Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out

Title

Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out

Subject

Typescript (photocopy) draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'War and peace. 1: on the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 5. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University.

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Source

The University of Queensland's Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291, Box 59, Item 1894

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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, Dr. N.A.J. Taylor.

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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.

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iii, [80] leaves. 43.93 MB.

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Manuscript

Text

l 89 - .r

1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N.

Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from
;-1
SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German,
British or Fre nch) viewpoint.
This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial
section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean
s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect
the morality
o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt.
eitlH_•t

t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e
als o
a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with
what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans,
or for the American
sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and
t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the
r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It
c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no
moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear
ar r angemen ts involve.
Mtwh o f

U~A,

CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n
structure of the argument
Pag e No

§O.

Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral

l.

i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the

f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter.
§1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the
2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war.
War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt
featur es o f nucle ar wars.

2

0

§2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations
-~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war.
The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted.
Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus:
s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated.
Li mits of st ate e n titlement.

§3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars.
One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is
pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of
the ke y argumen t elabo r ated.
§L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important
a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ .
Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality ,
p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles.

§ 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~·
De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata:
p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence
not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of
nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the
pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through
<l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the
c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of

1.

5

11

1 !•

17

Page No
!,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es;
separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle:
the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of
this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion
and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism .
AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence .
piu,.,f

Till·lll H.

56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national
daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of
nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas .
The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and
f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate
iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much
less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of
tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode].
§7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their
_supporl e rs.
Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs

37

43

fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the
nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts.

§8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e
ethical res 1lts.
Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate
and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate
approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it.
FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and
geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention.
Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r
1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative
po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons.

49

The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l
mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of
ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to
loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On

Scl1;!1l

t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to

and Anders.

Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption .
Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death
dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e.

H

64

.1,t . . ..

Page No

~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y
a nd on regional strat egies.
Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments
t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration .
Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear
dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons.
Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and
deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution
afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes:
what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation
in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social
and po litical adjus tment.

iii

73

ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!)

NtlCLEAR

DETERRENCE

AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated,
~ Ll

o r n~ arly

HO

th11 n e of even t he larges

d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war.

invo l ve,

and

threatened

sa id

to

so

differ

co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a

CertFdnly ma s sive

PX

hAnges

Gt1ch

as

nuc.le:ir

wars

exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e

neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of
Muc h

at

forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at

bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often
f r om

eit her

just

wars.

new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther

wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will

se rv e

as

initial

ethical

ba se.
Al though nuclear wars are, thus
non ex i s tent
(extrapolat e
va r ie tiea,

objects,
1

nuclear

wa rs

from n very limited
Ia

fnr, only a decidedly

menac1.ng

class

of

proper have several distinctive properties

nu .lear

experlence 2 )

and

come

in

several

particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical

or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)

- - - ------- ---- -1,

The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forc e fully:
'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral
issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could
ima g ine:
we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs
significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures
and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y,
peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h
it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there
implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to
give it , e .g.
sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence,
pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.

2.

an

The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds,
ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality.

111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 •

explosio n

A large-sca le nuclear

involv es

war

of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region;

a [unction of two main parameter s:
distr i bution.

Such

strnt.egic ) nuclear
quant l t leo

of

a

war

war

quantity

diffe rs

which

explosivc n,

ts

markedly

limited,

nnd

(megatonn age

wh ere

from

by

the

a

of

t:,Hget.s

it i s

ex plosive)

limited

assumptio n,

the

to

and

(tactical
much

or

smaller

chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y

arc

cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in
a

given

reg ion.

Though

t he

focus

in

what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir

prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no
nucl.car

arsenal

means

a

separate

st r ike 1

s ince

a

is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1

waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns

second

iss ue ,

et c. ).

4

Because

of

these

of

follow -up

or

connecti ons, much of the ca se made

acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent .
How nuclear wars

reHultlng

d-Lffer

from

oth er

war s:
wars and states and th e
-- ---------- - -- - --

llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war.

of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c
two

party

(or

thinking,

A model
is

th e

severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or

trib e bat tle ~.

A picture of

war

thu s

refle c tion

r e quirement s

for

legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical

on

advances have
trad iti ona l

now
theo ry

ender ed
of

war,

emerg ed,

inapprop riate
ha rdly

and

especiall y

sometimes

surprisin gly,

as

a

result

inapplica ble.

of

The

made no allowance for such

J.

Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially
the type of strike :lnvolved.
Though the sequence is j_mportant for the
mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the
immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge.

4.

'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no
limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars:
t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e
undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven
a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and
present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed
purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European
"theatre'' , is really a myth.

5.

There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of
prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal
wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given,
etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a
mu h deeper wa y,

j

phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s
Tokyo.

rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th

And

j t.'

many

occurred

wi.th

Dre s d e n

and

further crucial effects be yond mass

bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions .
Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument
1Jnchors,

Lo

historica l

were

accounted

unjust

war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control:

the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n
ar1ncd

'war'

of

content io n

or

comba t;

cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience .
but

other

are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8

proLagon ists, antag onists or players;
means

and

or

wrong.

to elabo rate
by

means

of

forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es

in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ;
noun

linkages

G
to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter),
and

of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions
Firstly ,

r e tain

always

a

f nction

of

sens es

of

the

States are the

forces c omprising armed soldiers are

the

a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent
Thus wars ar _ external or internal

states or their rule.

(c.ivi.l),

Thus too wars have grown in

quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have
transform ~d,

and

nuclear

war

has

emerged

with

nuclear states.

lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states :

6.

An obvious

:i.n short, wars

ar e

There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term
1
war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d
in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt
( OED) o n wa r,

7.

But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between
clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more
me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s
the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of
nation--s tates.

8.

Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and
unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone
.t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l
sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e.
James
proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a
wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12).
What it boiled down to,
howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil,
especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l
sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through
wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc .

.:1n uut

,~01•1p

of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture,
and are

nltcr i ng

by

the

s tructu r e.

Wars
j _Lu a t

from

c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of

(other wi se

defect ive)

politi ca l organ isatio n of states ;

they are a

ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation .

helps

wa r

arise

War

Thls seman t.ically based pictur e

of

exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and
deterr ence

d t: vo lves into an

war-m akers ,

argume nt

agains t

aga.in st

states .

In

the
fact

( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d)
on

the

war-d eclare rs

and

tradit ional theory , wars wer e

r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as
t heir

r emoved

t1 e

right

of

r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es;

states

or

the argume nt

was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the
c our ts 9, while states
did

not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of
th e law courts ).

But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim
at e

place

of

wars;

ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a
l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for

examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc.
Let. us

a

h OW\ ) V1_. r

to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on

-

basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s
tates or sets (axes)

of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars.
·ompr litive

game s,

could

be

won.

attent uated form for some "victo rs")
Lhc World vfars.

strate gy.

surrou nding
trad i tional ly

firstl y

for

mass ive

armed

wa rs,

Like

exchan ges

such

as

th •re may well be no winnin g

in

ar e as

the
of

No r thern

very

hemisp here

countr yside.

Thus,

and

the

second ly,

for

laying

the

was te

_£Dint

of

of

substa ntially

substa ntiall y

oblite rated 10 ,

(cxe rcl sed

and

most

as

nothin g
all

worse off than at the outset of the "play" .
are

huge

war

seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d:

a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that
prepar ed

that:

That assum ption still held good ~hough in

Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds;

is settle d with main protag onists
player s

It war; assume d

An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n
metro polita n

agglom e ra tio ns

9.

to

main
Hence

elabor ately

f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ;

Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p
. 776, top).
The
argume nt
presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva
te
dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way,
it looks as if it could be readil y
t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern
ment, or at least
effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a
t that time to be
one state!

5

hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e.
.:uid

ot her

Lhf'

e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was

not pu re de t e rr e nc e .

to

mil i tary

Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff,

Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in

tar gets

r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ;

and

military

e xchanges.

principle 11

This feature iG fundnnent al as

for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross

uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality.

ways

to

The special effects of

nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
canno t

w3rs

be

legitimat e ly

confined.

l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s
uz0ne

<lestr uc ti on,

s hockwav es,

suc h

effe cts

gign nt l c fum i gat i on s
§2.

a nd

th e

e nti re l y

rapid

••.

speed

special effects (presente d in

Schell)

include

radioacti vity,

pu lses, fireball or firestorm

e tc., etc.

As a result

of

these

of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e

mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s.

The mora l s ituation:

be c ome

as

el ec troma gnet1 c

<lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s,

com pounded

Th e se

the

r ecent

tend e ncy

submerged in the context of war.

of

moral

considera tions

to

It is particula rly important

i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient

distinctio n

mo r a lity

or local or nat :l. onal

and ~ ..e5:..diency.

What is done in war, especiall y

between

advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the

l ') .

There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or
extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e
no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves "
suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical
ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on.
Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of
pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective
me d ical int e rvention
(PL, p.313).
Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf
the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons
de veloped in the tex~.
Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are
resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and
t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other
things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" .

11.

In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed
wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc.

l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH'
Much

t.h at

oug h t

war ,

of

or

othenlis e 12,

not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or

anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like .

we

liv e

not

go

in

a rat her bar barous age :

unremarke d,

if

the

th e horrors of the twentieth century will

history

Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd

ge t s

writt e n

as

wi pi ng

moves :

based

on

"stra t e gy"

disad van t ages ,

of

mor a lly

excluded

actions,

·a J.culaU o ns.

charncterist i ca---1J:x
its

is.

that

rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in

o t

con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr

d0.Lcrmi nes

(accurately)

str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o

induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e
such

Hllitarily

its

e xp<'di e n cy .
by

gains

own

i.t _o u~ !:_, morally,

cons i d e r i n g

and

Eac h

side

only

lo s 8e s a s

a

in a military encounter
own

its

advantages

and

r e sult. of alterna tJve possible

to consider those of the other side( s) as

well.

In

t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality .
I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted
wa y,

a

no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without

l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of
eLc.) .

Such

t he

class lcal

through

"bald

an

inc r emental

a

distinct

nrgumen t

tc.tt1s .
g

a r gument

from

an

t ha t

th e

It

would

And
(bu t

The

externally

wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e .

ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed.

the

of

li mit)

escalation

man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit.

assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as
enforced

force,

Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated.

Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue,
reall y

this

Thus t oo

follow

from

i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n

nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the

s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable .

c onfusion
Nuclear

12.

For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the
c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness.
These
t li cn1<•s
run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n
th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r.

13.

As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a
hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e
prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument
Jike
the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s
a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
Th e
fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or
more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1..

i'

war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n .
for

the

l
anc,

r or

players

Still the !irgument

is

inc onclu s ive;

can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate,

examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4

A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by
of

mo ·al i t y:

lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to

take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y

c<;p,~, f,11 ly
t lw

1

constraint s

from the ot her s'ido.

11w~Liou not onl y

as

to

ma y

well

enc ount e r,

So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps
it

wlw t

o u g ht

to

do

in

mor a lly

permi ss ibl e

si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in
the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf.

But the last question do e s

not,

in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y .

There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having

0:x.pe<.lienc y,

even

under

extreme

to

give

way

to

circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war

involves .

Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of

give

to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often

way

morality

eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations.
t hcorc~ical

fac t

is

that

both

deliver

f r om

us

But the

the

vnlue

the o q'.: .
to

Expedlency

fact,

but

urg('s ,

tba t

does

foreign

takes

local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e

conside rat i on s .

proper charact risa t i on , a

remote

By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its
much

univ• r sa lizable

mor e

univ e rsal

pr inciples .

rePultan t

i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y

fairness,

eq u ita billty and

of

value

and,

And morality thereby imposes, through

principl e s,

jus t ice.

distributio n

c ertain

requ i rements

of

general

Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable

value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly
Ttie

no t

It assumes, or

what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of
or

to

cruci al

simply

narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable .
even

bound

moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same,

eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue

miraculousl y

are

placed

1 :.,

.

Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic

Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e

of

·va l untioi1~:;

pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under

14.

11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1

i nt e rr e pla cement,

from

the

same

As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely
I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war.

B

.
expr d 1e1cy
assessm ents 16 •

ic

c~ n

For expedie ncy loes not elude

deontic

presen tation:

be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right",

or ft lvcn tight formal

rest•mb le

charac terisat ion .

The

charac terisat ion

will

normal ly

that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to,
or

arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds.

Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity

~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi
ned.
util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as
cnn

Thus

onside ring only expedie ncy;

intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ;

meet

do

it

Lt does not, unlike the

me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the

individ ual

uti.lity

of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say.
There

are

dc•ont.o .logis ts
r egardin g war
mora ll y

howeve r

signlfic a11t

e.speci ally,
17



which

differe nces,

between

utilita rians

serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re

In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have

permis sible,

or

to

seemed

to

effect

some

to

rend er

justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards

~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not
permit.

already

and

partisa nship ,

since

utilita rians

But

this

is

would

reject the

descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly';

wherea s an

a im

in

what

follows

is

to

avoid

meta-e thical

me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not
there

is

a

neutra lity.

to

achieve

And

morally

large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which

ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn.
S('Vcr al

moral

partisa nship,

VJ.rtua ily all positio n s

grc•

that

the

obltter ation

of

major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous.

If

tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists
who seem to

feel

no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for
some Rus si a n
ones, s imply increas e the costs

involve d,

up

to

loss

of

whole

nations

if

l.5.

The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ",
nationa lism
and
pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which
exces siv e
applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi
ng a
person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards
treatme nt.
The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require
ment of
morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require
ment
to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte
nds to
strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry).
Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72.

16.

The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail
especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic .

17.

Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and
Hare
the other, i.n Collen et al.

by

Pl ato ;

see
on

:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs
Tile

ncounlere d;

_!: hen try to work down

again.

fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally

oul of perspecti ve, morally.
abandon

or

Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has

tended

to

suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also

do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does
not

m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that

to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be
Cons id er

t he

w11rld ,·inpl r1•.

be

so thern

risi.ng

(hemisphe re)

no

one's

advant3ge .

strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of

Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n

realised.

Thus

his

best

strategy,

having

rid

s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try

nil lear

to

exchange

in

the

North,

There

would

southern

to

be

waters

encourage

a

hardly

an

of US
all - out

point then in securing

institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much
espe . ially

given

the

apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts.

tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e:

lhc present point :1.

has

and

tts

power,

limitatio ns,

is

an

thnt ( t he fnct of) moral

inadequat e

But

conse nsus

const r aint without accompany ing

struct ural adjus tments.
For , typJrnlly ,

<lifferc11 tly

to

nationa l

impose

interest

ls

taken

hosta ges

or

override

morality,

e ven

holding

civilian

populatio ns

kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ).

unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian
such

as

of those

those of Eastern Europe.
things.

substitut ion

of

jus tificatio n;

fails

in

The

first,

expedienc y

,

.
C.!.BSSC,S

And,

regimes,

But morally national interest can do neither

the

overridin g

for

morality ,

of

morality,

which

the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of

:important

or

irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary

cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g
nuclear

to

is

entirely
national

simply
lacks

the
mo r al

interests ,

of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the

case of LSN war.
18 .

As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts
in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her
than based on national interests .

Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis ,
Ii:!.

It

nol

be

pretended

expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y ,

that

tha t
of

it

i.s

"group

but

n montl basi, as distJnct from one of

ego1 sm " ).

There

no

1s

special

moral

d.ispensa ll on

fo r governments.

j ndiv iduals :

ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or

analys is of obligation.

Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for

For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed

semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds;
no

di ff e r e nce

organisation.
extenuating
killers:

whether

X

is

an · individual

States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion
reaso ns

aside,

be having

just

as

beeu

conce ded , special moral dispensations;

more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism.
cannot

immorally

makes

system, grou p or

of

Lebano n)

are,

as brigands or mass

there is no moral difference.

Certainly t here are gro unds on which states
or

individual

or

and it

f11rnish

two

(incompatibl e)

their a gents

01:

have

claimed ,

but the excuses offered are no
A

moralities ,

a

s atis factory
state

moral

theory

or public one and a

private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual

morality

becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3

ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate

mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled
Y are permuted .
special

01 1t

cover

(e.g.

to

considerati.ons

citizen

Y

in

by state interests) when X and

A group or organisation or pe rson can be

der iv ati ve

damage

For

bound

of

course

by

in virtue of role, but these are der ivative

prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to
general

moral principles.

So it is also with a state which is an institutional

arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)

of

its

citizens:

its

charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly

1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency .
particular,

a

sta te is not

1 morally)

survivrd .

In

entitled to risk the lives of many of its

own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even
ow n

( at

for

its

Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear

de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge.

19 .

There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or
see Routley a nd Plumwood.

multiple)

morality

Lines:

11
!-: ' )
'j.J.

The i_ni t i<d argument

p:1cifli;m

yield

arguments

to

the

tmmora1 lt.1_

of _ LSN

wars.

to

tb e

1mmora1it.y

of war.

But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire

controversi a l in an area where th ere is no

go od

r·ason

to

Argumen ts

be

for

controve rsial.

Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of
LSN

wars follows .
All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime.

nil

wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior

ways of settling po litlcal issues between states .
wa r s

who

Not

are

Among more or l es s admissible

th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors

volu11l'cer

:w

Ho ldlers

nnd

whos<'

actfon

does

no t

6pi.ll

ov er

on to

noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants
were kjl.led in war.

conscrip tlon,

Since the esta bl i shme nt

press-gangs

and

recruitment

of

such

of

the

lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms;

induction

prac tices

as

near-d es titute, wars hav e

modern massive war s are

far

removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian
por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ).

imrnornl,

Most

s orts

of

wars

are

because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such

a n exte nt as LS N war s .

The first argument to th e

immorality

of

LSN

wars

and

of

sufficientl y

larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form:

Pl.

The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong.

P2.

LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts.

P3.

Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong .

( KA)

LSN wnrs ar• wrong.
The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set
of

Lhis

type.

the

(KA )

t·cpL1ccs

But the

qu1. te

'kl.11:!.ng

su ff i c l en tly

11v :i.l.

crcH tu res' .

Thu s

t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a

cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or
i. nvolvecl

f ocus

can

destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans

fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a
on

arguments

Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass

kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen.

vadu tlo n

of

not

ll

fir s t

uitable
directly

Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding

th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) .
The argumenL Js valid,
,1L t a .kcd)

on

the

basi :3

but
of

may

each

be

attacked

( and

of its p1·emisses.

has

in

ef fe ct

been

Let us consider these in

reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves

11

what

is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are,
in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,

purport

o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.

as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said
robbed;

but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong,

to

"involve."

providing

For

which

instance,

that person ' s

assistance

belng

is also wrong.

But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter
accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20
As aga inst P2, it may
legitimately

directed

be

argued

against

that

mi lit ary

nuclear

targets.

wars

can

be

encounters

But given the character of

nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets.
net

merely

the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all

the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings.

fnlloul

There i s

down-wlnd

from

military

pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of
uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl

tnrgcts
US

and

For example, t he radioactive

will affect large conc entratio ns o(
European

t argets ,

and

may

affe ct

as Conn <l o.

There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties

by

appeal

cffcrl ) 2 1.

t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side
If missiles wer e c haracte ristically

r.eliAbly

on

target,

and

one

20.

The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc
diagn osed.

21.

According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are
rcs ponsJblc
only
for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our
freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even U
these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
conseq uences .
Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is
pernicious ,
a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions .

whicl1 was

intend ed

unfort unatel y

only

went

off

to

destro y

an

unma1H1<HI

und e r g round

Such claims shou ld be reject ed :

ci ty.

dou bl e

effect

Noneth e l ess

the

circum sta nc es

differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo
ns lbl f'

,1

for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce
the

the

thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e

~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on.
innkc

silo

course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d

th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under

could

missil e

j

t was not as if t he y had

del iberat ely

aimed

at

The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of]
respo nsibil ity

Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of
the act.
~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of
argued

tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation .

the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' .
killin g

and

P2,

it

The equivo cation is induc ed by
be

conc eded

that

de libera te

milJta ry ,

e . g.

farmer s

or

goods

or

servic es

bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs .

used

exclud ed

as

innoce nt .

The

s econd

d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2.
other.

for

re a sons,

it

by

proper ly

point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s
Bec a use P2 s o amende d is

less

defen sible,

is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'.

What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status
of what is
mixtur e

of

tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs.

requir e

the

qualif icatio n

'delib e rate'

or

done,

So 'delib erate'

gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so
does Pl.
not

t he

Second ly, it will be

conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin
g of t hos e

a

It

no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi
litary ef f ort,

whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of

not

be

charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin
guish able,

by

and

ma y

of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will
be made .

will b
are

While it will

Pl

For Pl

do es

'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22

Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none
the worse for that, and
Lhere

is

no

seriou s

p·o blem

in

markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s,

people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and
J.s,

mnrco v'r,

no

need

to

adopt

action

chains .

There

the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of

statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic
22.

Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ).
The sugge stion depend s
upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent
ion, and wrong ness
with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri
ne.

,1

rlns:;

":'i

,c mnk.t~

t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try

t:(,

endenvourlng

c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then

i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants.
there

Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met,
.tr,~

for

;ir311mcnts

the

prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl

and

Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t

tend

will

For examp le, one argument for

v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory.

Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one,

(to

poi.nt)

,
re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns

mi n f nn l

from

-~_gume nts

§4 .

the

understate

sc,rio usly

doing

so

23

histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts

on

wars,

just

ur

dreamed

by

conlemporary

"free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and

opponents

communis t

im portant

the

The conclusion t hat LS,'

wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified -

1e

that

fail s to treat them with the

.0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments .

r.;omet. lti

to

of

is

Americ a

inspired,

me r ely

not
or

et c),

th e

of

same

The

conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al
t:irnt•s ,

(or jusL

wars.

first

One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the

;>1

:irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it

to

no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killc.:<l (cf.

be

Barnes , p .77.5) .

A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be

fought

by

morally

which

impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate

killing of noncombatants .

The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e

legitimate

of

means ,

discrimination

(betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions

directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)

/. ~:,

.

civilians

and

of

noncombatants'

(PL,

LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
')

(

I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' .

7.3.

Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military
in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One
;.rngLP
favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line
between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there
in
are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g.
c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of
See a l so PL , p.312, where a
their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r.
uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed .

2 1~.

Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common
lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally
usage. of

- - - -··---·--

Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f
being that of net evil to net good:

pro ro rLi on
cor; tr-:

up

proporclonality,

'the damage to be infljcted and

lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed

the damage and costs ,

req 1irement:

disproportio nate

to

goods

moral

pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R

er i t1! rlon

of

the

which

doctrine

through war .

"improvement"

ln

achieved

of

confined,

nationally

no t

ar

that

way.

ov e r a ll

co n sequences

of

abstaining

i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts":
c ondi. tion s

"nmel.ioratlve "

wn y

the

'a nation wages war

justly

than

Similarly

on l y

if

the

for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent

s:1tisfy

for

bad,

from war ' (Barnes, p.72) .

LSN wars can

in

these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch

Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also
wa rLl ,

nnd

war

According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r

c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no

are

Entangl ed with the

justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less
th e

taking

by

p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this

(PL,

arms'

the

e :a mple

that

of

infringed

reasonable expectation of success.

by

LSN

It seems that

tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r
t!il'

v0 ry

d lf !<r<' n t'Jy,
cx rhanges .

1 lmilcd

prospccUJ

of:

succl'SS

for

whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in

Wha t

some

sm11ll

strictly

state
limited

clltc ,

or

nucl ea r

is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict

with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right

intention.

Fo r

One (by no means
be arg ued to in various ways.
c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and
r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that,
1
wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as
a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).

25 .

Til e principle can

26 .

wars where t he targets ar e
c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he
For such wars remain unjust on
pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect .
on lif e
several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were
s ys tnms, etc.
mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of
nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be
nucl 'lH
kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are
The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear

ndded ).

Zi.

Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent

doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of
fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack,

t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what
are

se e n

as

b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars
can
b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed.

Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion

of

medieva l

theory

oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e

was

no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf.
lltt J e

is

wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc

se nsitive

howe ver,

me rit,

( a nd

when

issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently).

a r g uments

are

not

do

There

.In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents,

dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s

h i st orica l r e quireme nts

Barnes, p .778).

not

simply

commit

argumen t s

matters

underlyi ng

the

Finally , these argumen ts from

any

presc r iptive

fallacy;

from

historic al

autho r ity

for
to

th e
mo r al

c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed,
a nd

nome times applied , were justifie d.

As they are.

I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the
mo ral

rightnes s

or

justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist

str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin
e on
co ntempor ary

u n ti l

times.

Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they

arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and

This

ls

the

involve

beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars :

such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once

remov ed

( a nd

e ven,

howr• vcr you look
conse ns us

violence 28 •

Ht

very

f requentl y , when it is not) .

il morally .

a r gument;

it

The argume nt i.s not

proceeds

expedi.en cy

that

is

duly

They a re morally wrong

the

same

as

the

weaker

fr om similar results from the full sweep of

ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion.

The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case
each

type

of

moral

theory.

Fortuna tely

deta ils

can

be

de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents

28.

one,

from

shortcu t.

For

for

just

war

These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear.
For
the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it.
The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types
of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent
revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion
be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at
l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may
be co nd emned
'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of
l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311).
Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only
legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in
a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780).

.l /

whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate.
w.1r

were

i_;ornctimes

a rriv ed

at

or

l n fact conditions for just

defended through pr inciples of such moral

th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative

been

done .

work

already

The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has

in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is

maxim j.sati on

utl lHy

has

is

final ly

ac complished,

LSN

adopted,

wars

are

howe ve r

excluded

ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an
·
g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1
l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ;
wars
Llw l

involv e

on

LSN

1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure,

tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in

utllitarlan

Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 •

L1i; ldon.

The arguments

ovcrwhc .lming

so

moral

far

case

outlined
against

such

mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n
principles

are

de riv able

from

agains t

some

LSN

wa rs.
LSN

would

su bstanti ally

wo rse

are

tha n

exhaust

th e

violate

thes e

of the theories just considered).

These

ac countable,

condition

not

( again

th e obligation to maint a in

earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems :
we

do

For there are oth e r significant

war

pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns :

p,cnera tions, to whom

wars

we

the r.-esponsibility to futur e
pas s

to

th e

" recei ved

the

world

it".

Such

on"

not

in

conservative

principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are

bound

to

be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war.

§5.

The shi ft to nuclear deterrence:

suppo rt

nuclear

arguments to its immorality .

Those

who

arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,

certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars ,

by

pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars.

What i s being

done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om

war:

deterrence

is

most

important

precisely

engagement
in

preventing

in

LSN
such

wars from ever

occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values.
it

is

continued ,

deterrence

is

the

.9nly

practical

d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.

way

indeed

Indeed,

of obtaining both

Similar arguments

29.

For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM.

30.

An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail,
complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'.

are

But compare Hardin.
though

not

in

a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented

in:

mutually

;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31

Su,h c1aims as to the roles and
dubious,

for

seve ral

reasons.

objective s

of

deterrence

If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.

s uperior ity.

than

th i s,

and

sometime s

even

a

mili ta ry

goal.

In fac t there ha s
renewed

driv e

for

Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor

for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32
process

decidedl y

A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce,

despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only -

been a que st for more

are

Nor has deterrence set in motion

the

of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate

for dctct"rence .

On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its"

impu.ls e

there

has

been

almost

unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318).
A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what
sold
31.

is

being

11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor:

marketed

a nd

deterrence has

It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es
"flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e
ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s
is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely
out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it.
It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.

32.

As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e
for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r
intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use
nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he
third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official
military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and
nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM,
p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
[1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front,
which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine
deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it
la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff.

i.ncrt.:ascd the probability
nrms-race

type

t hat

of

LSN

war.

More

precis ely,

deterrence

of

th e

is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion

for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and
hns

to

that

,,,·te nt

least en hanced its prospect s of occurring .

at

r easons also, connected with pure
original

setting),

the last 30 years.

the

deterrence

and

with

the

For other

"cold

war"'

(its

probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in

The reasons include the threatening posture

called

for

by

deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to main tain credibility
overridden

or

with

''sacrificed"

a

population

whos e

real

for

military objectives;

state of military readiness;

etc.

The situation has

many

ther e

sober

analysts

century , i.e.

think

before 2000 .

is

a

high

There are s e veral

interests

are

being

the dangerous and risky
now

been

reached

where

pr obability of an LSN war this
routes

to

such

a

probability

assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to

an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and
Amer lean

2000.

alerts,

hav e

been

lucky

already .

In

of

nuclear

markedly.

the years ahead it appears likely that th e

For

the

danger

supplicant

nations

resources declines.
and

the

worsens

and

the

extent

The danger is enhanced by

connected

increasing

chance

of
the

lot.
33.

Cox).

easily

as

the

plight

extractable

continuation

of

of

crucia l
the

arms

of nuclear acci dent and human or

t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf .

:l.ncrease

zones separating the superstates are increasing in

sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and

r e veals

the

exchange .

number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l

race,

on

sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the

Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance
We

Full

past

experience

copiously

Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a

Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,

and

many

are

Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in r e cent years.
Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128).

20

conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) .
s e em s

no

way

Fof better

or

worse,

ther e

to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight;

a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and

t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight .
IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it

proha bJ~

that

LSN

an

war

will

d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it
proba bl e

that

c entury.

And that is enough

a

grossly

occur this ce ntury.
is

immoral
to

decidedly

morally

on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy

is

i.mmoral.

For then it follows ( by

plausi ble

that

it

highly

is

sequence of events will be perpetrated this
warrant

morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome.

de terrence

highly

is

evasiv e

act.Lon.

We

ought

That in turn implies taking steps ,

presently

practised.

Thus

present

That i.s but the first of several ways we shall

nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies.
The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of
war h a s of cour s e been disputed.

LSN

The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows :

Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying.
The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with

ar c

improbable.

assumption.

Unfortunately

however

horrifying

outcomes,

much ava i lable evidence counters this

More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal

exchanges

horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.

Kuper ).

What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the
ce r tnin ly

Ther e by, through det errence, we

si t uation,

since

have

already

got

into

t.h e probA.bility.

immoral

of

r aising

The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity

of nucle ar deterrence proceed by

LSN

an

deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for

thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense

war,

against

evidence

s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an

LSN war .

LSN

a nd

way

of

princ iple s

mapping

war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war.

mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic

connecti ng

pr inciples .

moral

arg uments

Such principles
The

fl rst

of

the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form:
Cl.
should

If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only
be

pr ob3ble

is

it

wrong

that

it

that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly

i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur .
Thus, f or

example ,

s i nc e

is

it

wrong

to

ki l l

a

large

noncomb atant

po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k
and
wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out,
which

nuclea r de terre nce does .

botl1

of

For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally

entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t
ho se
of third part y no nal i gned
most

Like

"' t tuations .
defeat by
example ,

0

t a te s .

sub s t an ti ve

Unless

mo ra l

count erexamp l es,

the

second

principl es oc c u r s.
probabi lity

that

par t

princ ipl e s

in

Cl

runs

into

dilemma.

and
of

a c c ord i ng l y,

Cl

e ncount e rs

to

require

complic ation.

For

apparen t trouble where clash of

Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the
oc curs

X

ord er

to

apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 •
nuclec1r

ethi s,

d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to

t o avoid a greater evil.

pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y
c r ashes,

in

dct:crrcn ce ,

make

that

t he

Cons i der for example the

passeng er

plane

he

ic

flying

sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y

Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of
ihe r e

(though

the r e

explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not

ls

a

of fs e t

clash
or

of

principl e s, as §6

removed

by

its

role

in

avoiding greate r e vil.
I L can be a r gued that it is:
argumen t

from

t he

pr e vious

a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le
perhaps

f rom

more

such is pa rt of

succe s s
credence

t he

de terrence .
th a n

the

of

the

popular

However this inductiv e

racing

world

As Barnett argues,

driver's

argumen t,

'the

happy

acciden t

has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is

unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war
34.

point

a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet

(des pite some close calla ) , he won't,
th a t

of

the

in

the

coming

era,

This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D.
Johnston .
There are more
dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es.
For example , in inciting people to
c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d.
Thus, t o ta ke C,
Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi
i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj.
But surely
Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence .
But spelling out
what 'dir ec tly' means
in terms of short causal chains over which
r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to
ot her connect ing princ i ples.

·2

(p. 100) .

lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power

incrt.' ,ise

111

Russian

strengt h,

the

ri se

r e 1aU. ons,

th e

of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc .

(cf.

simllarly Cox ).
There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Dl.

De errencc will not continu e to work,

and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that
D2 .

De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war.

The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again

persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together :
some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r.
proliferati on,

the

emergence

bu t the focus is on the ( in
An initial

of lesser nuc lear powers.

reason

concerns

As a result there are

many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect
Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that

lt. -i~i

us e of nuclear weapons by

confrontation

a

11

lesser

very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th

stat e .

Moreover

scarcitJ

;::i nd

o f chea per suppli es, etc ,

weapo n

systems,

more

or

Lcrror

s ltua ttons,

deterrence

power

lnvolv e s 36 ,

being mainta.ined :

costs

Wi t h so many more

Arms races, and interwoven

balanc e

of

have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record.

lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds .
of

resource

A second group of reasons concerns the

Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that

pres en t

for

wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war

through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased.
powrr

opportunities

growing

nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to.
wec1pons

.lnltlnl

to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political

Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline,
and

the

of

lead

escalating

eventually

to

arms
war ,

races,
with

such

as

probabili.ty

Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n

balance

if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen

during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for

35.

that

deterrence

practice

increases

It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations
weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf.

n 1clcar
p .. 2JO n.

36.

supposi ng

th e

armed with
Lackey, MM,

The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the
proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were
nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
dcle rrenc e.
Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of
scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled.

probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in

poli c y,

US

especiall y

th e

rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides
to

rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being

advantage

of

ov erwhelme d,

USA

the

to

take

superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy

the

tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear

missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets
con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as

hostages ),

thereby

war.

also

weakens

the

case

against

resort

to

nucle a r

detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t
of

mutual

understan ding,

leaders, and even some
nuclear.

sha r ed

principle s ,

cooperati on

supe r-states.

and

soundness

transmi ss i on

Finally,

impor tant)

level

judgement

among

of

of

and

informati on

between

It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s

in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for

instance,

follow

through on delusions of one sort or another.

deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts
seriously

mistaken:

'each

is

regarding

the

other

It is al so tha t

side ,

which

slde ' s

threat

is to the other' (P L, p.313) .

we

think' • 38

But

about

what

the

o t her

considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of
evidence,

that

on e

perceptio n of what is
possible

resul t

As

s ide

side

thinks

e rror.

Not

thinks ,

there
only

not

can be
is

a

there

sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,

as

regards

limited

nuclear

war,

of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n;

must now be severe doubts
cffectlvc ly.

"conv inc ing "

There is a grain of truth in

the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other
what

be

a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t

strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how
one

may

as

to

whether

rationa l

principle s

are

with

the

but there
operating

to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous

37.

The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not
to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward
defence)
have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is
some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies :
we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and
i.rrntiona llty .

J8.

Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the
West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not
understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'.
This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e.

24

idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA
and in UK) that

LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won.
The suppor ter of det er rence
connec ting

rrlnci ple s

ri val case.

such

J1as

not

onl y

to

defeat

a rgumen ts

Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing

as

For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly

~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_.

t hr o ugh

practic e

of

Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed

( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl),

only

a

feeble

case

through

the

questio na b le obv ers e of Cl,

Cl i.

If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X,

nppears open .


For it has to be shown that

deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war ,

and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that
deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options
.

o

The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill
be argu e d.

reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim.
up i-hc v ery

cond 1 t:1.ons

probab ility

of

suc h

for
a

an

LSN

war,

it

So ,

for

When nuclear deterr e nce set s

can

ha rdly

have

reduced

th e

war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o

when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le.
More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi
e d, it i s
c..! l1 0l l f',h

refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong.

LO

out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t.

altcrn1 1LJvc

pe rmissi ble

courses

of

a c tion

condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ;

to be no t merely

alrigh t ,

bu t

;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA,

r ig ht.

But

I t is not enough to make

For t he re certain ly seem to
withou t

deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory.
uniciue ne s s

includi ng

fright

To surpass t hese option s, a

nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown
es tablish ing

such

a

39.

LSN

war s ,

withou t

.(cf.

Jl

11

claim,

to

fear

or

is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39

OED)

40



For

most

people,

portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough
from

be

the costs or problem s of

Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by
t hr ea t s

not

the

enormo us

expense ,

t rouble

vivid scenari os
to

deter

t hem

and wastage of

An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre
nce is the
way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum
stances .
Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu
res , the

an s wl!r hn-, to be, No.

- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -

p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em.
det t·r rl'ncc

And

deterren ce

i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of

by

such

means

ourse not immoral .

(whi ch

miJit4ry

(Sc.h e ll was not

immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New
Yo rk .)

But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is

deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where
this

o bj e ct,

a

LSN

war., itself is no t

permiss ible.

The argumen t for this is

thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple

C2 .

l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong.

Hence

since

p re para t i on,

LS N wars
nuc l ear

are

wrong

and

nuclear

deterren ce

deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong .

claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X:
wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn
i
Y•

wi11at

W.'.1 S

wrong.

complete

It is not however being
Y and

Z may

both

be

41
i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1.
"

Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that
L SN wa r

implies

complete

prepara tion

for

Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the

Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls

(which

tr ied

the

major

war

c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e
Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or
waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l
tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan
or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in
Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added).

But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the
become

J ncreasi ngly

liable

to

question .

wrongne ss

implied

in

C2

has

However the doubts mainly come from

40.

De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty,
deceptio n,
mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally
unde sirable traits.

Li l .

Nor a re
ordered
be cause
wrong,
equally

degr e es of wrongne ss required :
wrongs can simply be
as
reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some
it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z
cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally
evil. Thus, e.g. William s:

.

partiall y
labourin g
are both
wrong or

.

there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy
on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a
nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil
a s the second.
This is because both are held to be absolute ly
forbidde n.
Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to
"S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ
mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and
3 lg a numbe r;
s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numeri c , lly from 3!

26
a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s.

Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as
sever~]

other

fea tures.

LSN

war ,

already

writes

in

In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t

ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply

pret e nce.

Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e
for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence.
too

sophistica t ed

for

bluff

alone

to

Military

succeed:

t here

preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in
t he

ot her

hand ,

has

to

is

now

be serious

deterr ence .

But,

on

c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for

wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly:
imply attemp t ed X.

c omplete preparatio n for X does

not

It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed

with wha l is prcpa·ed
whell1er

intelligenc e

for

under

c ertain

conditio ns.

Comple te

preparation ,

for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a

(proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an

be

taken

of

connecting

for

granted .

Principle C2
principles .

is

part

way

not

the

line

in

a

series

pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that

A

con necting X with a tt empted X:
perh,ps

down

if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong

as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not .

But the se ries ends ;

off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to

the

(thoug h
it cuts

claims

of

various religious pos i tio ns.

For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong

then

X

the

co n temp l ati on

con sidcra t Jon

of

of

is

wrong

carrying out Xis wrong.

or

that

non-action- oriented

The point ap plies equally to sexual

fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares .
no Lhing

mere

In

particular,

there

is

wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:

nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable ,
and in some senses are all too thinka ble.
Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each
common ly

involves

lt connects with.

decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanyin g the increased probability are

certain

r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves;
nol

I ho:a·

of

mere

pas s ! vc

.o nt emµ l at f on

I,,
1

'.

Howev er

oll

the

sets

of

these are
connectl.ng

n
prL nc lple s

invoked

except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of

wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased.
c ho:;c n

One rea son for th1s is that the

means

o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do

s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft .

The inc r eased prohabi llty

of

an

evil

out come

o l.mply makcB things worse .

Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but
thi s

accompa nied

by

threats

and

a threaten ing posture .

pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved,

announce ment

For some pa rty , th e

if

deterr e nce

s ucce ed :

the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible .

n uc 1 L' i1 r

deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le:

CJ.

of

is

to

This aspect of

if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also

wr o ng ;

or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng .

The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form
CG .

If Xis wrong so is a cond itional

r eq uires

some

further

ex planati on.

the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere
of' • 4 3

thre ate ning

~

Apar t

intensio n

to

A condit'o na l

do

intentio ns

e . g.

themselv es,

1

the

t ha t ) .
C

to

(or

in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style:

the

most

cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the
oblj gati on

form

a

are

not

impossi ble

claim

in

whnt

or even remote or imp r obable:

(spe c ifica lly those involvin g
cornmitn e nt)

for

follows
certain

is

tha t

s ort s

there
of

discusse d
an

it is obligato ry
conditio ns

the conditi ons

typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l
fund ame ntal

cred1ble

functor:

To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the

involv ed

whic h

intensio n is a judgemen t of

is some intensio nal functor,
f rom

X

enemy .

The

are intensio nal funct ors

threaten ing ,

intendin g ,

and

whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate

the

immoral ity

42 .

There is plenty of scope for f ur ther
elabora tion
here.
Passiv e
s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to
make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other
worlds where e vil oc curs .

43.

The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be
confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The
Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey
strike :
Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten
them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the
problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e
theories of condi ti onality.

of

nuclear

deterren ce.

Natural ly

again

there

are

many

28

no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions
c.ont. :•mplat J.on,

t'1l nld.ng,

dreaming, etc.

of

e.g .

fail,

those

of

The.r e is also a n interesting group of

more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) ,

expecting,

awaiting

and

the

like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:.
Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is
then

threatcn.ing

X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay:

is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that

to do
into

prac tic e

(e.g.

if

wrong

'What is wrong

putting

something

committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into

tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to
that

into

pract i ce.

beginning as fo] lows:

The

point

ca n

if worlds where

alternative ly
X

happens

be

are

put

argued semanti cal ly,

exclude d

then

so

are

adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen.
The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons.

nuclear

war

obta i n.

However t he required c onditional form can be derived

form,

is

through

only c onditionall y threatened , i.e .

the

f ollowing

wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if

argument:-

c.

should certain cond itions

particular,

(of

§§3-4)

LSN

oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it
wrong,

44.

so

a lso

is

simple

if it weren't it wouldn't

(The converse route fails

arg uments

the

Observe, furthermore that if something Xis

have b en wrong in the first place.
ear lier

from

su bstitute for X in the simple form,

wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions;

by

Firstly ,

threatening X if C,

war
has.

of

course.)

In

is wrong whether the
Hence,

where

X

is

More generally, to e sta blish CG it is

Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272.
It
i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as
Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue of
slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and
also,
i.n view of CJ,
not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral
oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked
out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t.
S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops:
se
PL, p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
"i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong.

Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is
open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality
mentione d below.

29

enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r

If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X.

CG'.

The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to
ca us es

more

t roubl e .

a

serious

threat,

Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often

contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e
is

t l1r e o.tene d

what

l
.
i s wrong , to prevent t,1c
occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n

f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been
by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion

at all to pr oceed t o action on
plaus ible
Lhrc a t s .

removes

i t

the

support

bas i s

for

of

threats.

s i mpl i f ied CJ.

Insofar

A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l.

sense

co nditi on s,

is

con s i de r a

accide nt .

intended,

For the challenge

grossly

immo r al

unconvincing,
case

wh e r e

conduct

under

certain

not

and calls for moral double-think.
ci rcum st ances

th e

result

from

improbable

To bring this

an

intricat e

Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by

Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her

not .

is

in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious

thr ea t s to under t a ke

out

is

Principle CJ is not

ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ.

says

this

Hence the shift to serious

one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible.

which

as

it

is

way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in

the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the
thr eat
nor

ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al

more

.. pra ctic al "

rep r es e n t atives

grounds.

Further more,

while

states

thei r

and

ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to

immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot:

it

moral

principled agents they ar e or take

natu r es ,

to

t he

kinds

of

th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains).
i nsignif i c ant

mora lly

would

run

For su c h agents , who may

counter

to

comprise

their

a

not

proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such

a s CJ are no t in doubt.
The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e

--- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of
ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The
quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is
i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n.

30
t.hrcnt involved

then

is

it

Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t,

inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no

Lhen by CJ deterren ce
depcn<l

is

wrong .

The

maintain ed.

sub-argu ment

on se ri ous threats is a practica l one:

Lf

it

s

no t

seri ous

Bu t if i t j s ser io us

that

nu c l ea r

dete r re nce

name l y , that if the t h rea t s were

not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro
ugh ,
then

the

op posit ion

would flnd out, in one way or a nother.

could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l
wi LhouL

A policy of bluff

system ,

f or

examp l e,

coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n .

Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems
maintain ing

such

a

po licy

weapons , espec ially
informa lion

would

clown

during
l i kel y

times
escape

the
of

there

would

be

ma jor

di f fic u l t ies

i.n

chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear
change

through

in

gov e rn ing

el i t es ,

a nd

the

op pos itio n i ntellige nce.

But then ,

since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d .

Ther e a re

as

we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s.

On e is t hat

nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts
a bo ut
the

r ationa lity

of

carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity

essentia l. to its effec t iven ess .

To be effec tive then i t mu s t

be

s e r i ous

( c f.

Benn).
Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of
one

centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent.

CG,

Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d

with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e
C4 .

If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is

n!so wr0ng.
The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o
die tionarie s,
etc . ' .
of

'a

d claratio r

of

intent

to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury,

It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of

deter rence,

which

in tend ing to go to war .
princip l e ,

th a t

turn

0 11

C4

is

s ome

pa r a doxes

the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout

Princ i ple

C4

is

j us t i f i e d

th rough

th e

s i mplified

inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do

wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s
p inc.iple

some

an

ex tr emel y

position

prevail.

Si mplif i ed

wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the

excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly.

Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d

to

Jl
agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows :

argue

siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when

the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng
to go to LSN wa r
when

the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong .

Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such

an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows.

He nc e

nuclear

deter rence

is

wrong.
But like virtua lly every
utilita rian

princip les

utiJita rian grounds .

deontic

t hems e lv es ,

princip le ,
princ i ples

For it is not difficu lt to

except

thos e

flowing

from

CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on
outline

str a tegic

situati ons

wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear
det e rr ence.

But

on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon

C4.

For

it

likewis e

fs

not

princip les

C3

difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE

innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d
by
maximum

expe cted

a nd

utility .

pu rsuit

Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o

avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism
,
scrappi ng

the

sp ots

not

by

doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around

with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will
trou bl e

of

wit h

utilit a riani sm.

enable

So

.i. t

them

to

evade

the

worst

is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y

illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its

mo r al

f avour

depend s

upon uti.lita rian ass umption s .
Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of
fwbst,r ntial

1itil.ita ri a n

e l ements '

(PD,

p.287).

consequ e n tia l

elemen ts

systems

incl ud e

must

infiltr ate,

an

with
the

' ass umption

if

Eve n

observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one

e thic s

thing

this
upon

must

hav e

astonis hing
confla ting

utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e
particu lar
that

assump tion

produce s

normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he

a ct

Kavka

thereup on

t ries

the paradox es of · deterre nce'.
wi t h

maximum

expecte d

to
The

utility

'( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great
deal of utility

- -

46.

·•---- ---- -

Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip
le (PD ,
p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler,
Bentham ,
Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as
to why the
pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4
to argue,
like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora
l' (cf .
Kavb p.29 1 ).
It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les
(espec iall y the
maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka
's f irst
paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see
PD.

.

, •"

.
12

i.s

s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87).

:;t

obj ec tions

as

This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h

ut il i taria nism

i self:

it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or

vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e .
usud l

stratc ~y

of

of

Kavka tries t he

weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the

~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising

u t i lit y

can mora l ly e njo i u.

But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies

fo l Low

fr om

t he

normative

( p . 28 7) • 11 7

what

ov erridde n

by

C4

s u ppo sed

u t il i t a rian

to

a ssumptio ns '

Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s

way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t

and

is

assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns

o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e

t h at .•.

in

produce ,

situa t i on s ,

are

whe n
moral

c ombi ned
dilemmas .

in

si tu a t i ons

These

are

not

s uc h

th e

f udg ed

as sump ti on

as

special

de t e rr e nt

c a ses

where

one

decnti c

pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e
c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it
int e nd

right

to

to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian

gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) .
wr ong :

that judg ement is not ov e rr i den.

Nuc lear de t e rr e nce

is

also

t he

case

is

t hat

in

r emai ns

Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4

i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion,
what

is

th e~e

s pe cial

p.290) .

situations,

Howeve r ,
t her e

ar e

count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives .

For

.ln

t he s e

is

wrong .

s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what
Howe ver

it

is

ha rdly

ne ws,

but

a

standing

objection,

that

ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g .
Spec ial
s pons on s hip

de t e rre nt
may

appea r

s itua t i.on a,

where

under

ntl lit a ri a n

t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l.

char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he
47 .

deterrence

de t e r r e nce

is

very

likely

As
to

Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n
cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument
f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 .
Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles,
but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s
with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in
the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e
with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s .

sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely

tp

lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well.

This is ve ry far removed from the real world

su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e.

si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the

deterrence

probabiU.ty

is

of

LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence .
that

<l1~ont <:

principles

sllbject

Even if it were

mistakenly

to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to

avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working
such

RS

supposed

de ontic

principles

C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons.

Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it

equi. r es,

by wa y of the following principle:

CS.

If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis

The reason is that the commitment is a commitment

circumstances;

and

that

commitment

is

to

act

itself wrong .

lso wrong.

wrongly

in

cer-tain

Nuclear deterrence is

however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions .

And

as

wi th

conditional

intention,

so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt

th a t

su perstates

and

controlling

commitmen t

and

their

intention

to

use

representatives

nuclear weapons.

did

not

occur)

is

enough

to

establish

the

relevant

The dangerous strategy of

launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a
thut

have

response

to

attacks

the point, for which there is

otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence.
Now the connecting principles
suffice

logically ,

but

are

nucl ar

deterrence,

for

weighty

principle

would

detachment

from

the

by complete preparat i on fo r and

Deterrence of this type is

wrong.

also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence

trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
parad ox ical:
det e rrence.
ir self

By

case .

i nstance

conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong.
This

sound

wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible

ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles

one

applied:

it

ou t

the

connections

between

and

not

be

engaged

in

(unl ess

i ts

ha s

appeared

nuclear war and nuclear

Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that

should

chang ed, e.g .

left

bizarre

nuclear

war

direct ion can be drastically

at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare,

to purely mi l i t ary targe ts).
Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different

sort s

of

ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e .

a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s

I

There

wh i ch start from the

commonplace ob se r va ti o n that
~

All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in

favou r

of

nuclear

deterrence

are

broadl y

ut ilitar i an.
In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many

t hat

inf iltra t ed

hav e

the

e thi.c a l

l i t erature ,

ar e

those

of

ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the
one

playe r,

t h r>

USA.

Utilitar ia nism ,

t hough

s till

looking

of

those

expedie ncy -·
advantage

of

basically

at

~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take

a

partisan

pain of

posi t io n,

a nd

consider

[ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity
sup po r t t d

by

o t he r

na tional i ties

othe rwi s e .

The

as

well,

commonplace

on

less

observation

is

the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains,

dflrive s from ut il i tarianism.

118

Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst

de terrence,

either

by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme

Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence
or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme ,
Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments.
The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory

in

f av our

d ir ec tion:

48 .

of de terrence.

moral

arguments

Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second

a ft e r all it is widely

thought

that

u tilitarianism

is

a

false,

Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and
a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent
de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a
much t oug her ent e rprise.
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was
· cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the
conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes
t.o deterre nce .
An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can
be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological
~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily
he way
of
<lcontic
connecting
pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail.
In the light of these
prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical
positi ons would go.
After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of
stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even.

seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition.
pol it i ca l

s yst em

whic h

depends

in

some

uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo.

It hardly does

measure

then

for

a

upon consensus , to rely on

Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e

just

thnt

appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that.

For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on:
how

it

ls

applied;

with

which

maximisa tion recipes; along with what other

r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well);
genc>rous

arc

utll i.ty·

assignmen ts

or

upon

With

different

(and · a rguably

superior)

va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results

emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49
basic

reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4).

LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility.
deterrenc e
out to

whi.c h increases th

other

recipes

of

feasible
a

how

for such things as preservat l on of national

sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc.
assumptio ns ,

and on

Any

policy

such

The

It is that
as

nuclear

probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e

alternati ves,

conseque ntialist

type

whatever
are

initially

applied

(e.g.

plausible

decision

Minimax, Dominance ,

Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) .
The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism
o[

ut j lltaria nlsm,

beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of

l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else
11t i l i tarla ni sm

when

applied

One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this:

by
to

addressin g

s ome

of

the

inadequac ies

of

issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e.
on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether

to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the
improbabi l ity of other options working.
deep,

uti ~itarlanis m

If the deterrenc e

probabili ty-well

is

morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is

morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are

pro babl e.

49.

Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the
discussio n
inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally
opposed conclusio ns are reached.
(Hardin 's approach tends however to
expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.)

50.

Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-know n to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilit arl.an ism'.
The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to
stand comes from L, Mirlin.

36
wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s

likPly

to

work

or not.

indepe nde nt

deterrence

are

decidedly

essentially

nowhere

i.s

Moral

princi p~s

not

are

through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how

ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be .

depend

.Lt

If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the

probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter .
det:crmlne<l

whcrhc r

of

upon

firm to stand.

Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these

a nd

of

the results util i ta r ianism delivers

uncert ainty

measures>

util itari anism off ers

In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle ,

utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and.
The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism.
(orm

shows

at

special

int e rests,

such

as

conditions
security

(the
of

estimation rules are pulled in).

probability- well

state ,

have

hi gh

1s

deep ,

utilities,

nat io n- s tat e
and

spe cial

It does not yie ld a deterrence polici;

ind eed

hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ).

11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a

o[

act

most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s

under very

il

The

acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity;

These

seque nce

di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult

dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left
(as

also

associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected).

No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered.
selected

out

to

To

see

this,

suppose

the

sequence

is

include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd

war breaks out.

In this event it can hardl y be argued that

deterrence

is

t he

pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence.
Along wit h the argument s, there are
dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence.

other

concom.itant

conventiona l wa rs .

f or

Firstly, the peace it has provided

011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re
smaller-s cale

reasons

is

no

deep
is

s hort age of

And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous

pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at

any

stage

by

a

r ange

of

51..

Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the
simplificat ion .
In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h
the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e
(ref rred to in footnote 49 ).

52.

Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm
the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open.

becaus e

- - - -- - -- - - - - - ·

-

37
fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and
t ec lrn1 .:fl.1,
j)C:lc (_~ ,
p 0:i

It thofl not

offer

genu i ne

of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo
nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e

·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ).

Secon dly, there

enorm ous

is

cost,

mora l
-~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe
nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t
moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami
liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly
Marx i st

way,

in

terms

of

destr uctiv e capac i ty and what

'the
ls

contr a dic tion
ne e ded

f or

betwe en

what

cons truct iv

the

is

spent

for

devel opme nt'

( PL,

p . 316) .

§6.

Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts
from

natio nal

dange rs

nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene
sis of nucle ar dilem mas.

to

Whil e

there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle
ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also
counr c ·-arg ument s,
that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe
ciall y to
Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l

just:!.fiab ili ty

of

nucle ar

war

pr e para tion

in

the

_p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es.

The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an
elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift,
of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the
local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or

f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and
every bit
a r gu1r.e nt

from

local dang ers.

dom inati on ;

a nd

dubio us

fir st

of

all

seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 .

atom ic

s urren der

and

so

avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ).

prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more
than these ;
third

eleme nt ,

name ly,

loss

of

basic

rig hts

there

with these .

black mail

of

forei gn

appea seme nt

In fact nucle ar
is

ways

a

cruc ial

of

life

This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the
dange r of

forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at
e eleme nt from risk of
Thoug h

and

(free dom, equa lity, etc .) and

fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human
dign ity, etc .) and
int eg rat ed

that

The two go toget her,

sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh
t adop t a polic y
or

as

It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be
en

tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er:
forei gn

as

black mail.

dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic
value s it does

imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin
ation , freed om to choos e vario us
natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi
on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s
can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta
nce, as is comm onpla ce in the

"[ r

•e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through

the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a

nti clcnr

prepnratlon

incr easi ngly

nuclear
risks,

state

demands,

extensive

etc.

But

what

nuclear destruction, also

involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction

ti, _ material

of

53
of the cherJshed life-style.
So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut

bnse

me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51•

fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of
lncku

cogency

an d

rings

ho 1 low,

It

is

basic

values

and

ri ghts

hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c:

oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
ci tati.o n

of

religious

values at politica l ceremonies;

clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
from

demand s

of

the

military-indus trial

of

private

wealth

and

vnl \les

appealed

to

category:

in

and

anot he r,

them

having

However

arising

to

do

with

th e

an argument isn't, or

associations.

And

the

rights

and

But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into

particular nationalistic ones do not.

And one of the main

a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or

many

are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,

and worth much sacrifice .

this

of

power.

oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury

that t he argument 1.s a

omplex , many concerned with foreign

domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many

conccut ·at:1.on

pious

of

"communism"

of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention

of cnpi talism.
communi.sm

has

What has
been

happened

here

confused

with

of

course

(the

t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms

(of

opinion ,

association,

is

reality
basic

information,

that

( the

of)

state

values,

etc.,

ideal

socialist

namely

etc.),

of)

and

certain
so does

derivative~ threaten basic values.
One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear
LSN

wa r,

and

indeed

for

rational way of preservtng

nuclear
those

holocaust,

fundamenmtal

preparation

for

is a good or effective or even
values,

which

we

have

left.

53.

The converse obviously does not hold.
Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life.

54 .

The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1.

.... ,

'lQ
J,

Simi la r ci. ue s tions
dominntion

and

arJs e

as

regard s

blackmail.

argumeq;; H from

er, e

Justification

danger

which

is

itself

open

questioned (i n §8 ), both from the

to

ser i ous

point

foreign

of the methods of extensi ve nuclear

preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e
structure

of

of

question,

v iew

of

nation
and

basic

states,

a

i s subsequently

valu s,

such

as

freedom, and oth r wise.
But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or

dangers

are

no t,

t hese

from

natlonal

those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear

prcpnration, and
jus tific, tlon.

have
They

been
have

par t of many people ' s

accepted
in

moral

by

policy

outlook.

particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar
however ,

the

makers

as

affording

moral

fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form
Wi thi n

frnmework the moral justification holds good .

others,

ar gumen t s

arguments

not

a

c onv entio nal

Northern

It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in

preparatio n
do

such

engenders

establis h

a

moral

fix.

For

the morality of extensive

nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
not

also

face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls

specif ically moral one.

,1

impressed

by

And

for

ma ny

other s

again,

who

are

who

not

so

or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life,

and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
peop)c

Such

live

beyond

For such

the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al

counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral

case

against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged .
Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated
people

who

live

in

people.

Consi de r

some

a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet)

under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nucl~ar

d ter r c nce

(a s under pr inciple Cl).

For such isolated people, who may

ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no
nucl ea r

diJ emma ,

and

nuclear

lo cations may have problems
problems
people.

as

deterrence
to

natio nal

is wro ng.
dangers,

genuine

People in less fo r tu na te
but

in

meeting

these

they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
In doing so

i mmorally;

and

f or

through
similar

nuclea r
reasons

deterrence , superstates
the

are

proceeding

conventi onal No rthern framework is

j_mpug rwd.

conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l

Tht'. same

argument::

put

a

reflective

i s olat e d pe rson, and check
S! 11 ci>

Amer ican

the

or-

resulting

by

a

substitution

Russi.an 1n the position of such an
asse ssment

of

nuclear

deterrence.

IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f

m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y

transfixed,

t h <~

c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality.
The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending
whc her

on

the

arguments

are

appU.ed

as

rega rds a superstate or not.

The

superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something
Jn

orde r

t hP

meet

of

the nuclear armoury that it has.

Or, weakening the theme to

ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it

retain

i1

t

l east

solid

a

ou~

core of the nu c 1ear devices it has.

(moretlly]

to

For su bs equent

argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for
inst a nce

be cause

of

the

character

the

of

pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of
g rou nds

to

those

di. sa rmame nL

supporting

ag ainst

a

the

dangerous

SS

reason 55•

prudent:ial

the me

nuclea r

Northern values supposedly being
On

similar

it can be argued that unilateral

opponent

would

be

prudentiall y

Jrralto nal.
It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is
a

s11 hopLimal

st rategy ,

li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma

si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games .
that

a

su peri or

would

be

cooperative

For

expen sive ,

re source s,

dr ai ning

of

such

t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1.

55.

admitted

arrangement s.

Cooperation

and

be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a

ra nge of other r espects .

future

be

strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the

lik . could be achif?Ved , would
agreeme nt

So it should

arrangement s

would

be

much

less

risky ,

destructive of the environment , a nd so on;
However for the present and the

foreseeable

the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state

It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local
expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.

rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~
unfortunate ly

rather

remote:

only

the

ca make

their

polici es

sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e

nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate :
proceed,

largely

unabated .

nuclear

preparation

Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state

one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a

one's

a rsen a l,

umbrella.

nu c l ear

pre paration ,

th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md

for

huddl es

conf l.dencc

in

!ts

and

which

under

co ntrast s

ncouragcd elsewhe r e .

st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear
grrH1nd

one

anoth e r's

But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by

dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof,
with

nu clear

in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly

thr oug h some supcrstate 's
nuclear

COVt!r

super-· ally

Does a "d epe nd ent"

on a s 1pc r -a lly,
rather

tha n

strangely

have

that

exchange

on its territory?

mu ch

Jt s ally's opponen t ?

Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or
nuclear

must

stag e

a

Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y

l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of
superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d .
Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e
it

<loes

theme ,

not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers

f rom SST nnd end s as follows:

DST.

Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he
facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally .

ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd
same

goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ).

Nor do the arguments of f ered for

SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments
striking l y

illu str ated

by

the

case

the

for

DST. 56

This

is

more

of more remot e nuclear dependent states.

Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.

Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in

j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans

of

the

Sovi et

Union.

Nor

ar e

they

thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical
56.

As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions
o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign
nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g.
eco nomic consideratio ns
such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs.

ca1 1acity to launc h
mot j .ve Lo

<.111y

<l o

look convincing .

carries

full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but

R

wc .i ght.

reasons

In

fact,

the
with

a rgumen t

from

of

For there

arg ument

t he

only

is

qucstLonable

non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs.

of

58

domina tion

In this way

too)

the

from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified .

such

supe r state

foreign

li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of

a

economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d.
fore(•

lack(ing]

so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol
For similar

1 it t le

'clearly

danger

because

nuclear

of

umbrella,

superstate
dang er

facilities

and

th e

tha t would be removed wi th

With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these

sorts

a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may

b e defeated along analogous lines .

The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and
peoples,

break

theme

the

of

a

of

monolithic West.

differently

situated

This is a theme especially

favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West,
its

freedom,

as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n.

und i.ffrrentiatcd unit.
dep1!nd0nL

i;tntes

with

But

this

l eadi ng

idea,
NATO

desig ne d

powers ,

and

In this the West is a single
in

and

part

to

align

lesser

to justify pu tting them at

nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West.

The West is

not

so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it

(i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is

now

coming

unde r

attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the.
und er lying retaliatory model that
0

Safety lies in weapons ,
More weapons i mply more. security59 ,

Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand,

safety

from

nuclear.

a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s

from nuclear submar ines ) .

Europe ans are ar guing in

present

of

syslem

is

more

a

similar

wa y,

that

the

a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g.

57.

For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e
Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 .

58 .

The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2.

59 .

Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson.

argument

for

it,

s ee

Threats

to

Thompson, p.251);

envi s -1ged

and thnt: w-ithou!:

Lhcut.r e

for

a

h\icJ. ,;,)ll''

instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be

limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l

thf'

is now seen by US

( ut not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons assumptions

are

qu es tioned,

other

assumptions

of

the

retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely
ci

Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular

o

Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament,

as

opposed ,

say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or,
takin g off from the previ ous point,
~

Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through
ar e

proper

methods,

armaments ,

etc.)

or should be such dominant methods, of conflict

resoLuti.on at the int er national level.
It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no

ordinary

level

do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
r e ally

warranted,

frontier

ethics.

This leads into the issue of alternative

defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60
and

explana tion

it

deserves,

questioning of the framework

of

but

never

one

that

already

nation-states.

While

emphasis

anticipates subsequent
the

state

system

is

inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted
and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c.
nation-state

system ':

For 'forc e has

[a]

permanent

plac,~

in

the

thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very

orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.

Th

resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites

Ass~mbli.ng
r eferred

th~
to

as

themes
the

so

far

nuclear

de v e lope d
fix:-

States

war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 )
to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east

60.

yields

the

both

and

their

supporters.

deontic dilemma. often

ought

not

to

engage

in

it is immoral, and also ought

for prudential reasons (as

Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alter native systems , see
su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on
i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s .

argu ed

using

China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,

·,,,,._

44
SST and DST).
tl w

Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction
of

virtues

parac.onsisteot

logic),

but

( c onc octed

61

prod uced

by

war itself 62 , or

at

war

and

its

version

of

the

deon tic

least war which spr.·eads beyond purely

mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably
e . g.

nuclear

, a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions.

ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense
di 1 emma

demonstrate

a serious real-life dilemma, t he

ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on

asper.ts

to

do

(since

ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) .

military

arrangeme nt s,

The ma in dil emma arises

from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of

war.

War

is

requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold);

but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es .
war

can

undPr

also

ce rtain

justified.

be

se e n

as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that

ctrcumstanees

Thus

' some

these

reall y

ju tifications
0

evi l

consequences

Regis

of

war '

(Walls ,

p.260).

accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic

are

morally

of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed

normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible
the

The doctrine of " ju st

But

this

argume nts

when

perfo rmed

under

is no better or mor e morally
for

uti l itorianism

as

bein g

corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e .

W;n· and preparedness for
61 .

wa r

als o

gene rate

s ubsidiary

di.lemmas

f or

Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence
the
best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of
world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii).
Green
also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e
asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he
is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s
down):
though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no
othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue.
Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops
d :llemma;
they s peak of ' th e
dilemma of how to prev ent the use
Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.

present the situation i n terms of a mora l
political paradox of de terrence •.. the
of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13).
In
too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in

Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs.
But
it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework.
62.

Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account
of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein.

. ...
inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and
difficult

prohlcms

au t ho f· t c y:

'one

of

th e

~0s t

o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying

the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL,

p.324).

The

problems

are

greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts.
The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed

by

t he

co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n

national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a .,
"
lnd.lvidual

li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) .

othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas ,
( poll U ca l)

obl lgations

to

s for

example

(the

question

the

extent

of

one' s

a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as

one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear
res c•archer

It also accentuates

of

politic a l

obligation s

armame nt s
and

processor

or

eva sion

is

their

considered f urther in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re
several

ques Ions

to

'Wh, t. should my sta t e

be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e
be

doing

and

influence, d epending on who one is.
I do?

1

one

Jives,

-

do?',

on

whi c h

one

may

exert

influences, i.e.

in

what

l it tle

There is not only the question 'What shou ld

a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending
a nd

ar e

on

whe re

sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or

on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the

questions

' What

sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64
Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o
act ion-or ien t ed

questions .

Each

of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations,

induce subsidiary dilemmas .
The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the
of

A

are

wrong

(or

di ffe rently,

pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy.

obliga tory),

negation

for some suitable A, such as

The place and essential role of deontic

and

63.

The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas.
T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and
security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and
autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state.

64.

For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility
of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out
Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate
than they are .

moral d il emmas ure not
l i t.t>r;,Lure

f, !.,



widely

or

well

und er stood,

p...." t'ticular]y
__

e 1-1
~ 1i

in

ca .1

Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e

utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which
giv•s

to

rise

them

but

the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve

acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y.

d i lemma doe

Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons

a

not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better

a nd worse ways

By

01t .

wh c h

assessments,

contr a st

f orm

the

with

basis

s uc h

e thical

theories ,

preanalytical

oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l

dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s.
Reactions an
f rom

the

res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas
fix.

nuclear

The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to

<lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to

temporary

Thus ,

crutch .

for

as

world' GG , that

b st"

j

ethical

RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o

way

a

of

neve r

exerci s ing

"mora lly

ou r

s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld .
fu nctor

s peak

moral

A similar

th e

'strictly

mor;il

Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role
but

de t e er e nc: e

th e

c i rc um s t a nce s.
de ter r .nc e,

is

be

in a fallen

to

" second

a

acceptability '

object

mus t

cert ainly

one

str ictly

and

wrong,

is

of

from th e

conditional

be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a

optlon

as

to

of

what

the
to

nucl ear
do

in

Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion
though

a

"morally

try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.

world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And

can

shift

'moral

c ond i tional '

while

a ccepta bi U.ty ,

good",

responsibility

d~t c rrcnce
fix.

·s

(as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic

of

we

gra s p

examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the

possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e
acceptable''

emerge

neverthel e ss

the

policy

to

fix.

awkward
that

war

in

the

pursu e

circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone

to

a

65.

There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as
Sar t re;
a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller
t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood.

66.

Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n
1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2.

6 7.

As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order
logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable'
hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s .

The

Australian,

February

12-13

!i

'.rnp erior

pol Ley ~

nsscrabled

(in

sufficien tly

it

is

§5-§6),

a

dt! cidetlly

reasons

of

·1

}-toor

the

opti_ n,

sort

reasons

i'o r

that

are

decisive

already
for those,

outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find

no

genuine

of

nuc le ar

nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re,
stal1.:s'

own mald.n&_.

fix

a

It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident.

initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the
Lhc

escaJAtio n

of

In these respects the

situation

is

like

peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble

relations hips , and build up
though

and

U.:, A,

has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by

the USA and the USSR in in teractio n.
th:1 t

The

one

there by.

It

is

build-up.

The fact i

programme is t o be in addition to existing
( which

are

to

Sovi et

that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has

frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does.

esources

myth,

a

some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear

in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response

bui ld·-up,

nucl~a ·

with

onflJctin g obligatio ns

generally

agr eed

The recent (1980)

United
to

States'

strategic

be already in excess of

Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) .
The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly,

state

policy,

allies, and
Naturally

not
the

USSR policies.
indicates

especiall y

that

merely
route

by
a

taken

advanced

response

to

capita list
t he

nations,

Soviets

(or

of

USA and its NATO
state

socialism ).

would not have been feasible without compleme nting

And independe nt evidence,
t l1 ere

is then a direct outcome

suc h

as

Soviet-Si no

confronta tion,

is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist

n.:.iti.ons .

There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts
nation-st.' .ltes

and

the

nuclear

f ix .

arrangeme nts are an evident source of the
nuclear

situation

is

increa singly

present wo rld polJU.cal structure .
is

widely

promulgat ed

.'.lrrangcm ents :

it .is'

seen

On

the

dil emma

as

one

hand,

with

t he

these
result

through
political
that

the

i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the

Indeed it is no longer a radical

theme

but

that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state
n world of sovereign states . • .

which

brought

the

wo.ld

to

the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ).

nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into

On th e other hand, th e

the

statist

form,

into

arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast.

stutlst

espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the
and

security,

to

defend

national

inter est s ,

reasons such as perpetuating the system
advantageous

of

confrontation,

st ate

to

(!),

provid e

but underneath there ore other

sovereign

st a tes

and

frame work

the

rlnd

peace

The

military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and

polit i cally
favoured

of

inequa l ity

it

supports .
The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e
statist

arrangements

a nd

interr e lations

( conomic

ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock
a rr nngcme nl.s

of

s overeign

where

the

pa ttern

world

states And zones of inter e st .

t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one .
side

the

rivalries,
into

conflict i ng
the

present

The argument to th1. s

Consider first, the matter from the

Soviet

of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic

reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer .
The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for
the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd
social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled
and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) .
"We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also
integrated

with

state

appara tus,

have,

in

forms

increasingly

the military-industrial complex, which is a

major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68
Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements,
by

th ing s

S llCh

as

the

SALT negotiation s ;

shown

there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a

(growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a
rule , partly held in place by deterrence .

as

flimsy

negotiated

set

Connected with this , there are cases

rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US i s

68 .

of

The

invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e
not

over.duly

worried

about

Afghanistan

and

its

people.

What

was

The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would free ly
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.

diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~
adj~c ~nt

~estcrn

oil

supp li es :

concerning,

were

these lay within the US zone of interest (cf .

th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212).

§8 .

Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:

results.

in itia l political fall-out from the ethical

Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in

one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limJt~tions

on

the

thu s inevitable.
and

more

or

power s of states.

Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re

The limitations may be reache d by agreement

and

negotiation ,

less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly

worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war.

As with other fixes produced by
there

are

suggested

ways

the

structural

ar rangements

of

states,

ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts,

inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure

nnd

power

·elations

extrastate approaches .

of

state s

(and,

in the limit, remove t hem altogether) ,

All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" ,

attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations , etc . , are interstate ;
sovereign

state .

The

s ame

goes

(graduated) unilate ral disarmament .
about the nation- state;

they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the

for

les s

"realistic"

But in fact there is

proposals,
nothing

or

empi rical

fact ,

is it part icula r ly a stable one.

nor,

and

its

replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s.

as

a

We are certainly

free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s
demise

sacred

it is not a particularl y well justified political form;

it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ;
matter

very

such as

to

its

And nuclear dilemmas

s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection.

69.

In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through
fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers,
lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s
are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by
conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like
these .
Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders
regarded the
institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration
between city-st a t es , not seeing
its
social,
structurally -emergent,
characte r.

50

approaches take one of

Extrnstr1te

ittlernat ional
of slate s.
r.ol

two

rou tes,

way

~Ile

to

l~,

ge nuine

power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0

The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;

,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e .

but they are

Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to

world governmen t, is alre ady there in the

international

law-courts.

Wer e

the

courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal
acl ion, that· medie val
principle

theo ri. t s

saw

to

all

disputes,

could

in

be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S

and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T.
given

intrastate

s n fflcienl

least jilitial]y)

But if

the

law

courts

were

power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t
upon

war deterrence ,

though

not by military means.

perhaps

Law courts, as usually conceived, are not

effective without police and jails or

their

and

equiva l ent

supcr-statist

back-up

eq uivalent

for
of

economic

other

penalties;

and

the

either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite

substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will
typicnlJy

be

organisations,

will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps

dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In

pa rt i es.

repC'ilt

uninvolved

short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to

rt .

Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying
ec:t

t. n

gri.ps

with

the

nuclear

though mostly 1n passing to be

to

problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned,

dismi ss ed 71 ,

in

orthodox

strategic

texts

on

-·--------- - - - -- -70.

Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is
a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of
the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the
uni on.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By
contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid
and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR ,
UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together;
and the one recent
attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e .
The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns
.illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification
of
Germany
should be resi sted;
instead a more rational regional
deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany
sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border
regio n, and so on.

71 .

Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical , etc.
Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour
wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations.

5l

thermonuclear war .

By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like

the

new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;

means

an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions,

combined

with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls:

unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s
considered

however

beginning

to

be

cf.

Way

and

is

more

sometimes
The Way Up,

sympatheti cally

by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.

a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing

inte rna tiona l

system';

and

'the

'towards

a

no

but lt is making

Galtung).

much

by

Up

mora lly

There is
integrated

missing element of world order today is the

absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320).

A main argume nt for the Way Up is

just

a

repetition

of

that

which

is

commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners'
Tragedy

of t he Commons.

traditionally,

ecological order.
not

herdsmen

as

best

solutions

regards

to

problems

as

the

of

organisation,

public order and, more rec ently, as to

So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are

but

nation·-states ,

and one of the prospects is destruction of a

r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now

sort

such

It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the

state - a r e r equired to ensure
espe cially,

Dilemma,

of superstnt e.

said

to

be

some

Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application

of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some

of

thcjr

be

order-imposing

corr espo, dingly weakened.
ar gum ent s

are

role,

and

But all

political
this

is

obligation
to

There a re, then, many problems

through

these

A

further

theoretical

with
h:1.tch

the
is

Way
that

Up,

a

both

"tragedy"

theoretical

and

the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.

It

is

contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations

nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated
72 .

will

72.

stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only

that

states

good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are

only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.

prac t ical.

assume

to

See further loutley and Routley
especially Griffin.

and

material

referred

to

a

level

therein,

up
and

The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the
thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state
enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital.

again .

The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h

no prospect at all of getting

su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose.
Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century
ago ,
In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we

have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before
Wo rld
War
TI.
The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied
soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United
Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has
grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United
Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less
influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui,
pp.2-3 ).
The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line .
future

For

t he

foreseeable

nuclea r

ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s

as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of
opcrnt l vc

world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear

hostlllt i es .
extre~ely

I n some ways, this is just as well.

monol ithic,

woul d

World

gov ernme n t

would

cer t ainly ,

whatever

it s

( g ray?)

politic al

colour,

{~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e

impose

damage

on

to

It

undesira b le

l eve l

Ideological,
r equ1 site

the world an

many

remaining

of

inde e d

u nity

political

and

parad 'gmatic ,

cannot

be

and,

e c o nomi c

sepa r atio n

expect e d

in

some

crucial

respects,

unity.
of

Moreover ,

give n

Northern

main

within nuclea r dea dlines.

swee ping

more

sovereig nty , c o ul d
blockages

and

agr ~ements,

be

negotiated?

dea dl ocks

i1

the

involving

genuine

There

an

way

is

When not even

endless

of

of

that
state

series

of s uch state reconciliation.

a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e

the

of

The s ame
Way

Up

nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged


-

through the Unit ed Nations);

73.

it

limitations

almost

the

cultures,

nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is

(e .g .

would

systems. 7 3

The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly

much

be

f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with

all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism.

·1
n .:ltur.:iL

an

7 11

Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
gov e rnment,
see Galtung.
Naturall y the objections to world
gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to
mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf .
Ma zrui ).
Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can
be
genuinely
s yn thesized with the Way Down.

jJ

There is
arrnrgemant s

regrettably
and

als o

conventions

much
are

e~ tdert ce

frequ ently

concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are
scntJments
signed
does

slide

smoothly

that
not

not

1nce rnational

observed (especially those

worth

into despicable dee d s .

bode

well

ever be rcc1chcd.
ln

<'nnv,•11t f< n

any

great

deal:

openly

violated.

I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one
fon·C!,

of

lofty

It

for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t

wl 1I C'h

tn

nl1

the

following

intEirna t i ona l

i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en,

w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc

includes

a

Even agreements states have

are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or
not

tr ea tie s ,

1

,

t h ton genocide.

Genoc i de

ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with

inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group

as such:

ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to

the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life
to

bring about physical

destruction

i.n who l e or i n pa rt.

f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e :
dJrcct

and

public

shall

Beside genoc ide th e

c onspira cy to

commit

be

Persons committing genocide o r any of

punl.shed ,

whether

they

are

the

othe r

act s

responsible rul er s, priva te

individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue
nucl~ar

genocide,

inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e ,

complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de.
mentioned

ca lculat ed

that

a

larg er

st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would

almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what
minority

groups.

conspir acy

repr:esentati .v

'S

does

to

some

But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear

deterrence stands indicted
pa r ticular

it

of the

and

as

involving

i.ncitement .

nuclea r

s t a tes

acts

ass oci a ted

with

genocide,

in

Some wel.i - known political and military
would

thus

ap pear

to

be

li.able

to

indictment . and punishment und er internation al law .
7L1.

Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms
control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t
suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp.
210- 13).
Reasons
include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n
drlvc f or strategic super ior ity .

75.

See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports.
in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden.

76.

The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the
Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff .

Most of the points
text

of

the

The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the
appare11t

I mpot ence

interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed

of

with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
ne:.rer

to

nuclear

the

" brink"

is

now

taken

to

ind ica te

contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l
tias

gi v en

new

impetus

sovereignty

the best-seller

and

to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions .

The

According

to

can

reorganise

the

radical

namely

n iclear

in

Sc.hell ' s

1

unsatis factoriness

situat .l on

The

should

the foundations of politic c l thought'

pollllcal

t.iicy opvrate •. ,

the

indicates

inst itutions

Fate

lead

political

of

to

req u i red

a

t he

Earth .

' ful l-sca le

to

make

't he

co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which

and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ...
its

political

li fe' (p.219).

However Schell himself tri e s to

avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by

the

of

the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed

stands,

Schell

reexaminatio n o f

world ' c

and

book

a new

a rrangements,

thesis that the nuc l ear problem

national

( f r om

and

work of our age'

else overimpressed

by

political t he oris ts.

the

7

Z

history,

c onstitute

So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or

real ities

of

(unstable)

nation-states ,

do

most

But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al

rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation.
There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too
11nthinklngly)

with

an

an tiquated

s ystem

many

present

state

arrangements,

representative
century

communications

•ery

different

condition;

in

a

77.

when
and

the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state

and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier.

of

( a llegedly

17th

we re

willing ly ,

The feat ures

go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he
especially ,

us

even

of poli t ical a rrangements which t he

nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion .
best

of

even

dem ocratic)

techno log y,
more
were

t he

and

primit i v e
d iscerned,

In the br iefs prese nt ed

A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e
national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l
( sec Co x , p. 225).
Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is
thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival "
bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an
undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1.

for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz
an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged .

But such systems con tinue to

opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es
und c r mi ne<l.

prese nt

Nuclear

problems

rep r esentative

have

political

emphasized

have

been

several other defici encies in

arrangement s.

In

particular,

they

have

rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident

will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles
Euro pe a n

countri es.

cen tury

ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved.

issues,

~

i s sues.

The

least, be reduced.
reduced

excessive

power

back

at

dev e lopme nts ,

pro cedures,

But the route down through

issue-regul ated

large

i mposes

and

complex

other

modern

requirement s.

states
What

lnl t .t1-1.l

s maller

a s iL ls

to

inf or med

citizens

gro uping

than

approx i mate
of

a

g lant

satisfa ctory

good will.

As

the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n

the

l.nf ormation

by
are

stn tes,

government

recent

tec hnologic al

called for a re smaller
Firstly,

in

present

information

and

democratic

progressive

procedure,

of

control,

nation-stat es,

channels, and so f o r.th.
ncc e ptable

the

from

These

upon

nuclear problems have again made patent,

even

·release
the

and

distributio n

distortion
r estrictive

of

most liberal of them (and

Aga in, especi a lly with new and less

systems , there is little excuse for thls.

information ,

upward

depends

But there ar e

e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited

pub} l t:1 y

and

Secondly , democracy, insofar

political

rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on).

flow

major

li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with

lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation.

a nd

on

of governments would, to that ex tent at

grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education.

cx pe n,, ive

lea st

governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e

poss ibl e ev en in

mu ch

elected

wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost

f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer
polic:y

th e

It is past time

for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once
(i n

some

Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g

make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major
19tl1

in

of

data

featu res

in
have

a vailab ility

major communicati on
helped

in

making

present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e

56
co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's
nuclear

superstates

are

often

seen

to

be

gJlemma

type

situation

th e

locked into (on which see, e.g.,

llardin1.
A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for

political

questi oning

current

arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at

le~sl), takes the following shape:•

Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain

j,rnt iff.-.d

111

te1·ms

of

dolng

ut

.eas t

where

and

are

so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns

en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those

arrangement s,

requirement s

(as

certainly

in

who

operate

under

the

muc h of the West) the basic

mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met .


l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have

these

requirement s.

For

guarnntce the prospect of
arrangement s.

nation-stat es,
good

meaningful

lives

those

to

under

their

yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that

person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged

a

meet

at least in the North, can no longer

such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way.

support

to

A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before

its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ;

m.-iny

and

ceased

s tate

to

Furthermore a

acquiesc e

in

or

engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.

Benn) .
Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have
should

be

amended .

have

their

justificatio n,

and

Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though

not all) natlon-stat es:
natio n- s t ate

f orfeited

it ls not only because of the

forfeited

their

mandate.

nuclear

Political

fix

that

some

obligations to such

states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed .
There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control
stght

of,

or

worse

have

lost

don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of

wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes.
78.

states

This

applies

both

to

How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
irn lerlyi.ng politica l
theory.
Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar
contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since
Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68).

r;7
rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both

c lai m

popular

Ln

and

mandate

ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! ,
power~.

put

a

value

hi3 lier

where,

nlrea y

illustrated

milita ry situa ti ons:
viol.1ted

the

'IH' t:.1k er s

on

some

have

more often , they act without it or

as

The sit1.1at-ton has been reached

sove reignty

nation al

survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210;
is

-✓ hl.'lfe

where

than

'nuc l ear:

they do on human

for copio us evidence see

Kupe r).

Thi s

by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear

the

principles

of

just

warfare

repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples.

much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l

have

been

blatantJ.y

Such states have forfeited

respect or internal political obedienc e;

so, on other grounds, have many other state s .
It could just be, of course, as is oft en
a lt er nat ives,
that have

been

re s arc hlng

glimpsed,

though

of world go vernment).

dismissed,

for

s tirc withou

very

no possibly better alterna tives .
but

little

As

to

whether

all

has

such

are

no

been

expended

on

opportunity

do

to

work,

a nd

not

Appea r

to

give

we

alternative s

w~y

Down.

There

working tow ar d s the wea kening
es pec .i.ally

can

be

the

may
and

ha ve

been

given

know very little a bou t how humans

suff icicnt

org anisi ng and trying out alternative
accessi ble

alter natives

instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely

operate under su bstantially different arrangement s.

But,

t ime

arrangemen t s,

to
even

once

again,

proc eed
thos e

nuclear

very far on
of

the

mor e

be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in
breakdown

of

t he

large r

s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem.

ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd
while

t here

But alternat i ves the r e are,

effor t

toking the risk of being dogmati c;

little

d e ad ii ne[,

tha t

t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e

0

op Li. on

or

insinuated ,

nuclear

st a tes,

Thus i t woul d be

s oc i a l

arrangemen t s,

theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly

off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x.

But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of
dll emrna

to

th t:

exclusion of all olh .rs:

quite the contra r y .

t he

nuclear

We can no t only

afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r
seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her )
con st rain ts ;

Indeed, given the urge ncy,

the

direness

of

t he

si tuat i on ,

we

58
:,hou1d

~s

be

fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such

boRged

rlown

( a nd

v ery

on

a rms

limitations

ner,ot inti o n s

m"thod::i

should

si~nifica nt

be

undemocratic

perservered

concessions

unrepr•sentativ e)

between main nuclear states.

wi.th,

from

cert ai nly

tJ nd

and

the

attemp t s

superstates,

made

to

e.g .

No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc.

But even s uch

a

wring

further

jointly

signed

The direction of most

hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially

new .

The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have
la rg e r

eve r y

liberal

or

huma nitarian

been

on

issue that has matte r ed:

from ou tside

state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or
nnd

it '

by

furnishing

self ·- organising

characte r is tically Bottom-Up
famiL l ar

cons i de rations

are

methods

an

alternatives

practically

wi t hout

which

never

virtually

upon

bypass

it ,

Top-Down.

Such

but part of the more general , and very effective,

case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
supply,

but

whic h

effectively and [or

can

almost

t hat

invariably

mnttcr

le ss

be

obta i ned, where required, more

e x pensive ly

without

them

(and

their

monopo1 i.es) •
In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions,
impo sed ,

or

acqulc s ced

and nuclear weapons .
frequently

from

time

being ,

movement

have

in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations

The opposition to th e

local

a nd

neighbourhood

esca lating
grou ps,

nuclear

fix

has

come

some of them now feder a ted

:1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate).

!we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1

that

These

groups

have

in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the

some

a ga inst

nuclear-free
nu c le a r

neighbourhoods .

equipment

The

patchwo r k

grass-roo ts

is strongest in Europe, which is - as the

mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic
thinking,

for

a

limited

nuclear

war

not

touching

ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American
Europe

will

E11 ropc wil l

these

mnke

it

a

saf er

place :

American shores.

nuclear

r emoved

installations

in

on the contrary it seems probable that

bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements

installations

It is

succeed

a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free.

g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced.

Ln

having

The chances of

mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and

Exc:c•p l

in

the

case

of

Eu ope,

where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern

Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication .
8Cr i ou s ly

And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is

failing

partly

g iant

fashioned

military-in dustrial allianc e.
inc r easJ. ngly

dominated

and

largely

domi na t ed

financially

ideo l ogically.

much

propped

exaggerat ed.

no t

nnd

c1d c quatcJJ

and

ec onomically

some

of

and,

in

some mea sure,

Indeed much of the "free"

world

countered

as

mil.itary

by

The

means .

i .,"

in

basic

any

mode of

mUitary .

But

mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by

the Sovi e ts is a

problem,

t here

are

several

ways

other

predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it.
on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down
alternative

is

it domina ted economicall y , by the US A.

doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant
in sofa r

a

up by the NATO powers '

i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and
ls

anyon'

Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n

polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA ,

c a1;e

Does

expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a

or Brasil say?

Th Rt

other?

social

methods

but

also

some

and

much

r eliance

on

These should include not

state-suppl ied
social

decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of
orga nlsat{ons,

than

me thods,

or

r estructurin g, such as

power

to

dispersed

local

mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and

East e rn Europe.
Part of the point of
whether

external

or

r es tructuring

internal,

so

is

especiall y

situa tions, is to
st a t e-contrived
79.

break

make

any

military

takeover,

much more difficult and pointless, and the

rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of
int e rch1nge,

to

the

point

of

cooperation

and

at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down

conditions

of

hostility

and

distrust

and

to

s abotage

the

West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove

For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of
some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which
appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need
be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options.

60
ot.hC'r

motl ves

fo r,

and

Western

popul ar

suppor t

Eu r ope ,

for

f or,

long

j.

much

Uitary
too

adventures

partial

to

and

military

advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean
nucl e ar

umbrella

for its defe nce .

Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least,

1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging
t he

world

in

the

i nterests

of

its own security .

extensive

parts

of

Nor should other "nuclear

depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European
impositlon.

There

wo rl<l, wha t

LS N war

is

no
risks,

enormous
for

virtue

Western

in sacrificing othe r parts of t he
Europe,

rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d.

which

has

long

exporte d

There ar e better. options

than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe.
-·-·- -----

--·- . ·--

80.

Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at
s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups
fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through
devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated
uni ts
it
in tegra t e d.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge
wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance,
sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c.
The net effect (as c.
Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of
militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high.
One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of
Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t
th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62).
Ycl
th
1 9 112 (wa r
r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly
untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence
r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to
military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.

81 .

In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l
supporting deterrenc e policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would b e
further co rroded.
In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas,
to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s
there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many
f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by
m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gi.( t
pro Jee ts .
If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e
l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e
versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended
to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g.
as part of the
strnteg y of the "cold war".

~

6J

What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press
b,oa rl out1 i.nc;

fof

::tccordingly

i.ic>

perceptive

t r ansarmamen t,

to

i.e.

conversion

outer

edges

of

graduat e d

the

movements,

alternative social defence arrangements).

Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go,
t hrough

in

i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction

an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more

wa y

clear

namely

all

the

disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament,

unilateral

c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's
s ur t~cc ,

inc luding

especially

Europe.

For

once

the

state is demoted , its

i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance
on

dec i s i on- making

its

diminished

de ci s ion-making - once all that is
happe n ) ,

one

in
duly

favour

of

allowed

more localised cont r ol and

for

(it

does

not

need

to

major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem

o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty .

Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty

has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken
we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers.

What is

important

and

wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
stn r- c .

The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying

features

s uch

as

mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation .
On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments
fr om

nat iona l

conce rni ng
part i cul a r.

dangers

.lndividual

also
and

grou p

rights

and

In

their

freedoms,

by

t he

that

nation- s tate .

matter

The

are

to

arguments

liberties

in

for

t hem,

as

sma ller

or

exclusivel y

nation-state is neith r sufficient for
are

disappearing,

nor

community arrangements can ensure them.

But

a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not?
ri sks

are

civil

necessarily

th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties
nec e ss ary

pl ace

None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.

None o f ti e rights and freedoms
g ua r a n te ed

disintegrate.

in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln:

To

be

sure,

th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not

---~------ ----82.

The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than
a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s.
The ste ps to disarmament ;ire
well-known , e.g.
the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o
modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as
Euro pe, et c .

62

hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of

moslly

to

wont

be

sure

t hat

nucle

or

arc

othe r

outsiders.

People

t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course,

i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be
Russ nns

natlon- states.

t

controlle d

by

Amiirican s

or

Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives

not a rational rout e to these ends .

In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way
dilemmas

the

as

nuclear

out

of

such

deo ntic

fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much

more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of
things

those

the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare

and a ut onomy;
wc,1pons.

but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by

The

main reasons are fam il iar :

threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values,

such

the

removal

nuclear

of

in particular, nuclear circumstanc es
as

welfare

and

autonomy,

for

many

cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in
a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another

with

nuclear

weapons ).

ideological

party

the

o pportunity

armed

There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons;

example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of

remain

welfare

for

(because

costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e

accompanyin g sec urity measures).
Thus

the

appropriate ly
de vi ces

and

nuclea r

fix

limiting
weapo ns

is

resolv ed ,

theoretical ly

it

can

deploy,

and

how ),

and

rate,

by

by

allowing

for

the

But, although that is a reasonable

Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be
s ince

any

sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear

con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty .

pra ctice ,

at

strongly

resisted

in

those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e

au s pices of the state.

This is a main reason why people must organise

and

act

aga i nsl the state .
Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since
sovereignt y

reduction

in

ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of

nuclear weapons .
83.

the

Ind eed

it

could

in

principle

be

obtained

by

negotiated

It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s.
Until
human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for
on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty.

agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) .

to

far

with

the

superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further:
for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation.
i.nto

both

milita ry

s yst ems - and

( c ivil)

Rather

it

is

industrial production of the states

So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being

concerned.

ti ed

solidly

resisted by super states.
Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s
and

espec i ally

against

the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t

serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r.
variety

of

organ is ed

forms.

These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear

war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or
wld •l y,

from

such

s t e ps

ns

Once again it will take a

The

indir ect l y.

the

forms

of

action

range

block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the

rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s,

t he

to

withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes.

They inc l ud e as we ll the whole

r a ng e

nuclea r

facilities

i nstal l a tions

and

of

nonviolent
(methods

protest
which

method s

against

do

exclude

not

i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new

model

.
8'~
resistance and de f e nce organisations).

It is important to realise that petitioning of
powe r

state

representat i ves

and

ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct

ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored,
th e r esul t s disco u r aging.

and

This is one reason why popular action should be based

on a mor e com prehensive politi c al

strategy,

which

also

involves

withdrawing

s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in
alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially

alternative

defence

forms.

85

Sufficient

d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start.

84.

For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp.

85.

For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g.
fu rt her Appe ndix 2.

Martin .

As to what to do, see

64

APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE

or

MANKIND AND THE EARTH,

according to Sch e ll, and to Anders.

A
ncrtes
of
nucl cn r
prophet s
lw a
pr odu c ed
a
EJ e r:les
of
ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of
l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the
nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith
the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary.
The most
wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th.
This skillful
piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep
phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is
not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for
a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect
j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
f or
i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e
defects .

Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage:

to selec t one example ,

consider

the

claim

that
' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e
[ human] spec i.es
nothing else t hat we undertake together can make
any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense
(p.1 73, rearranged ).
Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate
moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally
ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when
compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s
el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds.
Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor
spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r
presently
a rrang ed
nuclear
ho l oca usts .
l.

The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e
l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d
there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally
we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire
to
the
be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination,
A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being
r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s
a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t
t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity .
But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on
i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or
group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such:
a
l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted
w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it ,
While the
sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e)
w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a
poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s
rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all
f al l Rcy.
J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all
po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to
al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all:
t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1.

was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes,
two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers:
Sl.
Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on
arth (the
2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and
S2.
111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only
those of morality
a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon).
It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its
apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications
of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he
humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Th ·-- exDmp l e

Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real
po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does
t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl
appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of
con tracting the world to North Arner.lea .
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y
out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schel l's,
by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4
Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e
mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for
unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would
however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.

For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
o( S2 , se Foley JS.

3.

Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s
and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er
are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box .
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pando ra's box.
Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more
effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished.

4.

Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e
immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind
pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing
t'r""l .

66
th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense.
But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest
wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the
de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means
ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of
c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e .
Ther e are man y examples of
technological advances that have not been t ak en
adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have
be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special
a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns .

Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about
nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if
thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons
i t would not tell
aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and
the
limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work ,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the
" J.abnrn t.ories".
Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we
hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r
weapons in concer t, e . g .
for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or
firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war,
and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested
and lypothelical in chara ct er.
The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to
Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially.
This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2
being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply
penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended
by
Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to
be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl
Such ar e
all eged imp lications of ex tinction ;
but the fact is that the truths of
arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of
gods or g iraffes .
In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly
powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form.
Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and
tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving
pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not
e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording
to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an
impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In
imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the
strea m of huma n t.ime,
The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for
huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies
that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and
futur e
(p . 14 0) 6 •
Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s
time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass'
(p. lli3) .
But it: is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tens e s depend
on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but
no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other
time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o
other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons).
And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h
at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to
exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor
there were any human
beings.

- •••-- - - H•--- -

--- - - - - -

S.

Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry
ha s a wea pon it will u se it.

6.

Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future
repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73.

(etc.)

is

Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer
even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for
wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been,
if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e
would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n
mm1y
other org anisms would be differe n t.
Temporal themes do not la c k
' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion.
be

Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g
metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism
and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in
talki ng ab out what does not exist).
Thus, for example, Schell takes over
dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to
i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y
in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims.
The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main
tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory:
the simple and basic fact [si c!]
th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng
there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) .
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenche d
philo sophical
dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d
elsewhere 7.
Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans:
trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n
emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and
may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles ,
songs ,
Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to
p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss ,
and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of
the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not
worthwhi. le. 8
Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both.
'The death of
mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining
lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166)
a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a
per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even
if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d,
becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of
prec edi ng lif e and on the
very
questiona ble
represent ation
of
this
mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e .
From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an
absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that
' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly
'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+;
S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally
i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.

See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental
Ph i l oso n~
(ed i ted D.
Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social
Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980.

8.

Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of

the

argument

from

68
rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e .
1 011
Nor are all pe opl e
C<JuaJJy locked
in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d,
th e
po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR.

Nor,

---

1

i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme,
(in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go
theme, ,iccord ing to which
-S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really)
distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9
B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is
compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows:
'
t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with
nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding.
At
least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated
e l sewhere :
we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons
of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of
t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) .
But this is more of an
argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and
unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention
those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely
ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points:
we are
pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of
all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152).
And
again '[ as] perpe trators
we co nvey t he steady message
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless; that
it had bee n judg ed acceptable
fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign
against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as
is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply
dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e
less .
Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by
representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among
wi ll c :1

Schell

--- ·------·---- - - -

9.

An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is

responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on
of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r
re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng,
whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch
bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry,
a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election
especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l
o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al
processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of
political control .
10.

Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows:
'The
self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne
or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it
to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en
for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in
the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning .
Fur ther
't he world
chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194):
the world'?
This
connec ts
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fuodamental s, e .g.
for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against
soc inli.sm.
In the'
.nurse of
th:fA
argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s
assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the
end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) .

mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only
represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which
offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter
may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility,
st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated
th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation
generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).

When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s,
part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc.
(the whole ea r th
theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed,
unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scatter ed and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the
conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternative s.
At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Wa y Up.
So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar
simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns
( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the
r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it
is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to
military-indus trial organisation and ways of life .
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd ,
more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of
nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies .
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e
a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial
feature
Ls
the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear]
supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed
science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al
inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he
h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base,
the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state,
and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns
anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
ma le- female
re l ations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything
11.

Sec p.225ff.

12.

In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin.
The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er
analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164.

and especially p.227, bottom paragraph .

j

nee ds to be accompl ished at once;
and
the clus~~ - of damaging power and
do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of sta tes.
[n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats
th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st
between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics.
The teaching that
'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times,
ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134).
So 'stat es
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l
then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by
destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions .
Even if
all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is

13.

These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated
packag e,
compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
('TI C" rgy, sp ecr,
sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the
newer
Enlightenme nt (but
Faustian ) vlr tues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one
main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the
type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues .
Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the
Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel
maximls ation
of knowledge
paradoxes of omniscience .
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also
l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
t heo rems).

IL, .

R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also
drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral
science.
There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al
dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single,
source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out
of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and
those
who
control
them, for they are simply caught up by this
out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a
machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like
other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false .
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical
dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and
promoted , while other alternative s were not.
Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And
murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitran t
technologie s.
They also admit of being made t o look
r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if
it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation.

7l

claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the
r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context,
t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its
n uc l ear pol i cies . 15
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational.
As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war,
Schell leave s
us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the
right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187).
Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via
jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having
s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t
war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s
t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the
like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the
mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include
sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred.
It is on this basis th a t peace
ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as
•xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185).

Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to
undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means
arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately
th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous
c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
( p .189 ):
but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is
ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from
ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends
( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
a r e wo n).
It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being
defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no
o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just
wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand
improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional
war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme
t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between
na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme
d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
tha t coul d s e rv e , and
there is also th e possibility of more cooperative
behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n
assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit
as if war and violence were
thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for
winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are
pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of
understandl ngs , conventions and rules .
The y are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if no t a logic .
Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what
i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic]
plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd,
15.

Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context.
- j

72
rcnGonab.le, rational.
However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap
semn nti.cal trJ.ck .
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or
nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion
(as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning;
but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in,
extraloglca lly.
There are various ways these va lue assignments may
be
determined, to meet moral requirement s or not;
but in nuclear s tr ~tegic
planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In
fact,
'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general
commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he
policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying
with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he
emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng
11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i
viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat
of
thi s
unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd
locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends
on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the
Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l
be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t .

16.

Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own
ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of
deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions .

17.

Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g .
it
wishful]y
thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix
radioactiv ~ ashes .

has be en
f rom th e

The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing
mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e
one, but a n ideological one:
eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture
dominance of the riva i deo l ogy .
18.

An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n
appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"'negate" incoming USSR missiles .
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction;
although
involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of
intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention
to proceed.
Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an
intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed
how satisfactor ily in another matter
by a dis ti nction between
longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing

.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility
and on Regional ~~rategie ~
What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one
hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be .
So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In
presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt•
pol te l. cs .
The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl
r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states,
a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to
work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still
l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people
many for
th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of
othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s,
r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of
ce r tain soci al a r r angements .
Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t.
They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn
doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's
being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they
like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat
arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l
argument take s t he following lin es:
1.
The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a
d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore
2.
Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a
differenc e . Hence
3.
Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when
thint s go wr ong.
There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be
resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can "
t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e .
While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together
th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many
other i. nd lvidua ls do.
In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful
f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in
ma nner
M (e.g.
morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at
con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly.
Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al
s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in
ways t hat do make a differenc e.
An i ndividual is not exonerate d from
r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument .
While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are
di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of
more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical
di s obedi enc e.
An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in
Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards
defenc e
or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g.
nuc lear weapons productio n and
de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace
fun ds,
Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political
act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since
th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As
we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or
puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities.

1.

Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e
se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt
g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood.
- II

.,I<,'

Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under
Ro1ne
sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate
tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s,
etc., and o
such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the
state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e
Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing
cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individua l need bear.)
One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
wea pon s to, fo
example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e
wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the
we~pons for such war.
The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like
those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the
manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But
j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence
productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through
d e fence taxes .
The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the
a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be :
Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns?
Or with making
c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like?
What follows applies primarily to
people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people .
Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot
insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions ,
perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take
act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the
national defenc e effort?
It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no
dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be
re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ;
for in this case moral
obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are
alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does
not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the
respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further
moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts.
\n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear
war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s
working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n
this:
to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional
defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good
thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for
different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper
rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave
2.

An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of
s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes.

3.

This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give
t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in
remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing
ower from ind ividuals to the state.

4.

Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little
more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to
contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly
mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is

Seattle

in

"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more
that ch:ing,.. tha t .

H

T

~~ s

intact,

and

deeper

(ecological )

sch emes

Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a
su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking
for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper
se t of cha nge s in the superstates .
For those whose very limited political
i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow
goa ]
ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er
c ontr ol .
The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e
diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln
much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers).
There
i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local
a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps
towards
s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance,
wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with
the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases
and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to
por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear
ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite
s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ).
That much is easy, in
pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e
Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is
preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been
a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint
Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is
e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of
d e t erre nc e ' • 6
More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that
economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e
Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone
not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of
1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included
Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al
readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e
5.

Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1.
How slight
t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA .
Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor
one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated:
from a
Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe
( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important.
A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy
will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series .

and

alternative s,

76

whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even
dh,r ,, r t i ng
"d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence
gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat
in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and
c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive.

I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers 8 ,
a nd
s hould be preparing now, socia lly and
e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war.
Howev er
ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and
inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s
favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield
poli t i c al powe r .
But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed
r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj
so
why bot he r".
One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of
Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic .
A
mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political
re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o
bcf;1l l
th e m.
These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to
o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them.
It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e :
rather i t is that i t seems
unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes
~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear.
war.
Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in

6.

Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on
conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The
point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture ,
as
Hawke~ notes.
The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as
also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms
c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war
fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role
can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is
not in any do u bt:
'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the
vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e
Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e;
quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17).
Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities
put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk.
' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s
Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate
int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A
prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f .
Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since
Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic
consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the
ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put
Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk
.for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s .
A
worthwhile
re presenta tive
government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s
tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain
t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t
wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term
co mme r c ial considerati ons.

7.

As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of
a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment.

8.

Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as
the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively
insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e.

77

achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t.
-yen those who believe
tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life)
do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessmen t: . 9

Richard Routle y*

9.

Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g.
Mart in .
There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for
example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so
dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical
scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts .

*

The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C.
Pigden , R.
Good in, N.
Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
cor r espondenc e with G.
Fo ley.
J.
Norma n has helped in its final
organisat ion.
The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in
Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y
in 1982 .

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Citation

Richard Sylvan, “Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out,” Antipodean Antinuclearism, accessed March 29, 2024, https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/show/98.

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