Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism

Title

Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism

Subject

Computer printout (photocopy), with emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030.

Description

Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680.

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Source

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 680

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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.

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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.

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[27] leaves. 12.83 MB.

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Manuscript

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Como - Cupboard - Pile 3

Text

ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL INSENSITIVITY

OF PACIFISM

Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement
A
respectable

philooophieg-1 press.

another,

the

within

tradition

Catholic

church ,

It is commonly portrayed

characteristically

as

as

inconsistent.

as

a

continues to have a bad

incoherent

in

one

way

or

Even philosophical defences of

pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that
consistent,

and

pacifism

is

but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be

2
and morally insensitive .

What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out

in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods.

§1.

Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and

from rights.

In an influential and widely

disseminated

series

of

articles

attacking

.
pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's
position is

not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
better characterised by

P2.

be

A

It is morally wrong to use violence.

However T2 captures the cases that

orthodox

opposition.

The

separate

comprehensive

pacifism

from

the

main form of pacifism under investigation is called

'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual

1

narrower

sense

which

is

restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably

opposition to (violence in) war, and does

not

rule

necessarily

out

violence

elsewhere.

Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected

slides,

all

of

which the pacifist should resist - without force.

The initial

slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion

the

of

crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely
R2.

It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -

and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of

R2 (e.g.

from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,

forbidden

It is

cases

to

violence).

resist

The

slide

is

illegitimate

because

commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;

for

one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,

worked

out

by

pacifists

and others, which do not involve use of violence (or

perhaps force).

The initial slide is however that
assault

on

pacifism

(after

clearing

Narveson
several

exploits

confusions,

explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).

irresponsibility

of

pacifism,

in

This

his

first

main

which he takes to

argument,

from

the

does not actually lead to contradiction, but it

does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
...
It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ...
It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals,
that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on

2

of

this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back

violence),

(with

pacifism

unless a slide is made.

(tentatively)

by

Nor

does

T1

and

theses

does

without

fighting

not mean what Narveson claims it means,

comprehensive .pacifism,
T2 , imply

that

we

as

characterised

have no right to punish

criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods.

Nor

does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice

therefore

is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is.

One

hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter.

All

this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that

far

at

there

is,

so

least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that

violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken.

The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial

slide.

The

stunt

is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the

connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to
with

violence.

Thus

from among admissible pacifist methods.

of force is taken to by implied in R2.

resist

cannot

excluded

be

Hence the conflation of T2 and R2;
Hence too Narveson’s assumption
Hence

(p.415).

also

Narveson’s

that

against attack' (pp.417-8).

use
a

unwarranted

"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever

defended

equate

such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and

defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to

pacifist

the

to

be

If the stunt were got away with, it would

deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action

and

defensible position.

But

resistance,

and

so

render

pacifism

a

much

less

positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,

3

without

violence.

Things

be

can

resisted,

even

things like arrest, without violence (e.g.

sliding out of handcuffs and running away).

by

Force can be applied, as in opening

Violence implies force, but not vice versa;

and

it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists

are

a

jam

jar, without violence.

bound to exclude.

The attempt
nonviolent

castrate

to

depriving

It enjoys some popularity even

any case indefensible.

and

by

it

of

among

those

of

advocating

expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance

themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as

confined

to

mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions .

compromise,

But nothing in
standard,

range

the

is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in

practices,

development

pacifism,

so

the

characterisation

its

limits

of

pacifism,

admissible methods:

whether

comprehensive

or

nothing exclude^ uncompromising

methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ?

It

is

simply

that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in

conflict resolution.

Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against
just

variations

qualifier.

in

those

pacifism

are

given, writing violence-involving in as an internal

Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in

terms

of

’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat

perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist’s

’opposition

to

violence'.

If

this

slide

were

pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in

case

of

the

permissible any
being

opposed

to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed

Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though

to violence.

it

not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make

is

much of in his main inconsistency argument.

A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument

based

inconsistency

the

on

to

notion of rights, especially as it figures in the

pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge

in

violence

(p.418).

Narveson

violence in the notion of right.

tries

to incorporate the right to indulge in

The initial move is to work in assumptions

of

defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement
Because ’a right just is a status

of it.

preventative

action

...

does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary

what
to

justifying

prevent

necessary’

infringements

of

right'

his

(p.419).

That

'whatever

may

be

out to include force, now very generously construed - here is

turns

the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure.

Moreover ’it

is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is
force’ (p.421).

of

preventative

For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion
action

must

have

the notion of violence built into it.

argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism.

it

enough

is

for

preventative

To block the

The

argument

action associated with rights to be, or to be

limited to, nonviolent action.

How the argument from rights leads

to

inconsistency

is

summed

up

thus

(p.421):

SAI.

’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent

the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’.

SA2.

We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to

us’,

as

have

the

a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence.
right

self-contradictory,

to

use

both

violence,

granting

so

the

pacifist’s

position

Narveson

is

that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.

right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending

require that that action is violent.

is

and not granting the right to use violence.

The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming

But, therefore, we

mistaken

p.423).
action

in

That a

does

not

Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis

of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by
6
simply rejecting the Narveson slide .

What appears in place of SAI is something

like
SAI#.

If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.

But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,

give

facto,

an entitlement to the use of violence.

no dilemma for the pacifist.

does

not,

ipso

Without the slide there is

The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson’s slide

are

two aspects of the one thing.

The arguments from lesser

§2.

argument

violence

and

evil.

lesser

In

outline

the

- which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists

must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use
of

violence

those

where

Inconsistency

would be morally permissible and morally justified.

some
is

use

of

immediate

violence
by

T2.

would

prevent

evil,

some

greater

violence.

More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms

which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser

much

The cases are

to

admit

both

that

the

use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and

that it is not admissible, because it involves violence.

6

Narveson summarizes an

argument like this as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI]
the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater.
If the use of force
by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by
others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme
(kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am
committed to the use of physical force'7.

Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches,
p
It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the
ethical role pacifism can assume is to result.

lesser

The basic argument, from

violence, goes as follows
Cl.

There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.

C2.

One ought to minimize violence.

Therefore
C3.

There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in

any

arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized.
Therefore

~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,

contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,

according

which

to

it

is

morally

wrong, always, to resort to violence.

All the ingredients
premisses,

can

be

of

argument,

this

together

with

pulled together from Narveson’s work.

support

for

He not only expouses

C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects

argument with the lesser evil argument
El.

(Use of) violence is an evil.

E2.

Evil should be minimized.

9

The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,

7

the

the

E3.

One ought not to undertake violence

-

period;

that

the

is,

level

of

violence ought to be zero.
Neither argument is decisive;
of

that

reference

both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a

should

they

resist, where moral absolutes are warped into

moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations

all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible

being

does

it.

into

got

has

E3

is

directives quite different from minimization where violence is

with

involved, e.g.

E3

things

other

In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at

equal, etc.

Thus

frame

rooting it out which may

involve

strategies.

non-minimization

not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to

C2.

Nor do El and E2 entail C2;

so neither does commitment, by

to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.

instance,

10

,

e.g.

evil-perpetrating

but

argument

Narveson's

well-known

Such

nonviolent

fails

for

similar

some
as

cases

hypothetical
dictators.

for

For in particular violence is

not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
violence

pacifists

Regan’s

increases

in

slaying

of

the

reconstruction

of

Regan argues from premisses

reasons.

concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically
3.
4.

The use of force is a substantive evil.
Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must
great quantity of force (Rp.79).

The argument is invalid:
ordering

of

an

ordering

of

evils

force, even though force is an evil.

increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on

be preferrable \

8

does

be

preferred

not

induce

to

a

a

similar

It is enough to observe that

Regan-Narveson

assumptions,

Resort to the theme that

Elt,

Violence is an irredeemable evil

in

(proposed by Regan

by

investigated

his

Narveson,

Np.118)

irredeemable evil is figuratively

(lesser

or

evils)

whites

pacifism,

of

"defence"

promises

so

black

Rp.80,

and

subsequently

a way around the difficulty.
that

no

combination

(goods) will lighten its hue;

with

An

grays

it always dominates.

Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts

to

What are the grounds for that?

Elt.

not widely acceptable, most people being

amount

of

As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is
prepared

to

countenance

violence in exchange for considerable goods.

some

(But then, not so long

ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was
gross.)

small

/not

too

Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out

of the argument from lesser violence;

underwriting C2.

indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by

for it removes Cl and, more importantly,

It does not however;

the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which

starts from
DI.

There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.

For given, by Elt, that use of
greater

evil

than

that

cases such as DI requires.
Rp.80ff.),

which

however

violence

is

irredeemably

with violence;

tainted

evil,

there

is

no

and there are accordingly no

This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see
he

sees

as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and

vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the
12

which he outlines

9

features

of

The approach through

violence

as

an

irredeemable

evil

is

mistaken

a

(utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism
is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon.

But such

absolutes

expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence,

adequately

meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so

as

reasons

prima

are

facie,

otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or

acting

for

ought

but

long

come

not

what

may,

period.

old-fashioned

Such

deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide

head-on

with

utilitarianism

both

that

pacifism'.

For

the

moral

’utilitarianism

'that

utility

will

be

...

who

is

incompatible

brought out by doing some

violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative'
he

like

positions

and Regan (at the time) were working from.

Narveson

The reason for collision is simply that
with

malleable

highly

fashionable,

more

(Np.121)

13

.

So

acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may

acts

sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.

On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows

little:

position

every

suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines.

Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is

at

odds

with

contractarianism.
correct,

if

other

the

the

ethical

positions

he

presents, libertarianism and

But this argument would only carry weight, were it.
positions

were

suitably

exhaustive;

including no deeper ecological position for instance.
is

more

also

otherwise

however they are not,

What has

happened

which

insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of

the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to

incompatible

ethical

positions

such as pacifism.

10

There are two more specific

features.

damaging

consequentalist

Firstly,

as

more

approaches

have

we

of

consequentialist
Secondly,

facie

prima

principles

positions

out

utilitarianism,

of

This is entirely

mistaken.

The

is a theory-saving device, designed to get
difficulties

such

dilemmas.

moral

as

consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist

reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such

pacifism,

and

generally, have made it seem as if no deontic

principle were firm, but all are provisional.
theory

seen,

into

as

sometimes incongruous consequential support for their

offering

themes.

Narveson takes such procedures a

assumptions

upon

violence is that it
These

(p.425).

thus

pacifists:

produces

stage

further,

and

foists

utilitarian

says that the pacifist's 'objection to

he

suffering,

unwanted

pain,

in

the

recipients'

incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of

pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the

action

involved

and

what

it

does,

not

astonishing

such

of

only or always at all in the way of

suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is
more

type

inflicted.

Even

utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit

the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he

must

deny

(!):
[N]l.

To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at
least pjotTce prima facie).

[N]2.

Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the greater.

[N]3.

There are no "privileged" moral persons ...

(p.425^ ' .

'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the

problem',

11

pacifist's

among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force
when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception
of a right as an entitlement to defense.
And they therefore leave
pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position
(p.425).

consequences

out

of

the

substantive terms such as

implicans;

otherwise

but

logic,

It would take not merely

statements

’violence’

the

deal

good

a

of

magic,

coax

to

given.
For implications to hold the
, /''I
<</<<-</ ,■/"
<
F^
and
’right’ must also figure , in the

just

fail

implications

on

formal

grounds.

intended argument to the "commitment to force” conclusion appears however to
some

for
e.g.

The
be

of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it

sort

may C2.

such

(N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop

exceptions

being

made

oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import,

in

as reflected in Cl,

construction

work

the

ethical

an

end).

But,

without

need not worry pacifists;

arguments

much

further

they hardly leave

pacifism as untenable.

Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be
This

countered.

is

argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater

the

evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence)
inconsistency

in

comprehensive

stock examples concern murder,

What are these cases^?

pacifism.

one

of

them

being

the

Narveson’s

situation

where

(Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).

is the moral situation here?

Narveson ought to prevent

but

mass-murder,

that

of

a

paradigmatic

moral

In fact the example is

dilemma,

that

of

very

similar

also
The

to

Pedro and Jim, where Pedro

volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives

12

one

But what

Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
situation is that of a moral dilemma.

and

if

Jim

one

shoots

Now almost everything turns on what account is given of

What a comprehensive pacifist does

moral dilemmas.

trouble,

coherence

.

of them

is

to

take

do,

not

inadequate utilitarian line of trying to

the

explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur
an

than

initial

intuitive

negotiable, etc., etc.
is

as

level),

wants

he

unless

if

(at

at

least

other

all obligations were prime facie,

The conflicting obligations stand.

What is to

done

be

however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to

do in the circumstances.

action

In trying to determine what

circumstances

is

a

satisfied.

violent

sense

this

the

best

e.g.

Narveson

had

better

a

fix.

Narveson

dilemma,

but

no

B.

shoot

(not a deontic one) evil should be minimized;

not

ought

circumstances, he had better do so
moral

of

17

.

to

the

in

course

Granted, it is preferable to minimize

follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence.
remains

course

best

that

Suppose

one,

inconsistency in pacifism follows.
in

the

principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize

evil, will presumably be

and

is

evil,

it does not

On the contrary the situation

shoot

B,

but

in

the

appalling

There is the real-life complication of

inconsistency

No

a

through arguments like that from lesser

evil.

Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion

from rights, can now be met.

of

the

argument

The question presents a dilemma:

If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
use justified in that case? (p.420)

is

its

Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one
is to be raped.

qualified No:

Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is
No, it is not

deontically

13

justified

18

.

It

is

certainly

not

morally

it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which

and

obligatory,

reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*.

may

and

because

just
some

might

force

in

solution,

a

making

to

amount

dilemma

be

out

But justification is

The response is qualified then

a case.

consequentially

situation.

ambiguous,

as

justified,

a

second-best

Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that

enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least

as

as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking

far

his proposal as evident.
jackpot

the

question

As it is not - the pacifist can simply
does

not

dispute

it

to a decisive a^rument against pacifism

lead

(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423).

What

it

can

lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
The charge of moral insensitivity.

§3.

This

is

less

argument

an

than

a

damaging charge:

A person committed to an extreme pacifism,
though he need make no
logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the
vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86).

The smear is not without basis.
is

applied

avert

to

greater

Regan is envisaging situations
evil;

where

violence

and he points to what he takes to be the

evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has

free

herself

from

an

Interestingly, Regan has not

aspiring rapist* (Rp.86).

described the situation in a way which is incompatible with

there

is

violence,

which

implies

What is at issue

the

intentional,

non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or

(cf.

a

pacifist

stand:

nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that

involves some force) and fleeing.

using

to

is

(or

death,

the

permissibility

of

infliction

of

wilful)
by

forceful

means /

Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force

And it is by no means so

or power.

violence

inflict

upon

evident

A

rapist.

aspiring

the

the

that

woman

is

entitled

to

can hardly now be

pacifist

accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.

More generally, arguments

pacifism,

the

on

like

Regan’s

the

to

insensitivity

moral

of

basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil
I

occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity.

Narveson

p.425)

(e.g.

Both Regan

and

assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position.

20

This is far from true, as the variety of
nonviolent

action

methods

groups has made plain.

comprehend the real possibilities of

considered

or

adopted

by

Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly

nonviolent

action.

Otherwise,

Narveson

would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that

the pacifist is
Narveson's

standing

negative

later

'not

by

doing

assessment

does not change the situation:

anything

about’

violence

(p.425).

of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence'

for this positive approach is simply nonviolence

practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow

suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the
and

effectiveness

when

assembled

21

,

of nonviolent practices.
much

reduce

the

impact

scope

Fuller details of these practices,

of

the

argument

from

social

irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity.

Pacifism, however, like most positions, has

them

22

its

weaknesses,

one

of

undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter

and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the
amounts

and

of

violence

greater

than

zero.

Yet

scale

with

minute (non-foot-in-the-door )

amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with

15

small

the

that

evils

gross

us

confront

on most sides when we look.

Morally sensitive

pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the

of

exclusion

larger

moral

They

problems.

give

certainly

will

understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2

mean

they

it

undue

to be

'non-trivial

violence'.

§4.

and

The argument from radical political corollaries

The

corollaries.

out war by definition.

so clear.

Although

War

situations?

normally

would

Standard

war

always

would
be

what

excluded,

be

morally

counted

brought

progressively

then

second

dilemma

the

impermissible,
best

but

in

thing

to

closer

to

Comprehensive pacifism can of course

extreme

principles emphasizing the evil of violence.

weighing

of

Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard

A strange pacifism!

pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism.

be

pacifism

But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not

exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-)

do.

awkward

of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war.

practice

For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.

takes

other

from

best

choices

will

pacifism, in

practice, through

If evil is given a suitably

yield

the

large

same results as extreme

A

pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.

Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it
would

eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided

at all reasonable costs;

nor therefore can an

argument
Wz/Acuf

desirability

fHur/l

of war as an institution against pacifism,!

mounted from the
or Cldc.
However wars are by no
be

means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u

violence

extensively.

The

state and many of its institutions, most obviously

police

inadmissibility

of

characteriscally are
contraposition

do.

also

forces,

coercive
23

institutions

and hence

;

pacifism

Comprehensive

it

as

such

implies

police

anarchism

provides no refutation of pacifism..

the

implies

24

moral

forces and states
But

once

again

For anarchism itself is (to

25

stick with a bold claim) irrefutable

Pacifism as an

ideal

brought

not

is

.down by its political corollaries.

Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism.
While

does

it

not

eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to

forbid

animals.

At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence,

animals,

continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by

restriction of the application of violence to humans
little

good

for

however

basis

corollaries naturally

spread

suicide,

capt^al

euthenasia,

(or

such a chauvinistic restriction.
several

into

punishment,

controversial
indeed

There

persons).

is

The radical

moral,

wherever

to

e.g.

areas,

violence

plays a

significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason
/7j Qc4>
for giving it some pause. And there are others.
/

One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to "natural" behaviour

of

creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly
S' X
common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no

means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£

Ao'jje.tjw

enable

ct/ony

Ac

/Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption

/ZeSG-

creatures

offspring) in their

artificial

h

to

be

better

natural

environments

fitted

environment.

substantially

17

developed

to

for survival (of themselves and their
most

humans

removed

from

now

live

situations

in

for

rather
which

there is no way they are

evolution gradually adapted their features:

adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance.

have

substantially

living

their

adjusted

adjust

environment,

along

so

with

^oing

to

Much as humans

should

they

it

their social practices - including aggressive and violent

practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive.

There is a residual problem,

practices

of

living

creatures

like

in

that

confronting
natural

(relatively)

vegetarianism.

conditions, such as

predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they

Sometimes,

violence?

involve

when the violence grossly exceeds what is required

yes,

Though a way can be beaten around the

given the end to be attained; but always?

edge of this problem

Are

26

it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that
<u t be^t
nonviolence is not an absolute but^an ideal. The arguments for nonviolence
which

are

mostly

violence and do not strictly
suggest

a

to

apply

since

it

in

creatures

natural

surroundings

opens

door

the

a

approaches would categorically exclude.

chink

to

other

options

The further suggestion that

emerges is that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are

pretty

primitive

aimed, among
principles

state;

other
than

P2.

and

what

-

But the suggestion is a dangerous one,

sort of conclusion.

similar

practically at least,
nonviolent

arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of

practical

is

things,

at

sharper,

This

is

to

in

a

called for is much more investigation
more

concede

an

sensitive,

attentuated

and

less

charge

insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains

blanket

of moral

unqualified.

There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should
not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as

predation.

Nothing

logically

rules

18

out

such

a

genuine and more sensitive

pacifism

27

There are other requiriments the position to be worked out should meet.
in

should,

particular, be integrated into a Larger framework of nondestructive

practices, which

are

involve violence, e.g.
a

of

a

practices

metaphorically,

damaging

wild

nonviolent* practices.

are

practices

But,

except

destructive to the environment, for instance, do not

such

river,

with

piece

things

dumping

vandalism.

wastes

toxic

But

mining

strip

as

extended sense, which gets beyond the confines

these

It

of

in

a

valley,

fertile

in streams and oceans.

the

property

In an

picture,

all

even metaphorically, vandalism does not
such

cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence

as

I

"psychological

violence").

What is sought /is an appropriate synthesis of these

notions covering destructive practices - and

better than 'vandolence'.

an

Then P2 is superseded

accompanying synthetic term,
4/Z2°.
It is morally wrong to

use vandolence./ It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices

(/V

that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.

FOOTNOTES

1.

’a valid Christian
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
to
Christ
and the early
long
tradition
going
back
position’, with a
lifestyle:
see Origins
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent
pp.310-311.

2.

Thus, in particular, T. Regan ’A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy
11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by
_

3.

J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Ethics 75 (1968) and ’Is
pacifism consistent’, Ethics 78 (1868). The first article is reprinted in
War and Morality (ed.
R.
Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
T97O7 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Moral Problems (ed.

19

77ju

/

/A
ZAC

A

IZ(M2

J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper .Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page
references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's
theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his
’Violence and war’, Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed
by 'N' are to this article.

4.

Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G.
Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, it is important to distinguish fas Narveson does not in his
earlier work) force from violence; they not equivalent.
/\

5.

Thus, e.g., G.
Sharp in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow
definition of pacifism given in Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter
Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198.

6.

Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4) sees nothing
between (0) defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (1)
nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights’ occur
without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are
a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence.

An account of rights which will serve is that given in R. and V.
Routley
’Human chauvinism and environment ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed.
D. Mannison and others) Research School of Social Sciences, Australian
National University, 1980; see especially p.
Narveson 'Is pacifism inconsistent' Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.

7.

J.

8.

Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling,
that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).

9.

See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119> where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.

10.

An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument for
El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for
lesser violence.

11.

That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation
of
Narveson's argument that can
be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5.
If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a
greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is
to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of
supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying
obligations.

20

12.

Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas.

13.

To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified
in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18.
It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and
that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil,
etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences,
and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose
of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can
be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using
force. This is sceptically-based pacifism.

14.

Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the
claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in
substantive ethical theories.

15.

A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s "reconstruction",
is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions
logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve.

16.

The example was first discussed in B.

17.

This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more
technical detail in R.
Routley and V.
Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the
logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed.
G.
Priest and
others) 1983, to appear.

18.

An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.

19.

Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological
systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here
between live(go al-direct ed")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism
does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists
may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use
bulldozers to destroy habitat.
However sensitive eco-pacifists will not
condone "violent" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment
is different.

20.

The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off
to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components
have been removed

21

the peace movement should be preparing for
B. Martin ’How
See e.g
of
Peace
Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references
Bulletin
war

nuclear
cited therein pp.152-3.

Williams,

//.( Zc (V, /, ( 1
J n l »'

/? o C-, /

/ /'
/\ <. ?

/
< / / i ’'i

*7 z*

//4

’Conflict: of values’.

22.

Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial
violent action.

23.

These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else
because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their
behalf.

24.

In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without
moral basis or legitimacy.
Of course the "state" may have nonviolent
methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement.

25.

See R. Routley and V.
Alternatives, (1982).

26.

As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism.

27.

The position has been called 'pacificism*.

Plumwood 'The irrefutability of

22

anarchism’,

Social

On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world.

Appendix §5.

Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it

does

not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a

sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of,
major

examples

such

as Christ and Gandhi.

And it has to be admitted that the

real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests.

Nowhere is the practice of

nonviolence

than in replacing war \

succeed

usually

been

given

a

dress rehearsal.

defence of a region can vary

convention

observed

is

or

less

likely

to

Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the
2
detail ,

usual violent methods, have been described in some
never

thought

though

they

have

The prospects for success of nonviolent

significantly,

depending

upon

whether

the

war

If the convention Is observed then pacifism

not.

stands reasonable prospects of success.

The difficult cases are where the war convention

unleashed,

perhaps

broken,

is

in massive ways, on noncombatants.

his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of
resistance,

'success ...

may

all

sorts

of

this:

According to Walzer, in
nonviolent

defence

and

This is presumably false.

that

The invaders may give up and depart

reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick

decisive victory, they got homesick.
like

is

attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with

be

war - even if some conventions are flouted.
for

violence

is possible only if the invaders are committed to the

3
war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~).

Success

and

sufficiently

What Walzer no doubt

ruthless

invaders

sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc.

23

means

is

something

in sufficient numbers with
can eventually succeed.

But

sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence.

that

The difference lies in the pattern of events;
is

more

difficult

and

costly

for

if the defence is

invaders

the

to

well-armed

it

with and easier

start

afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-.

Walzer is thinking, however, like many who

jump

to

the

that

conclusion

nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms
of inappropriate examples.

command,

total

in

the

He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state,
way

the

Nazis

were

in Germany, the Jews of Germany
The

providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance".

is

highly misleading.

picture

The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of

all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of

the

bulk

of

the

For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous

population.

occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure.

island

With

such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically

territories

feasible against a largely united and actively resisting

of

impression

in

the

acquiscence (e.g.

resistance

Walzer's

population.

fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled

Wp.332) might have got things

the

wrong

way

around,

the

test

with

4
disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave .

Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put
adequate

way

in

present

state-determined

prepared to risk training its populace

(civil

defence

the police:

is different).

in

to

any

No state would be

circumstances.

full

in

action

nonviolent

techniques

It would then be. all to easy for them to "rout"

civil obedience, for example, could no longer

customary violent means.

24

be

ensured

by

the

FOOTNOTES

The replacement of the state is considered
op.cit.
For example, in Sharp, op.cit.
given there.

See also

in

Routley

Martin,

All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M.
Allen Lane, London, 1977.

and

op.cit.,

Plumwood,

and

82,

references

Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars,

The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak.
It is countered by
Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.

§6.

On the positive case for pacifism.

defensive,

meeting

itself is revealing.
deviations
enough:

a

The argument thus far has been largely

That in

of objections to comprehensive pacifism.

range

Pacifism

is

the

rest

position

from it are what require explanation.

and

state)

(inertial

-The reason for this is simple

violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie

evil,

so

use of it has to be justified.

Positive arguments for pacifdism

position

and

merely

try

supposed to be justified.
violent

opponent:

to

can

advantage

take

of

privileged

dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is

The favourite exception

is

self-defence

against

a

the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation)

is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker
moral bounds.

its

has

overstepped

Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever

he does - as in a dilemma situation.

And since

it

is

at

least

facie

prima

wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it.

An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can

be

adapted

to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong

Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.

self-defence) is still violence

Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge

the

first

premiss,

and

a

dialectic already glimpsed will begin.

None of the
arguments

are

arguments

for

pacifism

are

conclusive,

since

even

where

deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above).

are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones.

26

One of the

Nor

poorer

positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those
of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be

limited,

the

e.g.

that

hope

or

nuclear

selectively and restrictively is an illusion,
(moral)

limits

in

Although

the

chances

overstated.

war

-

of

whatever

they

eXcalation

are

exchanges

Limited

escalation

are

be

used

inevitable.

The

weapons

chemical

is

will

- are bound to be overstepped.

often

real

enough,

and confrontation are possible.

more social arrangements and much more conventional than

the

the

case

is

Wars are much

theory

classical

Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more

allows.
important

things

intervene

(e.g.

pollution

a

crisis

affecting

other

neighbouring states).

The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence.

They

include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and
practical reasons, e.g.

suffering

of modern industrial societies, the broader popular
avoidance

and

anguish

of

support

base

obtained

None of these well-known

types

are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable.

' Cz/

//

Z'1

1

Is Ct' i

L>

) s' *4

/

/

27
— >

A

by

of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as

a more open, less furtive, society.

)

violent

futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting

the

methods,

the cost in pain,

? . z.. z .

of

reason

Collection

Citation

Richard Routley, “Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed March 28, 2024, https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/147.

Output Formats