2 20 44 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/a712372fc5eb6f4fbc060ed2fdbafa53.pdf 201a8b138801518733d5f3bcd3bc60e3 PDF Text Text The Research Schoot oi Sociai Sciences Post Office Box 4 Canberra ACT 2600 Telegrams & cables NATUNiv Canberra Telex AA 62694 sopAC Telephone 062-49 5111 Department of Philosophy reference 10 February 1981. The Editor, A.N.U. Reporter Dear Editor, In the eyes of many the A.N.U. had already abandoned any semblance of neutrality on the issue of nuclear power and uranium mining ^me time ago, especially by the use of official university resources for the promotion of Professor Ringwood and his pro-nuclear position. Now we have the news that the A.N.U. has even more thoroughly compromised its neutrality on the issue through the purchase of /2(^0,00^ -weath'TKf shares in uranium mining. In view of the university's use of its funds and other resources to sponsor nuclear development, the initials A.N.U. could perhaps be better taken to stand for Australian Nuclear University. This suggests some possible ways in which the many people within the university who object to uranium mining and nuclear development could protest and express their awareness of and distaste for its pronuclear character, for example: * Sign published work with the home address to avoid the embarrassment of being associated with this thoroughly compromised institution, adding a note to explain why. * Sign published work 'Australian Nuclear University', appending a footnote to explain why this name is more appropriate. * Substitute 'Australian Nuclear University' on letterheads, envelopes, in letters to colleagues, and in other appropriate places, so that the character of the university and its political commitments become more widely known. No doubt others will be able to think of many appropriate variations on the theme, Yours, Richard Routley. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document The Research Schoot oi Sociai Sciences Post Office Box 4 Canberra ACT 2600 Telegrams & cables NATUNiv Canberra Telex AA 62694 sopAC Telephone 062-49 5111 Department of Philosophy reference 10 February 1981. The Editor, A.N.U. Reporter Dear Editor, In the eyes of many the A.N.U. had already abandoned any semblance of neutrality on the issue of nuclear power and uranium mining ^me time ago, especially by the use of official university resources for the promotion of Professor Ringwood and his pro-nuclear position. Now we have the news that the A.N.U. has even more thoroughly compromised its neutrality on the issue through the purchase of /2(^0,00^ -weath'TKf shares in uranium mining. In view of the university's use of its funds and other resources to sponsor nuclear development, the initials A.N.U. could perhaps be better taken to stand for Australian Nuclear University. This suggests some possible ways in which the many people within the university who object to uranium mining and nuclear development could protest and express their awareness of and distaste for its pronuclear character, for example: * Sign published work with the home address to avoid the embarrassment of being associated with this thoroughly compromised institution, adding a note to explain why. * Sign published work 'Australian Nuclear University', appending a footnote to explain why this name is more appropriate. * Substitute 'Australian Nuclear University' on letterheads, envelopes, in letters to colleagues, and in other appropriate places, so that the character of the university and its political commitments become more widely known. No doubt others will be able to think of many appropriate variations on the theme, Yours, Richard Routley. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 98, Item 1865: Richard Routley to The Editor, ANU Reporter, 10 Feb 1981 Subject The topic of the resource Typescript letter, with emendations. Letter on a Australian National University letter head. Richard Routley (later Sylvan) writes about ANU’s "…abandoned any semblance of neutrality on the issue of nuclear and uranium mining…", through the promotion of Professor Ringwood and "his pro-nuclear position", and the purchase of shares in uranium mining. Sylvan suggests some possible ways staff could protest. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 98, Item 1865 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource February 10, 1981 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, [1] leaf. 2.12 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondences Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:2e5219e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:2e5219e</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Far Bookcase - Second Bay - Second Shelf - Pile 1 Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookcase > Second Bay > Second Shelf > Pile 1 Box 98: Richard's Professional Work-refereeing - examining - reports etc and Philosophy of Language https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/16947195a878ecb196bb09099f17f712.pdf 3db2c0baa2c3c95fd45969180538a40b PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 120, Item 102: Richard Sylvan to John, c1983 to ? Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten letter to John from Richard Sylvan, letter isn't signed. Sylvan writes about a UNESCO Asia-Pacific meeting held in 1983 and discusses John's report on philosophy in New Zealand. The meeting is possibly the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Teaching and research in philosophy in Asia and the Pacific held in Bangkok, 21-25 February 1983. The letter is also possibly addressed to John Patterson who attended the UNESCO Asia-Pacific meeting and presented a paper on philosophy in New Zealand. (Information from UNESCO (1984) Teaching and Research in Philosophy: Asia and the Pacific, UNESCO). Description An account of the resource Note, one of two papers digitised from item 102. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 120, Item 102 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, [4] leaves. [12.73 MB] For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondences Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:d21b575">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:d21b575</a> Box 120: Philosophy Wisdom to Wowserism Como House Como House > Green Table > Pile 5 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e697a58c0c0eb658f0859e812161a780.pdf 6e6025285db216731a09bd2dbbf3c02f PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 139, Item 1: Richard Sylvan to Tom Cahill, Editor, Anarchist Studies, 5 Jan 1993 and peer review of paper Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten letter with peer view by Sylvan. Paper titled Research on 'creating cooperative autonomy', author not identified. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 139, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 5, 1991 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, [4] leaves. [2.34 MB] Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondences Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a892974">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a892974</a> Box 139: Anarchy https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b87130a29f9b52af42c4cef275532629.pdf b0bf742ca1521f0e62f99c840366ccf4 PDF Text Text I I 1 / I PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION 23 May 1983 Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor. Dear Professor Karmel, Publi .. Affairs Conference: The consequences of nuclear war. I have to advise you that I have serious concerns about several aspects of this conference, which takes place next Monday-Tuesday 30-31 May. Despit the unusual amount of time that it has taken in an attempt to establish and agree upon the programme, and an unprecedented level of involvement_ of the Assistant Vice-Chancellor in an attempt to enlist more senior authority to hold the programme to what is agreed, it has not proved possible for the Centre for Continuing Education effectively to be responsible for the programme, or indeed even to be sure what the programme is. I respect and personally happen to be in agreement with Dr Denborough in his commitment to the cause of peace and prevention of nuclear war. The large enrolment of the conference (well in excess of 300) is due to his very considerable efforts in publicising it as well as to its intrinsic contemporary interest and importance. His commitment however is such as to override all normal conventions of cooperative behaviour, and it leaves me unable to give assurances that the conference will be ah activity proper and appropriate to the University. The programme as it now appears to be is the result of a succession of compromises extracted through pressures of various kinds. Those involved in the Centre are by no means happy with the result, and fear that it has now become over-crowded, as we have been nbliged to honour agreements entered into, as I believe, illegitimately on behalf of the University. The likely high level of interest and energy among those taking part, and the frustration of a crowded programme and little opportunity till late on for floor contribution, may well make for an explosive situation. Much of this I have accepted, as I believe has the Assistant Vice-Chancellor, reluctantly and finding the alternatives still less attractive. As the programme now reads, my most serious concern is that Dr Denborough is to chair the final session. I believe that he is too dedicated to a point of view, and too embedded in the whole emotional side of the subject, the planning and the conference, to be able to take this part satisfactorily. I am also concerned that Dr Millar is apparently being limited in his participation to chairing the session at which Dr Ball is to speak. I consider that a strong chairperson and a well balanced panel are very important for the final session to be satisfactory from a University point of view. The various kinds of moral and other blackmail that have been employed may make this impossible, but in this and some other respects the conference remains, for all the efforts of CCE to retain balance and authoritative presentations, highly volatile. One reason for writing is to alert you to this, as even now it may not be too late to enhance the quality of what at any rate is certain to be a high profile event. The other is to anticipate and if possible avert a consequence of any embarrassment which might be caused by the conference: a natural reaction away from attempting any other important but controversial theme in public affairs and extension conferences. The cornmi ttee which was developing thi_s conference came to be replaced by one man, and the attempt of Mr Plowman and myself, with CCE colleagues, to fill the vacant place naturally proved less than satisfactory. The lesson should be not again to allow any member of the University with a particular personal commitment of this kind to capture � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document I I 1 / I PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION 23 May 1983 Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor. Dear Professor Karmel, Publi .. Affairs Conference: The consequences of nuclear war. I have to advise you that I have serious concerns about several aspects of this conference, which takes place next Monday-Tuesday 30-31 May. Despit the unusual amount of time that it has taken in an attempt to establish and agree upon the programme, and an unprecedented level of involvement_ of the Assistant Vice-Chancellor in an attempt to enlist more senior authority to hold the programme to what is agreed, it has not proved possible for the Centre for Continuing Education effectively to be responsible for the programme, or indeed even to be sure what the programme is. I respect and personally happen to be in agreement with Dr Denborough in his commitment to the cause of peace and prevention of nuclear war. The large enrolment of the conference (well in excess of 300) is due to his very considerable efforts in publicising it as well as to its intrinsic contemporary interest and importance. His commitment however is such as to override all normal conventions of cooperative behaviour, and it leaves me unable to give assurances that the conference will be ah activity proper and appropriate to the University. The programme as it now appears to be is the result of a succession of compromises extracted through pressures of various kinds. Those involved in the Centre are by no means happy with the result, and fear that it has now become over-crowded, as we have been nbliged to honour agreements entered into, as I believe, illegitimately on behalf of the University. The likely high level of interest and energy among those taking part, and the frustration of a crowded programme and little opportunity till late on for floor contribution, may well make for an explosive situation. Much of this I have accepted, as I believe has the Assistant Vice-Chancellor, reluctantly and finding the alternatives still less attractive. As the programme now reads, my most serious concern is that Dr Denborough is to chair the final session. I believe that he is too dedicated to a point of view, and too embedded in the whole emotional side of the subject, the planning and the conference, to be able to take this part satisfactorily. I am also concerned that Dr Millar is apparently being limited in his participation to chairing the session at which Dr Ball is to speak. I consider that a strong chairperson and a well balanced panel are very important for the final session to be satisfactory from a University point of view. The various kinds of moral and other blackmail that have been employed may make this impossible, but in this and some other respects the conference remains, for all the efforts of CCE to retain balance and authoritative presentations, highly volatile. One reason for writing is to alert you to this, as even now it may not be too late to enhance the quality of what at any rate is certain to be a high profile event. The other is to anticipate and if possible avert a consequence of any embarrassment which might be caused by the conference: a natural reaction away from attempting any other important but controversial theme in public affairs and extension conferences. The cornmi ttee which was developing thi_s conference came to be replaced by one man, and the attempt of Mr Plowman and myself, with CCE colleagues, to fill the vacant place naturally proved less than satisfactory. The lesson should be not again to allow any member of the University with a particular personal commitment of this kind to capture Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 1: Richard Routley? to Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor, Australian National University, 23 May 1983 Subject The topic of the resource Letter missing pages. Possibly written by Richard Routley (later Sylvan). Routley writes to Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor of ANU, about his concerns of the university's involvement in the Public Affairs Conference (30-31 May), in relation to the consequences of nuclear war and Dr Denborough, the conference chair. Typescript letter, written on Australian National University (ANU) Centre for Continuing Education letter head. Marked private and confidential. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered manuscript from collection, item number assigned by library staff. The rightsholder for this work cannot be identified, or is identifiable but cannot be found, after a reasonable good faith search. If you believe you have a valid claim to the rights in this work, please contact us by email copyright@library.uq.edu.au Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 23, 1993 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Richard Sylvan Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, 1 leaf [962.77 KB] Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondences Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7af99ef">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7af99ef</a> https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/46d18761af348ef21c37dca2628582a9.pdf 49ee38d32c731ad154d8fa5f39e25dea PDF Text Text /*/^/ R. SYLVAN (ng Routley) In the background for much of the year has been a sustained treatise on But the recent foreground has been dominated by bits and pieces on anarchism. science and environmental matters. PUBLICATIONS 2 and ROUTLEY, R., guest editors, Studia Logica, vol. 43, special PRIEST, G. double issue on paraconsistent logic. 2 and ROUTLEY, R., "Introduction", PRIEST, G. Studia Logica, vol. 43, pp. 1-14. 2 PRIEST, G. and ROUTLEY, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in Logic and Metaphysics, No. 1, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 235 pp. ROUTLEY, R., "The American plan completed: alternative classical style semantics, without stars, for relevant and paraconsistent logics", Studia Logica, vol. 43, pp. 129-156. ROUTLEY, R., "Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament", Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 10, numbers 3-4, pp. ROUTLEY, R., "Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 14, pp. 167-188. ROUTLEY, R., guest editor, Logique et Analyse, nos 103-104, (1983), special issue on non-classical logic. ROUTLEY, R., Maximising, Satisficing, Satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms, Discussion Papers in Environmental 1 �Philosophy, No. 10, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 27 pp. ROUTLEY, R., "On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity, and fanaticism of pacifism", Inquiry, vol. 27, pp. 117-148. ROUTLEY, R., "Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action", in R. Elliot and A. Gare, editors, Environmental Philosophy: collection of readings, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, pp. 260-293. ROUTLEY, R. "People vs the land: the ethics of the population case", in R. Birrell and others, editors, Populate and Perish?, Fontana, Sydney, pp. 325-351. ROUTLEY, R., MEYER, R.K., BRADY, R.T. z 1 and PLUMWOOD, V. , Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, I, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, Calif ornia, 460 pp. ROUTLEY, R. and PLUMWOOD, V.^, Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, No. 6, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 42 pp. SYLVAN, R., Windows on Science. beyond the Actual, and 2. 1. How Science and Myth and Fiction Step Science on Science, Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, No. 1, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 53 pp. SYLVAN, R., Windows on Science. 3. A Cosmo-Logical Synthesis, Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, No. 2, Philosophy Department, RSSS. ANU, 40 pp. 2 a �SYLVAN, R., Philosophy and Pluralism, Relevant Models and Arguments, Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, No. 3, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 35 pp. SYLVAN, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, No. 12, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 59 pp. SYLVAN, R. and PLUMWOOD, V.^, An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, No. 7, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 36 pp. 3 . �ANNUAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF TENURED ACADEMIC STAFF INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES Report by R. SYLVAN ( Department of Philosophy, RSSS) for the period 1981-4 inclusive 1. Research conducted and future plans for research My research has ranged over a wide area in philosophy — metaphysics, logic, philosophy of science, ethics, social and political theory, extending to environmental concerns. My work overlaps the three areas upon which research in the Philosophy Department, RSSS, concentrates: logic; metaphysics and epistemo logy; and social and political theory. The work extends into other disciplines as well, in an examination of their fundamental assumptions. For example, my current work includes the metaphysical principles in cosmology, realism and relativism in science, and the philosophical assumptions of economics. This philosophical investigation of the foundations of other disciplines is a research trend which is likely to increase. Uy research over the next few years will also include certain large projects, already underway. These include a treatise on anarchism, which will likely be several years in preparation, and an in-depth work on process theory and nondeductive logics with particular emphasis on nonmonotonic logics relevant to computing and information processing. 2. Publications during 1981-4 BOOKS, MONOGRAPHS AND JOURNAL, written and edited Environmental Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Monograph Series #2, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, (edited with D. Mannison and M. McRobbie). Reprint, with minor correction, 1982, 394 pages. Relevant Logics and Their Rivals I. The basic semantical theory (with R.K. Meyer, V\ Plumwood, and R.T.Brady), Ridgeview,California, 1983, 460 pages. Nonclassical Logic, (guest editor), special double issue of Logique et Analyse 103-4, 1983, devoted to nonclassical logic in Canada. On Paraconsistency (with G. Priest), Research Papers in Logic #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 321 pages; reprinted with minor revision in Research Series in Logic and Metaphysics #1 1984, 235 pages; to appear in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. with G. Priest and J. Norman), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1986. Paraconsistent Logics (edited with G. Priest as guest editor), with contributed introduction, Studia Logica 43 (1984), 220 pages. .../2 �-2- 2. Publications during 1981-4 (cont) ARTICLES: 'Necessary limits to Knowledge: Unknowable truths', Essays in Scientific Philosophy (ed. E. Morscher and others), Comes-Verlag, 1981, pp. 97-118. 'An alternative angle on the humanities', Cooperative Education Newsletter, University of Victoria (Fall 1981), pp. 2-3* 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future' (with V. Routley), Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, (ed^ E. Partridge), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, pp. 277-301. 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals', Inquiry 24 (1981 ), pp. 387-417. 'The inadequacy of the actual and the real: beyond empiricism, idealism and mysticism', Language and Ontology (ed. W. Leinfeller and others), Verlag Holder-Pitcher-Tempsky, 1982, pp. 49-67. 'An impressionistic survey of paraconsistent positions and theories', Collected Papers of the 1982 Foundations of Logic Conference, University of Waterloo. 'On the philosophical basis of relevant logic semantics' (with V. Plumwood, R.K. Meyer and E.P. Martin), Journal of Non-Classical Logic 1 (1982), pp. 71 -105. 'Negation and contradiction in Wittgenstein', Language and Ontology (ed. W. Leinfeller and others), Verlag Holder-Pitcher-Tempsky, 1982, pp. 471-4. 'World rainforest destruction - the social factors' The Ecologist 12 (1982), pp. 4-22. (with V. Routley), 'Disjunctive Syllogism seen as a fallacy of relevance', Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Polish Academy of Sciences (1982). 'Nuclear power - ethical and social dimensions' (with V. Routley), And Justice for All (ed. D. Van der Veer and T. Regan), Rowman and Littlefield, 1982 'In defense of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism' Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #2, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982, 47 pages. 'The irrefutability of anarchism' (with V. Plumwood), Social Alternatives 2(3) (1982), pp.23-8. 'Unravelling the meanings of life?' (with N. Griffin), Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy j^3. Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982, 49 pages; to appear in Studies in Analytic Philosophy: a comparative Approach (ed. B. Matita1 and J. Shaw), Reid el, Dordrecht, 1984; rescheduled. 'On what there is pp. 151-77. not', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1982), .../3 �-3- 2. Publications during 1981-4 (cont) 'Lessons from Pseudo-Scotus', Philosophical Studies 42 (1982), pp. 189-99. 'Algebra^analyses of relevant affixing logics, and other Polish connections' (with R.T. Brady, R.K. Meyer and C. Mortensen), Research Papers in Logic #16, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 56 pages; to appear in Relevant Logics and their Rivals II, 1986. 'Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania: its brief history and its present state', Research Papers in Logic #14, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983; condensed version to appear in Ruch Filozoficzny. 'Semantical foundations of value theory' pp. 441-56. (with V. Routley), Nous 17 (1983), 'Nihilisms and nihilist logics', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #4, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 53 pages; shortened version to appear in American Philosophical Quarterly, 1986. 'Relevant logics and their semantics remain viable and undamaged by Lewis's equivocation charge' (with R.K. Meyer), Topoi 2 (1983), pp. 205-1 5. 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions' (with V. Plumwood), Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #6, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 42 pages; to appear in Paraconsistent Logic, (ed. with G. Priest, and J. Norman), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1985. 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #9, 1983, 31 pages; also in Inquiry 27 (1984), pp. 11 7-28. 'The role and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action', Environmental Philosophy. A Collection of Readings (ed. R. Elliott and Al Gare), University of Queensland Press,1983,pp. 260-93. 'Relevantism and the problem as to when material detachment and the disjunctive syllogism can be correctly used', Research Papers in Logic #12, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 24 pages; revised version in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp. 167-88. 'The American plan completed: alternative classical-style semantics without stars, for relevant and paraconsistent logics', Studia Logica 43 (1984), pp. 125-56. 'How science and myth and fiction step beyond the actual and sometimes beyond the possible', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy #1, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 33 pages; appear in revised German translation, 1986. .../4 �-4- 2. Publications during 1981-4 (cont) 'Science and science: relocating Stove and the modern irrationalists', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy #1, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 20 pages; to appear in Critical Philosophy, 1985* 'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 27 pages. 'War and Peace I: On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, and the political fall-out', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 80 pages. 'People vs the Land: the ethics of the population case', Population Growth and Resources in Australia: The Intensifying Conflict (ed. R. Birrell, D. Hill, and J. Neville), Fontana, Sydney, 1984, pp- 325-57. Manucripts accepted or prepared (those accepted for publication are starred) BOOKS *Paraconsistent Logic (contributing editor, with G. Priest and J. Norman), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1984, 540 pages; several articles appear in this text. ^Directions in Relevant Logic (contributing editor, with J. Norman), Reason and Argument series, Nijhoff, Holland,1986, 350 pages; several articles appear in this book. *Soil Degradation in Australia: The Future of our Land (contributing editor), Croom Helm Australia, Sydney, 1986. j *The Philosophy of J.C.C Smart (edited with^J. Norman), Blackwell, 1986. ARTICLES 'A non-triviality proof for dialethic set theory', typescript 1981. 'Nuclear energy - ethical, social and political dimensions', typescript 1981, 50 pages. 'More general da Costa and dual-intuitionistic logics', typescript 1982, 14 pages. .../5 �-5- 3. Manuscripts accepted or prepared (cont) -those manuscripts accepted for publication are starred 'Starred semi-lattice semantics for full Urquhart systems', typescript 1982. 'Conditional probability as the probability of a conditional', typescript 1982, 26 pages; read at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 1982. 'The irrefutability of anarchism - enlarged', typescript 1982, 45 pages. 'Simple probabilistic sanantics for non-normal modal logics', typescript 1982; presented at Logic Workshop, University of Victoria, Canada, 1983. 'Non-classical probability theories', typescript 1983. 'A neglected goal of philosophy - wisdom', typescript 1983, 36 pages; read to the Philosophy Department, The Faculties. 'World order, cultural convergence and regional culture', typescript 1983, 6 pages. 'Culture and the roots of political divergence: The Australia/American contrast', typescript 1983, 32 pages; expanded to 121 pages 1984. 'On non-deductive reasoning I. Non-monotonic logics', typescript 1984. 'Myths concerning rationality', typescript 1984, 11 pages; read at University of Queensland, 1984. 'Nature JLs closed to mind: typescript 1984. Whitehead, deep ecology, and the theory of objects', *'Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy #2, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1985, 42 pages; to appear in Grazer philosophische Studien, special anniversary issue, 1985. ^'Introducing polylogue theory', to appear in Philosophia, 1985, 21 pages. ^'Negation and contradiction' (with V. Routley), to appear in Proceedings of the Third Latin-American Logic Symposium, Columbian Society of Mathematicians, Bogata, 1985. *'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', to appear in Philosophy and Social Criticism, February 1985. 'Moral Issues in Nuclear War' (with L. Sylvan), typescript, 1984; read at ANU Summer Studies Workshop on Peace, Disarmament and Development. �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences Department of Philosophy [1983?] research output report (8 pages) Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences Department of Philosophy 1985 research output report (8 pages) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document /*/^/ R. SYLVAN (ng Routley) In the background for much of the year has been a sustained treatise on But the recent foreground has been dominated by bits and pieces on anarchism. science and environmental matters. PUBLICATIONS 2 and ROUTLEY, R., guest editors, Studia Logica, vol. 43, special PRIEST, G. double issue on paraconsistent logic. 2 and ROUTLEY, R., "Introduction", PRIEST, G. Studia Logica, vol. 43, pp. 1-14. 2 PRIEST, G. and ROUTLEY, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in Logic and Metaphysics, No. 1, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 235 pp. ROUTLEY, R., "The American plan completed: alternative classical style semantics, without stars, for relevant and paraconsistent logics", Studia Logica, vol. 43, pp. 129-156. ROUTLEY, R., "Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament", Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 10, numbers 3-4, pp. ROUTLEY, R., "Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 14, pp. 167-188. ROUTLEY, R., guest editor, Logique et Analyse, nos 103-104, (1983), special issue on non-classical logic. ROUTLEY, R., Maximising, Satisficing, Satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms, Discussion Papers in Environmental 1 Philosophy, No. 10, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 27 pp. ROUTLEY, R., "On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity, and fanaticism of pacifism", Inquiry, vol. 27, pp. 117-148. ROUTLEY, R., "Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action", in R. Elliot and A. Gare, editors, Environmental Philosophy: collection of readings, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, pp. 260-293. ROUTLEY, R. "People vs the land: the ethics of the population case", in R. Birrell and others, editors, Populate and Perish?, Fontana, Sydney, pp. 325-351. ROUTLEY, R., MEYER, R.K., BRADY, R.T. z 1 and PLUMWOOD, V. , Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, I, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, Calif ornia, 460 pp. ROUTLEY, R. and PLUMWOOD, V.^, Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, No. 6, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 42 pp. SYLVAN, R., Windows on Science. beyond the Actual, and 2. 1. How Science and Myth and Fiction Step Science on Science, Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, No. 1, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 53 pp. SYLVAN, R., Windows on Science. 3. A Cosmo-Logical Synthesis, Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, No. 2, Philosophy Department, RSSS. ANU, 40 pp. 2 a SYLVAN, R., Philosophy and Pluralism, Relevant Models and Arguments, Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, No. 3, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 35 pp. SYLVAN, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, No. 12, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 59 pp. SYLVAN, R. and PLUMWOOD, V.^, An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, No. 7, Philosophy Department, RSSS, ANU, 36 pp. 3 . ANNUAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF TENURED ACADEMIC STAFF INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES Report by R. SYLVAN ( Department of Philosophy, RSSS) for the period 1981-4 inclusive 1. Research conducted and future plans for research My research has ranged over a wide area in philosophy — metaphysics, logic, philosophy of science, ethics, social and political theory, extending to environmental concerns. My work overlaps the three areas upon which research in the Philosophy Department, RSSS, concentrates: logic; metaphysics and epistemo logy; and social and political theory. The work extends into other disciplines as well, in an examination of their fundamental assumptions. For example, my current work includes the metaphysical principles in cosmology, realism and relativism in science, and the philosophical assumptions of economics. This philosophical investigation of the foundations of other disciplines is a research trend which is likely to increase. Uy research over the next few years will also include certain large projects, already underway. These include a treatise on anarchism, which will likely be several years in preparation, and an in-depth work on process theory and nondeductive logics with particular emphasis on nonmonotonic logics relevant to computing and information processing. 2. Publications during 1981-4 BOOKS, MONOGRAPHS AND JOURNAL, written and edited Environmental Philosophy, Department of Philosophy Monograph Series #2, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, (edited with D. Mannison and M. McRobbie). Reprint, with minor correction, 1982, 394 pages. Relevant Logics and Their Rivals I. The basic semantical theory (with R.K. Meyer, V\ Plumwood, and R.T.Brady), Ridgeview,California, 1983, 460 pages. Nonclassical Logic, (guest editor), special double issue of Logique et Analyse 103-4, 1983, devoted to nonclassical logic in Canada. On Paraconsistency (with G. Priest), Research Papers in Logic #13, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 321 pages; reprinted with minor revision in Research Series in Logic and Metaphysics #1 1984, 235 pages; to appear in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. with G. Priest and J. Norman), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1986. Paraconsistent Logics (edited with G. Priest as guest editor), with contributed introduction, Studia Logica 43 (1984), 220 pages. .../2 -2- 2. Publications during 1981-4 (cont) ARTICLES: 'Necessary limits to Knowledge: Unknowable truths', Essays in Scientific Philosophy (ed. E. Morscher and others), Comes-Verlag, 1981, pp. 97-118. 'An alternative angle on the humanities', Cooperative Education Newsletter, University of Victoria (Fall 1981), pp. 2-3* 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future' (with V. Routley), Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, (ed^ E. Partridge), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, pp. 277-301. 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals', Inquiry 24 (1981 ), pp. 387-417. 'The inadequacy of the actual and the real: beyond empiricism, idealism and mysticism', Language and Ontology (ed. W. Leinfeller and others), Verlag Holder-Pitcher-Tempsky, 1982, pp. 49-67. 'An impressionistic survey of paraconsistent positions and theories', Collected Papers of the 1982 Foundations of Logic Conference, University of Waterloo. 'On the philosophical basis of relevant logic semantics' (with V. Plumwood, R.K. Meyer and E.P. Martin), Journal of Non-Classical Logic 1 (1982), pp. 71 -105. 'Negation and contradiction in Wittgenstein', Language and Ontology (ed. W. Leinfeller and others), Verlag Holder-Pitcher-Tempsky, 1982, pp. 471-4. 'World rainforest destruction - the social factors' The Ecologist 12 (1982), pp. 4-22. (with V. Routley), 'Disjunctive Syllogism seen as a fallacy of relevance', Bulletin of the Section of Logic, Polish Academy of Sciences (1982). 'Nuclear power - ethical and social dimensions' (with V. Routley), And Justice for All (ed. D. Van der Veer and T. Regan), Rowman and Littlefield, 1982 'In defense of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism' Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #2, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982, 47 pages. 'The irrefutability of anarchism' (with V. Plumwood), Social Alternatives 2(3) (1982), pp.23-8. 'Unravelling the meanings of life?' (with N. Griffin), Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy j^3. Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982, 49 pages; to appear in Studies in Analytic Philosophy: a comparative Approach (ed. B. Matita1 and J. Shaw), Reid el, Dordrecht, 1984; rescheduled. 'On what there is pp. 151-77. not', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1982), .../3 -3- 2. Publications during 1981-4 (cont) 'Lessons from Pseudo-Scotus', Philosophical Studies 42 (1982), pp. 189-99. 'Algebra^analyses of relevant affixing logics, and other Polish connections' (with R.T. Brady, R.K. Meyer and C. Mortensen), Research Papers in Logic #16, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 56 pages; to appear in Relevant Logics and their Rivals II, 1986. 'Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania: its brief history and its present state', Research Papers in Logic #14, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983; condensed version to appear in Ruch Filozoficzny. 'Semantical foundations of value theory' pp. 441-56. (with V. Routley), Nous 17 (1983), 'Nihilisms and nihilist logics', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #4, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 53 pages; shortened version to appear in American Philosophical Quarterly, 1986. 'Relevant logics and their semantics remain viable and undamaged by Lewis's equivocation charge' (with R.K. Meyer), Topoi 2 (1983), pp. 205-1 5. 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions' (with V. Plumwood), Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #6, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 42 pages; to appear in Paraconsistent Logic, (ed. with G. Priest, and J. Norman), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1985. 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #9, 1983, 31 pages; also in Inquiry 27 (1984), pp. 11 7-28. 'The role and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action', Environmental Philosophy. A Collection of Readings (ed. R. Elliott and Al Gare), University of Queensland Press,1983,pp. 260-93. 'Relevantism and the problem as to when material detachment and the disjunctive syllogism can be correctly used', Research Papers in Logic #12, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983, 24 pages; revised version in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp. 167-88. 'The American plan completed: alternative classical-style semantics without stars, for relevant and paraconsistent logics', Studia Logica 43 (1984), pp. 125-56. 'How science and myth and fiction step beyond the actual and sometimes beyond the possible', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy #1, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 33 pages; appear in revised German translation, 1986. .../4 -4- 2. Publications during 1981-4 (cont) 'Science and science: relocating Stove and the modern irrationalists', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy #1, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 20 pages; to appear in Critical Philosophy, 1985* 'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 27 pages. 'War and Peace I: On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, and the political fall-out', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984, 80 pages. 'People vs the Land: the ethics of the population case', Population Growth and Resources in Australia: The Intensifying Conflict (ed. R. Birrell, D. Hill, and J. Neville), Fontana, Sydney, 1984, pp- 325-57. Manucripts accepted or prepared (those accepted for publication are starred) BOOKS *Paraconsistent Logic (contributing editor, with G. Priest and J. Norman), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1984, 540 pages; several articles appear in this text. ^Directions in Relevant Logic (contributing editor, with J. Norman), Reason and Argument series, Nijhoff, Holland,1986, 350 pages; several articles appear in this book. *Soil Degradation in Australia: The Future of our Land (contributing editor), Croom Helm Australia, Sydney, 1986. j *The Philosophy of J.C.C Smart (edited with^J. Norman), Blackwell, 1986. ARTICLES 'A non-triviality proof for dialethic set theory', typescript 1981. 'Nuclear energy - ethical, social and political dimensions', typescript 1981, 50 pages. 'More general da Costa and dual-intuitionistic logics', typescript 1982, 14 pages. .../5 -5- 3. Manuscripts accepted or prepared (cont) -those manuscripts accepted for publication are starred 'Starred semi-lattice semantics for full Urquhart systems', typescript 1982. 'Conditional probability as the probability of a conditional', typescript 1982, 26 pages; read at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 1982. 'The irrefutability of anarchism - enlarged', typescript 1982, 45 pages. 'Simple probabilistic sanantics for non-normal modal logics', typescript 1982; presented at Logic Workshop, University of Victoria, Canada, 1983. 'Non-classical probability theories', typescript 1983. 'A neglected goal of philosophy - wisdom', typescript 1983, 36 pages; read to the Philosophy Department, The Faculties. 'World order, cultural convergence and regional culture', typescript 1983, 6 pages. 'Culture and the roots of political divergence: The Australia/American contrast', typescript 1983, 32 pages; expanded to 121 pages 1984. 'On non-deductive reasoning I. Non-monotonic logics', typescript 1984. 'Myths concerning rationality', typescript 1984, 11 pages; read at University of Queensland, 1984. 'Nature JLs closed to mind: typescript 1984. Whitehead, deep ecology, and the theory of objects', *'Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy #2, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1985, 42 pages; to appear in Grazer philosophische Studien, special anniversary issue, 1985. ^'Introducing polylogue theory', to appear in Philosophia, 1985, 21 pages. ^'Negation and contradiction' (with V. Routley), to appear in Proceedings of the Third Latin-American Logic Symposium, Columbian Society of Mathematicians, Bogata, 1985. *'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', to appear in Philosophy and Social Criticism, February 1985. 'Moral Issues in Nuclear War' (with L. Sylvan), typescript, 1984; read at ANU Summer Studies Workshop on Peace, Disarmament and Development. The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences Department of Philosophy [1983?] research output report (8 pages) Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences Department of Philosophy 1985 research output report (8 pages) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 72, Item 2: Sylvan/Routley annual report for 1984 and the Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences Department of Philosophy research output reports for 1983? and 1985 Description An account of the resource Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences Department of Philosophy reports redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 72, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [25] leaves. 18.86 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:13116c5">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:13116c5</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - unlisted in manuscript finding aid Box 72: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5cb229c3d9affba38077a07c721b6799.pdf 864475d38dc9bafca72f1f6da54ba711 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 1264: Characterizing anarchism Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 1264 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [8] leaves. 4.58 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:709ee89">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:709ee89</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Bookcase - 1st on Right - 3rd Shelf Down - First Pile Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Bookcase > 1st on Right > 3rd Shelf Down > First Pile Box 17: Green Projects in Progress https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ead82de895e579a8e06b9cd889bf5470.pdf 33e8c3b195bf1de721f623ec3ef5dab1 PDF Text Text <L^ 80993 �o/ Methods reZ#Z:ons carrot <- -> stick Back-up possibly Transparent BENIGN PaciEst opposition T ^2---------------------------- --- 4, opaque Enlightenment opposition Liberal \ opposition ��PREFACE. A roc/ </'<:/' This text is written in deep anger, anger not just at what humans have done to so much of the face of the Earth, but still more at what they continue to do. ar Much of the Earth is now a mess.,) Mess is due to humans, some humans. Worse, much of the Earth's environment continues to be destroyed or seriously degraded. Again the main direct or indirect cause is human activity. Humans continue to foul, degrade, or destroy not only their own habitats but the environments of most other forms of life as well. That did not need to happen. It does not have to go on happening. There were paths not taken. There were significant options not even properly considered. In some cases, there still are such options, not being seriously considered, not being taken. 1 ( That should be changed. But present socio-political arrangements, throughout entire complex or states that covers the Earth, depend upon, are premiss^ upon, features that lead to precisely such destruction^ and degradation^. For many states such resully are both ^4 occurring in their own territories, and spilling over into those of others. Present socio political arrangements accordingly have to be changed, changed radically. But here we encounter an evident obstacle. It is unlikely that those in power, or with privilege, will go qui^ly, will let their class subside from its materially advantages position, or wither away environmentally. An appropriate revolution may be needed in certain key places to affect due changes. But that is a very controversial idea. There is no need to recite yet again the litany of environmental disasters that have ^co occurred or the even more calamitous stack thafare already activated. Almost every day there A is something new or still news. Another oil spill, wiping out the lives ojf present habitats of birds and fish. Through deforestation,^landslides here, flooding there. More whales taken by the Japanese, Ozone holes grow. And so it goes on, with much more in store. But now nearly every sizeable introductory textbook in biology or geography includes a large and largely depressing section on environmental "problems" (at least too some of the devastation and depredation is at last seen as constituting a "problem"). So do many other books; an excellent easy high ted introduction is Ear?Asropg. And more and more popular periodicals and newspapers^/e on environmental disasters and problems or run feature articles.' With new threats to the collective human future the environment has become highly fashionable. , Now, with some appreciation of the inconvenience to business and businessmen of a nuclear winter, runaway greenhouse, or like catastrophe even cautious conservatives are beginning 1 The intellectual who does most to bring this out, the arbitrariness even of present institutional arrangements, is no doubt I^acault. /<M J? �^7/ ^7W/ , 7 ^*/ , ., 7^ ^,/ , „ y^j. ^7 /. -^M_ y.-y </? ^7' '"^ , r.A-/^-. ^. ^1 /<A—, , l-"^- '—^-/^7 ��2 to recognise that there may be ^ome problems, that }a major nuclear exchange will have among its plausible efforts, the greatest biological and physical disruptions of this planet in the last 65 million years'. But the apparent fact is that the very course we are 3a, any further catastrophe, without a nuclear exchange, will cause the greatest biological Z) 6 Ar. disruption of the planet in the last 65 million years. It is enough to and compare data for species loss. It is now a relatively easy matter to .... the considerable array of environmental problems and outrages that we so far know something about. It is another, much more difficult, matter to do something worthwhile about them. While many environmental problems may now be sufficiently clear, and stark, how to react to them, what to do, what practice and theory to pursue are seldom so clear. [Nor is there any very grave difficulty about some of what needs to be done in order to avert or reduce some of the worst problems, and some of the major disasters in store. What is lacking is sufficient motivation, or opportunity among main power brokers (political will, .<............... ..... ................................................ .................... .................................................................... ——— ----------------------- - — political blockages,<etc)] Th& text aims to develop the assemble requisite theory and indicate resultant practices Ensuing political theory^ which will lead to relevant change. But) There is much theoretical work to be accomplished, both critical and constructive. Critical work criticizing present and prevailing assumptions and practices, and the acclaimed justification and alleged reasonableness of these practices. Constructive activity outlining ernative idea-< idea-e^clicism, alternative practices and way of reaching alternative structures, alternative ' . The present exercise aims to be a part of that endeavors. It is a them from where we—— are. .. ______________ —— -------------- A/ philosophical, theoretical book^ It concentrates on the theory, especially the theory, of / .. ...................................................................................................... I..... ....... . ^4—environmentalisin.\ While it offers a purework for environmental action, it says little directly Ar no c . on such action. Those are one practical details zmd recipes for saving a forest froim . _ eismAiSSUfi / hen? destructive logging interests, for example, ways to proceed abouTihal are forever become increasingly appreciated. What is still lacking is the wider p^lifactory structure which explains and justifies opposition and resistance. The run of environmental ethics text do little of what is required. They contain insufficient criticism, little analysis of depth, no vision or elaboration of alternatives. They are so sweetly, eminently reasonable^ fiddling while environmental Rome bums. Too many seek "blame" and all that sort of crap. Or, where they would shake " with ........ - development r r near ihA present predatory arrangements, it is only in one respect, and that not getting to bottom of the troubles, reat^ meat eating. For, while some problems work be ^t-&ough^(^ ----- other generals thereby), it is evident that the rape of most of the Earth could construe vegetarian way. ace in a , . �Environmental ethics texts have no anger, no outrage at what is Being being done to the Earth. Put crudely, they lack guts. Indeed some suggest that things are proceeding rather well, as it not so well, as well as could be expected. (If the latter it coop very little for managing humans competent as managers/organisers). Al! is vary/ivr from well. There is cause not merely for concern, but for deep anger. (Such anger may be un-American.) The dominant way, re^our^ism, if not successfully opposed, will ultimately destroy the ecosphere and then humans among other species Intellectuals, philosophers especially, lately economists even more,2 deal to answer for, socially and environmentally. They encouraged permit of present damaging practices; they proceeded to provide the intellectual and attitudinal underpinnings that helped motivate and continue^ to justify the practices. Nor, with the evidence of environmental crisis so manifest, have things changed much. Most intellectuals continue as if nothing had happened apart from the beneficial advancement of science and technology. Most economists continue to produce or partificate upon various growth (or maximal equilibrium) pmf^tonals. Most philosophers - most are AngloAmerican in background - continue in their hopeless efforts to prop up or impede upon what is fundamentally anfhdi d awedy^basicaiiyv Humean empiricism (thus recently in the on-going display of Humean fashions, evolutionary epistemology, belief as reduced to desire, causal reductions, etc). Most have said, or done, very little about the^..^./ environmental situations; those who have, like Naess, are often ridiculed by the comfortable professionals. 4 This book tries to retell, in a more organised and coherent way what deep-green theory, an environmental theory that has emerged in a sporadic and scattered way over the last couple of decades, is all about. But not everything is told; only the predominantly ethical pa^ts. Later parts of this series on deep-green theory will cover political and economics theory and social theory more generally. Untila century ago philosophy and economics were not separate disciplines. The significant economists were almost invariably philosophers (neeerds may be the one main^,...). �X\^7c-vr/ ?^7<!k^< /7,^ -7^ . r^/ 7^r^7 c)/-^^ //^A^-. ; / C/ A A' �Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic' issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and „--------- -—-sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory moBe^gen^ahy can A avoid them„ (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast m a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form^ Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. LA^to d^ep theory-— Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deep-green theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value t&at it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) e �exist in "suitable" determinate form in the second. Deep object-theory slices straight through these issues, removing the problem-generating ontological assumptions. is a grander theory lying in the background, which significantly influences the philosophical approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The background theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc.) With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehensive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehensiveness as regards present philosophical problems would come a certain completeness; but I've come to thinkjhat a total philosophy is an illusion, like at it Deep theory is no doubt a presumptuous title (there are worse about, e.g. Total philosophy", 'ecosophy'^, ^o( it is altogether satisfactory, given the problems and obscurities, .to be encountered, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did not exactly good to refuse. It emerged from a terminological confluence of several e&eas in which I'd thought, or environmental philosophy^with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelations, and some of their revolutionary potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presupposed in Western philosophy, and particularly in Enlightenmented contemporary philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:* the Ontological Assumption, that truth, and also/ meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectlv well talk and think trulv aboutS items that do not exist, and' also about items that are impossible. ^Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionally favoured full-back from enttcalism, namely possibilism, which assumes �* the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals# there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are * the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate requirement of consistency. under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that * entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication^. The rejection of such themes and their jeourses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to ependent development and analysis. //yyy- 1 Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. ,. A, �/ re/ �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document <L^ 80993 o/ Methods reZ#Z:ons carrot <- -> stick Back-up possibly Transparent BENIGN PaciEst opposition T ^2---------------------------- --- 4, opaque Enlightenment opposition Liberal \ opposition PREFACE. A roc/ </'<:/' This text is written in deep anger, anger not just at what humans have done to so much of the face of the Earth, but still more at what they continue to do. ar Much of the Earth is now a mess.,) Mess is due to humans, some humans. Worse, much of the Earth's environment continues to be destroyed or seriously degraded. Again the main direct or indirect cause is human activity. Humans continue to foul, degrade, or destroy not only their own habitats but the environments of most other forms of life as well. That did not need to happen. It does not have to go on happening. There were paths not taken. There were significant options not even properly considered. In some cases, there still are such options, not being seriously considered, not being taken. 1 ( That should be changed. But present socio-political arrangements, throughout entire complex or states that covers the Earth, depend upon, are premiss^ upon, features that lead to precisely such destruction^ and degradation^. For many states such resully are both ^4 occurring in their own territories, and spilling over into those of others. Present socio political arrangements accordingly have to be changed, changed radically. But here we encounter an evident obstacle. It is unlikely that those in power, or with privilege, will go qui^ly, will let their class subside from its materially advantages position, or wither away environmentally. An appropriate revolution may be needed in certain key places to affect due changes. But that is a very controversial idea. There is no need to recite yet again the litany of environmental disasters that have ^co occurred or the even more calamitous stack thafare already activated. Almost every day there A is something new or still news. Another oil spill, wiping out the lives ojf present habitats of birds and fish. Through deforestation,^landslides here, flooding there. More whales taken by the Japanese, Ozone holes grow. And so it goes on, with much more in store. But now nearly every sizeable introductory textbook in biology or geography includes a large and largely depressing section on environmental "problems" (at least too some of the devastation and depredation is at last seen as constituting a "problem"). So do many other books; an excellent easy high ted introduction is Ear?Asropg. And more and more popular periodicals and newspapers^/e on environmental disasters and problems or run feature articles.' With new threats to the collective human future the environment has become highly fashionable. , Now, with some appreciation of the inconvenience to business and businessmen of a nuclear winter, runaway greenhouse, or like catastrophe even cautious conservatives are beginning 1 The intellectual who does most to bring this out, the arbitrariness even of present institutional arrangements, is no doubt I^acault. /<M J? ^7/ ^7W/ , 7 ^*/ , ., 7^ ^,/ , „ y^j. ^7 /. -^M_ y.-y </? ^7' '"^ , r.A-/^-. ^. ^1 /<A—, , l-"^- '—^-/^7 2 to recognise that there may be ^ome problems, that }a major nuclear exchange will have among its plausible efforts, the greatest biological and physical disruptions of this planet in the last 65 million years'. But the apparent fact is that the very course we are 3a, any further catastrophe, without a nuclear exchange, will cause the greatest biological Z) 6 Ar. disruption of the planet in the last 65 million years. It is enough to and compare data for species loss. It is now a relatively easy matter to .... the considerable array of environmental problems and outrages that we so far know something about. It is another, much more difficult, matter to do something worthwhile about them. While many environmental problems may now be sufficiently clear, and stark, how to react to them, what to do, what practice and theory to pursue are seldom so clear. [Nor is there any very grave difficulty about some of what needs to be done in order to avert or reduce some of the worst problems, and some of the major disasters in store. What is lacking is sufficient motivation, or opportunity among main power brokers (political will, .<............... ..... ................................................ .................... .................................................................... ——— ----------------------- - — political blockages,<etc)] Th& text aims to develop the assemble requisite theory and indicate resultant practices Ensuing political theory^ which will lead to relevant change. But) There is much theoretical work to be accomplished, both critical and constructive. Critical work criticizing present and prevailing assumptions and practices, and the acclaimed justification and alleged reasonableness of these practices. Constructive activity outlining ernative idea-< idea-e^clicism, alternative practices and way of reaching alternative structures, alternative ' . The present exercise aims to be a part of that endeavors. It is a them from where we—— are. .. ______________ —— -------------- A/ philosophical, theoretical book^ It concentrates on the theory, especially the theory, of / .. ...................................................................................................... I..... ....... . ^4—environmentalisin.\ While it offers a purework for environmental action, it says little directly Ar no c . on such action. Those are one practical details zmd recipes for saving a forest froim . _ eismAiSSUfi / hen? destructive logging interests, for example, ways to proceed abouTihal are forever become increasingly appreciated. What is still lacking is the wider p^lifactory structure which explains and justifies opposition and resistance. The run of environmental ethics text do little of what is required. They contain insufficient criticism, little analysis of depth, no vision or elaboration of alternatives. They are so sweetly, eminently reasonable^ fiddling while environmental Rome bums. Too many seek "blame" and all that sort of crap. Or, where they would shake " with ........ - development r r near ihA present predatory arrangements, it is only in one respect, and that not getting to bottom of the troubles, reat^ meat eating. For, while some problems work be ^t-&ough^(^ ----- other generals thereby), it is evident that the rape of most of the Earth could construe vegetarian way. ace in a , . Environmental ethics texts have no anger, no outrage at what is Being being done to the Earth. Put crudely, they lack guts. Indeed some suggest that things are proceeding rather well, as it not so well, as well as could be expected. (If the latter it coop very little for managing humans competent as managers/organisers). Al! is vary/ivr from well. There is cause not merely for concern, but for deep anger. (Such anger may be un-American.) The dominant way, re^our^ism, if not successfully opposed, will ultimately destroy the ecosphere and then humans among other species Intellectuals, philosophers especially, lately economists even more,2 deal to answer for, socially and environmentally. They encouraged permit of present damaging practices; they proceeded to provide the intellectual and attitudinal underpinnings that helped motivate and continue^ to justify the practices. Nor, with the evidence of environmental crisis so manifest, have things changed much. Most intellectuals continue as if nothing had happened apart from the beneficial advancement of science and technology. Most economists continue to produce or partificate upon various growth (or maximal equilibrium) pmf^tonals. Most philosophers - most are AngloAmerican in background - continue in their hopeless efforts to prop up or impede upon what is fundamentally anfhdi d awedy^basicaiiyv Humean empiricism (thus recently in the on-going display of Humean fashions, evolutionary epistemology, belief as reduced to desire, causal reductions, etc). Most have said, or done, very little about the^..^./ environmental situations; those who have, like Naess, are often ridiculed by the comfortable professionals. 4 This book tries to retell, in a more organised and coherent way what deep-green theory, an environmental theory that has emerged in a sporadic and scattered way over the last couple of decades, is all about. But not everything is told; only the predominantly ethical pa^ts. Later parts of this series on deep-green theory will cover political and economics theory and social theory more generally. Untila century ago philosophy and economics were not separate disciplines. The significant economists were almost invariably philosophers (neeerds may be the one main^,...). X\^7c-vr/ ?^7<!k^< /7,^ -7^ . r^/ 7^r^7 c)/-^^ //^A^-. ; / C/ A A' Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic' issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and „--------- -—-sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory moBe^gen^ahy can A avoid them„ (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast m a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form^ Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. LA^to d^ep theory-— Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deep-green theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value t&at it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) e exist in "suitable" determinate form in the second. Deep object-theory slices straight through these issues, removing the problem-generating ontological assumptions. is a grander theory lying in the background, which significantly influences the philosophical approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The background theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc.) With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehensive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehensiveness as regards present philosophical problems would come a certain completeness; but I've come to thinkjhat a total philosophy is an illusion, like at it Deep theory is no doubt a presumptuous title (there are worse about, e.g. Total philosophy", 'ecosophy'^, ^o( it is altogether satisfactory, given the problems and obscurities, .to be encountered, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did not exactly good to refuse. It emerged from a terminological confluence of several e&eas in which I'd thought, or environmental philosophy^with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelations, and some of their revolutionary potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presupposed in Western philosophy, and particularly in Enlightenmented contemporary philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:* the Ontological Assumption, that truth, and also/ meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectlv well talk and think trulv aboutS items that do not exist, and' also about items that are impossible. ^Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionally favoured full-back from enttcalism, namely possibilism, which assumes * the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals# there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are * the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate requirement of consistency. under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that * entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication^. The rejection of such themes and their jeourses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to ependent development and analysis. //yyy- 1 Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. ,. A, / re/ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 993: Revision of Green anarkism, notes, possibilities Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten and typescript drafts, with handwritten emendations, and handwritten notes. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 993 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [14] leaves. 28.28 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a82519e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a82519e</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/47290a949d35cf80426b62ad11ea2f02.pdf 4bf0c098455f06e841302b4c0e11fc65 PDF Text Text ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts Anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of an encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present best-practice democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts Anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of an encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present best-practice democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 984: Abstract of Problems and solutions in deep ecopolitical theory Subject The topic of the resource Typescript Description An account of the resource Note, one item digitised from item 984. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 539.65 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1281ef1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1281ef1</a> Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d238dd79bb3f1ee48d89a9ee1eaafa0d.pdf e2faa9a5b7a1df99c3768418e2d7768c PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 984: Miscellaneous notes on anark Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. Note, one item digitised from item 984. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves. 1.84 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5c3aeec">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5c3aeec</a> Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/42a18a653f7af23cdf718163b4cc0a88.pdf f87fd85c0b206ea04ae5fc89ea649fcb PDF Text Text /' &*? /<^z^ V <k/ ---- ---------------------------------- ----- r>^^# x > /■ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document /' &*? /<^z^ V <k/ ---- ---------------------------------- ----- r>^^# x > /■ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 6, Item 1768: Notes on environmental ethics Description An account of the resource Note, one item digitised from item 1768. Notes housed in folder of "papers on ecology, environmental ethics etc ". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 6, Item 1768 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 798.3 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:db9559a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:db9559a</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Second Bookcase - Bottom Shelf Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Bottom Shelf Box 6: Environmental Ethics https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/782aa830b37f3c3af3eaa08c7a828de3.pdf 4ab73b7547a7fffb814caf0c8790bdbd PDF Text Text 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 1 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 106, Item 2: OED definition of nuclear deterrence Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten note on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaf not digitised. Note housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. Note, one of three notes/papers digitised from item 2. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 106, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 340.18 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8897af0">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8897af0</a> https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/69280df7dda6039687227f260b95dbf5.pdf 7c1ef202ad9606d21abe3109d8a2ea81 PDF Text Text / 7 DEEPER NUCLEAR roots of the arms race lie in the character of science and technology: such R & D drives the arms race. science. But it is disguised by myth of neutral Deeper still the drives lie in maximisation drives for power, knowledge, ————— 4 the "newer" virtures, Enlightenment but Faustian virtues. But the attainment of these even approximately is impossible, because of limitations, because for instance ultimate power means loss of power (for power becomes go great it goes out of control). This is a variation on the paradox For these Enlightenment ends there is no maximization /// because of limits and associated paradoxes, only an illusion of attainment. A of omnipotence. Thus maximization is here irrational. and Gods; In earlier times the drive le^d to God, later defter the Enlightenment i’£ led to science - a new, much more effective God since it delivers so much cargo. In the same framework, recast Foley's paradoxes of unlimited power:- 1. Omnipotence leads to impotence 2. Omniscience leads to ignorance 3. Total rationality becomes total irrationality: [becomes?] and technicized our means, the more irrational our ends. / z the more rational sr �X>£. e & f c/~lu cr-t/^ J '7 I r/^e wl- _ -O'- rf �Jo-d , </« sT-rf ; 7^/?/°; # t <rf //^— / X 0. **x (inC/^rv^ /fo?( G^S (X */’/ferc^ IS / } /he>/ ( e^^/ /7- a JAw/kJ ^J.J. 4/r7/e>*’2S /^t/') /ru^. i^o-fr^a/ S(^,,-/<j ,/?& rSH-, G-'l J c / /Astr*^? '•*-*- /• z //c.sw'lfas- f J'^./^f /t/77 4 ��r � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document / 7 DEEPER NUCLEAR roots of the arms race lie in the character of science and technology: such R & D drives the arms race. science. But it is disguised by myth of neutral Deeper still the drives lie in maximisation drives for power, knowledge, ————— 4 the "newer" virtures, Enlightenment but Faustian virtues. But the attainment of these even approximately is impossible, because of limitations, because for instance ultimate power means loss of power (for power becomes go great it goes out of control). This is a variation on the paradox For these Enlightenment ends there is no maximization /// because of limits and associated paradoxes, only an illusion of attainment. A of omnipotence. Thus maximization is here irrational. and Gods; In earlier times the drive le^d to God, later defter the Enlightenment i’£ led to science - a new, much more effective God since it delivers so much cargo. In the same framework, recast Foley's paradoxes of unlimited power:- 1. Omnipotence leads to impotence 2. Omniscience leads to ignorance 3. Total rationality becomes total irrationality: [becomes?] and technicized our means, the more irrational our ends. / z the more rational sr X>£. e & f c/~lu cr-t/^ J '7 I r/^e wl- _ -O'- rf Jo-d , </« sT-rf ; 7^/?/°; # t <rf //^— / X 0. **x (inC/^rv^ /fo?( G^S (X */’/ferc^ IS / } /he>/ ( e^^/ /7- a JAw/kJ ^J.J. 4/r7/e>*’2S /^t/') /ru^. i^o-fr^a/ S(^,,-/<j ,/?& rSH-, G-'l J c / /Astr*^? '•*-*- /• z //c.sw'lfas- f J'^./^f /t/77 4 r Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 106, Item 1: Abstract on deeper nuclear and miscellaneous notes Subject The topic of the resource Typescript and miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 106, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 2.51 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:85b7938">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:85b7938</a> Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace] https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e28d878d6ede2424d09ed6f344f9e03e.pdf da96b3abe313a02f2ceb6b3934239299 PDF Text Text Diokno answers a lot of questions about the _type of military installations the US ,maintains in the Philippines, about the nuclear capability of the bases, the effects of the bases on Philippi~e national security, the likelihood of nuclear war, the authority of by which the US maintains the bases, and the legality of the bases agreement. There are currently five bases in the Philippines, and nuclear armed ships regularly call at one of them. The bases are prime targets for nuclear warfare (and unless the arms race is halted, Diokno predicts, nuclear war will break out before the end of the century; the more countries which gain nuclear weapons, the greater the changes of war). The ba ~es agreement was signed in 1947, with later amendments, but was never agreed to by the Filipino people. The agreement was accepted by Filipino leaders only because it was made a condition of Philippine independence. Today, the US-backed Marcos regime is unlikely to call for their removal., The bases exploit workers and Philippine resources, and in no way contribute to the 'country's development. Their presence gives America the power to intervene in the country's political life. Diokno quotes the declaration of principle.s of the Anti-Bases Coalition, which works for the dismantling of all US military bases in the Philippines. -:t ~ J ~' J1 �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Diokno answers a lot of questions about the _type of military installations the US ,maintains in the Philippines, about the nuclear capability of the bases, the effects of the bases on Philippi~e national security, the likelihood of nuclear war, the authority of by which the US maintains the bases, and the legality of the bases agreement. There are currently five bases in the Philippines, and nuclear armed ships regularly call at one of them. The bases are prime targets for nuclear warfare (and unless the arms race is halted, Diokno predicts, nuclear war will break out before the end of the century; the more countries which gain nuclear weapons, the greater the changes of war). The ba ~es agreement was signed in 1947, with later amendments, but was never agreed to by the Filipino people. The agreement was accepted by Filipino leaders only because it was made a condition of Philippine independence. Today, the US-backed Marcos regime is unlikely to call for their removal., The bases exploit workers and Philippine resources, and in no way contribute to the 'country's development. Their presence gives America the power to intervene in the country's political life. Diokno quotes the declaration of principle.s of the Anti-Bases Coalition, which works for the dismantling of all US military bases in the Philippines. -:t ~ J ~' J1 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 88, Item 1455: Reference card, summary of Diokno J (1983) 'U.S. bases - a primer', Asian Exchange, 2-4:24 Subject The topic of the resource Reference written on card index, with typescript summary taped to index. Description An account of the resource Card index part of item 1455, "Index card box - abstracts of articles on development". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 88, Item 1455 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] card. 1.35 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:b40149f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:b40149f</a> https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/94dbbe314c3a666c558816df0b3201bc.pdf 135af6157b7d49f9fd133871991691f6 PDF Text Text ::r ¾ ' 1 ~--~ ' ......_ ..... The worldwide peace movement faces a new era in 1984. -Since 1979, there has been a massive revival of the peace movement in response to the preparations for a limited nuclear war in Europe. Up to now the movement has concentrated successfully on consciousness ra1s1ng. J-bwever, the challenge now is to present practical new ideas to end the anns race. Mr. Allan McKnight has undertaken a comparison of the separate draft treaties tabled by the Soviet Union and the United States at the United Nations (UN) in 1962. ~ has now c001piled them into one practical draft plan, whkhis the most feasible to date because it is based on the actual proposals of the two world powers. The progran111e should ensure t~at the nations have sufficient non-nuclear arms to protect their citizens yet reduce the military expenditure dramatically and not present an invading threat to neighbouring countries. It is interesting to note that ~eden, ~itzerland and Yugoslavia have defence forces · structured in this ay but this has never received the publicity it deserves. The plan is based on 3 stages of mutual reductions. All measures of disannament would be balanced so that at no stage during the implementation would any nation gain military advantage. The treaty provides a timetable. It also provides for an establishment of a peace force and disannament organisation independent of the UN. Dr. Suter says that it is only when we perceive the alternative that we can see how important it is to give consideration to grand schemes for disannament. Mr. McKnight's book is available from the Law Council of Ns.J. 'U ~ J~ \--., ~ �....... � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ::r ¾ ' 1 ~--~ ' ......_ ..... The worldwide peace movement faces a new era in 1984. -Since 1979, there has been a massive revival of the peace movement in response to the preparations for a limited nuclear war in Europe. Up to now the movement has concentrated successfully on consciousness ra1s1ng. J-bwever, the challenge now is to present practical new ideas to end the anns race. Mr. Allan McKnight has undertaken a comparison of the separate draft treaties tabled by the Soviet Union and the United States at the United Nations (UN) in 1962. ~ has now c001piled them into one practical draft plan, whkhis the most feasible to date because it is based on the actual proposals of the two world powers. The progran111e should ensure t~at the nations have sufficient non-nuclear arms to protect their citizens yet reduce the military expenditure dramatically and not present an invading threat to neighbouring countries. It is interesting to note that ~eden, ~itzerland and Yugoslavia have defence forces · structured in this ay but this has never received the publicity it deserves. The plan is based on 3 stages of mutual reductions. All measures of disannament would be balanced so that at no stage during the implementation would any nation gain military advantage. The treaty provides a timetable. It also provides for an establishment of a peace force and disannament organisation independent of the UN. Dr. Suter says that it is only when we perceive the alternative that we can see how important it is to give consideration to grand schemes for disannament. Mr. McKnight's book is available from the Law Council of Ns.J. 'U ~ J~ \--., ~ ....... Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 88, Item 1455: Reference card, summary of Suter K (1984) 'A practical plan for the world disarmament', Kurana Subject The topic of the resource Reference written on card index, with typescript summary taped to index. Description An account of the resource Card index part of item 1455, "Index card box - abstracts of articles on development". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 88, Item 1455 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] card. 1.32 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:03ccc9b">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:03ccc9b</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - not listed on manuscript finding aid Box 88: Old Papers: Letters - Slog 1 Proofs - Misc. XCs https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e5ad5dac90a81bc96f507e5d96051a0a.pdf 532d28ceec4d28da93082a77138bddbf PDF Text Text �Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full pluralism. �£■ Jhe source of our obligations to respect and protect works of art can be established in the type of value ^theory found in deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of w^ld ^proposed by Richard •Syfvan, where a diverse range of entities are seen to have inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of this metaphysical picture. We have also seen that the kind of valuation framework described by Sylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective value of works of art, which is of important practical ff JZ -7^ �In making an evaluation of the worth of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. While that value is inherent in the work itself, it is at the same time manifested in certain non-natural qualities which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. These qualities, which are fundamental characteristics of a work of art, provide us with a criteria for assessing value. This value, however, is not reducible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expressed by two essential types of qualities pertaining to art works, being firstly the qualities associated with aesthetic value, and secondly the qualities associated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relates to the tendency of a work of art to challenge, instruct, give valuable insight, or enlighten. While these two types of value may prima facie look like they constitute a distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work, I believe that they could nevertheless be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we needn't conclude from this that the didactic value consists solely in the relation between the art work and the subject experiencing it. It seems quite consistent to hold that the didactic value of an art work is derived from its inherent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. What Sylvan refers to as emotional presentation, would then be best construed with regard to artistic evaluation as the presentation of an art works intrinsic value; a value which is manifested in terms of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. These qualities can be assessed in terms of a comprehensive set of criteria for determining value. Such criteria would include for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, strength of expression, balance, harmony, composition, vividness and uniqueness, and for instructive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valuable insight into the nature of life or existence. After identifying the various components of an artistic presentation, the evaluating agent is required to engage intellectually in a further assessment. This stage is what Sylvan referred to as coherence processing, and it is the stage at which the surface characteristics of a work of art arc assessed for additional complexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work which are not intuited directly, such as the symbolism of a painting or the message of a powerful drama, will be assessed at this point. Coherence processing is especially important in making an evaluation of the instructive or intellectual component of an art �work. In the context of the type of theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possible to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made. One objection to the proposal that it'is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretation of art is an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solving arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admit that there is plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusions about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-works value, and thereby come to a not- too- different judgement of that value. This assumption is supported by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes good art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all independently come to respect and admire their value. Another difficulty regarding the attribution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for institutions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and which will not. While the judgement of any person who makes a considered evaluation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision making to the artists and admirers ol art who have the most extensive background knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artistic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full pluralism. £■ Jhe source of our obligations to respect and protect works of art can be established in the type of value ^theory found in deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of w^ld ^proposed by Richard •Syfvan, where a diverse range of entities are seen to have inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of this metaphysical picture. We have also seen that the kind of valuation framework described by Sylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective value of works of art, which is of important practical ff JZ -7^ In making an evaluation of the worth of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. While that value is inherent in the work itself, it is at the same time manifested in certain non-natural qualities which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. These qualities, which are fundamental characteristics of a work of art, provide us with a criteria for assessing value. This value, however, is not reducible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expressed by two essential types of qualities pertaining to art works, being firstly the qualities associated with aesthetic value, and secondly the qualities associated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relates to the tendency of a work of art to challenge, instruct, give valuable insight, or enlighten. While these two types of value may prima facie look like they constitute a distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work, I believe that they could nevertheless be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we needn't conclude from this that the didactic value consists solely in the relation between the art work and the subject experiencing it. It seems quite consistent to hold that the didactic value of an art work is derived from its inherent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. What Sylvan refers to as emotional presentation, would then be best construed with regard to artistic evaluation as the presentation of an art works intrinsic value; a value which is manifested in terms of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. These qualities can be assessed in terms of a comprehensive set of criteria for determining value. Such criteria would include for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, strength of expression, balance, harmony, composition, vividness and uniqueness, and for instructive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valuable insight into the nature of life or existence. After identifying the various components of an artistic presentation, the evaluating agent is required to engage intellectually in a further assessment. This stage is what Sylvan referred to as coherence processing, and it is the stage at which the surface characteristics of a work of art arc assessed for additional complexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work which are not intuited directly, such as the symbolism of a painting or the message of a powerful drama, will be assessed at this point. Coherence processing is especially important in making an evaluation of the instructive or intellectual component of an art work. In the context of the type of theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possible to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made. One objection to the proposal that it'is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretation of art is an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solving arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admit that there is plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusions about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-works value, and thereby come to a not- too- different judgement of that value. This assumption is supported by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes good art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all independently come to respect and admire their value. Another difficulty regarding the attribution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for institutions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and which will not. While the judgement of any person who makes a considered evaluation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision making to the artists and admirers ol art who have the most extensive background knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artistic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 76, Item 679: Miscellaneous notes on architecture and philosophy Subject The topic of the resource Miscellaneous handwritten and typescript notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. Note, one of two papers digitised from item 679. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 76, Item 679 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 2.71 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:b2a4573">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:b2a4573</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 76: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/29b8b561ea429ccf267b3803785e7d59.pdf 614ef7072f3a25aa048d1c2b523b8e46 PDF Text Text �I ' Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full plurallism_. _ _ ~---- ------ -- �{/'-'t~lr& t/1-:; . . . . __ -,,L ~ l),.,v,r✓L., J /4 _ -- ~ ~-: - - , · /4.. I -~ J 1/ f -4.:i, :f ' · · · =_ · .~ e source of our obligations to respect and protect wor ks of art can be established in the type of value [ theory foun . <;,c.Ae.-n-..e.d m deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of world proposed by Richard "Sylva-ft-, where a diverse range of enti ties are seen to have. inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of 'this ~eta phy sica l pict ure. We have also seen that the kind of valuatio n framework described by ~ylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective valu e of works of art, which is of importa nt practical 11-i(,_.L f J;_ a_.,-,Jfl't--'.? lA/} 16 ~ j ~ - . h,,, ~ -:,;~ i ~ ul; , C--..__<:_~/ J"~ ,-r,_._,, 1.,' ,r f-f .1f.,,,__1J ,-rt _:_..f'"Ltc.--t~.----..,, 4.... lri/2::;J._-1 ,,____, , ~~ , -?(, ".~A ✓ ~~ _} Y d-v..AJ -_ 6--1 #?..,.....1-4 ~_ a_?_.__ __ �In making an evaluation of the wort h of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. Whil e that value is inher ent in the work itself, it is at the same time mani feste d in certain non-natural quali ties which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. Thes e qualities, whic h are fund amen tal chara cteris tics of a work of art, prov ide us with a crite ria for asses sing value . This value , howe ver, is not reduc ible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expre ssed by two essen tial types of qualities perta ining to art work s, being firstly the qualities assoc iated with aesth etic value, and secondly the quali ties assoc iated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relate s to the tende ncy of a work of art to chall enge , instru ct, give valuable insig ht, or enlig hten. Whil e these two types of value may prim a facie look like they constitute a distin ction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work , I believe that they could neve rthel ess be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we need n't conc lude from this that the didactic value consists solel y in the relation betw een the art work and the subje ct experiencing it. It seem s quite cons isten t to hold that the didac tic value of an art work is deriv ed from its inher ent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. Wha t Sylvan refers to as emotional prese ntatio n, woul d then be best cons trued with regard to artistic evalu ation as the presentation of an art work s intrin sic value~ a value whic h is manifested in term s of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. Thes e qualities can be asses sed in terms of a comp rehen sive set of criter ia for deter mini ng value. Such criteria woul d inclu de for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, stren gth of expression, balance, harm ony, comp ositio n, vividness and uniqu eness , and for instru ctive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valua ble insig ht into the nature of life or existence. After ident ifyin g the various comp onen ts of an artist ic presentation, the evaluating agen t is requi red to enga ge intel lectu ally in a furth er asses smen t. This stage is what Sylv an refer red to as coherence proce ssing , and it is the stage at whic h the surfa ce characteristics of a work of art are asses sed for addit ional comp lexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work whic h are not intuited directly, such as the symb olism of a painting or the mess age of a powe rful drama, will be asses sed at this point . Cohe rence proce ssing is espec ially impo rtant in making an evalu ation of the instru ctive or intellectual comp onen t of an art �work. In th~ context of the type of'theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possi ble to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made . One objection to the proposal that it-is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretati ~n of 1s an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solvi ng arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admi t that there· i's plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusion_s about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-w orks value, and thereby come' to a not- too- diffe rent judg emen t ·o f that value. This assum ption is supp orted by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes go.od art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all indep endently come to respect and admire their value. Anot her difficulty regarding the attrib ution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for instit utions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and whic h will not. While the . t judgement of any person who makes a considered evalu ation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision maki ng to the artists and admirers of art who have the most extensive backgroun d knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artist ic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved. • art • r � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document I ' Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full plurallism_. _ _ ~---- ------ -- {/'-'t~lr& t/1-:; . . . . __ -,,L ~ l),.,v,r✓L., J /4 _ -- ~ ~-: - - , · /4.. I -~ J 1/ f -4.:i, :f ' · · · =_ · .~ e source of our obligations to respect and protect wor ks of art can be established in the type of value [ theory foun . <;,c.Ae.-n-..e.d m deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of world proposed by Richard "Sylva-ft-, where a diverse range of enti ties are seen to have. inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of 'this ~eta phy sica l pict ure. We have also seen that the kind of valuatio n framework described by ~ylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective valu e of works of art, which is of importa nt practical 11-i(,_.L f J;_ a_.,-,Jfl't--'.? lA/} 16 ~ j ~ - . h,,, ~ -:,;~ i ~ ul; , C--..__<:_~/ J"~ ,-r,_._,, 1.,' ,r f-f .1f.,,,__1J ,-rt _:_..f'"Ltc.--t~.----..,, 4.... lri/2::;J._-1 ,,____, , ~~ , -?(, ".~A ✓ ~~ _} Y d-v..AJ -_ 6--1 #?..,.....1-4 ~_ a_?_.__ __ In making an evaluation of the wort h of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. Whil e that value is inher ent in the work itself, it is at the same time mani feste d in certain non-natural quali ties which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. Thes e qualities, whic h are fund amen tal chara cteris tics of a work of art, prov ide us with a crite ria for asses sing value . This value , howe ver, is not reduc ible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expre ssed by two essen tial types of qualities perta ining to art work s, being firstly the qualities assoc iated with aesth etic value, and secondly the quali ties assoc iated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relate s to the tende ncy of a work of art to chall enge , instru ct, give valuable insig ht, or enlig hten. Whil e these two types of value may prim a facie look like they constitute a distin ction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work , I believe that they could neve rthel ess be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we need n't conc lude from this that the didactic value consists solel y in the relation betw een the art work and the subje ct experiencing it. It seem s quite cons isten t to hold that the didac tic value of an art work is deriv ed from its inher ent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. Wha t Sylvan refers to as emotional prese ntatio n, woul d then be best cons trued with regard to artistic evalu ation as the presentation of an art work s intrin sic value~ a value whic h is manifested in term s of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. Thes e qualities can be asses sed in terms of a comp rehen sive set of criter ia for deter mini ng value. Such criteria woul d inclu de for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, stren gth of expression, balance, harm ony, comp ositio n, vividness and uniqu eness , and for instru ctive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valua ble insig ht into the nature of life or existence. After ident ifyin g the various comp onen ts of an artist ic presentation, the evaluating agen t is requi red to enga ge intel lectu ally in a furth er asses smen t. This stage is what Sylv an refer red to as coherence proce ssing , and it is the stage at whic h the surfa ce characteristics of a work of art are asses sed for addit ional comp lexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work whic h are not intuited directly, such as the symb olism of a painting or the mess age of a powe rful drama, will be asses sed at this point . Cohe rence proce ssing is espec ially impo rtant in making an evalu ation of the instru ctive or intellectual comp onen t of an art work. In th~ context of the type of'theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possi ble to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made . One objection to the proposal that it-is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretati ~n of 1s an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solvi ng arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admi t that there· i's plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusion_s about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-w orks value, and thereby come' to a not- too- diffe rent judg emen t ·o f that value. This assum ption is supp orted by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes go.od art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all indep endently come to respect and admire their value. Anot her difficulty regarding the attrib ution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for instit utions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and whic h will not. While the . t judgement of any person who makes a considered evalu ation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision maki ng to the artists and admirers of art who have the most extensive backgroun d knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artist ic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved. • art • r Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 76, item 39: Notes on ethical ecology "Aesthetics 2000" Subject The topic of the resource Miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. Notes housed in folder on 'aesthetics - notes + article by M. Anderson'. Note, only notes from item 39 digitised. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 76, item 39 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 5.62 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cecf313">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cecf313</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Desk - Right Drawer 3 Box 76: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes Como House Como House > Desk > Right Drawer 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2b38bc4efae0110cc5e5bf7b4c1634c5.pdf 7bf7240e3a4c52b99ad1eaa3b4a045f3 PDF Text Text / y Z^ Z^i_ z/z/ �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document / y Z^ Z^i_ z/z/ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 61, Item 1415: Notes on environmental ethics Subject The topic of the resource Miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not included in PDF access file. Notes housed in folder of "Further ethical ado Ts & xc + some RS mss". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 61, Item 1415 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves. 1.87 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f67601f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f67601f</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Main Bookshelves > Fourth Shelf > Pile 2 Box 61: Ethics and Theoretical Ethics https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/cde186ea98d75f1919a922e23b67d38c.pdf 4bafab7486766f222f23545b86f15a15 PDF Text Text THE MODERN CITY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM It is widely assumed, for instance by philosophers, most of whom are urban creatures, that large modern cities are valuable institutions and whatever the very serious costs and deprivations of modern city living, the advantages considerably outweigh the costs. There are those who are not persuaded that that is so. The image of the mob is part of our image of the city,J and the city is the carrier of the best and the worst of civilization (S. Diamond, In Search for the Primitive p.167) - but the latter is also a pretty dubious customer according to Diamond. Note: 1. The modern city as a reducer of variety 2. The metropolitan state, with landscope dominated by the city. The drain, power relation, etc. 3. The loss of contact with the natural 4. The way commerce controls the city: the secondary and substitutional role of people. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document THE MODERN CITY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM It is widely assumed, for instance by philosophers, most of whom are urban creatures, that large modern cities are valuable institutions and whatever the very serious costs and deprivations of modern city living, the advantages considerably outweigh the costs. There are those who are not persuaded that that is so. The image of the mob is part of our image of the city,J and the city is the carrier of the best and the worst of civilization (S. Diamond, In Search for the Primitive p.167) - but the latter is also a pretty dubious customer according to Diamond. Note: 1. The modern city as a reducer of variety 2. The metropolitan state, with landscope dominated by the city. The drain, power relation, etc. 3. The loss of contact with the natural 4. The way commerce controls the city: the secondary and substitutional role of people. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 76, item 679: The modern city as an environmental problem Subject The topic of the resource Typescript. Description An account of the resource Note, one of two papers digitised from item 679. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 702.02 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c2681d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c2681d</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 76, item 679 Box 76: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/87ae026d1b7eb1686912cf50e2b4c625.pdf da91a8a30bfeb69bfdd62ed9f6cc3aeb PDF Text Text a/c*/ /Mi J (JO ef , • *1 A >—k Z /<—. Z^-!-< ��' 4 , X I �cM 'j /) r ex Zy / *~>Z A: » -^.—. '~^~y t ’ ’ / • -*x/^ < ’---- c« /' z/- 7^ . . . a new democratic public sphere of empowered, decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of national and regional state structures to facilitate legal, economic, educational and cultural values and practices, to support those local citizens lacking in material and cultural resources, and to settle the many disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local, direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures at the national level will make life for traditional political parties very difficult if not impossible. This development is to be applauded because too many citizens in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of the possibilities of democratic participation and often equate democracy with voting rituals® . /zCtZJ/J �» <3 j > . ' i — publicpolicies-ts-involved in one or other project/ Arterton s study shows stimulate the promise of some ways of using and enhance the impact and technology quality of to citizen participation in politics in the US, almost exclusively at the local level^?. Barber is perhaps the most prominent example of a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to revitalise local participation and local political power in his As one of a range of far’strong democracy'. reaching reforms,, including the establishment of 'neigborhood assemblies', he advocates 'a national civic communications vision of regulate and oversee technology and to communications __ ____ ___ __ .68 • discussion of referendum issues cooperative to the civic supervise /Z-<W • use of debate new and �8.2.95 A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. __ This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows:1* Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic ocout-r outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an antidemocratic tyrant.3 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which 3 Goodin condensing Saward p.168. ( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in UTD. �make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents.4 As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. \ first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7 Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5. Cf. p.12 essay. [Reference] [Reference] �3 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. ‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims CO l Qf~ (it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’8 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.9 familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. What Skyward proposes instead is dep Out therewith go deep-green positions. 8 9 [Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage. [ref]. �4 ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.10 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political ) culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.11 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 10 11 Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. [Ref. and page] . / /“■ w /’ �11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem- dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 X / \ „ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} R = — is as shown by arrows. T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). �11 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism in decentralism egalitarianism anarchism Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. n �12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b at b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. �13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 36 Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is explained) and Sylvan 95. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document a/c*/ /Mi J (JO ef , • *1 A >—k Z /<—. Z^-!-< ' 4 , X I cM 'j /) r ex Zy / *~>Z A: » -^.—. '~^~y t ’ ’ / • -*x/^ < ’---- c« /' z/- 7^ . . . a new democratic public sphere of empowered, decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of national and regional state structures to facilitate legal, economic, educational and cultural values and practices, to support those local citizens lacking in material and cultural resources, and to settle the many disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local, direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures at the national level will make life for traditional political parties very difficult if not impossible. This development is to be applauded because too many citizens in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of the possibilities of democratic participation and often equate democracy with voting rituals® . /zCtZJ/J » <3 j > . ' i — publicpolicies-ts-involved in one or other project/ Arterton s study shows stimulate the promise of some ways of using and enhance the impact and technology quality of to citizen participation in politics in the US, almost exclusively at the local level^?. Barber is perhaps the most prominent example of a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to revitalise local participation and local political power in his As one of a range of far’strong democracy'. reaching reforms,, including the establishment of 'neigborhood assemblies', he advocates 'a national civic communications vision of regulate and oversee technology and to communications __ ____ ___ __ .68 • discussion of referendum issues cooperative to the civic supervise /Z-<W • use of debate new and 8.2.95 A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. __ This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows:1* Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic ocout-r outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an antidemocratic tyrant.3 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which 3 Goodin condensing Saward p.168. ( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in UTD. make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents.4 As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. \ first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7 Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5. Cf. p.12 essay. [Reference] [Reference] 3 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. ‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims CO l Qf~ (it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’8 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.9 familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. What Skyward proposes instead is dep Out therewith go deep-green positions. 8 9 [Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage. [ref]. 4 ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.10 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political ) culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.11 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 10 11 Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. [Ref. and page] . / /“■ w /’ 11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem- dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 X / \ „ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} R = — is as shown by arrows. T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). 11 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism in decentralism egalitarianism anarchism Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. n 12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b at b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. 13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 36 Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is explained) and Sylvan 95. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 977: Notes and papers on anarchism Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes and typescript papers with handwritten emendations and annotations, 'A fundamental dilemma for (deep-) green political theory? Democratic or authoritarian procedures' (dated 8.2.95), and 'Technical interlude, strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures'. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: bundle of ms + ts for anarchism. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 14, item 977 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [13] leaves. 8.26 MB. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6593372" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6593372</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 14: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/adac1ea1e18dbc6bbd0afb6f54567c38.pdf 1f9efcf459d357d53c0fc4e0007d46a2 PDF Text Text �/Zr ? . —p ~r \? ^,rr C-dcOf' ’ Z/ <7 *" IT /r V *- / V-; *V / $ 7&L zz '//L Q^^^ziztix ’ / u/~ * Z ____________________________ _.__ __ i__ /LXiX^ caX /"&w€ < ��0 0 C2--7 > * # cJZZ ;/r<UL^ 7 /Uaf OL y^&J t^—-^ c / A. jfl-JZ- r^ Z< /& C^4 ydctu^ ■ /* ) ^o . t X Ifaj&S CZ--~~ f^.<..,r~.^ J* - t-*-—/'"ZO C'--' /Ah C cr^ %&x c + (J/U-'Z) So ^a, \.c^aQ^^-^- h -f^-. Al<^i & <c^e . /?7_7 ^Succx’ G f f C ’ ^lA y rw''-t/{-<-y ic^^> y i^~ re^td 7«Sc^ J Co-1 e-^--^ ) Z*! ff’zv-^- "f^ * — *—*. "fc-s £-?1'i cxj/ui&t^-r a-^f^~~ 0»c<ZJ-1 U-X-A *U \ i f-^ \ O/£ !~ -farf > /aVZ /(nJ/ ftc. 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Populations of Australia at 2040 under various assumptions as to population at 2000 and various growth rates. Population in Hypothesis as Population in millions at 2000 to growth rate millions at 2040 more \ likely) •' range /' 17-3 1.1% from 1970 26.8 17.8 1.2% from 1970 28.7 18.9 1.1% from 2000 29.2 18.9 1.2% from 2000 30.4 20.0 1.1% from 2000 30.9 20.0 1.2% from 2000 32.2 21.0 1.1% from 2000 32.5 21.0 1.2% from 2000 33.8 21.0 1.4% from 2000 36.6 22.0 1.7% from 2000 38.2 22.0 1.5% from 2000 39.6 22.4 1.87% from 2000 46.99 probable range �C C~ ^) ^co — fVX (f J) V /P' ~~ S^^C /1/^oa^ A X ex A . eu /^. C- t fdL <^2^^Z222 d^£ZZZ. *~^ <^tJO- Z^//9^ 7 s' ^y, J //t,i-rr-f (&df ) ■“?il/< ^' \<_2 TK / cz-v^ 4 - • ( Guy <k_-< Z'-X' —* t A'-r^ cr \ JQ v~<M ) W ' , 7 ��h t/Jo— i-v—^ f / 77 ! C ) 7 * —-z *- //7’Z. /£■ • Vr/(i7 .^r 6(Jo~-, Z<— /)L^i rMs. /?7/. X <sil<y/ t !A) ■ (aJ - * /?7 /f C tf btot . aJ 2-<~ LAtJ - -t)£^ < * ft /? 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H>^ .^-^t �Z>Z_-/_</j/'Z— . Zd~ *« /u^~^<-, ' Tl^ C^—zZ *-^ ?7vz) O£ . Z ‘5^ *-' 2) —- Z if-4/^. C<^V ZZtM—>«_LZZ«_J XZt-^Z-'Zt——»->—ZL /y/J<r 7/er ■Q 77 Crz> / * > z5 ?£> // r Al. 14 ■ ^C<Z>-x^ C Z-tLc /L-Z-Z-^ Z^->—^U<ZZ<^, //7 2- . % £■ <-4 -■-t>-<-^<-c-<^<—. J A /■Ic ly'.zr .Parf ^'7/. ., /-/ 2) 3 /??/. o^i>^ JLj/■■y �7. *3&-4 t-^/b (4J//y. £ * Oz ^Cff^4.7-t4-^ ? y ■ —>'— uJ^-j ^c/cXtJ yd^^x-. c^—cj'P <-4-4 7 / (./) - /3J~ CS^-C /??,). / &-O\^f &7 73 ><-C^ *Uy Z*/ . Z ^7 / . 6^7 -L- uJ^-7 — f"l— {)—&*<-. /■ '5, < £-4- ■ (J,3,^, /f73. �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Dick Coutinho, Royal Vangorcum to Dr Richard Routley, Australian National University, 1974? re Routhley's manuscript on environmental ethics. (1 leaf) �u*^ •f-— Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral objects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits. �2 farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing of the argument. it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter minate . �3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can * not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of �4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. �simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall A new ethic is wanted. e As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between try to show. §2. a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights^what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. �6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S| and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair- ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of 4- A'/Z the modified dominance position:. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): 'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishesproviding (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism -because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm * A related principle is that (modified) can operate within similar limits. t X /< > /Cy , .... r -r- free enterprise 'i- �others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient -hv being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others, 7/v It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are �assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every The last man example. living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esot eric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild �9. animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he �10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and product ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: looks rather like Civ) the society ours. The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the �11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains- dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ mental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if ’r < that point has not already been passed. 7/7 / (U• ‘ In sum' class of permissible actions that /rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? these people do is No, what to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] . �13. /•~i'<'-^\,< /a. Z\z i>'"<’- • > Gf * —‘<-r ^~i ♦ <"- capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic �14. morally, through obligations practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi ness, as a summum banum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing J �15. private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position.which has some vogue-obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them; that is (rough) justice. R. Routley Australian National University �REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, [2] J. Passmore, New York (196 6) . Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). [4] S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Animals, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971). H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, S. I. Benn, Acting Head of Department of Philosophy to Dr. R. Rosenkrantz, Department of Philosophy, University of South Caroline, 6 Sep 1973 re fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, supervised by Richard Routley. (3 pages) �A < wx ^S> eJ *-X (J J *~7f^ ^2 /^t)A / ' / �T L64'«-' *■■ J *e7^ 7' ** 44/ I { MorV 7^ c c *■/' /-X /_ ZMZL4ixO Z-/>< a>% , ... --------------- M-i-J ^1.___ /L (? k c 7 )------ 3o^> X^> £ i �Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold’s words ’an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. such as Thus assertions Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral oojects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house * spirits. �2. fanner who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the fanner subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter minate . �3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature? a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant^ and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, ■ and tne co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases, it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved * rom substantial human interference, whether of �4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright, h// The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. �simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of(j[3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. §2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rightsr what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. �6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): K^> AACC C-aU tv/' i^/' of O'f speA SPcP yvxo &"( The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because jlfjA-aw itUU* under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a $4vM« *h bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a d(L<- tic. tic. Cl-IK Cl-ik i/Au*/ �7. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in £my interests, because I detest you?, that you stop breathing « I- you are free to breathe , for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ’other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism • t. whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too ^1- -fL 3^ - WAa-Zm lullu rfy - Ah. I W-tc restrictive - <or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others, The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are �8. assessed over the class of ideal situations. The last man example. (1) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays . . --------.................................... I about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly i you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, ) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to eso values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving I badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking ‘r- l C-a values have shifted in an environ-nt.l direction h- ■ eric '°f -^responding shifts in the formulation fundamental evaluative principles). The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One const ers the last people in order to rule out the posslbt 1 y that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruit.u or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild 4 �v)O^ <? > J'" J fi. t(r JJj, /A h 9- ‘s, L . it ilr ll' ^onJk ^cU-i /6 U' , zcrta srS o/J oa animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various V, familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and KfalltL largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon bean ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform witlCthe^basic chauvinist principle, and as well with jltZ - /W's the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is foz‘ QC Ko^r‘ because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv 1 ft/qh'a»4. inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, b’J to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy^ 4^fV Vl to- A, (. ^,kJ ; 7 brovj^ rsuei jUj^^-° £o loot e^> K'oV«f^arjJ< (lii) ? But as_____________ the last people do not natural resources. --------------------------------------------- -------- —..... — xO°V ' ! J destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the the variant is still environmentallW^,^ best of reasons", inadequate. The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3) . The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant, S.sau'»' \ v#' rei complex of automated factories and farms which he - <r> I01" ’• I Z/ "11 *-)- LJ ° V / f O XI �10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. A Of coarse he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare CHvc since he much prefers increased output and product ka L■/ l^,(- if- A> p^i^ /? * ’ gUV* k' I */t^> pQ (J ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western J ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonlyj'bovtW', thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this C^S/XU-i example to the industrial society example: looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. (, J X «< T 7/ vr u*fl ^4/ ’“fa *• TafeTT lQ w the society Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The J— ' blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of X his qualities as a private good, as a source of valu- able oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, 7 though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect rf the "C V '•S M 'n �11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc— tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plainsdwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible — at least according to basic chauvinism. L-iUl il~ Wk & But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ mental economics would; instead the market model will HL ui 7?I grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if a n a 2^ o>^.‘ I, fisKis that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that Ola rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [ 3 ] . �0 n ‘s ■UjK , i 111 „lth ... „„ r .=... .J- extending (2) to rnclu .,question were they placed in would be so affected by the action in It may be preferand (3) to exclude speciej&de. the environment in vieW of the way the freedom “J ab le, imply to scrap it altogether, and mate proof, s of rights and permissible conduct, as in a b classes theory sometimes forces changes §3 a radical change in a rejects the Reference in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which a modification of the Theory in a Reference Theory and usual -ta-tdef-eh^also^aeee Jat simllt pheno^nCseens to occur in the case of a neta- A somewhat s nxl P ethlc. Quite apart from ethl°de’“ several environmentally important notions, such as introducing several meta— n 4.4™ arowth and preservation, for mec» conservation, pollut^COTp^e-examinatlon I ethical analysis, an ,< of such characteristic(actions) as natural and modified analyses 3 of obligation and round of right, and of the relations right■ may well require re-assessment of permissibility to rights; it notions as value and right, espectraditional analyses of such on chauvinist assumptions; and it ially where these are based of the more prominent meta-ethical forces the rejection of many illustrated by a very brief exam positions. These points are then by a sketch of the ination of accounts of nature^ right an speciess bias of some major positions. * positions. to defeating conditions Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject doctrine of natural rights here irrelevant, the classical which are 'anv adult human ■.• to which, among other things, according are developed by those protesting about points are oevei p especially the essay s Some of these ltreatment of animals; see especial y human ma collected in [4] . �9 /z O /< A, °uf 13. a i, g>OT' ° >f 1 capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect .. to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees^have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by partheists. since artefacts are not alive). But p^/theism is false For moral prohibitions forbidding certairTactions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., has a right also has responsibilities and thereat least , whatever____________ 'J fore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests, Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. r \fhO< * But persons can relate AT ***. A- */Z /» A '^s" fa . ... 8(^ �14. morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi ness, as a summum bgnum; characteristically each individual of soine base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to The species bias is transparent from the the collective ranking. selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing * �b'v d(k^ V10'" hU •x'5 5 15. oP , X» private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to kr^ow that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of .the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vogue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is R. Routley (rough) justice. Australian National University �REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, New York (1966) . [2] J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Environmental Decay. New York (1972). [4] The Solution becomes the Problem, S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Economic Growth and H.L.A. Hart, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971) . 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Oxford (1967). Animals, Political Philosophy, �The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, Of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that-the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then “rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not aione in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vigue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. / REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, London (1971). 5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). �§ 3. A radical change in a teory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation,for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as XT value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some * 6 major positions.7 A Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human . . . capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes * the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a farzfrom straight forward matter now that human rights with' respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. H Some of these points are developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays collected in [4] �/§ 2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S 3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature 4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in cludes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2contain different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) — in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent for mulation5 runs as follows ( [31, p. 58): ’The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.’ Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restric tion is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being t anywav, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ‘other’ may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whethe^ ‘other’ expands to ‘other human’ - which is too restrictive - or to ‘other’person’ or to ‘other’seritient being’; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and in versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely un workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations * (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where peonle arrive at a new planet and 5 A related principle is that (modified) free enterprise can operate v. ithin similar limits �destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex ample to the Industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalep to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be preferable, in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights. �CJ\^<. & ’ �§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people’s relations to the natural environ ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe’s actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits - To the consternation modoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 �single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserv ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that wiil deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for human ends, “humanized”. As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. 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H>^ .^-^t Z>Z_-/_</j/'Z— . Zd~ *« /u^~^<-, ' Tl^ C^—zZ *-^ ?7vz) O£ . Z ‘5^ *-' 2) —- Z if-4/^. C<^V ZZtM—>«_LZZ«_J XZt-^Z-'Zt——»->—ZL /y/J<r 7/er ■Q 77 Crz> / * > z5 ?£> // r Al. 14 ■ ^C<Z>-x^ C Z-tLc /L-Z-Z-^ Z^->—^U<ZZ<^, //7 2- . % £■ <-4 -■-t>-<-^<-c-<^<—. J A /■Ic ly'.zr .Parf ^'7/. ., /-/ 2) 3 /??/. o^i>^ JLj/■■y 7. *3&-4 t-^/b (4J//y. £ * Oz ^Cff^4.7-t4-^ ? y ■ —>'— uJ^-j ^c/cXtJ yd^^x-. c^—cj'P <-4-4 7 / (./) - /3J~ CS^-C /??,). / &-O\^f &7 73 ><-C^ *Uy Z*/ . Z ^7 / . 6^7 -L- uJ^-7 — f"l— {)—&*<-. /■ '5, < £-4- ■ (J,3,^, /f73. The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Dick Coutinho, Royal Vangorcum to Dr Richard Routley, Australian National University, 1974? re Routhley's manuscript on environmental ethics. (1 leaf) u*^ •f-— Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral objects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits. 2 farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing of the argument. it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter minate . 3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can * not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of 4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall A new ethic is wanted. e As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between try to show. §2. a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights^what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. 6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S| and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair- ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of 4- A'/Z the modified dominance position:. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): 'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishesproviding (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism -because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm * A related principle is that (modified) can operate within similar limits. t X /< > /Cy , .... r -r- free enterprise 'i- others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient -hv being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others, 7/v It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every The last man example. living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esot eric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild 9. animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he 10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and product ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: looks rather like Civ) the society ours. The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the 11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains- dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ mental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if ’r < that point has not already been passed. 7/7 / (U• ‘ In sum' class of permissible actions that /rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? these people do is No, what to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] . 13. /•~i'<'-^\,< /a. Z\z i>'"<’- • > Gf * —‘<-r ^~i ♦ <"- capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic 14. morally, through obligations practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi ness, as a summum banum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing J 15. private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position.which has some vogue-obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them; that is (rough) justice. R. Routley Australian National University REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, [2] J. Passmore, New York (196 6) . Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). [4] S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Animals, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971). H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, S. I. Benn, Acting Head of Department of Philosophy to Dr. R. Rosenkrantz, Department of Philosophy, University of South Caroline, 6 Sep 1973 re fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, supervised by Richard Routley. (3 pages) A < wx ^S> eJ *-X (J J *~7f^ ^2 /^t)A / ' / T L64'«-' *■■ J *e7^ 7' ** 44/ I { MorV 7^ c c *■/' /-X /_ ZMZL4ixO Z-/>< a>% , ... --------------- M-i-J ^1.___ /L (? k c 7 )------ 3o^> X^> £ i Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold’s words ’an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. such as Thus assertions Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral oojects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house * spirits. 2. fanner who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the fanner subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter minate . 3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature? a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant^ and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, ■ and tne co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases, it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved * rom substantial human interference, whether of 4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright, h// The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of(j[3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. §2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rightsr what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. 6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): K^> AACC C-aU tv/' i^/' of O'f speA SPcP yvxo &"( The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because jlfjA-aw itUU* under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a $4vM« *h bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a d(L<- tic. tic. Cl-IK Cl-ik i/Au*/ 7. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in £my interests, because I detest you?, that you stop breathing « I- you are free to breathe , for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ’other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism • t. whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too ^1- -fL 3^ - WAa-Zm lullu rfy - Ah. I W-tc restrictive - <or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others, The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are 8. assessed over the class of ideal situations. The last man example. (1) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays . . --------.................................... I about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly i you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, ) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to eso values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving I badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking ‘r- l C-a values have shifted in an environ-nt.l direction h- ■ eric '°f -^responding shifts in the formulation fundamental evaluative principles). The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One const ers the last people in order to rule out the posslbt 1 y that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruit.u or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild 4 v)O^ <? > J'" J fi. t(r JJj, /A h 9- ‘s, L . it ilr ll' ^onJk ^cU-i /6 U' , zcrta srS o/J oa animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various V, familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and KfalltL largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon bean ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform witlCthe^basic chauvinist principle, and as well with jltZ - /W's the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is foz‘ QC Ko^r‘ because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv 1 ft/qh'a»4. inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, b’J to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy^ 4^fV Vl to- A, (. ^,kJ ; 7 brovj^ rsuei jUj^^-° £o loot e^> K'oV«f^arjJ< (lii) ? But as_____________ the last people do not natural resources. --------------------------------------------- -------- —..... — xO°V ' ! J destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the the variant is still environmentallW^,^ best of reasons", inadequate. The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3) . The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant, S.sau'»' \ v#' rei complex of automated factories and farms which he - <r> I01" ’• I Z/ "11 *-)- LJ ° V / f O XI 10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. A Of coarse he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare CHvc since he much prefers increased output and product ka L■/ l^,(- if- A> p^i^ /? * ’ gUV* k' I */t^> pQ (J ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western J ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonlyj'bovtW', thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this C^S/XU-i example to the industrial society example: looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. (, J X «< T 7/ vr u*fl ^4/ ’“fa *• TafeTT lQ w the society Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The J— ' blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of X his qualities as a private good, as a source of valu- able oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, 7 though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect rf the "C V '•S M 'n 11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc— tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plainsdwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible — at least according to basic chauvinism. L-iUl il~ Wk & But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ mental economics would; instead the market model will HL ui 7?I grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if a n a 2^ o>^.‘ I, fisKis that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that Ola rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [ 3 ] . 0 n ‘s ■UjK , i 111 „lth ... „„ r .=... .J- extending (2) to rnclu .,question were they placed in would be so affected by the action in It may be preferand (3) to exclude speciej&de. the environment in vieW of the way the freedom “J ab le, imply to scrap it altogether, and mate proof, s of rights and permissible conduct, as in a b classes theory sometimes forces changes §3 a radical change in a rejects the Reference in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which a modification of the Theory in a Reference Theory and usual -ta-tdef-eh^also^aeee Jat simllt pheno^nCseens to occur in the case of a neta- A somewhat s nxl P ethlc. Quite apart from ethl°de’“ several environmentally important notions, such as introducing several meta— n 4.4™ arowth and preservation, for mec» conservation, pollut^COTp^e-examinatlon I ethical analysis, an ,< of such characteristic(actions) as natural and modified analyses 3 of obligation and round of right, and of the relations right■ may well require re-assessment of permissibility to rights; it notions as value and right, espectraditional analyses of such on chauvinist assumptions; and it ially where these are based of the more prominent meta-ethical forces the rejection of many illustrated by a very brief exam positions. These points are then by a sketch of the ination of accounts of nature^ right an speciess bias of some major positions. * positions. to defeating conditions Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject doctrine of natural rights here irrelevant, the classical which are 'anv adult human ■.• to which, among other things, according are developed by those protesting about points are oevei p especially the essay s Some of these ltreatment of animals; see especial y human ma collected in [4] . 9 /z O /< A, °uf 13. a i, g>OT' ° >f 1 capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect .. to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees^have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by partheists. since artefacts are not alive). But p^/theism is false For moral prohibitions forbidding certairTactions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., has a right also has responsibilities and thereat least , whatever____________ 'J fore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests, Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. r \fhO< * But persons can relate AT ***. A- */Z /» A '^s" fa . ... 8(^ 14. morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi ness, as a summum bgnum; characteristically each individual of soine base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to The species bias is transparent from the the collective ranking. selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing * b'v d(k^ V10'" hU •x'5 5 15. oP , X» private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to kr^ow that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of .the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vogue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is R. Routley (rough) justice. Australian National University REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, New York (1966) . [2] J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Environmental Decay. New York (1972). [4] The Solution becomes the Problem, S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Economic Growth and H.L.A. Hart, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971) . 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Oxford (1967). Animals, Political Philosophy, The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, Of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that-the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then “rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not aione in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vigue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. / REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, London (1971). 5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). § 3. A radical change in a teory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation,for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as XT value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some * 6 major positions.7 A Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human . . . capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes * the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a farzfrom straight forward matter now that human rights with' respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. H Some of these points are developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays collected in [4] /§ 2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S 3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature 4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in cludes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2contain different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) — in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent for mulation5 runs as follows ( [31, p. 58): ’The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.’ Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restric tion is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being t anywav, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ‘other’ may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whethe^ ‘other’ expands to ‘other human’ - which is too restrictive - or to ‘other’person’ or to ‘other’seritient being’; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and in versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely un workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations * (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where peonle arrive at a new planet and 5 A related principle is that (modified) free enterprise can operate v. ithin similar limits destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex ample to the Industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalep to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be preferable, in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights. CJ\^<. & ’ § 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people’s relations to the natural environ ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe’s actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits - To the consternation modoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserv ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that wiil deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for human ends, “humanized”. As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, Item 1720: Papers and notes on environmental theory, ethics, preference and economics Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 15, Item 1720 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:857e1c6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:857e1c6</a> Description An account of the resource Letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Manilla Folder - Environmental Theory /1) Ethics 2) preference 3) economics - papers. and notes RS & VP + others Subject The topic of the resource Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes 2 draft copies of 'Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?' by Sylvan, with handwritten emendations and annotations; and 2 letters. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [75] leaves. 57.42 MB. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. 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