Box 57, Item 2: Draft of Toward an improved cosmo-logical synthesis

Box 57, Item 2: Draft of Toward an improved cosmo-logical synthesis

Typescript draft, correction version. Paper published, Sylvan R (1985) 'Toward an improved cosmo-logical synthesis', Grazer philosophische Studien, 25:135-179.

Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff.

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 57, Item 2

1983

For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.

[40] leaves. 33.04 MB.

Manuscript

n/a - location not listed in manuscript finding aid

RBSTRRCT

The proposed syntheses Ls set Mithin generat object-theorg.

tde3

The

undertging

the sgnthesis ts that the 3tternative Mortds sewantics - arrived 3t tn

of

pursuit of a

tnctudtng

senanttes

universat

ones)

retevant

and,

semantics

generat

(a

as

connectedLg,

part

for
of

att

a

Languages,

comprehensive

object-theorg - be apptted atso tn fundamentat phgstcs, Most importanttg to

the

natter of the ortgtn, htstorg, 3nd phgstcat features of the cosmos, but as Mett,
agatn connectedtg,
theorg.

etseMhere,

Ln

particutar Ln the LnterpretatLon of quantum

a

The unLversat semantics Ls a mang Mortds -

theorg.

The

poLnt

of

such

apptgLng

an

mang

nonexistent

Mortds

-

LnterpretatLon Ln cosmotogg atso Ls

exptained bg Mag of examp Les, concernLng the understandLng of the contLngencg of
exLstence

and

of present arrangements.

improbabititg

the

R resotutton of the basLc question,

sketched,

a

as

Marm-up

exerctse

'Nhg does angthLng at

for

exLst?'

att

questions as to Mhg various other

the

prominent features of the universe are as theg are, notabtg Mhg the

constants of phgstcs
appear to have.

have

the

fundamentat

parttcutar surprtstngtg senstttve vatues theg

Chauvinistic ansMers through anthroptc prLnctptes are crLttcattg

Ln

favour

of

resotutLon

bg

Mag

of

Mortd

sgntactLcattg, status quo arguments, MhLch use

setection^ and

gross

rejected,

correspondLng

features

geophgsLcat

thLs and neLghbourLng unLverses to exp La Ln the surprLsLng vatues

of

The character of the Mortd—sgnthests resotutton - reaLLg a resotutton

Ls

ts

of

constants.
frameMork

fLLLed out Ln the course of countering a Mide SMeep of objections, and of

exp La LnLng

Mhg

the

resotutton

frameMork

invotving

seLeet ion

satisfactorg of the main tgpes LLLustrated in the four-fotd:

is

the

most

IMPROVED CO3MO-LOCICRL 3YMTHE3I3

TOWRRD RH

There

Logicai

is

a

foundations

tradition

persistent
-

impiging

simpLe

and

get undiscovered - for the whoLe of cosmoLogg. The

as

tradition, which peaked in modern rationaiism, continues strong in
cosmoLogicai

specuLation.

unassaiiabLe

Thus,

contemporarg

for exampLe, recent rationaiistic theories of

the universe, ambitiousLg aimed at mathematico-iogicai expression and capture of
nature. Thus,
of MheeLer:

for exampLe, the bottom Line to the mang theoreticaL enterprises

LittLe astonishment shouLd there be, therefore, if the description of
nature carries one in the end to Logic, the ethereat egrie at the
center of mathematics. If, as one beiieves, aLL mathematics reduces to
the mathematics of Logic, and aLL phgsics reduces to mathematics, what
aLtemative is there but for aLL phgsics to reduce to the mathematics
of Log ic ? Logic is the ontg branch of mathematics that can think about
itse Lf'.

Logic

reassumes its ancient roLe 3S the fundamentaL science; the Mord expresses

a LogicaL recipe.

Even white abandoning some of

the

it Lus ions

of

grand

reduct ion istic

schemes, and undermining the EnLightenment power guest for the LogicaL

the

theoreticaL

capture

and

can

The sgnthesis outiined in
setting.

contribute

what

foLLows

LiberaLised

bg

are

semantics

and

to the organisation of a unified

fits

into

this

more

modest

It is achieved bg suitabig reLocating cosmoLogg as a part of semantics

(generousig construed, for exampie, to admit contextuaL eLements).
then,

to

controt of the universe, there is much of a more

modest character that recent LogicaL theorg, as
nonstandard sgstematisation,
worid picture.

kegs

universaL

So

unified,

semantics, re Levant semantics and cosmoLogg, as suggested

in a preLiminarg wag in diagram 1.

RCTURL

X
L ORLD(S)

GEOPHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE

PHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE

RELEVRHT SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE
MORLD SPRCE

Comment. The subspaces are Marked out by ctosure and other requirements, that of
by cLosure of each worLd under deducibiLity (reLevant deriva—

systems

reLevant

biLity), that of physicaL systems by cLosure aLso under physicaL Laws

formuLated

terMS

Ln

(suitabLy

of condLtLonaLs) and perhaps factuaL constraints as weLL.

actuaL (or better t3ctuai) worLd Ls a seLect

coMMon

worLd

the

to

nested

spaces.

The underLytng Lde3 of the synthesis is siMpiy this: a subspace of

is aLso a suitabLe framework for cosmoLogy, for an interpret—

semantics

worids

neutrai

*3 L Lon of the Log iceL theory of the universe as a whoLe. In Less condensed

form,

the ide3 is that the aLternative worids semantics arrived at in the pursuit of a
semantics

universaL

part

connectedLy, as

semantics

comprehensive

(a

theory

the

of

aLL

of

for

aLL
be

objects,

Languages)

and,

aLso

appLied

physics - most importantiy to the matter of the origin, history and

fundamentaL

physicaL features of this cosmos, but 3S weLL eLsewhere, in
interpretation

theory.

quantum

of

particuLar

Ln

That

stripping.

ontoLogicai

of

Load

MorLd-ensembLe

terms of nonexistent Mortds. Hot surprisingiy, in the recasting the

in

theory j^s

for

is, the theory can be recast in existentiaLLy neutraL

terms, wcthout the originaL object ionabLe
theory,

the

Rnd in the case of quantum theory there is

aLready, most convenientiy, a many-universe or worLd-ensembLe theory, ready
neutrai

in

(e.g.

changed

unobservabLe

the

spiitting

worLd

of

the

Everett

other

worids

interpretation gives way to future— directed worLd branching).
The

setting

in

terms

of

do

which

objects

not

exist,

especiaLLy, is essentiaL. For one reason, the idea grew out of investigation
(with Griffin for the provisionaL but so far nonexistent book UQ) of what is

normaLLy taken to be a phiLosophicaL question, indeed by some such as
as

the

fundamentaL

question

of metaphysics, nameLy

exist? . Reset in worLd terms this becomes a question
worLd

such

Mhy does anything at aLL

of

seiection

the

-

a

contains

be

to

taken

exist.

For

then

the

oLd

circLe is simpiy reentered, expiaining existence in terms of more

existents. Here the circLe is
metaphysics:

3

much more tractabLe question. But the recasting Loses expLanatory

merit shouLd aLL the worids invoived
objectionabie

of

that we find ourseLves in which contains something existent (us

as

among other existent things) as opposed to an aLternative worLd, which

nothing

Heidegger

cf.

JB

broken,

as

it

is

eLsewhere

(particuLarLy

in

chapter 2), by expiaining what exists by way of what does

not. It is the faiLure to

duty

aLLow

for

and

-2-

acknowLedge

this

pattern

of

expLsnatLons,

though Lt represents coMMon practLce Ln the theoretLcaL sciences,

that has wade Lssues LLke the
Lntractab Le.
In

fact

quest Lons

Lihg

Hetdeggerean

the

concernLng

does

angthLng

quest Lon

onLg

Ls

exLst?

question

LLke

Lt

so

ftrst of a LattLce of

the

the character and nature of the cosMos Ln whLch Me happen

to be, that are LLabLe to be asked , questLons ascendLng to
(Just)

seen

Ls? ;

questLons

Uhg Ls

thLs

cosMos

Mhtch MorLd ModeLLLngs wag fruLtfuLLg be

to

appLLed, as an Lwportant fLrst step Ln eLLcLtLng sone ansMers.
(Bounded) LattLce of questLons.

DIRGRRM 2.

7
Uhg does

Mhg does

angthLng

evergthLng

at aLL exLst?

exLst as Lt

Uhg do

7

Hhg do

eLectrons

Lihg does

Lnte L L Lgent

ex Lst? (Ln

LLf e

LLfe forns

the nunbers

exLst? (Ln the

ex Lst?

theg do?)

forM Lt does?)

In the reorLentatLon of MorLds senantLcs

fron

Languages

to

cosnoLog Les,

f row

Language to
the
MorLd, there are certaLn features that shouLd be kept
fLrriLg Ln vLeM - apart fron such notorLous features as that anong the MorLds of
the node L L Lngs are a range of bLzarre, absurd, LncoMpLete and MaverLck MorLds,

and that each (nonexLstent) MorLd has a
LncLudes

donaLn

of

objects

though

Lt

a subdoMatn (perhaps nuLL) of ent Lt Les, tgpLcaLLg contaLns nonexLstent

objects, both posstbLe and not, phgsLcaLLg reaLLsabLe and

the

MhLch,

feature

of

not.

In

partLcuLar,

MorLd

seLectLon shouLd not be Lost sLght of. For Lnstance, Ln
assessing truth, a factuaL MorLd T Ls seLected - Ln one Mag or' another, but
tgpLcaLLg

bg

a

choLce

functLon

on

a

cLrcunscrLbed

evaLuatLons are Morked out (recursLveLg) at I.

cLass

NaturaLLg

and

ho LdLng

the

assessnent of
truth MLLL generaLLg Lead begond MorLd T LtseLf. For (reLevant) <deducLbLLLtg a
subsgstew of dertvatLonaLLg cLosed MorLds Ls defLned; for poss Lb L L Ltg a
subsgsteM coMprLsLng consLstent MorLds Ls Marked out; for naturaL LaMLLkeness a
subsgsteM of phgsLcaL MorLds Ls dLstLnguLshed^; and so on for other cases of
subsgstew and group seLectLon.
$I-

The Mang MorLds approach to the "Uhg does angthLng at aLL exLst?" quest Lon.

-3-

There ere Many canvassed answers to thts questton, and stLLL More Mays of trytng

to dtsMtss Lt. RLL

dtsposat

the

atteMpts

are

defective,

3nd

Most

of

the

canvassed answers are unsattsfytng (so Grtfftn and I devote a good deat of space

tn UQ to showtng). One approach that ts not inadequate

—

but

perMtts

however

devetopMent tn severat dtfferent dtrecttons - ts the Many wortds approach.

It ts true (and argued eLsewhere, e.g. JB) that
R)

SoMe thtngs extst.

Thts truth enjoys a Modat status, that of conttngency tn fact.
weaker ctatM sufftees, naMety

But, to begtn, a

C) It ts conttngentty true that sone thtngs extst.

For

the

extstence that Most thtngs enjoy or regret ts conttngent. The

obvious

truth of the More controverstat ctatM that nothtng necessartty
Left open for the present.

extsts,

can

be

NeutraL wortds ModeLLtng of theMe C) yteLds dtreetty a Many wortds picture,
wtth soMe wortds, tnctudtng the actuat wortd T, contatntng extstents, and wtth soMe

posstbte wortds contatntng no extstents (but perhaps soMe nonextstents).
Likened to a dtsp Lay of baLLoons:
DIRGRRH 3. Static pteture of a

0

:

0 :

0

Object doMatns contatn
0

____ _________ extstents

0

0

: 0

0

worLds ModeLLtng for theMe 0).

0

: 0

0

It can be

0

00

DoMatns contatn no

0

extstents

posstbte worLds

Such

a

neutraL

nodeLLLng

begs

no sertous onto Log teat questions, invotves no

ontoLogtcaL prodtgaLLty. For tt ts not assuMed that any of these

Ln

worLds

extst,

any way. (It ts not dtfftcuLt to represent what does not extst.) Nor need Lt

prejudtee Matters unduty agatnst necesstty theMes such
even

were

Lt

Lf

Lnterpretatton

MistakenLy

Lnststed,

as

as

agatnst

God-hypotheses.
the

For

stratghtforward

of C), whtch aLLows Lt ts necessartty true (under soMe necesstty

deterMtnabLe) that soMe thtngs

extst,

a

retated

Many

worLds

pteture

woutd

resuLt;
the dashed LLne woutd stMpty Move down the diagraM). But Let us st Lek
wtth what ts rtght, C.

It

ts

More

reveattng to take theMe C) as tensed - after aLL extstence ts

existence now (JB chapter 2) - and to tntroduce, what further Lnvesttgatton wLLL

require, dynaMtcat ModeLLLngs. Then, wtth soMe evtdent eMbrotdery, the foLLowtng

sort of pteture eMerges:

-4-

Dgnantc ptcture
untverses.

DIRGRRfl t*.

MorLds

of

nodeLLLng

of

thene

C),

ML th

sanpLe

t
3

EXI5TEHTS (FULL CONSERVRTION)

RLse and faLL of HD
]

A

Lt

SOMET IME EXISTENTS^

R NULL LJORLD

f*

ExternaL ttne scats (tsLgnLfLes the Locat present)

Consents.

r-bjch

Ls

presupposed Ln the wag the pLcture Ls draMn (e.g. that sone

Measure of exLstents C3n be obtained, bg Mag of

partLcLe

nunbers)^

but

these

presupposLtLons can be nodLfLed or renoved.
The
such as

sane

sort

nodeLLLng serves aLso to vaLLdate thenes LLnked to C),

of

D) There mag have been a tLne Mhen nothLng exLsted.
ConsLder
seLectLon,

noM

(or

done Ln terns

of
of

the

cructat

wetter

of

T-seLectLon,

L.e.

factuat

Mortd

6-seLectLon, L.e. referentLaL sub-Mortd seLectLon). ThLs Ls

certaLn

features

these

Mortds

have,

such

as

contaLnLng

entttLes, LncLudLng observers, exhLbLtLng LLfe, nanLfestLng LnteLLLgence or wLnd

-

to

antLcLpate features conLng up and sonetLnes proposed for MorLd seLectLon.

Such seLectLon pLcks out thts MorLd fron the ensenbLe of MorLds (our Mortd aLso,

as Lt happens). Rnd the Mortd thus seLected LncLudes exLstents.

Mhg does angthLng at aLL exLst? Because thts MorLd, T, LncLudes, happens to

LncLude, extstent objects. To thts extent Lt Ls

-5-

a

natter

of

fortune

-

qood

it night be hazarded, since the worLd exhibits enough that is good 3nd

fortune,

enough potentiaL for good. Rs a contingent Matter, this worLd contains

(in

its

object donain) '.tens that exist. So T-setection deLivers a worLd n3king it true
objectiveLg that sone things exist.^

The answer Mag seeM trite;

that

but

is

in

Measure

Large

because

the

and answer are taken in isoLation, apart froM issues as to the detaiLs

question

of the process, the how questions, such as
H) How does it happen that soMething exists?
The issue can be considered in

uLtinateLg

exists is
question

terns

this

of

of

nass-energg,

since

evergthing

that

kind (so it is argued in JB chapter 9). To the

H ) How does it happen that sone Mass-energg exists?

tMo sorts of answer are possibte.
FirstLg, there is the conservative answer: sone atwags existed. There is an
end Less ongoing sea of Mass-energg, which sinpLg fLuctuates, Moves, recgcLes,
etc. There are pLentg of probLens with this answer; for instance, phgsicaL

prob Lens,

such

as

how

did the Big Bang of standard cosMOLogg occur, what was
happening before it? But there are aLternative MatheMaticai stories now being
toLd, for instance, of a Massive singuLaritg Located in space (rather than at

phgsic3t tine t = 0 as with the Big Bang), which trg to offer a phgsicaL account
of a continuous universe (see e.g. G. ELLis). Rnd the singuLaritg stories
offered can be enriched (aiong Lines rather Like what wiLL be

ventured

in the
case of the second answer). RLnost aLL traditionaL phiiosophicai and theoLogicat
accounts,

aLL

v^rtuaLLg

honage

paging

to ontoLogicaL assunptions, shouLd be

inciuded
aMong
the
conservative,
existence-aiwags
answers.
But
the
nonnateriaLLst accounts anong these characteristicaLLg invoLve LeveL shifts^^Thei

is

back

to the existence of God or the (uLtinate) One, who, on a higher LeveL,

serves as eternaL sustainer, and perhaps fashioner, of the MateriaL universe.
The conceptual and other probtens of such answers are sufficientLg notorious.
SecondLg, there

is

stage nothcng existed.

The

energg.

the

Rt

More appeaiing and siMpLe radicaL answer: at sone

that

difficuLtg

before

tiMe,

the

that

anccent

Long-received

probLeM

orthodox

of

how

prejudice,

sonething

that

nchLi fct, is invariabLg reinforced bg
again

Bang,

there

was

no

for this picture is how Mass-energg ever appeared

froM the MacroscopicaLLg tranquiL sea of nothingness.
past

Big

can

It is no great feat to get
coMe

froM

nothing.

The

froM nothing nothing cones, ex nihiLo

Mistaken

ontoLogicaL

assunptions

(see

JB chapter 2). Yet even when these ontoLogicaL assunptions are set aside,

there is the awkward natter of C3usai nechanisn.
But an unLikeig storg can be toLd, a ngth retated, expLaining how sonething

-6-

a

may (suddenly) emerge from nothing,

jet

of

mass-energy

the

from

sea

of

nothingness. The story borrows from the quantum theory of the vacuum (or rather,

ot suitabie vacuums). There is suddeniy an avaianche of energy borrowing , 3nd
mass creation of particies in a concentrated area.& This is the beginning of the

Big

Bang

(at

internaL time zero). It is unigue (in experience) because such a

singuiarity is very improbabte. (Even a SmaLL Bang wouid be rather improbabie.)
The net energy "borrowed" is borrowed on a very Long term (at high interest?),
with a gradu3i repLayment pLan. This ties

concerning

the

run-down

eventuaL

eventuaLLy (though perhaps over

this

of

very

a

with

principLes

universe.

protracted

of

thermodynamics,

On this story, it wiLL

time)

subside

back

into

From nothing everything existent originaLLy came; into nothingness
everything existent wiLL uitimateLy process.
nothingness.

It is one thing

to

such

devise

3

story,

or

rather

the

(or

outLine

scaffoLding) of a story; it is another to condense it into science.

before

But

scorn is poured on such a story, Let it be noted that the story is Less bizarre,

more

and

informative, than other extant phiiosophicaL stories. For exampLe, it

appears more piausibie than the ideaList story of the construction of the

physicaL

worid

from idea, or than the set-theoreticaL myth of the construction

of the entire universe from the nuLL set - undoubtedLy a
it

as

earLy

encompasses

existent

individuaLs,

construction,

insofar

of something existent from nothing,

not

since, despite orthodox cLaims to the contrary, the nuLL set certainty does
exist (JB 9.9).

There

are

reasons for much preferring the second styLe

of

story

to the

first - though it may appear to some to viotate conservation principLes such
that

mass-energy:

of

as

in fact it need not. One is that the end Less mass-energy

story faits to account for the presence of mass-energy. By contrast, nothingness
does not reguire expLanation: it is, so to speak, the rest position. In terms of

the range of possibiiities here, existence is what is unusuaL, what is atypicaL,
what especiaLLy caLLs for expLanation, not nonexistence.? Hence the expLanatory
superiority of the radicaL answer.

Rs

one might expect in varying such an obvious and ancient story, and as is

easity discovered, scientific condensation and assessment has begun,

especiaLLy

in the Last decade. The idea that the totaL energy of the universe is zero was
considered a human generation ago by Mhitrow&, refLecting on Flach s phiLosophy
of motion. More recentLy, Tryon has argued the zero totaL energy theme, assuming

a

cLcsed

universe

and

appeaLing

the standard treatment of gravitationai

to

If the universe contains just enough

potentiaL energy as negative energy.

mass

to cLose it, then the negative energy must more or Less exactLy canceL the
energy (mc^) invoLved in the existence of that mass. Hence, the argument runs,

even
a

a cosmos as impressiveLy Large and ancient as this universe couLd exist as

deveLopment

quantum

vacuum

through

in

borrowing

fLuctuation

on

a

a

zero-energy

vacuum, that is, through

grand scaLe in a reiativistic setting. Such

vacuum fLuctuations can occur by dispensation of the
AE.At --h; when the mass-energy AE of a physicaL object

-7-

uncertainty principLe
approaches zero,
its

LLfe,tLMe At can becoMe verg targe.

OnLg the Merest begLnnLng on reMOvtng certaLn object Lons and

to

wore scLenttfLc storg MtLL be atteMpted. FLrstLg, there are, LnevLtabLg

a

such

obstacLes

Lt seews, onto Log LeaL and verLfteat Lontst object Lons. Hang of these turn hoMever

on assuMtng that a vacuuM and ewptg space Must soMehoM exLst, at Least bg Mag of
sort of exLstLng contaLner or structure. Such assuMpttons are wtstaken: no
(pre-) exLstence need be assuwed. Such objects 3s vacuuws and unoccupLed space

sone

nonexLstent

are

and

dLstLnctLve

Mtth

objects

assessLbLe

MatheMatLcaLLg

propertLes. Though theg nag not be access LbLe to observatton, and Ln thLs narroM
respect are outsLde the range of experLence,

then

concernLng

tnvesttgattons

exactLng

for

there

to

LnfornatLon

Ls

suffLcLent

be

Made of theLr features.

SLnLLar potnts teLL agaLnst the objection that Lt Ls Mrong to Lwpose an externat
spatLaL or tewporaL Measure on (Mass-energg) cLosed space-tLMe; for exawpLe,

Mhat happened before the BLg Bang, or to ewbed the curved space-ttMe of

LnquLre

the unLverse Ln a Larger spatLaL or tenporaL settLng. Rs a Matter of fact,

cosMOLogLsts

wang

exh Lb Lt no unease Ln ashLng Mhat happened before the BLg Bang even

Mhen assuwLng no Matter before that, though verLftcattonLsM MouLd no doubt
such

to

ruLe

guesttons out as weanLngLess or otherMtse out of order. More to the potnt,

bounded Metrtcs can atMags be extended (HubbLe ttMe Ls just

wtstahe

though

fruLtfuLLg,

soMettnes

bounds

vertfLcatLontst

one

are

exaMpte),

exceeded.

and

Rnother

has been to assuwe that NothLng, stnee nonexLstent, Ls entLreLg Mtthout

structure or organLsatton and ungoverned. Indeed tMo dtaMetrtcaLLg opposed poLar
v,eMS of Lt have prevented, and even been run together: of NothLng

chaottc,

as

and so excessLveLg rtch, and of Nothing as entLreLg bLank, and so excessLveLg
tMpovertshed. Both are Lnadequate.
R More tnteresttng ontoLogtcaL objeetton (ratsed bg Rrwstrong) Ls that such

an account of the ortgtn of the unLverse takes

granted

for

exLstence

the

naturaL LaMS, and so does not expLaLn hoM sowethLng ex Latent cane frow

objecttons

Such

confuse

truth

neo-PLaton Law. LaMS hoLd, but do not
vteMs,

Mhere

LaMS

Mtth

exLstence,

exLst

-

bg

after

contrast

Mtth

nothLng.

fashLon

the

of
of

neo-PLatonLc

reLatLons of unLversaLs, MhLch exLst. On object-theorg

are

(such as that of JB), hoMever, unLversaLs do not exLst, and so LaMS are not thus
extstentLaLLg Loaded. Once truth Ls duLg separated frow exLstence, there

Ls

of

course the further questton of Mhg the LaMS that hoLd or evoLve do hoLd. But
thts Ls a separate, and vextng, questton of uLttMate expLanatton.^

SecondLg,

are

there

More

technLcaL

adwLttedLg shakg phgstcaL account; for
quantuM

nuwbers

of

objeettons,

instance,

that

dtrected

But

Lt

the

Mtth

the

the vacuuw MtLL constst equaLLg of Matter and antt-Matter,

and qutckLg vantsh agatn, Mhereas features of the unLverse perstst

tMbaLance.

agaLnst

fLuctuattons
and

suggest

noM seeMs that a verg sLLght (and, so Lt Ls satd, deLLcate)

tMbaLance earLg Ln the evoLutton of the unLverse after the BLg Bang Ls just Mhat
Ls required for present
perMLtted

features

of

the

unLverse;

and

such

an

LMbaLance,

on recent (GUT) theorLes, catastrophtc fLuctuatton hardLg excLudes. R

thLrd connected obstacLe used to be sertous: Lt

-8-

has

been

presupposed

that

a

state can be assigned to the whoLe universe.^ But that is now aLright;

quantuM

according

for

neutraL

to

of)

(adaptation

the

Everett

Many-universe

interpretation of quantuM theory, a state function i covers the behaviour of the
P

worLds

phgsicaL

I

(with

P c K), which presuMabig evoLve according to a

e

reLativised Schrodinger equation of the fom

SE(T).

To

soMe

expLain

of

the

recent appeaL of this sort of wortd-ensewbLe interpretation, it is worth turning

to the interesting and curious business of the phgsicaL constants.

The

§2.

of constants of phgsics and sone of their neat interreLations.

natter

The interesting cLaiM is that the setting or adjustMent of certain constants

surprisingLg

deLicate,

and

if the constants (and soMe of their constant

that

ratios) were different bg ontg sMaLL Margins, then the actuaL universe woutd

very

is

be

with the resuLt, aMong Mang other things, that we shoutdn't be

different,

here to observe ang of its LocaL passing show.
Now

the

possibiLity

of

exp Lanation of the specific vaLues of these

the

in terMS of phgsicaL theory itseLf is not so far exciuded. Perhaps no

constants

constants in physics are uLtiMateLy fundaMentai,

Various

ways

eiiMinating

of

constants

though

seeMS

that

unLikeLy.

are now faMitiar, e.g. soMe represent

new

scaie factors and are eiiMinated by re-scaLing or

choice

of

coordinates.

Others are reMoved by More radicaL ways of reLooking at things, as in Einstein s

treatMent of gravitation. But sone resist eiiMination - so far.
in

For,

phgsicaL

any

theory,

what

case,

fundaMentai

is

depends

and soMe previousLg fundaMentat constants (such as Rvogadro s

nuMber) have turned out to be derivative as theory
constants

on the given shape of

advanced

new

and

(deeper)

were introduced. There is the reMote possibiLity, obviousLy cherished

that

bg soMe scientists, that in the end aLL phgsicaL constants can be reMoved,

a

constant-free

(very

grand

unified)

theorg

in

which aLL constants can be

reMoved wiLL resuLt. This is not obviousLg iMpossibLe in the wag that a coMpLete

eiiMination of LogicaL constants froM Log teat theorg is, that a finat triuMphant

reMovat of the Scheffer stroke froM cLassicaL propositionaL Logic is iMpossibLe.
However, it is too Much to expect that a "deep MatheM3tic3i

anaLgsis"

aLways do the job. For one thing, exp Lanations of this sort do give
is

an

arguMent

for

this

out.

can

There

froM the backward proceeding character of deductive

expLanations to More generaL preMisses (appLging the content-incLusion character
of deduction proper).

There are no MatheMaticaL anaigses

without

assuMptions, without a systeM of postutates. The hope (expressed by

MatheMaticat
Carter

and

others), that generaLLy deeper underlying theories can be found, wiLL not 3iwags

be fuLfiLLed, of necessity.

Since

transforMations,

such

as

seating,

aLter or reMove constants, can

transfer the Big Bang back to Minus-infinity, and so on, there is no soLid

to expLain, underLying the
ELLis,

for

one,

aLLegedLy

probLeMatic

nuMericaL

features

(so

data

B.

contends). UhiLe it is true that which constants feature, and

what their vaLues are, wiLL depend on initiaL choice

of

units,

whatever

that

at Least some of the constants wiLL emerge. Thus there wiLL be features

choice,

and vatues which require expianation, and exptanation of the

however

transforming

the

done.

is

For

S3me

broad

tgpe,

the present, 3nd immediate future at

Least, there is no getting rid of the constants,

and

white

theg

to

continue

figure their numericaL vatues and ratios set some trickg prob Lems.

There is the probtem, first of aLL, of describing the reLevant phgsicat data
neutraL non—prejudiciaL fashion. The facts of the matter are more or Less

a

Ln

as foLLows:- Present phgsicat theories incLude mang (phgsicaL) constants,

which

occur in the formutation of Laws and principtes. R number of these constants are

fundamentsL,

in that theg are not derived from other constants (or deduced from

deeper phgsicat theorg). Two things have

been

noticed

concerning

fundamentat

constants of present phgsicat theorg, both of which caLL for expLanation:If

1)

the

of certain constants Lag outside a rather narrow band (sur­

vatues

rounding

their

perhaps

universe

wouLd

be

ascertained

vatue), gross features of the geophgsicaL

different.

this - hopefuttg without

CaLL

prejudice, since its contra­
position represents the substantiat core of the

anthropic

poss ib Le

principte - the sens i t iv i tg

numer teat

f eature.

va Lues

For

record,

the

the geophgsicaL principte resuLting from contraposition takes

the foLLowing form: certain gross features of the geophgsicaL universe are

onLg

possibie in present form if the numericaL vatues of certain constants Lie within

a

narrow sensitivitg band. Examptes of such gross features are isLand gataxies,

Long-Lived stars, ptanets,

recognised

ittustrate,

water,

hgdrogen,

heavg

carbon,

metats.

RLL

the

forces, for instance, exhibit the sensitivitg features. To

phgsicat

the strong nuctear force were marginattg stronger, nuctei coutd

if

grow much begond the present Limits and att hgdrogen woutd Long

have

ago

been

converted to heLium, with the resutt that there wouLd be no Long-Lived stars (of
present

tgpe)

and

no water. On the other side, a decrease in the strong force

wouLd prevent the formation of nucLei of heavg metaLs. R dozen further

and more of simitar
phgsics Literature.

sensitivitg

mag

be assembLed from the re Levant

easiLg

2) The Pgthagorean feature. Large numbers arrived at in
ions

famous

turn
of

Eddington s

out

these

to

coincide
Large

reLation,

exampLes

astronomicaL

computat­

(to within order of magnitudes). Perhaps the most

number
stating

coincidences',
the

universe is the inverse square of the

number

as theg are mostLg caLLed,

of

gravitationaL

other exampLes are assembLed in Bondi.)

-10-

particLes
coupLing

in

the

constant.

is

visibLe
(Mang

These two nunericaL

features

sensitivitg features
co inc idences.

are

are

(or

can

be)

These nunericaL features are cited

LaMs)

conservation

of

inportanttg

that

in

Large

exptain

to

used

nunber

as evidence Justifging the introduction

of various exotic theories (e.g. invoLving
phgsicaL

Most

interconnected,

departures

exaMpies

earLg

Mhich

froM

accepted

norMaLLg

Mere

the "verging G

theories of Dirac and Jordan . So Mrites Carter, Mho appeais to soMe differentig
exotic principies, anthropic principtes,

Mithin

features

in

order

froM

far

opposite

the

phgsics

Bang)

thesis:

(GeneraL

cosMoLogg

and

Mhich

couLd in principLe have been used to

unsurprisingLg, the order of the dag in

Mag

and

be

great

fun.

It

cosnoLogg.

course

Of

that

the

is

distiLLation

specuLation

is

is Mith the conversion of this stuff to in

received MisdoM, or even knoMLedge, that caveats shouLd be

Mhen

cLaiM

froM evidentLg estabLished. But Large cLains on fLinsg foundations are,

far

fine,

i.e.

ReLativistic

predict theM 3LL in advance of their observation' (p.291) - 3 Large
is

nuMericat

evidence in favour of exotic theories these coincidences

being

shouLd rather be considered as confirMing "conventionat"
Big

the

noM received cosMoiogicai setting. Mith the heLp of these

the

anthropic principies he canvasses, as he puts it,
that

expLain

to

prejudiciaL,

in

e.g.

that

entered,

especiaLLg

it points to favoured

cone Lus ions such as priviLege or design (for huMans) in the universe.
Much

capitaL

has

aireadg been Made of the nuMericat features, of Mhat is

referred to - gou C3n see the Loading straightaMag - as a

cataLogue

of

extra­

ordinarg phgsicaL coincidence and apparentig accidentsL co-operation' (0 p.110).
Here is a tgpicaL beat-up, bg Davies:

The structure of the phgsicaL MorLd is deiicsteig dependent on a
varietg of apparent nunericaL accidents. hang of the rather basic
features of the universe are deternined in essence bg the vaLues that
are assigned to the fundanentaL constants of nature, such as G, a, Mp
and so on, and these features MouLd be drasticsLLg aLtered if the
constants
assuned
even
noderateig
different
vaLues.
... for
nature to produce a cosnos even renoteLg resenbLing our own, Mang
apparentLg unconnected branches of phgsics have to co-operate to a
renarkabLe degree (D p.lll; sone of the prejudiciaL terninoLogg is
under L ined).
The

part

Last

is

particuiarig

Meak: so our ignorance of interconnections is

disclosed, ignorance Me Might have forestaLLed

froM

arguMent

theorg

integrated
resist

apparentLg

fitting

of

unreLated

phgsics:

together.

the

topics'

present

if

Carter

serves

is

right.

RLL

the

to reveaL is Lack of an

theorg is bits and pieces, Mhich

Nor do Large nunber coincidences point to ang hidden

co-operation, but rather to over Looked connections Mhich can be argued toHards
(as bg Dicke, Carter and others) using fairLg conventionaL phgsicaL equations.^

Rs

for

the

hidden purpose terMinotogg,

for nature to produce ...', MeLL, the

Justificatorg case for its use is not Mereig not evident, but entireLg
The

sane

appLies

to

other

Lacking.

terns Mhich Davies and others infiLtrate, such as

-11-

*

'conspire' (Dp.Ill),

'fine-tuned',

deiicateiy baianced', 3ii of which suggests

agents with certain purposes.
Re Lated

happening
not

objections

te rm ino Logy,

be

some

against

Lodged

accident ,

it

accidentaL;

be

shouLd

of

the

improbab Le

coincidence , etc. R contingent worLd need

is not accidentaL that Griffin Lives in Troy, Ontario,

though it is contingent certainty. Rn improbabLe worLd need not be accidentaL
either.
RccidentaL
means, according to the Concise EngLish Dictionary (CED),

Occurring by chance, unexpectedLy, not according to the usuaL order of

non-essentiaL'. The
misp Laced for the actuaL worLd; and
adventitious,

th ings;

generaL thrust of the notion is decidedLy
accidentaL universe is a misdescription.^

To be sure, there is some considerabLe sLackness in terms Like
accidentaL',
wh Lch can come cLose aLso, when appLied as in schoLastic theory, to meaning
contingent.

The

term

vac i L La t ion,

as

its

of

condition

dictionary

coinciding;

concurrence

nicety

coincidence'

a

definition

remarkabLe

iLLustrates
makes

instance

the

The

pLain:
of

we L L-known

act, fact or

apparentLy

fortu itous

Large-number

The

coincidences are of the first type; there is
LittLe case for making them out as of the second type.

argue,

To

however,

that

the

actuaL worLd is not mereLy contingent, but

improbabLe, Lt is hardLy necessary to go so far afieLd as advanced physics. Some

more

homeiy

exampies

have

managed

ho Les

wiLL do, such as the matter of aLL the Lucky goLfers who

in

one.

consider

Or

foLLowing

the

from

argument

contingencies, to the improbabiLity of the actuaL worLd.

Take

some contingency, e.g. that person 1 in some ordering of the audience

<^s wearing a green top. She might have been wearing any other cotour. Say

there

are 100 shades to choose from in the cLothing coLour cards. Then the probabiLity
that

she is in green is no more than 1 in 100. eut the same sort of probabiLity

hoids for every other person on the earth presentLy wearing 3 top, and these
probabiLities are LargeLy independent, say in I(US) bit Lion cases, i.e. 10^
cases. That is, the probabiLity of the present array of tops is no more than 1
in loH. That aLready makes present arrangements exceedingiy unLikeLy, before we

go into the coLours of other bits of appareL peopie are customariLy bedecked in,
the

coLours

towards
16
improbabLe.
Lead

of
the

NonetheLess,

of motor cars and so on. So even surface contingencies

books,

cone Lus ion

that

the

worLd

actuaL

is

astronomicaLLu

the situation with the fundamentaL constants does differ. Rn

important difference between these day-to-day improbabilities, such as
have the spouses we do, and those the constants induce is

things

these

this:-

Even

that

if

aLL

(coLours, e.g.) had been different, the worLd wouLd not be a very

different pLace. Contrast the constants: their significant variation wouLd

the

we

make

worLd a very different pLace. Is there a difference in kind, with 3 radicaL

improbabiLity appearing as regards the constants,

degree?

OnLy

in

degree,

picture wiLL serve for

the

bridging
range

exampies

of

cases,

or

tend
for

-12-

mereLy

a

difference

in

to suggest. The same broad

everyday

and

cosmoLogicaL

contingencg.

§3- Back to mang worLds: improbabiLities and the universaL quantum theorg. Mhere

that

broad

-

Leads

picture

so

sgnthesis

sought

the

suggests, as does an

increasing amount of cosmoLogicaL theorg - is to the mang-worLds

of

interpretation

Quite evidentLg, worLds semantics are not the onLg semantics

improbabiLitg.

that can be offered for probabiLitg.

few

But

other

offer

semantics

simitar

universaLLtg and informativeness, and some of the aLLeged competitors (not to be
taken

too

serioustg

as

face damaging circuLaritg in this area, e.g.

rivaLs)

probabiListic semantics, urn semantics. The idea of the modeLLing

naturaLLg

It is improbabLe that gou have the spouse gou have , is true bg virtue of

this:

fact

the

is

that in onLg a few worLds of the modeLLing, incLuding the actuaL one,

do gou have gour current spouse; mostLg (insofar as gou occur) gou do not.

In preciseLg the

same

improbabiLities,

cosmic

wag

such

particuLar

as

numericaL vaLues for phgsicaL constants, Lead to mang universe modeLLings.

is

argument to mang-universes from improbabiLities . The description of the

the

situation

phgsicaL

coincidence

of

probabiListic

requires

remarkabLe

constants,

notions,

features',

e.g.

etc.

extraordinarg

semantics

But

probabiListic notions caLLs for aLternative worLds. (Thus Davies

archerg

Les Lie s

and

This

goLf

exampLe

Of course Davies tends to see worLds used for

exampLe).

probabiLities as a conceptuaL device (D p.128); Everett invariabLg sees them

That

reaL.

is,

what

we

have

emerging

is

repLag

then

do

improbabiLities

the

as

of universaLs issue! But

universaLs do not exist, and nor do these expLanatorg worLds (cf. JB

onLg

of

8.8).

Not

Lead to a mang-nonexistent-worLds picture;

converseLg the muLti-universe theorg expLains the improbabiLities.
envisaged modeL contains

ref Leet

a

huge

coLLection

of

certain intervaL of accuracg);
thus

worLds

the range of (naturaL) vaLues of the fundamentaL constants. RLL initiaL

arrangements of matter and motion are refLected in worLds
is

The

worLds.

the chances of the present

smaLL,

exceedingig

which

expLains

(at

Least

within

universe

a

resuLting

various improbabiLities. Does it

than

matter that we can t normaLLg quantifg these improbabiLities? Rng more

we

can quantifg the (Large) probabiLitg of nucLear war? No; there is something
offensive about the repeated demand for quantification.^

Quantum theorg

circumscribed

affords

situations,

a
the

aLternative phgsicaL situations.

actuaL

worLd

-

is

seLected,

simiLar
state

mang

worLds

function

is

On measurement, one

apparentLg

at random

picture.

Least

Rt

for

a superposition of severaL

particuLar

worLd

-

the

(D p.12!*). This approach

enab Les immediate resoLution of an important prob Lem in orthodox quantum theorg.
R standing probLem with a compLete universe state function is that

sgstem we must have some measuring apparatus that is
sgstem.

...

Mhen

the

not

itseLf

to measure a

part

of

the

sgstem is the entire universe, the notion of a piece of

externaL measuring apparatus is meaningLess

(D p.I2t+). So emerges the

famiLiar

conundrum for quantum theorg presented aLong orthodox (von Neumann) Lines:
If
there is nothing Left with which to measure [or otherwise interfere with] the

-13-

state

the

of

how

universe,

universe

the

can

transition from a

the

make

superposition of many possibLe worids to one, concrete, actu3t wortd?' (D p.12^)

is,

There

asserts,

Davies

interpretation

many-universes

one

oniy

-

which

comprehensive

however

a

resoLution

'accept[s]

simuitaneous

the

reaiity of aLL the possibte atternative universes' (D p.I2i+).

But, given the route we have come, it is easy to

ontccaLLy

atternative

neutrai

this,

to

direct

that

see

from

there

an

is

object-theory.

atternative assumes many universes atso, but onty some at any stage are

This

actuat.

It is obvious enough is that the probabilistic spread of quantum states does not

require existent states, any more than the range of atternative dress states for
someone

probabty

attired

in

requires

green,

the existence of the person in

different ctothes. Measurement now shows which wortd/state an object such as
etectron

or

person

in.

actuatty

is

an

In these terms it does not cotLapse the

probabiLity wave packet, or set of worLds, but marks one out. Lihat

isn't

known

measurement is which worLd (or narrower set of worLds) is actuaL (or the

before

actuat etectron is in).

quantum

description,

Uhen

nothing

the

entire

cosmos

encompassed

is

the

within

Left to coLLapse the wave' (D p,12S). Rather

is

nothing in the way of externat measurements is avaiLabLe to determine

which

is

the actuaL worLd; however internaL information can be made use of in the usuaL
experimentaL ways.

To

set

interpretations

many-worids

Everett

the

quantum

of

theory

and

in

the

contrasting

neutrai

worLds

perspective, here (adapting OeLJitt and

Graham) are some Leading features:
i) R separate cLassicaL sphere externaL to any and every
is

not

required;

quantum

set-up

it makes sense to consider and investigate a state

vector for the whoLe universe.

ii) The state vector

covering

the

totaL

system

never

universes)

(of

coLLapses, and so the totatity it describes can be deterministic.

iii) LJhat is described through

variabLes

dynamicaL

the

jointLy,

comprehensive

is

not

aLL

equaLLy

reaL;

vector

and

the

the actuaL worLd but a system

comprising many worLds. (On the Everett
are

state

interpretation

on the neutraL

worLds

these

interpretation they are not,

other worLds than actuaL ones Lacking of any sort of reaLity.)

iv) Through chronoLogicaL deveLopment of the dynamicaL
the

state

vector

decomposes

naturaLLy

ref Leeting a progressing branching of

the

into

system

orthogonaL

universe

worLds) into a set of mutuaLLy unobservabLe worLds.

variabLes,

(and
(On

account this is described as a continuaL spLitting into

vectors

system

the

of

Everett

equaLLy

reaL

worLds; but not in neutraL theory which disposes of this reLativism.)

v) In

each worLd

good" measurements yieLd definite resuLts, and in many

-14-

worLds,
incLuding the actuaL, famiLiar statisticaL quantum Laws hoLd,
indeed C3n be derived or approximated.

*-

-^ince the neutraL version directLg avoids mang of

the

to

theorg, what is the case for the Everett form? In main part it consists

Everett

simptg of mistaken ontoLogicaL assumptions,

as

such

objections

the

what

that

ReaLitg

overactive

an

principte,

has phgsicaL properties must exist.The further argument

that aLL branches must be equaLLg reaL, is not compeLLing. Thus DeMitt contends:

Because there exists neither a mechanism within the framework of the
formaiism nor, bg definition, an entitg outside of the universe that
can designate which
branch of the grand superposition is the reaL
worLd, aLL branches must be regarded as equaLLg reaL (p.178).
But we can easiLg incLude actuaL worLd seLection (as

group worLd seLection) within
cone Lus ion does not foLLow.

the

weLL

and

framework;

other

as

given

difficuLties

the

Everett

specific, there is, Ln the first pLace,

reaList

theories

such

Everett's.

as

permissive regarding such worLds.

In

reaList-reLativist
a

demarcation

SecondLg,

fact,

the

however,

interpretation

theorg avoids. To be

faced

prob Lem

not

neutraL

theorg

the

of

this the intended

It has been objected (e.g. bg Lewis) that the neutraL worLd

encounters

kinds

neutraL

bg

is too

theorg

is

restrictive about worLds; and few or none of worLds of contemporarg reaLists
(^uch as Lewis) get into the picture, since aLL such worLds incLude as existents
certain universaLs. OnLg neutraLised anaLogues of such worLds appear

fn

case, the theorg can be as restrictive as is appropriate about

ang

In

7).

aLso

(see

which worLds are phgsLeaL, or phgsicaLLg possible. Requisite subcLasses such

worLds

phgsicaL

can

marked

be

out

conform tig to phgsicaL Laws and

through

framework requirements (e.g. that the ensembLe forms a HLLbert space).
it

is

an

iLLusion

that

reaLism

as

Moreover

soLves the reLevant demarcation probLem. It

simpLg covers it up, in an unsatisfactorg wag.

highLight

To

us varg a

in

stock

of

coupLe

pertations,

some of what is different in

a

neutraL

iLLustrations

of

reaListic

interpretation,

the ontic

mang-worLds

Let

inter-

the famiLLar two sLit interfer­

wag. Consider first

ence affair. On a straightforward

the neutraL

approach,

we

appear

forced

to

concLude that each eLectron traverses both sLits in a wave Like form' (Les Lie LI,

p.I!+6),

is to the dcaLectic interpretation that the eLectron goes through

that

both sLits. The mang- worLds approach avoids such contradiction^, aLLowing
eLectron to traverse just one sLit in the actuaL worLd - onLg in another
branching

from

this,

the

the

worLd,

eLectron traverses the other sLit, therebg inducing

probabiListic interference with the

actuaL-case

eLectron.

The

wave

function

provides a superposition of two such possibLe cases, not two actuaL cases.
In

the

transition

other worLds are not
mang-worLds

theorg).

from phgsicaL (or potentiaL) worLds to the actuaL one,

'destroged'

(as

LesLie

suggests

in

his

criticism

of

Nor is the interaction of worLds causaL. There are few or

-15-

no causaL effects even on the Everett reaLity version;

is

spiitting

thus

not

not actuaity observed (cf. virtuai worLds, reLations, etc.). Though there

seen,

are transworLd interreLations on object-theory these do

further

criticaL point is that physicaL worLds are not probabiListicaLLy

The

entities.

as

exist

not

independent. But that s aLright; since probabiLity

is

an

natter,

intensionaL

probabiListic interference is unprobLenatic (cf. "possibiLity" interference).

scattering exanpLe where an eLectron is

Consider next Davies

at

fired

a

proton. The probabiLity wave in such scattering represents a set of worLds for
the eLectron. 'The quantun wave provides a Measure of the probabiLity of finding

the eLectron 3t the Location: where the
eLectron is Most LikeLy to be found

ation,

and

disturbance is greatest there the

wave

(D p.l2i*). Fleasurenent deterMines the

Loc­

so aLters the probabiLities, thus on the orthodox view reducing the

wave. Recording to the Everett

on

however,

interpretation,

neasurenent

the

universe

divides

into two, ... one containing a right Moving eLectron ... Each

worLd is

equaLLy

rest

inhabiting

each

since it is

not

The

observer

conscious

upon

that

MeasureMent

down-right

is

spiitting
so

thus,

by

occurs;

the

for

there

certain

a

is

so

near­

probabiLities,

anending

scattering,

that,

possibie

the

because

of

the

uncertainties

physicaL states of universe, corres­

ponding to the probabiLity wave, are increased. Lihere there was one
for the actuaL
possibLities).

worLd

in

possibiLity

regard, now there are N Many (N Mirroring the

this

R nany-worids interpretation of physicaL theory provides a naturaL
for

neutraL

a new state function resuits, appearing to coLLapse 'the wave.

since

RLL that happens wuth worLd branching is
guaranteed

copy

worLds. But onLy one worLd is actuaL, and represents the (reaL)

of

universe. Heasurenent can deterMine which this is,
and

one

spLits,

MisLeading. There is no spiitting; rather in

quantuM processes worLd-branching takes pLace,

rep Licat ion

atso

wortd . Even on the Everett interpretation this is inaccurate,

it

interpretation

...

principLes

which

aMong

seLect

detinit

or

wortds,

as

setting

what are caLLed

anthropic principLes, and aLso non-chauvinistic reptaceMents for then such as
geophysicaL principLes, can serve to do.^ Rnd in this setting expLanations, of
a sort and of varying adequacy,

The

of aLL the nunericaL features can be furnished.

under Lying reason is not (siMpty) that there wiLL aLways be sone universes,

which are duty seLected, where the nuMbers

coMe

out

right,

but

that

sone

and

universes

conditions

(for

of the right sort are aLso decent

physicaL universes (a Much More difficuLt requirenent to satisfy).

sone

such

coincidences)

It

is

as these, furtherMore, that are observed (by us), contain

universes

carbon and water LocaLLy, and so forth.

It is then no surprise that we perceive

a universe to which so Many speciaL conditions pertain, for we have seLected

fron

the

enseMbLe

onLy

by

our

very

existence'

(0

p.126).

But

it

again, taLk of

our seLecting is MisLeading (though taLk of seLection, or naturaL seLection,

is

not).
It is rather that, as a contingent natter, we happen to inhabit such
universes^. Rnd such taLk negLects the iMportant point that further work is
required, for satisfactory expianation - that piausibte argunents, not invoLving

us, but connecting gross geophysicaL features with nuMericaL features, have aLso

-16-

to be suppLLed.
In thts Mag, ustng the MorLd-ensembLe hgpothests ... [but]
MLth[out] the Meak anthropLc prLncLpLe, Lt Ls possLbte to discover pLausLbLe

arguments to pLn doMn the vaLues of aLmost aLL of the fundamentaL parameters
p.129,

a centraL part of hLs cLatm). Indeed DavLes hotds out the

negatLng

but

(D

prospect of beLng abte to do much more, constraLnLng the dtmensLonaLttg of space
and ttme, the number of quarks and Leptons, numbers of fundamentaL forces,

That

reaLLg

MouLd

a sgnthesLs of consLderabLe poMer. It Ls a sgnthesLs,

gtve

moreover, MhLch can be absorbed or sLmuLated MLth Ln a

upon

mang-MorLds

neutraLLsLng

prLncLpLes

MorLd

bg

etc.

quantum

seLectLon

theorg

prLncLpLes.

and

cosmo-Log LeaL
repLacLng

NonetheLess

sgnthesLs,

the

anthropLc

DavLes,

the

LLke

maLnstream phgsLcLsts he artLcuLateLg represents, Ls uncomfortabLe MLth ang such
that he LndLcates, ang such grand pLcture, and rLghtLg so, as the

3S

sgnthesLs

anthropLc expLanattons LnvoLved are far from entLreLg

satLsfactorg.

HostLg

he

seems to hope Lnstead that contLngencLes MLLL aLL be expLaLned as necessLtLes of

(proposLtLons

phgsLcs
grand

a

pLcture,

necessarg

grand

at

Least Ln foLLoMLng Log LeaLLg from another

theorg). But the hope Ls mLspLaced; Ln Large

unLfLed

measure Lt represents 17thC ratLonaLLsm over agatn. SometLmes, hoMever, he seems
to feet desLgn Ln the untverse.

-

Ls

Mhat

features:

to

supposed

emerge,

and

does emerge, from the numerLcaL

Mhat

anthropLc prLncLpLes vs. MorLd seLectLon prLncLpLes. Uhat Ls supposed

to emerge depends upon hoM the matter Ls set up, hoM the pLcture

emphasLaed.

Ls

Mhat

presented,

For exampLe, DavLes and LesLLe both set thtngs up so onLg

tMo optLons are supposed to be open. In hLs Preface to
Da^Le^

Ls

The RcctdentaL UnLverse,

suggests the sgstematLc aLternatLves are eLther reLLgLon or an anthropLc

prLncLpLe. R sLmLLar cLaLm appears Ln LesLLe, Mho puts the aLternatLves as
(ethtcaL) necessttg or anthropLc assumptLons. Thus hLs concLusLon (to L2, p.81)

The cosmotogLcaL evidence can suppLg __ forcefut grounds for vLeMLng at
Least one of these thtngs ss true. (1) God Ls reaL, though presumabLg as
a creattve ethtcaLrequtrement rather than as a
dtvtne person
Mho
LLteraLLg
destgned
our LLfe-contaLntng cosmos. [So the unLverse extsts
because Lt shouLd.J (2) There extsts a Mortd EnsembLe [so the condtttons
LeadLng to Ltfe are bound to occur someMhere (L2, p.55)J - and
the
attempt to dertve aLL the fundamentaL charactertstLcs of our cosmos
from
some untfted FLeLd Theorg Ls tn error.
DavLes

LnsLnuates

that

the

obvtous Lnference from the cat3Logue of numerLcaL

features Ls thts:

a htdden prLncLpLe seems to be at Mork, organLstng the cosmos

Ln a coherent Mag

(p.110). Thts runs paraLLeL to argument from desLgn,

hardLg

an

Lmprovement.

One

of

the

prLncLpLes

htdden

Ls

hgpothests; but another Mhtch DavLes (unLtke LesLLe) generaLLg

anthropLc

prLncLpLe,

to LncredLbLe accuracg

3nd

Ls

some sort of God
favours

Ls

the

a gutdtng prLncLpLe Mhtch serves to fLne-tune the cosmos
for us (humans) - or

Ltfe, or Ltfe-supportLng sgstems, or __ ? Or

for observers,or LnteLLLgence,

or

not for angthtng.

The chotce offered Ls reaLLg then an oLd famLLLar one, faced bg thtnkers at

Least

stnee

the (so-caLLed) EnLtghtenment:

God or Han, or after a recent ftrst

correctton and Mtth a different emphasts, Humans

-17-

or God. In

fact burted

under

duaLitg,

this

is

aLreadg

as

(Science) or Hunans or God. However the

a

nang

tenpts

favoured

which

option,

Phgsics

excLuded,

in error . Rnd it is

we

as

seen:

have

(coMprehensive) phgsics without netaphgsics, no scientific theorg

no

is

Much

scientist and phiLosopher, is increasinqLg seen as excLuded, as

forbidden fruit or even as

there

at Least a three-wag choice: Phgsics

giinpsed,

without Large assunptions - which stands on its own. But further afieLd there is

get

is

which

option,

another

not

excLuded:

option here canvassed. The ciain to be eLaborated is this: no

(deep-ecoLogicaL)

principies of a tgpe not aLreadg required

for

Low

LeveL

senanticaL

purposes

worLd seLection principies) are caLLed for in expiaining the nunericaL

(naMeig,

features at Least as satisfactoriig as

nor

huMans

Neither

principies,

gods

such

be

upon

popuiarig

aLreadg

foreshadowed,

doing.

in

More

in

reMoving

huMans

features

god-Like

(and,

universe.

the

principLe cones in a varietg of

anthropic

verg precise (incLuding Barrow's biocentric reforMutations). SoMe exaMptes

give

the

inpression:-

The

existence as observers

seLection

bioLogicaL

(D

to

the

own

used

be

can

existence

a

as

constants'

(ibid).

This

presents

severaL

for renoving underiging ngsterg is verg different fron

nunericat

of

expLanation,

our

p.viii);

effect, ... to expLain the otherwise Mgsterious nuMericat

disentangie;

expLat,ning

wiLL

idea is to reiate basic worLd features to our own

vaLues of the fundanentaL phgsicaL

issues

as

such

coLourfuL for nainstreaM phgsicists, atMost none of then

prettg

MostLg

the

upon

hunans,

associated

inteLLigence) fron a new speciaL pLace
Rs

succeed

options

other

the

are essenti3t. Since gods do not figure in anthropic

wiLL

focus

the

incidentaLLg,

forMS,

object-theoru

far-out

the

features.

sorts,

various

or

Rnd

nag

these

turn

in

have

further

theg Mag be siMpig contingent, refLecting

seLection without specific purpose. Sone phgsicists go so far as to ciain:

our

existence constrains the structure of the universe, indeed it even

it

(0

p-112),

for

to

us ,

quote froM Hawking and CoLLins.

connection in this sweeping context h3s been dubbed
this j^s Davies

the

does,

have

nothing

specificaLLg

to

do

inteLLigence, or with Life, etc. The Dicke argunent, for

Eddington-Dirac

expLain

coincidence,

is

based

of

principLe :

anthropic

the

show

with

what

work

the

or

hunans,

with

designed

exanpLe,

to

onig on the presence of heavg

eieMents, and so gives but a hint of bioLogg, if that. So
reversaL

Invoking the huMan

forMuLaticn of the principLe (D p.112)!

But quite generaLLg the argunents advanced, which do

principLe

seLects

reaLLg

there

is

no

spirit of the Copernican revoLution' in this fashion (pace D

p.115, barter, and others). The conditionaL principLe estabLished bg

the

Dicke

arguMent is essentiaLLg

J)

If

[because,

g^ven]

there exist heavg eieMents, then the universe is such

that the Eddington-Dirac coincidence ho ids.
The

fuLL

expLanatorg

argunent conprises, as weLL as the detaiLed phgsics that

goes toward J), the nodus ponens inference:

-18-

The Eddington-Dirac coincidence hotds.

There exist heavy eLements, J)

More generaLiy, the

anthropic

way

gives

principie

to

physicatiy

a

argued

conditionai scheme of the enthymematic form

K)

if F then T,

or its contrapositive
K ) if not-F then not-T,

where

F

is

a

hard factuai ciaim or more commoniy its existentiat

reiativety

generaiisation , and

T

is

a

more

theoretic3i

ciaim

concerning

typicaity

features of the worLd, such as numericai features. The short form of

anthropic

exp Lanation, or better status quo expLanation, is then the argument form
F, if F then T

L)

. .T.

famiLiar ontoLogicaL proofs, for instance of an externaL worLd from the

Moore s

fact that

exist,

hands

arguments.

such

omit

typicaLLy

proofs

phiLosophers

just

are

difference

The

is

that

the soLid argumentation that goes into

estabLishing the conditionai schemes of status quo expianations;

for

instance,

makes LittLe effort in this direction, and the required entaiLment rather

Moore

evidentLy faiLs to hoLd (see fn 30).

Other formutations of the anthropic principie in the Literature are

than

better

those

hardLy

3tready exhibited. LesLie, who at Least (Like Barrow) moves

humans a LittLe off centre stage, puts it in this counterfactuaL way:
if our
universe had been [everywhere] hostiie to Life then nobody wouLd be observing
it

(L2, p.66). If the consequent simpiy

contextuaLLy

impiies

that

something

a Live is doing the observing, then the principie is ana Lytic, and scarceLy up to
the

intended

expLanatory

tasks

(without

requisite information that the

the

universe contains Life, and much eLse being separateLy pumped in). MhiLe if

does not require this, it appears fatse; the Latest seeing-eye robot

consequent

did survive the hoLocaust, or did just happen as a resuLt of the quantum
fLuctuation.

In

such

as

Dicke's

most

purported

argument.

offers faces reLated difficuLties:
worLd

appLications

of

the

anthropic

The other version of the principie LesLie

NecessariLy we conscious

beings

observe

a

which is Life-containing (LI, p.lt+1). Rs it stands, this is faLse; for we

mightn t exist. Nor wiLL appropriate deLetion

consciousness

retain

we'

of

fix

things.

the

worLd

is,

Me

might

but not be observers, aLL being in vats. But repaired the

version is pretty use Less. It bears onLy tangentiaLLy (through

that

vacuum

any case the formuiation Lacks sufficient generaLity; it faiLs

to connect appropriateLy with

scheme,

the

but

contingency,

Life

its

consequent,

containing) on what is at issue

concerning numericaL features. The materiaL on us, on observers and the Like, is

strictLy

irreLevant,

a

hang-over

again

presumabLy

constructions of quantum theory.

-1?-

from

bad

ideaList

*

The

that the Copernican principte has suffered some sort of set-b3ck

idea

because of the essentiai rote of anthropic principies in explaining Large-number
can be traced back through Carter, who heLped popuLarise the rote

coincidences,

between

of anthropic principies and made the (rather obscure) distinction

strong

weak

has

been

exaggerated subservience to the 'Copernican principte' [which is] that we

must

and
not

assume

principies.

anthropic

gratuitoustg

that

we

Recording

to

Carter,

there

occupg a priviLeged centraL position in the

(C p.231). The regrettabLe tendency, he sags, has been to

universe

extend

the

to a most questionable dogma to the effect that our situation cannot

principte

be priviLeged in ang sense ... (in extreme form ...
the
'perfect cosmoLogicaL
principLe ...)'. The Latter assumption is certaintg untenabLe (as Dicke pointed

because the universe is bg no means spatiaLLg homogeneous on a LocaL scaLe

out)

and speciaL conditions (of

terrestrial

temperature,

chemicaL

environment)

do prevaiL on Earth. But its removaL does nothing to undercut

Life

the Copernican principLe, or to boost the anthropic principLe in the wag

thinks

Lt

For

does.

is

Carter

his bracketed comment after his first formuiation of the

anthropcc principle is that

Lt

for

requisite

aLthough our situation is not necessaritg

centraL,

inevitabLg priviLeged to some extent' (C p.291). It is doubtfuL that our

position

is

centraL;

whether

it

is

so

priviLeged

depends on the intended

contrast, but whatever the privilege is, it hardlg seems inevitabLe.

Carter

gives

severaL

non-equivaLent

formuLations

of

the

anthropic

principLe, the first of which takes the quasi-anaLgtic but ambiguous form,

LJhat

we C3n expect to observe must be restricted bg the conditions necessarg for our
presence as observers' (C p.291; repeated D p.119). This is certs inLg not the
same as Davies
condensation of
it, what he caLLs the weak principLe, that

observers

construaL,

restrict

the

observed'.

On

the

obvious (but Less charitabLe)
this is but rampant verificationism, of a tgpe verg familiar however

from interpretations of quantum theorg. Uhat exists is independent of observers;

and observers, especiaLLg remote ones, mag have no significant impact on what iL5
observed. The condensation is accordingLg false. So also, for different reasons,
is what it condenses. For one thing, our expectations mag run astrag. True, what
we observe is restricted bg the conditions for our doing just that, nameLg being

as observers. But this tautologg imposes no phgsical constraints, being
equaLLg true for Xing as observing; and no such connection is appeaied to in ang
of the derivations of coincidences that Carter sketches. Once again
aqain the

present

arguments

never

have angthing in detail to do with humans, or even "observers

4-c?

-20-

.2-1

(and surety animats observe). Fit best the arguments are directed to the presence

of water or carbon 12 or some such - things sometimes erroneousiy equated
Life, and often, rather dubiousty, said to be necessary for Life.^S

The situation is of this sort with Carter's "iiiustration" of the weak
better Locat) anthropic principte, which he formutates as foitows: 'we must

(or

be prepared to take account of the fact that our Location

in

observers

universe

is

existence

as

the

necessariLy priviLeged to the extent of being compatibLe with our

p.233). In order to get to grips with this recondite formuiation

(C

Let us remove the initiaL intensionaL functors (which my empiricist friends
to

with

assure

are

me

not

essentiaL

in

physics,

despite

ubiquity, and

their

physicists

procLivities to modaLs). Now our position can hardLy be

priviLeged

(despite

Carter s

tru

necessariLy

since human-types just might be

itaLicization),

uniformLy distributed through the universe or again might not exist at aLL. LJhat

necessity there is enters in a different way. LJhat we are Left

de Let ion,

with

since

misLeading,

probabiListic

arguments

suitabLe for Life in the universe (some detaiLs

justified

is

Like

more

something

unique

(though

principte

this

need

require

of

Hh3t

may

be

met.

In

this

humans

we

are

Long-Lived

stars

Rnd

stiLL

much

more

than

a

weak

is dragged in. It is enough, for seLeet ion,

universe contains Locations,

neighbourhood

Sag3n).

we're working at it); even on Terra much of the rest of

the animat kingdom is simitarLy favoured.
seLeet ion

in

priviLege

of habitats

miLLions

suggest
are

to

this: we are favoured in that the physicaL

conditions for our existence, as observers, are
hardLy

due

Our Location in the universe is priviLeged to the extent of

is then:

be',ng compatibLe with our existence as observers'. But this ciaim

cs

after

in

where

fact
heavy

Like the earth,

in

the

metaLs occur, and so on (for

certain other pureLy geotogicaL features).
BoLtzmann s expLanation of the present high degree of
which

Ls

extremety

improbabLe

cosmic

organisation

(in a thermodynamicaL setting) is aiso said to

appLy a

weak anthropic principte ;

witness

this

the onLy reason that we are

priviLeged

to

exceedingLy untikeiy occurrence is that our very existence [etc.J
-21-

O.2.2..

*

depends upon the condition which atone can be

bg

estabiished

remarkabte

that

(D p.123). But again onLg gross phgsicaL organisationat principLes

fLuctuation

are seLected for; and no more than a weak seLection principte is required.
beveraL

expLained , so Carter and Davies ci3im,

be

cannot

coincidences

simpig bg a weak principte (at Least in the

muLti-universes).

of

is made to the strong (or better gLobaL) principte:

appeaL

these

absence

The universe

... must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some
in

barter s

(p.120).

formuLation

exist
is

for

manifesttg

faLse.

So,

Cartesian

paraphrase

Carter

gives of the strong

different

cogito ergo mundus taLis est . The worLd wouLd presumabtg not be

principte,
verg

theg

is

this

appaLLing

the

necessarg;

the universe does. Rnd since observers mag verg easiLg never

given

have evotved in the universe,
reasons,

stage

R coroLLarg of the strong principte in this

heaviLg necessitated guise is that observers are conditionaLLg

must

For

so

different were the contingent premiss faLse; and certainLg the premiss mag

Least

be true but the cone Lus ion faLse. But at

Loading,

necessitg

gets

and

principte

the

appropriate conctusion. For, propertg
ideaLLg

this

the

inferentiaL form, with the

into

formuLated,

abandons

paraphrase

scheme

the

as

is

before,

Law Like conditionaL of basic form, if F then T, where however T is a

a

genuinetg gLobaL cLaim that the universe is such 3nd such (e.g. the universe now
contains more matter than radiation). The

scheme,

so

then,

recast

is

feature

distinctive

some

theoreticaL

LocaL

strong

the

that T is hoListic assertion 3bout the universe,

incLuding essentiaL reference to it, not, as it mag be on
about

of

the

weak

principte,

of the universe, which can readiLg be

features

stated or restated without reference to the universe. But the distinction is not
particuiarLg
important.
The

robust,

troubie

is

it

from

3

worLd-seLection

gives

Lt

a

misLeading

most

LawLike

Mag

requisite

within

consequent. For exampLe, there is stiLL no

(egocentric)

thought

matter;

to

phgsicaLLg

without

Descartes

God

to

puLL

him

out.

universe

the

taiLor-made

is

for

framework

of

idea

-

in essence it

cLaims
a

wag

Living organisms are subsequentig assured of existence. [So it is]... akin

mankind

to

inhabit.

products

secuLar

expLanations.

teteoLogicaL

R

duLg

cLaims

anthropic

worLd

for

(D p.121). Such erroneous presentations have done much to

encourage both a new anthropocentrism and the idea that

are

unLike

habitation, 3nd that both the Laws of

to traditionaL retigious expLanation of the worLd: that God made the

are

from

Hard as it is to credit, Carter is

phgsics and the initiaL conditions obLigingLg arrange themseLves in such
that

an

procLivitg to ideaiism

exceLLed bg Davies, who sags of the strong principte that

that

in

route

respectabLe

Carter's

(exhibited in C2)), he mag weLL get stuck in the

argue

to

bounds to the intended

phgsicaL

given

and

of satisfactorg

impression

antecedents for the scheme, and makes it presentLg impossibLe

appropriateLg

verg

perspective

Carter's extravagant Cartesian paraphrase of the strong

with

that

is

principte

nor

on

a

par

reformuLated

Davies

with,
strong

and

in

schema

expLanations

anthropic

competition
supports

design

with,
none

of

the

makes regarding the universe. Nor, as wiLL appear,

expLanations,

when

made

presentabLe,

-22-

akin

to

retigious

features of the worLd. The expLanations take different LogicaL

of

explanations

forms and LnvoLve quite different ingredients.

To see what is reaLLy required for the strong schema to operate, it pays to

Look

at

Then

appLications.

it

becomes

evident

observercentric

that

considerations are strictLy irreLevant. Once again far stronger, and

biocentric

more dubious, conditions than are required for the estimates actuaLLy made

been

For

introduced.

instance,

(BoLtamann)

K,
is a good exampLe of a prediction based on what
strong' anthropic principLe' (C p.23^); (8) is as foLLows:

K

aLL

f

<

that

is

2 "
Tl_
5

have

according to Carter, his condition (8), which

imposes an order of magnitude upper bound on cosmoLogicaL

But

and

constant

may be termed the

3

' "P ,

P

invoLved

in

obtaining

this

bound,

retevance, is the

of

assumption that ' the un iverse is not radiation dominated aLL its [finite]
Life
(i.e.
that the matter contribution ... to the mean mass density ... becomes
greater at some stage

Insofar

this

as

is

than

the

necessary

radiation

(C

...)'

contribution

pp.233-^.).

at aLL - since the estimates concern onLy very

broad features, and not LocaL variations - it is 3s necessary for Lichen as

for

Larkspurs. DLL that is required is a sLightLy stronger worLd seLection principLe
than

mereLy

that

worLd contain heavier eLements at some stage; but stiLL

the

onLy a gLobaL geophysicaL principLe. Rnd this is aLL that
here.

The

same

set

of

points

amounts

to

appLies to Carter's further use of the strong

principLe, to estimate the Lower bound on K,

which

appLies

the

conventionaL

that gaLax Les ... are formed by condensation, starting as reLativeLy

hypothesis

smaLL density fLuctuations in an otherwise homogeneous
further

The

strength

tendentious

assumption

in

background

(C

p.2St+).

this appiication is that gaiaxies are

necessary for the formation of stars and hence of Life

(C p.23!*).

NonetheLess there are arguments for the strong anthropic principLe, though
faLLacious ones obviousLy. They come firstLy from positivism. It is cLaimed that

if

the universe exists then it must be observabLe; so there must be observers -

a modaL faLLacy. Davies (in his exposition of Barrow

and

not

argues

universe which

from the faLse premiss that onLy what is observed exists, that a
did

then

others)

admit observers is meaningLess' (D p.I21). This is ideaListic garbage.

They come secondLy from an aLLeged expianatory rote, in expLaining coincidences.
But it is unnecessary for this purpose as initiaL worLd

seLection

wiLL

serve.

They come thirdLy from human chauvinism; thus, too human existence is said to be

responsibLe

for

the

very

speciaL

structure of the universe' (D p.121)! The

connection is not however causaL; so what is it supposed

There

is

be:

teLeoLogicaL?

thus a serious probLem as to how this responsibitity, hardLy evident,

is exercised. FinaLLy a strong principLe might
uniformity

to

-

one

principLe

to

cover

be

argued

for

on

grounds

of

aLL cases. But better a weaker correct

-23-

principLe than a strong faLse or
geophgsicaL

principLe

wouLd

suffice

Rnd

principLe.

dubious

doubt

no

a

weaker

aLL phgsicaL constants. (Of course,

for

there reMains the natter of this worLd seLection. This worLd does exhibit

Life,

incLude hunans, and so on. But these features, Like the present species of

does

eucaLgpts

expLanations,
or reLevant,
cLasses of worids.)"^

and

are

RnusingLg, astroLogicaL

and

More

converses

hunan affairs; white under

gerMane

not

the

to

extravagant

anthropic

principies

are

to astroLogg, ceiestiaL events infLuence

anthropic

hunan

anaLogue,

affairs

infLuence

CeiestiaL events and processes incLude those of the sun. Moon

events

ceiestiaL

its

are

abstracted fron in seLecting expLanatorg

Recording

other.

each

of

wonbats,

grazing

of

whereabouts

and

and other pLanets (especiaLLg). Rnd these certaintg appear to have an (indirect)

weak infLuence, especiaLLg through the

soLar

atMosphere

and

pLanetarg

Large

pLasMas, on terrestriaL phenoMena (Fegerabend, p.93). The anthropic converse, in

this forM danagingtg anthropocentric and exhibiting an excess of hubris, is Much
further froM the truth.
Not just the anthropocentric, but the

eMphasis

of nuMericat features. Rnd despite the bioLogicaL anaLogies,

just Lt,ke

explanation

seLection

without

vaLues,

so

even

Rs

are

there

there is seLection without seLectors.

More,

RLthough seLection is sonetiMes accoMpiished through seLectors, often
takes

not

is

naturaL seLection. It is not seLection for, for fitness, survivaL, or

whatever. Nor, More iMportant is it seLection bg, bg soMe agent.
vaLues

MispLaced.

is

insistence, Life is not essent-iaL in Mang worids

Le^Lie

Despite

biocentric

seLection

without seLecters, randonig or otherwise - this tiMe as in naturaL

pLace

seLection, which does not require a personified Nature to do the

have

evoLutionarg

theories

as/oid ageneg.

In avoiding ageneg, seLection is Like that

seLecting,

as

enphasised. Such expLanation can straightforwardig
of

Darwinian

evoLut-

ionarg theorg; and seLection contrasts with direction as incLuded in aLternative

evoLutionarg

Though

accounts

(cf.

DarLington,

p.l^ff).

anthropic principies coMe in a varietg of forMs, depending upon how

the conditionaL scheMa ^nvoLved is fitted out, none of theM, then, does what

is

saud,

none

depends essentiaLLg on the presence of huMans, or of Life.

SgntacticaLLg,

theg

etaborate

usuaLLg

status

quo arguMents, of forM L), with factuaL

fir^t preMis^ F concerning the state of the worLd LocaLLg (weak forM)

whoLe

(strong

seLection

forM).

SenanticaLLg,

or

as

a

the factuaL preMisses function as worLd

principies; theg serve to Mark out the cLass of phgsicaL wortds or to

narrow then down to these or those, e.g. to those where heavier eieMents such as
carbon occur, those where Long-Lived stars, such as the sun, appear. It is
that

carbon is sonetiMes taken to provide an "order-of-Magnitude" approxiMation

for Life (that is the nearest

Long-Lived

star

is

supposed

to
to

hunans

provide

that

the

the

"approxinations"

get);

Life

as

the

arguMents

a

steadg warMth required for the

evoLution of Life (but Long-Lived stars, water, and heavier objects are as
to

true

near

need get). But these additionaL, and nore dubious,

detaiis are unnecessarg for the Main thrust of status quo arguMents, as distinct

-24-

from their anthropic 3nd biocentric augmentations.

meet

Given that the worids seiected are of this and that cast - in generai

geophgsicai

gross

Less, up

the

to

constraints — other features of them can be derived (more or
standards

rough

accepted

in

and

physics)

in

expLained,

particuLar, how and that it is that certain (fundamentaL) physicaL constants Lie

in restricted ranges, narrow and unexpected ranges. These arguments, duty fitted
out, do provide exp Lanations, non-causat exp Lanations, of physicaL features of a
contingent,

mereLy

LmprobabLe universe. Much there is, however, in these

most

ctaims, that has been contested, from the psycho LogicaL

such

of

inadequacy

a

universe to the worth of such expLanations, if expLanations they are at aLL.

objections to the cosmo-LogicaL synthesis; and finding

unLikety,

an

in

comfort

and

with

Prob Lems

mereLy

universe.

contingent,

Somehow

contingent

universes have acquired the reputation of being coLd, remote and uncaring -

a

not

habitat for sensitive creatures. But the reputation is undeserved, since

fit

contingency does not bear on any of these things. Mhat is contingent can be

just as weLL as coLd or neither; caring or not, so far as the appLication

sense

aLL;

at

and

hot

makes

so on. One can be warm and comfortabLe in bed on a wet and

wintry night. One can be at home, comfortabLe in, in tune with, a tiny

part

of

an improbabLe universe, as some tribaL peopLes are. None of these virtues are Ln
any way undermined by contingency,
matter of a necessary universe.

or

aLways assured by the quite separate

a degree of harmony between us

Furthermore, there can be, or have evoLved,
and our surroundings , without

principLes,

as

that

our

worse, that the universe is

universe

such

exaggerated

cLaims,

on

based

anthropic

are very speciaL and tuned to us' or,

surroundings

made for us'. Me humans can be

in

with

tune

the

without having the universe tuned to us, as we can foLLow and ornament

a song on the wind or in the woods. But so far, especiaLLy recentLy,

we

humans

coLLectiveLy are not doing too weLL in attuning oursetves to the worLd.

Rs

this

iLLustration

begins

to

metaphysicaL and psychoLogicaL

reveaL,

predeLiction^ may pLay a not inconsiderabte rote in choice of, and ornamentation
of, physicaL theory, especiaLLy of controvers LaL theories such as quantum theory

and cosmoLogicaL theory. In the case of such theories there is a certain bag
technicaL
so to say

tricks,

tricks,

equations and so on, which are de rigeur - a theory-skeLeton

- and beyond that both an interpretation and setting for the bag
integrating

of

theM

and

suppLying

of

with some sort of meaning, and

them

usuaLLy aLso some further formaLism connecting the tricks together or to a wider
theoreticaL background. For exampLe, even in accounts of
too

much

in

the

way

of

interpretation

theory

where

is commonLy frowned upon, extensive

correspondence ruLes Linking the formaLism with

upon

quantum

cLassicaL

physics

are

retied

heaviLy. Rt Least for everything beyond the theory-skeLeton, which is what

is appLied in most concrete day-to-day appLications of the theory, there is much
room for rivaL fLeshing out of the skeLeton -

Latitude

-25-

such

as

there

is

in

archeological reconstructions of peoples from some scattered bones.
Recasting

quantum theorg, as in the mang-worlds interpretation, offers not

as

merelg a basis for fleshing out the theorg non-idealisticallg, but
for

combining

it

with

general

to

subject

much

of the criticism, much of it directed more broadlg at

most

Happilg

as

However such recasting, when not

reLativitg.

largelg ignored (the common fate of nonstandard theories), is
criticism.

well

plural world theories in general, misses the

neutral

modification.

There

are

firstlg a batch of aesthetic and ontological objections. These commonlg take off
from

the

of

unattractiveness

duplication or replication of

profligate

such

worLds. LJeLL, tastes and vaLues, Like intuitions, do varg with sub-cuLture. Some
of us, who escaped over-exposure to
worlds

the

ReaLitg

do

PrincipLe,

stories illuminating and attractive, indeed verg inviting. So, next, the

whole thing is said to be unbelievable: no one can reasonabLg

existence

believe

worLds nonetheless, especiaLLg in explanation.

these

in

(the

these unlimited numbers of universes. Granted, we do not believe

of)

in this either. These other worLds do not exist; but we can make
of

neutral

find

heavg Load of objections

carrging

on

about

excess

use

extensive

In this wag we avoid a

baqgage.

ontic

also

Ue

main criticisms based on Occam s razor. (RLL these objections are

short-circuit

met, in much detail, in JB.)
Linked to such Occamist protests are a batch of objections

that

are

pictures

worlds

effect

the

to

over-engineered, both too complex 3nd including too

much baggage. Thus in thermodgnamics a smalt fluctuation producing some order is

more LikeLg than one producing Lots of order, one galaxg more LikeLg than

Lihg

do

similarlg

we not find ourselves in a one galaxg universe, which is far

more LikeLg? The answer is in part: because Less LikeLg contingencies

hold.

Is

the

ubiquitg

No,

(D p.123)?

mgsterg

instance,

the

on the

commenting

of

of

numbers

approaches

reasons.

in

these

unwarranted presuppositions. The
that

the

universe

was

set

others

Like

be

explained.

For

Dicke

Thus

and

Peebles

remark,

in

of the universe for a few conscious individuals,

overdesign

revealed

well

one of a thing is itself verg unlikelg. Find

just

special

can,

that a single galaxg cosmos might be ruled out bg

the

can

observed galaxies in our universe ... therefore a

such

evolution

further

there mag be

mang.

up

Mach's

Moreover,

principle.

questions and remarks are based on various

overdesign"

for

idea,

for

example,

presupposes

some individuals; but the worlds picture

correctLg avoids thLS assumption. The things in this world that exist happen

to

be there, probable or not, and often, for reasons we can sometimes explain, not.

But there is tittle solid evidence that theg are arranged, for us or others.
In

its

original

form

the

unfocussed

"overdesign" objection was mainlg

directed at cruder anthropic principles, as were

unverifiabilitg

and

unfalsifiabilitg.

a

batch

of

objections

The well-worn criticism, that notorious

psgchoanalgtic and Marxist principles did too much, being so designed that
covered

everg

protested that

case,

was

redirected

from

against

anthropic

principles.

it is hard to see how the anthropic principLe

can

be

It
used

theg
was

to

make testable predictions, because ang theorg inconsistent with our existence is

4

M3nLfestLg

Not

faLse .

such protests been weakened bg avant garde

have

onLg

phLLosophg of science, but, as Carter has poLnted out, anthropLc arguments couLd

varLous

Ln prLncLpLe have been used to predLct

theg

Rnd

notLced.

were

faLsLfLcatLon, e.g. where erroneous

that

unLLkeLg

assumptLons

prLncLpLes,

regards

Rs

fLrst).

under

but

Ls

worLd-sgnthesLs,

aLL

that

worLds

the

whether

Ln

wLth

cosmoLog Les and

of

verLfLcatLonLst
seLectLon

whLch

semantLcs,

or

phgsLcs

exLst,

LnvoLved

of

themes

objectLons do have some

verLfLabLLLtg

vLrtue of what Ls meant bg

bg

bg

neutraLLsed

ex Lsttng. But the force of these objectLons Ls
theorg.

as

conversLon,

object-theorg

Granted

LnterpretatLon.

of

Often,

Lt

(though

of weaker forms wouLd be abandoned, other

surrendered

force agaLnst mang-worLds theories,
assume

derLved

object Lons are LargeLg mLsdLrected, because what are at Lssue are

phgsLcaL

semantLcs,

are

coLncLdences

premLss

factuaL

be

wouLd

verLfLabLLLtg
not

the

anthropLc arguments do admLt of

of

3ssumptLons

the

before

coLncLdences

numerLcaL

neutraL

worLds

objectLons, the crLtLcLsms of mang-worLd
such

prLncLpLes

anthropLc

as

geophgsLcaL

or

prLncLpLes are LntertwLned, and dLsentangLLng the crLtLcLsms Ls enough to partLg

So

them.

def Late

aLso wLth the reLated charge th3t the neutraL worLd-

Ls

Lt

sgnthesLs theorg Ls unscLentLfLc or at

much

turns

Least

dubLousLg

scLentLfLc.PLaLnLg

on what Ls admLtted Lnto that esteemed categorg, scLentLfLc. But on

most accounts, use of seLectLon prLncLpLes succeeds Ln gettLng LncLuded. Rnd so,
pLaLnLg enough, does mang-worLds quantum theorg. Rfter 3LL, Lt has 3pproxLmateLg

as

the same sorts of predLcatLve and test capabLLLtLes

more

That fact of narrow empLrLcaL LndLstLnguLshabLLLtg mag be the source of

theorg.

other compLaLnts, but Lt gtves no ground for the

charge

worLd

Ls

seLectLon

prLncLpLes

excLuded!

are

It

at

hand.

of

scLentLfLc

and

theorLsLng

experLmentLng

true that some theoretLcaL

and

wouLd

(per

prefer

LmpossLbLe)

and wantLng to st Lek to a

uLtLmate

and

unLfLed

expLanatLons. No doubt such semantLcaL apparatus does faLL fouL of the
the substance of the charge, consLder some of the crLterLa often
beLng

theLr

theorg

narrower

sLmpLg reveaLs further serLous defects Ln such vLews. But to reach

that

vLews:

fuLLer

the

narrower (hgpothetLco-deducttve) methodoLogg, are uneasg wLth worLds

seLectLon,

sureLg

But

phgsLcLsts, and mang phLLosophers, LosLng sLght of what enters Lnto
range

quantum

orthodox

scLentLfLc.

UnfaLsLfLabLe?

SureLg

set

down

for

Ln areas where the framework Ls

not

pLnned down bg phgsLcaL theorg. OvercompLLcated and LnsuffLcLentLg

gLven what the worLds theorg Ls Lntended to accompLLsh

sLmpLe?

Not

(e.g.

the

semantLcaLLg

theoretLcaL work Lt Ls aLso put to Ln areas such 3s LLnguLstLcs). Etc., etc.
Perhaps the most teLLLng
theorLes

LLke

worLd—sgntheses

objectLons
whLch

agaLnst

LncLude

status

quo

arguments,

and

them, concern theLr expLsnatorg

capacLtg. StrangeLg theg have been condemned both as expLaLntng too much

-

ang

thLng at aLL can be brought out Ln some worLd - and as expLaLnLng too LLttLe and
beLng

trLvLaL. Not both these objectLons are LLkeLg to succeed, as theg tend to

undercut one another. IndependentLg, Lt seems cLear that the arguments

do

provLde

expLanatLons,

for

LnvoLved

Lnstance, of the strength of the strong nucLear

force. It aLso seems cLear that the expLanatLons afforded are of vargLng

-27-

depth,

+

depending in part on the depth of the underlying physicaL theory invoLved,

this

and the pLausibiLity of the further assumptions made in the arguments.
Better exempiific3tions of status quo arguments in physics satisfy not oniy

more ordinary requirements for expLanation; they aLso meet

assembLed

conditions

considerable

time,

by

HempeL,

mainstream

the

which

conditions

on

position

demanding
for

represented,

some

what counted as a scientific

expLanation. Furthermore, the chief objections to

have

more

the

HempeLian

the

account

that

emerged have been to the effect that it is too rigorous, not that it faiLs

to provide jointLy sufficient conditions for expLanation. To make a prima

facie

case that better status quo arguments do provide exp Lanations, it is enough then

show

to

expLanation

LogicaL

HempeL s

that

conditions

on

the

(p.2t+7ff) have been met. By contrast

conditions

design

with

scientific

of

the

arguments,

3re satisfied. The expLanandum T is a LogicaL

adequacy

of

pattern

basic

consequence of the physicaL argument eLaborating the schemas F, if F then T; the

expLanans has empiricaL content, at Least in the shape of
expLanans

F;

which

connection

if F then T, provides

expLanans are true,

Uere

a

foLLows from arguments using physicaL Laws. FinaLLy,

the demanding empiricaL condition of adequacy, that the premisses

used

in

the

is satisfied in better status quo arguments.

the basic pattern aLso necessary for scientific expLanation, it wouLd

be an easy coroLLary that many poorer status quo arguments fait to provide

expianations (beginning with Carter s and Descartes
is

there

the

and

contains general, Laws which are actuaLLy used in the derivation. For,

in better status quo arguments, the conditionaL schema,
Law Like

premiss

much

quo

status

that

such

Cogito arguments), and that

arguments cannot presentLy expLain decentLy,

'^ncLuding such major puzzLes as Life and inteLLigence in the LocaL worLd. It can

be independentLy argued, moreover, that poorer status quo arguments, which
patentLy

(or

short

meeting HempeLian conditions, fait to generate satisfactory

of

satisfying) expianations. TriviaL, dogmatic, forms, such as that things 3re

the way they are because that is how they are, represent a virtuaLLy worse

of

sort.

this

But

possibie.

weakening

to

principte,

that

what

The universe is inhabitabie, because we are here, because
ask

Forrest

so

is

aLso

humans

inhabit

The universe is suited to inteLLigent Life because there are peopLe

such questions
upon).

focusses

inferences,

is

sLightLy embroidered, are arguments with connecting principLes

Such,

the earth ,

case

better, or more informative, are those arguments

scarceLy

which appLy the possibility
Like

faLL

(exampies adapted from the sorts of anthropic arguments
These

short;

patentLy

faLL

arguments,

which

they

LnvoLve

offer
no

aimost

immediate

further

appropriate

basic

(HempeLian)

argumentation making use of generaL Laws.

Given

that

better

status

quo

arguments

do

afford

scientific expianations, and given further that the arguments do serve to remove

and

not

without predictive force, why have they been

genuine

puzzLement

fauLted

as expianations, and sometimes criticised 3S not providing expianations

are

at aLL (e.g. Forrest)? The main reason offered, that

back-to-front ,

these

"expianations"

are

appears to rest on the assumption that aLL genuine expLanation

-28-

shouLd be broadLg causaL, and

accordingLg

exhibit

(time-)

the

direction

or controi. Status quo expLanations are certainLg not causaL, and mag

causation

weLL run counter to causaL direction, expLaining features of the earig
the

through

of

distribution

present

universe

of eLements. That is, however, perfectLg in

order. For satisfactorg expLanation is not causaLLg restricted either ordinariLg
or scientificaLLg. HempeL suppLies severaL different sorts of
pattern

basic

of

causaLLg or controL directed (pp.352-3). EspeciaLLg striking in this

exampLe

opticaL

straightforward

his

of

his

which are not causaL expLanation or

expLanation

scientific

exampLes

regard

is

a particuLar event...satisfactoriLg

of

expLained bg reference to subsequent occurrences'; but his

exampLe

of

two-wag

where the period of a penduLum serves to expLain the Length of the

expLanation,

penduLum as weLL as converseLg, is aLso highLg re Levant.
For it is too

expiaining

commonLg

assumed

numericaL

that

shouLd

coincidences

be

the presence of water, carbon and the Like in the universe, not vice

versa. But there is no
iLLuminating

reason
quo

status

whg

direction

shouLd

expLanation

the

instead

not

in

run

the

as weLL as, vice versa. That

of,

iLLuminating direction is after aLL from the famiLiar to the much Less famiLiar,
and more in need of expLanation.

such

It is true of course that

more

simpig means that status quo

expLanations

ad hominem stgLe of status quo expLanation,
for

are.

Like

expLanations,

most

further

unreasonabLg

stop

deeper expLanation. The expLanation-stopping forms are

and

form:

contraposed
inquirers

verg

for

expLanation

if it weren t so gou woutdn t be here to ask the

question. However such put-downs (in the envisaged

persistent

Legitimate

the

those (which Forrest discusses) where the response to a request for

the

Long.

wouLd

contexts)

not

more

charge,

damaging

feature

of

the

universe,

Then

PF.

seLecting worLds where PF hoLds. But the

theorg.

the

then, is that worLd-sgnthesis can expLain too

much. The charge is backed up bg the foLLowing sort of consideration.

puzzLing

deter

Theg wouLd be awag in search of further

expLanations, such as better status quo arguments mag furnish (at Least for
t ime be ing).

The

not

begin in the middLe wag. Nor do theg, except in speciaL, rather

theg

uLtimate:

takes

famiLiar,

the presence of water and carbon, aLso caLLs for expLanation; but that

as

quest

the

charge

it

Take

ang

can be expLained simpig bg

misrepresents

worLd-sgnthesis

There is more to it than this. There is a cruciaL argumentative Linkage

aLso invoLved, between PF and gross geophgsicaL features

of

the

worLds

(near

factuaL worLd T) which are seLected. Or, put differentig, the seLection does not

take

pLace

on

basis

the

of

PF,

but (mereLg) under the constraint of gross

geophgsicaL features; accordingLg if the argumentative Linkage from satisfactorg

status

quo

arguments

worLd-sgnthesis.

is

missing,

PF

is

not

to

be

expLained

through

In short, then, worLd-sgnthesis theorg offers expLanations when

bg

and

then the

expLanations mag varg greatLg in quaLitg depending on the depth of the

phgsicaL

the

framework

is

suitabLg

fLeshed

out

phgsicaL

theorg;

information invoLved in the argumentative Linkage.

EssentiaLLg

the

same points undermine Forrest's further objection to such

-2?-

many-worLds explanation,
truths;

contingent

have

we

aLL

do

to

coaches

easiLy

as

the

pumpkins

of

turning

numericsL coincidences. But there is no such free

as

seLection of phusicaL worLds - which do not incLude worLds vaLidating

magicaL

as

faiL,

can

schema

connecting

arbitrary

and practices. Status quo expianations may not be easy

transformations

at aLL, but physicaLLy comp Lex, they are not atways and
they

as

is to posit suitabLy many and varied

(p.9). Thus the theory is aLLeged to expLain

worLds
into

that it "expLains" contingent faLsehoods as easiiy

an

when

assumption

invoLved

easiLy

avaiLabte,

and

the eLaboration of the

in

, and the argumentative schema issues in a contingent

faiLs

faLsehood. For a necessary condition that a status quo expianation be successfuL
is that the argument be correct; but then given that the argument form is vaiid,

the cone Lus ion cannot be simpiy f aLse.

is

It

that

satisfactory

expianations,
with

conforming to such conditions of adequacy as deductive vaiidity

in

and

quo

status

expianations

winning

in

expianations

differ

from

decisiveLy

design

which are sometimes seen as on an expianatory LeveL

competition

with

status

quo

and

expianations

their

piuraL-worLds setting (thus e.g. LesLie), and sometimes even confused with them.

Design arguments characteristicaLLy take the deductiveLy invaLid abductive modus
toLLens form:
Things are (surprisingLy) so and so

F

If a design hypothesis heLd (e.g. the universe
anticipated observers, a design-force

operated), things woutd be (unsurprisingLy)
so and so.

If H then F

Therefore, a design hypothesis (probabLy) hoLds.

.. H

Nor

in

design

arguments

is

the

connecting

schema

normaLLy

eLaborated by

appropriate scientific argument; nor, where God is invoked, i§; there any way

of

suitabLy confining the argument scientificaLLy.

Thus
support

first

the

LesLie's

of

Larger

cLaims is faLse:-

the LiorLd EnsembLe hypothesis rather than the God hypothesis. !^e do not

have...strong evidence of an EnsembLe' (LI, p.150).
for

Science does not

their

existence

No branch of physics

in a way commanding wide acceptance

(LI, p.S3). The main

reason is that the Bod hypothesis is not part of a physicaL theory
that

many-worLd

theory

is

caLLs

in

the

way

of quantum theory (thus, e.g., there is no physics

text corresponding to DeLiitt and Graham for the God hypothesis), [^hiie the

Last

cLaim is true, it does not teLL against the truth of neutraL many-worLds theory.
Uhat

science

supports

is

science,

not

the

the metaphysics it presupposes.

Physics is not however aLL of science by any means, and even science doesn't

do

everything, onLy a rather narrow seLection of things.

Richard SyLvan

-30-

11

RPPENDIX 1. Some Rncient Rntecedents
The Non-Limited is the originaL materiaL of existing things; further the source]
from which existing things derive their existence is a iso that to which they'
return at their destruction, according to necessity [for reparation]...
—-----

So, in the 6th Century B.C., said Rnaximander, perhaps among the first

aLso

to

set down a story of the evoLution of humankind.Something the same was said in

text, though on the favoured taLe a Heideggerean and Taoist touch was Lent,

the

with Nothingness repLacing the Non-Limited. In the

on

beginning,

there was nothing; and uLtimateLy, too, there wiLL be nothing.
have been paid.

The p3raLLeL with Rnaximander can be pressed further. In
account

origins,

of
of

worLd

the

contemporary

charged pairs of particLes are created in the

oppositeLy

'the

order,

wiLL

Reparation

process of pair formation from the vacuum; white in Rnaximander's story

formation

story,

this

opposites

the

of

which are present Ln the one [the

Non-Limited], are separated out from it' (but 'the "opposites" are the hot,

coLd,

the

dry

the

, the moist, and the rest : see Robinson p.25). There is aLso a

phenomenon which corresponds to some Limited extent to the Big Bang, nameLy
Vortex.

the

It
seems cLear, however, from the materiaL Burnet assembLes,
that
Rnaximander's position amounted to the first Less satisfactory resoiution,

matter

or substance aLways. For the BoundLess or Infinite was a materiaL cause,

-^*-*dstance (p. 5k<); it is

eternaL and ageLess

is brought about the origin of the worids.
did

—

Further,

according

to

SimpLicius,

not ascribe the origin of things to any aLteration of matter, but said

that the oppositions
separated

encompasses aLL worids

substance". RLso there is in it eternaL motion, in which

which makes it a queer

he

and

out .

If

in

that

the

substratum

was

which

a

boundLess

body,

were

is right — and it may not be, especiaLLy given Later

ontotogicaL infLuences (cf. p.61) - then the matter is cLear.

Rnaximander beiieved there were
innumerabLe worids
(p.58). These worids were concurrent, not successive.

coex istent remains uncLear, but Later

in

the

Whether

Bound Less"

they

tradition

(biassed)

took them
exist, making Rnaximander's position a many-existent-wortds theory.
The

to

Law of compensation, under which for borrowing or variation reparation

must be made, becomes the Law of

repayment

aLL

were

of

conservation.

The

reparation

paraLLeLs

the

borrowed" mass-energy. The more generaL steering of aLL things -

overarching order in naturaL processes - becomes the Laws of nature which govern
(reguLate) the processes. 'The orderLiness ... is grounded in the nature of

things as such .
Rnaximander's account

represents

an

immenseLy

-31-

important

stage

in

the

transition

from

world-order

is

myth

from

science.

to

first

to

...

Last

'Hesiod's account of the origin of the

anthropomorphic.

account

Rnaximanders

represents,
in principLe, a complete break with this mode of thought (Robinson
p.27). From this angle the anthropic and idealistic fixes of contemporary
science show marked regression.

That transition, beyond anthropic creation stories, is also accomplished in

the main philosophical essentials of the favoured resolution can

where

Taoism,

be found. Something flowed from nothing, in a seemingly paradoxical way? but not
through ang creation or agency. There was

a

the

before

time

when

beginning

nothing at aLL existed. The problem of Laws (of nature) was also recognised, and
resolved.

did

Laws

not

exist (independently at least of things that did) but

were exhibited in in things that did exist. So it seems to follow that,
stage

at

restricted

property

to

duty

what

separated,

and

was

mainly

Lacking

ascriptions
Taoism

Such

nothing.

a

and

deep

in cosmogonic tales, then, from the ^.th C. B.C.

until the 20th C., was a plausible explanatory story as to how

come from
together.

of

does exist. (Fuller details of Taoist

cosmology, under this type of interpretation, are ventured in
ecology', written with D. Bennett.)

Mhat

the

which nothing existed, the taws could hold without having 3ny sort of

existence, i.e. truth and existence were

existence

at

story

a

few

something

could

humans are Just beginning to piece

NOTES

Thi^ passage from Misner, Thorne and Uheeter, p.1212, is given an appropriately
grander setting Ln the text. The passage Ls also quoted by DavLes, G p.222, who
Lt to Wheeler. In Davies the idea of

ascribes

foundations

for

cosmology

simple and unassailable Logical

is given a different exposure, and is then linked

with restrictions, to zero, on God s range of choice of universe to make.

2
Especially by those whose inquisitiveness and sense

of

blunted or destroyed by the mainstream culture and its

wonder

h3s

educational

not

been

practices,

practices much mainstream philosophy reinforces and tries to justify.
3

Indolent philosophers tend to assign those of these questions that they

write

off

(e.g.

as

semantically

defective

or

as

betraying philosophical

uonfuslon or hang—upz?) to science. But they are not Just a matter for

and scientists tend to come up with philosophically loaded,
naive,

theories

scientists remain,

insofar

as

they

address

the

cannot

questions

and

at

often

science;
enough

all. Too many

Like too many RustraLian phiLosophers, in the grips of awfuL

metaphysics, such as narrow empiricism and/or physicaiism.

-32-

^The

anaLysis

semantical

It

of

naturaL

a

is

Law

is

that'

Law-constrained worLds, naturaL worids. The interpretation ruLe
for necessity.

Terra,

appLy

but

to

Like

is

It shouLd be noted that geophysicaL features, appLied in seLecting

worLds, are not of course confined to
systems.

in terns of

geophysicaL

pLanetary

other

"Rn eLaboration of this type of answer can be further expLoited to heLp
why

actuaL

the

standard

ot

worLd

is

science

expLain

comparativeLy

so

that

simpLe,

mathematicaLLy tractabLe, etc. HameLy, it is convenientLy so because the actuaL
worLd

seLection

invoLved

impLicitLy

to render it so, by choice of a

serves

worLd with the compLexity of richer worLds removed and onLy tractabLe ideaL
etements (such as scientific universaLs) adjoined.

&RLtern3tiveLy,

through

quantum

and

borrowing

positive

feedback, a massive

firebaLL forms. The story admits of much variation.

?

The prob Lems, as the questions of the Lattice in diagram 2 indicate,

what

expLaining
phiLosophers

does

exist,

Lie

with

what does not. In a reLated way, 3LL those

not

papers on the prob Lems

nonexistence

of

and

nonexistents

have

misjudged the prob Lernatic, and misconceived the onus of proof. For commonLy the
probLems concern existents and their behaviour; nonexistents, especiaLLy

those

functioning in expLanatory rotes as regards existentiai

often

behaviour,

are

very weLL behaved by comparison with existents.

It has been suggested, by D. Lewis, that the underLying theory of items (of JB)
renders

everything

exists.

But

it

nonexistent,

is

and

makes

it

3 reaL probLem, how anything

patentiy faLse that the theory of items render everything

nonexistent. There are criteria for existence, which are often
JB, chapter 9). Every thing nominaLists normaLLy take to

satisfied

(cf.

exist

satisfies the
to be justified; it cannot (with any
pretension to satisfactoriness) just be cLaimed, in the fashion of so many
phiLosophers. In any case, Lewis can be simuLated: whatever ind iv idua Ls exist

criteria.

Beyond

that

existence

has

in Lewis worLds wiLL exist in worids-seLection theory.

Rnd

it

is. a

genuine

phiLosophicaL probLem how anything exists.
g
in 19t+6; see his cosmoLogicaL text. Llhitrow aLso appLied, more than

RpparentLy

a quarter of a century ago,
PrincipLe

,

in

his

what

has

now

been

eLevated

to

the

Rnthropic

answer to why the dimensions of space are three; nameLy,

th3t this atone permits the evoLution of Nan, the formuiator of the probLem'.
However
'Uhitrow's reasons concern not mankind but stabLe pLanetary orbits and

compLex neurai networks' (LI, p.!^).
g

Compare the binding energy which keeps etectrons

bound

to

a

nucLeus,

where

correiativeiy energy stored up in overcoming forces of repuLsion is positive.

-33-

e

a story couLd be totd to bring Laws within the expLanation framework.

However

It

wouid

teLLing

invoLve

Laws first evoLved or happened to hoLd,

the

how

before vacuum fLuctuations. (For some interesting specuLation, from which

the

ontic and anthropic commitment can be removed without totaL Loss, see Barrow
pp. 151-2, where "chaotic gauge theory" is considered.) The issue of uLtimate
is

expLanation

again

up

taken

seLf-justifying postulate as serving
refLexive,

expLanation.

Note

that

in

UQ,

to

the

resoLve

the

matter

the

especiaLLy

of

probLem

uLtimate,

PostuLate

Characterisation

a

of

of

object-theory is an initiaLLy promising candidate for such a principte.

issue is that, on the story as toLd, quantum phenomena assume

Another serious
decidedLy

they

course

Of

macro-dimensions.

may,

Schrodinger s cat iLLustrates, but perhaps not in

the

parabLe

the

as

supposed

of

catastrophic

form. In the absence of any approved quantization of general, reLativity, there

onLy

are

Lax

physicaL controis on what is in and what is out in specuLation

here. Rnd, of course, the second story couid

There are other mechanisms for the sudden

be

rise

in

eLaborsted

other

ways.

e.g.

white

mass-energy,

of

ho Les in geometrodynamics.

In

his second paper, Tryon makes a rather casuaL beginning on meeting some of

difficuLties

the

with

the

vacuum

fLuctuation

theory

the cosmos, and

of

expLains the advantages of combining the theory with that of a (stiLL
probLematic) "infLationary" universe, to boost the fLuctuation. But the theory
stiLL awaits aporopriateLy detaiLed deveiopment and modeLLing.
12

There are various

other

issues concerning the physicaL constants, incLuding

the question of the (sLow) evoLution of "constants" over time. LJeLL,

do

evoLve,

the

they

if

same sort of probLems arise for the parameters which repLace

them (L.e. at each time t, for c(t)).

There

are

putative

arguments

to the effect that there can be no very grand

unified theory, and no finaL eLimination of constants, because any such theory
wouid

do too much in determ in ing the worLd (and things). But it is unctear at

present how such an argument gets duty eLaborated. R tight

argument

uneLiminabiLity of some physicaL constants from physicaL principLes

for

the

wouLd

be

of much interest.

13

Th',s is what is reaLLy accompLLshed in Carter. To some extent we have emerging
in this area a contemporary scientific numeroLogy.

1L

Convergence

arguments,

e.g.

for

such

things

as the Church-Turing thesis,

underLying connections, but not co-operation.

l^Even Less, seemingLy, is the universe an accident,

'an event

proceeding

from

an unknown cause; something unexpected; a casuaLty, a mishap,
l&If however the worLd reaLLy were necessary, such improbabiLity must be grossLy

-34-

reduced. How can that be: how can these contingencies be not what theg seem?

1?

How M3ng worLds? ContinuousLg mang worLds? There is no reason whg not. But the
answer is: as mang at Least as required. In object-theorg numbers don t

short

matter

though

much,

so

difficuLties

technccaL

controL

Ls

advantage.

an

are

There

as to measures, e.g. of fewness, in infinite modeLLings. Yet the

notions are Ln order, e.g. among the naturaL numbers primes are few.

18

point,

ThL^,

and

the

inestimabLLitg

specific

of

probabLLLties

Ln

(e.g.

Ls argued, though in insufficient detaiL, bg TouLmLn among others

meteoroLogg)

Bg the wag, sureLg a creator wouLd have increased probabLLitLes bg seeing to a
unLverse

for

fit

decent habitation; a variation upon the argument from evLL

infiltrates itseLf Ln probabiLitg guise here.

13

worked

There are in fact mang proposed soLutions, most of them not

theg

(because

far

verg

out

have onLg few proponents), most of them not comprehensive

certainLg (but it couLd be argued that this is a faLse ideaL), severaL of them

discussed bg Everett, DeMLtt, Lande and others.

20

MheeLer s

sequentiaL

modeL

another, so satisfgLng the
theorg

(Like

certain

offers

a simitar range of worLds, but one after

'reaLLtg principLe". EarLLer MheeLer had adopted

cosmoLogies)

Eastern

with

in

muLtLpLLcitg

a

both

sequent La LLg and Lnto the possibLe; but recent Lg he has abandoned

dimen^Lon^,,

the Latter, partig on erroneous ontoLogLcaL grounds.

21

It Ls of course not the onLg reaLLstLc-stgie LnterpretatLon whLch

does

thLs:

envisage

everu

Lande s LnterpretatLon is another.

22

From a neutraL viewpoint, Lt ts entLreLg taLse that

atom

...

as

Me

must

constantLg engaging in this tgpe of scattering sctLvitg, therebg

spLLtting the worLd again and again Lnto a stupendous number

carbon-copLes

of

of LtseLf. The unLverse must therefore be LLkened to a tree, whLch branches 3nd
(D p.I25). Nor Ls

rebranches
universe.

23

To

anticipate,

schemas

of

what

the

form,

happens
"if

the

tree-structured

sgstern

of

universes

the

is as foLLows:- The antecedents of "anthropic"

there

exist so and so [e.g. observers] then ang

phgsLcaL worLds must be such and such", are appLLed to

phgsLcaL worLds. Rs there certainLg do exist so and so,

narrow

ctass

the

phgsLcaL

worLds

of

are

restricted to those that are such and such.

gL

It

cs

stLLL

reasonabLe to 3sk whg - indeed to

e.g. whg do we inhabit it?, whence a

Long

pose' severaL whg questions,

evoLutionarg

storg.

Mhg

are

the

constants those theg are?, then aLternative answers, LncLudLng brute fact, are
among the possibiLities.

-35-

roundLg defeated
Shapiro.

26

bg

the

sorts

considerations advanced bg Feinberg and

of

Davies aLso suggests that mang-worLds theorg can provide a pLausibLe phgsicaL
(as opposed to phiLosophicaL) justification for the strong principte (D p.122

middLe). In fact he never reaLLg shows this satisfactoriig (nor can it

be

so

shown), and in pointing to the power of the m3ng—universe theorg he undermines
the strong principte, showing it otiose.

2?

arguments are presented in modat form, with the connecting

quo

status

Often

scheme set in either necessitated form, if F

that)

(e.g.

T

if

exist

there

necessaritg

then

(it

if

possibLe

modaLities are de dicto

and

and

that

invoLved

cLaims

the

It

such).

if F then T. The modaLitg invoLved is not one of LogicaL
contingent

nomic

of
that

strength,

but

can

be

adequateLg

NecessariLg,

necessitg,

an

The

error.

argument

guarantee the concLusion, NecessariLg T, nor does it pretend

form

these

or

even

in Lowest common denominator form. To attach the (reLative)

modaLitg simpig to consequent T wouLd be

second

is

'it is more than mereLg

rather

reads

that

seems

represented, as usuaL, through a necessitated connecting schema,

one

F

form,

(e.g. what is the case LocaLLg (what observers observe,

T

etc.) is onLg possibLe if phgsics is such

aLwags

be

and so, then the universe must have, or

so

conform to, such and such features), or, in quasi-transcendentaL

onLg

must

to

do

does

not

so.

The

is a LittLe more probLematic; but it appears to assert that F is

inconsistent with not-T, and so, through obvious connections, the same as the
rectified first form.

28

Mhat we have are

devices,

that

fragments

of

theories,

ruLes

thumb,

of

appear to work in a range of cases.

and caLcuLating

It is these parts that mag

generate successfuL technoiogg. The picture is Like engineering.

29

R main charge made bg LesLie against mang-worid cosmoLogies, e.g. LI, p.l^Sff.

It

is

a

surprising

turn,

given

the

popuLaritg

of hgpothetico-deductive

methodoLogg, to have it aLso objected that mang-worLd theorg voids

induction.

Putting chance in controL of inter-worLd differences erodes confidence in our
sampLe of ReaLitg, on which our inductions are based' (LI, p.1^.3).

this objection gets off the ground (it is

transparentLg

Insofar

cLear

as

that

it

does), it depends on assuming the reaLitg of the entire worLd ensembLe. So

Lt

not

Lapses against a neutraL theorg.

30

R reLated phitosophicaLLg important exampLe where the schema does so far
is

in Moore s proof of an externaL worLd, noted above. The reason is that the

existence of arbitrarg materiaL objects, such as hands or

does

f3it

not

guarantee

that

the

requirements

(order,

isoLated
unitg,

cabbages,
coherence,

mcnd-cndependence, etc.) for an externaL worLd are satisfied.

31

Rn earLier version of this paper was presented at the RustraLasian Rssociation
of

PhiLosophg

Conference,

Rugust

138^.

The

-36-

heLpfuL

comments

bg

David

Rrmstrong, Brian Ellis and David Lewis, unreferenced above, were
the

discussion.

commentaries;

Both

several

made

during

John Leslie and Jack Smart supplied me with worthwhile

their points have been incorporated, but some have

of

been resisted. The initial
Univerity preprint series.

version W3S published in an Rustralian National

32^
See Freeman, p.IS. for fuller discussion of
need for reparation, see Burnet.

Rnaximander's

on

position;

the

REFERENCES
J.D.

Barrow,

Rnthropic

definitions',

Quarterly

Journal

of

Royal

the

Rstroncmical Society 21^ ( 1983) lt+6-153

H. Bondi, Cosmology, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, I960.

R,

Brout, F. Englert and F. Gunzig, The creation of the universe as a quantum
phenomenon' RnnaIs of Physics 115 (1978) 78-106.

J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, Fourth edition, Rdam & Charles Black, London,
1930.
B. Carter, Large number coincidence and the anthropcc principle is
in Longair, 291-98.
B.

Carter,

The

anthropic

principle

and

its

implications

cosmology',

biological

for

evolution ,
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London
(1983) St* 7-363.
C.B. Collins and S.U. Hawk eng,

Uhy is the universe

isotrophic?',

19310

Rstrophqsics

Journal 180 (1973) 317.
C.D. Darlington, Darwin's Place in History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1959.

P. Davies, The Rccidental Universe, Cambridge Universitu Press, Cambridge, 1982;
referred to as D.

P. Davies, God and the New Physics, Dent, London,1983;
B.S. DeUitt

referred to as G.

and N. Graham, The Many-Uorlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,

Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1973.
R.H.

Dicke and P.J.E. Peebles,
in S.U.

Hawking

and

U.

The big bang cosmology - enigmas and nostrums ,
Israel,

eds,

Genera 1

relativity:

an

Einstein

centenary survey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 501^-517.

-37-

G.F.R.

ELLis,

'is the universe expanding?', GeneraL Reiativitg and Gravitation

9(2) (L973) 87-9L.
G. Feinberg and R. Shapiro, Life Beyond Earth, Morrow, New York, 1980.

P. Feyerabend, Science Ln a Free Society, New Left Books, London, 1978.

'RnthropLc answers and the existence of

P. Forrest,

Proceedings

God',

of

the

Russet Lan Society, University of Sydney, 7 (1982) 1-13.

K. Freeman, RncLLLa to the Pre-Socratic Phitosophers, BLackweLL, Oxford, 1971.

N. Griffin and R. SyLvan, Provisionai Rnswers to ULtimate Questions, typescript,
Canberra, 1981}.; referred to as UQ.
S.

Hawking

and

G.F. ELiis, The Large-Scaie Structure of Space-time, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, 1973.

M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, (trans. R. Mannheim), YaLe University
Press, New Haven, 1959.

C.G. HempeL, Rspects of Scientific Exp LanatLon, Free Press, New York, 1965.

Lande,

The Laws behLnd the quantum Laws , BrLtLsh JournaL for the PhiLosophu

of Science 27 (1976) 27-^3.

J. L^sLLe,

RnthropLc prLncLpLe, worLd ensembLe, desLgn , RmerLcan PhLLosophLcaL

QuarterLy, 19 (1982) l^l-lSl; referred to as LI.
J. LesLLe,

Cosmo Logy, probabLLity and the need to exp La Ln LLfe', Ln

ScLentLfLc

ExpLanatLon and UnderstandLng (ed. N. Rescher), UnLversLty Press of RmerLea,
MaryLand,

M.S. LongaLr

1983, 53-82; referred to as L2.

(ed.),

Confrontat Lon of Cosmo Log LeaL Theories wLth ObsservatLonaL

Data, ReLdeL, Dordrecht, 1971}..
C.U. MLsner, K.S. Thorne and J.R. UheeLer, GravLtatLon, Freeman, San
1973.

G.E. Moore, PhLLosophLcaL Papers, RLLen and UnwLn, London,

FrancLsco,

1959.

R. RobLnson, Essays Ln Greek PhLLosophg, CLarendon Press, Oxford, 1969.

R. RoutLey, ExpLorLng MeLnong's JungLe and Beyond,

Research

SchooL

ScLences, RustraLLan NatLonaL UnLversity, 1980; referred to as JB.

-38-

of

SociaL

Sagan

Broca's Brain: Ref Leet ions on the Romance of Science, New York, Random
House, 1973.

S.Tou Lm in,

The

Return

to

CosmoLogy:

Postmodern

Nature, University of CaLifornia Press, BerkeLey

Ca., 1982.

Is the universe a vacuum fLuctuation?', Nature 2^6 (1973) 396-7

E.P. Tryon,
E.P. Tryon,

Science and the Theo Logy of

*Mhat made the worLd?', New Scientist 101 (198!+) It+00, 1!+-16

FLN. Mhitehead, Process and ReaLity, Cambridge University Press, 1929.

6.H. Uhitrow,

The Structure and Evo Lution of the Universe,

Harper, New York, 1959.

Second

edition,