Box 69, Item 3: Draft, brief correction version of The end of the world

Box 69, Item 3: Draft, brief correction version of The end of the world

Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations.

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The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 69, Item 3

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BRIEF CORRECTION VERSION

THE END OF THE WORLD
of the grandest philosophical problems are formulated In terms of the

Hany

way of the world, how the world Is, what there Is In the world - using, that vs,
an uncritical and pre-analytic notion of the world. Thus It Is with questcons as

to

the

nature

the world, the basic stuff and components of the world, the

of

arguments for realism, the Issue of universals and categories,
of

the

objectivity

and of ethics (e.g. whether values and directives are In the world);

values

thus It Is especially with the

foundations

semantics

of

supposedly

(meaning

being determined through what Is In or corresponds In the world); and so on. But
the

under

dissolves

notion

critical

Investigation, and therewith many grand

problems - often pressing on always on-going reductionist agendas such
of empiricism - are.

the

The

world

one

God,

as

that

If not resolved, at least relocated.

goes

the

the

way of the good life, the meaning of life, the Bomb,

one 1?^

...

theory,

(a)<^

. For there are many worlds, a

whole lattice of worlds, bottoming on the null world Into which all the apparent

richness encountered Is

worlds

projected,

allegedly

ascending

through

the

austere

of the nominalism and empiricism, through the richer world of Platonism,

to the very rich worlds of romanticism and Hegelianism, as lllustrated:-

Lattlce of putatively actual worlds (p-actuaI worIds)

Rn example of an austere world Is Smart's world, the world Smart would

see

for

adequate

Individuals

science

composed

by

(which

Is

set-theoretic

all

that

upon

to

a world of certain

counts),

operations

Uke

them,

but

with

no

properties or relations (except set membership), no propositions, no beliefs, no

lntent(s )lons,
categories,

no

values,

consciousness,

nothing
Insofar

else.

unlikely

null

world

everything

else

-

values,

as It matters, reduces; the rest comprises

constructions, projections, and the like. Rs
apparently

For

where

well

everything

-1-

as

the

bottom

world,

the

Is somehow fabricated from

nothing (even extreme Idealists
contractions

start

projections),

and

with

batch

some

Ideas

of

their

tor

Is a top world, but a trivial one which

there

Includes everything, all properties true and false and other, all

objects

both

as existing and not, etc.
Before details proceed very far, then, distinctions are usually Introduced,
belongs In a world, to Its domain or one of Its domains, and what

what

between

holds In It In one way or another

ordinance,
the

In

outlined

type

slgnlfleantly,

(truly,

Imperatively

or

by

This refinement leads to a more complex theory of worlds (of

etc.).

which Integrates the apparently separate worlds of

JB)

Wittgenstein’s Tractalus,

“the" world that comprises the domain of objects

with

“the" world as everything that Is the case, the totality of true propositions or
of facts. But the salient point Is that after this Integrating there remain many

worlds,
many not merely possible and Impossible worlds, but many candidates for
"the" actual world, wang actual worlds1. For
Instance, whatever physically
adequate worlds are contained In the selected actual world of a theory will also
be actual.

If Incomplete.

These

If that s what they are, do not prevent us

re levatIons,

distressing

speaking as we normally do, sensibly and significantly, of and about the

any

than

more

fact that there are several sorts and styles of meaningful

the

Ilves along with a variety of modern lifestyles that are
logical particles (Imp I les, not, every,

most

very

not

all

at

or

us from thinking and talking about the meaning of life. Like

stops

meaningful,

world,

...), the world Is a determinable,

with the worlds of the refined lattice Its determinates.
this

By

protested,
that's

ways

and

rendering

of

the world we

unique enough?!

we share’,

empiricists

philosophers,

pretty mad, and ready to

especially, are usually

objections

earlier,

stage,or

the

world

burst

In

and

realists

with a

unique. Surely,

suitably

though perhaps narrowing the class of determinates under

us,

the world

But descriptions like the world we live In ,

are still far from uniquely discriminating.

It s

and around

live In, the world we share, out there

of

range

the world ,

That Is to forget about culture for

one thing; much depends on who we are, which subculture

belong

we

to.

Tribal

will find themselves In a spIrIt-saturated landscape, where Qulneans

aborigines

live In a highly Impoverished '‘land". (But the aborigines
mistake. But mistake or not, either

can

be

what

Is

but

about

spoken

Is

a

primitive

those

by

speaking about the world In which they dwell. )

There’s
unless

we re

something

phenomenologlstIc

something else. That, the

theories,

there,

out

which

theories, though

Is

there

Idealistic),

objection

what
Is

has
a

Isn't there? Something or other (we grant,

but

continues,

Is

uniquely

to

determining jA Is

conflate

worlds

with

been going on here all along. No worlds are not

partial

Isomorphism.

But

worlds

too

have

a

multiplicity, [to elaborate]

What Is neglected Is that ’world’

Itself Is

-2-

a

theoretical

term,

not

an

observational

one,

there are Important observational components In any

though

determination of this or that world. There can be

well as one (actual) world theory,
since

theories

multiple

world

theories

as

Indeed not merely as well as but better than,
data

commonsense

match

multiple

better,

and only defective

ontological themes force retreat to one world theories.

to save the world, from radical fragmentat Ion, Ua Ismann

Perhaps

levels of descriptions and Ryle talked

doubt,

a

given

sizeable

enough

thick

bag

high

enough,

successful

of

of

thin

and

thick

talked of

No

descriptions.

enough level of worlds? or corresponding

reductions, this sort of trick will work,

[explain trick] But It Is not how we do commonly talk. Ue talk - and

this

Just

two world sort of talk was what the levels of description theory was designed to

get

of - of the physicists' (or Eddington's) world and the commonsense (or

rid

StebbIngs') world, find

descriptions do describe,

look

we

when

at

what

correspond Ing

the

levels

of

It Is these different worlds.
i

i

i

»

If a determinate world Is not given, what guides selection Is the choice of

base

for

world

3nd

semantical

philosophical

Investigations.

As for theory

choice, a range of factors do so. But there Is considerable virtue In taking the
object-theoretic
minimizing

direction,

which

Is

dlametrIcally

opposed

the

to

main

directIonof empirical and positivistic philosophy, namely the way

of richness,

diversity

ecologies I-type

and

features,

complexity.

subject

The

recipe

Is:

Satlslze

those

on

naturally to common-sens lea I constraints on

what exists and what Is true.
Richard Sy Ivan

NOTES

1.

At

least on 3 pluralist view of things, such as Is taken In PPP. Of course

any non-trlvlal theory will rule

some

rivals

centrally true from Its stance. For Instance

Platonic

out

as

not

object-theory

true
so

or

not

rules

out

worlds with their existent universals and Lewis s theory wtth Its

Implausible

existent counterpart worlds. (These other theories are at best

plural1stIcally-true).

2.

While

Ualsmann's

levels or strata are discrete, Ryle s account appears to-

allow for a continuous alternative. Ryle s suggestions

are

explained

and

applied In Ceertz, p.Bff.
3.

Hence the max ImIzIng of reductions? which has great technical appeal.

I*.

As will be explained In a later version of this paper, the theory of worlds

3-

given has very little In common with Goodman s ways of world Making.

Indeed

Goodman’s fletlonallsm-cum-conventlonallsm will be severely criticised.
REFERENCES
C. Geertz, The InterpretatIon of Cultures, Basic Books, Hew York, 1373.

N. GoodMan, Problems and Projects, BObbs-Merrlll, New York,
N. GoodMan, Ways of Uorldmaklng, Harvester, Sussex,
R. Rout ley,

1372.

1378.

Exploring Melnong's Jungle and Beyond,

Research

School of Social

Sciences, Australian National University, 1380; referred to as JB.

6. Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume 2
the relevant essays are

J

Thinking and

reflecting

and

The

thinking

of

thoughts ’ .

R. Sylvan,

Philosophy,

politics

and

pluralism:

relevant

modellings

and

arguments , Research Series In Logic and Metaphysics #2, Research bchool of

Social Sciences, Australian National University,

1385; referred to as PPP.
A.

F. Ualsmann,
Flew)/Serles , Blackwell, Oxford,

-4-