Box 149, Item 2: War and peace II : on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism

Box 149, Item 2: War and peace II : on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism

Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; number 9. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy. Published under Richard Sylvan's previous name Richard Routley.

One of two copies in collection.

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 149, Item 2

1983

This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.

For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.

[31] leaves; 25 cm. 58.22 MB.

Manuscript

Discussion Papers
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600

NUMBER 9

WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY

AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM

RICHARD ROUTLEY

FOR CIRCULATION AND

EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT

WAR AND PEACE.

II

ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND

FANATICISM OF PACIFISM

by

R. Routley

Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University

1983

ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND

FANATICISM OF PACIFISM

Pacifism,

despite

its

revival

limited

through

the

nonviolent

action

1

movement

and

as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues

to have a bad philosophical press.
one

way

or

another,

It is commonly portrayed

characteristically

as inconsistent.

as

incoherent

Even philosophical

defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism

is

in

only

that

consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2

position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .

What follows challenges the

prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic

methods.

§1.

Slide arguments to inconsistency;

from

rights.

an

In

influential

and

and arguments from irresponsibility and

widely

disseminated

set

of articles

3

attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory
(p.408, italics added).

Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would

be

better characterised by the more sweeping

1.

According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.

The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.

2.

In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief
vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.

as

"bizarre

and

P2.

It is morally wrong to use violence.

However T2 captures the cases that

orthodox

opposition.

separate

comprehensive

pacifism

from

main form of pacifism under investigation is called

The

'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual

is

which

sense

narrower

restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably

opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.

the

But

if

violence

is

violence

is impermissible, then it should be so

what

Pacifism, as a

universally and not merely in war.

out

rule

moral

position,

should

be

comprehensive.

On its own showing, it is contended,
proper

action

to

preventative action

commitment

to

prevent,

what

would

involve,

it

pacifism

acclaimedly

in

the

case

of

pacifism.

incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims

Narveson's

or

of

from

taking

violence;

But

force.

genuine

actively

defend

on

them,

pain

Hence

the

initial

that it cannot underwrite its

of

inconsistency.

However

location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several

connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.

initial

for

a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action

of a type logically excluded

own

prohibits,

use

sometimes,

precluded

is

The

slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion

of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it

should

be

'to

use

violence',

namely

3

J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia,
1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.

2

It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -

R2.

and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of

R2 (e.g.

It is

cases

from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,

forbidden

to

violence).

resist

The

slide

is

illegitimate

because

commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;

for

one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked

out

by

pacifists

and others, which do not involve use of violence (or

perhaps force).

The initial slide is however what

assault

on

pacifism

(after

Narveson

several

clearing

exploits

confusions,

explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility

of

in

This

his

first

main

which he takes to

argument,

from

the

does not actually lead to contradiction, but it

pacifism,

does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method

of

maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).

Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back

violence),

(with

unless

a

slide

(tentatively)

by

is

without

fighting

pacifism

does

not mean what Narveson claims it means,

Nor

does

comprehensive

made.

theses

on

ought,

T1

T2,

and

imply

that

pacifism,

characterised

we have no right to punish

criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will

not

apply

violent

methods.

Nor

therefore

does

it

imply

that

conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good

4.

deal,

of

that

machinery

is.

One

hardly

the

all

or

a

needs to be a comprehensive

Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.

3

pacifist to coherently think the latter.

the

This provides

some

for

confirmation

key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident

in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are

legitimate

morally

are mistaken.

The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial

slide.

is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the

stunt

The

connotation of violence or at least of force which

and defending are taken to imply (use of)

or

force

use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
resist

cannot

proceeds

Hence

(p.415).

and

violence,

so

to

Hence

the

also

Narveson's

assumption

that

against attack' (pp.417-8).

to

and

so

pacifism

render

a

much

less

can

be

resisted,

without

by

Force can be applied, as in opening

sliding out of handcuffs and running away).

a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;

and

violence.

things like arrest, without violence (e.g.

even

be

But

defensible position.

positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things

a

If the stunt were got away with, it would

deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action

resistance,

be

unwarranted

"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended

to

Hence the conflation of T2 and

excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.

pacifist

here

Narveson

Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,

equate with violence.

R2;

the

Violence implies

and it is violence, not all applications

of

force,

that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.

The attempt
nonviolent

to

castrate

practices,

any case indefensible.

development

themselves
compromise,

and
from

pacifism,

by

of

it

depriving

the

range

of

is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in

It enjoys some popularity even

among

those

advocating

expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance

older

mediation,

pacifism,

whose

methods

they

see

as

confined

to

negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.

The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;

for

pacifism

has

often

by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods

oeen

presented,

(cf.

even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously

4

said

pacifism

of

'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by

that

negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities

added).

and

of

total

doctrine

of

non-resistance

non-cooperation with any form of warfare':

But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether

or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:

to

italics

comprehensive

nothing excludes resistance,

uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.

It

is

simply

that

comprehensive

pacifism

has

not yet developed its fuller

potential, especially in conflict resolution.

Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against

just

variations

qualifier.

on

those

pacifism

are

given, writing violence-involving in as an internal

Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in

terms

of

'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's

'opposition

to

If

violence'.

this

slide

were

pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in

case

of

the

permissible any
being

opposed

to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it

is

Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though

not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make

much of in his main inconsistency argument.

5.

In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.

But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.

5

A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument

inconsistency

based

pacifism theme,

P2(R).

on

to

notion of rights, especially as it figures in the

the

transformed to the claim

No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).

For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in

notion

of

The

right.

initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from

breaches of a right and of
Because

very

the

action

preventative

against

infringement

'a right just is a status justifying preventative action ...

of

it.

what does

follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent

infringements of his right' (p.419).

That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out

to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide - to

such

incorporate

things

Moreover 'it is a logical truth,

as social pressure.

not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For

these

necessary

the

against

question

(p.421)!

nonviolent

quite indefensibly strong.
him

be,

to

to

or

be

limited

to,

In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is

action.

entitle

rights

with

The argument accordingly

To block the argument it is enough for

pacifism.

associated

preventative action

not

force'

logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative

action must have the notion of violence built into it.

begs

is

to

For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does

kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if

such action is necessary in the circumstances to

prevent

infringement

of

his

right.

to

How the argument from rights leads

inconsistency

is

summed

thus

up

(p.421):
SAI.

'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent

the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.

We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence

done

to us', as a consequence of the objection to avoid violence.

But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is

self-contradictory,

both

granting

and not granting the right to use violence.

The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.

claiming

Narveson

that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.

6

is

mistaken

p.423).

in

That a

right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending

require that that action is violent.

action

does

Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis

of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by

simply

rejecting

the

Narveson

not

slide^.

What

for

SAI,

appears in place of SAI is

something like
SAI#.

If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.

But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,

facto,

give

an entitlement to the use of violence.

no dilemma for the pacifist.

not,

does

ipso

Without the slide there is

The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide

are

two aspects of the one thing.

The arguments from lesser

§2.

violence

and

In

evil.

lesser

outline

the

argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must

admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
those

be

would

where

Inconsistency

some
is

morally
use

of

immediate

permissible
violence

by T2.

and morally justified.

would

evil,

of

The cases are

greater

violence.

More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms

which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser

much

prevent

use

to

admit

both

that

the

some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and

that it is not admissible because it involves violence.

An argument

like

this

as gets summarized as follows:-

It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.

Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like
'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.

7

supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force ?.

these

Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.

It

is

to

important

them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the

get

ethical place of pacifism

is

to

result.

The

from

argument,

basic

lesser

violence, goes as follows:Cl.

There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.

C2.

One ought to minimize violence.

Therefore
C3.

There are cases where one ought to use violence,

since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
*^P2.

the

indicated,

cases

violence

is

Therefore

It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,

contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,

according

to

it

which

is

morally

wrong, always, to use violence.

All the ingredients
premisses,

can

be

of

this

argument,

together

with

pulled together from Narveson's work.

support

for

the

He not only espouses

C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects

the

argument with the lesser evil argument:El.

(Use of) violence is an evil.

E2.

Evil should be minimized.

The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,

E3.

One ought not to undertake violence

-

period;

that

is,

the

level

of

violence ought to be zero.

Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.

7.

J.

8.

Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).

9.

See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.

8

Neither argument is decisive;

of

that

reference

they

both in fact begin easing pacifists into a

frame

resist, where moral absolutes are warped into

should

moral relatives, where obligations give way

to

obligations-other-things-being-

In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at

equal, etc.

all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one

compatible

got

E3

it.

into

is

directives quite different from minimization where violence is

with

rooting it out, which may

involved, e.g.

has

involve

nonminimization

strategies.

Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to C2

- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to

prepared

violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social

accept

justice.

Nor do El and E2 entail 02;

so neither does

principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept 02.

by

commitment

violence^",

evil—perpetrating
Narveson's

such

e.g.

but

argument

some

increases

well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an

non-violent

fails

to

For in particular, violence

is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by

in

pacifists

for

dictator.

similar

reasons.

Regan's

reconstruction

of

Regan argues from premisses

concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.

The use of force is a substantive evil.

4.

Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).

The argument is invalid:

be

preferred

to

a

great

an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering

force, even when force is an evil.

of

It is enough to observe that increasing force may

still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.

Resort to the theme that

Elt.

Violence is an irredeemable evil

(proposed by Regan in his

by

Narveson,

defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and

Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.

subsequently

considered

An irredeemable evil is

figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)

10.

An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.

9

will lighten its hue;

now

it always dominates.

Elt together with E2 will yield C2,

but

What are the grounds for that?

the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.

As

Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to

countenance

some

small

amount

of violence in exchange for considerable goods.

(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it

was

not

too

Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get

gross.)

pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,

by

indeed it seems to get

It does break the argument however;

underwriting C2.

them

in

for it removes Cl

and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument

from

lesser evil, which starts from

DI.

There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.

For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil

than that tainted with violence;

requires.

however

pacifism

is

no

of

pacifism

(see

(utilitarian

which

Rp.80ff.),

into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous' position (Rp.86),

extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines

But the approach

greater

and there are accordingly no cases such as DI

This is the core of Regan's defence
converts

there

through

violence

as

an

irredeemable

evil

is

a

.

mistaken

inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,

like other deontological positions, grounded upon.

But such absolutes are adequately

expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons

otherwise

don't

arise,

or

for

acting

other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not

11.

That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.'
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.

12.

Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.

10

come what may, period.
such

pacifism

as

is

Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,

at

collide

bottom,

head-on

more fashionable, highly

with

malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at

time) were working from.

The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...

is incompatible with pacifism':
some

one who acts

for the utility 'that will be brought out

by

may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)

violence

the

according

to

the

to

utilitarian-commandment

maximize

doing
13

So

.

utility

may

sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.

On its own inconsistency with a false

little:

every

position

doctrine

inconsistency

suffers

such

with

utilitarianism

as

very

many

false doctrines.

Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism

odds

the

with

contractarianism.

other

ethical

positions

But this argument would

only

no deeper ecological

position

insidious,

is

however,

for

Firstly, as we

such as pacifism.

generally,

have

have

provisional.
theory-saving

seen,

made

at

also

libertarianism

were

it

and

otherwise

however they are not, including

has

which

happened

is

more

it

utilitarianism,

seem

as

climate

unfavourable

to

incompatible

There are two more specific damaging features.

and

consequentialist

approaches

more

no deontic principle were firm, but all are

if

The theory of prima facie principles

This is entirely mistaken.

is

a

device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties

such as moral dilemmas.

13.

weight,

is

that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of

ethical thought, thus helping to establish a

positions

What

instance.

presents,

carry

if the positions were suitably exhaustive;

correct,

ethical

he

shows

Secondly, consequentialist positions tend

to

suggest

that

To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18.
It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force. This is
sceptically-based pacifism.

11

only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try

such

positions,

as

into

pacifism,

offering

sometimes

to

rival

ease

incongruous consequential

support for their themes.

Narveson
assumptions

takes

such

procedures

upon pacifists:

stage

a

further,

and

utilitarian

foists

thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence

is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,

in

the

recipients'

These

(p.425).

incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and

what

it

does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as

well

as

those

on

whom

it

is

inflicted.

Even

more

astonishing,

such

utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following

three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):

[N]l.

To will the end (as morally good) is to will the

to

it

(at

Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to

the

means

least prima facie).

[N]2.

greater.

[N]3.

There are no "privileged" moral persons ...

(p.425)^ .

'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist s problem ,
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).

It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out

of the statements given.

such

consequences

For implications to hold the substantive terms such as

'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or

otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.

another,

in

the

implicans;

The intended argument to the

"commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of

variant

on

the

lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles , N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself

14.

and

one's

group,

and

N1

to

ensure

that

:se may be defended on purely
Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.

12

violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.

in

Cl,

in

ethical

an

end.

But,

is

reflected

for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least

dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which

as

the

begs

bound morally to shun violent means.

question

pacifism,

against

Under pacifist reformulation Nl will

give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally

Nl#.

means

acceptable

to it.

For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need

the three principles duly adjusted;

pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;

worry

not

they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.

More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.

This

and

E2

N2

or

inconsistency

is

of

evil)

comprehensive

to

pacifism.

Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one

what is the moral situation here?

to

not

(admissibility

What
of

these

are

them

being

violence)

of

difficult
the

Indeed the example is very similar to

dilemma,

situation

where

turns

on

Jim

shoots

one

of

what account is given of moral dilemmas.

pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian

line

N

But
ought

The situation is that

of

a

paradigmatic

that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing

squad about to shoot several captives if

everything

that

and

cases 15?

N ought to prevent mass murder, but also

kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.

of a moral dilemma.

moral

03

N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).

person

be

the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)

(minimization
in

to

yet

of

trying

them^,

almost

Now

What a comprehensive

take

the

inadequate

to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever

occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima

facie, negotiable, etc., etc.

No, the conflicting obligations stand.

to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try

to

determine

What is
the

best

15.

A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.

16.

The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.

13

do

thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to

the

In

circumstances.

trying

N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.

the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.

that

B.

No inconsistency in pacifism follows.

evil,

minimize

it

Suppose

N had better shoot
is

preferable

to

and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
On the contrary the situation

N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had

fix.

a

that

Even granted

it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.

remains

to

is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,

what

determine

in

There is the real-life complication

better do so^.

of

dilemma,

moral

a

but

no

inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.

Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.

the

argument

The question presents a dilemma:

If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)

is

its

use

Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to

be

raped.

No, it is not deonticly justified^.

and

amount to making out a case.

But

justification

on

proposes

is

solution,

back-up

ambiguous,

in

p.423).

against

may

dilemma

a

another

argument, taking his proposals as evident.

pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument

and

just

situation.

the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is

morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing

no

It is certainly not morally

The response is qualified then because some force might

be consequentially justified, as a second-best

presents

is

it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its

deontic origin in 'making right'.

Narveson,

one

Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer

is a qualified No:

obligatory,

from

pacifism

-

person

but

he

As it is not - the

lead

to

a

decisive

(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.

What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.

17.

This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.

18.

An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.

14

The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral

§3.

its

adherence

to

unexceptionable

fanaticism, so Hare contends.^

principles

Insofar

as

such

Hare

as

manages

insensitivity.
P2,

to

Through

pacifism is a form of

get

his

remarkable

accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:

the

pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(P.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting

stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's

dilemmas

moral

deceptively neat two-level

thought,

into

intuitive

Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution

pacifism.

himself

helps

moral

of

to,

without

any

violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.

redefinition,

a

Harey-fanatic,

e.g.

p.175).

Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.

Hare's

Hare

of the requisite supporting argument, according to

which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,

on

and

pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme

comprehensive

But

critical.

classification

A fanatic

is a person who adheres to ideals which

diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.

p.170)!

Since

comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as

already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)

namely

tends,

towards the

pacifists are Harey—fanatics. This
usual

whether they are

sense:

whether

The

'bigoted'.

idea

that

violence

in many situations, such

does not of course make them

fanatics

position comprises

their

of

appropriateness

'wild

of

some

of

pacifist principles^.

the

depends on the very different matter of
or

extravagant opinions'

or

(OED)

is

pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an

appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,

founders

in

fanatics,

and

the

the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions

hardly be, all of the condemned type.

of

such

thinkers

Whence the conclusion follows.

are

not,

can

By this simple

syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.

19.

R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.

15

All

page

Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's

satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being

as

Jewish,

is

completed,

it

there^^ fanaticism

wearing

beads

Naturally, given that using of characterising

or

moral

hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant

can

matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:

blue

For however the sensitive task matter of using

morally relevant.

violence as morally irrelevant.
relevance

more

earlier,

those

of

applying

this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up

at the end of §4).

Does it really matter then that

fanatics?

it

Although

argument that it does.
homework

appears

pacifists,

that

though

not

Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had

guess

what,

they

their

done

the

Thus, e.g.
p.15:

go

over

to

Hare's

As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great

store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...

20.

Harey-

properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would

utilitarianism).

of

are

it does not matter in the least, Hare has an

abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,

logic

fanatics,

concepts

A.

based [entirely] on

involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several

Naess, Gandhi and Group

Conflict,

Universitetsforlaget,

...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.

the

R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace — from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.

16

Oslo,

crucial points.

objectionable

to

getting

Before

of

feature

these

of

some

theory.

The

a

highly

Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in

which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level

is

there

details,

procedure

adopted

is

methodologically

Hare's

of

own

radically unsound

because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at

the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way

above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic

rejected

Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.

which

logic,

already

But

since

that

Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some

to Hare's utilitarianism).

important opponents of utilitarianism.

In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and

comprise

intuitionists

moral

and

pure

Impure

impure.

fanatics

who stick to their deontic

deontologists,

principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what

calls

'critical

thinking'.

Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme

pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal

clearly'

Hare

or

inability

to

facts

face

or

to

think

involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,

(p.170)

originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).

But

cases

this

comprehensive

bit

intuitive

principles

conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28

dirty-trick

philosophy

can

where

of

pacifists

are

presumably

"pure

willing to think critically, but somehow survived

opinions

different

from

here

be

fanatics";

the

ordeal

those of the utilitarian' (p.171).

set

aside,

still

holding

his

argument

is

correct

argument is not correct.

See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.

17

moral

They are in fact "pure

to

be

According to Hare there cannot be

inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if

since

for they are 'able and

fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out

22.

of

(p.171).

Therefore,

his

One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure

to

consider

the

possibility

a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical

that

assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians

(cf.

other

p.177 ff.) depends on preference

reasons.

substitution,

preferences

For

which

can

be

one,

argument (e.g.

Hare's

requires

a

base

class

intersubstituted.

Hare,

chauvinistically contracts this base class

representation

whole

of

to

ff.).

p.176

preference-havers,

in

the

of

course

There

are

whom

among

his

discussion

humans.Differently,

certain

the

of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to

familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.

As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this

is

less

an

argument

a

than

damaging charge:

A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).

The smear is not without basis.

applied

to

avert

greater

Regan is envisaging

where

situations

violence

and he points to what he takes to be the evident

evil;

moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free

from

an

aspiring

rapist'

is

Interestingly,

(Rp.86).

has

Regan

situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:

herself

not described the

there is nothing

in

to

prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and

fleeing.

What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the

(perhaps

wilful)

that

infliction

death, by forceful means^ (cf.

mere

use

of

of

damage,

non-negligible

Np.110);

that is, which

physical force or power (or energy).

including pain, injury or

involves

much

more

than

And it is by no means so evident

that the woman is entitled to

inflict

violence

from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way

is

duly

separated

violence

upon

the

aspiring

rapist.

Once

that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.

23.

On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.

18

class,

see

R. and

V.

But

a

straightforward

action

violence

disentangling

defective

It

is

of

subcase

not

depend

force

by

is

means

no

of
on

violence.

a

tight

Fortunately

characterisation

what

indicate

some

done, in the way of inflicting damage.

constraints

Firstly,

presupposed.

force:

is

legalised force,

violence,

so

violence,

a

on

satisfactory

violence

is

not

applied

on

behalf

account

adequately
of

some

of

violence,

where no force is applied.

violence.)

24.

supposed

that

and

are

which

distinguished as illegitimate

"legitimate

authority,

long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.

so often mistakenly

of

However it is important to

is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.25 Secondly, violence is not

of

the

enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of

actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through

so

Indeed the literature on nonviolent

characterisations

arguments developed in this paper do

violence.

a

matter as may at first seem.

with

abounds

as

the

is

Violence
threat

(This only needs emphasizing because it is

threats,

intimidation

and

the

like,

involve

Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.

Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
"economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.

19

There can be unintentional violence, e.g.

the women may have applied violent

Fourthly, such matters as the distance

without intending to, in escaping the rapist.

at which force is applied and the indirectness of

military operations, are irrelevant.

modern

means,

the

means,

as

instance

for

in

The submarine operator who, by causally

pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian

city

instigates

violent

a

By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not

act.

in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined

to

action

done

against

persons,

means.

but

can

violence

Finally,

be

directed

not

is

against

other

life-forms, as will soon emerge.

Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and

the

from

fact

that

one

of

them^

derives

violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that

there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts

violence greater than zero.

of

Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to

matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on

most sides when we look.

Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on

small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral

certainly

will

problems.

They

give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2

they mean 'nontrivial violence'.

Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not

taking

obvious

steps

passivity and pacifity.

to

prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of

Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.

p.425) assume

that

pacifism

25.

The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence'
is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.

26.

Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.

20

This is far from true, as the variety of methods

is a passive do-nothing position.

or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.

considered

Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of

Otherwise,

Narveson

negative

later

Narveson's

action.

nonviolent

hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)

would

way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).

Neither Regan nor

doing

assessment

nonviolence' does not change the situation:

for this

of

anything

about'

violence

what

calls

'positive

positive

he

approach

simply

is

nonviolence practised in an exemplary :.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential

or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.

extent

when

assembled^,

much

the

reduce

of

and

training

the

Fuller details of these practices,

the

of

impact

nonviolent

argument

from

social

irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.

§4.

The

argument

corollaries.

The

from

radical

practice

political

corollaries

by

definition.

But

from

other

awkward

of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.

war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.

war

and

the

position

Although normally war would be excluded,

Standard pacifism takes

For
out

of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what

of

dilemma

situations?

War

would

always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances

it might be the (second-) best thing

27.

to

do.

A

strange

pacifism!

Comprehensive

The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.

As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).

28.

See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.

21

pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast

to

extreme

pacifism.

Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to

If

extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.

is

given

a

large

suitably

that

evil

weighting then second-best choices will yield the same

results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.

Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate

since

wars,

of

war

an

as

or

mounted from

upon

rely

the

institutions.

only

obviously police and military forces but

many of their institutions, most

legal

state

arrangements,

States are however desirable social institutions,

typically depend on violent means.

and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just

comprehensive

implies

pacifism

the

of

inadmissibility

institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;

be ruled out either
individuals,

as

directly

delegates,

who

violence-dispensing
violence

effect

however exclude the replacement of such
forces,

by

nonviolent

nonviolent means.
state;

but

it

substitutes,

is

nonviolent

methods

or

such organisations may

else

because

their behalf.
evolved

will

Pacifism

institutions concerned with

does

not

public

that

order

have

Pacifism does not

organisations

maintain

they

by
fully

as

police

alternative
nonviolent

will be applied, where necessary, to

The force of the objection should thus not

entail
order,

sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.

22

the

and

are

coercive

actively

Law and authority can still operate then in the

back-up authority and "enforce" laws.

overestimated.

on

recently
which

wars,

A more telling objection, then, is

no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that

which

violence-underpinned

these

of

directly

less

institutions

and a more general argument may be

and

nation-states

particular,

or

arrangements

social

inevitability,

or

not without much further ado.

least

extensively:

violence

desirability,

In

at

institution,

However wars are by no means the

dispense

exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all

nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the

reasonable costs;
desirability

are

wars

would

it

elimination

accordingly

of
does

Nor is it true that

prominent

not

be

social

succumb

to

pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).

A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
noncoercive,

arrangements.

political

arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply

the

absence

or

illegitimacy

of

government,

political community organised under a government.

state

with

authority

and

not

necessarily

pacifism does not entail anarchism.

main

implies

it

Accordingly,

that

not

does

or therefore of a state, of a

Nor does

it

even

that

imply

a

certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral

dilemmas of political organisation.
and

only

pacifism

Comprehensive

or (differently)

objective,

attained,

not

was

Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based

on

the free agreements of individuals,

Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:

a

nonviolent

Indian

genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism
simple as derivability.

Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a

it was not the

state;

replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.

moral

his

Granted there

are

they are not so

so

ideal

easily

brought down by its political corollaries.

Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than

concerning
like:

external

and

internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the

it also tells against the received treatment of

example.

While

other

species,

animals

for

it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating

of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.

29.

those

At least it does this

so

long

Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).

23

as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is

humans (or persons).
restriction.

30

controversial
euthanasia,

the category by restriction of the application of violence to

from

removed

not

There is little good basis
in

And,

humans,

of

violence?

At

the

suicide,

But

must

creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.

simply

the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature

killing

of

No force need be applied:

in

a

eats

and dies painlessly and without a struggle.

The

or

pill

given

is

life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?

technical

purely

arrangements

pacifist

will

to

objections

in

solve,

eating

meat

worthwhile

On the face of
obtained.

so

New

any rate, the disruption of

at

principle

an

Then the proper objections to

such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that

it, there are no

they

risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples

like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.

injection

several

into

e.g.

So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve

chauvinistic

spread

corollaries

killing

a

such

indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.

punishment,

capital

the

concerning

for

however

similar

case,

any

areas

moral

and

violence,

practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.

But suppose now that the new technology

is

as the anti-neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
which

by

further

clever

newly devised "weapons", such

scientists, working in their accustomed military role:

devices

much

extended

property

but

not

people,

or

"dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence.

just

Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these

reaches

of

technological

For "dissolving" people requires energy,

fantasy.

which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:

Was

(upgraded)

account

of

that is, the new wars will still involve violence.

there

old-fashioned

however

violent

anything
methods

wrong

so

such

as

with

hunting

eating

meat

obtained

by

more

or raising and killing one's own?

Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural"

iO.

an

behaviour

of

creatures

to

cit.
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.

24

which the principles are supposed to apply.

Aggression is a fairly common feature of

and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made

animal

out) erupts in violence.

ways,

various

for

The force of the

example

along

these

argument

can

however

Aggression

lines.

is

assumed to be an

evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for

(of

their offspring) in their natural environment.

and

themselves

ir

mitigated

be

survival

But most humans

now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations

which

evolution

for

gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to

adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).

Much

humans

as

have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent

practices,

now

ill-adapted

to

their

and mostly counterproductive.

situation

So

argues the pacifist.

is a residual problem,

There

like

that

of

and tribal

people, to be condemned as morally

Sometimes,

yes,

Are

wrong

when

predators

involve

these

the

violence?

when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to

Though a way

but always?

can

it is a rather unsatisfactory way.

problem

vegetarianism.

creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as

practices

be attained:

confronting

beaten

be

the

around

of

edge

this

What this suggests is that nonviolence

is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.

The arguments for

nonviolence

-

which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence

and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -

sort

of

But

conclusion.

exclude.

nonviolent

what

is

called

charge

for

state,

is

is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at

This is^ to concede

an

of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as

P2 remains unqualified.

31.

would

The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral

sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.

attentuated

similar

approaches

thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that

a

the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,

since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically

suggest

The sheer moral power of such pacifism

As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.

25

vegetarianism:

is

one

see

reason

e.g.,

for

Animal

There is no reason however why

giving its adoption some pause.

a

genuine

pacifism

(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.

Nothing logically rules out such a genuine

and

more sensitive pacifism.

There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In

particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts

similar to those using violence:
This

is

a

requirement

of

otherwise they could have a case made against them.

in a different sense from the pure logical

consistency

sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for

well.

pacifism,

Again there need be no deep problem

so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must

be a single principle

(e.g.

just

P2)

-

as

distinct

from

a

bundle

of

moral

principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving

violence.32 To meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be

integrated

into

a

in

larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a

piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.

mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and

oceans.

In

an

does

not

destructive

such things as strip
wastes

in

streams

extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property

picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.

vandalism

particular,

cover

violence

But

even

metaphorically,

against persons (and certainly not nonphysical

violence such as "psychological violence").

What is sought then

is

an

appropriate

of these notions covering destructive practices;

and also an accompanying

synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.

Then P2 is superseded by

synthesis

an appropriately qualified

P2#.

It is morally wrong to use vandolence.

It remains to characterise

the

cluster

of

destructive

practices

that

count

as

vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.

32.

It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.

33.

The position has been called 'pacifism.

26

APPENDICES

§ 5.

from

arguments

The

and

pacifism in the real world.

of

impracticality

impracticality

reality:

social

the

alleged_

Even if it is conceded that pacifism

is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still

the

feasibility

of

pacifism

as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -

despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to

be

that

admitted

the

pacifism to severe tests.

real

world,

with

all its horror and squalor, does put

But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.

Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less

than in replacing war^.

prepared

for

to

likely

succeed

Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual

violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they

properly

And it has

or

given

a

have

been

never

The prospects for success of

dress rehearsal.

nonviolent defence of a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
convention

is

observed

or not.

If the convention is observed then pacifism stands

reasonable prospects of success.

The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps

unleashed,

in

broken,

is

and

violence

is

According to Walzer, in his

massive ways, on noncombatants.

superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,

'success

is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -

...

and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).

attained

-

there

is

conventions are flouted.

reasons,

some

got homesick.
ruthless

of

This is

presumably

be

never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give

them irrelevant, e.g.

up

and

depart

for

all

sorts

or

they needed a quick decisive victory, they

What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:

invaders

may

Success

false.

that

sufficiently

in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support

34.

The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit

35.

Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op.cit.
references given there.

36.

All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.

27

See also

M. Walzer,

Martin,

Just

and

of

war)

op.cit.,

Unjust

is

and

Wars,

But that sort of thing is also true even if the

lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending

to violence.

resorts

side

The difference lies in the pattern of events;

is

if the defence "forces" are well-armed it

invaders

to

easier

and

with

start

difficult

more

than

afterwards

and

with

costly

the

for

civil

well -prepared

resistance.

Walzer is

nonviolent

the

of

model

the

in

way

enslaved

Jews,

misleading

The

way.The

Nazis,

many

like

who

to

jump

that

conclusion

the

cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of

defence

inappropriate examples.

command,

however,

thinking,

who

He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian

the

in

state,

total

Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the

the

population,
by

The

"resistance"

picture

is

highly

and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
invaded

never

Germany,

were

in

control

the

all

or

For

infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took

over

and

managed

all

key

Australia it is not even so clear
largely

united

and

actively

With island territories such as

infrastructure.
that

resisting

this

is

which

logistically

population.

Walzer's

feasible

against

impression

resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.

a

of the
Wp.332)

might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.

Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
No state would be prepared to risk

way

in

37.

It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.

38.

The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.

present

state-determined circumstances.

28

training its

populace

different).

It

in

would

full

techniques

defence

(civil

all too easy for them to "rout" the police:

be

then

action

nonviolent

is

civil

obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.

The argument

thus

far

§6.

On the positive case for pacifism:

has

been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.

That in itself is revealing.
deviations

from

it

are

initial sketchings.

Pacifism is the

what

require

rest

position

explanation.

(inertial

and

state)

The reason for this is simple

violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of

enough:

it is what has to be justified.

Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of

and

merely

justified.

case

try

privileged

dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be

to

in

that

the

defender

(person

or

nation)

is

morally—excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the

position

The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:

curious

is

its

the
in

already

a

Still

bounds.

defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have

situation.

to

use

it, he should not resort to it.

An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can

be

adapted

to give a similar result:-

Violence is (intrinsically) wrong

Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.

self-defence) is still violence

Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.

Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic

already glimpsed will begin.

None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are

deductively

tight

assumptions

can

be

challenged

arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for

pacifism,

(as

above).

Nor

One of the poorer positive

are all the
arguments

for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory

29

of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,

that

nuclear

or

chemical

case is overstated.

hope

weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an

illusion, escalation is inevitable.

are bound to be overstepped.

the

e.g.

The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are

-

Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the

Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.

Wars are much

more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped

things intervene (e.g.

(as

support

more

should

midstream

for

first

the

those

inevitably,
premiss

above)

for

mixture

a

suffering

and

anguish

of

violent

the

methods,

They

nonviolence.

of

consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,

important

a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).

The main reasons for pacifism are,

include

in

injustice

characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of

means-ends

cost

the

in

violence

that

violence

within

the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as

more

less furtive, society.

open,

the why of

pacifism)

considerable.

These

are

None of these well-known types of reason (giving

separately

decisive,

but

their

cumulative

affords a model for one way of proceeding^:

Mill's

defence

Mill's

procedure

works

(st

least

As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.

30

of

liberty

nonviolence,

it works as well as it works for

liberty).

39.

is

it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)

to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for

otherwise

effect

reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong

positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.

as

a

A

decisive

more

consequentialist

data.,

argument,
takes

a

but

making

semantical

preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds

modelling

nonviolence

Again

principles.

use

and

The data is used to arrive at

route.
are

practical

similar

of

then

pacifism

in

applied

is

derived

semantically
principled

as

nonviolence.0

R.

40.

Routley*
*

The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.

* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.

31

while

the

author

was

a

research

OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:

R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.

D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.

Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
and
13.
14.
15.

R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A note on R_
* matrices, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.

Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
10.

R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning$of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war—deterrence and the political fall-out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in
rational behaviour under rival paradigms.

/

/-

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