Box 120, Item 102: Drafts and notes on anakyrie

Box 120, Item 102: Drafts and notes on anakyrie

Handwritten and typescript drafts, with handwritten emendations.

Note, one paper/notes digitised from item 102.

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 120, Item 102

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R TREATISE ON POLITICAL THEORY

OTHER HQJOR TOPICS (UNOROERED):-

1.

PturatisM and pturatisMS: the otd (and Marxist) fallacy
of one form.

2.

Power,

hierarchies,

Constitutions, corporations, states and

transnationats

Authoritarian

rotations;

organisations.
3.

Undertying Metaphysics.

(not independent things).

Stytes of denocracy, and inproving denocracy.
6.

A Major source of power: property.

Land rights.

INTRODUCTION

Present poLet Leet arrangements are hardig satisfactorg, angMhere. Theg
not

de Livering

adequate

shoutd at Least assist Ln

environment,

Meifare,

of mang of* the things that such arrangements

Levels^

productLon

the

are

or

education^

LiveLihood,

of,

attainment
...

e.g.

securLtg,

. Thus if better Mags to do

these things can be found, theg shouLd be sought, and tried.

Perhaps surprisingLg, there has been remarkabLg Lit tie effort expended upon
surveuing the range of poLLticaL

atternatives

(as

compared,

e.g.,

Mith

the

effort put into defending the status quo), or to Mork out, so far as can or need

be

done,

areas,

detaiLs

Mhere

of the more promising options.

entrenched

positions

Indeed, as Mith so mang other

dominate^ there

been

has

cons iderabLe

discouraoement of such important investigation.

R s ign if ican t r ange of a L te ma t i ves, sea roe Lg g i ven a triaL in

modern

historg, are these arrangements Mhich reduce domination and the exercise

of poMer and increase freedom. The present studg concentrates on these sorts
arrangements,

not

in

totaLitarian

of

or fascist or imperiaiist structures Mhich

have more than sufficient exempiification in recent times, despite their Lack of
justification and base in raM poMer and brute force.

10.

POLITICS WITHOUT DONINRTION:

Rnakgr ie means
varietg

of

RNRKYRIE RND RNRRCHISM

Mi thout domination.

domination.

For

domination

That

incLudes

comes

in

the

Mhoie

range

mang forms: of citizens bg

states, civiLians bg miLitarg, poor bg rich, bLacks bg Mhites, thirdMoriders

-1-

and

bg

HMerLeans

)

Russ Lans. MOMen bu nan. young by otder, anLMaLs by huMans, nature
'.
\

. RnaRyrLsM consLsts Ln socLaL arrangeMents desLgned to avoLd aLL
e<.c*i v.*? , ^etA/'o
, py<-.
'fiohcoAc^
forMs of doMLnatLon-^ [There Ls nothLng Ln the account so far g^v^n whLch

bu Men?

such

orr

...

<3/*

LMpLLes that Lt Must taRe a gLven shape, that Lt Ls unLquety deterMLned.]

RnarchLsM

dLrectLy

Ls

MLth

concerned

onLy one part of Mhat anahyrLe Ls

about: doMLnatLon by peopte by states (Mhether theLr OMn or that of others), and

rewovaL of thLs doMLnatLon by aboLLtLon of the state. But there are

forMs

other

not essenttaLLy bound up MLth thLs forM, and aboLLtcon of

doMLnatLon

of

Many

the state Ls but oney rather drasttcyMay of reMovtng state doMLnatLon.

RnarchLsM has been extended, for Lnstance to eco-anarchLsM (as feMLnLsM has

been broadened to eco-feMLnLsM), Ln an effort to overcoMe a conspLcuous part of
c/
n/ttj
19th
C
anarchLsM tended to accept the saMe doMLnatLon of
the probteM,
that
nature by

Lndeed

and

huMans,

the

saMe

sort

of

scLentLfLo

reductLonLstLc

MaterLaL',SM, as Lts doMLnant rLvats, capLtaLLsM and (MarxLst) socLaLLsM. But the
broadenLng

caLLs

for

atso

further

expLanatLon,

to

LncLude

other types of

doMLnatLony^id strLctLy,such a recr^antatLon as to LnvoLve a change Ln MeanLng,

A
Ln Mhat Mas Meant by

anarchLsM .

In these cLrcuMstances, Lt Ls

More

forMard and Less MLsLeadLng sLMpLy to Lntroduce neM terMLnoLogy. Rtw

straLghtthere

are

, good reasons for seeRLng neM terMLnoLogy.

In

More

than

a century of use

anarchy

and Lts derLvatLves have becoMe

thoroughLy oenve-p-tied- MLth undesLrabte and LnapproprLate assoc LatLons, to such an
extent that soMe of these, such as chaos and dLsorder, are no&'saLd to gLve part

/
of the MeanLng of

anarchy'.

3.

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BOCK NUMBER

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AUTHOR
(BLOCK
LETTERS)

-------------------------------------------------------

DATE DUE

<V

HILE

NAME
&

cheer?

I?U(/ tLE;^

/ KQ-Cc

DEPT.
(BLOCK
LETTERS)

PHONE NUMBER
IF YOU WISH DETAILS OF THIS
LOAN TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.
PLEASE INITIAL SPACE BELOW
CP-228-81 GTO

DATE

TVB./gTT

SIGNATURE

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138

139

genuine solution' since it combines both autonomy and authority; the difficulty i* 3
that it is empirically unrealistic? I shall return to WolfFs reasons for hesitating to 3
accept his own philosophical anarchist conclusions in a moment. Godwin, in his
F/M/mry Concerning Po/Mcu/ Justice, was not so timid. Godwin's theory is extremely
interesting for any discussion of political obligation because, like Hobbes' theory, it 3
shows the full implications of one form of adherence to radical, abstract
individualism.
B
Godwin's theory is a mirror image of Hobbes'. He ends where Hobbes begins^
with a collection of individuals who each view the world through their own,
subjective viewpoint. For Hobbes, the absolute freedom of individual private
judgement leads to complete insecurity and arbitrariness; for Godwin, the
unspeakably beautiful' practice of absolutely free exercise of individual private
judgement is the only way to peace (p. 208).*" Hobbes creates an artificial social
union held together by the Sword and reduces obligation' to enforced submission
and obedience. Godwin relies on reified Reason that speaks identically to
individual and he completely eliminates obligation' along with all other social
relationships. Social institutions and social relationships, Godwin argues, merely
stand in the way of individual judgement by preventing individuals seeing things as
they really are." Unhindered by governments, and other social institutions such as
promising, each individual will be able to decide for herself what ought to be done
and individuals' judgements will coincide. Reason will speak to all in a single voice
because, in the absence of social institutions, reality will stand revealed in all its
transparency.
Godwin's objections to the practice of promising are similar to his objections to
political institutions. Promising is absolutely considered, an evil' (p. 218). It may
occasionally be necessary to make a promise in order not to mislead other people
about one's intentions, but a defence of necessity in specific cases does not detract
from the essential evil of the practice itself. The evils of promising are twofold: first,
promising binds future conduct and thus rules out further individual judgement as
information and circumstances change. Secondly, promising encourages individuals
to act from 'a precarious and temporary motive' (p. 219). It distracts attention front
the consequences of particular actions, and hence obscures their intrinsic merits. If
the individual judges that an action ought to be performed (and Godwin saw this
judgement as a utilitarian calculation) then a promise adds nothing; it merely clouds
the moral worth, or otherwise, of the judgement itself. Political institutions function
in the same way to prevent individuals seeing things as they really are. For example;
they give an appearance of permanence to opinions that prevail at their inception and
thus cause the stagnation of judgement. Laws, like obligations, bind future conduct
and, being general in form, can take no account of the fact that each case is unique
and should be judged, according to Reason, on its own merits. Moreover, political
assemblies impose a factitious unanimity' on their members. Decisions have to bn
reached in which all the members must acquiesce, thus pretending that they am
something more than a collection of individuals, each with their own opinions;
Deliberation has to be cut short ly a vote and everyone, if their efforts are not to be
for nothing, has to see themselves as obliged' to carry out the decision: 'Nothing can

'3

?

3:

?

3;

'

y

more directly contribute to the depravation of the human understanding and
character' (p. 547).
Properly, according to Godwin, there are no obligations, only actions that ought
to be performed, or refrained from; nor is there any political authority, only a
coincidence of individual judgements that certain things ought to be done. Godwin's
individuals, unlike those who enter a social contract, are bound to nothing'. If an
individual joins in a 'common deliberation', he is, 'when the deliberation is over,...
as much disengaged as ever' (p. 234). This is not to say that he will never act with his
fellows; they may independently have arrived at the same judgement as to the right
course of action. Godwin also allows that individuals may sometimes defer to the
judgements of an authority on a particular matter; this he calls authority' that
depends upon the conhdence of him with whom it prevails' (p. 242). This deference
should, however, be rarely given, or it may tip over into a misplaced 'conhdence' in
alleged superiors who make judgements for others, and so inculcate those slavish
feelings that shrink up the soul' (p. 232). This form of obedience is a greater source
of degradation and depravity' than if the individual bows to political authority out
of fear of the sanctions for disobedience. Here Godwin anticipates Wolffs denial' of
the authority of the state. Wolff recognizes that there are many reasons for
compliance, but these are irrelevant providing that the claims of the state are
subjectively denied a binding moral force'." Similarly, Godwin argued almost two
hundred years ago that the individual who obeys solely to avoid punishment, may
reserve, in its most essential sense, his independence. He may be informed in
judgement,... and suffer his understanding neither to be seduced nor confounded'
(p. 141).
Godwin was confident that the philosophical anarchist denial' of authority and
obligation could be put into practice. Through discussion and education, and the
example of sincerity and frankness, individuals will become enlightened and develop
an appreciation of the evils of social institutions and social cooperation. Godwin
ruled out a sudden revolutionary change as this would not be based on the necessary
development of individual understanding. As a transitional measure he advocated a
system of 'juries', within small political communities or parishes', the juries dating
with individual offenders and disputes over property. He expected that disputes
between parishes would be rare and that the obvious principles of convenience'
would soon suggest a settlement (p. 546). A national assembly' might occasionally
be necessary to adjudicate in such matters, but it would not be a permanent body. At
first, all these institutions would exercise political 'authority' but, in time, Godwin
expected that they would merely issue invitations' to ^individuals to cooperate in
executing their verdicts, and, eventually, ail political institutions and cooperation
would wither away.
Abstract individualism rests on heroic assumptions. In Godwin 's case he assumes
that individual moral judgement can be exercised in complete absence of intersubjective theoretical categories and communal relationships. The argument of the
&!<7uiry implies that that which can be thought can be put into practice. Because it is
Possible to imagine an individual abstracted from social life, yet endowed with
Reason and a capacity for moral judgement, Godwin also assumes that, given a

140

sufficient period of education and social and political change, those individuals could
actually exist, with their social past 'stored', as it were, within the consciousness of
each one. They would exist largely in isolation and yet, on occasions, emerge, inspect
reality and make an individual judgement that would coincide with judgements and
Reason of others.
Godwin's theory has some extremely charming aspects, but they cannot hide the
philosophically and sociologically bizarre consequences of radical individualism
taken to one of its extremes. Everything, except their own judgements, and actions
that flow immediately and unhindered from them, is foreign to one of Godwin's
individuals. Even the individual's own physical needs or freely created relationships
appear as impediments. A solitary individual, Godwin writes, is prevented from
executing his judgements 'in compliance with his necessities, or his frailties' (p. 758).
The evils of social cooperation are much worse, but technological progress will
enable individuals to do many things for themselves in the future that now require
the help of others. Godwin expects that concerts and plays will cease to be
performed; what enlightened individual would want to mouth the words or play the
compositions of another ? Eventually, the individual will come to see society as 'not a
necessary of life, but a luxury, innocent and enviable, in which he joyfully indulges'
(p. 761). At this point, however, there is no 'society' for them to indulge in. Godwin
relies on a reified Reason to link his individuals together but this cannot take the
place of the social relationships he has wished away.
Once again, the impossibility of distinguishing between institutions in various
dimensions of social life from within an abstractly individualist perspective is
demonstrated. Godwin treats promising as just as much a constraint and
impediment, and just as mystifying, as the laws of the state. It is worth emphasizing
that Godwin ends by depriving his individuals of the means of transcending their
own subjectivity. They have no social means of acting on their judgements and thus
must remain totally immersed in their own assessments of what 'ought' to be done.
The creative moral and social capacities of individuals are meaningless treated in the
abstract; they presuppose, and, in practice, can only be exercised and developed as a
part of social relationships including relationships of obligation.
A tacit realization of the peculiar conclusion of philosophical anarchism seems to
underlie Wolfs equivocations about the 'just state'. In the last part of /n Defence of
,4norchism, Wolff offers some 'deeper philosophical reasons' why he is unwilling to
accept the 'negative results' of his argument; the social world, unlike the natural
world, is not 'irreducibly other'. Wolff is thus implicitly arguing against Godwin
when he says that the state is 'no more than the totality of the beliefs, expectations,
habits, and interacting roles of its members and subjects.... The state,... cannot be
ineradicably other'." In other words, instead of arguing that all authority is
illegitimate, Wolff is now moving to the opposite theoretical extreme and putting
forward a version of the conceptual argument; the state is no more than the
association of its members and so necessary to them, so there is no problem about its
authority. Wolff also suggests that there might be a practical solution to the problem
of authority; political institutions must be decentralized and based on 'voluntary
compliance' (although he may be arguing that a system based on 'voluntary

141

compliance' does not involve authority at all). Curiously, Wolff does not appear to
see anything odd in an 'anarchism' that proclaims the necessity of the state. The
-central argument of anarchism is precisely that the state, including the liberal
democratic state, is inherently 'other', and so its claim to authority can never be
justified.
Anarchists, philosophical or otherwise, it will be objected at this point, make a
much larger claim than this. Like Wolff, they argue that all political authority, not
just that of the state, is illegitimate. It is true that anarchist writings are full of
statements to this effect. Kropotkin, for example, writes that 'anarchism... works to
destroy authority in all its aspects'." Such statements are usually taken at face value.
Flathman, for instance, criticizing Pitkin's comments on 'authority', argues that the
state of nature in Hobbes' and Locke's theories provides an example of individuals
living together without authority, and he asks what else have anarchists been
putting forward as an ideal?'." But, as I have shown, any social relationships
existing in Hobbes' radically individualist natural condition are likely to be based on
force and power, not authority, and Locke's state of nature, with its father-rulers
and capitalist economy, would certainly not And favour with anarchists. Nor is it
self-evident that the anarchist ideal does involve an absence of authority; not, that is,
if anarchism is seen as a political theory and not merely as a variety of philosophical
scepticism.
The political theory of anarchism is not a theory of the chaos with which
'anarchy' is popularly equated, but a theory of a specihc form of socio-political
organization that is, as it must be, ordered and rule-governed. Anarchists have
usually been political activists and popular pamphleteers and not concerned with
precise conceptual distinctions. They have tended to treat authority' as a synonym
for 'authoritarian', and so have identified authority' with hierarchical power
structures, especially those of the state. Nevertheless, their practical proposals and
some of their theoretical discussions present a different picture. Kropotkin calls
anarchism the 'no-govemment system of socialism'," but on one occasion he also
distinguishes 'government' and the 'state'. He writes that 'it seems to me that in State
and government we have two concepts of a different order'." Unfortunately,
Kropotkin does not pursue this distinction, but it suggests that one anarchist, at least,
did not totally reject political authority. This conclusion is also suggested by the
social and political changes advocated by Kropotkin. He argued that abolition of the
political institutions of the state would allow 'mutual aid' to become the ordering
principle of socio-political life. His discussion of this principle presents similar
dif&culties to the recent philosophically sophisticated discussions of cooperation,
reciprocity and obligation. In part, Kropotkin 's claim can be seen as a version of the
conceptual argument: 'the practice of mutual aid... [has] created the very conditions
of society ...'.** He also used mutual aid to refer to actual historical examples of
cooperative institutions based on the voluntary agreement of the members, and it is
the principle of free agreement that will govern an anarchist socio-political order.
However, as I have argued, in political life self-assumed obligation and authority
presuppose such 'free agreement'. Kropotkin's sketch of the internal organization of
the communes that will replace the state is significant here. Kropotkin envisages

ct^—

C ^u^n.

^41

7

?

<*W

THE SERRCH FOR RNRRCHISil - RND FOR RN RPPROPRIRTE NE!*f TITLE FOR IT.

IB.

term

The

anarchism

has acquired such an encrustation of unfortunate and

undesirabLe associations that it is time for a ciear neM term to rep Lace Lt. But
that is not so easg, one reason being that it is not at aLL easg to sag Mhat the

[neM] position the term is to ref Leet is Like, even in

rough

outLine,

or

hoM

that position (that nonstate state) might come about. [RepLace B approach Mith R
approach.]

It

easier

is

to be negative than positive, to sag (as

LtseLf

anarchism

does) Mhat anarchism, or the repLacement $-ism (sag) is not, rather than Mhat it
is.

LJhat the position is not is, firstig^a state of chaos. R state

not

one

of

disorder;

on

contrarg^ ^-istic

the

arrangements

definiteLg be sociai and poLiticaL arrangements - MiLL be

coroLLarg

-

since

(thermodgnamicaLLg)

energg for its production
extremeLg

untikeLg

and

-

$-g

is

there MiLL

organLsed.

R

organised sgstem or state requires

an

maintenance

highLg

of

-

is

that

a

t^-istic

sgstem

is

to arise spontaneousig. Directed urganisationaL energg must

be put into the attainment of a ^-istic endstate. Sought

d)-istic

sgstems

MiLL

' )

simpig

not

emerge spontaneousLg,

even Mhen energg LeveLs have been raised and

states excited, as in vigorous demonstrations or in revoLutionarg activities.

Furthermore, t^-ism does not inciude^ ang more than anarchism need

invoLve

vioLet=tee: Nur need a ^-istic sgstem emerge in a vioient Mag. Even if it arises

in

a

revoiutionarg Mag, there is no need for the route to incLude substantiaL,

or even perhaps ang vioience. The notion of a nonvioient
contradictorg

revoLution

is

not

a

one. Nor are rapid nonvioLentig induced changes begond the bounds

of reaL posstbeietg Ln severaL parts of the Morid.

-3-

.

Rn additionat
anarchLsM

set
froM

derives

EngeLs-LenLn
anarchLsM,

Mounted

as

negative

of

the

assoc tat Lons

pretty

a

pubLLeatLon

the

for

reasons

scurrLLous,

against

and

Rnarcho-

reveaLs. R Main reason for the Marxist reject Lon of

synd Lea L Lsw

term

caMpaign

RnarchLSM

LenLn.

EngeLs

Marx

the

grafted on to Lt by Marxists. Marx-

and

reguLar,

MLth

dispensing

anarch LSM

Mas

that Lt Mas assuMed to LnvoLve LMMed Late transact Lon to state Less socLety.

Uhat aLL anarchist trends have Ln coMMon Ls a utop Lan vLsLon of
settLng up a socLety ML thout state and expLotttng cLasses through a
spontaneous rebeLLLon by the Masses and instant abotition of state
poMer and aLL Lts LnstLtut Lons, instead of through potiticat struggLe
bu the working cLass, socLaLLst revoLutLon, and estabtishMent of a
proietarian dictatorship (p.9).

ThLs Last LnvoLves a faLse dLchotoMy. SiMitarLy there Ls heavy crLtLcLsM of
anarehLst dogwas

about

revoLutLon (p.I7). The
transition

aboiishing
opposLng

the

as

state"

the

idea Mas that of the

fLrst

as

state

step

Ln

affording

the

a

period". But reaLLy there Ls no opposLtLon: both are coMpatLbLe with

anarchLsM: there Ls /yio^d than one May of deaiing MLth a scoundreL.

The qeneraL shape of poLLtLcaL transfurMation, both Ln

cLassicat

MarxisM

and Ln anarchLsM, Ls a MuLti-stage transforMation MLth

1)

transLtLon states, Mhere the state Ls retaLned,

2)

an end state, Mhere the state Ls reMoved.

But

the

suggestion,

especiaLLy

LenLn,

Ln

that even Ln the end state of

Ls

cuMHUH LSM, the s ta te M L L L surv eve:

criticai

Marx Lsts

anarchist

of

proposeLs

for

the

destruction of authority of every k end, and the introduction of totaL decentrat­

er L tic LsM

ts

decentraLisation^; but it

difference

(which

ref Leet

unfairLg

never the Less
deeper

with

Loaded,

r*.

MBf^S

out

differences

Ln

every kind and totaL

Lts
tMO

areas

MorLd

of

substantLaL

vieM). For exaMpLe,

Leadership need not be excLuded, Mhere roLe to direct is freeLy granted and does

-4-

not devoive into 3 fixed or imposed power relationship?

and

influence

mag

be

exercised from federai to Locai LeveL as we Li as from LocaL to federai.

There

are

batch

a

sort of theorg to

anarchism.

Like

of iesser associations aiso removed bg distancing the

be

outiined

from

its

dominant

rivaL, accepted too much Eniightenment doctrine,

anarchism.

For

(e.g. the essentiai goodness of man, the unaiieged

instance,

benigness

centurg

19th

science,

of

and

worthwhiLeness of dominant economic goats. Not ontg was it too much a product of

thinking:

Eniightenment

it

shared with Marxist unecoLogicaL assumptions about

the eiimination of scarcitg, and with capitalism

assumption

an

reduction (at Least in most of its

individuai

of

being an exception).

If we trg to reach behind the contrasts, of 19th centurg poLiticaL thought.

both orthodox and

at ternatives"'.

do

we

reduct ion ism, . science

individuai

especiaLLg

what

find?

and

Not

reduct ion ism,

ontg

worship,

techno Logg

and

maximisation, but mang other doctrines from its mgre orthodox, powerfut and
yei/cvc-Z
successfui rivais, incLuding domination, ^forms of domination. It is the removai
of a wide varietg of forms of domination, of
a ims

at

(Martin's

power

getting rid of)^

the

structures,

that

negative side of anakgrie.

rTn-srchg, w t th the remove L of state, ts ontg part of that: tt aLsc
remova L

anakgrie

concerns

the

of domination of nature (bg humans), countrgside (bg cities), women (bg

men), b Lacks (bg whites), etc.

Rs the removai of weeds makes wag for new growth, so the removaL
of

domination

makes

wag

respects

too

reiations

anakgrie

forms

for new relations. The primitive side of anakgrie is

concerned, among other things with such retations, especiaiig

seLf-reguLating

of

of

reaches

this
far

with

stabie

sort, and wags of achieving them.
begond

what

anarch ism.

5-

and

In these

was normaLLg encompassed bg

j

was selected

RnakgrLe
tupographLc

to

resembLance

resembLance,

and

e^c4mf"Cttics4T.3

get

It

-

Ln

tern

the

was

It

of*

because

Lts

and

phonetcc

cLose enough to benefit bg the

Ls

hopefuLLg,
to
shed
the
bed
/A <%<2
the fLrst term arrLved at, bg eng weans, get Lt

not

removed,

means rough Lu the same as the fLrst.

resuLt

however

anarkLe .

enough

farMas

part

SRNOOillNISfl,

In the

search

terms

new

for

f'crst

the

L.e. sandomLn (wtthout waster or authorLtg)

But atthough domLnatLon cs one of the ma tn thcngs to be removed tn

served for
aLternatLve

arrangements,

especLaLLg)

Ls

onLg

Ln

domLnatLon

part

range

pLcture.

the

of

a

of

forms

(envLronmentaL

DLth domLnatLon Ls assumed to go

subject Lon and expLoLtatLon of what Ls domLnated. LIL th domLnatLon a Lso tends

go

Yet

expans ton.

there

are

other

thtngs. [Expand, when Look at domLnatLon

Later.J Finother word Looked at that has some currencg
state Less

roughLg

LLteraLLg Lt means

to

acephaLous

Ls

wLthout a head

head Less .

meaning

It Ls not a

part Lou LarLg good term for present purposes.

state

The

operates

wLth,ratLfLes,

SLnce both AnakgrLe

domLnatLon.

the same road for a Long part of

ensure,

and

reLg

upon,

and

LegLtLmLzes

forms

of

and anarchg aLm to eLLmLnate these, theg traveL
thejourneg. Find

forms

of domLnatLon -

Lf

the

rLde

together;

and

state

Ls

as mang crLtLcs,

anarchLsts, have argued - then anakgrLe LncLudes anarchg.
of the LnLtLaL argument, theg

mang

some

In ang case

bound

to

not reaLLg
for

sssLmLLatLon^ Ln

much
the

interests of brevLtgwLLL not be too mLsLeadLng.

S

great

Ls proper - Ls

advantage of anakgrLe, however - and one reason whg the LncLusLon
thLsj- The

rewovaL

of

domLnatLon

gLves

actLvLsts

something

LmmedLate to work for, and Ln an ef'fectLve wag — 3gaLn bg contrast wLth anarchg,
whLch

mau

be

a Long-term project, or aLmost a do-nothLng one Ln some advanced

capLtaLLst states.

-6-

FOOTNOTES

The probiem is frequentiy not one of suppiy, but rather of

1.

distribution

stiii -3 matter of poiitico-economic arrangements.

2.

Negativety remains a prob Lem. It is considered beioM.

3.

foLLoM

Preface

iJhat

are

from the

by N.Y. KeLpinsky, to thLs work.

couLd

be argued is that the idea of immediate

modern states is rather naive.

)

A

<3'

/ZuA

<5^

/7^

c

y*&"-

-7-

7

21/3/84 - I.

ANARCHISM :

%ea</oc/

s

The multiple

aims of

Often

theory.

political

an aim,^ is

takq^ to

(model) of the good society, or even more strongly (and less likely) of
a
or perfect, society.
But, to put it in an old-fashioned way, there is no

"X

such

thing as the good society, any more than there is such a thing as the good life.

In

at

principle

least,

are

there

variety

a

of

good

and

societies,

even

pluralistically there are different mixes (or pluralities) of good societies.

ft
-Ritter's

Rosseau,

(p.135)

problem

A

with

of

'

Marx,

equality, vs.

with

models

material

of

the

good

de^dgnce^ vs

society

(e-g-

Prato,

with

The^ can be combined in a pluralistic framework of

intellectual virtues)^ vanishes,

many good societies.

competing

Likewise the problem of conflicting values is

much reduced,

4
and indeed given sufficient tolerance of other arrangements largely vanishes.

Ritter,

Equality.

'The real

p.137:

/?*

diversity that matlcs anarchist society is

supposed to be accompanied by equality of staffs'.

But this is not required.

even is equality of power, but rather removal of social power.

Nor

This leads Ritter

on to the alleged conflict of community, which is 'repressive', and individuality.
But

some conflict

Ae.

^following

is alright^

as Ritter admits later (pp.138-9), where he gives

conflict:

pairs? generating

diversity/equality,

r?J

censure/^o^^^

individuality/community.

Consistency requirements.

required

to

demonstrate

Ritter^ at^mp^yes these everywhere; e.g.
the

of

public

censure.

, from partial models,

argues

of

a

state-less

issue
f
____ of.consistency of freedom with use

But see also(p.l, p.9^

Ritter

harmoniousness)

*i ^3-

/

condition, p.138.

(also

consistency

anarchists are

to

consistency,

and

permissibility

of

some

limited communities and arrangements of anarchistic

(primarily those given by Krop^t^ut)^

1.

Criticisms^

'Individualism

gone

wild'

destructive

'socially

(Hyndman),

This confuses pluralistic/socialistic anarchism with right-

selfishness (Rp.140).

And as R's model one has 'communal individuality'.

leaning^

2.

Social

oppressiveness

gang'

'adolescent

picture^

Thus

But,

e.g.

on

suffocating

contrary

group

peer

considerable

very

permit^

pressures;

individualism and choice.

Insufficient 'provision for privacy, for external self-expression and for

3.

meeting

claims

in

problems

of

distributive

some anarchist

justice'

communities,

While

(Rp.140).

things

these

'Godwin's conversational

e.g.

may

be

anarchy',

they are not problems in pluralistic arrangements.

Ritter argues however that

in the anarchistic society

the needs

for privacy

vanishes - both as refuge from considerable intrusions and as a place of seclusion
A
for inner growth or restoration.
But these things depend on much^improved other
people.

3.2

Of course nothing excludes solitude.
4
The issue of

older

character

of

such

behaviour

by

reasoned

ties up with the

the expression of emotions

anarchism,

argument.

the

settling

ig&aanarchisms

of

reject

disputes

rationalistic

and

reliance

the

controlling

on

reason,

because reason has too often been used for evil ends, etc., and because emotional

attributes are considered

to

be more central

MiilLLiinally-oriented anarchism,

to

Ritter draws on

the

In rejecting more

person.

the

reason/formation
*

dichotomy.

*

t i

'

vp-v
{y
But emotion does not exclude or block out reason indefinitely.

emotion does not interfere with freedom:

So too

it is false that 'the extensive freedom

/!

of classical anarchy is simply unattainable without the limits on emotional self­
expression that non-rational anarchists reject'

(Rp.143).

3.3
special

failure

The

of

bestow

to

on

benefits

from a one-track view,

This again comes

talents.

society

anarchistic

those

with

from pure communistic

anarchism alone.

Ritter argues

[or

understanding',

people will not

receive

is better

It

'desire

, efficient production

incentives'

(p.143).

He argues

to develop

... native

talents',

'satisfaction

'polytechnical education'

that people not of

to argue

'just de^ejfft'^

re&SM^@d]
A

usual

varied work',

voluntary,

etc.

these

without

'mutual

...

some

in terms of what they put in, still '

v'tewetf
occurs

though

that

(of English

from

in

character!),

this sort will choose different

life-styles, in different communities.

The

4.
political
'unanimous

'repudiation of
(Rp.144).

direct

democracy'.

individuality

between

This

theory'

citizenship is

and

which

active citizenship'
to

has

argued

Rosseau

(see

citizenship

correlative to a state,

do

with

'is a

anarchistic

there

that

recurrent theme

Rp.145):

was

a

criticism

of

contradiction

itself.

dubious

in

But

.
.
.
,
,
so^not too surprising that it is damaged.

Anarchism gives much greater scope for the do-nothing or do—it-when-you-feel-like-

it life.

No filling-in blw form; at this
cn.

times, voting^ those Ejeg^ixicLal days, etc.

demoded,

time,

registrations at those
,

That is, it offers a range of freedoms the

citizen does not get.

Presumably also then the Kantian idea of man as a self-governing citizen also
gets ditched.

public

But the alleged accompanying virtues - such as being self-directred,

spirited,

controlling

die t ing

-

are

not

lost,

but

enhanced.

For

communities replace the state as the place where they are manifested.

5.

1 Argument

making.

roblem

from the strange character of anarchist

arises

because

it

(p.148), provided Wational procedural

permits

bad

freedom and decision-

decision-making,

rules are met.

so

R

claims

This is very curious.

But

4
cjoc4

the problem of

appeals to

rationality-justified

freely-chosen

exploitation ^arise^ here.

constraints - which from a consistency viewpoint limits freedom.

R
The

constraints are internalisation, positional authority, censorial rebuke.

Anarchist arrangements

are better

superior to feasible alternatives,

than where we are.

Since they are also

that is enough for movement in that direction.

No requirement of best need be met.

5.

dm rd al
Anarchism is a dangerous ideal, because it helps undermine the established
4

social order.

But it is pernicious because that ideal is unattainable.

)

6.
no

place

Objection to anarchist methods.
in

them.

example' (p.152).

According

to R

But aversion and fraud are said to have

the main

methods are

'fr#ecof argument and

But this ^gnves out a range of i-ndi-catrrves and strategies.

s

THE^ARCUhEETS HJR THE STATE.

There are a variety of arguments^*which will be ass^^bled at first
a

jumbled

order.

Other arguments are:

in

from organisational demands, from

law and order, from provision of public goods generally, from

maximization

(ana prisoners' dilemma, etc.)

(e.g.A A.

surprising Argument for the State is given by economists
Atkinson

and

Lectures

Stieglit^,

in

Economics).

Public

required to regulate market(s) and ensure that

theorems

of

The state is
welfare

even

ground that it

apply, Is that .case? .the market is invariably recommended
------- /)
is self-regulating, and can dispense with government.

Argument for^ state
appalling^from
ideal).

that

overcoming

CrSiK

angle^
angle

deficiencies

really

of ^market

For it means that the market is assumed (as

All.argument shows ^is that market isn't means of regulation^

that

should adopts^ In a way it is a reductio of ^market.

It may be claimed that

it

is

analytically

that

true

any

society

involves a state. This is false. Social arrangements without state powers
A)ct
5M!
L' /
J -- CT
are perfectly possible. ^&onstruct small social moael^,,

The argument that no society &ommon4ry-1 s

anthropologists

iI^

defence

of

the

claim

that

71c

internal

by

some

primitive society is

anarchic - depends on an A-conversion. ^rgument^^j QJ

(a) every society has exhibits (some)

used

stateless

order

,

fJ"—
(otherwise

it

would not be a society)

(b) the basic proper^function of
order, i .e.
(c)

the

fA/e

is

to

ensure

internal

state^(ought to% impl^) order.

there is internal order.there must be some sort of state.

7

^77777^77- /71

<?/=

^7757777;

- /<F^ /

3?

ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATES AND THEIR POKERS

Nation-state arrangements, which

based

on

assumptions

of

are

fairly

recent

phenomena,

are

a cert^jn amount of independence and isolation.

The rise of technology, including communication, have put these assumptions

in doubt, as has.war.

1
'The presumption of the nation-state system, that sovereignty

implied

an ability to protect a nation's territory and population, is precisely the

presumption denied by the nuclear, capacities
313).

This

was

already

put

in

doubt

by

of

both

other

superpowers'
things:

(PL,

now also by

Consider again also
Argument A.

1) Kars are the rights of states only.3

'x may [wagej war upon y only if x is a sovereign state;
has

legal

means

(Barnes, p.776).
declaration

of

by

which

it

may

3.

not

of

authority,

requires 'just authority' to do so, thus:

authority of a prince, at whose command the war is to

does

otherwise

x

and must settle the claim against y'

Thus Aquinas explains the condition

war

for

be

that

'first the

waged;

for

it

belong to a private person to start a war since he can prosecute

Naturally one has to worry about private armies and so forth, as well.
But undoubtedly the overwhelming problem in the case of 4cyp*=. LN wars
with the superstate.

his rights in the court of a superior' (Aquinas, quoted in Barnes,
In tact however an alternative factual premiss will serve as well:
(a) only (super)states are capable of waging

LN wars.

p.776).

PATHS TO ANARCHISTIC END-STATE
Pasture of stages ( o ) and transitions (o ** o)

finish

start

Golden
future
age

Present

Past

Intermediate states

'?

Pluralist
anarchism
Communist
anarchism
Kingdom of
God

Corporate
capitalism
State socialism
Democratic
socialism
Totalitarianism

A useful model for the process is that of punctuated equilibrium, drawn from

recently

reformulated

evolutionary

theory.

Another

useful

model

is

Kuhn's

picture of the growth of science, which is also one of punctuated equilibrium,

the

equilibrium

dominates,

There

is

states

or

stages

being

those

where

a

scientific

paradigm

the transitions between stages being rapid and even revolutionary.
presumably

a

general

model

of

this

type within

the

framework

of

systems theory, which brings models of this type together [verify *1].
The classical anarchist assumption is that no intermediate stages need be

involved, we can transit directly (in a single revolutionary upheaval) into an

anarchistic end-state - a pretty unplanned and unprepared for end-state.
the

fast

increasing

size of

the world's

With

human population and complexity of

modern organisation - both further locking things into statist frames - that

assumption looks

increasingly untenable.

reasons for supposing

necessary.

There

are

also,

and always were,

that intermediate preparation and planning stages are

For what have to be altered,

in particular, are human attitudes,

2

expectations, etc. - malleable parts of human "nature" that can be altered by
reeducation, reflection and immersion in alternative conditions.

What has to be changed?

Much.

The modern encouragement of greed - in

such forms as maximum consumption, maximum production, etc.
of

gross

inequality.

economic

bottom up,

The

is

reversal

to be achieved in affluent

and by redirecting military and industrial
What still has some appeal is

reorganising.

The entrenchment

the idea,

spending into

social

suggested by Marx's

work, of initial transition into a state governed from the bottom (certainly
no longer workers) instead of from the top:
this pending

of

states' structure

could

but the intended good effects of
be

rather

quickly

lost

(like

the

Aid­

effects of shallowly^/cultural revolutions).

A

critical

question

is

what

produces

the direction and

so on are desirable.

decidedly undesirable, e.g. nuclear war.

But

one

state

to

some causes of^ transition are

There are other ways as the models

natural cataclysm, economic instability

The anarchistic

which -

from

For if we can find out perhaps we can hasten the process - assuming

another?

reveal,

transition

route

is a branch on the

1

accumulation o^f anomalies.

2

tree of future political options,

blown over and assuming a single starting point (that of Australia

say) - schematically looks like this?

^E.g.

the present

loans and deficit situation,

especially

in

third world

countries.
2

Including undermining of state economies by al ternative economies (examples
from places like Peru).

3

Anarchistic
branches

It is crucial to avoid many of the alternative futures possible from where we
are, e.g. transitions to the increasing state-corporate control of life.

The Kingdom of God can^ be comjhpared with the marxist findj state?
The
Kingdom of God is pacifist (state).
Peace is fully realised, and
justice i^foundation of it (yet there are tensions between them
sometimes?)
J/

/ _---- .--------------

seek 3 newer world.

'Its

%

<7^t/

1

?V^^/ 4^7

1

state has destroyed so Much of coMMunity arrangeMents that

road
anarchism wiii have to Make use of the state. 11 Ls L ike 3 weed such as
lantana,
It has suppressed growth of the new forest, But simply sorting it
out will
expose the ground to forces fertile to the new forest aiso (moisture
stress,
erosion, etc.), bo the state Must be pruned awasy, substituted
for, and
Jttirpated bit by bit.

&. There is now so Much governMent - the governMent
effectively

in

Many

so

areas

of

IsoMMunal structures - that simply/

social

life, Ibreaking down and displacing

dispensing

with

governMent,

an

immediate

to coMMunal arrangeMents, could not be accomplished without Massive dislocation. Short of a Massive disaster, disabling governmental s^^ructure,

return

instant

anarchisM

is

not

feasible.

Since such a disaster is not improbable,

instant anarchism should not however be excluded, but,

-^pnte.s
states,

allowed

and

planned

for.

Otherwise,

the

like

route

more

evolutionary

is by replacement,

ching us or substituting for the displaced coMMunity structures

broken

down

state ac t iv i ty.

Removal of government - not from where controls are required ac^trarl
rep lacements^e.g. transitional penetration, big business,(are developed^ - from

exploitative areas, e.g. gambling, drugs, prostitution, etc. 5et up instead nets
to gatch people/victijhs of these things.

voluntarg arrangement freelg unLirtt/ted to, then contributions
to state coffer^ should also be votuntarg, likewise involving free assent, not

If ^the state

compulsorg as theg are.
But

then

free-rider

problems,

etc. No, onlg showing there wasn t consent, bg

mang exodus from fragments. If there were onlg a few free-riders^ these people
who didn't have a state constribution and would get state carried, such as

police - as simple as RR

You bug state protection, whatever, just Ibke

state insurance.

/

. E Is ter Sour Gr apes p. 37_bqttow

(a Iso

surrounding

section))

....... ...... —' ------------- ------------------------

ueMucracg

anc^-

o the r po1i t ica1 :sustems advanted bu various authors for their side effects
Z! o
which obtainable better in other wags. Lare for anarchism here. Patemen good
A
____ J*

j

On Tr.3nsn.3t Lona Ls
The sources of
-3re power of one sort or another. SocLaL
arrangements wLthout ^%?-W^-b^-h'A^^>wLLL be designed so far as possLbLe to LLmLt
such power and prevent Lts accumutatLon.

Prevent,^ gLobaL corp^arrangements/ LnternatLonaLLsm^ aLready over hLLL. Rnd good
twenty years our of date.

//GLobaL (^each p.368.. Rehun^ the prob Lem — passed by the gLobaL corporatLon ...
---------------------/)
ms
Ls excessLve power, and the seLf-Lmpatred LLmLtatLon on power cs not characterr Jsttc of human LnstLtutLons',^ rearranged?.

Remedies.

1.

at
InformatLon and end to secrecy, as a

way

to

socLaL

responses.^

books as pubLLc documents etc., p.369.
2.

TndLspensLbLe data for natLonaL program of natLonaL and Lnternat-

LonaL reguLatLon, 370. Sc<%/<)<2

,

Standsrd Last Lon of accountLng -r-------- and practLces.
p.3*^/ Breakdown of pubLLc/prLvate dLstLnctLon and dLsappearance of free market?
'L--------- .
GLobaL co rpo rat Lons buLLt on socLaL cap^taL consp ucuous L^*

p.376

RLternatLon of t3X Laws to remove credLts and

Tax bLas Ln favour of transnatLonaLs.

counterrLdLng power / be^^re strateggt^ ,
pubLLc dLrectors , better uaadetermLnatLon , pre^Ldents runnLng for
c?r
companys at Least eLectLonjfor candLdates of reguLati)$y comm css conf

GeneraLLyatter tax Laws, remove subsLdLes whLch 4ncouraaa the accumutatLon of
.
,7
prLvate weaLth, and power, us Lng pubLLc/socLat and bLoLogLcaL capLtaL. ^7^

/j /y

CCyTY
^g

-y

power.

fAc
State underpinning of multinationals.

Multinationals would not have

arisen to their present position of eminence without state assistance - and
infrastructure, education, security, etc.

N^d detailed evidence of this.

Then can argue that problem of multinationals can be resolved, more or
-3
p
less automatically, with problem of state.

/^*

/?

-e^—

7
0

,%?.
rofit system^never satisfactory,^now extremely dama^gmg. Compare^ damag
fetnoTie.
,
/ i
be
profits - and look at the way these
^to worlds
by destruction for

profits are spent.

Profit system compare with (ccyM?) sovereignty systems.

an anarchist.theory.

LAW
.

jLaw is incompatible with anarchist utopianism.

Anarchism can retain a framework of rules.

are backed up, and enforced.

where this involves violence.
pre^$e, etc.
consider,

This is false.

The key issue is how these rules

What anarchism excludes is coercive backing
Opposition usually involves sliding on coergion,

So it looks as if there are several different theses to

depending on how enforcement, rules, etc. are expanded.

Kam argued that anarchism could not handle law on basis of
A
i.

A

level of detail of law.

ii. amount of procedural detail.
But there are no barrier at all.

be refuted by a countermodel.

Complexity is no bar.

The claims can

One such is the model Chom^siey appeals to,

that of rules of language, which are complex and intricate enough, and nvj

backed by force (Passmore wanted to suggest they were!

But it is obvious

that they need not be, whatever lapses occurred in the 16th century.)

As a matter of history, several anarchist thinkers were not opposed to
operation of law, but included it in their framework.
Proudhon.

Others?

One example is

/^ <2

MY ENGAGEMENT WITH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY

Over the past decadeI have found myself increasingly concerned with

social and political problems and more and more immersed in the theoretical
issues raised thereby.

In large part this has arisen from environmental

involvement, especially on forestry and nuclear matters, and the realisation

that the basic problems mostly lay with social and political arrangements.

It

thus became important to try to determine what those really were, and how they
might be changed, what the alternatives weie.

But in part also my legitimate intellectual movement from logic and meta­

physics^ to a wider perspective which includes social and political philosophy

as major area of concern has come about as a result of reflection on the
unsatisfactory and fragmented state of philosophy and its surrounds.

It became

increasingly hard (in particular for someone trained in analytic philosophy with

a heavy Oxbridge orientation) to avoid noting, especially when confronted with

wider philosophical and social issues, that one's philosophical education and

ifn 1972 I presented and circulated a paper, 'Is there a need for a new, and
environmental ethic?' which played an influential part in the rapid growth of
environmental philosophy in New Zealand and Australia (on the latter see D.
Mannison and M. McRobbie in Environmental Philosophy). Such an excursion into
ethics was not without precedent. My research work in fact began in ethical
theory, with a thesis on moral scepticism, and I thought about and wrote on
deontic problems in the sixties.
^The point is explained in detail in work cited in the accompanying curriculum
vitae (where all otherwise unreferenced work is listed).
In the case of
forestry see for example 'Destructive forestry in Australia and Melanesia' and
'World rainforest destruction - the social factors'; as to nuclear see
'Nuclear power - some ethical and social dimensions' and 'The ethics of nuclear
war, and political fall-out'; and for the general argument see 'Social theories,
self management and environmental problems'.

^This does not mean that I have entirely abandoned these areas. Logic is, I
believe (with Anderson, and so with the mainstream of Australia's most
significant philosophical movement), the central part of philosophy, and many
conceptual problems in applied philosophy will continue to require return to
logical ground in order to find satsifactory solutions. A sound training in
logical theory is essential for deeper solutions for some of these problems.
I should add that I never have been a very pure logician. I moved into logic
in order to try to solve severe conceptual problems first in the philosophy of
science and then in metaphysics. Now that these problems are largely solved
(to my satisfaction at any rate) I can presumably move on to other things.

2.

practice offered only a somewhat limited set of tools and techniques for
tackling wider philosophical concerns and, worse, but few instruction as to how
to apply these analytic techniques more widely.

Nor had the inadequacy of

such an education and the sort of philosophy to which it led gone
unremarked.

It was charged that philosophy had abdicated several of its proper respons­

ibilities - for example, to organise knowledge into some more coherent whole

or world-view, to elaborate a social theory and influence social criticism,

even to afford intellectual leadership - and had become excessively analytic
and specialised, and therewith narrow and sterile (concerned, e.g., merely with

linguistic niceties, conservative commonsense and/or scholastic logic-chopping).
It was charged that academic philosophy not only had become excessively timid and

accordingly lost intellectual excitement and appeal, but also had lost relevance
to and touch with the important intellectual issues of the times and had failed

in the business of addressing a larger audience with philosophical interests.
These charges, which have a solid foundation, did not come from within academic
philosophy but were most evocatively made by people outside philosophy (though

with some knowledge of it) or by those in the margins of academic, professional­

ised^ philosophy.

Thus Durrant, an outsider, has powerfully expressed a part of

the charges:

... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences to its
aid in making a coherent image of the world and an alluring picture
of the good, found its task of inordination too stupendous for its
usage, ran away from ... .'LtheJ battlefronts of truth, and hid itself
in recondite and narrow lanes, timidly secure from the issues and
responsibilities of life.*

Philosophy began to change in the Seventies, some philosophers naturally

changing with it.

We aimed to address a wider range of socially relevant

topics - and also sometimes a .wider audience - for example, to get beyond the

^W. Durrant, The Story of Philosophy, Second edition, Simon and Schuster, New
York, 1926, p.v. Durrant though (or perhaps because) a leading populariser
of philosophy in North America, is not usually at all well regarded by
academic philosophers.

3.

sterile examples of previous texts on moral philosophy to live issues, from

minor cases of promising and truth-telling to abortion and euthanasia, genetic
engineering and the treatment of animals, violence and nuclear war.

But the

analytical methods used for the most part did not change, the widening of
horizons in applied philosophy proceeded from a narrow and inadequate logical

(argumentive) and metaphysical base.

stagnation:

The applied expansion went with theoretical

mainstream theoretical philosophy sat in the doldrums.

Nor has the applied transformation gone far enough.

Significant issues

have been left to theologians and journalists.And there has been insufficient

effort by philosophers (even those addressing relevant issues) to integrate

their work with that of other (social) sciences that shed light on the issues,
to overcome discipline fragmentation by synthesis.

For it was not merely that

philosophy itself was fragmented and often irrelevant, it had also become
largley isolated

from other disciplines and had ceased to be properly informed

by them - or to inform them.

This unsplendid isolation is particularly conspicuous in the case of
political philosophy, which often proceeds in much the way it did in the
17th century, with little of the import it should be receiving from recent

advances in social psychology and

well-founded) sociobiology.

ethology and (to the extent that it is

More generally, the way in which areas have been

isolated from one another, and ceased communicating, to the disadvantage to

all, is a matter for serious concern.

It is not merely that philosophy, for

example, can be enriched by taking due account of the social sciences.

The

^This description derives from Passmore.
^Philosophers and other academics should not be led in these areas, but do
the leading. One of the roles of the academic community - a role in which
philosophy in Australia (much, degenerated by too long an incestuous history)
mostly fails - is to address a wider public than part of itself. Philosophers
may justly complain that there is little competent public discussion of these
issues where applied philosophy matters and no reputable intellectua
ea er
ship in Australia at present, but they have by and large done little to

rectify the matter.

4.

social sciences also can be improved, and much rubbish removed, by taking account
of philosophical criticism.Each impacts on the others, in ways that should

be taken into account.

Moreover the interplay of different parts is fruitful.2

There is a richness to be generated if the interaction works well.

And such

interaction is required to pull much material into a more coherent whole.

Such sentiments on integrating areas and rendering work more informed and

holistic have been expressed before.
another putting them into effect.

It is one thing expressing them, and

The tasks involved are difficult.

And

putting them into effect is not of course a task for just one person, but for
several.

A start can however be made with interdisciplinary people who

willingly cross discipline boundaries, because they need to, and see the need

to;

by people who are able to adopt the often special methods and procedures

of other disciplines and combine them with those of their own.

But a start can

not in general be satisfactorily initiated just by administrative fiat.

A

good deal of evidence has now accumulated to show that an administrator cannot

simply pull together a successful interdisciplinary research group by hiring

people skilled in the different disciplines concerned and putting them in a

common setting.

Such, groups can evolve however by individuals with wide-ranging

concerns interesting other researchers or like-inclined people from other
disciplines in overlapping or joint problems.

And in setting up the conditions

for such collaborative research to evolve, administrative inputs are important.
It is, for example, an astute move to have a position linking several different
departments 3 attached to none of them but to a section that sits so-to-speak

above them;

for in this way the researcher has access to all the departments

concerned but is confined to none.

*New philosophies of nature call for much more than this, indeed for major theor­
etical reorientation of some social sciences. The point is elaborated in the
concluding part of 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics'.
2Nor will unified or coherent social sciences be arrived at without substantial
philosophical imports.

3 As the present post does.
influenced the move.

No doubt other political considerations have also

5.

I think I can justifiably account myself an interdisciplinary person.

Firstly, I have considerable experience in collaborative work, an advantage
that philosophers, in contrast to experimental scientists, seldom enjoy.

claim

is supported by my publication record.

The

While that indicates the extent of

my joint activity in research, it does not fully record cooperative activity

in organising conferences and workshops, both in logic and in environmental
philosophy, in helping found or reestablish organisations (the Australasian

Association of Logic is the main example, but the local AAP is another), in

establishing publications (e.g. the Environmental Philosophy Discussion Papers
serve both Philosophy Departments) and so on.

More significantly, I can also fairly claim substantial experience in
interdisciplinary work, as well as in other fields of philosophy.

For example,

I have worked not only in philosophy departments but in mathematics and in

environmental studies programs.i

Furthermore, my work in forestry, which is

continuing, brought me into close touch with people from a broad spectrum of
fields, not only forestry, but also economics, geography, demography, botany
and zoology.

The work, which is well-known locally and referred to in inter­

national textbooks, has for the most part been well received by people in

those area, except forestry, and has been taken seriously .by those who disagree
with the often controversial positions developed.

My more recent work on

environmental problems has led me to communicate and interchange material with
sociologists and political Scientists in North American and England, and also

with people in a variety of fields in Australian Colleges of Advanced Education.
Naturally then, much of the resulting work reaches people in a range of fields.

My work on environmental problems has also resulted in invitations to participate
in conferences in a wide range of areas, on forestry (in several Australian

^1 declined invitations to work in interdisciplinary research groups in Washington
and The Hague primarily because they would have kept me away from Australia too
long and obliged me to endure northern winters.

6.

states), on energy, on the environment (in New Guinea and USA).

I have twice been

invited to present papers at Australian Sociology conferences, but been unable to

do so because of commitments abroad.
The basic forestry book The Fight for the Forests, and subsequent forestry

and environmental papers, already included much that bears upon and is informed

by social and political theory.

A new book, tentatively entitled Forestry in

Australia, now in preparation by a team of people drawn from a wide range of
disciplines - which is intended to replace The Fight for the Forests, long out

of print - will be even more closely involved with social and political theory.
It includes much fuller analysis of social classes and power structures (and

models of these) as well as, like earlier work, examination of elites, and types
of inequality.

This should also begin to reveal how my work on apparently diverse areas is
interrelated, and not a result of compartmentalisation.

Most obviously, my

work on forestry, which directly involves a range of environmental problems, in

a very practical way, leads directly into areas of social and political theory.
It is less obvious, but nonetheless a fact, that work on environmental problems,
value theory and logic, is not disconnected, but joined by several connecting

ways.

For example, relevant deontic logic has shown how the key moral matter of

moral dilemmas and conflicts of value can be treated.

The logic of obligation

is important in rejecting arguments that there is a significant separate
"morality" for nation states or for public representatives of these which

exonerates them from normal responsibility.

Differently, logic provides the

basis of decision theory, which is important in structuring environmental
problems.

And so on, to look at some of the more straightforward connections.

There are larger connections.

Social and political theory necessarily presupposes

^Explanations of these connections are much expanded in "The logical basis of the
social sciences'.

7.

a metaphysics, and this in turn a logical theory X

Philosophers of very

different persuasions, for instance Hegel and Mill, have agreed about this.
Of course work in logic, such as that in probability theory and on

statistical inference, sometimes speaks directly to other areas in the social
sciences.

My own work on universal semantics is of interest to linguists, and

'Universal semantics?' was abstracted in Sociological Abstracts, as have been
several of my philosophical papers, on for example metaphysics, limits to
Work on the recent history of logic and

knowledge and animal intentionality.

of philosophy of science in Australasia has led me into some sociological as

well as historical investigations.
political science and economics.

Logical pursuits have also lead me into

Because of my interest in applied logic I came

to take over supervision of B. Embury's doctoral dissertation on voting theory,
a thesis in the Department of Political Science.

in work with a post-doctoral
social choice theory.

My interests also involved me

fellow on preference and decision theory and

Regretably no joint work issued from this enterprise, but

I did publish some papers in the area, and emerged with further ideas for research
jotted down:

these ideas, mainly for further impossibility and limitative

results in social theory, have yet to be followed through.
My present research in social and political theory has (like a conic
section) double foci.

One focus (Fl) is a book tentatively entitled The

Philosophic Reach of Environmental Problems and intended to supersede

Environmental Philosophy in main respects, on the ethical, social and political
dimensions of environmental problems.2

familiar list:

The central problems yield a now rather

for instance, those of human and animal populations, disappearing

species, vanishing rainforests and other habitats and ecosystems, treatment

(and rights) of indigenous peoples, of animals and of plants, cities and
substantial start in explaining these deeper connections is made in 'Social
theories, self management and environment problems' and in Exploring Meinong's
Jungle and Beyond, chapter 9, ^12.

^Here environmental is used in the wide sense, of which the ecological is only a
quite proper part.

8.

neighbourhoods, landscape transformation or destruction, mining, pollution,
nuclear and energy issues, and so on.

The underlying problems have significant

features in common and common social and political sources.

Before the integrative

task is tackled in detail however, an analytical approximative approach is being
followed.

Discussion papers on several of the topics listed are being researched

or written, and discussion papers on others will follow, before the whole thing

is pulled together.
The other focus (F2) is a book on what might be called New Age Social
Organisation, investigating alternatives to prevailing social, economical and

political arrangements.

Major alternatives considered in detail include left­

leaning and right-leaning anarchisms, which will involve a careful examination

of the extent to which social arrangements and political organisations can
be self-managed and self-regulating.

While it is ambitiously hoped that the investigation will not only result
(ideally) in a more philosophically-adequate left-leaning anarchist theory
than has so far been produced, that is only part of its purpose.

Another very

important part of the enterprise is to give some better understanding of the

range of alternatives to present (monopolistic capitalist and state socialist)

arrangements that there are and that could be tried.

A further part is, by

considering alternatives, to shed light on the prevailing systems (their
structures, institutions, etc.), in particular to bring out more clearly their
underlying assumptions,the extent of their necessity, to give a better idea

^In several respects the term 'anarchism' is unsatisfactory and will have event­

ually to be replaced, perhaps by a neologism, since no available term delineates
the types of socio-political arrangements envisaged.

It should perhaps be remarked, in case it is thought that I have no academic
background in political theory, that my university education did include courses
and seminars in the area. Furthermore I have more recently acquired a good
working knowledge of the anarchist literature, and am well advanced in the
process of obtaining a grasp of organisation theory and the necessary parts
of social psychology.
Some of these assumptions are rejected or varied in an assessment of alternatives.
Thus, as a much better idea of euclidean geometry was obtained with the elaboration
of hyperbolic and Riemannian geometry, and similarly of arithmetic with the
formulation of nonstandard arithmetics, so also a much better appreciation of
mainstream social theory should be achieved by investigating nonstandard social
theories and assumptions. This method of variation of assumptions is a fruitful
one as regards many scientific,theories.

of the values they write in, of their desirability or undesirability, and so on.
Although my enagement has two main foci, naturally there are also other and

smaller endeavours under way:
of these - but only some.

the attached curriculum vitae gives some indication

For example, the trilogy of papers on the meaning of

life, nihilism, and the ultimate existence question is to be arranged into a book

which will probably also address such related issues as the quality of life.

Richard Routlev

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ANAKYRIE.

In Chapter 1

The multiple and inconsistent axioms of political theory : pluralism,

morality, ...

The differences in theory begin at the beginning, in what political arrangements

are for, what they are about, whom they are for, how they apply.

There are

important differences in the extent to which peoples' and other creatures'

activities and lives can be controlled and regulated.

More authoritarian

or paternalistic political arrangements impose much more in the way of
regulations than more liberal arrangements which in theJlimit reduce regulation
or setting for pursuit of satisfactory lives.

to some minimum, to some

So far as political relations are concerned, the world (Terr& is a closed
system.

Political influence is not exercised from outside that system,

nor f!'o political influences of significance so far flow from Terra elsewhere.

(All that may of course change, in which case the problem is reset in terms
of some larger system, the Universe providing an upper limit - unless some
extraspb tial gods are invoked.)

With the advance of industrialisation,

communications and spill-over technology, few communities smaller than the

world system are any longer effectively closed.

The general political problem is unsolvable. The argument for this

theme is that the problem is only solvable for small relatively uniform
But we no longer have such, given modern interference

com-unities (Taylor).

effects.

The basic picture is of a network of goal-directed

Defining the^problem:
creatures and systems.

The aim (political goal) is to ensure that these

creatures are able to pursue goals so far as these are satisfactory.

A major value judgment is inserted here : what of wiping out lives, of

war, etc., those that interfere seriously with others?

A liberal setting such

as Redman sketched is operating in the background here.

Present political arrangements anachronistic : they were introduced at a
time when much less interference was technically possible.

longer appropriate.

The

They are no

of empires now affects everyone s lives,

so on democratic grounds all should have say (or vote).

But they don t :

democracy stops at national borders (even in those borders where it kmd-of
operates).

2
Present political arrangements, by increasing population,

etc. for what sort of consumption high can be obtained by present people

are making things much worse.

For the benefit of present power-holders,

their maintenance of power and privilege,
short-term drr

the inadequacies of

%^ts - of present economics within political frameworks.

On the End State:

According to Kamenka a central deficiency of a M^up-ist account is its pre­

industrial character, also its romantic character, and its view of creative
labour.

These are a result in part of looking for utopia in the past, the

sources of which according to Kumenka are:
(i)

a mistaken view of the happy (noble) savage;

(ii)

the abundance of industry;

(iii) the rationality of industry (presumably its increasingly automatic and

self-regularity character?).

This is confused.

Sources

(ii) and (iii) are the basis of the past industrial

character of the end state (where the machines are really whirring along).
The main source of the search in the past is quite different, namely the search

for historical models, however partial, of the good or better life.

The

reason is that
(iv)

there is something drastically wrong with present arrangements which not

rectified by minor adjustments.

The end state, so far as it is described, is certainly a curious mixture of
A'
pre- and past-industrial elements.

The end state is not a static state, but a stable, climax state.

analogy is again useful here.

The ecological

Capitalism is like a pioneering stage.

Stable

states may have been achieved in the past, to be disturbed in one way or another.

That is one reason why it is important to look in the past - for fc^r^r

of past stable states.

Political theory (note A *)
As a result of the way 'political system' is commonly defined, anarchy is not a

political system.

The reason is that 'most authors consider the modern

political system to be that system which controls the use of power or force in

society'

(Kaplan, p.22).

therewith that system.

Anarchy aims to remove use of power and force, and
The exclusion could of course be taken to be a (further)

inadequacy in the definition, a mere technicality almost, got around by

expanding 'controls' disjunctively to 'controls or removes'.

3
For whether or not anarchy is a political system, it is certainly an

organisational system or structure.

POLITICAL THEORY AND MORALITY

1.

On the one hand, it is claimed that 'any acceptable form of social

order...must rest on moral foundations, which are in principle ascertainable
at any period, and permanently valid'.'*'
(Donegan, p.xiv)

On the other, and more common view, politics simply tramples over morality

when it suits it.

However that is a matter of one morality, e.g. of a

Christian established form, being overwhelmed by another Mafia-style morality
not the absence of a value position.

theory.

2.

Any political theory rests on a value

That is the point.

There is the problem of evil, powerful people, often unintentionally

evil people such as Reagan, Thatcher, ... Hitler flourished most of his life;

he led an active (etc.) life ...

3.

Anarchism does not require especially good people.

But political life

would run much more easily without a certain range of people.

(Of course,

states think this, and totalitarian states try to realise theit aim).

4.

On Political Obligation

obligation.

There is no good ground as basis of political

All arguments designed to establish obligation to a state -

of people living in it ('its territory') especially - are wanting.
(Argument for this there).

Scepticism about political obligation does

not imply scepticism about obligation.

So moral scepticism is not implied.

And on the contrary, most requirements are of the first importance in
outlining alternatives to the state.

Hobbes problem was that of political obligation - 'reasonswhy we ought to
change the state'

(R p.61).

Hobbes finds three causes of disorder (competition - reflecting self
interest drives;

distrust;

argued for on ground that

enjoyment of power ('glory') [Self-interest is
motive is self-preservation.]

To these he opposes inter - from desire for security.

1.

This involves a very dubious objectivity.

4

On Marx-Engels way

Although Marx and Engels say comparatively little about their projected
end state, they say a great deal about the route through the new state -

to that end, and about the means to be used along that route.

By contrast with means, they are far too restrictive about routes, ruling
out many plausible roads to change (including peasant revolutions, etc.)

Engels' proposed route is through 'a new social order' where production and

industry run on behalf of society, according to a social plan.

The main

features are addition of private property (vol.l, p.88) and of private
means of communication (p.92).

Note that it is unclear whether this social

order is an immediate or end state, but those features are common to both.

There is massive industrial and agricultural production (though not over­
production) by (rationalised) planned economy without (

) private

property (I,p.92).

Hence, division into antagonistic clauses becomes superfluous.

There are

new all-round people (p.93), a disappearance of division of labour, for
flexible labour.

There is association instead of competition.

Fusion of

town and country (p.94).

According to Marx-Engels (I,p.l83) the route is through the central state.
'The workers must not only strive [against democrats]

for a single and

indivisible...republic, but also within this republic for the most
determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority.

They must not allow themselves to be misguided by the democratic talk of
freedom for the communities, of self-government, etc.'

No communal property

'Concentrate productive

to remain :

etc... in

means of

of state'.

This account is

extremely top-down.

As to means, it looks as if Marx and Engels are prepared to adopt any means,
likely or not.

For Marx, the main means are by violent revolution (last

page Poverty of Philosophy).

of classes.

Revolution is the outcome of the contradiction

By contrast, Engels prefers peaceful means (in 1847 i.e.
vol 1, p.89);

but he won't at all rule out revolution.

But together Marx and Engels emphasise violent means, and encourage excuses
on occasions (

p.180).

5

Under the pretext that the petty bourgeous democrats will betray the

workers, the subversion (destabilization) of their government is planned

(Vol 1. address of CC to League, pp.180-1) Unlike Bak

Marx and Engels.advocate fostering massacres etc.
stuff mean?), and a regime of terror.

(for what else can this

Bak

thinks that in a

revolutionary situation such things may occur but should be immunized
(I can easily check the reference in Bak

if necessary (p.180).

For the most part, Engels was much more inclined to peaceful and established
means to change, even to change by way of ballot box and universal suffrage;

the Democratic route to state transformation (1, p.195, also 1, p.202).

Note Engels' introduction to Class Struggles in France written in 1895 (p.195),

e.
i.

later than the more bellicose texts Lenin is relying on - and as the

fruit of a riper experience of politics.

He says that by party action

universal suffrage
'transforme de mayer de dupere qu'il a ete jusqui'

en instrument

d'emarcqation'and this as footnote shows is a quote from Marx.

This suggests that it can be used to gain control of and subsequently transform
state app

In 1895 (pp.199-200) Engels suggests a revision of

.

Now show

means, propaganda etc., to win over the mass of people [different from
technological determination!]

No doubt because of technological determination,

there is no need to be too specific about means;

for it is not as if activity

is shaping the course of things, only speeding up the (in

) process.

Reasons for the lack of detailed description of the end state in Marx-Engels:

1.

This would be to try to set the future, which is reactionary (Why?

Because

of historical determination?), and unnecessary, because future people will be

wiser than us.

2.

Standard explanation, suggested by Marx:

'scientific socialism cannot

describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism.

Utopians

speculate about the socialist future : Marxists analyse the capitalist present'
(Moore, p.76).

Moore argues the standard explanation is implausible.

6

Principles of Individualism [ ?]

1.

Government based on individually-given consent of citizens - 'its

authority or legitimacy deriving from that consent'

(Lubes, p.ll)

Consent-answering back requirement

2.

Political representation as representing individual interests, not

classes, estates, etc.

3.

That's all.

interests.

Government confined to enabling satisfaction of individual

Hence towards laissez-faire, against paternalism, influencing

or interpreting individual wants.

(79).