Box 149, Item 3: War and peace II - on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism
Title
Box 149, Item 3: War and peace II - on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism
Subject
Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; number 9. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy. Published under Richard Sylvan's previous name Richard Routley.
Description
One of two copies in collection. Annotation on cover: Part corrected.
Creator
Source
The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 149, Item 3
Date
1983
Contributor
This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.
Rights
For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
Format
[31] leaves ; 25 cm. 58.71 MB.
Type
Manuscript
Text
Discussion Papers
in environmental phiiosophy
_.
Phitosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
by
R. Routley
Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
Pacifism,
despite
its
limited
revival
through
the
nonviolent
action
1
movement
and
as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues
to have a bad philosophical press.
one
way
or
another,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as inconsistent.
as
incoherent
Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism
is
in
only
that
consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;
from
rights.
an
In
influential
and
and arguments from irresponsibility and
widely
disseminated
set
of articles
3
attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ...
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
be
better characterised by the more sweeping
1.
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.
The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.
2.
In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists'
belief
vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
as
"bizarre
and
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
sense
which
is
narrower
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.
the
But
if
violence
Pacifism, as a
universally and not merely in war.
violence
is impermissible, then it should be so
what
is
out
rule
position,
moral
should
be
comprehensive.
On its own showing, it is contended,
proper
action
to
preventative action
commitment
to
prevent,
what
would
involve,
it
use
in
the
case
Narveson's
or
of
pacifism.
of
incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims
prohibits,
acclaimedly
sometimes,
precluded
from
taking
violence;
But
force.
genuine
actively
defend
on
them,
pain
Hence
the
initial
that it cannot underwrite its
of
inconsistency.
However
location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several
connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.
initial
for
a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action
of a type logically excluded
own
is
pacifism
The
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it
should
be
'to
use
violence',
namely
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970, pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.
2
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
R2.
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
It is
cases
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
to
resist
The
violence).
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
pacifists
by
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
4
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however what
assault
on
pacifism
Narveson
clearing
(after
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
pacifism,
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
of
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
unless
a
slide
(tentatively)
by
is
without
fighting
pacifism
does
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
Nor
does
comprehensive
made.
theses
on
ought,
T1
T2,
and
imply
that
pacifism,
characterised
we have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will
not
apply
violent
methods.
Nor
therefore
does
it
imply
that
all
conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good
4.
deal,
of
that
machinery
is.
One
hardly
the
or
a
needs to be a comprehensive
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
3
pacifist to coherently think the latter.
the
This provides
confirmation
some
for
key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident
in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are
legitimate
morally
are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
stunt
connotation of violence or at least of force which
equate with violence.
use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
cannot
here
resist
Hence
(p.415).
violence,
or
force
and
to
so
Hence
the
against attack' (pp.417-8).
also
Narveson's
and
so
to
a
much
less
can
be
resisted,
But
without
violence.
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
even
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;
and
defensible position.
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
pacifism
render
a
unwarranted
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
resistance,
be
that
assumption
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
to
proceeds
Hence the conflation of T2 and
excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.
pacifist
Narveson
Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,
and defending are taken to imply (use of)
R2;
the
Violence implies
and it is violence, not all applications
of
force,
that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
to
castrate
practices,
any case indefensible.
development
and
themselves
from
compromise,
pacifism,
by
depriving
it
of
the
range
of
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
It enjoys some popularity even
among
those
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance
older
mediation,
pacifism,
whose
methods
they
see
as
confined
to
negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.
The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;
for
pacifism
has
often
by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods
jeen
presented,
(cf.
even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously
4
said
of
pacifism
'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by
that
negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities
added).
and
of
total
doctrine
of
non-resistance
non-cooperation with any form of warfare':
But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether
or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:
to
italics
comprehensive
nothing excludes resistance,
uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.^
It
is
simply
that
comprehensive
pacifism
has
not yet developed its fuller
potential, especially in conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
on
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in
terms
of
'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's
'opposition
to
If
violence'.
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it
is
Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
5.
In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.
But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.
5
A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument
on
based
inconsistency
pacifism theme,
the
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
transformed to the claim
No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).
P2(R).
For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in
notion
The
right.
of
very
initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from
breaches of a right and of
Because
the
against
action
preventative
infringement
'a right just i_s a status justifying preventative action ...
it.
of
what does
follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent
infringements of his right' (p.419).
That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out
to
to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide
such
incorporate
things
as social pressure.
Moreover 'it is a logical truth,
not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For
action must have the notion of violence built into it.
the
against
question
nonviolent
(p.421)!
quite indefensibly strong.
him
To block the argument it is enough for
rights
with
The argument accordingly
to
be,
to
or
be
to,
limited
In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is
action.
entitle
pacifism.
associated
preventative action
not
force
logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative
these
begs
is
necessary
to
For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does
kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if
such action is necessary in the circumstances to
prevent
infringement
his
of
right.
to
How the argument from rights leads
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence
done
to us', as a consequence of the.o&f^e&i^fi to avoid violence.
But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is
self-contradictory,
both
granting
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
Narveson
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
6
is
mistaken
p.423).
in
That a
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
action
does
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by
simply
rejecting
the
Narveson
not
slide^.
What
for
SAI,
appears in place of SAI is
something like
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
SAI#.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
not,
does
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
violence
and
In
evil.
lesser
outline
the
argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must
admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
would
where
those
Inconsistency
be
some
is
morally
use
of
immediate
permissible
violence
by T2.
and morally justified.
would
prevent
evil,
of
The cases are
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
use
to
admit
both
that
the
some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible because it involves violence.
An argument
like
this
as gets summarized as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.
7
supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force .
these
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.
It
is
important
to
them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the
get
ethical place of pacifism
is
to
The
result.
from
argument,
basic
lesser
violence, goes as follows:—
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence,
the
since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
""P2.
indicated,
cases
violence
is
Therefore
It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
to
it
which
is
mora
y
wrong, always, to use violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
this
argument,
together
with
pulled together from Narveson's work.
support
for
the
He not only espouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
the
argument with the lesser evil argument:-
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
is,
the
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
J.
8
9.
Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
8
Neither argument is decisive;
of
reference
that
they
both in fact begin easing pacifists into a
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
should
moral relatives, where obligations give way
to
obligations-other-things-being-
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
frame
got
into
it.
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
has
rooting it out, which may
involve
nonminimization
strategies.
Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to 02
- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to
accept
prepared
violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social
justice.
Nor do El and E2 entail 02;
so neither does
principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
by
commitment
evil-perpetrating
Narveson's
such
e.g.
violence
but
argument
some
increases
well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an
dictator.
non-violent
fails
to
For in particular, violence
is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
in
pacifists
for
similar
reasons.
Regan's
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
4.
Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
be
preferred
to
a
great
an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering
force, even when force is an evil.
of
It is enough to observe that increasing force may
still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.
Resort to the theme that
Elt.
Violence is an irredeemable evil
(proposed by Regan in his "defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and
by
Narveson,
Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.
subsequently
considered
An irredeemable evil is
figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.
9
will lighten its hue;
now
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2,
but
What are the grounds for that?
the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.
As
Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to
countenance
some
small
amount
of violence in exchange for considerable goods.
(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it
was
not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get
gross.)
pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,
It does break the argument however;
underwriting C2.
by
indeed it seems to get
them
in
for it removes Cl
and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument
from
lesser evil, which starts from
DI.
There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil
than that tainted with violence;
requires.
however
pacifism
is
no
of
pacifism
(see
into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous
(utilitarian
through
as
violence
an
irredeemable
evil
which
Rp.80ff.),
position (Rp.86),
extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines
But the approach
greater
and there are accordingly no cases such as DI
This is the core of Regan's defence
converts
there
is
a
.
mistaken
inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,
like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such absolutes are adequately
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons
otherwise
don't
arise,
or
for
acting
other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not
11.
That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss 5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
10
Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,
come what may, period.
such
is
pacifism
as
collide
bottom,
at
more fashionable, highly
with
head-on
malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at
time) were working from.
The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...
for the utility 'that will be brought out
is incompatible with pacifism':
some
one who acts
by
may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)
violence
the
according
to
the
to
utilitarian-commandment
maximize
doing
13
So
.
utility
may
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false
little:
position
every
doctrine
inconsistency
suffers
such
with
very
many
false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism
odds
the
with
contractarianism.
correct,
other
ethical
positions
But this argument would
only
position
insidious,
is
however,
for
have
Firstly, as we
generally,
have
provisional.
theory-saving
seen,
made
also
libertarianism
were
it
at
and
otherwise
however they are not, including
has
which
happened
is
more
it
utilitarianism,
seem
as
climate
unfavourable
to
incompatible
There are two more specific damaging features.
and
consequentialist
approaches
more
no deontic principle were firm, but all are
if
The theory of prima facie principles
This is entirely mistaken.
is
a
device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties
such as moral dilemmas.
13.
weight,
is
that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of
such as pacifism.
positions
What
instance.
ethical thought, thus helping to establish a
ethical
carry
if the positions were suitably exhaustive;
no deeper ecological
presents,
he
shows
utilitarianism
as
Secondly, consequentialist positions tend
to
suggest
that
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force.
This is
sceptically-based pacifism.
11
only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try
such
positions,
as
pacifism,
into
offering
to
ease
rival
incongruous consequential
sometimes
support for their themes.
Narveson
assumptions
takes
such
procedures
upon pacifists:
a
stage
further,
and
utilitarian
foists
thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence
is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,
in
the
(p.425).
recipients'
These
incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and
what
it
does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as
well
as
those
on
whom
it
is
inflicted.
Even
more
astonishing,
such
utilitarian—style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following
three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as morally good) is to will the
it
(at
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the
means
to
least prima facie).
[N]2.
greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425)^.
'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem',
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).
It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out
of the statements given.
consequences
such
For implications to hold the substantive terms such as
'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or
otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.
another,
in
the
implicans;
The intended argument to the
"commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of
variant
on
the
lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself
and
one's
group,
and
N1
to
ensure
that
14. Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these
may be
defended on purely
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.
12
violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.
in
in
Cl,
ethical
an
end.
for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least
But,
dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which
is
reflected
as
the
begs
bound morally to shun violent means.
pacifism,
against
question
Under pacifist reformulation Nl will
give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally
Nl#.
acceptable
means
to it.
For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need
pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;
worry
not
the three principles duly adjusted;
they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.
More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.
This
and
E2
N2
or
inconsistency
is
of
evil)
comprehensive
to
pacifism
Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one
what is the moral situation here?
to
(admissibility
What
of
are
them
these
being
of
violence)
dilemma,
Indeed the example is very similar to
the
turns
that
on
Jim
shoots
one
of
what account is given of moral dilemmas.
pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian
line
and
where
situation
N
But
ought
The situation is that
of
a
paradigmatic
that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing
squad about to shoot several captives if
everything
be
cases
difficult
N ought to prevent mass murder, but also
kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
of a moral dilemma.
moral
03
N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
person
not
to
the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)
(minimization
in
yet
of
trying
them^.
almost
Now
What a comprehensive
take
the
inadequate
to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever
occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima
facie, negotiable, etc., etc.
No, the conflicting obligations stand.
to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try
to
determine
What is
the
best
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
13
thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to
in
the
In
circumstances.
trying
N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.
the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.
that
B.
No inconsistency in pacifism follows.
minimize
that
Even granted
it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.
N had better shoot
is
preferable
to
On the contrary the situation
N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had
fix.
a
it
Suppose
and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
evil,
remains
to
is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,
what
determine
do
There is the real-life complication
better do so^.
of
a
dilemma,
moral
but
no
inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.
the
Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)
its
is
use
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to
be
No, it is not deonticly justified^.
is a qualified No:
and
amount to making out a case.
But
justification
on
proposes
is
solution,
back-up
ambiguous,
in
p.423).
against
may
just
situation.
dilemma
a
another
argument, taking his proposals as evident.
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument
and
the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing
no
It is certainly not morally
The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best
presents
is
it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'.
Narveson,
one
Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
raped.
obligatory,
from
pacifism
person
-
but
he
As it is not — the
lead
to
a
decisive
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
17.
This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
14
The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral
its
adherence
to
principles
unexceptionable
Insofar
fanaticism, so Hare contends.
such
manages
Hare
as
as
insensitivity.
P2,
to
Through
pacifism is a form of
get
his
remarkable
accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:
the
pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(p.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting
moral
stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's
dilemmas
deceptively neat two-level
critical.
thought,
into
intuitive
himself
to,
without
any
Hare
of the requisite supporting argument, according to
which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,
violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.
Hare s
redefinition,
a
Harey—fanatic,
e.g.
p.175).
Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.
on
and
pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme
Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution
pacifism.
helps
comprehensive
But
moral
of
classification
A fanatic
is a person who adheres to ideals which
diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.
Since
p.170)!
comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as
already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)
tends,
namely
the
towards
pacifists are Harey—fanatics.
usual
sense:
whether
position
their
bigoted .
they
whether
The
idea
appropriateness
violence
This does not of course make
are
'wild
in many situations, such
them
or
extravagant
opinions'
of
some
pacifist principles
of
.
the
or
(OED)
is
pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an
appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,
founders
in
fanatics,
depends on the very different matter of
fanatics
comprises
that
of
and
the
the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions
hardly be, all of the condemned type.
of
such
thinkers
Whence the conclusion follows.
are
not,
can
By this simple
syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.
19.
R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
15
All
page
Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's
satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being
Jewish,
as
relevance
is
completed,
it
there^ fanaticism
wearing
beads
Naturally, given that using of characterising
can
or
moral
hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant
matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:
blue
For however the sensitive task matter of using
morally relevant.
violence as morally irrelevant.
more
earlier,
those
applying
of
this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up
at the end of §4).
Does it really matter then that
fanatics?
it
Although
argument that it does.
homework
appears
pacifists,
that
though
Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had
guess
what,
they
their
done
the
Thus, e.g.
go
over
to
Hare's
As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great
store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...
20.
Harey-
properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would
utilitarianism).
of
are
it does not matter in the least, Hare has an
abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,
logic
fanatics,
not
concepts
A.
based [entirely] on
involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several
Naess, Gandhi and Group
Conflict,
Universitetsforlaget,
p.15:
...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.
the
R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.
16
Oslo,
crucial points.
objectionable
getting
Before
feature
some
to
these
of
The
theory.
highly
a
Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in
of
which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level
is
there
details,
procedure
adopted
methodologically
is
Hare's
of
own
radically unsound
because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at
the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way
rejected
above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic
Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.
which
logic,
already
But
that
since
Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some
to Hare's utilitarianism).
important opponents of utilitarianism.
In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and
comprise
moral
intuitionists
and
pure
impure.
deontologists,
fanatics
Impure
who stick to their deontic
principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what
calls
'critical
thinking'.
Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme
pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal
clearly'
Hare
or
inability
to
face
facts
or
to
think
involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,
(p.170)
originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).
But
cases
this
comprehensive
bit
intuitive
principles
conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28
dirty-trick
philosophy
can
where
of
pacifists
are
presumably
"pure
willing to think critically, but somehow survived
opinions
different
from
be
here
fanatics";
the
ordeal
those of the utilitarian' (p.171).
set
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if
his
argument
is
for they are 'able and
still
holding
moral
They are in fact "pure
to
be
According to Hare there cannot be
correct
argument is not correct.
See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.
17
since
aside,
fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out
22.
of
(p.171).
Therefore,
his
One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure
to
consider
the
possibility
that
a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical
assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians
reasons.
other
substitution,
preferences
For
which
can
be
one,
argument (e.g.
Hare's
requires
a
base
class
intersubstituted.
representation
to
ff.).
are
There
p.177 ff.) depends on preference
the
of
course
whom
among
preference-havers,
in
Hare,
chauvinistically contracts this base class
whole
of
p.176
(cf.
his
discussion
humans.Differently,
certain
the
of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to
familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.
As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this
an
less
is
argument
a
than
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
applied
to
avert
greater
Regan is envisaging
violence
where
situations
and he points to what he takes to be the evident
evil;
moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free
from
an
aspiring
rapist'
is
Interestingly,
(Rp.86).
has
Regan
situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:
herself
not described the
there is nothing
in
to
prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and
fleeing.
What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the
(perhaps
wilful)
that
infliction
death, by forceful means^ (cf.
mere
use
of
of
damage,
non-negligible
Np.110);
that is, which
physical force or power (or energy).
including pain, injury or
involves
much
more
than
And it is by no means so evident
that the woman is entitled to
inflict
violence
from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way
is
duly
separated
violence
upon
the
aspiring
rapist.
Once
that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
23.
On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
18
class,
see
R. and
V.
But
a
straightforward
action
violence
disentangling
abounds
as
It
with
is
subcase
matter as may at first seem.
defective
of
not
depend
force
is
by
means
no
violence.
of
on
tight
a
Fortunately
characterisation
what
indicate
some
done, in the way of inflicting damage.
constraints
Firstly,
presupposed.
force:
is
legalised force,
violence,
so
violence,
a
on
satisfactory
violence
is
not
applied
on
behalf
adequately
of
of
account
some
violence,
where no force is applied.
violence.)
24.
supposed
that
and
are
which
distinguished as illegitimate
"legitimate"
authority,
long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.
so often mistakenly
of
However it is important to
is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.2$ Secondly, violence is not
of
the
enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of
actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through
so
Indeed the literature on nonviolent
characterisations
arguments developed in this paper do
violence.
a
the
is
Violence
threat
(This only needs emphasizing because it is
threats,
intimidation
and
the
like,
involve
Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent"
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
"economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.
19
There can be unintentional violence, e.g.
the women may have applied violent
without intending to, in escaping the rapist.
Fourthly, such matters as the distance
at which force is applied and the indirectness of
military operations, are irrelevant.
modern
means,
the
for
as
means,
instance
in
The submarine operator who, by causally
pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian
city
instigates
a
violent
By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not
act.
in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined
to
action
done
against
persons,
means.
but
can
violence
Finally,
be
directed
not
is
against
other
life-forms, as will soon emerge.
Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and
from
the
fact
that
one
of
derives
them^
violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that
there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts
violence greater than zero.
of
Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to
matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on
most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on
small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral
will
certainly
problems.
They
give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2
they mean 'nontrivial violence'.
Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not
taking
obvious
steps
passivity and pacifity.
to
prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of
Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.
p.425) assume
that
pacifism
25.
The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence' is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.
26.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.
20
is a passive do-nothing position.
This is far from true, as the variety of methods
or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.
considered
Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of
Narveson
Otherwise,
would
negative
later
Narveson's
nonviolent
action.
hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)
way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).
Neither Regan nor
doing
assessment
nonviolence' does not change the situation:
for this
of
anything
about'
violence
what
calls
'positive
he
positive
is
approach
simply
nonviolence practised in an exemplary ;.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential
or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.
extent
when
reduce
assembledmuch
the
of
training
and
the
Fuller details of these practices,
of
impact
nonviolent
the argument
from
social
irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.
§4.
The
argument from
corollaries.
The
radical
practice
political
by
definition.
But
from
other
awkward
of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.
For
Standard pacifism takes
out
war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
war
and
corollaries
the
position
Although normally war would be excluded,
of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what
of
dilemma
situations?
War
would
always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances
it might be the (second-) best thing
27.
to
do.
A
strange
pacifism!
Comprehensive
The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.
As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).
28.
See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G.
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.
21
pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast
extreme
to
pacifism.
Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to
extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
is
given
a
large
suitably
If
that
evil
weighting then second-best choices will yield the same
results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate
since
wars,
are
war
of
an
as
or
mounted from
rely
the
institutions.
exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all
upon
only
arrangements
social
and
nation-states
particular,
obviously police and military forces but
of
violence-underpinned
many of their institutions, most
state
legal
arrangements,
States are however desirable social institutions,
typically depend on violent means.
and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just
comprehensive
pacifism
implies
the
of
inadmissibility
institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;
be ruled out either
individuals,
directly
delegates,
as
violence-dispensing
effect
who
forces,
by
nonviolent
nonviolent means.
state;
but
it
substitutes,
recently
or
such organisations may
because
else
their behalf.
evolved
will
which
is
nonviolent
methods
Pacifism
institutions concerned with
does
not
public
that
order
have
Pacifism does not
organisations
maintain
they
by
fully
as
police
alternative
nonviolent
will be applied, where necessary, to
The force of the objection should thus not
entail
order,
sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.
22
the
and
are
coercive
actively
Law and authority can still operate then in the
back-up authority and "enforce" laws.
overestimated.
on
violence
however exclude the replacement of such
wars,
A more telling objection, then, is
no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that
which
institutions
these
directly
less
or
and a more general argument may be
inevitability,
or
not without much further ado.
least
extensively:
violence
desirability,
In
at
institution,
However wars are by no means the
dispense
would
nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the
reasonable costs;
desirability
wars
it
elimination
accordingly
of
does
Nor is it true that
prominent
not
be
social
succumb
to
pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).
or (differently)
A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
political
noncoercive,
arrangements.
arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply
the
absence
or
illegitimacy
of
government,
political community organised under a government.
state
with
authority
and
not
necessarily
pacifism does not entail anarchism.
main
Accordingly,
that
implies
not
does
it
or therefore of a state, of a
Nor does
even
it
that
imply
a
certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral
dilemmas of political organisation.
and
only
pacifism
Comprehensive
objective,
not
attained,
was
Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based
on
the free agreements of individuals,
Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:
a
nonviolent
Indian
state;
replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.
his
it was not the
Granted there
are
genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism 2", they are not so
simple as derivability.
Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a
moral
so
ideal
easily
brought down by its political corollaries.
Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than
concerning
like:
external
and
internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the
it also tells against the received treatment of
example.
While
other
species,
animals
for
it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating
of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.
29.
those
At least it does this
so
long
Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
23
as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is
There is little good basis
humans (or persons).
restriction.^
controversial
euthanasia,
any
in
And,
moral
areas
concerning
the
corollaries
killing
a
such
for
however
similar
case,
spread
humans,
of
At
violence?
the
suicide,
But
must
creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.
the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature
simply
killing
of
No force need be applied:
in
a
eats
and dies painlessly and without a struggle.
The
or
pill
is
given
life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?
technical
purely
arrangements
pacifist
will
to
objections
solve,
in
eating
meat
worthwhile
On the face of
obtained.
so
New
any rate, the disruption of
at
principle
an
Then the proper objections to
such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that
it, there are no
they
risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples
like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.
injection
several
into
e.g.
So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve
chauvinistic
indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.
punishment,
capital
and
the category by restriction of the application of violence to
from
removed
not
violence,
practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.
But suppose now that the new technology
is
extended
scientists, working in their accustomed military role:
as the anti—neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
devices
which
much
but
clever
'weapons , such
newly devised
property
by
further
not
people,
or
"dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence.
just
Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these
reaches
of
technological
fantasy.
For "dissolving" people requires energy,
which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:
Was
(upgraded)
account
of
that is, the new wars will still involve violence.
there
old-fashioned
however
violent
anything
methods
so
such
wrong
as
with
hunting
eating
meat
obtained
by
more
or raising and killing one's own?
Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural"
M.
an
behaviour
of
creatures
to
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
cit.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics,
p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.
24
which the principles are supposed to apply.
Aggression is a fairly common feature of
and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made
animal
The force of the
out) erupts in violence.
various
for
ways,
example
along
these
argument
lines.
can
however
Aggression
assumed to be an
is
evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for
themselves
(of
their offspring) in their natural environment.
and
ir
mitigated
be
survival
But most humans
for
now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations
which
evolution
gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).
as
Much
humans
have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices,
ill-adapted
now
to
their
and mostly counterproductive.
situation
So
argues the pacifist.
There is a residual problem,
practices
like
that
vegetarianism.
the
Are
creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators
of
and tribal people, to be condemned as morally
Sometimes,
confronting
yes,
be attained:
when
wrong
these
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to
Though a way
but always?
can
problem 3 1, it is a rather unsatisfactory way.
be
beaten
the
around
of
edge
this
What this suggests is that nonviolence
is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.
The arguments for
nonviolence
-
which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence
and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -
sort
of
But
conclusion.
exclude.
nonviolent
what
is
called
charge
for
state,
is
is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at
This is^ to concede
an
of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as
P2 remains unqualified.
31.
would
The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral
sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.
attentuated
similar
approaches
thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that
a
the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,
since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically
suggest
The sheer moral power of such pacifism
As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
25
vegetarianism:
is
one
see
reason
e.g.,
for
Animal
There is no reason however why
giving its adoption some pause.
a
genuine
pacifism
(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.
Nothing logically rules out such a genuine
and
more sensitive pacifism.
There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In
particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts
similar to those using violence:
This
is
a
of
requirement
otherwise they could have a case made against them.
in a different sense from the pure logical
consistency
sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for
well.
pacifism,
Again there need be no deep problem
so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must
be a single principle
just
(e.g.
P2)
-
as
distinct
from
bundle
a
of
moral
principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving
violence.32 io meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be
integrated
into
a
in
larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a
piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.
mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and
oceans.
In
an
does
not
destructive
such things as strip
wastes
in
streams
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property
picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.
vandalism
particular,
cover
violence
But
even
metaphorically,
against persons (and certainly not nonphysical
violence such as "psychological violence").
What is sought then
is
an
appropriate
of these notions covering destructive practices;
and also an accompanying
synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.
Then P2 is superseded by
synthesis
an appropriately qualified
P2#.
It is morally wrong to use vandolence.
It remains to characterise
the
cluster
of
destructive
practices
that
count
as
vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
32.
It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.
13.
The position has been called 'pacifism.
26
APPENDICES
§5.
The
from
arguments
impracticality
impracticality
and
pacifism in the real world.
of
the
reality:
social
alleged
Even if it is conceded that pacifism
is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still
the
feasibility
of
pacifism
as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -
And it has
despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to
be
admitted
the
that
real
world,
with
all its horror and squalor, does put
But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.
pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less
than in replacing war^.
prepared
or
for
succeed
Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual
violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they
properly
to
likely
given
a
dress rehearsal.
have
been
never
The prospects for success of
nonviolent defence of,a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
is
convention
observed
or not.
If the convention is observed then pacifism stands
reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps
unleashed,
in
broken,
is
massive ways, on noncombatants.
and
violence
is
According to Walzer, in his
superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,
'success
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -
...
and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).
attained
-
there
is
conventions are flouted.
reasons,
some
got homesick.
ruthless
of
This is
presumably
be
never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give
them irrelevant, e.g.
up
and
depart
for
all
sorts
or
they needed a quick decisive victory, they
What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:
invaders
may
Success
false.
that
sufficiently
in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support
34.
The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit.
35.
Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op. cit.
references given there.
36.
All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
27
See also
M. Walzer,
Martin,
Just
and
war)
op.cit.,
Unjust
is
and
Wars,
lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
to violence.
resorts
side
But that sort of thing is also true even if the
is
if the defence "forces" are well-armed it
to
invaders
start
and
with
difficult
more
civil
well -prepared
with
than
afterwards
easier
the
for
costly
and
resistance.
Walzer is
inappropriate examples.
in
command,
model
the
of
way
the
Jews,
The
way.The
Nazis,
to
jump
who
that
conclusion
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian
the
enslaved
misleading
many
like
cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of
defence
nonviolent
however,
thinking,
who
in
state,
total
Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the
the
population,
by
The
"resistance"
picture
is
highly
and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
never
invaded
Germany,
were
in
control
all
or
the
infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took
over
and
managed
all
key
Australia it is not even so clear
largely
united
and
actively
resisting
this
is
which
With island territories such as
infrastructure.
that
For
logistically
population.
Walzer's
feasible
against
impression
resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.
a
of the
Wp.332)
might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.
Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
present
state-determined circumstances.
No state would be prepared to risk
way
in
37.
It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.
38.
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
28
training its
populace
different).
It
full
in
techniques
(civil
is
defence
all too easy for them to "rout" the police:
be
then
would
action
nonviolent
civil
obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.
thus
The argument
initial sketchings.
far
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism:
has
been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
That in itself is revealing.
deviations
from
are
it
Pacifism is the
require
what
rest
position
(inertial
and
state)
The reason for this is simple
explanation.
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of
enough:
it is what has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of
and
merely
justified.
case
try
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be
in
that
the
defender
(person
or
nation)
is
morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the
position
privileged
The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:
curious
is
to
its
already
the
in
bounds.
a
Still
defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have
situation.
to
use
it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:-
Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic
already glimpsed will begin.
None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are
deductively
tight
assumptions
can
be
challenged
arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for
pacifism,
(as
above).
Nor
One of the poorer positive
are all the
arguments
for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory
29
of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,
nuclear
that
or
chemical
hope
weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an
illusion, escalation is inevitable.
are bound to be overstepped.
case is overstated.
the
e.g.
The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are
-
Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the
Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.
Wars are much
more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped
things intervene (e.g.
support
(as
midstream
more
should
the
for
first
inevitably,
premiss
for
those
mixture
a
above)
suffering
and
anguish
violent
of
methods,
the
They
nonviolence.
injustice
characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of
means-ends
of
the
consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,
important
a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are,
include
in
cost
that
in
violence
violence
within
the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
more
less furtive, society.
open,
the why of
pacifism)
considerable.
These
are
None of these well-known types of reason (giving
separately
decisive,
but
their
cumulative
affords a model for one way of proceeding^;
Mill's
defence
Mill's
procedure
works
(at
least
As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
30
of
liberty
nonviolence,
it works as well as it works for
liberty).
39.
is
it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)
to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for
otherwise
effect
reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong
positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.
as
a
A
more
decisive
consequentialist
data ,
argument,
takes
a
but
making
semantical
preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds
modelling
nonviolence
Again
principles.
use
of
route.
are
similar
practical
and
The data is used to arrive at
then
pacifism
in
applied
is
derived
semantically
as
principled
nonviolence.^0
R.
40.
Routley*
*
The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.
* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.
31
while
the
author
was
a
research
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
2. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
3. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
4. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
5. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
6. R.K. Meyer, A note on R-^ matrices, 1979.
7. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
8^ C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
9. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
10. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
11. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
12. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
13. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 198314. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983
15.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.
Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I.
Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
moo
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war-deterrence and the political fall out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deonti
R°"ouU.y and V. Plumwood, A. expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
7.
10.
R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing:
rational behaviour under rival paradigms.
the difference 1
in environmental phiiosophy
_.
Phitosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
by
R. Routley
Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
Pacifism,
despite
its
limited
revival
through
the
nonviolent
action
1
movement
and
as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues
to have a bad philosophical press.
one
way
or
another,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as inconsistent.
as
incoherent
Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism
is
in
only
that
consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;
from
rights.
an
In
influential
and
and arguments from irresponsibility and
widely
disseminated
set
of articles
3
attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ...
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
be
better characterised by the more sweeping
1.
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.
The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.
2.
In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists'
belief
vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
as
"bizarre
and
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
sense
which
is
narrower
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.
the
But
if
violence
Pacifism, as a
universally and not merely in war.
violence
is impermissible, then it should be so
what
is
out
rule
position,
moral
should
be
comprehensive.
On its own showing, it is contended,
proper
action
to
preventative action
commitment
to
prevent,
what
would
involve,
it
use
in
the
case
Narveson's
or
of
pacifism.
of
incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims
prohibits,
acclaimedly
sometimes,
precluded
from
taking
violence;
But
force.
genuine
actively
defend
on
them,
pain
Hence
the
initial
that it cannot underwrite its
of
inconsistency.
However
location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several
connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.
initial
for
a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action
of a type logically excluded
own
is
pacifism
The
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it
should
be
'to
use
violence',
namely
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970, pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.
2
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
R2.
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
It is
cases
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
to
resist
The
violence).
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
pacifists
by
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
4
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however what
assault
on
pacifism
Narveson
clearing
(after
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
pacifism,
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
of
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
unless
a
slide
(tentatively)
by
is
without
fighting
pacifism
does
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
Nor
does
comprehensive
made.
theses
on
ought,
T1
T2,
and
imply
that
pacifism,
characterised
we have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will
not
apply
violent
methods.
Nor
therefore
does
it
imply
that
all
conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good
4.
deal,
of
that
machinery
is.
One
hardly
the
or
a
needs to be a comprehensive
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
3
pacifist to coherently think the latter.
the
This provides
confirmation
some
for
key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident
in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are
legitimate
morally
are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
stunt
connotation of violence or at least of force which
equate with violence.
use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
cannot
here
resist
Hence
(p.415).
violence,
or
force
and
to
so
Hence
the
against attack' (pp.417-8).
also
Narveson's
and
so
to
a
much
less
can
be
resisted,
But
without
violence.
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
even
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;
and
defensible position.
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
pacifism
render
a
unwarranted
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
resistance,
be
that
assumption
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
to
proceeds
Hence the conflation of T2 and
excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.
pacifist
Narveson
Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,
and defending are taken to imply (use of)
R2;
the
Violence implies
and it is violence, not all applications
of
force,
that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
to
castrate
practices,
any case indefensible.
development
and
themselves
from
compromise,
pacifism,
by
depriving
it
of
the
range
of
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
It enjoys some popularity even
among
those
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance
older
mediation,
pacifism,
whose
methods
they
see
as
confined
to
negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.
The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;
for
pacifism
has
often
by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods
jeen
presented,
(cf.
even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously
4
said
of
pacifism
'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by
that
negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities
added).
and
of
total
doctrine
of
non-resistance
non-cooperation with any form of warfare':
But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether
or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:
to
italics
comprehensive
nothing excludes resistance,
uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.^
It
is
simply
that
comprehensive
pacifism
has
not yet developed its fuller
potential, especially in conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
on
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in
terms
of
'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's
'opposition
to
If
violence'.
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it
is
Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
5.
In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.
But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.
5
A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument
on
based
inconsistency
pacifism theme,
the
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
transformed to the claim
No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).
P2(R).
For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in
notion
The
right.
of
very
initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from
breaches of a right and of
Because
the
against
action
preventative
infringement
'a right just i_s a status justifying preventative action ...
it.
of
what does
follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent
infringements of his right' (p.419).
That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out
to
to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide
such
incorporate
things
as social pressure.
Moreover 'it is a logical truth,
not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For
action must have the notion of violence built into it.
the
against
question
nonviolent
(p.421)!
quite indefensibly strong.
him
To block the argument it is enough for
rights
with
The argument accordingly
to
be,
to
or
be
to,
limited
In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is
action.
entitle
pacifism.
associated
preventative action
not
force
logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative
these
begs
is
necessary
to
For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does
kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if
such action is necessary in the circumstances to
prevent
infringement
his
of
right.
to
How the argument from rights leads
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence
done
to us', as a consequence of the.o&f^e&i^fi to avoid violence.
But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is
self-contradictory,
both
granting
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
Narveson
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
6
is
mistaken
p.423).
in
That a
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
action
does
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by
simply
rejecting
the
Narveson
not
slide^.
What
for
SAI,
appears in place of SAI is
something like
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
SAI#.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
not,
does
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
violence
and
In
evil.
lesser
outline
the
argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must
admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
would
where
those
Inconsistency
be
some
is
morally
use
of
immediate
permissible
violence
by T2.
and morally justified.
would
prevent
evil,
of
The cases are
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
use
to
admit
both
that
the
some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible because it involves violence.
An argument
like
this
as gets summarized as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.
7
supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force .
these
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.
It
is
important
to
them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the
get
ethical place of pacifism
is
to
The
result.
from
argument,
basic
lesser
violence, goes as follows:—
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence,
the
since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
""P2.
indicated,
cases
violence
is
Therefore
It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
to
it
which
is
mora
y
wrong, always, to use violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
this
argument,
together
with
pulled together from Narveson's work.
support
for
the
He not only espouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
the
argument with the lesser evil argument:-
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
is,
the
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
J.
8
9.
Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
8
Neither argument is decisive;
of
reference
that
they
both in fact begin easing pacifists into a
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
should
moral relatives, where obligations give way
to
obligations-other-things-being-
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
frame
got
into
it.
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
has
rooting it out, which may
involve
nonminimization
strategies.
Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to 02
- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to
accept
prepared
violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social
justice.
Nor do El and E2 entail 02;
so neither does
principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
by
commitment
evil-perpetrating
Narveson's
such
e.g.
violence
but
argument
some
increases
well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an
dictator.
non-violent
fails
to
For in particular, violence
is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
in
pacifists
for
similar
reasons.
Regan's
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
4.
Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
be
preferred
to
a
great
an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering
force, even when force is an evil.
of
It is enough to observe that increasing force may
still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.
Resort to the theme that
Elt.
Violence is an irredeemable evil
(proposed by Regan in his "defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and
by
Narveson,
Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.
subsequently
considered
An irredeemable evil is
figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.
9
will lighten its hue;
now
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2,
but
What are the grounds for that?
the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.
As
Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to
countenance
some
small
amount
of violence in exchange for considerable goods.
(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it
was
not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get
gross.)
pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,
It does break the argument however;
underwriting C2.
by
indeed it seems to get
them
in
for it removes Cl
and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument
from
lesser evil, which starts from
DI.
There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil
than that tainted with violence;
requires.
however
pacifism
is
no
of
pacifism
(see
into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous
(utilitarian
through
as
violence
an
irredeemable
evil
which
Rp.80ff.),
position (Rp.86),
extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines
But the approach
greater
and there are accordingly no cases such as DI
This is the core of Regan's defence
converts
there
is
a
.
mistaken
inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,
like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such absolutes are adequately
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons
otherwise
don't
arise,
or
for
acting
other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not
11.
That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss 5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
10
Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,
come what may, period.
such
is
pacifism
as
collide
bottom,
at
more fashionable, highly
with
head-on
malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at
time) were working from.
The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...
for the utility 'that will be brought out
is incompatible with pacifism':
some
one who acts
by
may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)
violence
the
according
to
the
to
utilitarian-commandment
maximize
doing
13
So
.
utility
may
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false
little:
position
every
doctrine
inconsistency
suffers
such
with
very
many
false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism
odds
the
with
contractarianism.
correct,
other
ethical
positions
But this argument would
only
position
insidious,
is
however,
for
have
Firstly, as we
generally,
have
provisional.
theory-saving
seen,
made
also
libertarianism
were
it
at
and
otherwise
however they are not, including
has
which
happened
is
more
it
utilitarianism,
seem
as
climate
unfavourable
to
incompatible
There are two more specific damaging features.
and
consequentialist
approaches
more
no deontic principle were firm, but all are
if
The theory of prima facie principles
This is entirely mistaken.
is
a
device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties
such as moral dilemmas.
13.
weight,
is
that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of
such as pacifism.
positions
What
instance.
ethical thought, thus helping to establish a
ethical
carry
if the positions were suitably exhaustive;
no deeper ecological
presents,
he
shows
utilitarianism
as
Secondly, consequentialist positions tend
to
suggest
that
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force.
This is
sceptically-based pacifism.
11
only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try
such
positions,
as
pacifism,
into
offering
to
ease
rival
incongruous consequential
sometimes
support for their themes.
Narveson
assumptions
takes
such
procedures
upon pacifists:
a
stage
further,
and
utilitarian
foists
thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence
is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,
in
the
(p.425).
recipients'
These
incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and
what
it
does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as
well
as
those
on
whom
it
is
inflicted.
Even
more
astonishing,
such
utilitarian—style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following
three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as morally good) is to will the
it
(at
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the
means
to
least prima facie).
[N]2.
greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425)^.
'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem',
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).
It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out
of the statements given.
consequences
such
For implications to hold the substantive terms such as
'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or
otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.
another,
in
the
implicans;
The intended argument to the
"commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of
variant
on
the
lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself
and
one's
group,
and
N1
to
ensure
that
14. Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these
may be
defended on purely
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.
12
violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.
in
in
Cl,
ethical
an
end.
for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least
But,
dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which
is
reflected
as
the
begs
bound morally to shun violent means.
pacifism,
against
question
Under pacifist reformulation Nl will
give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally
Nl#.
acceptable
means
to it.
For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need
pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;
worry
not
the three principles duly adjusted;
they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.
More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.
This
and
E2
N2
or
inconsistency
is
of
evil)
comprehensive
to
pacifism
Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one
what is the moral situation here?
to
(admissibility
What
of
are
them
these
being
of
violence)
dilemma,
Indeed the example is very similar to
the
turns
that
on
Jim
shoots
one
of
what account is given of moral dilemmas.
pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian
line
and
where
situation
N
But
ought
The situation is that
of
a
paradigmatic
that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing
squad about to shoot several captives if
everything
be
cases
difficult
N ought to prevent mass murder, but also
kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
of a moral dilemma.
moral
03
N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
person
not
to
the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)
(minimization
in
yet
of
trying
them^.
almost
Now
What a comprehensive
take
the
inadequate
to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever
occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima
facie, negotiable, etc., etc.
No, the conflicting obligations stand.
to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try
to
determine
What is
the
best
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
13
thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to
in
the
In
circumstances.
trying
N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.
the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.
that
B.
No inconsistency in pacifism follows.
minimize
that
Even granted
it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.
N had better shoot
is
preferable
to
On the contrary the situation
N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had
fix.
a
it
Suppose
and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
evil,
remains
to
is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,
what
determine
do
There is the real-life complication
better do so^.
of
a
dilemma,
moral
but
no
inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.
the
Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)
its
is
use
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to
be
No, it is not deonticly justified^.
is a qualified No:
and
amount to making out a case.
But
justification
on
proposes
is
solution,
back-up
ambiguous,
in
p.423).
against
may
just
situation.
dilemma
a
another
argument, taking his proposals as evident.
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument
and
the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing
no
It is certainly not morally
The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best
presents
is
it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'.
Narveson,
one
Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
raped.
obligatory,
from
pacifism
person
-
but
he
As it is not — the
lead
to
a
decisive
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
17.
This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
14
The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral
its
adherence
to
principles
unexceptionable
Insofar
fanaticism, so Hare contends.
such
manages
Hare
as
as
insensitivity.
P2,
to
Through
pacifism is a form of
get
his
remarkable
accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:
the
pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(p.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting
moral
stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's
dilemmas
deceptively neat two-level
critical.
thought,
into
intuitive
himself
to,
without
any
Hare
of the requisite supporting argument, according to
which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,
violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.
Hare s
redefinition,
a
Harey—fanatic,
e.g.
p.175).
Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.
on
and
pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme
Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution
pacifism.
helps
comprehensive
But
moral
of
classification
A fanatic
is a person who adheres to ideals which
diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.
Since
p.170)!
comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as
already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)
tends,
namely
the
towards
pacifists are Harey—fanatics.
usual
sense:
whether
position
their
bigoted .
they
whether
The
idea
appropriateness
violence
This does not of course make
are
'wild
in many situations, such
them
or
extravagant
opinions'
of
some
pacifist principles
of
.
the
or
(OED)
is
pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an
appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,
founders
in
fanatics,
depends on the very different matter of
fanatics
comprises
that
of
and
the
the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions
hardly be, all of the condemned type.
of
such
thinkers
Whence the conclusion follows.
are
not,
can
By this simple
syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.
19.
R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
15
All
page
Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's
satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being
Jewish,
as
relevance
is
completed,
it
there^ fanaticism
wearing
beads
Naturally, given that using of characterising
can
or
moral
hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant
matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:
blue
For however the sensitive task matter of using
morally relevant.
violence as morally irrelevant.
more
earlier,
those
applying
of
this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up
at the end of §4).
Does it really matter then that
fanatics?
it
Although
argument that it does.
homework
appears
pacifists,
that
though
Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had
guess
what,
they
their
done
the
Thus, e.g.
go
over
to
Hare's
As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great
store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...
20.
Harey-
properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would
utilitarianism).
of
are
it does not matter in the least, Hare has an
abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,
logic
fanatics,
not
concepts
A.
based [entirely] on
involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several
Naess, Gandhi and Group
Conflict,
Universitetsforlaget,
p.15:
...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.
the
R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.
16
Oslo,
crucial points.
objectionable
getting
Before
feature
some
to
these
of
The
theory.
highly
a
Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in
of
which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level
is
there
details,
procedure
adopted
methodologically
is
Hare's
of
own
radically unsound
because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at
the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way
rejected
above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic
Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.
which
logic,
already
But
that
since
Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some
to Hare's utilitarianism).
important opponents of utilitarianism.
In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and
comprise
moral
intuitionists
and
pure
impure.
deontologists,
fanatics
Impure
who stick to their deontic
principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what
calls
'critical
thinking'.
Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme
pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal
clearly'
Hare
or
inability
to
face
facts
or
to
think
involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,
(p.170)
originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).
But
cases
this
comprehensive
bit
intuitive
principles
conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28
dirty-trick
philosophy
can
where
of
pacifists
are
presumably
"pure
willing to think critically, but somehow survived
opinions
different
from
be
here
fanatics";
the
ordeal
those of the utilitarian' (p.171).
set
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if
his
argument
is
for they are 'able and
still
holding
moral
They are in fact "pure
to
be
According to Hare there cannot be
correct
argument is not correct.
See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.
17
since
aside,
fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out
22.
of
(p.171).
Therefore,
his
One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure
to
consider
the
possibility
that
a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical
assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians
reasons.
other
substitution,
preferences
For
which
can
be
one,
argument (e.g.
Hare's
requires
a
base
class
intersubstituted.
representation
to
ff.).
are
There
p.177 ff.) depends on preference
the
of
course
whom
among
preference-havers,
in
Hare,
chauvinistically contracts this base class
whole
of
p.176
(cf.
his
discussion
humans.Differently,
certain
the
of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to
familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.
As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this
an
less
is
argument
a
than
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
applied
to
avert
greater
Regan is envisaging
violence
where
situations
and he points to what he takes to be the evident
evil;
moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free
from
an
aspiring
rapist'
is
Interestingly,
(Rp.86).
has
Regan
situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:
herself
not described the
there is nothing
in
to
prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and
fleeing.
What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the
(perhaps
wilful)
that
infliction
death, by forceful means^ (cf.
mere
use
of
of
damage,
non-negligible
Np.110);
that is, which
physical force or power (or energy).
including pain, injury or
involves
much
more
than
And it is by no means so evident
that the woman is entitled to
inflict
violence
from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way
is
duly
separated
violence
upon
the
aspiring
rapist.
Once
that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
23.
On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
18
class,
see
R. and
V.
But
a
straightforward
action
violence
disentangling
abounds
as
It
with
is
subcase
matter as may at first seem.
defective
of
not
depend
force
is
by
means
no
violence.
of
on
tight
a
Fortunately
characterisation
what
indicate
some
done, in the way of inflicting damage.
constraints
Firstly,
presupposed.
force:
is
legalised force,
violence,
so
violence,
a
on
satisfactory
violence
is
not
applied
on
behalf
adequately
of
of
account
some
violence,
where no force is applied.
violence.)
24.
supposed
that
and
are
which
distinguished as illegitimate
"legitimate"
authority,
long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.
so often mistakenly
of
However it is important to
is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.2$ Secondly, violence is not
of
the
enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of
actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through
so
Indeed the literature on nonviolent
characterisations
arguments developed in this paper do
violence.
a
the
is
Violence
threat
(This only needs emphasizing because it is
threats,
intimidation
and
the
like,
involve
Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent"
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
"economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.
19
There can be unintentional violence, e.g.
the women may have applied violent
without intending to, in escaping the rapist.
Fourthly, such matters as the distance
at which force is applied and the indirectness of
military operations, are irrelevant.
modern
means,
the
for
as
means,
instance
in
The submarine operator who, by causally
pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian
city
instigates
a
violent
By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not
act.
in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined
to
action
done
against
persons,
means.
but
can
violence
Finally,
be
directed
not
is
against
other
life-forms, as will soon emerge.
Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and
from
the
fact
that
one
of
derives
them^
violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that
there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts
violence greater than zero.
of
Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to
matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on
most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on
small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral
will
certainly
problems.
They
give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2
they mean 'nontrivial violence'.
Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not
taking
obvious
steps
passivity and pacifity.
to
prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of
Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.
p.425) assume
that
pacifism
25.
The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence' is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.
26.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.
20
is a passive do-nothing position.
This is far from true, as the variety of methods
or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.
considered
Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of
Narveson
Otherwise,
would
negative
later
Narveson's
nonviolent
action.
hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)
way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).
Neither Regan nor
doing
assessment
nonviolence' does not change the situation:
for this
of
anything
about'
violence
what
calls
'positive
he
positive
is
approach
simply
nonviolence practised in an exemplary ;.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential
or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.
extent
when
reduce
assembledmuch
the
of
training
and
the
Fuller details of these practices,
of
impact
nonviolent
the argument
from
social
irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.
§4.
The
argument from
corollaries.
The
radical
practice
political
by
definition.
But
from
other
awkward
of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.
For
Standard pacifism takes
out
war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
war
and
corollaries
the
position
Although normally war would be excluded,
of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what
of
dilemma
situations?
War
would
always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances
it might be the (second-) best thing
27.
to
do.
A
strange
pacifism!
Comprehensive
The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.
As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).
28.
See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G.
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.
21
pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast
extreme
to
pacifism.
Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to
extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
is
given
a
large
suitably
If
that
evil
weighting then second-best choices will yield the same
results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate
since
wars,
are
war
of
an
as
or
mounted from
rely
the
institutions.
exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all
upon
only
arrangements
social
and
nation-states
particular,
obviously police and military forces but
of
violence-underpinned
many of their institutions, most
state
legal
arrangements,
States are however desirable social institutions,
typically depend on violent means.
and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just
comprehensive
pacifism
implies
the
of
inadmissibility
institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;
be ruled out either
individuals,
directly
delegates,
as
violence-dispensing
effect
who
forces,
by
nonviolent
nonviolent means.
state;
but
it
substitutes,
recently
or
such organisations may
because
else
their behalf.
evolved
will
which
is
nonviolent
methods
Pacifism
institutions concerned with
does
not
public
that
order
have
Pacifism does not
organisations
maintain
they
by
fully
as
police
alternative
nonviolent
will be applied, where necessary, to
The force of the objection should thus not
entail
order,
sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.
22
the
and
are
coercive
actively
Law and authority can still operate then in the
back-up authority and "enforce" laws.
overestimated.
on
violence
however exclude the replacement of such
wars,
A more telling objection, then, is
no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that
which
institutions
these
directly
less
or
and a more general argument may be
inevitability,
or
not without much further ado.
least
extensively:
violence
desirability,
In
at
institution,
However wars are by no means the
dispense
would
nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the
reasonable costs;
desirability
wars
it
elimination
accordingly
of
does
Nor is it true that
prominent
not
be
social
succumb
to
pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).
or (differently)
A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
political
noncoercive,
arrangements.
arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply
the
absence
or
illegitimacy
of
government,
political community organised under a government.
state
with
authority
and
not
necessarily
pacifism does not entail anarchism.
main
Accordingly,
that
implies
not
does
it
or therefore of a state, of a
Nor does
even
it
that
imply
a
certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral
dilemmas of political organisation.
and
only
pacifism
Comprehensive
objective,
not
attained,
was
Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based
on
the free agreements of individuals,
Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:
a
nonviolent
Indian
state;
replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.
his
it was not the
Granted there
are
genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism 2", they are not so
simple as derivability.
Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a
moral
so
ideal
easily
brought down by its political corollaries.
Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than
concerning
like:
external
and
internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the
it also tells against the received treatment of
example.
While
other
species,
animals
for
it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating
of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.
29.
those
At least it does this
so
long
Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
23
as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is
There is little good basis
humans (or persons).
restriction.^
controversial
euthanasia,
any
in
And,
moral
areas
concerning
the
corollaries
killing
a
such
for
however
similar
case,
spread
humans,
of
At
violence?
the
suicide,
But
must
creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.
the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature
simply
killing
of
No force need be applied:
in
a
eats
and dies painlessly and without a struggle.
The
or
pill
is
given
life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?
technical
purely
arrangements
pacifist
will
to
objections
solve,
in
eating
meat
worthwhile
On the face of
obtained.
so
New
any rate, the disruption of
at
principle
an
Then the proper objections to
such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that
it, there are no
they
risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples
like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.
injection
several
into
e.g.
So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve
chauvinistic
indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.
punishment,
capital
and
the category by restriction of the application of violence to
from
removed
not
violence,
practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.
But suppose now that the new technology
is
extended
scientists, working in their accustomed military role:
as the anti—neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
devices
which
much
but
clever
'weapons , such
newly devised
property
by
further
not
people,
or
"dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence.
just
Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these
reaches
of
technological
fantasy.
For "dissolving" people requires energy,
which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:
Was
(upgraded)
account
of
that is, the new wars will still involve violence.
there
old-fashioned
however
violent
anything
methods
so
such
wrong
as
with
hunting
eating
meat
obtained
by
more
or raising and killing one's own?
Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural"
M.
an
behaviour
of
creatures
to
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
cit.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics,
p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.
24
which the principles are supposed to apply.
Aggression is a fairly common feature of
and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made
animal
The force of the
out) erupts in violence.
various
for
ways,
example
along
these
argument
lines.
can
however
Aggression
assumed to be an
is
evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for
themselves
(of
their offspring) in their natural environment.
and
ir
mitigated
be
survival
But most humans
for
now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations
which
evolution
gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).
as
Much
humans
have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices,
ill-adapted
now
to
their
and mostly counterproductive.
situation
So
argues the pacifist.
There is a residual problem,
practices
like
that
vegetarianism.
the
Are
creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators
of
and tribal people, to be condemned as morally
Sometimes,
confronting
yes,
be attained:
when
wrong
these
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to
Though a way
but always?
can
problem 3 1, it is a rather unsatisfactory way.
be
beaten
the
around
of
edge
this
What this suggests is that nonviolence
is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.
The arguments for
nonviolence
-
which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence
and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -
sort
of
But
conclusion.
exclude.
nonviolent
what
is
called
charge
for
state,
is
is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at
This is^ to concede
an
of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as
P2 remains unqualified.
31.
would
The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral
sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.
attentuated
similar
approaches
thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that
a
the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,
since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically
suggest
The sheer moral power of such pacifism
As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
25
vegetarianism:
is
one
see
reason
e.g.,
for
Animal
There is no reason however why
giving its adoption some pause.
a
genuine
pacifism
(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.
Nothing logically rules out such a genuine
and
more sensitive pacifism.
There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In
particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts
similar to those using violence:
This
is
a
of
requirement
otherwise they could have a case made against them.
in a different sense from the pure logical
consistency
sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for
well.
pacifism,
Again there need be no deep problem
so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must
be a single principle
just
(e.g.
P2)
-
as
distinct
from
bundle
a
of
moral
principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving
violence.32 io meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be
integrated
into
a
in
larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a
piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.
mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and
oceans.
In
an
does
not
destructive
such things as strip
wastes
in
streams
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property
picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.
vandalism
particular,
cover
violence
But
even
metaphorically,
against persons (and certainly not nonphysical
violence such as "psychological violence").
What is sought then
is
an
appropriate
of these notions covering destructive practices;
and also an accompanying
synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.
Then P2 is superseded by
synthesis
an appropriately qualified
P2#.
It is morally wrong to use vandolence.
It remains to characterise
the
cluster
of
destructive
practices
that
count
as
vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
32.
It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.
13.
The position has been called 'pacifism.
26
APPENDICES
§5.
The
from
arguments
impracticality
impracticality
and
pacifism in the real world.
of
the
reality:
social
alleged
Even if it is conceded that pacifism
is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still
the
feasibility
of
pacifism
as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -
And it has
despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to
be
admitted
the
that
real
world,
with
all its horror and squalor, does put
But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.
pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less
than in replacing war^.
prepared
or
for
succeed
Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual
violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they
properly
to
likely
given
a
dress rehearsal.
have
been
never
The prospects for success of
nonviolent defence of,a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
is
convention
observed
or not.
If the convention is observed then pacifism stands
reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps
unleashed,
in
broken,
is
massive ways, on noncombatants.
and
violence
is
According to Walzer, in his
superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,
'success
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -
...
and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).
attained
-
there
is
conventions are flouted.
reasons,
some
got homesick.
ruthless
of
This is
presumably
be
never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give
them irrelevant, e.g.
up
and
depart
for
all
sorts
or
they needed a quick decisive victory, they
What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:
invaders
may
Success
false.
that
sufficiently
in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support
34.
The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit.
35.
Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op. cit.
references given there.
36.
All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
27
See also
M. Walzer,
Martin,
Just
and
war)
op.cit.,
Unjust
is
and
Wars,
lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
to violence.
resorts
side
But that sort of thing is also true even if the
is
if the defence "forces" are well-armed it
to
invaders
start
and
with
difficult
more
civil
well -prepared
with
than
afterwards
easier
the
for
costly
and
resistance.
Walzer is
inappropriate examples.
in
command,
model
the
of
way
the
Jews,
The
way.The
Nazis,
to
jump
who
that
conclusion
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian
the
enslaved
misleading
many
like
cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of
defence
nonviolent
however,
thinking,
who
in
state,
total
Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the
the
population,
by
The
"resistance"
picture
is
highly
and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
never
invaded
Germany,
were
in
control
all
or
the
infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took
over
and
managed
all
key
Australia it is not even so clear
largely
united
and
actively
resisting
this
is
which
With island territories such as
infrastructure.
that
For
logistically
population.
Walzer's
feasible
against
impression
resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.
a
of the
Wp.332)
might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.
Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
present
state-determined circumstances.
No state would be prepared to risk
way
in
37.
It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.
38.
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
28
training its
populace
different).
It
full
in
techniques
(civil
is
defence
all too easy for them to "rout" the police:
be
then
would
action
nonviolent
civil
obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.
thus
The argument
initial sketchings.
far
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism:
has
been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
That in itself is revealing.
deviations
from
are
it
Pacifism is the
require
what
rest
position
(inertial
and
state)
The reason for this is simple
explanation.
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of
enough:
it is what has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of
and
merely
justified.
case
try
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be
in
that
the
defender
(person
or
nation)
is
morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the
position
privileged
The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:
curious
is
to
its
already
the
in
bounds.
a
Still
defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have
situation.
to
use
it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:-
Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic
already glimpsed will begin.
None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are
deductively
tight
assumptions
can
be
challenged
arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for
pacifism,
(as
above).
Nor
One of the poorer positive
are all the
arguments
for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory
29
of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,
nuclear
that
or
chemical
hope
weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an
illusion, escalation is inevitable.
are bound to be overstepped.
case is overstated.
the
e.g.
The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are
-
Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the
Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.
Wars are much
more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped
things intervene (e.g.
support
(as
midstream
more
should
the
for
first
inevitably,
premiss
for
those
mixture
a
above)
suffering
and
anguish
violent
of
methods,
the
They
nonviolence.
injustice
characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of
means-ends
of
the
consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,
important
a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are,
include
in
cost
that
in
violence
violence
within
the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
more
less furtive, society.
open,
the why of
pacifism)
considerable.
These
are
None of these well-known types of reason (giving
separately
decisive,
but
their
cumulative
affords a model for one way of proceeding^;
Mill's
defence
Mill's
procedure
works
(at
least
As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
30
of
liberty
nonviolence,
it works as well as it works for
liberty).
39.
is
it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)
to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for
otherwise
effect
reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong
positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.
as
a
A
more
decisive
consequentialist
data ,
argument,
takes
a
but
making
semantical
preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds
modelling
nonviolence
Again
principles.
use
of
route.
are
similar
practical
and
The data is used to arrive at
then
pacifism
in
applied
is
derived
semantically
as
principled
nonviolence.^0
R.
40.
Routley*
*
The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.
* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.
31
while
the
author
was
a
research
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
2. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
3. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
4. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
5. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
6. R.K. Meyer, A note on R-^ matrices, 1979.
7. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
8^ C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
9. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
10. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
11. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
12. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
13. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 198314. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983
15.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.
Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I.
Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
moo
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war-deterrence and the political fall out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deonti
R°"ouU.y and V. Plumwood, A. expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
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rational behaviour under rival paradigms.
the difference 1
Collection
Citation
Richard Routley, “Box 149, Item 3: War and peace II - on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed March 29, 2024, https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/154.