an ’extraordinary nuclear occurrence’.
But such accidents can happen,
3
and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island).
If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water)
reactors,
then the core melts and ’containment failure’ is likely, with the
result that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioactively contaminated.
In the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam
explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly
and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident, property damages
would exceed $17 billion and an area the size of Pennsylvania would be destroyed.
Modern nuclear reactors are about five times the size of the reactor for which
31
these conservative US government figures are given :
the consequences of a
similar accident with a modern reactor would accordingly be much greater still.
The consigner in risking the lives, well-being and property of the
passengers on the train has acted inadmissibly.
Does a government-sponsored
private utility act in a way that is anything other than much less responsible
in siting a nuclear reactor in a community, in planting such a dangerous package
on the community train.
The answer will be No, if the analogy holds good and the
consigners’ action is, as we would ordinarily
sible.
suppose, inadmissible and irrespon
The proponents of nuclear power have in effect argued to the contrary,
while at the same time endeavouring to shift the dispute out of the ethical arena
and into a technological dispute as to means (in accordance with the Old Paradigm).
It has been contended, firstly, what contrasts with the train example, that
there is no real possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident.
Indeed in the
32
influential Rassmussen report “ - which was extensively used to support public
confidence in US nuclear fission technology - an even stronger, an incredibly
strong, improbability claim was stated: namely, the likelihood of a catastrophic
nuclear accident is so remote as to be Almost) impossible.
The main argument for
this claim derives from the assumptions and estimates of the report itself.
These
assumptions like the claim are undercut by nuclear incidents that came very close
to accidents, incidents which reflect what happens in a reactor rather better than
mathematical models.
As with the storage of nuclear wastes, so with the operation of nuclear
reactors, it is important to look at what happens in the actual world of
technological limitatioms and human error, of waste leakage and reactor incidents
and quite possibly accidents, not in an ideal world far removed from the actual,
a technological dream world where there is no real possibility of a nuclear
28.
catastrophe.
In such an ideal nuclear world, where waste disposal were fool-proof
and reactors were accident-proof, things would no doubt be morally different.
But we do not live in such a world.
According to the Rasmussen report its calculation of extremely low accident
probabilities is based upon reasonable mathematical and technological assumptions
and is methodologically sound.
This is very far from being the case.
The under
lying mathematical methods, variously called ""fault tree analysis"" and
""reliability estimating techniques"", are unsound, because they exclude as
not
credible"" possibilities or as ""not significant"" branches that are real
possibilities, which may well be realised in the real world.
It is the
eliminations that are otherworldly.
In fact the methodology and data of the report
33
has been soundly and decisively criticized.
And it has been shown that there
is a real possibility, a non-negligible probability, of a serious accident.
It is contended, secondly, that even if there is a non-negligible
probability of a reactor accident, still it is acceptable, being of no greater
order than risks of accidents that are already socially accepted.
here we
encounter again that insidious engineering approach to morality built into
models of an economic cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk assessment
models, etc.
Risk assessment, a sophistication of transaction or trade-off
models, purports to provide a comparison between the relative risks attached to
different options, e.g. energy options, which settles their ethical status.
The following lines of argument are encountered in a risk assessment as applied
to energy options:
(i)
if option a imposes costs on fewer people than option b then option a is
preferable to option b;
(ii)
option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths,
injuries, etc.) which is less than that of option b, which is already accepted;
34
therefore option a is acceptable.
For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations is less than
the. likely number killed by cigarette smoking or in road accidents, which are
accepted: so nuclear power stations are acceptable.
A little reflection reveals
that this sort of risk assessment argument involves the same kind of fallacy
as transaction models.
It is far too simple-minded, and it ignores distributional
and other relevant aspects of the context.
In order to obtain an ethical
assessment we should need a much fuller picture and we should need to know at
least these things:- do the costs and benefits go to the same parties; and is
the person who undertakes the risks also the person who receives the benefits or
29,
primarily, as in driving or cigarette smoking, or are the costs imposed on other
parties who do not benefit?
It is only if the parties are the same in the case of
the options compared, and there are no such distributional problems, that a
comparison on such a basis would be valid.
This is rarely the case, and it is
not so in the case of risk assessments of energy options.
Secondly, does the
person incur the risk as a result of an activity which he knowingly undertakes
in a situation where he has a reasonable choice, knowing it entails the risk,
etc., and is the level of risk in proportion to the level of the relevant
activity, e.g. as in smoking?
Thirdly, for what reason is the risk imposed:
is it for a serious or a relatively trivial reason?
A risk that is ethically
acceptable for a serious reason may not be ethically acceptable for a trivial
reason.
Both the arguments (i) and (ii) are often employed in trying to justify
nuclear power. The second argument (ii) involves the fallacies of the first (i)
and an additional set, namely that of forgetting that the health risks in the
nuclear sense are cumulative, and already high if not, some say, too high.
The maxim ""If you want the benefits you have to accept the costs"" is
one thing and the maxim ""If I want the benefits then you have to accept the
costs (or some of them at least)"" is another and very different thing.
It is
a widely accepted moral principle, already argued for by way of examples and
already invoked, that one is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs
of a significant kind arising fron an activity which benefits oneself onto other
parties who are not involved in the activity and are not beneficiaries.
This
transfer principle is especially clear in cases where the significant costs
include an effect on life or health or a risk thereof, and where the benefit to
the benefitting party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature, because, e.g.
it can be substituted for or done without.
Thus, for instance, one is not
usually entitled to harm, or risk harming, another in the process of benefitting
oneself.
Suppose, for another example, we consider a village which produces, as a
result of an industrial process by which it lives , a noxious waste material which
is expensive and difficult to dispose of and yet creates a risk to life and health
if undisposed of.
Instead of giving up their industrial process and turning to
some other way of making a living such as farming the surrounding countryside,
they persist with this way of life but ship their problem on a one-way delivery
service, on the train, to the next village.
The inhabitants of this village are
then forced to face the problem either of undertaking the expensive and difficult
disposal process oor of sustaining risks to their own lives and health or else
leaving the village and their livelihoods.
transfer of costs as morally unacceptable.
Most of us would see this kind of
30.
From this arises a necessary condition for energy options: that to be
morally acceptable they should not involve the transfer of significant costs or
risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, do not use the energy source or
do not benefit correspondingly from its use.
Included in the scope of this
condition are not only future people and future generations (those of the next
villages) but neighbours of nuclear reactors, especially, as in third world
countries, neighbours who are not nuclear power users.
The distribution of
costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. on to non-beneficiaries is a
characteristic of certain widespread and serious forms of pollution, and is one
of its most objectionable moral features.
It is a corollary of the condition that we should not hand the world on to
our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it - the l_ramsmission.
principle.
For if we did then that would be a significant transfer of costs.
(The corollary can be independently argued for on the basis of certain ethical
theories).
VI. OTHER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND COSTS OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT,
ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR.
The problems already discussed by no means exhaust the
environmental, health and safety risks and costs in^or arising from?the nuclear
fuel cycle.
The full fuel cycle includes many stages both before and after
reactor operation, apart from waste disposal, namely mining, milling, conversion,
enrichment and preparation, reprocessing spent fuel, and transportation of
materials.
Several of these stages involve hazards.
Unlike the special risks
in the nuclear cycle - of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionable material,
and of the further proliferation of nuclear armaments - these hazards have
parallels, if not exact equivalents, in other very polluting methods of generating
power, e.g. ’workers in the uranium mining industry sustain ^the same risk of
fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry"".38 Furthermore, the
various (often serious) hazards encountered in working in some sectors of
uranium fabrication should be differently viewed from those resulting from location
I
for instance from already living where a reactor is built or wastes are dumped.
For an occupation is, in principle at
any rate, chosen (as is occupational
relocation), and many types of hazards incurred in working with radioactive
material are now known in advance of choice of such an occupation, with where
one already lives things are very different.
The uranium-miner s choice of
occupation can be compared with the airline pilot’s choice, whereas the Pacific
Islander’s ""fact"" of location cannot be.
The social issue of arrangements that
contract occupational choices and opportunities and often at least ease people
into hazardous occupations such as uranium or tin or coal mining (where the
risks, in contrast to airline piloting, are mostly not duly compensated), while
very important, is not an issue newly produced by nuclear associated occupations.
31.
Other social and environmental problems - though endemic where large-scale
industry operates in societies that are highly inegalitarian and include sectors
that are far from affluent - are more irdtimately linked with the nuclear power
cycle.
Though pollution is a common and generally undesirable component of
large-scale industrial operation, radioactive pollution, such as uranium mining
for instance produces, is especially a legacy of nuclear development, and a
specially undesirable one, as enormous rectification estimates for dead radio
active lands and waterways reveal.
Though sabotage is a threat to many large
industries, so that modern factory complexes are often guarded like concentration
camps (but from us on the outside), sabotage of a nuclear reactor can have dire
consequences, of a different order of magnitude from most industrial sabotage
(consider again the effects of core meltdown).
Though theft of material from more
dubious enterprises such as munitions works can pose threats to populations at
large and can assist terrorism, no thefts for allegedly peaceful enterprises
pose problems of the same order as theft of fissionable material.
No other
industry produces materials which so readily permit of fabrication into such
massive explosives.
No other industry is, to sum it up, so vulnerable on so
many fronts.
In part to reduce it£ vulnerability, in part because of its long and
continuing association with military activities, the nuclear industry is subject
to, and encourages, several practices which (certainly given their scale) run
counter to basic features of free and open societies, crucial features such as
personal liberty, freedom of association and of expression, and free access to
information.
These practices include secrecy, restriction of information,
formation of special police and guard forces, espionage, curtailment of civil
liberties.
Already operators of nuclear installations are given extraordinary
powers, in vetting employees, to investigate the background and
activities not only of employees but also of their families and
sometimes even of their friends. The installations themselves
become armed camps, which especially offends British sensibilities.
The U.K. Atomic Energy (Special Constables) Act of 1976 created a
special armed force to guard nuclear installations and made it
answerable ... to the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority.
■JLhee-e- developments^in the IJnd t^d
—and worjc in West Gcmafiy-ji presage
along with nuclear development increasingly authoritarian and anti-democratic
societies.
That nuclear development appears to force such political consequences
tells heavily against it.
32.
Nuclear development is further indicted politically by the direct
connection of nuclear power with nuclear war.
It is fortunately true that
ethical questions concerning nuclear war - for example, whether a nuclear war
is justified, or just, under any circumstances, and if so what circumstances -
are distinguishable from those concerning nuclear power.
Undoubtedly, however,
the spread of nuclear power is substantially increasing the technical means
for engaging in nuclear war and so, to that extent, the opportunity for, and
chances of, nuclear engagement.
Since nuclear wars are never accountable
positive goods, but are at best the lesser of major evils, nuclear wars are
always highly ethically undesirable.
The spread
of nuclear power accordingly
expands the opportunity for, and chances of, highly undesirable consequences.
Finally the latter, so increasing these chances and opportunities, is itself
undesirable, and therefore what leads to it, nuclear development, is also
undesirable.
The details and considerations that fill out this argument,
from nuclear war against nuclear development, are many.
They are firstly
technical, that it is a relatively straightforward and inexpensive matter to
make nuclear explosives given access to a nuclear power plant? secondly political,
that nuclear engagements once instituted
likely to escalate and that those
who control (or differently are likely to force access to) nuclear power plants
do not shrink from nuclear confrontation and are certainly prepared to toy with
nuclear engagement (up to ’’strategic nuclear strikes” at least); and thirdly
ethical, that wars invariably have immoral consequences, such as massive
damage to involved parties, however high sounding their justification is.
Nuclear wars are certain to be considerably worse as regards damage inflicted
than any previous wars (they are likely to be much worse than all previous
wars put together), because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear
weapons, and the extent of spread of their radioactive effects, and because
of the expected rapidity and irreversibility of any such confrontations.
The supporting considerations are, fourthly, drawn from decision theory, and
are designed to show that the chances of such undesirable outcomes is itself
undesirable.
The core argument is in brief this (the argument will be
elaborated in section VIII):- Energy choice between alternative options is
a case of decision making under uncertainty, because in particular of the gross
uncertainties involved in nuclear development.
In cases of this type the
appropriate rational procedure is to compare worst consequences of each
alternative, to reject those alternatives with the worst of these worst
consequences (this is a pretty uncontroversial part of the maximin rule which
enjoins selection of the alternative with the best worst consequences).
The
nuclear alternative has, in particular because of the real possibility of a nuclear
war, the worst worst consequences and is accordingly a particularly undesirable
alternative.
33.
VII. CONFLICT ARGUMENTS, AND UNCOVERING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF NUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENT.
As with nuclear war, so given the cumulative case against nuclear
development, only one justificatory route remains open, that of appeal to
important overriding circumstances.
That appeal, to be ethically acceptable,
must go far beyond merely economic considerations.
For, as already observed,
the consigner’s action cannot be justified by purely economistic arguments,
such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village would be more
prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable
changes would otherwise be needed.
The transfer principle on which this
assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious
risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in
particular, applied to the nuclear case.
For this reason the economistic
arguments which are those most commonly advanced under the Old Paradigm to promote
nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity
utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring
of employment, investment and consumption - do not even begin to show that the
nuclear alternative is an acceptable one.
Even if these economistic assumptions
about benefits to present people were correct ~ it will be contended that most of
them are not - the arguments would fail because economics (like the utilitarianism
from which it characteristically derives) has to operate within the framework of
moral constraints, and not vice versa.
What do have to be considered are however moral conflict arguments, that is
arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable (nuclear)
alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only
possible outcome, and
will ensue.
For example, in the train parable, the
consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is taken his
village will starve.
It is by no means clear that even such a justification
as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is
high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others,
but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps
hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances.
Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing
commitments to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people,
both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future
significant risk of serious harm.
The structure of such moral conflict arguments
is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of
alternatives (or at least practical alternatives) and upon showing that the only
alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable
ones.
If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to
be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument - for
example, if in the village case it turns out that the villagers have another option
34.
to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some
other way - then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched.
Just
such a suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument
designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than
the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments
as well.
In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentation of
false dichotomies.
A first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding
obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of
industrialised countries.
Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed,
would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence
we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialised
nations.
The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination
either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world.
There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase
unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very
much available
capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally
poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through
encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use.^ The argument that nuclear
energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing.
Nuclear energy is
both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it
requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists
and engineers, but creates negligible local employment, and depends for its
feasibility upon, what is largely lacking, established electricity transmission
systems and back-up facilities and sufficient electrical appliances to plug into
the system.
Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised
entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political
41
structures which are a large part of the problem.
The fact that nuclear energy
is not in the interests of the people of the third world does not of course
mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the
westernised and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these
countries are usually organised, and wanted often for military purposes.
It
is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may
make in the name of the poor.
35.
The poverty argument is then a fraud.
help the poor.
Nuclear energy will not be used to
Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries
there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of
developing other energy sources, alternatives some of which offer far better
prospects for helping the poor.
It can no longer be pretended that there is no alternative to nuclear
development: indeed nuclear development is itself but a bridging, or stop-gap,
procedure on route to solar or perhaps fusion development.
And there are various
alternatives: coal and other fossil fuels, geothermal, and a range of solar
options (including as well as narrowly solar, wind, water, tidal and plant power),
42
each possibly in combination with conservation measures.
Despite the availability
of alternatives, it may still be pretended that nuclear development is necessary
for affluence (what will emerge is that it is advantageous for the power and
affluence of certain select groups).
Such an assumption really underlies part
of the poverty argument, which thus amounts to an elaboration of the trickledown argument (much favoured within the Old Paradigm setting).
runs:-
For the argument
Nuclear development is necessary for (continuing and increasing)
affluence.
Affluence inevitably trickles down to the poor.
development benefits the poor.
Therefore nuclear
First, the argument does not on its own show
anything specific about nuclear power: for it works equally well if ’energy'
is substituted for ’nuclear’.
It has also to be shoum, what the next major
argument will try to claim, that nuclear development is unique among energy
alternatives in increasing affluence.
The second assumption, that affluence
Inevitably trickles down, has now been roundly refuted, both by recent historical
data, which show increasing affluence (e.g. in terms of GNP averaged per capita)
coupled with increasing poverty in several countries, both developing and
developed, and through economic models which reveal how ’affluence” can increase
without redistribution occurring.
Another major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set
of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people.
We have,
it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions
which our culture has developed.
Unless our high-technology, high energy
industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and
traditions will fall into decay or be swept away.
The argument is essentially
that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth
it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out.
Future people will be the losers.
4:
36.
The lights-going-out argument does raise questions as to what is valuable
in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary for a good society.
But for the most part these large questions, which deserve much fuller
examination, can be avoided.
The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely
uncritical position with respect to present high-technology societies, apparently
assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable.
It assumes that technologic
society is unmodifiable, that it cannot be changed in the direction of energy
conservation or alternative (perhaps high technology) energy sources without
collapse.
It has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited
supplies of energy - such as nuclear and only nuclear power is alleged to furnish -
are essential to maintain this whole.
These assumptions are hard to accept.
The assumption that technological
society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so — after all it has
survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technologic^
restructuring and consumption modification.
If western society's demands for energy
are totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a
program of increasing destruction, but one might ask what use its culture could
be to future people who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction,
lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of
contemporary society.
There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness;
but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain
existing high-technological society and its political institutions, but rather,
what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political
institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things.
While it may be
easy to argue that high energy consumption centrally controlled is necessary to
maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue that it
is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably
that we have a duty to pass on to the future.
The evidence, for instance from history, is that no very high level of
material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable.
There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and
resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own.
But even
if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we should
argue, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least,
in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-going-out argument are wrong.
No enormous reduction of well-being is required to consume less energy than at
37.
present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of
44
consumption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.
What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the
lights going out in western civilisation, but to enable the lights to go on
burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of
the Energy Extravaganza.
In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy
consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy
is obtained by nuclear fission means, be positively inimical to it.
A society
which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralised, controlled
and garrisoned, capital-
and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one
which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces
which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert
enormous power over the political system and over people’s lives, even more
than they do at present.
Such a society would, almost inevitably tend to become
authoritarian and increasingly anti-democratic, as an outcome, among other
things, of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear
45
situation.
Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations
some of the worst aspects of our society - the consumerism, alienation,
destruction of nature, and latent authoritarianism - while many valuable
aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for
personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished:
political freedom, for example, is a high price to pay for consumerism and
energy extravagance.
But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in
our society, presumably, that we have some obligation to pass on to the future,
and if possible enhance.
Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives,
alternative social, economic and political choices, which do not involve such
unacceptable consequences, are available.
The alternative to the high technology-
nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable,
but either the adoption of an available alternative such as coal for power or,
rather, the development of alternative technologies and lifestyles which offer
far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is
valuable in our society than the highly centralised nuclear option.
The lights-
going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it
also is based on a false dichotomy.
38,
Thus the further escape route, the appeal to moral conflict, is, like the
If then we apply - as we have argued we should -
appeal to futurity, closed.
the same standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the
present, the conclusion that large-scale nuclear development is a crime against
the future is inevitable.
Closed also, in the same way, are the escape routes
to other arguments — from reactor melt-down, radiation emissions, and so on for rejecting nuclear development as morally unacceptable, for saying that it is
not only a moral crime against the distant future but also a crime against the
present and immediate future.
In sum, nuclear development is morally
unacceptable on several grounds.
A corollary is that only political arrangements
that are morally unacceptable will support the impending nuclear future.
VIII. A NUCLEAR FUTURE IS NOT A RATIONAL CHOICE, EVEN IN OLD PARADIGM TERMS.
The argument thus far, to anti-nuclear conclusions, has relied upon, and
defended premisses that would be rejected under the Old Paradigm; for example,
such theses as that the interests and utilities of future people are not
discounted (in contrast to the temporally-limited utilitarianism of market-
centred economic theory), and that serious costs and risks to health and life
cannot admissibly be simply transferred to uninvolved parties (in contrast
to the transfer and limited compensation assumptions of mainstream economic
theory).
To close the case, arguments will now be outlined which are designed
to show that even within the confines of the Old Paradigm, choosing the nuclear
future is not a rational choice.
Large-scale nuclear development is not just something that happens, it
requires, on a continuing basis, an immense input of capital and energy.
Such
investment calls for substantial reasons; for the investment should be, on
Old Paradigm assumptions, the best among feasible alternatives to given economic
ends.
Admittedly so much capital has already been invested in nuclear fission
research and development, in marked contrast to other newer rival sources or
power, that there is strong political incentive to proceed - as distinct from
requisite reasons for further capital and energy inputs.
The reasons can be
divided roughly into two groups, front reasons, which are the reasons given
(out), and which are, in accordance with Old Paradigm percepts, publicly
economic (in that they are approved for public consumption), and the real
reasons, which involve private economic factors and matters of power and social.
control.
The main argument put up, an economic growth argument, upon which
variations are played, is the following version of the lights-going-out argument
(with economic growth duly standing in for material wealth, and even for what is
Nuclear power is necessary to sustain economic growth.
valuable!):-
Economic
growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e.g. to increase the size of
the pie, to avoid or postpone redistribution problems, and connected social
Therefore nuclear power is desirable.
The first premiss is
A6
part of US energy policy,
and the second premiss is supplied by standard
unrest, etc.).
economics textbooks.
But both premisses are defective, the second because
what is valuable in economic growth can be achieved by selective economic growth,
which jettisons the heavy social and environmental costs carried by unqualified
economic growth.More to the point, since the second premiss is an assumption
of the dominant paradigm, the first premiss (or rather an appropriate and less
vulnerable restatement of it) fails even on Old Paradigm standards.
For of course
nuclear power is not necessary given that there are other, perhaps costlier
alternatives.
The premiss usually defended is some elaboration of the premiss :
Nuclear power is the economically best way to sustain economic growth, ’economically
best’ being filled out as 'most efficient’, ’cheapest’, ’having most favourable
benefit-cost ratio’, etc.
Unfortunately for the argument, and for nuclear
development schemes, nuclear power is none of these things
a good deal of economic cheating (easy to do) is done.
decisively, unless
Much data, beginning with
the cancellation of nuclear plant orders, can^ be assembled to show as much.
Yet
the argument requires a true premiss, not an uncertain or merely possible one, if
it is to succeed and detachment is to be permitted at all, and evidently true
premisses
if the argument is to be decisive.
The data to be summarised splits into two parts, public (governmental)
analyses, and private (utility) assessments.
Virtually all available data
concerns the USA; in Europe, West and East, true costs of uniformly ""publicly^
controlled” nuclear power
are generally not divulged.
Firstly, the capital costs of nuclear plants, which have been rising much
more rapidly than inflation, now exceed those of coal-fired plants.
Romanoff
has estimated that capital costs of a nuclear generator (of optimal capacity)
49
will exceed comparable costs of a coal-fired unit by about 26% in 1985.
And
capital costs are only one part of the equation that now tell
against private utility purchase of new nuclear plants.
rather decisively
Another main factor
is the poor performance and low reliability of nuclear generators.
Coney showed
that nuclear plants can only generate about half the electricity they were
designed to produce, and that when Atomic Energy Commission estimates of relative
costs of nuclear and coal power, which assumed that both operated at 80% of design
capacity, were adjusted accordingly, nuclear generated power proved to be far more
40.
expensive than estimated.
The discrepancy between actual and estimated
capacity
is especially important because a plant with an actual capacity factor of 55%
produced electricity at a cost about 25% higher than if the plant had performed
at the manufacturers’ projected capacity rate of 70-75%.
The low reliability
of nuclear plants (per kilowatt output) as compared with the superior
reliability of smaller coal-fired plants adds to the case, on conventional economic
grounds of efficiency and product production costs, against nuclear power.
These unfavourable assessments are from a private (utility) perspective,
before the very extensive public subsidization of nuclear power is duly taken
into account.
The main subsidies are through research and development, by way
of insurance (under the important but doubtfully constitutional Price-Anderson
Act^), in enrichment, and in waste management.
It has been estimated that
charging such costs to the electricity consumer would increase electricity bills
for nuclear power by at least 25% (and probably much more).
When official US cost/benefit analyses favouring nuclear power over
coal are examined, it is found that they inadmissibly omit several of the public
costs involved in producing nuclear power.
For example, the analyses ignore
waste costs on the quite inadmissible ground that it is not known currently
what the costs involved are.
But even using actual waste handling costs (while
wastes await storage) is enough to show that coal power is preferable to nuclear.
When further public costs, such as insurance against accident and for radiation
damage, are duly taken into account, the balance is swung still further in
favour of alternatives to nuclear and
against nuclear power.
In short, even on
proper Old Paradigm accounting, the nuclear alternative should be rejected.
Nuclear development is not economical, it certainly seems; it has been
kept going not through its clear economic viability, but by massive public
subsidization, of several types.
In USA, to take a main example where
information is available, nuclear development is publicly supported through
heavily subsidized or sometimes free research and development, .th«xugh the
Price-Anderson Act^ which sharply limits both private and public liability,
i.e. which in effect provided the insurance subsidy making corporate nuclear
development economically feasible, and through government agreement to handle all
radioactive wastes.
While the Old Paradigm strictly construed cannot support uneconomical
developments, contemporary liberalisation of the Paradigm does allow for
uneconomic projects, seen as operated in the public interest, in such fields as
social welfare.
Duly admitting social welfare and some
equity
principles
41.
in the distribution of wealth (not necessarily of pollution) leadsjtne modern
version of the Old Paradigm, called the-Modified Old Paradigm.
The main
changes from the Old Paradigm are (as with state socialism) as emphasis of
economic factors, e.g. individual self-help is down-played, wealth is to a
small extent redistributed, e.g. through taxation, market forces are regulated
or displaced (not in principle eliminated, as with state socialism).
Now it
has been contended - outrageous though it should now seem - that nuclear power
is in the public interest as a means to various sought public ends, for example,
aparL^from those already mentioned such as energy for growth and cheap
electricity, and such as plentiful power for heating and cooking and appliance
brown-outs and the like.1
use, avoidance of shortages, rationing,
Since
4^
alternative power sources, such as coal, could serve s^me ends given power was
supplied with suitable extravagance, the
argument has again to show that the
choice of nuclear power over other alternatives is best in the requisite
respects, in serving the public interest.
Such an argument is a matter for
decision theory, under which head cost-benefit analyses which rank alternatives
also fall as special cases.
Decision theory purports to cover theoretically the field of choice
between alternatives; it is presented as the
theory which
deals with the^
problem of choosing one. course of action among several possible courses .
Thus the choice of alternative modes of energy production, the energy choice
problem, becomes an exercise
in decision theory; and the nuclear choice is
often’justified” in Old Paradigm terms through appeal to decision theory.
But though decision theory is in principle comprehensive, as soon as it is put
to work in such practical cases as energy choice,
it is very considerably
contracted in scope, several major assumptions are surreptitiously imported,
and what one is confronted with is a
depauperate
theory drastically
pruned down to conform with the narrow utilitarianism of mainstream economic
theory.
The extent of reduction can be glimpsed by comparing, to take one
important example, a general optimisation model for decision (where
uncertainty is not gross) with comparable decision theory methods, such as the
expected utility model.
The general model for best choice among alternatives
specifies maximisation of expected value subject to constraints, which may
include
ethical constraints excluding certain alternatives under given
conditions.
Expected utility
models demote value to utility, assuming thereby
measurability and transference properties that may not obtain, and eliminate
constraints altogether (absorbing what is forbidden, for example, as having a
high disutility, but one that can be compensated for nonetheless).
Thus, in
particular,
ethical constraints against nuclear development are replaced, in
Old Paradigm fashion, by allowance in principle for compensation for damage
sustained.
Still it is with decision making in Old Paradigm terms that we
are now embroiled, so no longer at issue are the defective (neo-classical)
economic
assumptions made in the theory, for example as to the assessment of
everything to be taken into account through utility (which comes down to
monetary terms ■ everything worth accounting has a price), and as to the legitimacy
of transferring with limited compensation risks and costs to involved parties.
The energy choice problem is, so it has commonly been argued in the
assumed Old Paradigm framework, a case of decision under uncertainty.
It is not a
case of decision under risk (and so expected utility models are not applicable),
because some possible outcomes are so uncertain that, in contrast to the case of
risk, no (suitably objective) quantifiable probabilities can be assigned to them.
Items that are so uncertain are taken to include nuclear war and core meltdown
of a reactor, possible outcomes of nuclear development :
widespread radio
active pollution is, by contrast, not uncertain.
The correct rule for decision under uncertainty is, in the case of energy
choice, maximin, to maximize the minimum payoff, so it is sometimes contended.
In fact, once again, it is unnecessary for present purposes to decide which
energy option is selected, but only whether the nuclear option is rejected.
Since competing selection rules tend to deliver the same
rejections for
options early rejected as the nuclear options, a convergence in the rejection of
the nuclear option can be effected.
All rational roads lead, not to Rome,
but to rejection of the nuclear option.
A further convergence can be effected
also, because the best possible (economic) outcomes of such leading options as
coal and a hydroelectric mix are very roughly of the same order as the nuclear
option (so Elster contends, and his argument can be elaborated). Under these
o
conditions complex decision rules
(such as the Arrow-Horwicz rule) which take
---- ----------outcomes
------------ ------4^-^
account of both best possible and ^ost- possible
under
reduce to the maximin
rule.
each option
Whichever energy option is selected under the
maximum rule, the nuclear option is certainly rejected since there are options
where worst outcomes are
substantially better
than that of the nuclear
option (just, consider the scenario if the nuclear nightmare, not the nuclear
dream, is realised).
Further application of the rejection rule will reject
the fossil fuel (predominantly coal) option, on the basis of estimated effects
on the earth’s climate from burning massive quantities of such fuels.
43.
Although the rejection rule coupled with
position several rivals to maximin
each
proposed,
enjoys a privileged
for decision under uncertainty have been
of which has associated rejection rules.
rules, such as the risk- added
which ’assesses
maximin
Some of these
reasoning criticised by Goodin (pp.507-8),
the riskiness of a policy in terms of the increment of
risk it adds to those pre-existing in the status quo, rather than in terms of
the absolute value of the risk associated with the policy’ are decidedly
and rather than offering a
rational
decision procedure appears to
afford protection of the (nuclear) status quo.
What will be argued, or rather
dubious,
what Goodin has in effect argued for us, is that wherever one of these rival
rules is applicable, and not dubious, it leads to rejection of the nuclear
option.
For example, the keep-options-open or allow-for-reversibility
(not an entirely unquestionable rule
rule
’of strictly limited applicability’)
excludes the nuclear option because ’nuclear plants and their by-products have
an air of irreversibility ... ’’One cannot
the
way one can abandon
simply abandon
a coal-fired plant""’
(p.506).
a nuclear reactor
The compare-the-
alternatives rule* in ordinary application, leads back to the cost-benefit
assessments, which,
as already observed, tell decisively against a nuclear
option when costing is done properly.
The maximise-sustainable-benefits rule,
which ’directs us to opt for the policy producing the highest level of net
benefits which can be sustained indefinitely’, ’decisively favours renewable
Other lesser rules Goodin discusses,
sources’, ruling out the nuclear option.
which have not really been applied in the nuclear debate, and which lead yet
further from the Old Paradigm framework,
harm-avoidance and protecting-the-
vulnerable. also yield/ the same nuclear-excluding results.
Harm-avoidance,
in particular, points ’decisively in favour of ""alternative"" and ""renewable""
energy sources ... combined with strenuous efforts at energy conservation’
The upshot is evident: whatever reasonable decision rule is adopted
(p.442).
the result is the same, a
standards.
nuclear choice is rejected, even by Old Paradigm
Nor would reversion to an expected utility analysis alter this
conclusion; for such analyses are but glorified cost-benefit analyses, with
probabilities duly multiplied in, and the
conclusion
is as before from
cost-benefit considerations, against a nuclear choice.
The Old Paradigm does not, it thus appears, sustain the nuclear
juggernaut: nor does its Modification.
The real reasons for the continuing
development program and the heavy commitment to the program have to be sought
elsewhere, outside the Old Paradigm, at least as preached.
It is, in any case,
sufficiently evident that contemporary economic behaviour does not accord with
Old Paradigm percepts, practice does not accord with neo-classical economic
theory nor, to consider the main modification, with social
theory.
democratic
There are, firstly, reasons of previous commitment, when nuclear
power, cleverly promoted at least, looked a rather cheaper and safer deal,
and certainly profitable one:
corporations so committed are understandably
keen to realise returns on capital already invested.
There are also typical
self-interest reasons for commitment to the program, that advantages accrue to
some, like those whose field happens to be nuclear engineering, that profits
accrue to some, like giant corporations, that are influential in political
affairs, and as a spin-off profits accrue to others, and so on.
There are.
just as important, ideological reasons, such as a belief in the control of
both political and physical power by technocratic-entreprenial elite, a belief
in social control from above, control which nuclear power offers far more than
alternatives, some of which (vaguely) threaten to alter the power base, a faith
in the unlimitedness of technological enterprise, and nuclear in particular,
so that any real problems that arise will be solved as development proceeds.
Such beliefs are especially conspicuous in the British scene, among the
governing and technocratic classes.
Within contemporary corporate capitalism,
these sorts of reasons for nuclear development are intimately linked, because
those whose types of enterprise benefit substantially from nuclear development
are commonly those who hold the requisite beliefs.
along with its state
It is then, contemporary corporate
enterprise image, that fuels the nuclear juggernaut.
To be sure, corporate
capitalism, which is the political economy largely thrust upon us in western
nations, is not necessary for a nuclear future; a totalitarian state of the
type such capitalism often supports in the third world will suffice.
But,
unlike a hypothetical state that does conform to precepts of the Old Paradigm,
it is sufficient for a nuclear future - evidently, since we are well embarked
on such a future.
The historical route by which the world reached its present advanced
threshold to a nuclear future confirms this diagnosis.
split into two main cases, the national
This diagnosis can be
development of nuclear power in the
US? and the international spread of nuclear technology for which the US has been
largely responsible.
the
Eastern bloc is
which had in 1977 only
nuclear plants.
By comparison with the West, nuclear power production in
and is largely confined to the Soviet Union
small
about
one -sixth
the wattage output of
US
Nuclear development in USSR has been, of course, a state
controlled and subsidized venture, in which there has been virtually
no public
participation or discussion; but Russian technology has not been exported else
where to any great extent.
American technology has.
45.
The 60s were, because of the growth in electricity demand, a period of
great expansion of the electrical utilities in the US.
These companies were
encouraged to build nuclear plants, rather than coal or oil burning plants,
for several state controlled or influenced reasons:-
Firstly, owing to
governmental regulation procedures the utilities could (it then seemed) earn
a higher rate of profit on a nuclear plant than a fossil fuel one.
Secondly,
the US government arranged to meet crucial costs and risks of nuclear operation,
and in this way, and more directly through its federal agencies, actively
encouraged a nuclear choice and nuclear development.
In particular, state
limitation of liability and shouldering of part of insurance for nuclear
accidents and state arrangements to handle nuclear wastes were what made
profitable private utility operation appear feasible and resulting in nuclear
investment.
In the 70s, though the state subsidization
continued, the private
’high costs of construction combined with low capacity
cO
,
factors and poor reliability have wiped out the iyst advantage that nuclear power
picture changed :
had enjoyed in the US.
Much as the domestic nuclear market in the US is controlled by a few
corporations, so the world market is dominated by a few countries, predominantly
and first of all the US, which through its two leading nuclear companies,
Westinghouse and General Electric, has been the major exporter of nuclear
55
technology. '
These companies were enabled to gain entry into European and
subsequently world markets by US foreign policies, basically the ""Atoms for
Peace"" program supplemented by bilateral agreements providing for US technology,
research, enriched uranium and financial capital.
’The US offered a Estate
subsidized] nuclear package that Europe could not refuse and with which the
British could not compete*.
In the 70s the picture of US domination of Common
Market nuclear technology had given way to subtler influence: American companies
held
dudlJug with relevant governments) substantial interests in European
and Japanese nuclear companies and held licences on the technology which remained
largely American.
Meanwhile in the 60s and 70s the US entered into bilateral
agreements for civilian use of atomic energy with many other countries, for
example, Argentina, Brasil, Columbia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Portugal, South Africa,
Taiwan, Turkey, Venezuela, South Vietnam.
The US proceeded,
Spain,
in this way, to ship
nuclear technology and nuclear materials in great quantities round the world.
It also proceeded to spread nuclear technology through the International Atomic
Energy Agency, originally designed to control and safeguard nuclear operations,
but most of whose *budget and activities ... have gone to promote nuclear
activities’.
46.
A main reason for the promotion and sales pressure on Third World
countries has been the failure of US domestic market and industrial world
markets for reactors.
Less developed countries
offer a new frontier where reactors can be built with
easy public financing, where health and safety regulations
are loose and enforcement rare, where public opposition
is not permitted and where weak and corrupt regimes offer
easy sales.
[For]
... the US has considerable leverage
with many of these countries. We know from painful
experience that many of the worst dictatorships in the planet
would not be able to stand without overt and covert US support.
Many of those same regimes
are now^ pursuing
the
nuclear path, for all the worst reasons.
It is evident from this sketch of the ways and means of reactor
proliferation that not only have practices departed far from the framework
of the Old Paradigm and five social Modification, but that the practices (or
corporate capitalism and associated third world imperialism) involve much
that is ethically unacceptable, whether
percepts;
for principles such as
by older, modified, or alternative
thos
and self-determination are grossly violated.
IX. SOCIAL OPTIONS : SHALLOWER AND DEEPER ALTERNATIVES.
The future energy
option that is most often contrasted with nuclear power, namely coal power,
while no doubt preferable to nuclear power, is hardly acceptable.
For it
carries with it the likelihood of serious (air) pollution and associated
phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the
despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which result from its use
in meeting very high projected consumption figures.
Such an option would also
fail, it seems, to meet the necessary transfer condition, because it would
impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to
some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production
.
i
58
and replacement.
To these conventional main options a third is often added which emphasizes
softer and more benign technologies, such as those of solar energy and, in
Northern Europe, hydroelectricity.
The deeper choice, which even softer paths
tend to neglect, is not technological but social, and involves both
conservation measures and the restructuring of production away from energy
intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic
and nonconsumeristic futures.
These more fundamental choices between social
alternatives, conventional technologically-oriented discussion of energy options
tends to be obscure.
It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet
47.
given and unexamined goals (as the Old Paradigm would imply), but also a matter
of examining the goals.
That is, we are not merely faced with the question of
comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given
demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this
with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the
matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of a society that creates
them.
It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these
alleged needs conceived of as inevitable and unchangeable.
(Hence there are
solar ways of producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants, as opposed to
nuclear ways.)
Naturally this is not to deny that these softer options are
superior because of the ethically unacceptable features of the harder options.
But it is doubtful that any technology, however benign in principle, will
be likely to leave a tolerable world for the future if it is expected to meet
unbounded and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands.
Even the more benign
technologies such as solar technology could be used in a way which creates costs
for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being handed
on to them.
Consider, for example, the effect on the world’s forests, which are
commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of methanol or of
electricity by woodchipping (as already planned by forest authorities and
contemplated by many other energy organisations).
While few would object to the
use of genuine waste material for energy production, the unrestricted exploitation
of forests - whether it goes under the name of ’’solar energy'
or not - to meet
ever increasing energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world s
already hard-pressed natural forests.
The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the
forests are often dismissed, even by soft technologicalists, by the simple
expedient of waving around the label 'renewable resources'.
Many forests are
in principle renewable, it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of
exploitation, but in fact there are now very few forestry operations anywhere
in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense
of the renewal of all their values.
In many regions too the rate of
exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total
decline is widely thought to be imminent if not already well advanced.
It certainly
has begun in many regions, and for many forest types (such as rainforest types)
which are now, and very rapidly, being lost for the future.
The adaition of a
major further and not readily limitable demand pressure, that for energy,
on top of present pressures is one which anyone with a realistic appreciation
of the conduct of contemporary forestry operations, who is also concerned with
long-term conservation of the forests and remaining natural communities, must
regard with alarm.
The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes,
48.
resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, again for energy purposes, would be extensive and devastating
erosion in steeper lands and tropical areas, desertification in more arid
regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural
ecosystems.
Some of us do not want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass
on - a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one
poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products.
In short, a mere
switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any
more basic structural and social change is inadequate.
Nor is such a simple technological switch likely to be achieved.
It is
not as if political pressure could oblige the US government to stop its nuclear
program (and that of the countries it influences, much of the world), in the
way pressure appeared
to succeed in halting the Vietnam war.
While without
doubt it would be good if this could be accomplished, it is very unlikely
given the integration of political powerholders with those sponsoring
nuclear
development.
The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social
structure which promotes consumerism, consumption far beyond genuine needs, and
an economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensive
modes of production.
This means, for instance, trying to change a social
structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work force,
are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control
and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive
very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods
and services.
A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from
products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction
in work and in social relations and other activities, is virtually bound to oe
one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption.
(A production
system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and non-
genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.)
Consumption frequently
becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas.
The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the larger set of
adjustments involved in socially implementing the New Paradigm, the
move away
from consumerism is for example part of the more general shift from materialism
and materialist values.
The social change option tends to be obscured in most discussions of
energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it does
question underlying values of current social arrangements.
The conventional
discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or
needs ^) as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can
49.
be most profitably employed to meet them.
This effectively presents a false
choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social
context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly
taken as unchallengeable and unchangeable.
It is commonly argued by representatives
The point is readily illustrated.
of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth
of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners,
power boats, ... It would be authoritarian to prevent them from satisfying
these wants.
Such an argument conveniently ignores the social framework in
which such needs and wants arise or are produced.
To point to the determination
of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist
approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework level
(e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual
choice or determination at all.
It is to see the social framework as a major
factor in determining certain kinds of choices, such as those for travel,
and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled
and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of
corporate and private profit and advantage.
The social change option is a hard option - at least it will be difficult
to obtain politically - but it is the only way, so it has been argued, of avoiding
passing on serious costs to the future.
And there are other sorts of reasons than
such ethical ones for taking it: it is the main, indeed the only sort of option
62
open to those who take a deeper ecological perspective , a perspective integral
with the New Paradigm but not essential to radical departure from the dominant
paradigm.
The ethical transmission requirement defended accordingly requires,
hardly surprisingly, social and political adjustment.
The social and political changes that the deeper alternative requires will
be strongly resisted because they
and power structure.
mean changes in current social organisation
To the extent that the option represents some kind of
threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surprising
that official energy option discussion proceeds by misrepresenting and often
obscuring it.
But difficult though a change will be, especially one with such
far-reaching effects on the prevailing power structure, is to obtain, it is
imperative to try : we are all on the nuclear train.
FOOTNOTES
1.
All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Goodin, p. 417;
the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6.
While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear fuel cycle
in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it
helps to know a. little.
& Abbotts, Gyorgy.
The basics are presented in many texts, e.g. Nader
Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such
important background and stage-setting matters as the likelihood of a
core meltdown of a (lightwater) reactor, much more information is required.
For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fallacies
and decision theory is at least as important as knowledge of nuclear technology.
2.
As to the first, see references cited in Goodin, p. 417, footnote 1.
As regards the second see Cotgrove and Duff, and some of the references
given therein.
3.
Cotgrove and Duff, p. 339.
4.
The table is adapted from Cotgrove and Duff, p. 341;
compare also
Catton and Dunlap, especially p. 34.
5.
See, e.g., Gyorgy, pp. 357-8.
6.
For one illustration, see the conclusions of Mr Justice Parker at
the Windscale inquiry (The Windscale Inquiry Vol. 1., Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, London, 1978), discussed in both Cotgrove and
Duff, p. 347 and in Goodin, p. 501 ff.
7.
Much as with the argument of one theory or position against another.
One can argue both, from one’s own position against the other, and in the
other’s own terms against the other.
8.
As well as screening the debate from the public such manoeuvres
favour the (pro-)nuclear establishment, since they (those of the
alliance of military, large industry, and government) control much of the
information and (subject to minor qualifications) can release what, and only
what, suits them.
9.
This is a conclusion of several governmental inquiries and is
conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development; for requisite
details up to 1977 see Routley (a).
The same conclusion has been reached in
some, but not all, more recent official reports, see, e.g.,
2
10.
For some details see Gyorgy, p. 60 ff.
11.
See the papers, and simulations, discussed in Goodin, p. 428.
11a.
Naturally the effect on humans is not the only factor that has to be
taken into account in arriving at moral assessments.
Nuclear radiation, unlike
most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life and welfare.
But since the harm nuclear development may afflict on non-human life, for
example, can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can
be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional
(Old Paradigm) way.
12.
On the pollution and waste disposal record of the nuclear industry,
see Nader and Abbotts, Lovins and Price, and Gyorgy.
On the more general
problem of effective pollution controls, see also, Routley (a), footnote 7.
13.
Back of thus Humanity Unlimited assumption is the idea of Man
replacing God.
First God had unlimited power, e.g. over nature, then when
during the Enlightenment Man replaced God, Man was to have unlimited
power.
Science and technology were the tools which were to put Man into the
position of unlimitedness.
More recently nuclear power is seen as providing
man at least with unlimited physical power, power obtained through technology,
[ability to manage technology represents the past]
14.
On such limitation theorems, which go back to Finsler and Godel on one
side and to Arrow on the other, see, e.g. Routley 80.
All these theorems mimic
paradoxes, semantical ""paradoxes"" on one side and voting ""paradoxes
other.
on the
Other different limitation results are presented in Routley 81.
It
follows that there are many problems that have no solution and much that is
necessarily unknowable.
Limitative results put a serious dent in the progress picture.
According
the Dominant Western Worldview,
the history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem
there is a solution, and thus progress need never cease (Catton
and Dunlap, p. 34).
15.
See Lovins and Price.
15a.
The points also suggest a variant argument against a nuclear future,
namely
.
A nuclear future narrows the range of opportunities
open to future generations.
.
’What justice requires ... is that the overall range
of opportunities open to successor generations should not be
narrowed’ (Barry, p.243).
Therefore, a nuclear future contravenes requirements of justice.
3
16.
For examples, and for some details of the history of philosophers’
positions on obligations to the future, see Routley (a).
17.
Passmore, p. 91.
Passmore’s position is ambivalent and, to
all appearances, inconsistent.
It is considered in detail in Routley (a),
as also is Rawls’ position.
18.
For related criticisms of the economists’ arguments for discounting,
and for citation of the often eminent economists who sponsor them, see
Goodin, pp. 429-30.
19.
The reasons (not elaborated here) are that the properties are different
e.g. a monetary reduction of value imposes a linear ordering on values to which
value rankings, being only partial orderings, do not conform.
20.
Goodin however puts his case against those rules in a less than
satisfactory fashion.
What he claims is that we cannot list all the
possible outcomes in the way that such rules as expected utility maximization
presupposes, e.g. Goodin suggests that we cannot list all the things that can
go wrong with a nuclear power plant or with waste storage procedures.
But
outstanding alternatives can always be comprehended logically, at worst by
saying ""all the rest” (e.g. ~p covers everything except p).
For example,
outcomes Goodin says cannot be listed, can be comprehended along such lines
as ""plant breakdown through human error”.
Furthermore the different
more appropriate rules Goodin subsequently considers also require listing of
""possible"" outcomes.
are really two points.
Goodin’s point can be alternatively stated however.
There
The first trouble is that such ragbag alternatives
cannot in general be assigned required quantitative probabilities, and it is
at that point that applications of the models breaks down.
The breakdown is
just what separates decision making under uncertainty from decision making
under risk.
Secondly, many influential applications of decision theory methods,
the Rasmussen Report is a good example, do, illegitimately, delete possible
alternatives from their modellings.
21.
Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to
follow the market, cf. P.A. Samuelson, EcOYiorri'icsi 7th Edition, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 1967, p.351.
22.
A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could
eventuate.
A real possibility requires producible evidence for its
consideration.
23.
Thus the rates have little moral relevance.
The contrast is with mere logical possibility.
4
24.
Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g.
Sidgwick p. 414), and in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and
Rousseau to Rawls (p.293).
How
the principle is argued for will depend
heavily, however, on the underlying theory; and we do not want to make our use
depend heavily on particular ethical theories.
25.
The latter question is taken up in section VII; see especially, the
Poverty argument.
26.
SF, p. 27.
Shrader-Frechette is herself somewhat critical of the
carte blanche adoption of these methods, suggesting that ’whoever affirms or
denies the desirability of ... [such] standards is, to some degree,
symbollically assenting to a number of American value patterns and cultural
norms’
27.
(p. 28).
The example parallels the sorts of counterexamples often advanced to
utilitarianism, e.g. the admissible
lynching
of pleasure given to the large lynching party.
of an innocent person because
For the more general case
against utilitarianism, see ...
28.
US Atomic Energy Commission, Comparative Risk-Cost-Benefit Study of
Alternative sources of Electrical Energy (WASH-1224), US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., December 1974, p.4-7 and p. 1-16.
29.
As SF points out, p.37-44., in some detail.
As she remarks,
... since standards need not be met, so long as the
NRC [Nuclear Regulatory commission] judges that the
licence shows ’a reasonable effort’ at meeting them,
current policy allows government regulators to trade
human health and welfare for the [apparent] good
intentions of the promotors of technology.
[Such]
good intentions have never been known to be sufficient
for the morality of an act (p. 39).
The failure of state regulation, even where the standards are as mostly not very
demanding, and
the alliance of regulators with those they are supposed to be
regulating, are conspicuous features of modern environmental control, not just
of (nuclear) pollution control.
30.
31.
The figures are those from the original Brookhaven Report:
possibilities and consequences of major
'Theoretical
accidents in large nuclear plants’,
USAEC Report WASH-740, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1957.
This report was requested in the first place because the Commission
bn Atomic Energy
wanted positive safety conclusions ""to reassure the
private insurance companies"" so that they would provide
coverage for the nuclear industry.
Since even the
conservative statistics of the report were alarming it
was
suppressed and its data were not made public until
almost 20 years later, after a suit was brought as a result of
the Freedom of Information Act (Shrader-Frechette, pp. 78-9).
32.
Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of
Accident Risks in US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 1975.
This report, the only allegedly complete study,
concluded that fission reactors presented only a minimal health risk to the
public.
Early in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the relevant
organisation that superseded the troubled Atomic Energy Commission) withdrew
its support for the report, with the result that there is now no comprehensive
analysis of nuclear power approved by the US Government.
32a.
Most present and planned reactors are of this type: see Gyorgy.
33.
34.
Even then relevant environment factors may have been neglected.
35.
There are variations on (i) and (ii) which multiply costs against
numbers such as probabilities.
In this way risks, construed as probable
costs, can be taken into account in
the assessment.
(Alternatively, risks may
be assessed through such familiar methods as insurance.)
A principle varying (ii), and formulated as follows:
(ii’)a is ethically acceptable if (for some b) a includes no more risks than b
and b is socially accepted,
was the basic ethical principle in terms of which
the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry recently decided that nuclear power development
in Saskatchewan is ethically acceptable:
see Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final
Report, Department of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 1978, p. 305 and
p. 288.
In this report, a is nuclear power and b is either activities clearly
accepted by society as alternative power sources.
In other applications b has
been taken as cigarette smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietnam War (!)
The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to principles
(i) - (ii’).
The principles are certainly ethically substantive, since an
ethical consequence cannot be deduced from nonethical premisses, but they have an
inadmissible conventional character.
For look at the origin of b: b may be
socially accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though its
social acceptibility is no longer so clearcut and it would not have been socially
What
accepted if as much as is now known had been known when it was introduced.
is required in (ii’), for instance, for the argument to begin to look, convincing
is then ’ethically acceptable’ rather than ’socially accepted'.
But even with
the amendments the principles are invalid, for the reasons given in the text.
It is not disconcerting that these arguments do not work.
It would be
sad to see yet another area lost to the experts, namely ethics to actuaries.
36.
A main part of the trouble with the models is that they are narrowly
utilitarian, and like utilitarianism they neglect distributional features,
involve naturalistic fallacies, etc.
Really they try to treat as an uncon
strained optimisation what is a deontically constrained optimisation:
see R. and
V. Routley ’An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism’.
37.
Apparent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and redistribution
of income generally) vanish when wealth is construed (as it has to be if taxation
is to be properly justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly
monopolised by a minority of the population.
Examples such as that of motoring
dangerously do not constitute counterexamples to the principle; for one is not
morally entitled to so motor.
38.
SF, p.
39.
Goodin, p. 433.
40.
On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and
15, where references are also cited.
Energy, Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC, 1977, pp.1-7,
and also the details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner
On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as
well E18], p. 23. On the employment issues, see too H.E. Daly in L9 J, p.
149.
A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich,
Energy and Equality, Calden and Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that
the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the opposite of
what the poor need.
41.
For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E.F. Schumacher,
Small is Beautiful, Blond and Briggs, London, 1973.
As to the capital and
other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and also [7] and
[9].
For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy
technology will tend to promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries see
the paper of Waiko and other papers in The Melanesian Environment (edited
J.H. Winslow), Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977.
42.
A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not
Taken, Friends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs,
October 1976); see also [17], [6], [7], [14], p. 233 ff, and Schumacher, op. cit.
43.
An argument like this is suggested in Passmore, Chapters 4 and 7,
with respect to the question of saving resources.
In Passmore this argument
for the overriding importance of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned
by what appears to be a future-directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand
argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be
fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only
way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to go wrong) is to
take proper care of the present and immediate future.
The argument has all
the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others.
44.
See Nader and Abbotts, p. 66, p. 191, and also Commoner.
45.
Very persuasive arguments to this effect have been advanced by civil
liberties groups and others in a number of countries: see especially M. Flood
and R. Grove-White,
Nuclear Prospects.
A comment on the individual, the State
and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural
England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London, 1976.
46.
'US energy policy, for example, since the passage of the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act, has been that nuclear power is necessary to provide ”an economical
and reliable basis”
needed ""to sustain economic growth” (SF, p.lll, and
references there cited).
There are now a great many criticisms of the second premiss in the
literature.
For our criticism, and a reformulation of the premiss in terms
of selective economic growth (which would exclude nuclear development), see
Routley (b), and also Berkley and Seckier.
To simple-mindedly contrast economic growth with no-growth, in the fashion
of some discussions of nuclear power, c.f. Elster, is to leave out
alternatives; the contraction
crucial
of course much simplifies the otherwise faulty
case for unalleged growth.
48.
In UK and USSR nuclear development is explicitly in the public domain,
in such countries as France and West Germany the government has very substantial
interests in main nuclear
involved companies.
Even as regards nuclear plant
operation in the US,
it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data.
Estimates of cost very dramtically according to the
sample of plants chosen and the assumptions made
concerning the measurement of plant performance
(Gyorgy, p. 173).
49.
50.
See Kalmanoff, p.
See Comey.
51.
Ref. to what it has to say about Price Anderson Act.
52.
Full ref to SF onargument
from ignorance etc.
53.
These e.g. Elster, p. 377.
54.
A recent theme in much economic literature is that Bayesian decision
On decision theory see also,
theory and risk analysis can be universally applied.
The theme is upset as
soon as one steps outside of select Old Paradigm confines.
In any case, even
within these confines there is no consensus at all on, and few (and
widely diverging) figures for,the probability of a reactor core meltdown,
and no reliable estimates as to the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation.
Thus Goodin argues (in 78) that 'such uncertainties plague energy theories'
as to 'render expected utility calculations impossible’.
55.
For details see Gyorgy, p. 398 ff., from which presentation of the
international story is adapted.
7
56.
Gyorgy, p. 307, and p. 308.
points, see Chomsky
57.
For elaboration of some of the important
and Hermann.
Whatever one thinks of the ethical principles underlying the Old
Paradigm or its Modification - and they do form a coherent set that many
people
can
respect - these are not the principles underlying contemporary
corporate capitalism and associated third-world imperialism.
58.
Certainly practical transitional programs may involve temporary and
limited use of unacceptable long term commodities such as coal, but in
presenting such practical details one should not lose sight of the more basic
social and structural changes, and the problem is really one of making those.
Similarly practical transitional strategies should make use of such
measures as environmental (or replacement) pricing of energy i.e. so that the
price of some energy unit includes the full cost of replacing it by an
equivalent unit taking account of environmental cost of production.
Other
(sometimes cooptive) strategies towards more satisfactory alternatives should
also, of course, be adopted, in particular the removal of institutional barriers
to energy conservation and alternative technology (e.g. local government
regulations blocking these), and the removal of state assistance to fuel and
power industries.
59.
Symptomatic of the fact that it is not treated as renewable is that
forest economics do not generally allow for full renewability - if they did
the losses and deficits on forestry operations would be much more striking than
they already are often enough.
It is doubtful, furthermore, that energy cropping of forests can be a
fully renewable operation if net energy production is to be worthwhile; see, e.g.
the argument in L.R.B. Mann ‘Some difficulties with energy farming for portable
fuels’, and add in the costs of ecosystem maintenance.
60.
For an outline and explanation of this phenomena see Gyorgy,
and also Woodmansee.
61.
The requisite distinction is made in several places, e.g. Routley (b),
and (to take one example from the real Marxist literature), Baran and
Sweezy.
62.
The distinction between shallow and deep ecology was first emphasised
by Naess.
For its environmental importance see Routley (c)
further references are cited).
(where
/bU/
REFERENCES.
In order to contain references to a modest length, reference
to
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Generally the reader can easily trace the primary sources.
For those parts of
the text that overlap Routley (a), fuller references will be found by
consulting the latter article.
S. Cotgrove and A. Duff, ’Environmentalism, middle-class radicalism and
politics’, Sociological Review 28 (2) (1980), 333-51.
R.E. Goodin,
’No moral nukes’, Ethics 90 (1980), 417-49.
A. Gyorgy and Friends, No Nukes: everyone’s guide to nuclear power, South End
Press, Boston, Mass., 1979.
R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne,
1977.
R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', Inquiry
21 (1978), 133-79 (cited as Routley (a)).
Fox Report: Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977.
K.S. Schrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy, Reidel, Dordrecht,
1980 (referred to as SF).
W.R. Catton, Jr., and R.E. Dunlap, ’A new ecological paradigm for post-exuberant
sociology’, American Behavioral Scientist 24 (1980) 15-47.
United States Interagency Review group on Nuclear Waste Management, Report
to the President, Washington.
29442)
(Dept, of Energy) 1979.
(Ref. No. El. 28. TID-
(cited as US(a)).
A.B. Lovins and J.H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical
Energy Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco, 1975.
R. Routley, ’On the impossibility of an orthodox social theory and of an
orthodox solution to environmental problems’, Logique et Analyse,
23 (1980), 145-66.
R. Routley, ’Necessary limits for knowledge: unknowable truths’, in Essays in
honour of Paul Weingartner,
(ed. E. Morscher), Salzberg, 1980.
J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duekworth, London, 19 74.
2.
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, Third Edition, RSSS, Australian
National University, 1975 (cited as Routley (b)).
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1971.
P.W. Berkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, New York, 1972.
J. Elster, ’Risk, uncertainty and nuclear power’, Social Science Information
18 (3)
(1979) 371-400.
J. Robinson, Economic Heresies, Basic Books, New York, 1971.
B. Barry,
'Circumstances of Justice and future generations’ in Obligations to
Future Generations (ed. R.T. Sikora and B. Barry), Temple University Press,
Philadelphia, 1978.
II. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London, 1962 (reissue).
B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York, 1975.
N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, 2 vols., Black
Rose Books, Montreal, 1979.
J. Woodmansee, The World of a Giant Corporation, North Country Press, Seattle,
Washington, 1975.
P.A. Bd\ran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, Penguin, 1967.
A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long range ecology movement.
A summary’, Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100.
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/181810b7c7449d4d292188b3898281ac.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
117,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/117,"Box 120, Item 102: Drafts and notes on anakyrie","Handwritten and typescript drafts, with handwritten emendations.","Note, one paper/notes digitised from item 102.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 120, Item 102","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[66] leaves. 150.42 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ab005a4",,"R TREATISE ON POLITICAL THEORY
OTHER HQJOR TOPICS (UNOROERED):-
1.
PturatisM and pturatisMS: the otd (and Marxist) fallacy
of one form.
2.
Power,
hierarchies,
Constitutions, corporations, states and
transnationats
Authoritarian
rotations;
organisations.
3.
Undertying Metaphysics.
(not independent things).
Stytes of denocracy, and inproving denocracy.
6.
A Major source of power: property.
Land rights.
INTRODUCTION
Present poLet Leet arrangements are hardig satisfactorg, angMhere. Theg
not
de Livering
adequate
shoutd at Least assist Ln
environment,
Meifare,
of mang of* the things that such arrangements
Levels^
productLon
the
are
or
education^
LiveLihood,
of,
attainment
...
e.g.
securLtg,
. Thus if better Mags to do
these things can be found, theg shouLd be sought, and tried.
Perhaps surprisingLg, there has been remarkabLg Lit tie effort expended upon
surveuing the range of poLLticaL
atternatives
(as
compared,
e.g.,
Mith
the
effort put into defending the status quo), or to Mork out, so far as can or need
be
done,
areas,
detaiLs
Mhere
of the more promising options.
entrenched
positions
Indeed, as Mith so mang other
dominate^ there
been
has
cons iderabLe
discouraoement of such important investigation.
R s ign if ican t r ange of a L te ma t i ves, sea roe Lg g i ven a triaL in
modern
historg, are these arrangements Mhich reduce domination and the exercise
of poMer and increase freedom. The present studg concentrates on these sorts
arrangements,
not
in
totaLitarian
of
or fascist or imperiaiist structures Mhich
have more than sufficient exempiification in recent times, despite their Lack of
justification and base in raM poMer and brute force.
10.
POLITICS WITHOUT DONINRTION:
Rnakgr ie means
varietg
of
RNRKYRIE RND RNRRCHISM
Mi thout domination.
domination.
For
domination
That
incLudes
comes
in
the
Mhoie
range
mang forms: of citizens bg
states, civiLians bg miLitarg, poor bg rich, bLacks bg Mhites, thirdMoriders
-1-
and
bg
HMerLeans
)
Russ Lans. MOMen bu nan. young by otder, anLMaLs by huMans, nature
'.
\
. RnaRyrLsM consLsts Ln socLaL arrangeMents desLgned to avoLd aLL
e<.c*i v.*? , ^etA/'o
, py<-.
'fiohcoAc^
forMs of doMLnatLon-^ [There Ls nothLng Ln the account so far g^v^n whLch
bu Men?
such
orr
...
<3/*
LMpLLes that Lt Must taRe a gLven shape, that Lt Ls unLquety deterMLned.]
RnarchLsM
dLrectLy
Ls
MLth
concerned
onLy one part of Mhat anahyrLe Ls
about: doMLnatLon by peopte by states (Mhether theLr OMn or that of others), and
rewovaL of thLs doMLnatLon by aboLLtLon of the state. But there are
forMs
other
not essenttaLLy bound up MLth thLs forM, and aboLLtcon of
doMLnatLon
of
Many
the state Ls but oney rather drasttcyMay of reMovtng state doMLnatLon.
RnarchLsM has been extended, for Lnstance to eco-anarchLsM (as feMLnLsM has
been broadened to eco-feMLnLsM), Ln an effort to overcoMe a conspLcuous part of
c/
n/ttj
19th
C
anarchLsM tended to accept the saMe doMLnatLon of
the probteM,
that
nature by
Lndeed
and
huMans,
the
saMe
sort
of
scLentLfLo
reductLonLstLc
MaterLaL',SM, as Lts doMLnant rLvats, capLtaLLsM and (MarxLst) socLaLLsM. But the
broadenLng
caLLs
for
atso
further
expLanatLon,
to
LncLude
other types of
doMLnatLony^id strLctLy,such a recr^antatLon as to LnvoLve a change Ln MeanLng,
A
Ln Mhat Mas Meant by
anarchLsM .
In these cLrcuMstances, Lt Ls
More
forMard and Less MLsLeadLng sLMpLy to Lntroduce neM terMLnoLogy. Rtw
straLghtthere
are
, good reasons for seeRLng neM terMLnoLogy.
In
More
than
a century of use
anarchy
and Lts derLvatLves have becoMe
thoroughLy oenve-p-tied- MLth undesLrabte and LnapproprLate assoc LatLons, to such an
extent that soMe of these, such as chaos and dLsorder, are no&'saLd to gLve part
/
of the MeanLng of
anarchy'.
3.
r
/
7.
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BOCK NUMBER
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AUTHOR
(BLOCK
LETTERS)
-------------------------------------------------------
DATE DUE
wLLL be designed so far as possLbLe to LLmLt
such power and prevent Lts accumutatLon.
Prevent,^ gLobaL corp^arrangements/ LnternatLonaLLsm^ aLready over hLLL. Rnd good
twenty years our of date.
//GLobaL (^each p.368.. Rehun^ the prob Lem — passed by the gLobaL corporatLon ...
---------------------/)
ms
Ls excessLve power, and the seLf-Lmpatred LLmLtatLon on power cs not characterr Jsttc of human LnstLtutLons',^ rearranged?.
Remedies.
1.
at
InformatLon and end to secrecy, as a
way
to
socLaL
responses.^
books as pubLLc documents etc., p.369.
2.
TndLspensLbLe data for natLonaL program of natLonaL and Lnternat-
LonaL reguLatLon, 370. Sc<%/<)<2
,
Standsrd Last Lon of accountLng -r-------- and practLces.
p.3*^/ Breakdown of pubLLc/prLvate dLstLnctLon and dLsappearance of free market?
'L--------- .
GLobaL co rpo rat Lons buLLt on socLaL cap^taL consp ucuous L^*
p.376
RLternatLon of t3X Laws to remove credLts and
Tax bLas Ln favour of transnatLonaLs.
counterrLdLng power / be^^re strateggt^ ,
pubLLc dLrectors , better uaadetermLnatLon , pre^Ldents runnLng for
c?r
companys at Least eLectLonjfor candLdates of reguLati)$y comm css conf
GeneraLLyatter tax Laws, remove subsLdLes whLch 4ncouraaa the accumutatLon of
.
,7
prLvate weaLth, and power, us Lng pubLLc/socLat and bLoLogLcaL capLtaL. ^7^
/j /y
CCyTY
^g
-y
power.
fAc
State underpinning of multinationals.
Multinationals would not have
arisen to their present position of eminence without state assistance - and
infrastructure, education, security, etc.
N^d detailed evidence of this.
Then can argue that problem of multinationals can be resolved, more or
-3
p
less automatically, with problem of state.
/^*
/?
-e^—
7
0
,%?.
rofit system^never satisfactory,^now extremely dama^gmg. Compare^ damag
fetnoTie.
,
/ i
be
profits - and look at the way these
^to worlds
by destruction for
profits are spent.
Profit system compare with (ccyM?) sovereignty systems.
an anarchist.theory.
LAW
.
jLaw is incompatible with anarchist utopianism.
Anarchism can retain a framework of rules.
are backed up, and enforced.
where this involves violence.
pre^$e, etc.
consider,
This is false.
The key issue is how these rules
What anarchism excludes is coercive backing
Opposition usually involves sliding on coergion,
So it looks as if there are several different theses to
depending on how enforcement, rules, etc. are expanded.
Kam argued that anarchism could not handle law on basis of
A
i.
A
level of detail of law.
ii. amount of procedural detail.
But there are no barrier at all.
be refuted by a countermodel.
Complexity is no bar.
The claims can
One such is the model Chom^siey appeals to,
that of rules of language, which are complex and intricate enough, and nvj
backed by force (Passmore wanted to suggest they were!
But it is obvious
that they need not be, whatever lapses occurred in the 16th century.)
As a matter of history, several anarchist thinkers were not opposed to
operation of law, but included it in their framework.
Proudhon.
Others?
One example is
/^ <2
MY ENGAGEMENT WITH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
Over the past decadeI have found myself increasingly concerned with
social and political problems and more and more immersed in the theoretical
issues raised thereby.
In large part this has arisen from environmental
involvement, especially on forestry and nuclear matters, and the realisation
that the basic problems mostly lay with social and political arrangements.
It
thus became important to try to determine what those really were, and how they
might be changed, what the alternatives weie.
But in part also my legitimate intellectual movement from logic and meta
physics^ to a wider perspective which includes social and political philosophy
as major area of concern has come about as a result of reflection on the
unsatisfactory and fragmented state of philosophy and its surrounds.
It became
increasingly hard (in particular for someone trained in analytic philosophy with
a heavy Oxbridge orientation) to avoid noting, especially when confronted with
wider philosophical and social issues, that one's philosophical education and
ifn 1972 I presented and circulated a paper, 'Is there a need for a new, and
environmental ethic?' which played an influential part in the rapid growth of
environmental philosophy in New Zealand and Australia (on the latter see D.
Mannison and M. McRobbie in Environmental Philosophy). Such an excursion into
ethics was not without precedent. My research work in fact began in ethical
theory, with a thesis on moral scepticism, and I thought about and wrote on
deontic problems in the sixties.
^The point is explained in detail in work cited in the accompanying curriculum
vitae (where all otherwise unreferenced work is listed).
In the case of
forestry see for example 'Destructive forestry in Australia and Melanesia' and
'World rainforest destruction - the social factors'; as to nuclear see
'Nuclear power - some ethical and social dimensions' and 'The ethics of nuclear
war, and political fall-out'; and for the general argument see 'Social theories,
self management and environmental problems'.
^This does not mean that I have entirely abandoned these areas. Logic is, I
believe (with Anderson, and so with the mainstream of Australia's most
significant philosophical movement), the central part of philosophy, and many
conceptual problems in applied philosophy will continue to require return to
logical ground in order to find satsifactory solutions. A sound training in
logical theory is essential for deeper solutions for some of these problems.
I should add that I never have been a very pure logician. I moved into logic
in order to try to solve severe conceptual problems first in the philosophy of
science and then in metaphysics. Now that these problems are largely solved
(to my satisfaction at any rate) I can presumably move on to other things.
2.
practice offered only a somewhat limited set of tools and techniques for
tackling wider philosophical concerns and, worse, but few instruction as to how
to apply these analytic techniques more widely.
Nor had the inadequacy of
such an education and the sort of philosophy to which it led gone
unremarked.
It was charged that philosophy had abdicated several of its proper respons
ibilities - for example, to organise knowledge into some more coherent whole
or world-view, to elaborate a social theory and influence social criticism,
even to afford intellectual leadership - and had become excessively analytic
and specialised, and therewith narrow and sterile (concerned, e.g., merely with
linguistic niceties, conservative commonsense and/or scholastic logic-chopping).
It was charged that academic philosophy not only had become excessively timid and
accordingly lost intellectual excitement and appeal, but also had lost relevance
to and touch with the important intellectual issues of the times and had failed
in the business of addressing a larger audience with philosophical interests.
These charges, which have a solid foundation, did not come from within academic
philosophy but were most evocatively made by people outside philosophy (though
with some knowledge of it) or by those in the margins of academic, professional
ised^ philosophy.
Thus Durrant, an outsider, has powerfully expressed a part of
the charges:
... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences to its
aid in making a coherent image of the world and an alluring picture
of the good, found its task of inordination too stupendous for its
usage, ran away from ... .'LtheJ battlefronts of truth, and hid itself
in recondite and narrow lanes, timidly secure from the issues and
responsibilities of life.*
Philosophy began to change in the Seventies, some philosophers naturally
changing with it.
We aimed to address a wider range of socially relevant
topics - and also sometimes a .wider audience - for example, to get beyond the
^W. Durrant, The Story of Philosophy, Second edition, Simon and Schuster, New
York, 1926, p.v. Durrant though (or perhaps because) a leading populariser
of philosophy in North America, is not usually at all well regarded by
academic philosophers.
3.
sterile examples of previous texts on moral philosophy to live issues, from
minor cases of promising and truth-telling to abortion and euthanasia, genetic
engineering and the treatment of animals, violence and nuclear war.
But the
analytical methods used for the most part did not change, the widening of
horizons in applied philosophy proceeded from a narrow and inadequate logical
(argumentive) and metaphysical base.
stagnation:
The applied expansion went with theoretical
mainstream theoretical philosophy sat in the doldrums.
Nor has the applied transformation gone far enough.
Significant issues
have been left to theologians and journalists.And there has been insufficient
effort by philosophers (even those addressing relevant issues) to integrate
their work with that of other (social) sciences that shed light on the issues,
to overcome discipline fragmentation by synthesis.
For it was not merely that
philosophy itself was fragmented and often irrelevant, it had also become
largley isolated
from other disciplines and had ceased to be properly informed
by them - or to inform them.
This unsplendid isolation is particularly conspicuous in the case of
political philosophy, which often proceeds in much the way it did in the
17th century, with little of the import it should be receiving from recent
advances in social psychology and
well-founded) sociobiology.
ethology and (to the extent that it is
More generally, the way in which areas have been
isolated from one another, and ceased communicating, to the disadvantage to
all, is a matter for serious concern.
It is not merely that philosophy, for
example, can be enriched by taking due account of the social sciences.
The
^This description derives from Passmore.
^Philosophers and other academics should not be led in these areas, but do
the leading. One of the roles of the academic community - a role in which
philosophy in Australia (much, degenerated by too long an incestuous history)
mostly fails - is to address a wider public than part of itself. Philosophers
may justly complain that there is little competent public discussion of these
issues where applied philosophy matters and no reputable intellectua
ea er
ship in Australia at present, but they have by and large done little to
rectify the matter.
4.
social sciences also can be improved, and much rubbish removed, by taking account
of philosophical criticism.Each impacts on the others, in ways that should
be taken into account.
Moreover the interplay of different parts is fruitful.2
There is a richness to be generated if the interaction works well.
And such
interaction is required to pull much material into a more coherent whole.
Such sentiments on integrating areas and rendering work more informed and
holistic have been expressed before.
another putting them into effect.
It is one thing expressing them, and
The tasks involved are difficult.
And
putting them into effect is not of course a task for just one person, but for
several.
A start can however be made with interdisciplinary people who
willingly cross discipline boundaries, because they need to, and see the need
to;
by people who are able to adopt the often special methods and procedures
of other disciplines and combine them with those of their own.
But a start can
not in general be satisfactorily initiated just by administrative fiat.
A
good deal of evidence has now accumulated to show that an administrator cannot
simply pull together a successful interdisciplinary research group by hiring
people skilled in the different disciplines concerned and putting them in a
common setting.
Such, groups can evolve however by individuals with wide-ranging
concerns interesting other researchers or like-inclined people from other
disciplines in overlapping or joint problems.
And in setting up the conditions
for such collaborative research to evolve, administrative inputs are important.
It is, for example, an astute move to have a position linking several different
departments 3 attached to none of them but to a section that sits so-to-speak
above them;
for in this way the researcher has access to all the departments
concerned but is confined to none.
*New philosophies of nature call for much more than this, indeed for major theor
etical reorientation of some social sciences. The point is elaborated in the
concluding part of 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics'.
2Nor will unified or coherent social sciences be arrived at without substantial
philosophical imports.
3 As the present post does.
influenced the move.
No doubt other political considerations have also
5.
I think I can justifiably account myself an interdisciplinary person.
Firstly, I have considerable experience in collaborative work, an advantage
that philosophers, in contrast to experimental scientists, seldom enjoy.
claim
is supported by my publication record.
The
While that indicates the extent of
my joint activity in research, it does not fully record cooperative activity
in organising conferences and workshops, both in logic and in environmental
philosophy, in helping found or reestablish organisations (the Australasian
Association of Logic is the main example, but the local AAP is another), in
establishing publications (e.g. the Environmental Philosophy Discussion Papers
serve both Philosophy Departments) and so on.
More significantly, I can also fairly claim substantial experience in
interdisciplinary work, as well as in other fields of philosophy.
For example,
I have worked not only in philosophy departments but in mathematics and in
environmental studies programs.i
Furthermore, my work in forestry, which is
continuing, brought me into close touch with people from a broad spectrum of
fields, not only forestry, but also economics, geography, demography, botany
and zoology.
The work, which is well-known locally and referred to in inter
national textbooks, has for the most part been well received by people in
those area, except forestry, and has been taken seriously .by those who disagree
with the often controversial positions developed.
My more recent work on
environmental problems has led me to communicate and interchange material with
sociologists and political Scientists in North American and England, and also
with people in a variety of fields in Australian Colleges of Advanced Education.
Naturally then, much of the resulting work reaches people in a range of fields.
My work on environmental problems has also resulted in invitations to participate
in conferences in a wide range of areas, on forestry (in several Australian
^1 declined invitations to work in interdisciplinary research groups in Washington
and The Hague primarily because they would have kept me away from Australia too
long and obliged me to endure northern winters.
6.
states), on energy, on the environment (in New Guinea and USA).
I have twice been
invited to present papers at Australian Sociology conferences, but been unable to
do so because of commitments abroad.
The basic forestry book The Fight for the Forests, and subsequent forestry
and environmental papers, already included much that bears upon and is informed
by social and political theory.
A new book, tentatively entitled Forestry in
Australia, now in preparation by a team of people drawn from a wide range of
disciplines - which is intended to replace The Fight for the Forests, long out
of print - will be even more closely involved with social and political theory.
It includes much fuller analysis of social classes and power structures (and
models of these) as well as, like earlier work, examination of elites, and types
of inequality.
This should also begin to reveal how my work on apparently diverse areas is
interrelated, and not a result of compartmentalisation.
Most obviously, my
work on forestry, which directly involves a range of environmental problems, in
a very practical way, leads directly into areas of social and political theory.
It is less obvious, but nonetheless a fact, that work on environmental problems,
value theory and logic, is not disconnected, but joined by several connecting
ways.
For example, relevant deontic logic has shown how the key moral matter of
moral dilemmas and conflicts of value can be treated.
The logic of obligation
is important in rejecting arguments that there is a significant separate
""morality"" for nation states or for public representatives of these which
exonerates them from normal responsibility.
Differently, logic provides the
basis of decision theory, which is important in structuring environmental
problems.
And so on, to look at some of the more straightforward connections.
There are larger connections.
Social and political theory necessarily presupposes
^Explanations of these connections are much expanded in ""The logical basis of the
social sciences'.
7.
a metaphysics, and this in turn a logical theory X
Philosophers of very
different persuasions, for instance Hegel and Mill, have agreed about this.
Of course work in logic, such as that in probability theory and on
statistical inference, sometimes speaks directly to other areas in the social
sciences.
My own work on universal semantics is of interest to linguists, and
'Universal semantics?' was abstracted in Sociological Abstracts, as have been
several of my philosophical papers, on for example metaphysics, limits to
Work on the recent history of logic and
knowledge and animal intentionality.
of philosophy of science in Australasia has led me into some sociological as
well as historical investigations.
political science and economics.
Logical pursuits have also lead me into
Because of my interest in applied logic I came
to take over supervision of B. Embury's doctoral dissertation on voting theory,
a thesis in the Department of Political Science.
in work with a post-doctoral
social choice theory.
My interests also involved me
fellow on preference and decision theory and
Regretably no joint work issued from this enterprise, but
I did publish some papers in the area, and emerged with further ideas for research
jotted down:
these ideas, mainly for further impossibility and limitative
results in social theory, have yet to be followed through.
My present research in social and political theory has (like a conic
section) double foci.
One focus (Fl) is a book tentatively entitled The
Philosophic Reach of Environmental Problems and intended to supersede
Environmental Philosophy in main respects, on the ethical, social and political
dimensions of environmental problems.2
familiar list:
The central problems yield a now rather
for instance, those of human and animal populations, disappearing
species, vanishing rainforests and other habitats and ecosystems, treatment
(and rights) of indigenous peoples, of animals and of plants, cities and
substantial start in explaining these deeper connections is made in 'Social
theories, self management and environment problems' and in Exploring Meinong's
Jungle and Beyond, chapter 9, ^12.
^Here environmental is used in the wide sense, of which the ecological is only a
quite proper part.
8.
neighbourhoods, landscape transformation or destruction, mining, pollution,
nuclear and energy issues, and so on.
The underlying problems have significant
features in common and common social and political sources.
Before the integrative
task is tackled in detail however, an analytical approximative approach is being
followed.
Discussion papers on several of the topics listed are being researched
or written, and discussion papers on others will follow, before the whole thing
is pulled together.
The other focus (F2) is a book on what might be called New Age Social
Organisation, investigating alternatives to prevailing social, economical and
political arrangements.
Major alternatives considered in detail include left
leaning and right-leaning anarchisms, which will involve a careful examination
of the extent to which social arrangements and political organisations can
be self-managed and self-regulating.
While it is ambitiously hoped that the investigation will not only result
(ideally) in a more philosophically-adequate left-leaning anarchist theory
than has so far been produced, that is only part of its purpose.
Another very
important part of the enterprise is to give some better understanding of the
range of alternatives to present (monopolistic capitalist and state socialist)
arrangements that there are and that could be tried.
A further part is, by
considering alternatives, to shed light on the prevailing systems (their
structures, institutions, etc.), in particular to bring out more clearly their
underlying assumptions,the extent of their necessity, to give a better idea
^In several respects the term 'anarchism' is unsatisfactory and will have event
ually to be replaced, perhaps by a neologism, since no available term delineates
the types of socio-political arrangements envisaged.
It should perhaps be remarked, in case it is thought that I have no academic
background in political theory, that my university education did include courses
and seminars in the area. Furthermore I have more recently acquired a good
working knowledge of the anarchist literature, and am well advanced in the
process of obtaining a grasp of organisation theory and the necessary parts
of social psychology.
Some of these assumptions are rejected or varied in an assessment of alternatives.
Thus, as a much better idea of euclidean geometry was obtained with the elaboration
of hyperbolic and Riemannian geometry, and similarly of arithmetic with the
formulation of nonstandard arithmetics, so also a much better appreciation of
mainstream social theory should be achieved by investigating nonstandard social
theories and assumptions. This method of variation of assumptions is a fruitful
one as regards many scientific,theories.
of the values they write in, of their desirability or undesirability, and so on.
Although my enagement has two main foci, naturally there are also other and
smaller endeavours under way:
of these - but only some.
the attached curriculum vitae gives some indication
For example, the trilogy of papers on the meaning of
life, nihilism, and the ultimate existence question is to be arranged into a book
which will probably also address such related issues as the quality of life.
Richard Routlev
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ANAKYRIE.
In Chapter 1
The multiple and inconsistent axioms of political theory : pluralism,
morality, ...
The differences in theory begin at the beginning, in what political arrangements
are for, what they are about, whom they are for, how they apply.
There are
important differences in the extent to which peoples' and other creatures'
activities and lives can be controlled and regulated.
More authoritarian
or paternalistic political arrangements impose much more in the way of
regulations than more liberal arrangements which in theJlimit reduce regulation
or setting for pursuit of satisfactory lives.
to some minimum, to some
So far as political relations are concerned, the world (Terr& is a closed
system.
Political influence is not exercised from outside that system,
nor f!'o political influences of significance so far flow from Terra elsewhere.
(All that may of course change, in which case the problem is reset in terms
of some larger system, the Universe providing an upper limit - unless some
extraspb tial gods are invoked.)
With the advance of industrialisation,
communications and spill-over technology, few communities smaller than the
world system are any longer effectively closed.
The general political problem is unsolvable. The argument for this
theme is that the problem is only solvable for small relatively uniform
But we no longer have such, given modern interference
com-unities (Taylor).
effects.
The basic picture is of a network of goal-directed
Defining the^problem:
creatures and systems.
The aim (political goal) is to ensure that these
creatures are able to pursue goals so far as these are satisfactory.
A major value judgment is inserted here : what of wiping out lives, of
war, etc., those that interfere seriously with others?
A liberal setting such
as Redman sketched is operating in the background here.
Present political arrangements anachronistic : they were introduced at a
time when much less interference was technically possible.
longer appropriate.
The
They are no
of empires now affects everyone s lives,
so on democratic grounds all should have say (or vote).
But they don t :
democracy stops at national borders (even in those borders where it kmd-of
operates).
2
Present political arrangements, by increasing population,
etc. for what sort of consumption high can be obtained by present people
are making things much worse.
For the benefit of present power-holders,
their maintenance of power and privilege,
short-term drr
the inadequacies of
%^ts - of present economics within political frameworks.
On the End State:
According to Kamenka a central deficiency of a M^up-ist account is its pre
industrial character, also its romantic character, and its view of creative
labour.
These are a result in part of looking for utopia in the past, the
sources of which according to Kumenka are:
(i)
a mistaken view of the happy (noble) savage;
(ii)
the abundance of industry;
(iii) the rationality of industry (presumably its increasingly automatic and
self-regularity character?).
This is confused.
Sources
(ii) and (iii) are the basis of the past industrial
character of the end state (where the machines are really whirring along).
The main source of the search in the past is quite different, namely the search
for historical models, however partial, of the good or better life.
The
reason is that
(iv)
there is something drastically wrong with present arrangements which not
rectified by minor adjustments.
The end state, so far as it is described, is certainly a curious mixture of
A'
pre- and past-industrial elements.
The end state is not a static state, but a stable, climax state.
analogy is again useful here.
The ecological
Capitalism is like a pioneering stage.
Stable
states may have been achieved in the past, to be disturbed in one way or another.
That is one reason why it is important to look in the past - for fc^r^r
of past stable states.
Political theory (note A *)
As a result of the way 'political system' is commonly defined, anarchy is not a
political system.
The reason is that 'most authors consider the modern
political system to be that system which controls the use of power or force in
society'
(Kaplan, p.22).
therewith that system.
Anarchy aims to remove use of power and force, and
The exclusion could of course be taken to be a (further)
inadequacy in the definition, a mere technicality almost, got around by
expanding 'controls' disjunctively to 'controls or removes'.
3
For whether or not anarchy is a political system, it is certainly an
organisational system or structure.
POLITICAL THEORY AND MORALITY
1.
On the one hand, it is claimed that 'any acceptable form of social
order...must rest on moral foundations, which are in principle ascertainable
at any period, and permanently valid'.'*'
(Donegan, p.xiv)
On the other, and more common view, politics simply tramples over morality
when it suits it.
However that is a matter of one morality, e.g. of a
Christian established form, being overwhelmed by another Mafia-style morality
not the absence of a value position.
theory.
2.
Any political theory rests on a value
That is the point.
There is the problem of evil, powerful people, often unintentionally
evil people such as Reagan, Thatcher, ... Hitler flourished most of his life;
he led an active (etc.) life ...
3.
Anarchism does not require especially good people.
But political life
would run much more easily without a certain range of people.
(Of course,
states think this, and totalitarian states try to realise theit aim).
4.
On Political Obligation
obligation.
There is no good ground as basis of political
All arguments designed to establish obligation to a state -
of people living in it ('its territory') especially - are wanting.
(Argument for this there).
Scepticism about political obligation does
not imply scepticism about obligation.
So moral scepticism is not implied.
And on the contrary, most requirements are of the first importance in
outlining alternatives to the state.
Hobbes problem was that of political obligation - 'reasonswhy we ought to
change the state'
(R p.61).
Hobbes finds three causes of disorder (competition - reflecting self
interest drives;
distrust;
argued for on ground that
enjoyment of power ('glory') [Self-interest is
motive is self-preservation.]
To these he opposes inter - from desire for security.
1.
This involves a very dubious objectivity.
4
On Marx-Engels way
Although Marx and Engels say comparatively little about their projected
end state, they say a great deal about the route through the new state -
to that end, and about the means to be used along that route.
By contrast with means, they are far too restrictive about routes, ruling
out many plausible roads to change (including peasant revolutions, etc.)
Engels' proposed route is through 'a new social order' where production and
industry run on behalf of society, according to a social plan.
The main
features are addition of private property (vol.l, p.88) and of private
means of communication (p.92).
Note that it is unclear whether this social
order is an immediate or end state, but those features are common to both.
There is massive industrial and agricultural production (though not over
production) by (rationalised) planned economy without (
) private
property (I,p.92).
Hence, division into antagonistic clauses becomes superfluous.
There are
new all-round people (p.93), a disappearance of division of labour, for
flexible labour.
There is association instead of competition.
Fusion of
town and country (p.94).
According to Marx-Engels (I,p.l83) the route is through the central state.
'The workers must not only strive [against democrats]
for a single and
indivisible...republic, but also within this republic for the most
determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority.
They must not allow themselves to be misguided by the democratic talk of
freedom for the communities, of self-government, etc.'
No communal property
'Concentrate productive
to remain :
etc... in
means of
of state'.
This account is
extremely top-down.
As to means, it looks as if Marx and Engels are prepared to adopt any means,
likely or not.
For Marx, the main means are by violent revolution (last
page Poverty of Philosophy).
of classes.
Revolution is the outcome of the contradiction
By contrast, Engels prefers peaceful means (in 1847 i.e.
vol 1, p.89);
but he won't at all rule out revolution.
But together Marx and Engels emphasise violent means, and encourage excuses
on occasions (
p.180).
5
Under the pretext that the petty bourgeous democrats will betray the
workers, the subversion (destabilization) of their government is planned
(Vol 1. address of CC to League, pp.180-1) Unlike Bak
Marx and Engels.advocate fostering massacres etc.
stuff mean?), and a regime of terror.
(for what else can this
Bak
thinks that in a
revolutionary situation such things may occur but should be immunized
(I can easily check the reference in Bak
if necessary (p.180).
For the most part, Engels was much more inclined to peaceful and established
means to change, even to change by way of ballot box and universal suffrage;
the Democratic route to state transformation (1, p.195, also 1, p.202).
Note Engels' introduction to Class Struggles in France written in 1895 (p.195),
e.
i.
later than the more bellicose texts Lenin is relying on - and as the
fruit of a riper experience of politics.
He says that by party action
universal suffrage
'transforme de mayer de dupere qu'il a ete jusqui'
en instrument
d'emarcqation'and this as footnote shows is a quote from Marx.
This suggests that it can be used to gain control of and subsequently transform
state app
In 1895 (pp.199-200) Engels suggests a revision of
.
Now show
means, propaganda etc., to win over the mass of people [different from
technological determination!]
No doubt because of technological determination,
there is no need to be too specific about means;
for it is not as if activity
is shaping the course of things, only speeding up the (in
) process.
Reasons for the lack of detailed description of the end state in Marx-Engels:
1.
This would be to try to set the future, which is reactionary (Why?
Because
of historical determination?), and unnecessary, because future people will be
wiser than us.
2.
Standard explanation, suggested by Marx:
'scientific socialism cannot
describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism.
Utopians
speculate about the socialist future : Marxists analyse the capitalist present'
(Moore, p.76).
Moore argues the standard explanation is implausible.
6
Principles of Individualism [ ?]
1.
Government based on individually-given consent of citizens - 'its
authority or legitimacy deriving from that consent'
(Lubes, p.ll)
Consent-answering back requirement
2.
Political representation as representing individual interests, not
classes, estates, etc.
3.
That's all.
interests.
Government confined to enabling satisfaction of individual
Hence towards laissez-faire, against paternalism, influencing
or interpreting individual wants.
(79).
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 120: Philosophy Wisdom to Wowserism,Como House,Como House > Green Table > Pile 5",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/9fad10700c696fd3710e7ebe33ec9966.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
140,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/140,"Box 120, Item 102: Richard Sylvan to John, c1983 to ?","Handwritten letter to John from Richard Sylvan, letter isn't signed. Sylvan writes about a UNESCO Asia-Pacific meeting held in 1983 and discusses John's report on philosophy in New Zealand. The meeting is possibly the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Teaching and research in philosophy in Asia and the Pacific held in Bangkok, 21-25 February 1983. The letter is also possibly addressed to John Patterson who attended the UNESCO Asia-Pacific meeting and presented a paper on philosophy in New Zealand. (Information from UNESCO (1984) Teaching and Research in Philosophy: Asia and the Pacific, UNESCO).","Note, one of two papers digitised from item 102.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 120, Item 102","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"Letter, [4] leaves. [12.73 MB] For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,Correspondences,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:d21b575",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 120: Philosophy Wisdom to Wowserism,Como House,Como House > Green Table > Pile 5",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/16947195a878ecb196bb09099f17f712.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
62,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/62,"Box 13, Item 948: Early drafts and finished papers on anarchism",,"Typescripts and handwritten chapters, with handwritten emendations and annotations. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Anarkism. Early Drafts + Finished Papers. ","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 948","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[41] leaves. 87.25 MB.",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a6a08c8","Lake George - Floor - Pile 6","00948
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The most notorious of these
(econstructions*are the social contract theories ^pf^ilg&bes, Rousseau,reccntly Rawls.
,
whereby individual members of a society fictitiously enter into an enforceable contract,
inescapable for themselves and all their descendants, setting up the state, primarily as a security
arrangement. In later versions4here is much negotiating and bargaining in contrived sifuations,
where humans lose many of their distinctive features and accoutrements (in a effort to ensure
some initial fairness).
A variant on contract theories, which justify some sort of state arrangements aj y they
arose in an ideal way, is retrojustification of the state as naturally arising, as a sort of super
insurance agency, from pre-state arrangements. For example, the minimal state evolves from a
competing set of state-like security agencies one of which somehow gains a monopoly, and is
retrojustified through insurance arguments (concerning risk and compensation).
Now modern states did not arise in any such ""natural"" or contractual way. Often they
we^^posed by conquest or through colonialisation, and with a few exceptions, using military
means^ra&*than Offering much sweetness and light and choic^Nor do the ideal constructions
(
or histories offer much justification for these resulting state power configurations. For the states
so delivered are very different from those most people presently toil under.
In any case, the arguments involved do not succeed. They are extraordinarily gappy by
contemporary logical standards, amd (hey depend upon some utterly implausible assumptions,
for example as to how vile conditions are in extra-state situations.
No doubt some of the gaps
Could be plugged by further, further contestable, assumptions, but such analytic work remains
,^V- Au
to be attempted and assessed. In fact it was ea^ realised that such arguments exhibit unlikely
and even paradoxical features. For example, in consenting to a state for security purposes,
'4
participants to the state contract proceed to establish an institution which is far more dangerous
to them than the power of others taken distribudvely. It would seem that those smart enough to
enter into a social contract for a state would be smart enough to foresee the problems of hiring a
monster, and to avoid the steer and stated along without it.
WA s
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/
'the state is necessary and that
' the state is superior to its absence, 1)ut w;, argument^as are presented depend upon a false
choice. For only two opdons are considered:
H, a horrible Hobbesian ""state of nature"" and
S, a well ordered(contructually-rea^e^Hobbesian state.
The argument, appealing to the vices of H and the virtues of S, has little trouble in concluding
* * S is better than H (or similarly, radial agents would select S over H, etc.)
The choice conveniently leaves out other options,
as anarchist ones.
Why should
anarchists want to line up with S? They can agree with proposition * *. They might also want
to assert that anarchistic arrangements Z are superior to S. Whereupon it is evident that neither
* nor * follows. For necessity all aggeRible alternatives have to be considered (by the
That has not been done. For superiority the superiority of S to Z and
semantics of
other altemadves has to be taken into account. That has not been done.
One alternative is Carter's -Society which produces 'the kind of individuals who have
strongly internalized values and can live cooperatively and freely without the threat of force ...'
(p-25).5
5
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Bottom half: really a reranking.
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68,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/68,"Box 13, item 959: Miscellaneous notes on the state","Handwritten notes and photocopy of Dictionary of Philosophy entry of State.
","Published work redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Clipping of misc notes on the state.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 959","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[11] leaves. 14.76 MB.
",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4b2597f","Lake George - Floor - Pile 6","y
// /
00959
Z^r^y
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated photocopy of 'State' from Dictionary of Philosophy, 300-301. Publisher and
publication not identified. (1 leaf)
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212,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/212,"Box 13, Item 985: Notes and cuttings on anark","Printout of draft of unknown paper, 6 pages (page 28-33), with handwritten emendations, miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper, cutting from The Economist (1988, November 19), and Raise the stakes : the Planet Drum review, no 7 S2, Spring 1983.","Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Cutting and journal redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13 Item 985","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[12] leaves + 1 journal. 6.7 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:da4138c","Lake George - Floor - Pile 7","28
undiluted anarchism); holistic and tribal means (as, obversely, utterly individualistic ones) are
anarchistically admissible.
The connections can be made in this way:- If there is no head, top or centre, how are
political affairs structured? A standard anarchist response-not essential for mathematical
structure, but incorporated in the modem definition of anarchism-is organisation (of course)
by acceptable means, by noncoercive, nonauthoritarian organisation, what is typically expanded
to voluntary and cooperative organisation. Features of this response will be elaborated in what
follows (starting in the next chapter).
~
5. With in anarkism: green and deep-green anarkism.
~
/\-
1¥ short, a green position or theory is one that reflects sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, with that commitment shown in relevant positive action. Even more
briefly, what is required for such greenness (gre-eenness) is this: environmental commitment
manifested in suitable action. 28
A deep-green theory, is a green theory, that is one reflecting sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, which exhibits depth, roughly some items, notably natural items, that do
not answer back to human interests are valuable in themselves and human interests do not
always predominate. 29 A deep-green political theory is a political theory of this deep-green
sort.
Deep green agents do not have to attempt anything in an explicitly political direction, even
though they have to attempt something for environmental causes. They can live as part of a
minority, as many do, watching what they value degraded or destroyed. They are committed,
in principle (only), to reform. There is no commitment to radicalism. But if such greens wish
to retain enough of what they value, they will have, sooner or later, to become involved in
-------
political issues, in more than merely reformist ways.
!J..,+ 0
..ilfvl
j\ is a m11fatter of completeness, deep-green theory~is bound to touc~/ at leastj; upon
r::'""'
-::i:;,
/./ow,t,-.J~
polit ical issues. B:a.t,\deep-green theory does not, itsel~ force a particular form of political
theory, certainly not anarchoid forms. Rather such forms present appealing options, especially
given the deep-green inadequacy of mere small and marginal variations upon prevailing
unjustified state arrangements. While some, important changes may be achieved in reformist
ways, they are unlikely to do enough. They are for more likely to be, what virtually all
•• idence, suggests: too little, too late.
28
A full account of greenness is easily accessible in GE. So the many elaborating details are not spelt out
here. An overlapping detail also offered in GI.
29
Again these features have been explained in detail elsewhere, esp OOE, also GE.
,/4 11:
t~ ~ ~ rJjPhc.J.\:r l~~ e,J, k
1 -tt:fo()'l'l,,tiYP...
f
~ 0us foc1'J.e..t4), t'.sf-s,
- - · ·-
29
sees
1
----- - - - l;.11n3 .,.,,t.
p1~11a -;_/,;,,
A popular illusion Jla5 Are political structures as satisfactory, the problem ~ the players
who occupy critical niches, a problem that can be solved by rendering these players suitably
green. 30 Hence the call for greener politicians, and extensive efforts to green up''those that are
~o/
there. This assumes that the players are independant of the niches they occupy, instead of that
the players are partially shaped by the niches they occupy.
(Persons can be seen as
constitlf.[ted, in important part, by the roles they occupy). Rather to obtain virtuous green
policy makers and controllers, changes in political structures into which they ~,,,.- appear
/ slut
necessary. In these terms, present structures are inadequate; significant structural change is part
of what is required, again going further than straightforward reform.
It may already be evident that the fuzzy reformist/radical divide does not correspond to the
shallower/deep distlic tion of green positions and actors. As it happens, leading deep ecologists
;;..
e'i
,,;-shMtJ'
who tend not to be enyironmentally deep, are political radical, and in~l~ding Bila committed to
I
o.l• q)
""eco-anarchism"" (' 13's ""munipal liberterianism""). By contrast some deep-green theorists
(myself included) aim both for environmental depth and political radicalness. However deep,S~c~ l
green theory represents a plurallism, of which political radicalism
,.. is,\not an-~··· feature. In any
case, radicalism does not exclude judicious reformist activity of support of reformist measures
(and it is remotely possible that some regions ~ ould just get very 1i ckm:g in reforms). So too
~
while anarchical investigations are politically radical, a good deal of P1at is this ....... may be of
relevance to reformist green theory, both theory and methods.
Like most political theory, green theory spans a range from practical, getting things done
within prevailing arrangements, to highly theoretical, such as envisaging superior organisation
(postponing questions as to how to get from here to there). The present investigations
(parallelling my interests) lie in the more theoretical end, partly because (from where I am)
prevailing arrangements look, not to overstate things, environmentally hopeless.
Whether or not a deep-green approach is limited to reformist practice or not, it is bound to
be revolutionary in theoretical impact. For by yirtue of what is meant by deep-green, any such
dcw,,E.'~ ro~
approach is bound to reject assumptionsi ntegral to modem political theory.
dt\,,;... ... J
Political theory ... address the question of which politically variable institutions
are normatively satisfactory: in particularly, normatively satisfactory from the
point of view of some constituency ... . Modem political theory, at least in the
Western tradition, makes two assumptions in giving further specification to the
enterprise. The first is the ...
[humanist] assumption, that the relevant constituency is human beings, usually
the [individual] human beings who are to live under the institutions ... . And the
30
Thus such despairing c\~lls as the following:
The environmental movement is exhausted by campaigning on so many fronts; what is needed now is for
the decision makers to change their loyalties and priorities-don't just wear the green, think green and act
green!
I
a..
·tQ
1-e
30
second is the
[local egalitarian] assumption, that the arrangements should be normatively
satisfactory from the point of view equally, of all relevant individuals ... .
These assumptions are almost constituive of Western political thought ....31
Like hi:i;~inent predecessors, Pettit does not offer much argument for these large assumptions,
, Jk
and what is on offer is quite inadequate. The second assumption, his ""universalism"" ,whic~ takes
as less controversial, obtains only an invalid one-liner: 'If persons are all that matter [a first of
various transformations of the humanist assump~o~ ], they surely matter equally, so universialism
ton
is hard to resist' .32 To emphasis the invalidity, consider a few substitutions: if possessions
(species, assumptions, ... ) are all that matter, they matter equally. What is more, when the first
assumption is duly broken, the second assumption is commonly abandoned. That when other
items than humans do matter, for some other creatures, humans matter more than those others
r-
(this sort of assumption in fact typifies intermediate, opposed to deep, positions). An easy
egalitarianism (which shelves merit distribution issues) tends to become increasingly
controversial, and implausible, as constitf e~ es are further varied and widened; witness the
bf spheric egalitarianism of deep
ecology.33
It is the first assumption, then that deep-green approaches are bound to reject. pettit passes
.-
upon discussion of the 'challenging' 'objection': 'It is that if political arrangements are devised
with a view just to the interests of human beings [note the further transformation] then they are
quite likely to be damaging to the rest of nature' (to grossly understate the problematic
situation). 34 He cannot resist the observation that as 'the interests of human beings are tied up in
great part with those of non-human nature, ... we may hope that in approaching political matters
from a personalist standpoint we will not be insensitive to the needs of non-human species and of
31
Thus Pettit, pp 286-7, who provides some selective docmentation for these claims and that these
assumptions are made. Pettit, dubiously equating persons with humans, calls the first assumption 'the
w sonalist assumption'; but really the l~ ger assumption is that political theory conforms to human
chauvinism (for a critical rejection of which see the final section of EE). He calls the second assumption
'the • iversalist assumption', though it is far from universal, as r.
ds either temporal or spatial
dimensions; for example, states invariably tr~ t foreigners or aliens differently from citizens or
constituents, in ways supported by prevailing theory. It is abandonment of the second assumption, which
Pettit does not discuss, that distinguishes ancient and nonWestern theory. For slaves, members of lesser
castes and tribes and so on, withinf the state were not treated equally (whether they regarded this as
satisfactory or not).
32
Pettit. p.287.
33
34
Pettit p.287.
Jo
~c
f
31
~~
the bitat that we share with those species' .35 While we share this pious and regularly frustrated
.
)ha.
hope, the feebleness of the observation should not pass unremarked. Evidently there are many
types of interrelations where (limited) interests of a dominant party are no reliable assurance of
~
satisfactory treatment of dominated or lesser relatf master-servant, land-self, and so on. While
some parties may have treated their slaves and animals well and appropriately, many did not.
Nature and its creatures and features are hardly looked after well by present cohorts of humans:
insen~ vity dominates. Many humans, especially substantiaii;;lf-interested humans, are not to
be trusted; so a majority or like consituency of humans can hardly prove satisfactory. The
humanist assumption, part of a pervasive human chauvinism, should be abandoned.
It is very doubtful that the two assumptions i ettit p~ ents are anywhere near consitutive of
J~ )~
modem Western political thought. Further major assumptions concern the role of the state and the
position of individual rights; it is the former that does not enter decisively in tribal and like
socie~ ies, and the latter distinctively modem issue that is downplayed or neglected in nonWestem theory.
Under present political arrangements, the world is divided up, virtually ex~umiativ ly, into
) h.o..us..t/
a set of exclusive states. None of these states should be accounted green, though there are now
very ~ e green tinges to so~
of them. While none exhibit any depth of greenness, there is no
reason, theoretical or pgi\tical why some should not. M~ er deep-green arrangements can, in
principle, be ensured by political structures that are unacceptable on other grounds. More
IV/~
/,
technically, deep-greenness, however necessary, does not supply full conditions of adequacy for
satisfactory political arrangements, environmental and otherwise: for eucracy.
For any
arrangements where political control, a ~riing class for instance, proves suitably disposed can
ensure greenness of depth. Thus such, independently objectionable, arrangements as: green
v
~
(benev,ient) dictatorships, green guardit nships (in the style of an eco-Platonic Green Republic),
green foundations, and caste systems even eco-f~p cisms and eco-totalitarianisms. Many such
arrangements fall down
fnbroadly liberatarian grounds: that they do not allow agents and
creatures to govern their own lives and affairs freely. Other arrangements fail on broadly
egalitarian grounds, that they undul_y privil~ge some classes or agents at the expense of others. ';
-
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69,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/69,"Box 13, item 986: Notes and cuttings on residue of anarchism",,"Typescript and handwritten chapters. Includes photocopy of pages from Ritter A (1980) Anarchism : a theoretical analysis, Cambridge University Press. Published work redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Bundle of notes and cuttings - marked 'Residue of Anarkism file'.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 986","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[22] leaves. 42.71 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a0d77e1","Lake George - Floor - Pile 7","00988
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70,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/70,"Box 13, item 988: Notes and cuttings on green anarchism",,"Handwritten notes. Includes typescript of 'Anarchist science policy' by Brian Martin (1993), and clippings from The Reporter (1993, November 24). Works by other authors, including published works redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Bundle notes and clippings - marked 'Green Anark'.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 988","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[13] leaves. 6.9 MB.",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8b0db18",,"009S8
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The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Typescript (photocopy) of Martin B (1993) ‘Anarchist science policy’, 1-14. (7 leaves)
Draft of article for The Raven, this version dated 19 November 1993. Published 1994, Martin B
(1994) 'Anarchist science policy', The Raven, 7(2):136-153.
2. Cuttings from The Reporter (1993, November 24), 3-6. (2 leaves)
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77,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/77,"Box 13, item 996: Draft chapters 1 to 4 on anarchism, for correction",,"Typescripts and handwritten chapters, with handwritten emendations and annotations. Title in collection finding aid: Blue folder: Anarkism - For Correction - chapters 1-4.
","Richard Routley","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 996","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[60] leaves. 137.3 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9ab5607",,"CASE DISSOLVED:
critique of argumentsto and for the State
Over the centuries that humans have been stuck with states, many different attempts to
justify them, as in some way necessary or desirable (as more than an unfortunate accident of
history), have been attempted. None pf these arguments succeed (as much would perhaps be
quite widely conceded^).
/
/
There are various wayjs of showing that the arguments fail. One powerful way deploys,
indicates or develops, counterexamples; for instance modelling social arrangements without
states. Another more pedestrian but essential way consists in direct examination of the
arguments, not merely some of them or various classes of them, but, for completeness, each and
every one of them. Ultimately that calls for, what is attempted first in a first attempt fashion,
an exhaustive classification of the arguments „
A preliminary classification of these arguments can take the following form:
1. //i-yfonc or V
w t^L y
^).
/%4?/ e
/
J—,
/7 ^^7< Z
*-
^rt^
*—
""
Z^?
C-
/^L
^-7
-^7
ZL- < Z*^/
c-y
7
<^*
z
Ay
/, ?/ y*^ <9
'
J
w
to be accomplices in a crime, have been
separately imprisoned. A State represen
tative makes the following offers
separately to each: if the prisoner con
fesses and becomes a State's witness
while his or her accomplice remains
silent, he or she will be released at once
while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so
happens that if both prisoners remain
silent the State has only enough evidence
to impose a 1 year sentence. But if both
confess they would each receive 4 years.
The 'game' can be summarised in the
following 'payoff' matrix:
Prisoner 1
Strategies S(ilence) C(onfess)
S
-1, -1
-8, 0
C
0, -8
-4, -4
Prisoner 2
3. T7/E C/1SE z1G.4/MSE
AEFL.4 CEA^E^T ERCW
ER/5CWERS' D/EEA7AE1
tS77X/?177CW5
E/7E E/AE.
I he main arguments designed to rebut
the replacement argument for anarchism
and to buttress the State status quo, are
based on variants of the Prisoners'
Dilemma, to the effect that there are /wporftm/cases where individuals will not
agree^-or co-operate to provide them
selves with (or to maintain) collective
goods without coercion, such as cw/y the
State can furnish/ In such 'dilemma'
situations each individual will hope to
gain advantage, without contributing (or
exercising restraint), from others' contri
butions (or restraint), by freeloading on
others (or profiting from others'
restraint). The claim is that only the
State with its backing of force can
resolve such situations: anarchistic
replacement cannot succeed^
A basic ingredient of a considerable
variety of arguments of this type, in
cluding Hobbes' and Hume's arguments
for the State, the 'Tragedy of the Com
mons' argument, and recent economic
arguments for State intervention to
secure collective goods, is the single
Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two
players/ Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken
The game^ is not intended to present a
moral dilemma, that each can only go
free at the cost of the others' freedom,
but the following dilemma: It is in each
prisoner's private interest to choose
strategy C no matter what the other
docs: strategy C is, in the jargon, each
players' 'dominant' strategy (and also in
fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for ex
ample, remains silent, then 1 goes free
by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then
1 halves his or her sentence by confess
ing.
if both prisoners choose their
dominant strategy they obtain an m/er/or
outcome to that which would have
resulted by what is tendentiously called
'co-operating', by their both remaining
silent.
?./
It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to
show the necessity of the State — which
is supposed to intervene, forcibly if re
quired, to ensure that the prisoners 'co
operate' to obtain an optimal outcome
— should bg set up by the State's own
operative.^Of course the State's
presence in arranging (or accentuating)
such dilemmas is inessential, as is
much else from the example. But some
features of the prisoner's relations are
essential, in particular the separability
assumption that the prisoners are
isolated, and so have no opportunity to
communicate or rec/Zy co-operate.
Similarly, in the more general argument,
a privatisation assumption is smuggled
in in the way the dilemma is formulated,
that we are dealing with self contained
individuals who, like the prisoners, act
only in their own narrowly construed
private interests and whose interests are
opposed. The applicability of the dilem-
A
7
ma to the human condition is accordingly
seriously limited/
A cursory aside is often added to the
Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the
segregation of the prisoners makes no
real difference. It is claimed that even if
the prisoners could meet and discuss and
even agreed to co-operate, that would
make no difference, since neither could
trust (the sincerity) of the other
(Abrams, p.193), 'neither has an incen
tive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p.5).
Experimental and historical evidence in
dicates that this is very often not so —
and in a more co-operative social setting
than the currently encouraged privatisa
tion of life, the extent of co-operation
and trust would undoubtedly be much
higher/ The argument has to depend
crucially then on substantially mistaken
assumptions about human propensities
in various settings, e.g. that purely
egoistic interests are always pursued,
backed up by a large measure of scep
ticism about the reliability of other peo
ple (but if people were /Ar?/ unreliable
and devious, many State arrangements
involved in providing public goods
would not succeed either). That such
assumptionsareoperating can be seen by
elaborating the situation; e.g. to bring
out the first, suppose the prisoners have
a common bond, e.g. they are friends or
they are political prisoners with a shared
social commitment, or they are neigh
bours and face a future in the same com
munity; to bring out the philosophical
scepticism involved, suppose the
prisoner with a tarnished record offers
the other security against default, and so
on.
The question of the character of
human interests and preferences
the
extent of their determination by the
social context in which they occur is
/MnrArznrvna/ to the whole question of
social and economic arrangements, and
also accordingly to arguments for the
State on the basis of human propensities.
A major assumption underlying prevail
ing (non-Marxist) economics and
associated political theory, is that the in
terests and preferences, as summed up in
a preference ranking or utility function,
of each human that is taken to count is
an mc/e/zenr/enf parameter, which
depends neither on the preference rank
ings of others nor on the social context
in which that human operates. While the
individuals and firms of mainstream
economic theory do, by definition,
satisfy the independence requirements,
and while there is very substantial
cultural pressure on consumers to con
form (through advertising, education,
popular media),
wany
<7o
/?oz ccw/bfTn, and the extent of cultural
pressure towards privatisation itself
belies the naturalness of this indepen-
sequential games permit that isolated
games exclude, is that players' actions
may be dependent upon past perfor
mance of other players. This dependence
effectively removes one extremely
....a major functmn of the state is unrealistic self-containment assumption
to maintain and pohee inequitable from Dilemma situations, that in
dividuals act in totally isolated ways, not
distribution.
learning from past social interaction. In
such supergames then, no intervention is
required.
Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are
Z/gtZ-f resolved by 'intervention', e.g. by allow
dence. And having sufficiently many/ ing the prisoners to get in touch so that
interest-interdependent people in a smali they find they are neighbours or that
community (which is not thoroughly im they can really co-operate. Equally im
poverished) is normally enough, given portant, and equally independent of the
State, is the matter of breaking down the
their social influence, to avoid or resolve
adversary, or game, situation so the
by co-operation the types of Prisoners'
prisoners do not act as competitors but
Dilemma situations that appear to count are
prepared to co-operate/' Informa
in favour of the State/
tional input may also be important, e.g.
news that each prisoner has a good
ff /yy 77/E /VLEA7A/.1
record of adhering to agreement, or if
not is prepared to stake collateral, etc.
Nor is force or threat of force required
SC/CC777)
as an incentive to guarantee optimal
What the Dilemma-based case for the strategies: a range of other inducements
State has to show — what never has been and incentives is known (should they be
shown — is that there are outstanding required in recalcitrant cases), and is
Dilemma situations which are relevant, used even by the State, e.g. gifts,
important, and also damaging if deprivation, social pressure, etc. But at
unresolved, and that they are resolvable no stage is the State required to make
by State intervention, and only so (op these arrangements: much as some real
timally) resolvable. Finally it has to be Prisoners' Dilemmas are resolved by
shown that in the course of so resolving work of Amnesty International, so
these Dilemma situations, worse situa voluntary organisations can be formed
tions than those that are resolved are not to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilem
thereby induced. These complex condi ma situations where they are not already
tions cannot be satisfied, if they can be catered for. And in fact communal and
satisfied at all, in a way that is not ques co-operative organisation did resolve
tion begging. For several of the condi Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations
tions are value dependent (e.g. what is historically, for example in the case of
important, damaging, optional, worse) the Commons.
In sum, here also replacement works.
and involve considerations about which
reasonable parties can differ. The selec There are no important Dilemma situa
tion of Dilemmas itself provides an ex tions, it seems, where the State is essen
ample of value dependence: after all tial. The State has been thought to be
there are many such Dilemmas (e.g. as to essential because of certain influential
environmental degradation, of over false dichotomies; for example, that all
exploitation, of family fcuds/or^violencQ) behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic
which are considered beyond the sphere (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon,
of the State or not worthy of State atten and 'irrational'), that the only way of
allocating goods, apart from profittion.
There are now grounds for concluding directed markets — which tend to deal
that the conditions cannot be satisfied at abysmally with collective goods — is
all. For many of the arguments using through State control.'^ But it is quite
Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' evident that there are o/Aer methods of
and Hume's arguments for the State and allocation, both economic (e.g. ex
Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons' for change, through traditional markets,
instance, turn out when projver/y /or- based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by
to consist not just of a single co-operatives, clubs).
Lastly, introduction of the State to
game but of a sequence of such games,
to be more adequately represented by resolve so/ne Dilemma situations has
what is called a
But in many very extensive effects/ many of them
such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma negative, so that the gains made, if any,
games, rational 'co-operation' can oc in so resolving Dilemma situations, ap
cur, even assuming separated players pear to be substantially outweighed by
with purely egoistic interests.'"" For what the costs involved. For there are the
SOCIAL ALTERNA ! tVES Vet. 2 No. 3. )982
25
many evi! aspects of the typicai State to
put in the baiance. As regards Dilemma
situations, entry of the State with its
authority showing may not help but may
worsen some situations, and more im
portant, new Dilemmas may be initiated
by State activity, as in the case of the
prisoners, or differently with the State as
a further player (since the State may
engage in whaling, have access to a com
mons, etc.). These points lead also to
further arguments against the State.
available 'collective good' (e.g. commons, un
polluted streams, whales, wilderness). That
received arguments of ail these types involves
Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide
sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op.cit.
and etsewhere. An easier introduction to the
material covered by Taylor, which also
surveys other Important literature, is given in
the final chapter of R Abrams, Foundations
of Political Analysis, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1980.
5.
An important matter the two player game
does not illustrate is the relevance of popula
tion size in the arguments for the State. But
size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter
2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated)
by organisation into smaller communities.
The figures given in the matrix are illustrative
only; for inequalities which suffice for a
Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p.5.
6.
It is similarly bizarre that there should be out
comes that the State alone is said to be able to
arrange, but not mere social cooperation,
when the State zs (as on many theories) the
result or reflection of social cooperation.
7.
This important point is much elaborated in V.
and R. Routley, Soc/af Theories, Se//
Management, and T'n wronwm'a/ ProAferru
in Environmental Philosophy (edited D
Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian
National University, 1980.
9.
10.
11.
12.
4.
Arguments of this type are sometimes said to
represent 'the strongest case that can be made
for the desirability of the State' (M. Taylor,
Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London,
1976. p.9). To cover all arguments of the
type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase
'variants of' and disputes as to whether cer
tain arguments such as those of Hume and of
Olson involve Prisoners' Diiernnta situations,
Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense
to include not merely single n-person
Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example,
games where the payoffs are not merely
egoistic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and
where such games are iterated. As the
bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there
are two types of case, not sharply separated
and both of the same /ogtcaZ/orm — those
where people do not rwr/A/wfe to sup/r/y
themselves with, or with 'optimum' quantities
of, a 'collective good' (e.g. security, order,
sewage), and those where people do not
re.s/ram themselves to mam/am, or maintain
'optimum"" quantities of, some already
13.
As a result of G. Hardin's Tragerh' o/ rhe
Commons, historical evidence has been
assembled which reveals how far Hardin's
'Commons' diverges from historic commons;
see, in particular, A. Roberts, 7'he Se/fManagmg TTiwonmenr, Allison & Busby.
London, 1979, chapter 10, but also Routley,
op.cit. p.285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points
apply as regards many other Dilemma situa
tions. 'In the experimental studies of the
prisoner's dilemma game approxtmately half
of the participants choose a cooperative
strategy even when they know for certain that
the other player will cooperate'. Abrams.
op.cit., p.3O8.
'
Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op.cit.. p.93.
This important result is established in
Taylor, op.cit, for a number of critical cases,
though not generally; see, e.g. p.32 but
especially chapter 5.
Such moves have proved valuable in reducing
the State's role in legal prosecution, and in
eliminating courtroom procedures, including
cases where the State is one of the 'adver
saries'.
Both the false dichotomies cited are common
place, not to say rife, in modern economic
and political theorising. Both are to be found
in Abram's final chapter, for example, and
the first (with an attempt to plaster over the
gap with a definition) in Taylor. For a further
criticism of such false dichotomies, see
Routley, op.cit., pp.25O ff.
To take one lesser example. State intrusion
often induces a certain social escapism: one
escapes one's social roles and is enabled to
concentrate on private affairs or just to laze.
Or so it may appear: for in reality anyone
who works, works long and often alienated
hours to pay for this apparent escapism and
to cover the high costs of frequently inade
quate State activity.
of course. ]
5^
The case if broken-backed right here:
to agree
because if we don't to this not goint/
to social contract - which allegedly implies these things - either.
Similarly, the social contract theory is broken-backed.
G5;
. Alternative longer
at this point in §3:-
In shof^* in certain
important cases, cooperative individual choice cannot replace state-covered choice.
There are (as the bracketed clauses indicate) two main types of case, those
where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with optimum quant
ities of, a ""collective good"", and those where people do not restrain themselves
to maintain, or maintain optimum quantities of, some already available ""collective
good"".
The first type of case is taken to include such traditional and
modern
concerns of the state and its subsidiary institutions as order, security, defence,
and perhaps private property, as well as sewerage schemes, water supplies^.waste
services, public health, social security, etc.
The second case is supposed to
include, as well as village commons, newer environmental concerns such as clean
air, unpolluted streams and beaches, parks, rainforests, wilderness, wha les, etc.
But there is no sharp division between the cases (security or parks could be of
either type depending on the status quo), and as arguments for state institution
both have the same logical form, that of a Prisoners' Dilemma or some finite
sequence of Pri soners' Dilemma games (what are called Prisoners' Dilemma
The arguments are not mere exercises in game theory since it is through
arguments of this type that political theorists such as Hobbes and Hume have
5.
attempted to demonstrate the necessity of the Stato4^
Furthermore, it is with
arguments of the same form, the ""Tragedy of the Commons"", that Hardia and others
have tried to show that extensive, indeed draconian, state powers are required
to resolve environmental problems;
without such powers no exploiter or polluter
will exercise restraint.
Consider the gj^le Prisoners' Dilemma game where each player, or prisoner,
is assuined, as is usual in these things, to be egoistic (sometime equated with
""being rational""), to seek just&axijnisation of his own private payoff, in the
special case where there are just two players.
(The special case illustrates all
the main points except one, the importance of size in making a case for the state.)
[Joins text again at fn.5 point.]
/* 4.
In §3:-
The Trac^ec[y of the Commons is set up so as to assume no collective
methods had [Teen developed or can be developed without coercion.
(Roberts).
The point of coercian is to ret^n the privatised individual.
$
For the factor
of coercion makes it in interests of private individualize coercion makes the
effect of relations to be got without exceeding privatised individual picture.
Coercion substitutes for relations in the context of privatised individuals.
Privatised individuals are, of course, products, in large part, of the
operation (and enforcement and entrenchment) of a particular social theory, or
rather sort of social theory.
^5^
In §4:-
The case looks like an inside job;
and it is, though neither
the operative, nor for that matter the prisoners ^n their own,
essential role.
play an
The prisoners, in any finite number, can be members of a
community and payoffs quantities of some collective good .
The claim is, that
without intervention (by thecate), the community will only corpse a subeyy^mo/
quantity of the good if any.
Some features of the prisoners' relations are
assumed to transfer however.
Suppose, to see the impact of the first reason for the
failure of independence, the prisoners are friends and their common interest is to
6.
be together.
Then, if they are given the opportunity to cooperate, and independ
ence is not enforced by separation, they will, quite rationally, choose a joint
optimal strategy,and there is no dilemma.
Since the same considerations will not
apply where large numbers of strangers are involved, the question arises as the
extent and severity of Dilemma situations.
The question is complicated by the
second double-edged reason for the failure of independence, namely that statist
political arrangements undoubtedly accentuate the extent and severity of Dilemma
situations by discouraging (providing negative incentives) for genuinely cooper
ative behaviour and nmttAcd
aid.
This is another respect in which statist
arrangments (like some subclimax biological communities) tend to be self-reinforcing
and self-perpetuating.
[Transfer some experimental material to here?]
Accordingly, what arguments for the State on such b ases as Prisoners' Dilemma
situations have to show is not merely
1)
that state coercion does suffice to resolve (sufficiently^ many such (damaging)
Dilemmas, but also
2)
that such coercion is the only way of doing so, and
3)
that in doing so worse situations than those that are resolved are not thereby
induced.
These things have never been shown:
nor can they be shown definitely, since firstly
4
there are various nonstatist arrangements for resolving what are taken to be
damaging Dilemmas, and secondly the overall assessment of what Dilemmas are damaging
and what costs are worth incurring in resolving them are ultimately evaluative and
go back to rival, and presumably coherent, value systems.
Hence, when all this is
spelled out, the irrefutability of anarchism.
To get some feel for the complexity of the
issue
and for the extent to
evolutive matters do enter, several points relevant to l)-3) should be introduced.
Firstly, there are many Dilemma situations into which the State puts little or no
effort and many others which are, or were, considered as beyond the sphere of
influence of the State or as not worthy of State attention, for instance, cases of
7.
environmental degradation, overexploitation of a ""resource"", personal or family
feuds, etc., several of them aggravated by State arrangements such as excessive
privatisation of resources (e.g. enclosure of the commons).
(If such Dilemmas can
be downgraded in importance to suit the Statist case so can other Dilemmas appar
ently favouring State intervention.)
Many of these cases would not be helped at all by the entry of the State or
its representatives with their authority duly showing (though they might be
assisted by sensitive mediation, which does not call for a State, only rudiments
Secondly, introduction of the State tof&yolve some Prisoners'
of a society).
Dilemma situations is not without wide-ranging effects, many of them negative, so
that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma situations have to be
weighed against costs involved in achieving these gains.
Among the costs are
new Dilemmas, such as the very example considered in illustrating Prisoner Dilemma
games which was initiated by State activity.
Differently, new Dilemmas will
result with the state as a further player (since the State may have access to the
commons, engage in whaling, etc.).
Some of these situations are interesting in
that they may lead to litigation and decision-making outside of or
independ
ent of the State, the resultgof which the State is supposed to enforce though it
may be against its
d
Nothing does:
interests.
But what ensures that rt sticks to the findings.
it is simply assumed that the State will adhere to its role.
But
if that assumption is valid with respect to the State (not known for its reliability)
then it is good also for various other parties.
In short,agreement or decision!*
can be reached and adhered to without need for State enforcement.
So coercion is not
always required.
Are there important Dilemmas where use the authority of the State is the
only way?
Often behind the claim that is is, is a false (but very influential)
dichotomy, that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed
markets which may deal abysmally with collective goods, is through state control^'
8.
But it is quite evident that there
are other methods of allocation, both
economic (e.g. exchange, based on costs involved) and social (e.g. clubs, cooper
[And a mixture of these methods can be applied to resolve any Prinsoners'
atives).
Dilemma that matters, i.e. here too replacement works.
An important initial move
is, as was seen, to put the prisoners in touch, so that they could cooperate:
equally important is breaking down the ...]
[Joins top of p.7]
Such organisations would not have nearly so much to do as statists would like
us to believe, especially once cooperative ways of doing things and mutual aid had
become established ways in contrast to competitive and privatised ways.
For the
extent of simple Prisoners' Dilemma situations calling for intervention (o^ some
sort) has been exaggerated and many, probably, very many, of those that have been
thought to require intervention do not because the players (are prepared to)
""cooperate"" anyway.
happen:-
There are importantly different reasons why the latter can
Firstly, enough players operate with motives which are not purely priv
atised for a sufficiently optimal outcome to result.
these players have altruistic motives:
This does not imply that
their interests may depend on those of
other players in a range of nonaltruistic ways.
Secondly, many cases presented
as if they were simple Prisoner's Dilemma games turn out when properly analysed,
in particular when time is duly taken account of, to be Prisoners' Dilemma supergames.
Such, for instance, is the position with the arguments of Hobbes, Hume
and Hardin.
But in such supergames rational ""cooperation"" often occurs, even
assuming the players have the worst of privatised
correct analysis of a Prisoner's Dil&wima
often beaten at their own game.
problems.]
motives.
In short, where the
game is as a supergame, statists are
[Detail Taylor's partial results, and their
Chapter 3
Con,v7i^c%y^ /)
CRITIQUE OF THE STATE
1. ARGUMENTS
The main argument for anarchism can be concentrated in a detailed critique of the state.
For therewith arguments against state-like institutions are also advanced. However further
ado is no doubt required to remove all other (unexplified) alternatives to anarchism.
A
Anarchist critiques of the state advance the following themes:
* States and state-like institutions are without satisfactory justification.
* Such institutions are not required for organisational purposes.
* Such institutions have most inharmonious consequences; they bring a whole series of
social and environmental bungles or evils in their train.
In brief, they are unnecessary unjustified evils. The anarchist critique does not end
there, but typically includes, such further themes as :
* States have excessive power,
linkages to state power.
* Societies are not inductably saddled with states. States can be displaced or even decay
(though they are unlikely to just wither away).
(9
1
Chapter 3
: CRITIQUE OF THE STATE
1. ARGUMENTS
The main argument for anarchism can be concentrated in a detailed critique of the state.
For therewith arguments against state-like institutions are also advanced. However further
ado is no doubt required to remove all other (unexplified) alternatives to anarchism.
/
Anarchist critiques of the state advance the following themes:
*
States and state-like institutions are without satisfactory justification.
e
Such institutions are not required for organisational purposes.
Such institutions have most inharmonious consequences; they bring a whole series of
social and environmental bungles or evils in their train.
In brief, they are unnecessary unjustified evils. The anarchist critique does not end
there, but typically includes, such further themes as :
* States have excessive power.
* States are devices for channelling privilege and wealth to certain minorities with inside
linkages to state power.
* Societies are not ineluctably saddled with states. States can be displaced or even decay
(though they are unlikely to just wither away).
1. The state is an undesirable, or even downright evii, institution, for the following range
of reasons:-
* States entrench inequities, domination and exploitation. States are devices for the
protection of wealth, property and privilege, and usually for the redistribution upwards, and
often concentration, of wealth and privilege. A minor but popular illustration is offered by the
expensive conferences and other junkets that state employees or party officials organise for
themselves and manage to bill to state revenue, in turn sucked up from inequitable taxation.
Certainly a main historical outcome of the state has been domination of exploitation of certain
segments of society by others, and some see its main, and barely concealed, purpose as just
that: domination and exploitation.
* States are typically corrupt. For example, there are enquiries presently in train, or with
follow-through activities yet to be duly completed, in many states in Australia, enquires
which have revealed considerable corruption, and there are prima facie cases for similar
enquiries in most of the remainder. Nor is this a new phenomenon: these revelations often
resemble older or on-going scandals.
* States are enormously expensive, and constitute a heavy drain upon regional resources, and
accordingly on local environments. In poorer regions they are not merely a heavy burden, but
2
a main cause of impoverishment. One reason for their voracious appetite is an excess of over
remunerated and often under-productive state employees. Another connected reason is that
many state operations are far from lean and efficient, but incorporate many duplications, drag
factors and dead weight. Under anarchisms, of all varieties, these heavy cost burdens,
weighing down subservient populaces, would be shed. Costs of organisation would be very
significantly reduced.
* The state is an incubus. States are major impositions on everyday life. They are intrusive
and demanding. Never has this been more forcefully expressed than in Proudhon's famous
denouncement of state government:
To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction,
noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed,
licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished.
It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest,
to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized,
extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the
first world of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked,
abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot,
deported sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed,
outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; that is its
morality (quoted in M p.6).
As a result, there are constant demands for the reduction of the cancerous state, for removing
parts of it through deregulation, selling off state enterprises and so on. There are two troubles
with such demands from anarchist standpoints: they never go far enough, to the complete
reduction of the state to zero, but characteristically retain parts supportive of or favourable to
bigger business, and they proceed in the wrong way, stripping away social safety nets rather
than ripping off business support nets (such as limited liability, strike limitation legislation,
etc.).
* States, for all that they have been promoted as delivering public goods, are mostly dismal
news for environmental protection and health and for social justice. Furthermore they are
liable to impose substantial hazards or risks upon subservient populations not merely through
military and like activities but, more insidious, through support and promotion of dangerous
industries, such as nuclear and giant chemical industries.
* States usually exert a heavy pressure to uniformity, they tend to eliminate plurality and
cultural differences. These pressures are exercised by a state in the alleged interests of
national unity, and against its enemies, external and internal. Even the most liberal of states
tend to give minorities more difficult lives in times of stress, such as war. They are always
espousing national values, state interests, and commonly assimilation and adoption of state
values (thus for example Canada, formerly and briefly a state toying with multiculturalism,
now insistent upon ""Canadian values""). Such exercises are conspicuous, not only in citizen
ceremonies and other state rituals, such as national sporting and religious events, but more
important are virtually ubiquitous in elementary education (down to deference to the flag, and
3
similar).
* States are a major source of wars, and the major source of major wars, undoubted evils
(however supposedly inevitable). They are major sources and suppliers of military
technology and weapons, the means of war. Roughly, the more powerful and ""advanced"" a
state, the further it is engaged in weapon production and export. Without states it is doubtful
that there would be any nuclear weapons, and accordingly there would be no prospect of
nuclear wars as there would be no weapons with which to fight them.
* States are a serious drag on a more satisfactory international order. That there are not
more, and more satisfactory, international regulatory organisations ""is mainly a matter of the
reluctance of nation states to surrender their powers and the dangers of their being dominated
by very powerful states. If only nation states would be dissolved into specialized
[departments] there is every reason to believe that most world problems could be handled by
appropriate specialized [organisations]' (Bumheimp.221).
* States have excessive power, and are even accumulating or trying to accumulate more, for
instance through more centralization, further controls, additional licences, etc., etc. The
excessive power of the state is exhibited not only in the treatment of its citizens and foreigners
within its territory; it is exemplified also in its practices
its territory, through such
features as military pressures, including invasion, trade pressures, including sanitions, and in
treatment of its citizens everywhere.!
Obvious responses to excessive power are
regionalization of powers, separation of powers, achieved by decoupling and some
fragmentation, limitation of powers, and so on.
* Present monolithic governments have assumed far too many roles, for many of which they
are not competent, from some of which they are disqualified by other roles (e.g. as impartial
referees by their business commitments). Because the centre tries to do and control foo much,
as a consequence it does very much unsatisfactorily. Improved arrangements would separate
these roles, deconcentrating and decentralizing power.
States thus appear far from a good bargain on a preliminary consideration of costs, and
very far from maximal or optimal. Especially bad states, the run of states, which engage in
politically-motivated inclination or torture of their citizens, and so on. Where are the
The issue tends to be avoided; it is contended that, contrary to
appearances, we cannot get along without state cossetting: states are necessary. But, given
that we can get along without them, would we really be significantly worse off without them?
cfr .
Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 997","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[73] leaves. 195.22 MB.",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:74587d1","Lake George - Floor - Pile 7","The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated cutting (photocopy) of Meyers DT (1981) 'The inevitability of the state', Analysis,
41:46-47, https://doi.org/10.2307/3327871. (3 leaves)
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated cutting (photocopy) of four pages from Chomsky N (1992) Deterring democracy, Hill
and Wang. (2 leaves)
V
-^
Floor > Pile 7",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/444eca0d35c73ff9b0dc82f8f6d70024.pdf,Text,"Draft Papers",1,0
75,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/75,"Box 13, item 998: Draft chapters on anarchism, for correction",,"Typescripts and handwritten chapters, with handwritten emendations and annotations. [133] leaves. ","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, item 998","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[133] leaves. 370.52 MB.",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:490d6e5","Lake George - Floor - Pile 7","f
Chapter 10
_
CRITICS OF ANARCHISM AND FURTHER CRITICISM.
..
One of the regular obstacles almost any innovative ideology encounters is hardened
dogfpMdwi. Hardened dogmatism characteristically sees little scope for movement from some
established status quo. There are many hardened dogmatists who see no alternative to the
modern state. In this they join company with a huge and motley crew of political ""realists"":
'There simply is no way an advanced industrial state can cope with technological complexities,
can minimize waste and misery and the danger of revolutions without strong government
controls' (Gardner!, our sample dcifnatist, selected^because he has ranted^at verbose length,on
his anti-anarchist disposition). We can grant that there is no viable state without requisite
government controls, no state without a state. The question is rather whether such objectives as
reduction of waste and misery and control of technology even he accomplished, perhaps
significantly better without the state, which tends to wagnt/y the problems concerned.
A feature of dogmatism is that assertion, reiterated assertion, replaces argument. So it is
with^state dogmatism: 'As things are, there simply is no way a modem industrial society can
flourish without a strong government to enforce the law' (p.123). international industrial
society flourishes, after a fashion ^without such a government. Analogous functional ways in
which regional industrial societies can operate, way implicit in historic anarchism, have been
explained. 'It is not just the necessity of a state to preserve law and order that makes the
anarchist dream so hopeless' (p.124). Order requires only a certain organisation^, for which the
state is quite unnecessary. As for law, the necessity is but analytic on the law being state-law.
But a wide network of conventions and regulations can operate without a state; there are many
examples, beginning with stateless societies, continuing through a range of voluntary
organisations.
Why 'so hopeless'?
,,
Even if small communities [observe the limitation on anarchism
immediately slippst in]... found a way to police themselves, there is no way
they could maintain, let alone establish, an industrial society. Small selfgoverning groups are incapable of building reservoirs to bring them clean
water, or roads to connect cities, or dynamos to supply electricity, or cars,
or printing presses, or modem hospitals, or anything else that is a product of
an advanced technology. Big tasks can be done only by big corporations
that are either state-owned or state-controlled, or that operate as vast
independent oligarches within the state (p.124).
eV
As well as intellectually lazy, this is hopelessly astray: there resides the hopelessness. In some
regions, pioneer societies and industrial society developed more or less regardless of the state.
Even small f^rm communities built themselves reservoirs for stock and household water
supplies, built their local roads, and so on (in Australia, USA, and elsewhere). They still do.
Electricity generates and printing presses can be manufactured in fairly unsophisticated
i
.
Martin Gardner
776-7SS.
e
W7ry.y i?/
*#
/
ch.7
Aafe.- WTry 7 owi
an
'
workshops, where the state need be nowhere in evidence. As for big tasks, international
organisations (for construction, forestry, dam building, oil-well sinking,^ substantially
independent of particular states can, and do, perform the work. They may presently be required
to have a state location, but that is strictly unnecessary for accomplishing the tasks; they are
certainly not state-owned, or state-controlled, nor do they, in any real sense, operate within the
states'. Furthermore, regions investing in large works beyond their capacities can set up their
own specialized structures, to oversee such big tasks, to monitor activities and ensure
accountability, and to exclude cowboy operations. It is simply false that the advancement and
application of science and technology requires the state, as much history reveals. In a similar
way, it is simply misleading that 'if we want to enjoy the benefits of science and technology,
the ideals of an archism are as irrelevant as the ideals of the Sermon on the Mount' (p.124). By
contrast with the ideals of the Sermon, the impact of which are quite indirect, much anarchist
output concerns science and technology, their promotion and qualified benefits, proper place
and appropriateness.
Next our philosophical scrivener turns to pulling down anarchism by a superficial
comparison with and sen^up of the American 'counter culture scene of the sixties' (pp. 1244-5).
As technology is not condemned by one bad result, nor is anarchism shown impracticable by
one presumed form wht^e merit remain a matter of controversy. In any case, m^re accurate
comparisons are available than Gardner's prejudical poQ)ourL These set anarchist elements of
the counterculture substantially witli^th&\merican individual, pro-violence form of anarchism.
Hardened dogmatists are almost invariably crt^ss critics. They do not ever get at close
quaters^et alon^ inside, what they are criticising; so they do not achieve a good view, still less
adequate
sympathetic view, of what they ^/are criticising. Fortunately there are less cr^ss
critics, most of them with heavy commitments to democratic states (Gardner, though he makes
obeisant gestures towards democracy, is underneath it committed to the strong tech,o-cratic
state.) It should be plain that any critic with heavy commit^nts to democracy would have to
take anarchism more seriously as an option; for the demos may chose, or rule, to remove their
state. (Quite constitutional means may, and should, permit this.) The point, though elementary,
has escaped apparently more sympathetic opponents of anarchism such as Dahl, who premisses
his critique of anarchism upon the incompatibility of anarchism with democracy. He appears to
manage this yhnx
by mistakenly equating democracy with the democratic state. Certainly
anarchism is incompatible with the democratic state, as with any state, but it does not follow,
except through a variant of the mistaken equation, that it is incompatible with democracy. And
it should be evident that this latter incompatibility is contested. For the^e have many proposals
for combining anarchism with m^re participatory democracy (ul^minating on enterprises like
Burgheim's quest fortrue democracy^ which arrives at a dilute anarchism).
Dahl begins his criticism of anarchism by asserting that anarchist (and guardianship)
'objections to democracy aare so fundamental that unless they can be satisfactorily met any
further explanations of the democratic idea would be futile' (p.37).
Given the heavy
commitment of much anarchism to democratic processes, this assertion faces evident
rejoinders. And Dahl himself quickly shifts ground (though a page later he shifts back,
assuming that his archetypal democrat and anarchist are opposed as archist and anarchist):
'Because democracy might well be the most des^be process for governing [anarchist
v^lu^ttpry]
it might also be the prevented form of government in an anarchist society.
But i^ the anarchist view democracy cannot redeem a state
*
(p.37, two paragraphs down).
Since nothing can redeem the state, ergo neither gods nor people nor democracy can. Yet Dahl
begins his cri^tism with this curious twist: since the state^coercism, and coercisaa is
intrinsically bad, can the democratic process somehow make it good?
*
(p.37). This problem for
archism, which Dahl assumes, is no problem at all for anarchism. Instead of addressing the
question posed, Dahl switches focus, by challenging the coherence and consistency of
anarchism. But all his exhibition of divWity/shows is that anarchism is a family-resemblance
notion, like many Wittgenstein pointed outigbwc, warAewatic.?, and so on. It is a family
resemblance notion with certain key features (as being played, is of a game), namely rejection
of archie authority, ^percion and the state; beyond that there is a plurality of forms. Once the
pluralistic conceptualisation is appreciated, there need be no incoherence; it all fits together.
^^Many of the criticisms of anarchism turn on the issue of
especially how
economic activity such asf marketing, distribution, and so on, is to be organised in the absence
of a central state authority. Meeting these criticisms in appropriate detail is no mean feat,
requiring the elaboration of substantially new economic theory (except for excessively
individualistic anarchists like Rothbart, but sketchy details and hints have been offered by
anarchist theorists). While economic criticisms bulk large in recent criticism of anarchism, the
state having assumed the role of grand macro-economic organiser, these by no means exhaust
criticisms. There are serious issues also concerning political and cultural organisation,
concerning the presumed enemies of organisation and order.
In many criticisms it is simply assumed that anarchistic organisation will have to take
over the arrangements of present mega-states and somehow substitute for those, without mega
states. The assumption is astray. Mega-states are mostly recent undesirable constructions,
obtained by conquest or war dealings, and held together coercive means and other devices of
state. These would, would be allowed to, fragment into regional components. Thus the
problem of organisation is a substantially smaller problem than that of organisation of mega
states; namely, that of organisation of regions. The regions would naturally be grouped
together, by principles of federation. (The new Europe provides a partial, suggestive example.)
No strand of anarchism 'has developed an adequate economic theory. The individualists
are stymied by the public goods problem, the communists by the problems of coordination.
[Even more plausible intermediate positions] require the support of the state at a number of
critical points' (M p.172). How the state is presumed to provide its benign supportative role is
well illustrated in the case of more individualistic anarchism, where the familiar problem of
public goods is also taken to manifest itself.
4
A cynic might well observe that no strand of capitalism or of socialism has developed an
adequate economic theory. But theories there no doubt are, in certain narrow reaches in
abundance.
*
Anarchism assumes the benefits of autonomous
operations, indeed the
individualistic ideal is one of personal sovereignty in the market place', but 'is not the state an
indispensible prerequisite for a successfully functioning economy?' (M p.169). There are two
parts to a response. First, markets functioned before states, and function outside states, for
example internationally. Second, whatever institutions are required for the operation of
markets can be supplied regionally under anarchistic fragmentation of the state.
How much background structure do markets depend upon, which might presuppose
apparatus of state. A market has a place of transactions, which can be common or waste
ground, a supply of goods or services to be exchanged there for other goods or services (barter)
or currency (in a money economy). Buyers and sellers enter the market to effect exchanges.
No doubt presupposed are at least limited entitlements (leasehold or property rights, so a seller
is entitled to dispose of, to a new user, holder or owner, what is offered for sale), contractual
arrangements, and in a money economy, some recognised currency. Also presumed, normally
where markets operate, are certain levels of safety, for instance protection against invasion,
assault and theft. But these are normal expectations for much of social life, for even conducting
a conversation. As for the rest, except perhaps for currency, it is a mere pretence that a state is
required for their assurance: customary or tribal arrangements will ensure both property in
transportable goods and recognition of verbal contracts or undertakings. An appropriate
currency too can develop in the absence of states, as exemplified in the shell currencies of
Melanesia and the bank notes of early America. Bank notes are not fully public goods; for a
bank which can profit from their circulation or issue has an incentive to supply them. (And
banks themselves do not require a sponsoring state, even if sometimes that helps, as in bailing
them out.)
It is worth observing that much of the conventional apparatus presumed for markets is
already presupposed
for the fictional covenant by which the state is supposedly
established. Namely, meeting in relative safety, entering into contractual arrangements (in the
case of the state of a very sophisticated sophistical sort).
* Anarchism has not met the 'intractable ... problem of co-ordinating the activities of many
independent social units without recourse to central authority' (M p.181). But there are many
examples, most notably at an international level again, where such coordination has been
achieved (e.g. IUCO). Examples are increasing with new networking arrangements (e.g.
Pegasus network).
Where substantially self-managing arrangements, such as traditional
markets are allowed to flourish, there are no such intractable problems. Certainly, however,
with anarcho-communist structures which aim to suppress such self-managing arrangements,
there are problems: namely those of
* co-ordinating productive activity, aligning production with the needs of consumers without
5
markets or central planning.
Key approach: localising production, face-to-face.
How can this work in an advanced industrial economy, where a high degree of specialization
and much division of labour. Suggestion CAN'T!
* motivating people to work.
Pressure, sanctions, rewards. While this is a problem in any setting, it is caAaaccJ since certain
personal rewards removed.
*
a central agency seems necessary to maintain any society-wide distribution of resources'
(p.172). W/nc/i resources? Where markets operate, many resources will be distributed without
any role for a central agency, which would often serve as a serious blockage. WAat
distribution? What was intended was: a
distribution of resources, so the blatant inequalities
now observed in even the wealthist societies are mitigated and the conditions of the worst-off
are alleviated. That is drawing upon experience of capitalism: anarchism would not start out
from such an invidious position. Further, it is assumed that there are only two ways of righting
such (capitalistic) maldistribution: through purely private means or by a centralised state means.
So presented it represents an extremely familiar false dichotomy, private or state, in which
society is either equated with the state or else drops out, and all other public means disappear.
For socially-inclined anarchists there is no disputing that there need to be safety nets in
place for the poor and disadvantaged. What is in question is how those nets are placed and
administered, and whether the state has an essential role or is rather a less efficient more
officious nuisance. One option is an exposed tithing system, where members of society are
offered a choice of schemes to contribute to, and expected to contribute to these, and
encouraged to make their contribution open to public inspection. Those who tried to evade
contribution and closed their books would be subject to a range of social pressures.
It is further claimed that while smaller anarchist communities, especially those of a
collectivistic or communistic bent, may be able to resolve inequitable distribution problems,
'there are major difficulties' in attempting to realise some distributive ideal 'between
communities' (p.173). There may be major difficulties, there are now, but that is scarcely an
argument for a central authority. Some redistribution and a small transfer of wealth occurs
intentionally without a central authority. There is not even decisive evidence that a central
authority helps, so far from making matters worse.
* AaarcA/sw
no
/or /aw.
Anarchism cannot traffic in law - at least in the initial and prominent sense of /aw
(ventured e.g. in the OED), namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by
authority and characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent
counter balancing this prognostication is a second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific
and philosophical uses' from which likewise anarchism is not debarred): namely 'without
reference to an external commanding authority'. Thus as the term gavcrawcar is variably
determinable, so also is /aw. Under the main determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism.
6
But under a different determinate, there is no incompatibility. Anarchism could operate with
such a derminate (as with appropriate notions of moral law, and similar). Law, however,
deservedly has a tarnished reputation, in anarchism as elsewhere. Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive oligopolistic priesthood. Too often it is an oppressive tool of the
state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatible with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely assented to sorts, and so
on. These can substitute.
The state has other less conspicuous roles than law and order, war and defence, and
managing the economy.
* The state serves as representative of national identity, which people crave. Anarchism does
not cater for this basic human need. This is pretty dubious stuff. Such a need is by no means
ubiquitous, and is, if not manufactured, certainly exaggerated in convenient cases, by state
devices. But let us concede a need hypothesis (there is nothing basic about it). Is it true that
The anarchist does nothing to replace the notion; his ideal society is devoid of any features
which might serve as a focus of identity' (M p.180)? No. The components in terms of which
an anarchistic society is structured — the local community, the local region, the regional
federations,... - offer foci for identification, bases for sporting teams, and so on. But, in any
event, nothing excludes national organisations, fielding cultural groups, artistic troupes,
sporting teams, and so on. The present structure of national sporting bodies, only loosely
affiliated with states, and coordinated in model anarchist fashion, provides in fact a worthwhile
example of anarchism in action (Burnheim again).
Do such concessions to features of nationhood 'naturally lead to a demand for self
government', and thence for a nation-state (p.181)? They may (as with the Basques) or may
not (as with the Cornish), and if so more likely the former than the latter? Further these
demands may come only from a small minority of nationals, or may be ill-founded. A demand
on its own demonstates comparatively
of merit, for all that modem economics would have
us imagine.
A repeated criticism of anarchism is that 'with the state removed, the system has no
ultimate guarantor ...'. So it used to be said in favour of God. But who guarantees the
guarantor? (A state may underwrite a bank, but a state itself can fail, despite support of other
states.) There is no ultimate guarantor. There are other issues also, such as the character of the
guarantor. While it is seen to in theology, as a matter of further (illicit) characterisation, that
God has the right features, nothing guarantees that an ""ultimate guarantor"" is not, rather like
most states, corrupt, unfair, heavy handed and incompetent.^ Even if an ultimate guarantee was
needed, none could be provided. But lesser assurances can be offered. For example, a bank's
2
If a guarantee cannot be obtained without violence, it is most unlikely that a satisfactory one
will be obtained with it.
7
books can be open to public scrutiny and assessment, so that it can be seen that it is trading in a
responsible and viable fashion. (It is better that a person's healthy state be assured by
observation that the person is functioning well, than by maintaining the person as a closed
system and relying on the doctor's guarantee of the person's health.)
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determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism. But under a different determinate, there is no
( incmpatibiHty.
--------------- —----------------- ------------------------------ ------ L_
--- Cjy.
Anarchism cannot traffic in law, in the initial and prominent sense of /<2w(offered in the
OEE^, namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by authority and
characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent counter^teducing this
prognostication is a second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific and philosophical
-
uses'): namely 'without reference to an external commanding authority'.
^aw deservedly has a tarnished reputation^ m anarchism. Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive, priesthood. Too often it is an oppression tool of the state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatable with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely assented to Kats, and so
On.
can
t
?
guarantor. While it is seen to in theology, as a matter of further (illicit) characterisation, that
God has the right features, nothing guarantees that an ""ultimate guarantor"" is not, rather like
most states, corrupt, unfair, heavy handed and incompetent? Even if an ultimate guarantee was
needed, none could be provided. But lesser assurances can be offered. For example, a bank's
books can be open to public scrutiny and assessment, so that it can be seen that it is trading in a
responsible and viable fashion. (It is better that a person's healthy state be assured by
observation that the person is functioning well, than by maintaining the person as a closed
system and relying on the doctor's guarantee of the person s health.)
6^/77///^ ,^7c-.
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<)
/
4 O full public
(tribal) ownership
diminished
ownership
no ownership
This spectrum evidently connects with the preceding holistic dimension, and both contribute to
what was the old right-left political division (a sort of crude super-position), and to what should
be superseding it, three-colour political spectrum:
(old right) blue
<-
red (old left)
green (new environmental)
and electoral spectrum:
Gronp
fully
O <- bottom up
— democratic — oligopolistic — top down
participatory
O fully
dictatorial
Change proceJnre dimensions:
violent
non-constitutional
constitutional O total holism
This is a most important dimension of variation among organisational arrangements (for
analysis see SM). It accounts for a major bifpriation between European anarchisms, which tend
...
.
1
'S^
to be socially oriented, and American anarchism^ which are usually highly individual (religious
communities^ some European transplants/ excepted). For markedly holistic arrangements to
persist, some strong ideological relational glue appears required, such as an immersing spiritual
ideology.
Properly spectrum:
Although this can be compressed into two dimensional form, it is better presented three
dimensionally as follows:
full
privatization
—> O full public
(tribal) ownership
no ownership
This spectrum evidently connects with the preceding holistic dimension, and both contribute to
what was the old right-left political division (a sort of crude super-position), and to what should
be superseding it, three-colour political spectrum:
(old right) blue
<------------------------ .--------------------------- >
red (old left)
green (new environmental)
Group Jectwon and electoral spectrum:
fully
O <- bottom up — democratic —y oligopolistic — top down
participatory
C/umge procedure dimensions:
^violent
-*
O fully
dictatorial
constitutional <------------------------- —---------------------------------- > non-constitutional
pacific
5
Some of these ""dimensions"" are not really h'wear in the way strictly required. That they are not, and that
they are not fully independent, does not impede a much improved classification.
22
CTtangc mmai/ors': vanguard group or class;
<—
Lumpen-proletariat—workers
*
syndicates
bottom
""the people""
political
parties
business ---companies
top
alternative
ccylitions
a/
And so on. The schema presented are clearly far from exhaustive; nothing has been directly
included concerning distribution methods (market vs command, open vs closed storehouses,
etc.), admissible technology, or work-leisure arrangements, to take three important examples.
More pieces will be picked up as we proceed (the approximate number of dimensions is
computationally small), and some of the rather schematic sketches ventured above, elements of
which should be familiar, will receive some development in what follows^ Once the (n)
dimensions are duly elaborated an anarchism can be located and classified (pidgeon-holed in n-
space) by placement in sach dimension. For instance, the form of anarchism preferred by me
(s<$SM for an early presentation),[But one sort never to be^instituted everywhere/rom a riciT'
.
V77
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66,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/66,"Box 13, Item 999: Notes and clippings on anarchy","Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes copies of published works by other authors and letters.
","Published works and letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Green Folder single large staggered bundle of notes on anarchy.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 13, Item 999","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy",,"This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"[124] leaves. 195.74 MB. ",,Manuscript,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:b38b8da","Lake George - Floor - Pile 7","^_/^L
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Annotated cutting (photocopy) of New Scientist (15 July 1999) 'Let them eat yellowcake', New
Scientist, 123(1673):3. (1 leaf)
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
2. Annotated cutting (photocopy) of Jacobs, M (August 1989) 'Green blues in Europe',
Australian Society, 32-33. (2 leaves)
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DEPT.
(BLOCK
LETTERS)
-------------------------------
PHONE NUMBER
IF YOU WISH DETAILS OF THIS
LOAN TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.
PLEASE INITIAL SPACE BELOW.
CP-228-81 GTO
... - ----
!
DATE DUE
DATE/^O 4p
'
------------------------
The present situation can be summarised in terms of certainties
and uncertainties.
The certainties are:
There are limits to the absorptive capacity (of technological
waste products and toxic substances), resilience, and
adaptability of biological systems - a principle which
applies as much to the biosphere as a whole as it does
to local ecosystems and to individual organisms.
1.
,______________________rin
2.
The present pattern of increasing per capita
resources, discharge of technological wastes and use of
J__ 2.3 is
ecologically unsustainable:
energy in human ___
society
if it is 1not
-- brought under control through' deliberate
-- as
— a
societal action, it will come to an end either
consequence of depletion of mineral resources or, more
nf
seriously, as the result of irreversible damage to the
biosphere caused by technological waste products.
The uncertainties are:
1 How much longer the biosphere can continue to P^^ *
suitable habitat tor humanity given the present pattern of
industrial productivity.
Which particular culturally-induced environmental changes
2.
represent the greatest threat to the integrity o the
biosphere.
Which cultural phenomena are the most critical m causing
undesirable change in the biosphere .
3.
t
For example, social goals, patterns of investment, favoured
technologies, modes of decision-making, loci of power J
use of machines powered by extrasomatic energy (e.g. fossil
fuels). As a consequence of these developments, the ecological
impact of the human species (as expressed in terms of energy use)
is now about 15,000 times greater than it was at the time of the
domestic transition.
98 percent of this increase has occurred
since 1800 AD, and 80 percent in the last 50 years.
It is certain that the biosphere, as a dynamic system capable of
supporting the human species, will not be able to tolerate this
continuing intensification of technometabolism (i.e. use of
energy and resources and discharge of technological wastes by the
human population) indefinitely.
.
* . -t
ecologically sustainable.
*
Phase Four human society is not
/^e^/ dyx-^7
'' '
If humans are to continue to exist in the biosphere, they must
devise a nee societal system (or systems) , such that their needs
can be satisfied with a more modest rate of resource and energy
use than that which at present prevails in the high-energy
societies.
Certain essential characteristics, or biosocral imperatives of
^t^-new societal system are clear .
.
rhe additional ecological load now imposed
on the biosphere by human society is, in energy terms, equivalent
to about 5 percent of the total ecological load imposed by all
other animals and plants put together.
If the technometabolism
of human society as a whole continues to intensify at the same
rate as it has over the past 20 years, by the year 2100 human
beings will be using as much energy, and consequently having as
much impact on the biosphere, as all other existing forms of
life. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the biosphere would be
able to tolerate this eventuality.
Moreover, many authors are of
the opinion that the biosphere would not be able to withstand an
intensification of technometabolism in the developing countries
of the world such that it reached the present level of intensity
characteristic of the modern high-energy societies^-J:t^t^is, 5
times the present global level of technometabolism)Indeed,-^
7^533= *=^ady mentionetA i
is clear that the biosphere will not be
able to tolerate indefinitely even the present pattern of
technometabolism.
Four important biosocial imperatives can be stated as follows:
*
1.
The si2e of the Auman population must be stable.
2.
The overall rate of resource and energy use and of
technological waste production by society fi.e. the intensity
of technometabolism? must be steady for decreasing?.
This
rate must be considerably lower than that characteristic of
the high-energy societies at the present time.
3.
The organisation of society and the economic system must be
such that human health, well-being and enjoyment of life do
not depend on continually increasing per capita use of
resources and energy and production of technological wastes.
4.
The organisation of society and the economic system must be
such that high rates of employment* are not dependent on
increasing consumption of the products of resource—intensive
anc? ener^ry-in tensive industry.
distribution of natural resources, should be an essential aim of
society at both regional and global levels.
Moreover, it is also
assumed that all societal activities that threaten the integrity
of the biosphere must cease — including the manufacture, storage
and deployment of nuclear weapons.
It is self-evident that these biosocial imperatives raise some
important questions about the future of human society.
The FQP
is based on the view that consideration of these questions is an
urgent matter, and that serious thought should now be given to
the design of a new society which, for an indefinite period,
satisfies the health and well-being needs both of the biosphere^-
*
**
The actual size of this sustainable stable population will
depend on its pattern of resource and energy use. The higher
the intensity of technometabolism, the smaller the
sustainable human population.
For the purposes of this Program, 25 percent of the present
per capita intensity of technometabolism in the high-energy
societies will be taken initially as a reasonable societal
objective.
*** The word employment is used here in a broad sense to include
all direct or indirect subsistence activities that are
associated with a sense of personal involvement and purpose.
(Indirect subsistence activities are those which are aimed at
providing subsistence but which do not involve the direct
acquisition of food from its place of origin. Working for
wages with which to procure food and shelter is thus an
indirect subsistence activity).
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139,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/139,"Box 139, Item 1: Richard Sylvan to Tom Cahill, Editor, Anarchist Studies, 5 Jan 1993 and peer review of paper","Handwritten letter with peer view by Sylvan. Paper titled Research on 'creating cooperative autonomy', author not identified.","Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff
","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 139, Item 1","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy","January 5, 1991","This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.",,"Letter, [4] leaves. [2.34 MB]",,Correspondences,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a892974",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Box 139: Anarchy",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e697a58c0c0eb658f0859e812161a780.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0
143,https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/143,"Box 14, Item 1765: Correspondence between Richard Sylvan and John Martin, 2 letters, Jul 1983","Letter 1: Typescript on a Australian National University letter head. Letter dated 22 July 1983 to John Martin, Warracknabeal, VIC 3393. From Richard Sylvan, The Research School of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, The Australian National University. Sylvan sends feedback to Martin about an article published in The Deep Ecologist (July 183). John Martin was the founding editor of the Australian based newsletter, The Deep Ecologist. One of three copies of letter held in collection, two copies with annotations: Deep ecology notes ; Fred, please return newsletter [?]. Thanks for your comments, [?] things. [Richard?]. Letter 2: Handwritten letter dated 30 Jul 1983 to Richard Sylvan. From John Martin, Warracknabeal, VIC 3393. Martin replies to Sylvan's letter and comments on an article published in The Deep Ecologist.","Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1765. Letter from John Martin redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.","Richard Sylvan","The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 14, Item 1765","Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy","July 23, 1983","This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.","For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
",,"[7] leaves. 1.43 MB. ",,Correspondences,"https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4660a51",,"✓
f
/
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)
The Australian National University
■The Research School of Social Sciences
Department of Philosophy
reference
Post Office Box 4 Canberra ACT 2600
Telegrams & cables natuniv Canberra
Telex aa 62694 sopac
'telephone 062-49 $111
22 July 1983
John Martin
10 Alamein Avenue
WARRACKNABEAL
VIC
3393
Dear John,
Thank you for the July 83 copy of The Deep Ecologist.
I
certainly think that such a network newsletter is a fine idea (and
my sub. follows under separate cover).
I should confess, however, that I was alarmed by the extent
to which shallow ecology - which already has an excellent press had crept into the issue. In particular, the centerpiece article,
purportedly on wilderness (signed P. Conroy) contained themes
directly antithetical to deeper ecology, some of which I shall
note. I really hope the article was intended as some sort of
test or as a spoof; but I fear it wasn't.
1.
'The wonders of creation exist in the minds of humans'. The
three step argument to this, from the granted 'Nature is wondrous,
...' is quite fallacious. For one thing, it smuggles in the
assumption of a creation. Deep ecologists don't have to buy into
creation, or (what Conroy goes on to, in a version of the argument
from design I suppose) God(s). More important, the wonders of
nature are not confined to, and do not require, the minds of humans.
A core theme of deep ecology is that some natural things are
intrinsically valuable, worthwhile in themselves, independently of
any creatures, including humans. An alpine gentian does not owe
its value, its importance to humans.
For similar reasons the deep ecologist, who may embrace some
one of the more orthodox religions but need not, rejects both parts
of Conroy's supporting comparison:
'As light needs our eyes to give it reality, so [nature] around
us needs our constant assent', human affirmation. There was light,
as an element of nature, before humans evolved; there will be
light, and still some wonders of nature, when humans are gone, for
instance after nuclear annihilation.
It is the same on the genesis
account as it is on deep ecological assumptions: nature and light
were real, and also good, before man appeared on the scene (on the
seventh day).
2.
Admittedly some deeper ecological themes are picked up by
Conroy, for example 'the importance of relationships', especially
those of ecosystems. Unfortunately Conroy almost at once tries to
2/...
2.
undermine this theme (a theme that runs counter to a main thrust
of Western philosophy, concerning the eliminability or secondary
character of relations) and in a human chauvinist way:
'Let us not
delude ourselves as to the basis for this'.
Relations too are
alleged to answer back to humans, and owe their importance to them:
again shallow, and surely mistaken, anthrocentricism. But Conroy
wants us to proceed to a strong form of this‘shallow doctrine:
'To
recognise the importance of our environment is to recognise the
importance of ourselves'. No; and certainly not on deeper thinking.
Environments free of humans, such as pure wilderness, can be
important; worlds devoid of humans beautiful, or ugly.
3.
'Humans do hold dominion over the earth';
'recognise your
kingship of the earth'. The dominion position, with which Conroy
gets quite carried away, is only one of various positions that the
shallow ecologist can adopt; others (delineated by Passmore) are
the stewardship and the perfectionist positions. It is however the
position most antithetical to the concerns of deep ecology.
4.
Conroy repudiates the theme of biological (or biospheric)
egalitarianism, often taken to be an ingredient of deep ecology, in
a decidedly arrogant way:
'To pretend we can treat ourselves as
equals with other organisms in our cohabitation of this planet is to
show an ignorance of the inevitable forces that continue to shape
human destinies everywhere' (it reminds me of the worst reaches of
German Ubermensch philosophy, Nietzsche to Hitler). An egalitarian
theme was tendered by Naess in his introduction of deep ecology, and
has certainly been built into the West Coast understanding of the
notion. And as Singer's work on ""equality of consideration"", and
other nonutilitarian work on respect has made plain, the theme can
be given relatively palatable construals. It remains however something
of an open question whether the theme is an essential ingredient of
deep ecology. My view is also that it is not; but I should not want
to have anything much to do with Conroy's human chauvinist (and
sometimes human fascist) case for ditching the theme.
Regrettably Naess's more recent account of deep ecology, in
terms of asking 'deeper and deeper questions', has further muddied
what started out by being d valuable and sufficiently clear notion.
Now a nuclear engineer who asks deeper questions, or any shallow
ecologist who 'probes the deepness of the human psyche', stands a
fair chance of passing perself off as a deep ecologist. I hope
however that Ths Deep Ecologist can maintain a deep relationship
with deep ecology.
Best wishes,
Richard
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, John Martin to Richard Sylvan, 30 July 1983 re Martin replies to Sylvan's letter and
comments on an article published in The Deep Ecologist. (1 leaf)
",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,"Australian National University Office,Australian National University Office > Second Shelf > Bottom Shelf,Box 14: Green Projects in Progress",https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/74c5918ce1775b9771b6ab241d1cfda9.pdf,Text,"Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia",1,0