Box 15, item 1721: Notes and cuttings on environmental ethics

Box 15, item 1721: Notes and cuttings on environmental ethics

Handwritten notes and annotated photocopy (2 copies) of Routley R (1973) 'Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?', Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1:205-210.

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The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 15, item 1721

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IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW, AN ENVIRONMENTAL, ETHIC?
Richard Routley (Australia)

§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new
ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ­
ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and
plants which grow upon it' (| 1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal
with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as
he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject
to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with
others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to
this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­
ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing
views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is
beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required
to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct
what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand,
as he himself-explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not
taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the
woods ofTa 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into
the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ (UJ), p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be
accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a
new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics
may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a
1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits
2 To the consternation nodoubt of Quineans But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary
systems the identity of which may be indeterminate

205

single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilisation: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin­
ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [21) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfcctor. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be preserv­
ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com­
fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature — all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions
both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some
evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they
do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite
natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a
principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for
human ends, “humanized”.
As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so
straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such
proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump­
tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi­
tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa­
tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.
2. -A^ we noticed-(an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic,
and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S
3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least
as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature
4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions

206

'^"es
- a( SeS’a,Pr0pos^r th«>ry whlch in.
is, near enough, a proposit1or ., ~"f'm (1.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in--.:ludes ( like individuals of a th• . a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set
° of general
or to‘other
he^er conduct.
to verselytypically
to its of
thers
obligatory,
or isonf
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n’ untableand wrong,
what
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evaluativeOnjudgements
of what are rights, what is valued, and !>O forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a
principle; and certainly if systems S, and S2 contain _different principles, then they are different
systems. It follows that any en\llnnmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethic5 lifTer from Western ethical systems on some core principle
embedded in Western systems, then ,hese systems differ from the Western super ethic (assurring,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental
ethic is needed t!ien a new ethic is wanted It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environmental count,·r examples to 1t.
It 1s commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical
systems. principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed
in the Golden Ruk I w ,des one example. Directly relevant here. as a good stab at a core principle.
is the com111unli, formulated liberal principle 0f the moqified flominan"-,~siti on..A recent for-""•..._ ,/c,.,.M,....,,, ~ lo/,'/
mulation~ runs a, follows ( 131, p. 58}:
'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he
wishes, providing ( I) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not hkel 1 to harm himself
irreparably.'
Let us call this prmciple basic (/Funan) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people,
come fir~t and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom
principle because it gives perm1ss10n to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which
mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to
cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is wortti remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a rc,tnction tu the I usual) interests of others; it is not enough that 1t is in my
interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being
anywa~ because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to e~actly what counts
as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the pnnciple is so far obscure because 'other' ma~
be filled out in significantly diffen:nt 11, ays. it makes a difference to the e,itent, and pri, ilege, of the
chauvinism whether 'other' expands to ·other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'peradequacy
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versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
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e.
whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unand
others,
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It ysK" ^nled in des<gning anaJ ).
"ple ™' last m,„
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semantical
workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others.
,(
.,
■ „di examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a
It is taken for granted in designing counter
·~ .....-<;,_
semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations , ... ~#...
ideal
some
in
(which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds
situation, what is obligatory in every id.:al situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal
situation. But the mam point to grasp for the counter example\ that follow, is that ethical principles
if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations.
-(i) The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system
lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as a• the best abattoirs). What he doc~ 1s quite permissible according to ba 1c chauvinism,
but on environmental ground~ what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard Mr Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that raof corresponding
in' advance
dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental
usurne direction ’’
^""oplos
shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles}.
(ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rul!! out
«rcorre
p„
that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
the spossibility
Otherwise one could as well 1..ons1der science fiction cases where peoole arrive at a new planet and

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207
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destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation,
and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­
vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­
ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the
principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co­
operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the
basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.
(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’.
Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex­
ample to the industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours.
(iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic­
ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a
source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the
whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up­
set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist: nor need whale hun­
ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through
destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many
plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in
eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to
basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will
not cease allocating whale^ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics
would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the
blue whale population is no longer viable—if that point has not already been passed.

In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly
circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en­
vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in
dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac
tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way ? No. what these people do is to a
greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar
as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial
development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain­
ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory
6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in 131

2^°;™ pn"c,p e ls 3 morc d,flku11 matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be
made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by
the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude speciepide. It may be
preferable, m view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it
altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights.
rei2tsArhadRaJ change-ri" a ^eory some,,mcs forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
jects the Reference Theory tn 4 thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for
logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a
meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen­
tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation, for meta-ethical
analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such
characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and per­
missibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as
\alue and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec­
tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a verv
brie! examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some
major positions,7
Hart (in |5|) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical
doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human ... capable of
choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a
human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental
ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural
right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes
the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the
classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with
respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that
long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees
have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since
artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object
do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or
piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be
mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with
mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and
so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever
has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in­
terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can
(significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have
rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically
anything at all.
r
J
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of
conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions
typica ly employ a single criterion p. such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum;
characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including
future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of afTairs, of
the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as
in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism,
in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is
transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace
persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing
P°’ntS arC deVdOped by thOSC protcstin« about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays

testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may
be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base
class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto
ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly,
from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of
most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective
demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue
whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in
the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
‘‘rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the
blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­
sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for
deciding on what is environmentally desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the
same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer
some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a
matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights
and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
~^^base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some
* v^gue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case
if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is
too bad for them: that is (rough) justice.

REFERENCES
1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966).
2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished).
3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the
Problem, New York (1972).
4. S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment
of non-humans, London (1971).
5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford
(1967).

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■

IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW, AN ENVIRONMENTAL, ETHIC?

Richard Routley (Australia)

§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new
ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ­
ment, in Leopold's words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and
plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as
he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject
to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with
others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to
this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­
ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing
views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is
beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required
to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct
what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand,
as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not
taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the
woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into
the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be
accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a
new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics
may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a
1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits
2 To the consternation .nodoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary
systems the identity of which may be indeterminate

205

is, near enough: ~ propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes ( like md1v1duals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general
evaluative Ju~gements co~cermng conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong
of_ what ~re rights, what _is valued, and so forth. A ~eneral or lawlike proposition of a system is ~
prmc1ple, and certainly 1f syst~ms S, and S2 contam different principles, then they are different
systems. It foll?ws t~at any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreo~er 1f environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle
embedded m Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming
wh~t _seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environm~ntai
eth1_c 1s needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environmental counter examples to it.
It is com_monly assu_med that_ there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical
~ystems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed
~n the Golden Rule provides o~e example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle,
ts the . commonly formulated hberal pnnc1ple of the modified dominance position .. A recent for: · " • "'• ,;, /'' /,'. /
~·- - ·· ..._
mulation 5 runs as follows ( [ 3 I, p. 58):
. 'The liberal philosophy of the Wes tern world holds that one should be able to do what he
wishes, prov1dmg ( 1) that he d0es not harm orhers and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself
irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people.
co_me_ first and everyt_hmg else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom
pnnc1ple becaus~ 1t gives perm1ss1on to perform a wide range of actions (including actio.ns which
mess_ up the ~nv1ronment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to
c_unn_mgly shift the onus of pro?fto others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restrict10n 1s narrower than a restnct1on to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my
mterests, because. I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being
anyway, because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts
as harm or mter_ference. Mor~over the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may
be fill~d. out m s1gmficantly different ways: it makes a difference to the e~tent, and privilege, of the
cha~vm1s~ whe~her '.other' _ex~ands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'person or to _other sent1~nt be1~g ; and 1t mak~s a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic apphcab1hty, to which class of others it is intended to apply whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable
future others, a?d. whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and 1t 1s generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. ' //4-_ ItIt_ is taken for granted. in_ d_e_signing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a ....,. /..~..., . (
sem_antical analysis of perm1ss1b1hty and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations r.,.·-=-"'t.. :.;1 -c.:
, · ~/:_
(".~-htch may be mcon:iplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
ideal
every
in
s1tuat10n, what 1s obl_1gato_ry in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded
~1tuat10n. But the_mam pomt to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles
· t·
1f correct are umversal and are assessed over the class of I·deal s1tua
ions.
(') Th z
collapse of the world system
the
1
_survi~ing
perso~)
(or
man
e as_t ma~ e~a~ple. The last
lays ~bout him, ehmmatmg, ~s far as he can, e~ery !tvmg th_mg, animal or plant (but painlessly if
iou hke, a~ at the best abattoirs). What he does 1s qmte permissible according to basic chauvinism
ut on envir?nmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit~
~~d \o e~ot~nc values to regard M'.. Las_t Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra~cfa th mkmg a nd val~es have shifted m an environmental direction in advance of corresponding
s .. 1 ts m the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles).
(u) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects h_a~~ blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out
~e pos~1b1hty that what these pe~ple d~ harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
therwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and

single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-Europea n small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions
both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some
evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they
do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite
natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a
3
principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for
human ends, "humanized".
As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so
straightforwa rd; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is riot
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such
proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for m~ny thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.
a ~pecific ethic,
/§ 2. -As. we noticed----(a~ ethic is ambi~uous, as bet_ween a specifi~ ethical system,
and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S
./
3 If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least
as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use p1 inciple is tied to the resource view of nature
4-A meta-elhic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions

5 A related principle is that (modified) free c.1tcrprise can operate

I

il

11 ,·thi'n

s· -1 1- •
1m1 ar 1m11s

207

destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
ar,imal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation,
and all ~emaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the
principles enjoined ·by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or cooperation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the
basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of reasons", the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.
(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving outpJt to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since h~
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off'.
Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours.
(iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a
source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the
whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through
destruction of its habitat by man's activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many
plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The l?ehaviour of the whalers in
eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accqrdingly quite permissible-at least according to
basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will
not cease allocating whal~[~ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental econo_mics
would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the
blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment _is more narrowly
circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respe~ted industrialists fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of ;he sort described, in a morally impermissible way~ No, what these people do _is to a
greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For exampl_e, mso~ar
as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an mdustnal
development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is _the slau~hter of the last_ remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvm1sm as a satisfactory
6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [31

freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be
made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by
the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be
preferable , in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof. simply to scrap it
altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct. as in a bill of rights.
§ 3. A radical change in a {eory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for
logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a
meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmentally important notions, such as conservation, pollu1io11, growth and presen•atio11,for meta-ethical
analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such
characteristic actions as na1ural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights: it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as
i-alue and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejection o [ many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very
brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some
major positions. 7
Hart (in I 5]) accepts. subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical
doctrine of natural rights according to which. among other things, 'any adult human . .. capable of
choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a
human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an em iron mental
ethic rt::jects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the deflni1io11 of a natural
right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes
the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the
classical notion of a natural right. a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with
rcspc:ct to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that
lon g ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees
have rights (though such a view is occa~ionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since
artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object
do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or
piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right n_ot to _be
mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with
mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and
so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever
has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests . Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can
(significantly) have rights. and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have
rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth. to practically
anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of
conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions
typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summ.um_ bonu_m;
characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps mcludmg
future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, 6f
the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either_ ~ire~tl~, as
in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, asin rule-ut1lttanantsm,
in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is
transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embr~ce
persons. or even some animals (at the cost. like that of including remotely future humans, of losing
1 Some of thes< points arc developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays

collec!ed in I 4 I

9
~

iii

208

WJ 6

14

209

testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may
be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base
class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto
ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly,
from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of
most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective
demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue
whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in
the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
“rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the
blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­
sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for
deciding on what is environmentally desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the
same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer
some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a
matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights
and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
_base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some
v v^gue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case
if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is
too bad for them: that is (rough) justice.

REFERENCES
1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966).
2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished).
3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the
Problem, New York (1972).
4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), A nimals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment
of non-humans, London (1971).
5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford
(1967).

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it is none loo clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or al all well worked out. so that the application of identity criteria foi ethics
may remain obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical sy stems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christen ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two,.other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethicszor that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
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? nCW e^h‘C and Prevai,ln8 ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity that prevathng ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
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Indeed Passmore (in |2|) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.-31

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The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic^— Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removeej, eg. vv/zo is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with a ^environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be presen
ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com
fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect galiye - all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being
^usefulness for.human purposes: while on
the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources./ '7Zu^ /fate-

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such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or’romantic, would be new aljigjiu The matter is r
straightforward: for the dominant.ethic has been substantial!v uuaiitle^y the n&er that one is not
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically int^Tes \0tn peers'.
7
> proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the Goiyuuterference assump­
tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position: and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
'* towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which, destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [31) that blends with the modified position;

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. may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa
tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I ^vall
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is, near‘enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in
dudes (like individuals of a theory > a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general
evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligators permissible and wrong.'x* !
of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a \
principle; and certamlv if systems S, and S2contain different principles, then they are different
systems. It follows that anv en onmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin
ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principlaJL
embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming. I
what seems to be so. that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental
ethic /s needed then a new- ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environ mental counter examples to it z

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(which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some idefl^fe
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal ' ■
situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles
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(i) ’ The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system
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eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to
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but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover pne d^gsjtot have to Ke commit
ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly, (the reason l^eing^crhapsthatra
dica! thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding
shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles)./^

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. to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out
the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and

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destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, "
and all remaining forests disappear in favour ofpatfuM or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­
vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly;
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they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­
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effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons’", the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.

(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better ofT’.

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on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a
source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the
whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up
set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun
ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
blue w'hale example are provided by cases where a speues is eliminated or threatened through
destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many
plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in
eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to
basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not However the free-market mechanism will
not cease allocating whale$ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics I
would; instead the market r
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jf vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in­
dustrialists, fishermen and farmers arc behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac
tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a
5 greater or lesser extent eviitand hence in serious vases morally impermissible. For example, insofar
as the killing or forced displacement of primiioe peoples who stand in the way of an industrial
development is morally indefensible and-^r* permissible, so also is the slaughter ol the last remain
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does not commit one to the view

that natural objects such as trees have rights

is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists.
since artefacts are not alive).

(though such a view

But pantheism is false

For moral prohibitions forbidding

certain actions with respect to an object do^riot award that object
a correlative right.

That it would be wrong to mutilate a given

tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of

property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without
seriously stretching the notion of a right).

Environmental views

can stick with,jmainstrean» theses according to which rights

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coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing
obligations, and with corresponding interests and concerns; i.e.,
at least, whatever, has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever^has a right has^interests

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