1
20
44
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/69280df7dda6039687227f260b95dbf5.pdf
7c1ef202ad9606d21abe3109d8a2ea81
PDF Text
Text
/
7
DEEPER NUCLEAR
roots of the arms race lie in the character of science and technology:
such R & D drives the arms race.
science.
But it is disguised by myth of neutral
Deeper still the drives lie in maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
—————
4
the "newer" virtures, Enlightenment but Faustian virtues.
But the attainment of these even approximately is impossible, because of limitations, because for instance ultimate power means loss of power (for power
becomes go great it goes out of control).
This is a variation on the paradox
For these Enlightenment ends there is no maximization ///
because of limits and associated paradoxes, only an illusion of attainment.
A
of
omnipotence.
Thus maximization is here irrational.
and Gods;
In earlier times the drive le^d to God,
later defter the Enlightenment i’£ led to science -
a new, much more
effective God since it delivers so much cargo.
In the same framework, recast Foley's paradoxes of unlimited power:-
1.
Omnipotence leads to impotence
2.
Omniscience leads to ignorance
3.
Total rationality becomes total irrationality:
[becomes?]
and technicized our means, the more irrational our ends.
/
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the more rational
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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/
7
DEEPER NUCLEAR
roots of the arms race lie in the character of science and technology:
such R & D drives the arms race.
science.
But it is disguised by myth of neutral
Deeper still the drives lie in maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
—————
4
the "newer" virtures, Enlightenment but Faustian virtues.
But the attainment of these even approximately is impossible, because of limitations, because for instance ultimate power means loss of power (for power
becomes go great it goes out of control).
This is a variation on the paradox
For these Enlightenment ends there is no maximization ///
because of limits and associated paradoxes, only an illusion of attainment.
A
of
omnipotence.
Thus maximization is here irrational.
and Gods;
In earlier times the drive le^d to God,
later defter the Enlightenment i’£ led to science -
a new, much more
effective God since it delivers so much cargo.
In the same framework, recast Foley's paradoxes of unlimited power:-
1.
Omnipotence leads to impotence
2.
Omniscience leads to ignorance
3.
Total rationality becomes total irrationality:
[becomes?]
and technicized our means, the more irrational our ends.
/
z
the more rational
sr
X>£. e &
f
c/~lu
cr-t/^ J
'7
I
r/^e wl-
_ -O'- rf
Jo-d
, </« sT-rf
; 7^/?/°;
#
t
<rf
//^— / X
0.
**x
(inC/^rv^
/fo?( G^S (X
*/’/ferc^
IS
/
} /he>/
( e^^/ /7-
a JAw/kJ
^J.J. 4/r7/e>*’2S /^t/') /ru^. i^o-fr^a/ S(^,,-/<j
,/?&
rSH-,
G-'l J
c /
/Astr*^? '•*-*- /• z
//c.sw'lfas- f J'^./^f /t/77
4
r
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Box 106, Item 1: Abstract on deeper nuclear and miscellaneous notes
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Typescript and miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8834aaf1b324714f2e3774aef33d071c.pdf
d06136786af094263b1bdde256ccf526
PDF Text
Text
ps re Walzer’s discussion of obliteration bombing of German cities
in WWII, have you seen Stephen E Lammers, ’Area Bombing in
World War II: The Argument of Michael Walzer’ (Journal of Religious
Ethics, Vol. 11, Spring 1983)? Lammers offers a much better critiaue
of Walzer’s argument than mine.
The 'alternative defence systems' have, in fact, a much longer history
th^n you let on, and have been studied more intensively than you suggest.
There's a st^ongish pacifist tradition: £.g. in a number of works
by Tolstoy mi 1900-1910 (e.g. The Law of Violence and the Law of Love,
Engl, transl. 1959; ak masses of smaller pamphlets), also Gandhi'is
work (esp. Non-violence in Peace and War, 2 vols. 1942, 1948), and
some work done by Allied pacifists during World War II and slightly
earlier (e.g. J.W. |(ughan, Pacifism and Invasion, published by War
Resisters' League, 19^2). Perhaps most relevant however, are two
post-nuclear collections: Adam Roberts et.al. Civilian Defence
(1965) and Quincy Wright et.al., Preventing World War III: Some
Proposa1s (1962). As I recall, these take one outside a purely
pacifist tradition. Ar^e NaEss has written on the topic - e.g.
'Nonmilitary defence' in Wright, op.cit.; 'A systematization of
Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution' Jrul of Conflict Resolution
(1958). Gene Sharp, who^you cite, has written very extensively on the
topic. But presumably you don't want to get too involved in this
issue - not in this paper anyway.
�Notes
1
Aldridge Bob, The Counterforce SyndromeiA Gu^de__toU^
NuclearrWeapons aAd-^-Sn^egTc-^rine.
Washington, D.0..
Barnet, Hlchard, The Giants.
TransnatTonal Institute, 19?87.
Simon and Schuster, 1977» Barnet, Richard, Real^^Z
New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981J Ellsberg, Lanlex, **}ter
New York:
See also Sidney Lens, The Day Before
in Current, June 1981.
An Anatomy*of the Nuclear Arms Race.
Bostont
Beacon
Doomsday:
____________ ______
Press, 1977 •
j
Lens, Op. Cit.
2.
3.
"Challenging the Myths of National Securl y , y Rl-h
3.
Barnet, in New York Time_s_Masazln£» Apr^ X’ ^79. Cited ar
elaborated T7I Questions and_Answers_orLthe Sovlet_Threatand
National SecurVtyT^ubilihed by the Disarmament Program of
^Tta^i^TFH^nds Service Committee.
(1501 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia Pennsylvania.)
“Interview**, in Current, June, 19^1*
T
1
Tv-rnnnv
New York: Warner Books, 1979*
5.
See Robert Jungk’ ^^^TcK^topher Trump); Richard Rashdie.
(Tvonoi nted from the German by onrisuopn^x
. r T*
1077
industry.
6. meh.ed Pelt. ■"“^“.r'^rSo^J^rKd.SVr^S!"12"1”’
New York 10036.
Hovt, "The Bishops and the Bomb" (Christianity and
7.
See Robert G. 1982.)| Michael Novak, "Nuclear Morality and
Crisis, August 9»
Man’s Primer on Nuclear Morality" (AmerJ^.
J.A. C’Hare, ’’One 1982); Francis X. Winters, "Catholic Debate
June 26 - July 3#
and Division on Deterrence ' ~merl
_ °christian Century, March 3, 1982.)
Walter Wink, "Nuclear Paralysis
8. John Leslie of the University of
who has reflected
™ preseSte<l «t the Cmedlm Philosophical
ii"
ESX
X' to
I
7 - z/7 zTco> w
�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of three pages (65-67) from unidentified publication, on Peace, war and philosophy,
and Peano Giuseppe. (3 leaves)
�/A/rzw
)(/>
I
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
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ps re Walzer’s discussion of obliteration bombing of German cities
in WWII, have you seen Stephen E Lammers, ’Area Bombing in
World War II: The Argument of Michael Walzer’ (Journal of Religious
Ethics, Vol. 11, Spring 1983)? Lammers offers a much better critiaue
of Walzer’s argument than mine.
The 'alternative defence systems' have, in fact, a much longer history
th^n you let on, and have been studied more intensively than you suggest.
There's a st^ongish pacifist tradition: £.g. in a number of works
by Tolstoy mi 1900-1910 (e.g. The Law of Violence and the Law of Love,
Engl, transl. 1959; ak masses of smaller pamphlets), also Gandhi'is
work (esp. Non-violence in Peace and War, 2 vols. 1942, 1948), and
some work done by Allied pacifists during World War II and slightly
earlier (e.g. J.W. |(ughan, Pacifism and Invasion, published by War
Resisters' League, 19^2). Perhaps most relevant however, are two
post-nuclear collections: Adam Roberts et.al. Civilian Defence
(1965) and Quincy Wright et.al., Preventing World War III: Some
Proposa1s (1962). As I recall, these take one outside a purely
pacifist tradition. Ar^e NaEss has written on the topic - e.g.
'Nonmilitary defence' in Wright, op.cit.; 'A systematization of
Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution' Jrul of Conflict Resolution
(1958). Gene Sharp, who^you cite, has written very extensively on the
topic. But presumably you don't want to get too involved in this
issue - not in this paper anyway.
Notes
1
Aldridge Bob, The Counterforce SyndromeiA Gu^de__toU^
NuclearrWeapons aAd-^-Sn^egTc-^rine.
Washington, D.0..
Barnet, Hlchard, The Giants.
TransnatTonal Institute, 19?87.
Simon and Schuster, 1977» Barnet, Richard, Real^^Z
New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981J Ellsberg, Lanlex, **}ter
New York:
See also Sidney Lens, The Day Before
in Current, June 1981.
An Anatomy*of the Nuclear Arms Race.
Bostont
Beacon
Doomsday:
____________ ______
Press, 1977 •
j
Lens, Op. Cit.
2.
3.
"Challenging the Myths of National Securl y , y Rl-h
3.
Barnet, in New York Time_s_Masazln£» Apr^ X’ ^79. Cited ar
elaborated T7I Questions and_Answers_orLthe Sovlet_Threatand
National SecurVtyT^ubilihed by the Disarmament Program of
^Tta^i^TFH^nds Service Committee.
(1501 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia Pennsylvania.)
“Interview**, in Current, June, 19^1*
T
1
Tv-rnnnv
New York: Warner Books, 1979*
5.
See Robert Jungk’ ^^^TcK^topher Trump); Richard Rashdie.
(Tvonoi nted from the German by onrisuopn^x
. r T*
1077
industry.
6. meh.ed Pelt. ■"“^“.r'^rSo^J^rKd.SVr^S!"12"1”’
New York 10036.
Hovt, "The Bishops and the Bomb" (Christianity and
7.
See Robert G. 1982.)| Michael Novak, "Nuclear Morality and
Crisis, August 9»
Man’s Primer on Nuclear Morality" (AmerJ^.
J.A. C’Hare, ’’One 1982); Francis X. Winters, "Catholic Debate
June 26 - July 3#
and Division on Deterrence ' ~merl
_ °christian Century, March 3, 1982.)
Walter Wink, "Nuclear Paralysis
8. John Leslie of the University of
who has reflected
™ preseSte<l «t the Cmedlm Philosophical
ii"
ESX
X' to
I
7 - z/7 zTco> w
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of three pages (65-67) from unidentified publication, on Peace, war and philosophy,
and Peano Giuseppe. (3 leaves)
/A/rzw
)(/>
I
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Box 106, Item 2: Miscellaneous notes and cutting on defence
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Handwritten notes on scrap paper, and cutting from unidentified publication.
Description
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Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Cutting redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Notes and cutting housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. One of three notes/papers digitised from item 2.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 106, Item 2
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/782aa830b37f3c3af3eaa08c7a828de3.pdf
4ab73b7547a7fffb814caf0c8790bdbd
PDF Text
Text
1
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
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1
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Box 106, Item 2: OED definition of nuclear deterrence
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Handwritten note on scrap paper.
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Verso of leaf not digitised. Note housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. Note, one of three notes/papers digitised from item 2.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 106, Item 2
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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<span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span>
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-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/35e9d8df917f7d8ae32e0943d5ebd99b.pdf
c5c9e5bc6ded0b74c1752018d15876e1
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Text
<%///# /(V?fac/
’
�Nuclear energy and obligations to the future.
.. .discussion of values and goods may seem
fuzzy and unscientific, but it is the beginning
and end of any energy policy ... . (Lovins, 75, xxii).
Important ethical issues concerning obligations to the
future and evaluative issues as to what sort of world we want
to see are raised by proposed nuclear development, but have been
largely neglected in current technologically oriented discussion
of the development.
The first part of the paper considers the
arguments of a number of philosophers
philosophical positions
(e.g.
obligations to the future
we do have practical,
(e.g. Passmore)
and
c
social contract theories)
and rejects them.
concerning
It concludes that
and not merely theoretical, moral obligations
to the non-immediate future, and that these are not made void
by temporal remoteness or some degree of uncertainty about the
effects of our nations.
The second part of the paper considers
a number of examples of crimes against the future and sets the
more comp ex nuclear energy case against this background.
One
philosophical corollary which emerges is the falsity of the still
common view that philosophical analysis of moral concepts,
meta-ethics,
or
is neutral with respect to practical moral issues.
�r * '"'
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much energy is required in reactor establishment
Fthat it will be a considerable time before nuclear development makes a substantial
fpositive contribution to net energy output. ;
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���A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears
in I.
Illich, Energy and Equity, Calder and Boyers, London,
1974,
where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy
represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need.
The
main thesis seems to be that a society heavily dependent for basic
needs on capital demanding, commercially or centrally controllable
energy forms
(especially for transport), will inevitably create
energy hierachies and en/l ance poverty and inequalities in contrast
to a society employing low capital energy sources which people
control themselves,
fairly convincing,
such as bicycles or feet.
The main thesis is
given that there is unequal access to capital
and centralised power,
even if the argument for it leaves something
to be desired and the emphasis on speed as the critical factor
seems mistaken
(would the invention of a cheap 60 m.p.h.
bicycle
thereby convert the bicycle to an instrument of hierarchy?)
If
the thesis is correct the common economic assumption that the
solution to poverty lies in more and more massive inputs of costly
energy is mistaken in a quite fundamental way.
�Elaboration of
'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future, :
A note on expertise and methodology.
Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about
nuclear physics,
should be dealing with this area, which surely
should be left to the province of the real experts in the area,
nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority
in the area of nuclear power.
One of the most irritating things in this area for a
philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by
themselves and others,
as experts and authorities whose pronounce
ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen
(see e.g. articles
[15]
and
[16]), when in fact the issues involve
quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^
matters concerning which the so-called "authorities'
and
experts
commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy.
Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political
theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues
than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly
they are just as important.
Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be
experts
or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear
experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who
can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or
which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non
philosophers .
Rejection of the argument from authority is basic
in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond,
and forming a basic position without which the subject,
as critical
inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and
traditionally has.
Indeed rejection of the argument from
authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper
from closely related areas such as theology,
casuistry,
some
�2.
areas of legal thought and various types of apology.
But a form
of the argument from authority-the claim to entitlement to have
one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says
and how sound it is,
but of who one is - appears however to be
an important element in the modern cult of the "scientific expert"
which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian
discussion of the nuclear issue.
While most philosophers would
reject the view that they were "experts"
or moral issues,
in this sense on values
philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of
special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions
about values or morality,
and expose defects in arguments.
philosophers also have moral views,
Most
that is, they believe some
things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable,
although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without
use of explicit moral terminology.
In writing this paper then we don't hope to be accepted as
'authorities' or
'experts'
on moral questions, but only to have
skills which may throw light on some areas.
bring out value and moral assumptions,
We have tried to
expose logical defects and
inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in
certain sorts of argument concerning the future,
and to argue that
if one accepts a certain moral judgment
(which we accept and which
we believe would be widely agreed on*),
one should,
going to be consistent,
principles,
non-arbitrary ,
accept a certain other one.
if one is
and follow through one's
This seems to us a proper
area for philosophical work.
The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which
are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in
substance only those of the Fox Report
(p.110,
in particular).
* We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree with
virtually every statement we make.
�Nuclear Power
Ethical and Social Dimensions
The issue of nuclear power raises many basic issues in ethics.
By means of an example, we argue for the illegitimacy of certain
sorts of transfers of costs,
transfers from one party who obtains
benefits from a given course of action,
onto other parties who do
The inadequate methods currently available for storing nuclear
not.
wastes mean that nuclear power could permit such an illegitimate
transfer of serious costs and risks onto future people.
Many of
the arguments for the acceptability of imposing such risks on the
future ignore these crucial ethical transfer issues.
We argue that
the mot'Q 1 constraints on action such transfer principles give rise
to are not removed by the fact that those affected are future and
not present people.
The nuclear issue and associated arguments also raise in a
highly topical wSy
really
many basic issues in social theory.
Do people
’need' all the consumer items nuclear power is supposed to
allow for,
and is it authoritarian or wrong to frustrate such needs,
or are such needs in part imposed by a particular, alterable social
framework?
Are existing democratic mechanisms for control over
the social framework adequate, or do they give inadequate control
and permit excessive concentrations of power?
If the answer to the
last question is affirmative, what kinds of social changes would
prevent such>concentrations of power and allow for more adequate
control by people over the social framework and over their own
lives?
The approach to all these questions depends crucially on
how the underlying elements of social interaction are conceived are these basic elements pure individuals, are they social wholes,
or do we need to assume both, distinct and irreducible, as we shall
argue ?
R. and V,. Rout ley
�t.
;
/
%
//
C
.
f
« ^7
£C—e
Z'
fe
c*
—
fl
AUStrOl/LCt'S
I£ nuclear energy is unacceptable on moral grounds, what of
Australia s role in cooperating in its development overseas?
Is its development
inevitable, as some say, so that others would sell if we didn’t and Australia
would simply profit from the folly and immorality of others?
assumption is false.
This inevitability
Most countries considering nuclear energy are not yet
irreversibly committed to it, and have other options.
Australia has a good
percentage of the world’s high-grade reserves of uranium and is regarded by western
powers as a stable and reliable energy source.
In so far as there is an economic
case for nuclear energy development, the relative cheapness of its fuel and
reliability of its source is a major part of it.
It seems likely that by with'
�holding its uranium Australia could shake this assumption and thus be influential
in directing attention to alternatives.
Nuclear energy development is not
inevitable, but even if it were, inevitability does not cancel moral responsibility.
Few would accept the argument of the hired assassin that if he did not do the job
someone else would be found who would perhaps make a messier job of it.
Australia
does not evade moral responsibility by arguing in a similar way, that other, possibly
even less responsible, suppliers would emerge.
Other arguments are presented to excuse Australia’s collaboration in nuclear
development, that by selling its uranium Australia will help prevent nuclear
proliferation and the development of the breeder reactor.
The argument that widely
exporting the basic means of making nuclear weapons is the best means of preventing
nuclear proliferation compares, in its twisted logic, with the all too familiar
6,,-vvA
claims that war is the best means of promoting peace, that the best way to assist
the poor is to increase the power of the wealthy^and so on.
help prevent development of the breeder reactor?
Will uranium export
That seems, at least, unlikely,
since the most important potential customers, in Europe, have already announced
their determination to proceed with it, while the other most important customer,
Japan, has made no secret of its interest in it.
faulty too.
But such an argument is logically
The fact that the breeder creates even worse problems, for present
people, than conventional fission reators hardly shows that conventional fission
A
is acceptable or ought not also to be opposed.
These are not exhaustive options,
and the case against even conventional fission energy is a sufficiently strong one.
The strategy of the argument here is to suggest that rather than opposing or
resisting something immoral, one should collaborate in it in order to use one’s
influence to secure improvements;
this would justify, for example, assisting in
fabricating evidence against an innocent man in order to use one’s influence to
ensure minimum suffering, a speedy trial and humane execution.
These arguments to excuse Australia’s participation are sad and threadbare,
exhibiting the morality of the market.
There seems little doubt that Australia’s
collaboration will assist and encourage the development of nuclear energy as
opposed to alternatives.
Thus Australia’s uranium export policy makes it an
important accomplice in this crime against the future.
�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
•
Cutting (photocopy), 'Letters' (24 November 1978), Science, 202: 818, 820-821. (3 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'The World: Europe' (13 November 1976), The Economist, 261: 6364. (2 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'Nuclear man at bay' (19 March 1977), The Economist, 292(2): 12-13.
(2 leaves)
�9
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��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Typescript (photocopy), Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981
of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ‐ 1981, Farewell Address to the
Nation. (5 leaves)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
<%///# /(V?fac/
’
Nuclear energy and obligations to the future.
.. .discussion of values and goods may seem
fuzzy and unscientific, but it is the beginning
and end of any energy policy ... . (Lovins, 75, xxii).
Important ethical issues concerning obligations to the
future and evaluative issues as to what sort of world we want
to see are raised by proposed nuclear development, but have been
largely neglected in current technologically oriented discussion
of the development.
The first part of the paper considers the
arguments of a number of philosophers
philosophical positions
(e.g.
obligations to the future
we do have practical,
(e.g. Passmore)
and
c
social contract theories)
and rejects them.
concerning
It concludes that
and not merely theoretical, moral obligations
to the non-immediate future, and that these are not made void
by temporal remoteness or some degree of uncertainty about the
effects of our nations.
The second part of the paper considers
a number of examples of crimes against the future and sets the
more comp ex nuclear energy case against this background.
One
philosophical corollary which emerges is the falsity of the still
common view that philosophical analysis of moral concepts,
meta-ethics,
or
is neutral with respect to practical moral issues.
r * '"'
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Fthat it will be a considerable time before nuclear development makes a substantial
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A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears
in I.
Illich, Energy and Equity, Calder and Boyers, London,
1974,
where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy
represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need.
The
main thesis seems to be that a society heavily dependent for basic
needs on capital demanding, commercially or centrally controllable
energy forms
(especially for transport), will inevitably create
energy hierachies and en/l ance poverty and inequalities in contrast
to a society employing low capital energy sources which people
control themselves,
fairly convincing,
such as bicycles or feet.
The main thesis is
given that there is unequal access to capital
and centralised power,
even if the argument for it leaves something
to be desired and the emphasis on speed as the critical factor
seems mistaken
(would the invention of a cheap 60 m.p.h.
bicycle
thereby convert the bicycle to an instrument of hierarchy?)
If
the thesis is correct the common economic assumption that the
solution to poverty lies in more and more massive inputs of costly
energy is mistaken in a quite fundamental way.
Elaboration of
'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future, :
A note on expertise and methodology.
Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about
nuclear physics,
should be dealing with this area, which surely
should be left to the province of the real experts in the area,
nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority
in the area of nuclear power.
One of the most irritating things in this area for a
philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by
themselves and others,
as experts and authorities whose pronounce
ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen
(see e.g. articles
[15]
and
[16]), when in fact the issues involve
quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^
matters concerning which the so-called "authorities'
and
experts
commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy.
Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political
theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues
than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly
they are just as important.
Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be
experts
or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear
experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who
can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or
which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non
philosophers .
Rejection of the argument from authority is basic
in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond,
and forming a basic position without which the subject,
as critical
inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and
traditionally has.
Indeed rejection of the argument from
authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper
from closely related areas such as theology,
casuistry,
some
2.
areas of legal thought and various types of apology.
But a form
of the argument from authority-the claim to entitlement to have
one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says
and how sound it is,
but of who one is - appears however to be
an important element in the modern cult of the "scientific expert"
which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian
discussion of the nuclear issue.
While most philosophers would
reject the view that they were "experts"
or moral issues,
in this sense on values
philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of
special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions
about values or morality,
and expose defects in arguments.
philosophers also have moral views,
Most
that is, they believe some
things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable,
although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without
use of explicit moral terminology.
In writing this paper then we don't hope to be accepted as
'authorities' or
'experts'
on moral questions, but only to have
skills which may throw light on some areas.
bring out value and moral assumptions,
We have tried to
expose logical defects and
inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in
certain sorts of argument concerning the future,
and to argue that
if one accepts a certain moral judgment
(which we accept and which
we believe would be widely agreed on*),
one should,
going to be consistent,
principles,
non-arbitrary ,
accept a certain other one.
if one is
and follow through one's
This seems to us a proper
area for philosophical work.
The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which
are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in
substance only those of the Fox Report
(p.110,
in particular).
* We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree with
virtually every statement we make.
Nuclear Power
Ethical and Social Dimensions
The issue of nuclear power raises many basic issues in ethics.
By means of an example, we argue for the illegitimacy of certain
sorts of transfers of costs,
transfers from one party who obtains
benefits from a given course of action,
onto other parties who do
The inadequate methods currently available for storing nuclear
not.
wastes mean that nuclear power could permit such an illegitimate
transfer of serious costs and risks onto future people.
Many of
the arguments for the acceptability of imposing such risks on the
future ignore these crucial ethical transfer issues.
We argue that
the mot'Q 1 constraints on action such transfer principles give rise
to are not removed by the fact that those affected are future and
not present people.
The nuclear issue and associated arguments also raise in a
highly topical wSy
really
many basic issues in social theory.
Do people
’need' all the consumer items nuclear power is supposed to
allow for,
and is it authoritarian or wrong to frustrate such needs,
or are such needs in part imposed by a particular, alterable social
framework?
Are existing democratic mechanisms for control over
the social framework adequate, or do they give inadequate control
and permit excessive concentrations of power?
If the answer to the
last question is affirmative, what kinds of social changes would
prevent such>concentrations of power and allow for more adequate
control by people over the social framework and over their own
lives?
The approach to all these questions depends crucially on
how the underlying elements of social interaction are conceived are these basic elements pure individuals, are they social wholes,
or do we need to assume both, distinct and irreducible, as we shall
argue ?
R. and V,. Rout ley
t.
;
/
%
//
C
.
f
« ^7
£C—e
Z'
fe
c*
—
fl
AUStrOl/LCt'S
I£ nuclear energy is unacceptable on moral grounds, what of
Australia s role in cooperating in its development overseas?
Is its development
inevitable, as some say, so that others would sell if we didn’t and Australia
would simply profit from the folly and immorality of others?
assumption is false.
This inevitability
Most countries considering nuclear energy are not yet
irreversibly committed to it, and have other options.
Australia has a good
percentage of the world’s high-grade reserves of uranium and is regarded by western
powers as a stable and reliable energy source.
In so far as there is an economic
case for nuclear energy development, the relative cheapness of its fuel and
reliability of its source is a major part of it.
It seems likely that by with'
holding its uranium Australia could shake this assumption and thus be influential
in directing attention to alternatives.
Nuclear energy development is not
inevitable, but even if it were, inevitability does not cancel moral responsibility.
Few would accept the argument of the hired assassin that if he did not do the job
someone else would be found who would perhaps make a messier job of it.
Australia
does not evade moral responsibility by arguing in a similar way, that other, possibly
even less responsible, suppliers would emerge.
Other arguments are presented to excuse Australia’s collaboration in nuclear
development, that by selling its uranium Australia will help prevent nuclear
proliferation and the development of the breeder reactor.
The argument that widely
exporting the basic means of making nuclear weapons is the best means of preventing
nuclear proliferation compares, in its twisted logic, with the all too familiar
6,,-vvA
claims that war is the best means of promoting peace, that the best way to assist
the poor is to increase the power of the wealthy^and so on.
help prevent development of the breeder reactor?
Will uranium export
That seems, at least, unlikely,
since the most important potential customers, in Europe, have already announced
their determination to proceed with it, while the other most important customer,
Japan, has made no secret of its interest in it.
faulty too.
But such an argument is logically
The fact that the breeder creates even worse problems, for present
people, than conventional fission reators hardly shows that conventional fission
A
is acceptable or ought not also to be opposed.
These are not exhaustive options,
and the case against even conventional fission energy is a sufficiently strong one.
The strategy of the argument here is to suggest that rather than opposing or
resisting something immoral, one should collaborate in it in order to use one’s
influence to secure improvements;
this would justify, for example, assisting in
fabricating evidence against an innocent man in order to use one’s influence to
ensure minimum suffering, a speedy trial and humane execution.
These arguments to excuse Australia’s participation are sad and threadbare,
exhibiting the morality of the market.
There seems little doubt that Australia’s
collaboration will assist and encourage the development of nuclear energy as
opposed to alternatives.
Thus Australia’s uranium export policy makes it an
important accomplice in this crime against the future.
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
•
Cutting (photocopy), 'Letters' (24 November 1978), Science, 202: 818, 820-821. (3 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'The World: Europe' (13 November 1976), The Economist, 261: 6364. (2 leaves)
Cutting (photocopy), 'Nuclear man at bay' (19 March 1977), The Economist, 292(2): 12-13.
(2 leaves)
9
/vuclem
9
7 7/A
»
■«■
r«v<-Z
>
^4
Jr
X
(7
6s *'t
Ai
cr *
7
C T~
<7^
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Typescript (photocopy), Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981
of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ‐ 1981, Farewell Address to the
Nation. (5 leaves)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 106, Item 3: Early drafts, notes and cuttings on big nuclear
Subject
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Various typescript and handwritten early drafts and notes on big nuclear, undated. Includes cuttings on nuclear power and photocopy of Embargoed Advance material for release at 0200 GMT January 15 1981 of Jimmy Cater, 39th President of the United States: 1977 ? 1981, Farewell Address to the Nation.
Description
An account of the resource
Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Cutting redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Papers housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. One of four papers digitised from item 2.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 106, Item 3
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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[26] leaves. 10.28 MB.
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Manuscript
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:88d3475">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:88d3475</a>
Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/16947195a878ecb196bb09099f17f712.pdf
3db2c0baa2c3c95fd45969180538a40b
PDF Text
Text
����
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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Dublin Core
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Box 120, Item 102: Richard Sylvan to John, c1983 to ?
Subject
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Handwritten letter to John from Richard Sylvan, letter isn't signed. Sylvan writes about a UNESCO Asia-Pacific meeting held in 1983 and discusses John's report on philosophy in New Zealand. The meeting is possibly the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Teaching and research in philosophy in Asia and the Pacific held in Bangkok, 21-25 February 1983. The letter is also possibly addressed to John Patterson who attended the UNESCO Asia-Pacific meeting and presented a paper on philosophy in New Zealand. (Information from UNESCO (1984) Teaching and Research in Philosophy: Asia and the Pacific, UNESCO).
Description
An account of the resource
Note, one of two papers digitised from item 102.
Creator
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 120, Item 102
Publisher
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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Letter, [4] leaves. [12.73 MB] For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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Correspondences
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:d21b575">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:d21b575</a>
Box 120: Philosophy Wisdom to Wowserism
Como House
Como House > Green Table > Pile 5
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/73ae60638a5fd08b1f6f3ce2164e80f2.pdf
138ef73ff6dc2fdca4027cfd05cc1e49
PDF Text
Text
y
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00959
Z^r^y
���The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated photocopy of 'State' from Dictionary of Philosophy, 300-301. Publisher and
publication not identified. (1 leaf)
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
y
// /
00959
Z^r^y
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated photocopy of 'State' from Dictionary of Philosophy, 300-301. Publisher and
publication not identified. (1 leaf)
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 13, item 959
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 6
Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 6
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/62dfb49e2e6b38d58a9ab61536132136.pdf
a12a16b6a5d108e89c5accfaec970ea1
PDF Text
Text
�28
undiluted anarchism); holistic and tribal means (as, obversely, utterly individualistic ones) are
anarchistically admissible.
The connections can be made in this way:- If there is no head, top or centre, how are
political affairs structured? A standard anarchist response-not essential for mathematical
structure, but incorporated in the modem definition of anarchism-is organisation (of course)
by acceptable means, by noncoercive, nonauthoritarian organisation, what is typically expanded
to voluntary and cooperative organisation. Features of this response will be elaborated in what
follows (starting in the next chapter).
~
5. With in anarkism: green and deep-green anarkism.
~
/\-
1¥ short, a green position or theory is one that reflects sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, with that commitment shown in relevant positive action. Even more
briefly, what is required for such greenness (gre-eenness) is this: environmental commitment
manifested in suitable action. 28
A deep-green theory, is a green theory, that is one reflecting sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, which exhibits depth, roughly some items, notably natural items, that do
not answer back to human interests are valuable in themselves and human interests do not
always predominate. 29 A deep-green political theory is a political theory of this deep-green
sort.
Deep green agents do not have to attempt anything in an explicitly political direction, even
though they have to attempt something for environmental causes. They can live as part of a
minority, as many do, watching what they value degraded or destroyed. They are committed,
in principle (only), to reform. There is no commitment to radicalism. But if such greens wish
to retain enough of what they value, they will have, sooner or later, to become involved in
-------
political issues, in more than merely reformist ways.
!J..,+ 0
..ilfvl
j\ is a m11fatter of completeness, deep-green theory~is bound to touc~/ at leastj; upon
r::'"'
-::i:;,
/./ow,t,-.J~
polit ical issues. B:a.t,\deep-green theory does not, itsel~ force a particular form of political
theory, certainly not anarchoid forms. Rather such forms present appealing options, especially
given the deep-green inadequacy of mere small and marginal variations upon prevailing
unjustified state arrangements. While some, important changes may be achieved in reformist
ways, they are unlikely to do enough. They are for more likely to be, what virtually all
•• idence, suggests: too little, too late.
28
A full account of greenness is easily accessible in GE. So the many elaborating details are not spelt out
here. An overlapping detail also offered in GI.
29
Again these features have been explained in detail elsewhere, esp OOE, also GE.
,/4 11:
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29
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A popular illusion Jla5 Are political structures as satisfactory, the problem ~ the players
who occupy critical niches, a problem that can be solved by rendering these players suitably
green. 30 Hence the call for greener politicians, and extensive efforts to green up''those that are
~o/
there. This assumes that the players are independant of the niches they occupy, instead of that
the players are partially shaped by the niches they occupy.
(Persons can be seen as
constitlf.[ted, in important part, by the roles they occupy). Rather to obtain virtuous green
policy makers and controllers, changes in political structures into which they ~,,,.- appear
/ slut
necessary. In these terms, present structures are inadequate; significant structural change is part
of what is required, again going further than straightforward reform.
It may already be evident that the fuzzy reformist/radical divide does not correspond to the
shallower/deep distlic tion of green positions and actors. As it happens, leading deep ecologists
;;..
e'i
,,;-shMtJ'
who tend not to be enyironmentally deep, are political radical, and in~l~ding Bila committed to
I
o.l• q)
"eco-anarchism" (' 13's "munipal liberterianism"). By contrast some deep-green theorists
(myself included) aim both for environmental depth and political radicalness. However deep<le-f,;,i~\,
(>,S~c~ l
green theory represents a plurallism, of which political radicalism
,.. is,\not an-~··· feature. In any
case, radicalism does not exclude judicious reformist activity of support of reformist measures
(and it is remotely possible that some regions ~ ould just get very 1i ckm:g in reforms). So too
~
while anarchical investigations are politically radical, a good deal of P1at is this ....... may be of
relevance to reformist green theory, both theory and methods.
Like most political theory, green theory spans a range from practical, getting things done
within prevailing arrangements, to highly theoretical, such as envisaging superior organisation
(postponing questions as to how to get from here to there). The present investigations
(parallelling my interests) lie in the more theoretical end, partly because (from where I am)
prevailing arrangements look, not to overstate things, environmentally hopeless.
Whether or not a deep-green approach is limited to reformist practice or not, it is bound to
be revolutionary in theoretical impact. For by yirtue of what is meant by deep-green, any such
dcw,,E.'~ ro~
approach is bound to reject assumptionsi ntegral to modem political theory.
dt\,,;... ... J
Political theory ... address the question of which politically variable institutions
are normatively satisfactory: in particularly, normatively satisfactory from the
point of view of some constituency ... . Modem political theory, at least in the
Western tradition, makes two assumptions in giving further specification to the
enterprise. The first is the ...
[humanist] assumption, that the relevant constituency is human beings, usually
the [individual] human beings who are to live under the institutions ... . And the
30
Thus such despairing c\~lls as the following:
The environmental movement is exhausted by campaigning on so many fronts; what is needed now is for
the decision makers to change their loyalties and priorities-don't just wear the green, think green and act
green!
I
a..
·tQ
1-e
�30
second is the
[local egalitarian] assumption, that the arrangements should be normatively
satisfactory from the point of view equally, of all relevant individuals ... .
These assumptions are almost constituive of Western political thought ....31
Like hi:i;~inent predecessors, Pettit does not offer much argument for these large assumptions,
, Jk
and what is on offer is quite inadequate. The second assumption, his "universalism" ,whic~ takes
as less controversial, obtains only an invalid one-liner: 'If persons are all that matter [a first of
various transformations of the humanist assump~o~ ], they surely matter equally, so universialism
ton
is hard to resist' .32 To emphasis the invalidity, consider a few substitutions: if possessions
(species, assumptions, ... ) are all that matter, they matter equally. What is more, when the first
assumption is duly broken, the second assumption is commonly abandoned. That when other
items than humans do matter, for some other creatures, humans matter more than those others
r-
(this sort of assumption in fact typifies intermediate, opposed to deep, positions). An easy
egalitarianism (which shelves merit distribution issues) tends to become increasingly
controversial, and implausible, as constitf e~ es are further varied and widened; witness the
bf spheric egalitarianism of deep
ecology.33
It is the first assumption, then that deep-green approaches are bound to reject. pettit passes
.-
upon discussion of the 'challenging' 'objection': 'It is that if political arrangements are devised
with a view just to the interests of human beings [note the further transformation] then they are
quite likely to be damaging to the rest of nature' (to grossly understate the problematic
situation). 34 He cannot resist the observation that as 'the interests of human beings are tied up in
great part with those of non-human nature, ... we may hope that in approaching political matters
from a personalist standpoint we will not be insensitive to the needs of non-human species and of
31
Thus Pettit, pp 286-7, who provides some selective docmentation for these claims and that these
assumptions are made. Pettit, dubiously equating persons with humans, calls the first assumption 'the
w sonalist assumption'; but really the l~ ger assumption is that political theory conforms to human
chauvinism (for a critical rejection of which see the final section of EE). He calls the second assumption
'the • iversalist assumption', though it is far from universal, as r.
ds either temporal or spatial
dimensions; for example, states invariably tr~ t foreigners or aliens differently from citizens or
constituents, in ways supported by prevailing theory. It is abandonment of the second assumption, which
Pettit does not discuss, that distinguishes ancient and nonWestern theory. For slaves, members of lesser
castes and tribes and so on, withinf the state were not treated equally (whether they regarded this as
satisfactory or not).
32
Pettit. p.287.
33
34
Pettit p.287.
Jo
~c
f
�31
~~
the bitat that we share with those species' .35 While we share this pious and regularly frustrated
.
)ha.
hope, the feebleness of the observation should not pass unremarked. Evidently there are many
types of interrelations where (limited) interests of a dominant party are no reliable assurance of
~
satisfactory treatment of dominated or lesser relatf master-servant, land-self, and so on. While
some parties may have treated their slaves and animals well and appropriately, many did not.
Nature and its creatures and features are hardly looked after well by present cohorts of humans:
insen~ vity dominates. Many humans, especially substantiaii;;lf-interested humans, are not to
be trusted; so a majority or like consituency of humans can hardly prove satisfactory. The
humanist assumption, part of a pervasive human chauvinism, should be abandoned.
It is very doubtful that the two assumptions i ettit p~ ents are anywhere near consitutive of
J~ )~
modem Western political thought. Further major assumptions concern the role of the state and the
position of individual rights; it is the former that does not enter decisively in tribal and like
socie~ ies, and the latter distinctively modem issue that is downplayed or neglected in nonWestem theory.
Under present political arrangements, the world is divided up, virtually ex~umiativ ly, into
) h.o..us..t/
a set of exclusive states. None of these states should be accounted green, though there are now
very ~ e green tinges to so~
of them. While none exhibit any depth of greenness, there is no
reason, theoretical or pgi\tical why some should not. M~ er deep-green arrangements can, in
principle, be ensured by political structures that are unacceptable on other grounds. More
IV/~
/,
technically, deep-greenness, however necessary, does not supply full conditions of adequacy for
satisfactory political arrangements, environmental and otherwise: for eucracy.
For any
arrangements where political control, a ~riing class for instance, proves suitably disposed can
ensure greenness of depth. Thus such, independently objectionable, arrangements as: green
v
~
(benev,ient) dictatorships, green guardit nships (in the style of an eco-Platonic Green Republic),
green foundations, and caste systems even eco-f~p cisms and eco-totalitarianisms. Many such
arrangements fall down
fnbroadly liberatarian grounds: that they do not allow agents and
creatures to govern their own lives and affairs freely. Other arrangements fail on broadly
egalitarian grounds, that they undul_y privil~ge some classes or agents at the expense of others. ';
-
<Arrangements that meet conditions of adequacy, that is that do not so fail yet are deepgreen, are called eucratic. Eucracy means satisfactory political organisation.
Green anarkism and, still more, deep-green anarkism offer important fresh political
directions and alternatives for sustained green activity, and for the wide green movement more
35
Pettit p.287.
Jo
�32
generally. They are alternatives very compatible with green ideas and broad ideology, as well as
alternatives often implicitly adopted, and certainly heavily borrowed from, by greenr.· There is
0
already a symbi\ tiin relation of sorts. Green and anarchist movements can not only complement
each other substantially; in important ways they need each other, and mutual dependence.
Anarkism stands in need of a significant driving force, an active directed constituency, which the
green movement can apply (or still better, a green movement allied with other alternative forces,
such as peace and feminist movements). Conversely, green succesfD slowing or stopping
#
massive degradation of the Earth, requires very different political directions from those of the
present, or of red (state socialist) or blue (liberal capitalist) colour variations on offer, anarchoidal
directions, so it can plausible be argued. That isl can be argued, persua\ ively if inconclusively
f /s
so far, that a genuinely green future cannot be obtained under present political arrangements; for
S1.1h.sfa"'helA.:1
l<n~s'tr-C1 ,'ht?J..
example this can be argued, in several ways, from the inbuilt commitment to fairly connectional~
economic growth. Accordingly political structures n\ ed to be changed, but so that important
J~
social desiderata that have been more or less achieved over a long and often dark human history
are not lost, in particular personal liberty, democra~c procedur~, just practice; Certain types of
4Q 12:.IJU-Qf~ t
~
,\
green anarchism meet these requirements,36 A··· types, other optiorJdo not satisfactorily.
sre~,i
i:,
Arguments from genuine soerees to • dical change assume the following sort of form:
• Human impact on the Earth, on very many of its ecosystems and habitats, is excessive.
•
Impact will not be significantly reduced under prevailing dominant socio-political
arrangements, under what is called the dominant social paradigm. To the contrary, these
arrangements obligate growth, which is likely to increase, even if now with some shallow
sustainability constraints. 37
Therefore,
• Arrangements slwuld be changed
® There are more and less far-reaching ways of attempting to achieve such changes of
arrangements, from zero, conservative, through reformist, to radical,c.ulminating in total change.
® There are also more and less authoritarian and coercive ways of endeavouring to achieve such
arrangements. (At the more authoritarii n fnd thes~~i~clude green dictatorship, ecofascism, etc.)
The further detail Jargument is that these way should be anarchoid. Briefly, ~
matives to
anarchoid ways not only infringe basic social and environmental desiderata (including, for
instance, noninterfering freedom of choice of individual creatures), but they utterly lack rational
0
~
36
Th#se types encouraging relevant organisation, regulation and control-features 8f which certain sorts of
traditional anarchism stand opposed.
37
While this is substantial thesis, we shall not stop off to argue for it here. The thesis is argued elsewhere,
e.g. GE, GEF.
().II ~uc,'af~ / s
�33
justification.
The detailed argument for anarchoid directions for radical .green change reveals features of
importance concerning the required character of resulting arrangements. For example, what
emerges cannot be a free-for-all for some classes of agents, such as developers. Regulation and
planning will have to be tighter, while different in character, than what now prevails in most
regions.
Accordingly a green anarkism like that to be elaborated differs in ma·or respects from most
of what has hitherto passed as anarchism. Salient differences tum around the following matters
and em~
/ h
, among others
o
regulation of social and environmental kinds.
o
social organisation and political structure, with both bottom-up and also top-down linkages and
constraints.
o
rational organisational and decision practices, including preparation and planning, to ensure
adequate outcomes.
o
reasonable objectives and planning targets, pitched at adequacy, not optimality (or other
maximizing goals).
o
pluralism of arrangements, indeed a plural pluralism, with space for a plurality of cultures and
subcultures within various of an appropriate plurality of political structures.
Such a plurality could well include structures that did not conform to matters emphasized,
not merely inadequate arrangements but adequate ones. For example, with creatures different
from the present run of humans, environmental regulation could prove substantially otiose. To be
sure, it would be hoped, though certainly not required, that arrangements were uniformly benign;
for example that, environmental circumstances permitting, they were evironmentally benign.
Correspondingly, socially, it would be hoped that arrangements aimed to conform to fairly basic
standards of ethical decency, such as
o
basic social (as well as environmental) provision.
Satisfactory arrangements would supply a subsistence floor, meeting the principle: to each
accou~ ing to basic needs. This modified comm unal principle is not confined in scope to
fr-d
~
resident humans, but includes other inhabitants.
o
a presumption of nonviolence, with violence at least not perpt trated against innocent or
/e..
uninvolved parties (including again nonhumans).
REFERENCES
\
J. Burnheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms of Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
_
J.W. Gough, The Social Contract: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
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�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
Cutting, The Economist (19 November 1988) ‘Business bribes’, The Economist, 21-24. (4
pages (2 leaves))
Journal, Raise the stakes: the Planet Drum review, no 7 S2, Spring 1983.
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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Any textual data included in the document
28
undiluted anarchism); holistic and tribal means (as, obversely, utterly individualistic ones) are
anarchistically admissible.
The connections can be made in this way:- If there is no head, top or centre, how are
political affairs structured? A standard anarchist response-not essential for mathematical
structure, but incorporated in the modem definition of anarchism-is organisation (of course)
by acceptable means, by noncoercive, nonauthoritarian organisation, what is typically expanded
to voluntary and cooperative organisation. Features of this response will be elaborated in what
follows (starting in the next chapter).
~
5. With in anarkism: green and deep-green anarkism.
~
/\-
1¥ short, a green position or theory is one that reflects sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, with that commitment shown in relevant positive action. Even more
briefly, what is required for such greenness (gre-eenness) is this: environmental commitment
manifested in suitable action. 28
A deep-green theory, is a green theory, that is one reflecting sufficient commitment to
environmental causes, which exhibits depth, roughly some items, notably natural items, that do
not answer back to human interests are valuable in themselves and human interests do not
always predominate. 29 A deep-green political theory is a political theory of this deep-green
sort.
Deep green agents do not have to attempt anything in an explicitly political direction, even
though they have to attempt something for environmental causes. They can live as part of a
minority, as many do, watching what they value degraded or destroyed. They are committed,
in principle (only), to reform. There is no commitment to radicalism. But if such greens wish
to retain enough of what they value, they will have, sooner or later, to become involved in
-------
political issues, in more than merely reformist ways.
!J..,+ 0
..ilfvl
j\ is a m11fatter of completeness, deep-green theory~is bound to touc~/ at leastj; upon
r::'"'
-::i:;,
/./ow,t,-.J~
polit ical issues. B:a.t,\deep-green theory does not, itsel~ force a particular form of political
theory, certainly not anarchoid forms. Rather such forms present appealing options, especially
given the deep-green inadequacy of mere small and marginal variations upon prevailing
unjustified state arrangements. While some, important changes may be achieved in reformist
ways, they are unlikely to do enough. They are for more likely to be, what virtually all
•• idence, suggests: too little, too late.
28
A full account of greenness is easily accessible in GE. So the many elaborating details are not spelt out
here. An overlapping detail also offered in GI.
29
Again these features have been explained in detail elsewhere, esp OOE, also GE.
,/4 11:
t~ ~ ~ rJjPhc.J.\:r l~~ e,J, k
1 -tt:fo()'l'l,,tiYP...
f
~ 0us foc1'J.e..t4), t'.sf-s,
- - · ·-
29
sees
1
----- - - - l;.11n3 .,.,,t.
p1~11a -;_/,;,,
A popular illusion Jla5 Are political structures as satisfactory, the problem ~ the players
who occupy critical niches, a problem that can be solved by rendering these players suitably
green. 30 Hence the call for greener politicians, and extensive efforts to green up''those that are
~o/
there. This assumes that the players are independant of the niches they occupy, instead of that
the players are partially shaped by the niches they occupy.
(Persons can be seen as
constitlf.[ted, in important part, by the roles they occupy). Rather to obtain virtuous green
policy makers and controllers, changes in political structures into which they ~,,,.- appear
/ slut
necessary. In these terms, present structures are inadequate; significant structural change is part
of what is required, again going further than straightforward reform.
It may already be evident that the fuzzy reformist/radical divide does not correspond to the
shallower/deep distlic tion of green positions and actors. As it happens, leading deep ecologists
;;..
e'i
,,;-shMtJ'
who tend not to be enyironmentally deep, are political radical, and in~l~ding Bila committed to
I
o.l• q)
"eco-anarchism" (' 13's "munipal liberterianism"). By contrast some deep-green theorists
(myself included) aim both for environmental depth and political radicalness. However deep<le-f,;,i~\,
(>,S~c~ l
green theory represents a plurallism, of which political radicalism
,.. is,\not an-~··· feature. In any
case, radicalism does not exclude judicious reformist activity of support of reformist measures
(and it is remotely possible that some regions ~ ould just get very 1i ckm:g in reforms). So too
~
while anarchical investigations are politically radical, a good deal of P1at is this ....... may be of
relevance to reformist green theory, both theory and methods.
Like most political theory, green theory spans a range from practical, getting things done
within prevailing arrangements, to highly theoretical, such as envisaging superior organisation
(postponing questions as to how to get from here to there). The present investigations
(parallelling my interests) lie in the more theoretical end, partly because (from where I am)
prevailing arrangements look, not to overstate things, environmentally hopeless.
Whether or not a deep-green approach is limited to reformist practice or not, it is bound to
be revolutionary in theoretical impact. For by yirtue of what is meant by deep-green, any such
dcw,,E.'~ ro~
approach is bound to reject assumptionsi ntegral to modem political theory.
dt\,,;... ... J
Political theory ... address the question of which politically variable institutions
are normatively satisfactory: in particularly, normatively satisfactory from the
point of view of some constituency ... . Modem political theory, at least in the
Western tradition, makes two assumptions in giving further specification to the
enterprise. The first is the ...
[humanist] assumption, that the relevant constituency is human beings, usually
the [individual] human beings who are to live under the institutions ... . And the
30
Thus such despairing c\~lls as the following:
The environmental movement is exhausted by campaigning on so many fronts; what is needed now is for
the decision makers to change their loyalties and priorities-don't just wear the green, think green and act
green!
I
a..
·tQ
1-e
30
second is the
[local egalitarian] assumption, that the arrangements should be normatively
satisfactory from the point of view equally, of all relevant individuals ... .
These assumptions are almost constituive of Western political thought ....31
Like hi:i;~inent predecessors, Pettit does not offer much argument for these large assumptions,
, Jk
and what is on offer is quite inadequate. The second assumption, his "universalism" ,whic~ takes
as less controversial, obtains only an invalid one-liner: 'If persons are all that matter [a first of
various transformations of the humanist assump~o~ ], they surely matter equally, so universialism
ton
is hard to resist' .32 To emphasis the invalidity, consider a few substitutions: if possessions
(species, assumptions, ... ) are all that matter, they matter equally. What is more, when the first
assumption is duly broken, the second assumption is commonly abandoned. That when other
items than humans do matter, for some other creatures, humans matter more than those others
r-
(this sort of assumption in fact typifies intermediate, opposed to deep, positions). An easy
egalitarianism (which shelves merit distribution issues) tends to become increasingly
controversial, and implausible, as constitf e~ es are further varied and widened; witness the
bf spheric egalitarianism of deep
ecology.33
It is the first assumption, then that deep-green approaches are bound to reject. pettit passes
.-
upon discussion of the 'challenging' 'objection': 'It is that if political arrangements are devised
with a view just to the interests of human beings [note the further transformation] then they are
quite likely to be damaging to the rest of nature' (to grossly understate the problematic
situation). 34 He cannot resist the observation that as 'the interests of human beings are tied up in
great part with those of non-human nature, ... we may hope that in approaching political matters
from a personalist standpoint we will not be insensitive to the needs of non-human species and of
31
Thus Pettit, pp 286-7, who provides some selective docmentation for these claims and that these
assumptions are made. Pettit, dubiously equating persons with humans, calls the first assumption 'the
w sonalist assumption'; but really the l~ ger assumption is that political theory conforms to human
chauvinism (for a critical rejection of which see the final section of EE). He calls the second assumption
'the • iversalist assumption', though it is far from universal, as r.
ds either temporal or spatial
dimensions; for example, states invariably tr~ t foreigners or aliens differently from citizens or
constituents, in ways supported by prevailing theory. It is abandonment of the second assumption, which
Pettit does not discuss, that distinguishes ancient and nonWestern theory. For slaves, members of lesser
castes and tribes and so on, withinf the state were not treated equally (whether they regarded this as
satisfactory or not).
32
Pettit. p.287.
33
34
Pettit p.287.
Jo
~c
f
31
~~
the bitat that we share with those species' .35 While we share this pious and regularly frustrated
.
)ha.
hope, the feebleness of the observation should not pass unremarked. Evidently there are many
types of interrelations where (limited) interests of a dominant party are no reliable assurance of
~
satisfactory treatment of dominated or lesser relatf master-servant, land-self, and so on. While
some parties may have treated their slaves and animals well and appropriately, many did not.
Nature and its creatures and features are hardly looked after well by present cohorts of humans:
insen~ vity dominates. Many humans, especially substantiaii;;lf-interested humans, are not to
be trusted; so a majority or like consituency of humans can hardly prove satisfactory. The
humanist assumption, part of a pervasive human chauvinism, should be abandoned.
It is very doubtful that the two assumptions i ettit p~ ents are anywhere near consitutive of
J~ )~
modem Western political thought. Further major assumptions concern the role of the state and the
position of individual rights; it is the former that does not enter decisively in tribal and like
socie~ ies, and the latter distinctively modem issue that is downplayed or neglected in nonWestem theory.
Under present political arrangements, the world is divided up, virtually ex~umiativ ly, into
) h.o..us..t/
a set of exclusive states. None of these states should be accounted green, though there are now
very ~ e green tinges to so~
of them. While none exhibit any depth of greenness, there is no
reason, theoretical or pgi\tical why some should not. M~ er deep-green arrangements can, in
principle, be ensured by political structures that are unacceptable on other grounds. More
IV/~
/,
technically, deep-greenness, however necessary, does not supply full conditions of adequacy for
satisfactory political arrangements, environmental and otherwise: for eucracy.
For any
arrangements where political control, a ~riing class for instance, proves suitably disposed can
ensure greenness of depth. Thus such, independently objectionable, arrangements as: green
v
~
(benev,ient) dictatorships, green guardit nships (in the style of an eco-Platonic Green Republic),
green foundations, and caste systems even eco-f~p cisms and eco-totalitarianisms. Many such
arrangements fall down
fnbroadly liberatarian grounds: that they do not allow agents and
creatures to govern their own lives and affairs freely. Other arrangements fail on broadly
egalitarian grounds, that they undul_y privil~ge some classes or agents at the expense of others. ';
-
<Arrangements that meet conditions of adequacy, that is that do not so fail yet are deepgreen, are called eucratic. Eucracy means satisfactory political organisation.
Green anarkism and, still more, deep-green anarkism offer important fresh political
directions and alternatives for sustained green activity, and for the wide green movement more
35
Pettit p.287.
Jo
32
generally. They are alternatives very compatible with green ideas and broad ideology, as well as
alternatives often implicitly adopted, and certainly heavily borrowed from, by greenr.· There is
0
already a symbi\ tiin relation of sorts. Green and anarchist movements can not only complement
each other substantially; in important ways they need each other, and mutual dependence.
Anarkism stands in need of a significant driving force, an active directed constituency, which the
green movement can apply (or still better, a green movement allied with other alternative forces,
such as peace and feminist movements). Conversely, green succesfD slowing or stopping
#
massive degradation of the Earth, requires very different political directions from those of the
present, or of red (state socialist) or blue (liberal capitalist) colour variations on offer, anarchoidal
directions, so it can plausible be argued. That isl can be argued, persua\ ively if inconclusively
f /s
so far, that a genuinely green future cannot be obtained under present political arrangements; for
S1.1h.sfa"'helA.:1
l<n~s'tr-C1 ,'ht?J..
example this can be argued, in several ways, from the inbuilt commitment to fairly connectional~
economic growth. Accordingly political structures n\ ed to be changed, but so that important
J~
social desiderata that have been more or less achieved over a long and often dark human history
are not lost, in particular personal liberty, democra~c procedur~, just practice; Certain types of
4Q 12:.IJU-Qf~ t
~
,\
green anarchism meet these requirements,36 A··· types, other optiorJdo not satisfactorily.
sre~,i
i:,
Arguments from genuine soerees to • dical change assume the following sort of form:
• Human impact on the Earth, on very many of its ecosystems and habitats, is excessive.
•
Impact will not be significantly reduced under prevailing dominant socio-political
arrangements, under what is called the dominant social paradigm. To the contrary, these
arrangements obligate growth, which is likely to increase, even if now with some shallow
sustainability constraints. 37
Therefore,
• Arrangements slwuld be changed
® There are more and less far-reaching ways of attempting to achieve such changes of
arrangements, from zero, conservative, through reformist, to radical,c.ulminating in total change.
® There are also more and less authoritarian and coercive ways of endeavouring to achieve such
arrangements. (At the more authoritarii n fnd thes~~i~clude green dictatorship, ecofascism, etc.)
The further detail Jargument is that these way should be anarchoid. Briefly, ~
matives to
anarchoid ways not only infringe basic social and environmental desiderata (including, for
instance, noninterfering freedom of choice of individual creatures), but they utterly lack rational
0
~
36
Th#se types encouraging relevant organisation, regulation and control-features 8f which certain sorts of
traditional anarchism stand opposed.
37
While this is substantial thesis, we shall not stop off to argue for it here. The thesis is argued elsewhere,
e.g. GE, GEF.
().II ~uc,'af~ / s
33
justification.
The detailed argument for anarchoid directions for radical .green change reveals features of
importance concerning the required character of resulting arrangements. For example, what
emerges cannot be a free-for-all for some classes of agents, such as developers. Regulation and
planning will have to be tighter, while different in character, than what now prevails in most
regions.
Accordingly a green anarkism like that to be elaborated differs in ma·or respects from most
of what has hitherto passed as anarchism. Salient differences tum around the following matters
and em~
/ h
, among others
o
regulation of social and environmental kinds.
o
social organisation and political structure, with both bottom-up and also top-down linkages and
constraints.
o
rational organisational and decision practices, including preparation and planning, to ensure
adequate outcomes.
o
reasonable objectives and planning targets, pitched at adequacy, not optimality (or other
maximizing goals).
o
pluralism of arrangements, indeed a plural pluralism, with space for a plurality of cultures and
subcultures within various of an appropriate plurality of political structures.
Such a plurality could well include structures that did not conform to matters emphasized,
not merely inadequate arrangements but adequate ones. For example, with creatures different
from the present run of humans, environmental regulation could prove substantially otiose. To be
sure, it would be hoped, though certainly not required, that arrangements were uniformly benign;
for example that, environmental circumstances permitting, they were evironmentally benign.
Correspondingly, socially, it would be hoped that arrangements aimed to conform to fairly basic
standards of ethical decency, such as
o
basic social (as well as environmental) provision.
Satisfactory arrangements would supply a subsistence floor, meeting the principle: to each
accou~ ing to basic needs. This modified comm unal principle is not confined in scope to
fr-d
~
resident humans, but includes other inhabitants.
o
a presumption of nonviolence, with violence at least not perpt trated against innocent or
/e..
uninvolved parties (including again nonhumans).
REFERENCES
\
J. Burnheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms of Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
_
J.W. Gough, The Social Contract: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
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The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
•
•
Cutting, The Economist (19 November 1988) ‘Business bribes’, The Economist, 21-24. (4
pages (2 leaves))
Journal, Raise the stakes: the Planet Drum review, no 7 S2, Spring 1983.
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
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Gardner ^^ek^Ihe_J^5 of a Philosophical Scrivener
ork: Qmll, 198^).
Quill is a branch of Wm. Morrow.
_<^i-—
/7
1
Toward an Fco/ogica/ Society
�28
when;inhis Q a'cyr-ce-i?ac /a
have been by Pierre Joseph Proudh
an anarchist
propricie ? (WAat is properry?,
ris, 1840), he described himself
be replaced b; /
because he believed that politic<d organization based on Authority sho
ement (Woodcoci t
social
economic organisation based on voluntary con
p.lll).
/
According to a rival encyclopaedia, however,
The world "anarchy" described a stateless society was for the
st time by Louis
Armand de Labort_ in his iVoreveMMS vogage^ dans /' Amer/iya^cptentr/ena/e
(1703), describing thb\Indians living in a society without state, laws, pilons, priests?
private property, in sho in anarchy" (Lehiing p.71).
A glance at the OED reveals the falsityx?f these interesting contentions [detail]^
]^rimary works
x"
Drigina/ and esposifary worEs
Secondary works^
H/s/ories and Ais/or/
o/ ideas
Textbooks
textbook anarchism, which takes a jauhdiccd-view-ofit^--
REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Heid, and C. Pollitt, New Forms o/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, 77ie Soria/ Conlraci: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/ections /rom die Prison
NoieAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment/ PAi/o^opAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcA/sm, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAeEnnctiona/ TAeory o/*Po/il/cs, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and Oh/'ecdv/ly, Oslo University Press,
Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Soc/a/ A/ternat/vcs,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
�29
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology',
Z^apgry in
ZTnvAvnnt^nta/ PAi/oyopAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990.
R.P. Wolff, Zn De/ence o/*AnarcAM?n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an Annotate BiAAograpAy o/*AnarcAtynt , Greenwood Press, 1992.
�REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system", in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms <9/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, TAe Social Contract a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/eczAms /ram tAe Prison
AoteAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Fnvironmenra/ PAdosopAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcAism, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAe Functional TAeory o/Po/itics, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and OAyectivity, Oslo University Press,
Primary works
Original and espositary worAs
Secondary works
#istories and Ais/ories o/ ideas
Textbooks
Textbook anarchism, which takes a jaundiced view of it.?
J
�Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', 5acta/ A/ternahvey,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dtycayytan Papery tn
jEnvtronmenfa/ P/w/ayapAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990, rc
R.P. Wolff, /n De/ence p/Anarc/ny/n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an AnnotareJPtbPograpAy o/AnarcAiy/n , Greenwood Press, 1992.
�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of four pages from Ritter A (1980) Anarchism : a theoretical analysis, Cambridge
University Press. (2 leaves)
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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00988
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ork: Qmll, 198^).
Quill is a branch of Wm. Morrow.
_<^i-—
/7
1
Toward an Fco/ogica/ Society
28
when;inhis Q a'cyr-ce-i?ac /a
have been by Pierre Joseph Proudh
an anarchist
propricie ? (WAat is properry?,
ris, 1840), he described himself
be replaced b; /
because he believed that politic<d organization based on Authority sho
ement (Woodcoci t
social
economic organisation based on voluntary con
p.lll).
/
According to a rival encyclopaedia, however,
The world "anarchy" described a stateless society was for the
st time by Louis
Armand de Labort_ in his iVoreveMMS vogage^ dans /' Amer/iya^cptentr/ena/e
(1703), describing thb\Indians living in a society without state, laws, pilons, priests?
private property, in sho in anarchy" (Lehiing p.71).
A glance at the OED reveals the falsityx?f these interesting contentions [detail]^
]^rimary works
x"
Drigina/ and esposifary worEs
Secondary works^
H/s/ories and Ais/or/
o/ ideas
Textbooks
textbook anarchism, which takes a jauhdiccd-view-ofit^--
REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Heid, and C. Pollitt, New Forms o/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, 77ie Soria/ Conlraci: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/ections /rom die Prison
NoieAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment/ PAi/o^opAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcA/sm, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAeEnnctiona/ TAeory o/*Po/il/cs, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and Oh/'ecdv/ly, Oslo University Press,
Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Soc/a/ A/ternat/vcs,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
29
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology',
Z^apgry in
ZTnvAvnnt^nta/ PAi/oyopAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990.
R.P. Wolff, Zn De/ence o/*AnarcAM?n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an Annotate BiAAograpAy o/*AnarcAtynt , Greenwood Press, 1992.
REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system", in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms <9/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, TAe Social Contract a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/eczAms /ram tAe Prison
AoteAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Fnvironmenra/ PAdosopAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcAism, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAe Functional TAeory o/Po/itics, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and OAyectivity, Oslo University Press,
Primary works
Original and espositary worAs
Secondary works
#istories and Ais/ories o/ ideas
Textbooks
Textbook anarchism, which takes a jaundiced view of it.?
J
Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', 5acta/ A/ternahvey,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dtycayytan Papery tn
jEnvtronmenfa/ P/w/ayapAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990, rc
R.P. Wolff, /n De/ence p/Anarc/ny/n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an AnnotareJPtbPograpAy o/AnarcAiy/n , Greenwood Press, 1992.
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of four pages from Ritter A (1980) Anarchism : a theoretical analysis, Cambridge
University Press. (2 leaves)
J(Z( b
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Dublin Core
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Box 13, item 986: Notes and cuttings on residue of anarchism
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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Typescript and handwritten chapters. Includes photocopy of pages from Ritter A (1980) Anarchism : a theoretical analysis, Cambridge University Press. Published work redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Bundle of notes and cuttings - marked 'Residue of Anarkism file'.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4838f6129c5578fba61fb73907484c27.pdf
cdc1de9a0d69c4e1adca96862b2a9ea6
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009S8
���r
�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Typescript (photocopy) of Martin B (1993) ‘Anarchist science policy’, 1-14. (7 leaves)
Draft of article for The Raven, this version dated 19 November 1993. Published 1994, Martin B
(1994) 'Anarchist science policy', The Raven, 7(2):136-153.
2. Cuttings from The Reporter (1993, November 24), 3-6. (2 leaves)
�
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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009S8
r
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Typescript (photocopy) of Martin B (1993) ‘Anarchist science policy’, 1-14. (7 leaves)
Draft of article for The Raven, this version dated 19 November 1993. Published 1994, Martin B
(1994) 'Anarchist science policy', The Raven, 7(2):136-153.
2. Cuttings from The Reporter (1993, November 24), 3-6. (2 leaves)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
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Box 13, item 988: Notes and cuttings on green anarchism
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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Handwritten notes. Includes typescript of 'Anarchist science policy' by Brian Martin (1993), and clippings from The Reporter (1993, November 24). Works by other authors, including published works redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Bundle notes and clippings - marked 'Green Anark'.
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 13, item 988
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/f6748caa77d394f98064c95f59219565.pdf
fdad19b4223a20f4ae583cb194a94be7
PDF Text
Text
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landscape', Daedalus, 94:474–486. (1 leaf)
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BEHIND LEFT AND RIGHT:
ENVIRONMENTAL ANARCHISM.
There are forms of anarchism which represent a new political
^dimension outside the lineal left-right classification.
Of course
these forms of anarchism have features in common with rightist
positions (forms of capitalism and "free" enterprise) and with
of
leftist positions (formsXsocialism and communism) and currently
with both.
But they reject crucial features of both, and, more
to the point, assumptions upon which the classification of the
conventional right-left political spectrum is based.These are
assumptions of central control of a state, of control of the means
of production
(on the one side by private individuals and on the
other side by the people or a committee supposedly representing
them), of ownership of property (privately versus publicly) , and
overarching all these the familiar assumptions of human chauvinism
(e.g. those discussed in [1], such as that all of value resides in
humankind or answers back to human interests).
There are forms
of anarchism - especially environmental anarchisms, the working
out of the character of which is one of the main objectives - which
reject, or importantly qualify, all these assumptions.
There has been a concerted, but intellectually fradulent,
attempt by statements of both right and left to absorb anarchism
as theirs.
For example, Nozick [2] and others to the right try
to represent anarchism as fitting into their libertarian scheme.
Nozick (in his final chapter) outlines a framework for utopias, a
generous framework which would include most anarchist options;
but
1 As might be expected the right-left classification is not a single
thing, but a bundle of different, and not mutually consistent,
classifications.
In the sense in which 'right' means 'conservative
for example, in contrast to 'left' as 'non-conservative', the
dichotomy is exhaustive, but then the distinction is a different
one from that under discussion and attack. The origin of the
classification would hardly lead one to anticipate completeness.
The members of continental parliaments who sat on the right or the
left hardly exhausted the range of political positions, especially
those in opposition to such a centralised state mechanism of
cont..
�1.1
control and concentration of power.
In the end the right
left 'distinction' is to be left behind: it is only some
thing to hang an introduction on.
From a philosophical viewpoint there is hardly a more
interesting word in English than 'right' with 24 headings
in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, several of major philosophical
importance, and by no means all of the senses there are
untangled.
�2.
he goes on, without any discernible argument,to claim - what
certainly seems false
that the framework for utopias is nothing
but his minimal state.
Both this minimal state and the arguments
for it are, however, decidedly objectionable at least from
anarchist viewpoints not to the right, in particular which reject
the propertarians or chauvinistic assumptions slipped into the
bottom of Nozick's position.
(The criticism of Nozick is so far
no more than a set of memos:
it will have to be spelled out.)
The attempted take-over bid by the left is sometimes if
anything, even cruder.
Consider, for example, Guerin's argument
from meaning for his inclusion thesis that every anarchist is a
([1], p.12).
socialist
It is this:-
Anarchism is really a synonym
for socialism.
The anarchist is primarly a socialist whose aim
is to abolish the exploitation of man by man.
Anarchism is only one of the streams of socialist
thought, that stream whose main components are
concern for liberty and haste to abolish the State.
This is inconsistent:
for if anarchism is really a synonym for
then anarchism is no sub-variety of socialism,
socialism,/but identical with it.
In fact the terms are far from
synonymous, as perusal of a better dictionary would have revealed,
and neither includes the other in meaning:
that is all.
there is overlap, and
An environmental anarchist's aims extend further than
abolishing the exploitation of man by man, it also includes ending
the exploitation of other things, natural items
by man.
in particular,
This is, of course, by not the only respect in which
anarchism may differ from socialism;
for it may well reject the
collectiv-istassumptions of socialism, the public ownership of all
the means of productions, etc.
Guerin not only relies on the
synonymy claim but goes so far as to say that 'today the terms
"anarchist" and "libertarian" have become interchangeable'.
By
transitivity then, "libertarian" and "socialist" are interchangeable
so Nozick, also is a libertarian, is a socialist:
this would come
�as a surprise to Nozick.
Chomsky's argument that the consistent anarchist is a
socialist (in his Introduction to [1], p.XO) is more elaborate
and devious but equally invalid.
Chomsky's moves begin with
several appeals to authority, to the anarchist historian Rocker
(first introduced as an anarchist, and then as a socialist), to
Fischer (who simply asserted a version of the thesis in need of
defence) and to Bakunin
(who simply laid down the principle
that each member must be, to begin with, a socialist' in his
"anarchist manifesto",something which only reflects Bakunin's
narrowness, that he was only prepared to
admit
certain approved
types of anarchists to his projected revolutionary fraternity.
The appeal to authority can be no better than the arguments of the
authority, and unfortunately for Chomsky the remaining authority,
Rocker, does not deliver the arguments.
himself to modern
For a start he restricts
anarchism, thereby excluding such counter
examples to the inclusion thesis as Thoreau.
Secondly Rocker's
argument from the 'realities of capitalist economic
forms'
and the resulting 'exploitation of man by man' does not show that
'anarchism is necessarily anti-capitalist', but only that it is
opposed to the tried forms of large-scale capitalism.
Small-scale
capitalism, for example with appropriate technology, is not
ruled out thereby;
and nor are anarchist's who would incorporate
such features into their theory.
Thirdly, Rocker simply assumes
in his view that modern anarchism is the confluence of socialism
and liberalism, that it must be one or the other (it is not the
one he thinks, so by Disjunctive Syllogism, it must be the other):
but the dichotomy is a false one, as we have already seen.
�Chomsky's direct argument for his qualified**" inclusion
thesis begins thus:
Any consistent anarchist must oppose private
ownership of the means of production and the
wage-slavery which is a component of this system,
as incompatible with the principle that labor
must be freely undertaken and under the control
of the producer
(p.xiii).
Libertarian anarchists would deny this.
'The means of
production' is ambiguous as between 'some means (or methods)
of production; and 'all means of production'.
1 Need we wonder what becomes of the inconsistent anarchist?
�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Letter, Fred to Richard Sylvan re: Interested in draft paper ‘Behind left and right’ by
Sylvan. (1 leaf)
2. Photocopy of eight pages from Moore B (1972) Reflections on the causes of human
misery and upon certain proposals to eliminate them, Allen Lane. (4 leaves)
����The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Annotated photocopy of four pages from Russell B (1935) In praise of idleness and other
essays, Allen & Unwin. (2 leaves)
2. Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
�lf)f)%Racvch^ paper
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Photocopy of four pages from unidentified publication. (2 leaves)
��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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�/
cases.
.
themselves.
BIEDENKOPF IGNORED
Although the symposium was entitled
Multinationals in
Muller (American University, Washington D.C.) had thrown
few heretical thoughts into the discussion - but they were
ignored.
on trust
bevond question", said Biedenkopf,
"that in the new economic order? which is characterized above
all by confrontation ^tween industrial ^ates^an^_^ey^^^„
countries, the role of private prope^ y
<ri ^i-,a T-d^rivitv of the concept of property
Biedenkopf compared the relati
y
German industry,
with that of patent Paction. As long a=,ue
in the last century, lagged
J?^fa Q^y ^hen German
consistently against paten
j_ ^<g Bismarck became an
industry had caught up with England s,
advocate of patent protection.
Biedenkopf said that claims to
^gyg^iimited in time;
than patent claims, since P^^^J^^tess
"Should the
holdi^g^of^private ^stments in developing countries^not^
allow the most important industrial and
be in foreign hands.
�WHAT IS THE " BERNE DECLARATION "
"Berne Declaration":
development policy.
theologians.
original name of a manifesto on Swiss
Published in 1968 on the initiative of some
The Declaration was signed by over 10,000 persons, who thus
made a financial and political commitment (e.g. to giving
up 1-3%'oftheir income to development aid for three years).
An organisation sprung from it which combines information
on the relationship between Switzerland and the Third World
with social and political action:
e.g. coffee campaign, meat renunciation campaign, evaluation
of school materials and children's books, campaign against arms
exports, etc.
No fund raising for projects abroad, financially independent and
not linked to any political party.
Membership:
Over 10,000 signatories of the original Declaration,
including about 1,200 members of the Association "For Development
in Solidarity".
For further reading on this topic we recommend:
Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller.
Global Reach:
The Power of the Multinational Corporations
Published by Simon & Schuster, New York 1974 (US$ 11.95)
�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
2. Letter, [?], Philosophy Department, University of Queensland to Richard, 2 Jul 1993 re
update on review of the Word Society and Kaldor tax. (1 leaf)
�,,
Democracy within
ANARCHY,
and
'
.--7 '^;' '2
DEMANARCHY
Present electoral arrangements offer what? What presently have is a competative game
between competating blocks of the ruling elite (with professional power-brokers who trade with
each other their patronage and cites/br the acclaimed right to govern.
Thus elections hardly represent a genuine expression of agreement by the populace to be
governed; rather they are occasions when the populace is duped into supporting one or other
elite team.
For the most part power is concentrated in organisations which are not elected not
controlled by the people effected by their contractions and not representative.
By and large, satisfactory democratic arrangements will not be participatory (see
Burnheim).
are valuable for limited purposes, viz. as/a//
. satisfactory in general (p.91). There is no need to dissent.
B argues that they are not
1. Encourage those without interest in, or not genuinely affected by issue not to vote.
2. only structural, not material issu^to refs. Certainly not material moral issues, for
instance, not capital punishment, not abortion.
has the wrong etymology and the wrong meaning for anarchist purposes. It
the office of a demarch [a president, chief magistrate, major or govemnorj; a popular
government. The municipal body of a modem Greek commune' (OED). Anarchism recognises
no chiefs or leaders, even democratic ones or demogogues. What can be done very simply,
however, is to enlarge the word by a simple important syllable 'an', giving
��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Flyer, Australian National University Centre for Resource and Environment Studies Seminar,
Resource development dilemmas in Indochina by Dr Philip Hirsh, 24 Oct 1991. With
handwritten annotations. (1 leaf)
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�ism? I take
; ___
Why does democracy entai 1 anarchy and social
The
democracy to be government of the people by the people.
not
is
It
'Which people are we talking about?",
question is:
democratic,
I presume, for the people of Sydney to be deciding
'minding
whether or not Melbourne has trams. They would not be
I
assume
their own business" as we say. So for these reasons
by
affected
that the people are those people who are primarily
perhaps
the decision. OK, -some are affected more than others and
by an?/
everyone is affected a little bit, albeit unnoticeably,
or if you like
So that"s why I say 'primarily'
decision,
There will be difficulty in many cases in knowing
'mostly".
the
someone is affected sufficently to get into
whether
By and
electorate, but we needn"t get too up tight about that.
large people will be the best judge of that themselves.
Now if society operated in some such way, there could be no
laws in the common sense of 'law". For a law is a decision to the
effect that everyone of a certain type will be constrained to
behave in a certain fashion. But the people who are primarily
affected by the people of that type being constrained in that way
will vary from time to time, so that, in a democracy, such a law
could be deemed to be operative only for as long as the people
primarily affected by it (a) remained the same and (b) had no
wish to change their behaviour - and that, for anything a lawyer
would call a law would be to all intents and purposes no time! at
Dead
all.
Hence the truly democratic society will be lawless,
people are no longer affected by social decisions they helped to
make.
So any such social decisions must be remade by the new
electorate.
/
y
/
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k<
i -
Similarly, democracy entails socialism, where by socialism I
mean the public control of the means of production, distribution
Producing, distributing and exchanging are all
and exchange.
acts, which, if made democratically, are made publicly - by those
Those
members of the public that are primarily affected.
primarily affected will be those who are required to do the work,
those who receive the goods or services produced, and those who
e.g.
suffer the negative effects of the industrial decision,
deprivation of wealth or income, unemployment or pollution.
Democracy does not entail optimum freedom, if that means
optimum satisfaction. However, on the assumption that people will
want to maximise their satisfaction, they should prefer optimally
satisfying decision procedures in the democratic decision making
processes. Given that they are rational in this regard, they will
therefore opt for rational conflict resolution procedures rather
than merely counting heads, hands or ballot papers.
I take it that you don"t need counterexamples to show the
invalidity of arguing from anarchy or socialism to democracy.
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Affairs publication. Article 'The church in a liberal society' has handwritten annotations. (1 leaf)
��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated photocopy of six pages from MacIntyre A (1988) Whose justice? Which rationality?,
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CHARACTERISING ANARCHISM: reaching the core of anarchism
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���The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
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Australian Society, 32-33. (2 leaves)
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CP-228-81 GTO
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------------------------
�The present situation can be summarised in terms of certainties
and uncertainties.
The certainties are:
There are limits to the absorptive capacity (of technological
waste products and toxic substances), resilience, and
adaptability of biological systems - a principle which
applies as much to the biosphere as a whole as it does
to local ecosystems and to individual organisms.
1.
,______________________rin
2.
The present pattern of increasing per capita
resources, discharge of technological wastes and use of
J__ 2.3 is
ecologically unsustainable:
energy in human ___
society
if it is 1not
-- brought under control through' deliberate
-- as
— a
societal action, it will come to an end either
consequence of depletion of mineral resources or, more
nf
seriously, as the result of irreversible damage to the
biosphere caused by technological waste products.
The uncertainties are:
1 How much longer the biosphere can continue to P^^ *
suitable habitat tor humanity given the present pattern of
industrial productivity.
Which particular culturally-induced environmental changes
2.
represent the greatest threat to the integrity o the
biosphere.
Which cultural phenomena are the most critical m causing
undesirable change in the biosphere .
3.
t
For example, social goals, patterns of investment, favoured
technologies, modes of decision-making, loci of power J
�use of machines powered by extrasomatic energy (e.g. fossil
fuels). As a consequence of these developments, the ecological
impact of the human species (as expressed in terms of energy use)
is now about 15,000 times greater than it was at the time of the
domestic transition.
98 percent of this increase has occurred
since 1800 AD, and 80 percent in the last 50 years.
It is certain that the biosphere, as a dynamic system capable of
supporting the human species, will not be able to tolerate this
continuing intensification of technometabolism (i.e. use of
energy and resources and discharge of technological wastes by the
human population) indefinitely.
.
* . -t
ecologically sustainable.
*
Phase Four human society is not
�/^e^/ dyx-^7
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If humans are to continue to exist in the biosphere, they must
devise a nee societal system (or systems) , such that their needs
can be satisfied with a more modest rate of resource and energy
use than that which at present prevails in the high-energy
societies.
Certain essential characteristics, or biosocral imperatives of
^t^-new societal system are clear .
.
rhe additional ecological load now imposed
on the biosphere by human society is, in energy terms, equivalent
to about 5 percent of the total ecological load imposed by all
other animals and plants put together.
If the technometabolism
of human society as a whole continues to intensify at the same
rate as it has over the past 20 years, by the year 2100 human
beings will be using as much energy, and consequently having as
much impact on the biosphere, as all other existing forms of
life. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the biosphere would be
able to tolerate this eventuality.
Moreover, many authors are of
the opinion that the biosphere would not be able to withstand an
intensification of technometabolism in the developing countries
of the world such that it reached the present level of intensity
characteristic of the modern high-energy societies^-J:t^t^is, 5
times the present global level of technometabolism)Indeed,-^
7^533= *=^ady mentionetA i
is clear that the biosphere will not be
able to tolerate indefinitely even the present pattern of
technometabolism.
�Four important biosocial imperatives can be stated as follows:
*
1.
The si2e of the Auman population must be stable.
2.
The overall rate of resource and energy use and of
technological waste production by society fi.e. the intensity
of technometabolism? must be steady for decreasing?.
This
rate must be considerably lower than that characteristic of
the high-energy societies at the present time.
3.
The organisation of society and the economic system must be
such that human health, well-being and enjoyment of life do
not depend on continually increasing per capita use of
resources and energy and production of technological wastes.
4.
The organisation of society and the economic system must be
such that high rates of employment* are not dependent on
increasing consumption of the products of resource—intensive
anc? ener^ry-in tensive industry.
distribution of natural resources, should be an essential aim of
society at both regional and global levels.
Moreover, it is also
assumed that all societal activities that threaten the integrity
of the biosphere must cease — including the manufacture, storage
and deployment of nuclear weapons.
It is self-evident that these biosocial imperatives raise some
important questions about the future of human society.
The FQP
is based on the view that consideration of these questions is an
urgent matter, and that serious thought should now be given to
the design of a new society which, for an indefinite period,
satisfies the health and well-being needs both of the biosphere^-
*
**
The actual size of this sustainable stable population will
depend on its pattern of resource and energy use. The higher
the intensity of technometabolism, the smaller the
sustainable human population.
For the purposes of this Program, 25 percent of the present
per capita intensity of technometabolism in the high-energy
societies will be taken initially as a reasonable societal
objective.
*** The word employment is used here in a broad sense to include
all direct or indirect subsistence activities that are
associated with a sense of personal involvement and purpose.
(Indirect subsistence activities are those which are aimed at
providing subsistence but which do not involve the direct
acquisition of food from its place of origin. Working for
wages with which to procure food and shelter is thus an
indirect subsistence activity).
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Annotated photocopy of six pages from Bahro R (1982) Socialism and survival : (articles, essays,
and talks, 1979-1982), Heretic Books. (3 leaves)
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��WORLD ORDER, CULTURAL CONVERGENCE
AND REGIONAL CULTURAL AUTONOMY
The success of Australia's relations with the Pacific Island States
will be based upon the practical and sustained recognition that no one
culture is basically superior to another, -that each and every
[traditional]
culture, together with its social, polLtical and
economic ingredients, have a measuring and value
...
that our new
found freedoms [and independence] were fought so that to a significant
degree a renaissance of Melanesian values, principles and expectations
can take place (Lini, p.ll and p.6).
World order with regional cultural autonomy is a highly desirable goal.
It
is an objective not only of political leaders such as Lini but also of ambitious
proposals such as Mazrui's world federation of cultures J But there is
evidence
that, despite its prime facte plausibility and appeal, it is an impossible goal.
There are various routes to this most unwelcome conclusion.
Mazrui admits that tris 'approach
Consider first Mazrui's cultural paradox.
to
appears
have
But it is worse than that:
contradictory aims' (M p.9).
approach is contradictory, almost as it stands, and Mazrui
way out.
to
the
next premiss:
calculations.
reform
as
a
problem of building up
on
'To get mankind to agree to a new world system [one with
social
reasoning
and
Consensus behind three or four values will need consensus
behind many more supporting values and perspectives.
world
clear
In Mazrui's terms, which leal
order], we need to give mankind that shared framework of
social
no
The argument proceeds as follows:
World order implies a certain consensus.
Pl.
indicates
the
problem
of
supporting
mobilizing
values;
...
consensus;
and
we
see
In
summary,
w*
s <e
we see consensus as a
this
latter
as
an
outgrowth of cultural convergence' (M p.l).
P2.
Such consensus implies [substantial]
cultural
convergence.
In
Mazrui's
'World order...': as mentioned before, I think you should take into account
the world order writings of people such as Richard Falk (A Study of Future Worlds,
etc.) and Johan Galtung (The True Worlds, etc.).
�'Consensus
formulation,
behind much-needed world reforms is impossible without
substantial cultural convergence on a global scale' (M p.9).
[Substantial]
P3.
Mazrul's
cultural
formulation:
'the
convergence
In
which the world has so far
convergence
cultural
dependence.
cultural
implies
attained carries with it the evil of dependency'.
P4.
Cultural dependence is incompatible with regional cultural autonomy.
Hence, by P1-P4, world order is incompatible with
and
world order with such regional autonomy is impossible.
hence
is valid, but some of the premisses can
of P2 with Pl.
produce
cultural
regional
be
certainly
shaken,
autonomy,
The argument
the
especially
Even so, no matter how hard they are shaken the problem
cannot be entirely removed.
*****
There is no general solution to the
cultural
regional
This
autonomy.
problem
result
of
world
order
maintaining
is an application of a generalised
Arrow's Theorem.in the application, world options or courses-of-action are the
regional cultures are the factors.
and
alternatives,
Then the factor rankings
are different cultural rankings of the world options.
that
is
there
no
dominant
culture,
no
cultural dictator.
conditions can be assumed satisfied, or satisfied by
result
Regional autonomy implies
Since the other
adjustments 3,
the
dismal
given that world order it taken to require overall rankings of
follows,
world options.
Although a general solution is impossible, a solution
possible
confront.
however
for
all
the
choices
world
a
federation
Given the environmental and economic
that
seems
increasingly
unlikely:
choices
more
may
be
nonetheless
cultures ever has to
of
that
and
are
more,
being
made
because
environmental dependence, choices made by one culture spill over into others.
2
of
�The resolutions hitherto have primarily been
cultural
assimilation.
the
And
by
cultural
arsenal of defences, ranging from explicit claims of cultural
claims
through
down
superiority
of democratic cultural adjustment .(tribal voting with the feet)
tn the face of technological superiority and improved "standards of living"
least
registered
as
imported
by
e.g.
relatively easy to shatter;
dominant
culture
ranked
highly,
concerning local environments);
etc.
economics).
the
of
Many
superiority
is
these
only
(at
defences are
in
the
things
not in other matters (such as discrimination
the improved "standards of living" often enough
from leisurely lives of primitive affluence to "wage slaves",
people
converted
and
been backed up by
has
domination
cultural
domination
Some of the evangelical defences are harder to break.
While it is easy in
hindsight to see that there was little justification for imposing religions like
various forms of Christianity in the way they were imposed on other
gentler
or
militarily weaker cultures, the same is not seen in regard to ideologies such as
positivistic science of mainstream economics.
Perhaps most
more
that
dangerous
than
pretentious
the
idea
main Western culture is the
guardian of the truth, is the idea that it has a special
Rationality
is
tool
a
all,
of
dangerous
hold
on
rationality.
that can be applied to justify convergence to orthodox
Western norms.
A world federation of cultures - an Integrated world culture, so almost
to
say - appears to afford a viable alternative to world government, as a source of
world order in particular.
firstly,
it
is
a
what
'we
it
less remote prospect:
than we were a century ago;
Secondly,
Moreover,
should
is
preferable
alternative,
-'we are no nearer a world government
but we are much nearer to world culture'
be
since,
(t
p.2).
aiming for are internalised controls [those of
�culture], based on new human inclinations,
rather
organisational mechanisms [government]' (M p.2).
than
external
not.
governmental,
typically
by
Thirdly, cultural controls and
liaisons permit flexibility, regional autonomy, and so on,
rigid
controls
in
ways
that
more
authoritive and externally imposed, controls do
There is evidence, furthermore, from a
range
of
indigenous
cultures
-
Melanesian cultures are ]ust one group of examples - that culture can substitute
Hie vision of a well-ordered
for government.
cultures
government
without
it
anarchists;
especially
is
goes
of
federation
back,
of
course,
prominent
in
the
organisations
to
the
century
and
of
convergence
to
Bakunin
of
work
19th
or
Kroprotkin.
To make the vision work does not however require
the
Mazrui
extent
imagines;
it
does not require a single shared culture
essence, a single characterising feature
is wanted
in
the
rope
strands [the regional cultures
need
as
sought
where a family resemblance is what
A model for a world federation is given Wittgenstein s rope picture.
strands
Various
erroneously
Mazrui has
shared cultural universe, or one world culture
an
cultura1
overlap and criss-cross
It is this overlap of
that give the rope its strength
usually does, run through the length of the rope.
But no
strand
So similarly there
need be no shared or common culture for a world federation, or rope, of culttires
to have strength, and to ensure thereby world order.
regional cultures overlap one another suitably.
it
will
not
follow
that
It is enough that adjacent
Nor is overlap transitive;
there must be something shared.
so
This rope model of
cultures may be alternatively described in other family ways , e.g
in terms
of
a network of cultures.
FOOTNOTES
1.
For these objectives see Mazrui's Introduction, p.l ff. Here as elsewhere in
text, author's names double as references.
�2.
On the generalisation see Routley.
3.
For methods of adjustment, e.g. completing rankings, see again Routley.
REFERENCES
O. Lint, 'Keynote Address', Australia and the South Pacific,
Proceedings on a
Conference
held
at the Australian National University, Centre for
Continuing Education, Canberra, 1982.
A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press,
New York" 1*976. All page references prefixed M are to this work.
R. Routley, 'On the impossibility of an orthodox social theory and of an
orthodox solution to environmental problems', Logique et Analyse 23 (1980)
145-166.
K. Lehrer and C. Wagner, Rational consensus
Rolland, 1981.
Science
in
and
Society,
Re Idel,
1. It is widely assumed that cultural convergence is a good thing, to
NOTES
promoted.
This
is the operational assumption in Lehrer and Wanner, who want to
see the conditions for
everywhere
their
(fortunately,
fail for important real
excessive
be
cultural
Markov
convergence
theorem
applying
virtually
of course, the conditions are pretty restrictive, and
life
cases).
convergence
is
There
not
are
good
reasons
for
thinking
a good thing. Certainly some cases of
convergence are undecidable.
Experimental testing of convergence (Defi groups) showed that
when
convergence,
occurred, tended to confirm the status quo. Methods of convergence are
it
essentially conservative. Both locally and on a larger scene such methods can be
damaging,
in several respects. They undercut the perhaps otherwise positions of
minorities. And they can reinforce the posltLon of dangerous power triggers.
Consider what would happen - what appears to be happening -
scene
the
world
where we have, in some measure, "enforced convergence". What we would be
headed for - what we are headed for ts imposition
western
in
paradigm,
with
its
economism,
5
everywhere
violence
of
and
the
dominant
environmental
�* "
destructiveness. Lower cultures are progressively undermined.
buddhism,
which
stand
opposed
to
main
afford just one conspicuous example. (The
useful
working
example.)
Buddhism
is
Those
practicing
directions of the dominant paradigm,
American
right
out
impact
of-
on
step
Thailand
with
is
a
economism,
encouraging as it does removal of consumerist ambitions, and it is dianetrically
opposed
to
violence and like destructive practices. (Thus to pull Buddhism out
of the educational curriculum, as in the fairly recent American-inspired,
constitution,
their
is not the enlightened step it is usually seen as: to be sure, it
is "progressive" enough, but in a direction more of us should not be headed.)
2. Total consensus represents a limit of convergence. Consensus also
its serious limitations then.
6
has
�WORLD ORDER, CULTURAL CONVERGENCE
AND REGIONAL CULTURAL AUTONOMY
The success of Australia's relations with the Pacific Island States
will be based upon the practical and sustained recognition that no one
culture is basically superior to another, that each and every
[traditional]
culture, together with its social, political and
economic ingredients, have a measuring and value ...
that our new
found freedoms [and independence] were fought so that to a significant
degree a renaissance of Melanesian values, principles and expectations
can take place (Lini, p.ll and p.6).
World order with regional cultural autonomy is a highly desirable goal.
It
is an objective not only of political leaders such as Lini but also of ambitious
proposals such as Mazrui's world federation of cultures.But there is
evidence
that, despite its prima facie plausibility and appeal, it is an impossible goal.
There are various routes to this most unwelcome conclusion.
Consider first Mazrui's cultural paradox.
appears
to
have
Mazrui admits that his 'approach
But it is worse than that:
contradictory aims' (M p.9).
approach is contradictory, almost as it stands, and Mazrui
way out.
to
the
next premiss:
calculations.
reform
as
a
problem of building up
on
'To get mankind to agree to a new world system [one with
social
reasoning
and
Consensus behind three or four values will need consensus
behind many more supporting values and perspectives.
world
clear
In Mazrui's terms, which lead
order], we need to give mankind that shared framework of
social
no
The argument proceeds as follows:
World order implies a certain consensus.
Pl.
indicates
the
problem
of
supporting
mobilizing
values;
...
consensus;
and
we
see
In
summary,
we
see
we see consensus as a
this
latter
as
an
outgrowth of cultural convergence' (M p.l).
P2.
Such consensus implies [substantial]
cultural
convergence.
In
Mazrui's
�formulation,
'Consensus
behind much-needed world reforms is impossible without
substantial cultural convergence on a global scale' (M p.9).
[Substantial]
P3.
cultural
formulation:
Mazrui's
'the
implies
convergence
cultural
dependence.
cultural
In
which the world has so far
convergence
attained carries with it the evil of dependency'.
P4.
Cultural dependence is incompatible with regional cultural autonomy.
Hence, by P1-P4, world order is incompatible with
and
cultural
world order with such regional autonomy is impossible.
hence
is valid, but some of the premisses can
of P2 with Pl.
produce
regional
certainly
shaken,
be
autonomy,
The argument
especially
the
Even so, no matter how hard they are shaken the problem
cannot be entirely removed.
*****
problem
There is no general solution to the
regional
This
autonomy.
cultural
result
of
order
world
maintaining
is an application of a generalised
Arrow's Theorem.in the application, world options or courses-of-action are the
alternatives,
regional cultures are the factors.
and
Then the factor rankings
are different cultural rankings of the world options.
that
is
there
no
dominant
culture,
no
cultural dictator.
conditions can be assumed satisfied, or satisfied by
result
Regional autonomy implies
Since the other
adjustments 3,
the
dismal
given that world order it taken to require overall rankings of
follows,
world options.
Although a general solution is impossible, a solution
possible
confront.
however
for
all
the
choices
world
a
federation
Given the environmental and economic
that
seems
increasingly
unlikely:
choices
more
may
be
nonetheless
cultures ever has to
of
that
and
are
more,
being
made
because
environmental dependence, choices made by one culture spill over into others.
2
of
�The resolutions hitherto have primarily been
cultural
the
And
assimilation.
cultural
by
cultural
arsenal of defences, ranging from explicit claims of cultural
claims
through
down
superiority
of democratic cultural adjustment (tribal voting with the feet)
in the face of technological superiority and improved "standards of living"
least
registered
as
ranked
culture
e.g.
people
converted
etc.
the
superiority
of
is
these
only
(at
defences are
in
things
the
not in other matters (such as discrimination
highly,
concerning local environments);
Many
economics).
imported
by
relatively easy to shatter;
dominant
and
been backed up by
has
domination
domination
the improved "standards of living" often enough
from leisurely lives of primitive affluence to "wage slaves",
Some of the evangelical defences are harder to break.
While it is easy in
hindsight to see that there was little justification for imposing religions like
various forms of Christianity in the way they were imposed on other
gentler
or
militarily weaker cultures, the same is not seen in regard to ideologies such as
positivistic science of mainstream economics.
more
dangerous
than
pretentious
the
idea
Perhaps most
that
is
tool
a
all,
main Western culture is the
guardian of the truth, is the idea that it has a special
Rationality
of
dangerous
hold
on
rationality.
that can be applied to justify convergence to orthodox
Western norms.
A world federation of cultures - an integrated world culture, so almost
to
say - appears to afford a viable alternative to world government, as a source of
world order in particular.
firstly,
it
is
a
what
'we
it
less remote prospect:
than we were a century ago;
Secondly,
Moreover,
should
is
preferable
alternative,
'we are no nearer a world government
but we are much nearer to world culture'
be
since,
(M
p.2).
aiming for are internalised controls [those of
3
�culture], based on new human inclinations,
than
rather
organisational mechanisms [government]' (M p.2).
typically
governmental,
in
ways
more
that
authoritive and externally imposed, controls do
There is evidence, furthermore, from a
not.
by
Thirdly, cultural controls and
liaisons permit flexibility, regional autonomy, and so on,
rigid
controls
external
range
of
indigenous
cultures
-
Melanesian cultures are just one group of examples — that culture can substitute
The vision of a well-ordered
for government.
government
without
cultures
it
anarchists;
especially
is
back,
of
course,
prominent
in
the
goes
organisations
of
federation
the
to
century
and
of
convergence
to
Bakunin
of
work
19th
or
Kroprotkin.
To make the vision work does not however require
Mazrui
extent
the
imagines;
does not require a single shared culture , a
it
shared cultural universe, or one world culture.
an
cultural
erroneously
Mazrui has
sought
essence, a single characterising feature, where a family resemblance is what
is wanted.
Various
A model for a world federation is given Wittgenstein's rope picture.
strands
in
the
rope
overlap and criss-cross.
It is this overlap of
strands [the regional cultures] that give the rope its strength.
need,
as
usually does, run through the length of the rope.
But no
strand
So similarly there
need be no shared or common culture for a world federation, or rope, of cultures
to have strength, and to ensure thereby world order.
regional cultures overlap one another suitably.
it
will
not
follow
that
It is enough that adjacent
Nor is overlap transitive;
there must be something shared.
so
This rope model of
cultures may be alternatively described in other family ways, e.g.
in terms
of
a network of cultures.
FOOTNOTES
1.
For these objectives see Mazrui's Introduction, p.l ff. Here as elsewhere in
text, author's names double as references.
4
�2.
On the generalisation see Routley.
3.
For methods of adjustment, e.g. completing rankings, see again Routley.
REFERENCES
W. Lini, 'Keynote Address', Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings on a
Conference
held
at the Australian National University, Centre for
Continuing Education, Canberra, 1982.
A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press,
New York, 1976. All page references prefixed M are to this work.
R. Routley, 'On the impossibility of an orthodox social theory and of an
orthodox solution to environmental problems', Logique et Analyse 23 (1980)
145-166.
K. Lehrer and C. Wagner, Rational consensus
in
Science
and
Society,
Reidel,
Holland, 1981.
1. It is widely assumed that cultural convergence is a good thing, to
NOTES
promoted.
This
is the operational assumption in Lehrer and Wagner, who want to
see the conditions for
everywhere
their
(fortunately,
fail for important real
excessive
be
cultural
Markov
convergence
theorem
applying
virtually
of course, the conditions are pretty restrictive, and
life
cases).
convergence
is
There
not
are
good
reasons
for
thinking
a good thing. Certainly some cases of
convergence are undecidable.
Experimental testing of convergence (Defi groups) showed that
occurred, tended to confirm the status quo. Methods of convergence are
it
when
convergence,
essentially conservative. Both locally and on a larger scene such methods can be
damaging,
in several respects. They undercut the perhaps otherwise positions of
minorities. And they can reinforce the position of dangerous power triggers.
Consider what would happen - what appears to be happening -
scene,
the
world
where we have, in some measure, "enforced convergence". What we would be
headed for - what we are headed for is imposition
western
in
paradigm,
with
its
economism,
5
everywhere
violence
of
and
the
dominant
environmental
�destructiveness. Lower cultures are progressively undermined.
which
Buddhism,
stand
opposed
to
main
afford just one conspicuous example. (The
useful
working
example.)
Buddhism
is
Those
practicing
directions of the dominant paradigm,
American
right
out
impact
of
on
step
Thailand
with
is
a
economism,
encouraging as it does removal of consumerist ambitions, and it is dianetrically
opposed
to
violence and like destructive practices. (Thus to pull Buddhism out
of the educational curriculum, as in the fairly recent American-inspired,
constitution,
their
is not the enlightened step it is usually seen as: to be sure, it
is "progressive" enough, but in a direction more of us should not be headed.)
2. Total consensus represents a limit of convergence. Consensus also
its serious limitations then
has
��
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated cutting (photocopy) of two pages from Sears PB (1965) 'Utopia and the living
landscape', Daedalus, 94:474–486. (1 leaf)
Z^7b
r.
,
x^L.
BEHIND LEFT AND RIGHT:
ENVIRONMENTAL ANARCHISM.
There are forms of anarchism which represent a new political
^dimension outside the lineal left-right classification.
Of course
these forms of anarchism have features in common with rightist
positions (forms of capitalism and "free" enterprise) and with
of
leftist positions (formsXsocialism and communism) and currently
with both.
But they reject crucial features of both, and, more
to the point, assumptions upon which the classification of the
conventional right-left political spectrum is based.These are
assumptions of central control of a state, of control of the means
of production
(on the one side by private individuals and on the
other side by the people or a committee supposedly representing
them), of ownership of property (privately versus publicly) , and
overarching all these the familiar assumptions of human chauvinism
(e.g. those discussed in [1], such as that all of value resides in
humankind or answers back to human interests).
There are forms
of anarchism - especially environmental anarchisms, the working
out of the character of which is one of the main objectives - which
reject, or importantly qualify, all these assumptions.
There has been a concerted, but intellectually fradulent,
attempt by statements of both right and left to absorb anarchism
as theirs.
For example, Nozick [2] and others to the right try
to represent anarchism as fitting into their libertarian scheme.
Nozick (in his final chapter) outlines a framework for utopias, a
generous framework which would include most anarchist options;
but
1 As might be expected the right-left classification is not a single
thing, but a bundle of different, and not mutually consistent,
classifications.
In the sense in which 'right' means 'conservative
for example, in contrast to 'left' as 'non-conservative', the
dichotomy is exhaustive, but then the distinction is a different
one from that under discussion and attack. The origin of the
classification would hardly lead one to anticipate completeness.
The members of continental parliaments who sat on the right or the
left hardly exhausted the range of political positions, especially
those in opposition to such a centralised state mechanism of
cont..
1.1
control and concentration of power.
In the end the right
left 'distinction' is to be left behind: it is only some
thing to hang an introduction on.
From a philosophical viewpoint there is hardly a more
interesting word in English than 'right' with 24 headings
in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, several of major philosophical
importance, and by no means all of the senses there are
untangled.
2.
he goes on, without any discernible argument,to claim - what
certainly seems false
that the framework for utopias is nothing
but his minimal state.
Both this minimal state and the arguments
for it are, however, decidedly objectionable at least from
anarchist viewpoints not to the right, in particular which reject
the propertarians or chauvinistic assumptions slipped into the
bottom of Nozick's position.
(The criticism of Nozick is so far
no more than a set of memos:
it will have to be spelled out.)
The attempted take-over bid by the left is sometimes if
anything, even cruder.
Consider, for example, Guerin's argument
from meaning for his inclusion thesis that every anarchist is a
([1], p.12).
socialist
It is this:-
Anarchism is really a synonym
for socialism.
The anarchist is primarly a socialist whose aim
is to abolish the exploitation of man by man.
Anarchism is only one of the streams of socialist
thought, that stream whose main components are
concern for liberty and haste to abolish the State.
This is inconsistent:
for if anarchism is really a synonym for
then anarchism is no sub-variety of socialism,
socialism,/but identical with it.
In fact the terms are far from
synonymous, as perusal of a better dictionary would have revealed,
and neither includes the other in meaning:
that is all.
there is overlap, and
An environmental anarchist's aims extend further than
abolishing the exploitation of man by man, it also includes ending
the exploitation of other things, natural items
by man.
in particular,
This is, of course, by not the only respect in which
anarchism may differ from socialism;
for it may well reject the
collectiv-istassumptions of socialism, the public ownership of all
the means of productions, etc.
Guerin not only relies on the
synonymy claim but goes so far as to say that 'today the terms
"anarchist" and "libertarian" have become interchangeable'.
By
transitivity then, "libertarian" and "socialist" are interchangeable
so Nozick, also is a libertarian, is a socialist:
this would come
as a surprise to Nozick.
Chomsky's argument that the consistent anarchist is a
socialist (in his Introduction to [1], p.XO) is more elaborate
and devious but equally invalid.
Chomsky's moves begin with
several appeals to authority, to the anarchist historian Rocker
(first introduced as an anarchist, and then as a socialist), to
Fischer (who simply asserted a version of the thesis in need of
defence) and to Bakunin
(who simply laid down the principle
that each member must be, to begin with, a socialist' in his
"anarchist manifesto",something which only reflects Bakunin's
narrowness, that he was only prepared to
admit
certain approved
types of anarchists to his projected revolutionary fraternity.
The appeal to authority can be no better than the arguments of the
authority, and unfortunately for Chomsky the remaining authority,
Rocker, does not deliver the arguments.
himself to modern
For a start he restricts
anarchism, thereby excluding such counter
examples to the inclusion thesis as Thoreau.
Secondly Rocker's
argument from the 'realities of capitalist economic
forms'
and the resulting 'exploitation of man by man' does not show that
'anarchism is necessarily anti-capitalist', but only that it is
opposed to the tried forms of large-scale capitalism.
Small-scale
capitalism, for example with appropriate technology, is not
ruled out thereby;
and nor are anarchist's who would incorporate
such features into their theory.
Thirdly, Rocker simply assumes
in his view that modern anarchism is the confluence of socialism
and liberalism, that it must be one or the other (it is not the
one he thinks, so by Disjunctive Syllogism, it must be the other):
but the dichotomy is a false one, as we have already seen.
Chomsky's direct argument for his qualified**" inclusion
thesis begins thus:
Any consistent anarchist must oppose private
ownership of the means of production and the
wage-slavery which is a component of this system,
as incompatible with the principle that labor
must be freely undertaken and under the control
of the producer
(p.xiii).
Libertarian anarchists would deny this.
'The means of
production' is ambiguous as between 'some means (or methods)
of production; and 'all means of production'.
1 Need we wonder what becomes of the inconsistent anarchist?
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Letter, Fred to Richard Sylvan re: Interested in draft paper ‘Behind left and right’ by
Sylvan. (1 leaf)
2. Photocopy of eight pages from Moore B (1972) Reflections on the causes of human
misery and upon certain proposals to eliminate them, Allen Lane. (4 leaves)
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Annotated photocopy of four pages from Russell B (1935) In praise of idleness and other
essays, Allen & Unwin. (2 leaves)
2. Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
lf)f)%Racvch^ paper
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228 81
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of four pages from unidentified publication. (2 leaves)
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication by Hobbes? (1 leaf)
/
cases.
.
themselves.
BIEDENKOPF IGNORED
Although the symposium was entitled
Multinationals in
Muller (American University, Washington D.C.) had thrown
few heretical thoughts into the discussion - but they were
ignored.
on trust
bevond question", said Biedenkopf,
"that in the new economic order? which is characterized above
all by confrontation ^tween industrial ^ates^an^_^ey^^^„
countries, the role of private prope^ y
<ri ^i-,a T-d^rivitv of the concept of property
Biedenkopf compared the relati
y
German industry,
with that of patent Paction. As long a=,ue
in the last century, lagged
J?^fa Q^y ^hen German
consistently against paten
j_ ^<g Bismarck became an
industry had caught up with England s,
advocate of patent protection.
Biedenkopf said that claims to
^gyg^iimited in time;
than patent claims, since P^^^J^^tess
"Should the
holdi^g^of^private ^stments in developing countries^not^
allow the most important industrial and
be in foreign hands.
WHAT IS THE " BERNE DECLARATION "
"Berne Declaration":
development policy.
theologians.
original name of a manifesto on Swiss
Published in 1968 on the initiative of some
The Declaration was signed by over 10,000 persons, who thus
made a financial and political commitment (e.g. to giving
up 1-3%'oftheir income to development aid for three years).
An organisation sprung from it which combines information
on the relationship between Switzerland and the Third World
with social and political action:
e.g. coffee campaign, meat renunciation campaign, evaluation
of school materials and children's books, campaign against arms
exports, etc.
No fund raising for projects abroad, financially independent and
not linked to any political party.
Membership:
Over 10,000 signatories of the original Declaration,
including about 1,200 members of the Association "For Development
in Solidarity".
For further reading on this topic we recommend:
Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller.
Global Reach:
The Power of the Multinational Corporations
Published by Simon & Schuster, New York 1974 (US$ 11.95)
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
2. Letter, [?], Philosophy Department, University of Queensland to Richard, 2 Jul 1993 re
update on review of the Word Society and Kaldor tax. (1 leaf)
,,
Democracy within
ANARCHY,
and
'
.--7 '^;' '2
DEMANARCHY
Present electoral arrangements offer what? What presently have is a competative game
between competating blocks of the ruling elite (with professional power-brokers who trade with
each other their patronage and cites/br the acclaimed right to govern.
Thus elections hardly represent a genuine expression of agreement by the populace to be
governed; rather they are occasions when the populace is duped into supporting one or other
elite team.
For the most part power is concentrated in organisations which are not elected not
controlled by the people effected by their contractions and not representative.
By and large, satisfactory democratic arrangements will not be participatory (see
Burnheim).
are valuable for limited purposes, viz. as/a//
. satisfactory in general (p.91). There is no need to dissent.
B argues that they are not
1. Encourage those without interest in, or not genuinely affected by issue not to vote.
2. only structural, not material issu^to refs. Certainly not material moral issues, for
instance, not capital punishment, not abortion.
has the wrong etymology and the wrong meaning for anarchist purposes. It
the office of a demarch [a president, chief magistrate, major or govemnorj; a popular
government. The municipal body of a modem Greek commune' (OED). Anarchism recognises
no chiefs or leaders, even democratic ones or demogogues. What can be done very simply,
however, is to enlarge the word by a simple important syllable 'an', giving
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Flyer, Australian National University Centre for Resource and Environment Studies Seminar,
Resource development dilemmas in Indochina by Dr Philip Hirsh, 24 Oct 1991. With
handwritten annotations. (1 leaf)
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ism? I take
; ___
Why does democracy entai 1 anarchy and social
The
democracy to be government of the people by the people.
not
is
It
'Which people are we talking about?",
question is:
democratic,
I presume, for the people of Sydney to be deciding
'minding
whether or not Melbourne has trams. They would not be
I
assume
their own business" as we say. So for these reasons
by
affected
that the people are those people who are primarily
perhaps
the decision. OK, -some are affected more than others and
by an?/
everyone is affected a little bit, albeit unnoticeably,
or if you like
So that"s why I say 'primarily'
decision,
There will be difficulty in many cases in knowing
'mostly".
the
someone is affected sufficently to get into
whether
By and
electorate, but we needn"t get too up tight about that.
large people will be the best judge of that themselves.
Now if society operated in some such way, there could be no
laws in the common sense of 'law". For a law is a decision to the
effect that everyone of a certain type will be constrained to
behave in a certain fashion. But the people who are primarily
affected by the people of that type being constrained in that way
will vary from time to time, so that, in a democracy, such a law
could be deemed to be operative only for as long as the people
primarily affected by it (a) remained the same and (b) had no
wish to change their behaviour - and that, for anything a lawyer
would call a law would be to all intents and purposes no time! at
Dead
all.
Hence the truly democratic society will be lawless,
people are no longer affected by social decisions they helped to
make.
So any such social decisions must be remade by the new
electorate.
/
y
/
/
k<
i -
Similarly, democracy entails socialism, where by socialism I
mean the public control of the means of production, distribution
Producing, distributing and exchanging are all
and exchange.
acts, which, if made democratically, are made publicly - by those
Those
members of the public that are primarily affected.
primarily affected will be those who are required to do the work,
those who receive the goods or services produced, and those who
e.g.
suffer the negative effects of the industrial decision,
deprivation of wealth or income, unemployment or pollution.
Democracy does not entail optimum freedom, if that means
optimum satisfaction. However, on the assumption that people will
want to maximise their satisfaction, they should prefer optimally
satisfying decision procedures in the democratic decision making
processes. Given that they are rational in this regard, they will
therefore opt for rational conflict resolution procedures rather
than merely counting heads, hands or ballot papers.
I take it that you don"t need counterexamples to show the
invalidity of arguing from anarchy or socialism to democracy.
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Annotated photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
2. Annotated cutting (photocopy) of Jacobs, M (August 1989) 'Green blues in Europe',
Australian Society, 32-33. (2 leaves)
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BOOK NUMBER
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AUTHOR
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TITLE^S>
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NAME
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DEPT.
(BLOCK
LETTERS)
-------------------------------
PHONE NUMBER
IF YOU WISH DETAILS OF THIS
LOAN TO REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.
PLEASE INITIAL SPACE BELOW.
CP-228-81 GTO
... - ----
!
DATE DUE
DATE/^O 4p
'
------------------------
The present situation can be summarised in terms of certainties
and uncertainties.
The certainties are:
There are limits to the absorptive capacity (of technological
waste products and toxic substances), resilience, and
adaptability of biological systems - a principle which
applies as much to the biosphere as a whole as it does
to local ecosystems and to individual organisms.
1.
,______________________rin
2.
The present pattern of increasing per capita
resources, discharge of technological wastes and use of
J__ 2.3 is
ecologically unsustainable:
energy in human ___
society
if it is 1not
-- brought under control through' deliberate
-- as
— a
societal action, it will come to an end either
consequence of depletion of mineral resources or, more
nf
seriously, as the result of irreversible damage to the
biosphere caused by technological waste products.
The uncertainties are:
1 How much longer the biosphere can continue to P^^ *
suitable habitat tor humanity given the present pattern of
industrial productivity.
Which particular culturally-induced environmental changes
2.
represent the greatest threat to the integrity o the
biosphere.
Which cultural phenomena are the most critical m causing
undesirable change in the biosphere .
3.
t
For example, social goals, patterns of investment, favoured
technologies, modes of decision-making, loci of power J
use of machines powered by extrasomatic energy (e.g. fossil
fuels). As a consequence of these developments, the ecological
impact of the human species (as expressed in terms of energy use)
is now about 15,000 times greater than it was at the time of the
domestic transition.
98 percent of this increase has occurred
since 1800 AD, and 80 percent in the last 50 years.
It is certain that the biosphere, as a dynamic system capable of
supporting the human species, will not be able to tolerate this
continuing intensification of technometabolism (i.e. use of
energy and resources and discharge of technological wastes by the
human population) indefinitely.
.
* . -t
ecologically sustainable.
*
Phase Four human society is not
/^e^/ dyx-^7
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If humans are to continue to exist in the biosphere, they must
devise a nee societal system (or systems) , such that their needs
can be satisfied with a more modest rate of resource and energy
use than that which at present prevails in the high-energy
societies.
Certain essential characteristics, or biosocral imperatives of
^t^-new societal system are clear .
.
rhe additional ecological load now imposed
on the biosphere by human society is, in energy terms, equivalent
to about 5 percent of the total ecological load imposed by all
other animals and plants put together.
If the technometabolism
of human society as a whole continues to intensify at the same
rate as it has over the past 20 years, by the year 2100 human
beings will be using as much energy, and consequently having as
much impact on the biosphere, as all other existing forms of
life. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the biosphere would be
able to tolerate this eventuality.
Moreover, many authors are of
the opinion that the biosphere would not be able to withstand an
intensification of technometabolism in the developing countries
of the world such that it reached the present level of intensity
characteristic of the modern high-energy societies^-J:t^t^is, 5
times the present global level of technometabolism)Indeed,-^
7^533= *=^ady mentionetA i
is clear that the biosphere will not be
able to tolerate indefinitely even the present pattern of
technometabolism.
Four important biosocial imperatives can be stated as follows:
*
1.
The si2e of the Auman population must be stable.
2.
The overall rate of resource and energy use and of
technological waste production by society fi.e. the intensity
of technometabolism? must be steady for decreasing?.
This
rate must be considerably lower than that characteristic of
the high-energy societies at the present time.
3.
The organisation of society and the economic system must be
such that human health, well-being and enjoyment of life do
not depend on continually increasing per capita use of
resources and energy and production of technological wastes.
4.
The organisation of society and the economic system must be
such that high rates of employment* are not dependent on
increasing consumption of the products of resource—intensive
anc? ener^ry-in tensive industry.
distribution of natural resources, should be an essential aim of
society at both regional and global levels.
Moreover, it is also
assumed that all societal activities that threaten the integrity
of the biosphere must cease — including the manufacture, storage
and deployment of nuclear weapons.
It is self-evident that these biosocial imperatives raise some
important questions about the future of human society.
The FQP
is based on the view that consideration of these questions is an
urgent matter, and that serious thought should now be given to
the design of a new society which, for an indefinite period,
satisfies the health and well-being needs both of the biosphere^-
*
**
The actual size of this sustainable stable population will
depend on its pattern of resource and energy use. The higher
the intensity of technometabolism, the smaller the
sustainable human population.
For the purposes of this Program, 25 percent of the present
per capita intensity of technometabolism in the high-energy
societies will be taken initially as a reasonable societal
objective.
*** The word employment is used here in a broad sense to include
all direct or indirect subsistence activities that are
associated with a sense of personal involvement and purpose.
(Indirect subsistence activities are those which are aimed at
providing subsistence but which do not involve the direct
acquisition of food from its place of origin. Working for
wages with which to procure food and shelter is thus an
indirect subsistence activity).
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated photocopy of six pages from Bahro R (1982) Socialism and survival : (articles, essays,
and talks, 1979-1982), Heretic Books. (3 leaves)
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r
WORLD ORDER, CULTURAL CONVERGENCE
AND REGIONAL CULTURAL AUTONOMY
The success of Australia's relations with the Pacific Island States
will be based upon the practical and sustained recognition that no one
culture is basically superior to another, -that each and every
[traditional]
culture, together with its social, polLtical and
economic ingredients, have a measuring and value
...
that our new
found freedoms [and independence] were fought so that to a significant
degree a renaissance of Melanesian values, principles and expectations
can take place (Lini, p.ll and p.6).
World order with regional cultural autonomy is a highly desirable goal.
It
is an objective not only of political leaders such as Lini but also of ambitious
proposals such as Mazrui's world federation of cultures J But there is
evidence
that, despite its prime facte plausibility and appeal, it is an impossible goal.
There are various routes to this most unwelcome conclusion.
Mazrui admits that tris 'approach
Consider first Mazrui's cultural paradox.
to
appears
have
But it is worse than that:
contradictory aims' (M p.9).
approach is contradictory, almost as it stands, and Mazrui
way out.
to
the
next premiss:
calculations.
reform
as
a
problem of building up
on
'To get mankind to agree to a new world system [one with
social
reasoning
and
Consensus behind three or four values will need consensus
behind many more supporting values and perspectives.
world
clear
In Mazrui's terms, which leal
order], we need to give mankind that shared framework of
social
no
The argument proceeds as follows:
World order implies a certain consensus.
Pl.
indicates
the
problem
of
supporting
mobilizing
values;
...
consensus;
and
we
see
In
summary,
w*
s <e
we see consensus as a
this
latter
as
an
outgrowth of cultural convergence' (M p.l).
P2.
Such consensus implies [substantial]
cultural
convergence.
In
Mazrui's
'World order...': as mentioned before, I think you should take into account
the world order writings of people such as Richard Falk (A Study of Future Worlds,
etc.) and Johan Galtung (The True Worlds, etc.).
'Consensus
formulation,
behind much-needed world reforms is impossible without
substantial cultural convergence on a global scale' (M p.9).
[Substantial]
P3.
Mazrul's
cultural
formulation:
'the
convergence
In
which the world has so far
convergence
cultural
dependence.
cultural
implies
attained carries with it the evil of dependency'.
P4.
Cultural dependence is incompatible with regional cultural autonomy.
Hence, by P1-P4, world order is incompatible with
and
world order with such regional autonomy is impossible.
hence
is valid, but some of the premisses can
of P2 with Pl.
produce
cultural
regional
be
certainly
shaken,
autonomy,
The argument
the
especially
Even so, no matter how hard they are shaken the problem
cannot be entirely removed.
*****
There is no general solution to the
cultural
regional
This
autonomy.
problem
result
of
world
order
maintaining
is an application of a generalised
Arrow's Theorem.in the application, world options or courses-of-action are the
regional cultures are the factors.
and
alternatives,
Then the factor rankings
are different cultural rankings of the world options.
that
is
there
no
dominant
culture,
no
cultural dictator.
conditions can be assumed satisfied, or satisfied by
result
Regional autonomy implies
Since the other
adjustments 3,
the
dismal
given that world order it taken to require overall rankings of
follows,
world options.
Although a general solution is impossible, a solution
possible
confront.
however
for
all
the
choices
world
a
federation
Given the environmental and economic
that
seems
increasingly
unlikely:
choices
more
may
be
nonetheless
cultures ever has to
of
that
and
are
more,
being
made
because
environmental dependence, choices made by one culture spill over into others.
2
of
The resolutions hitherto have primarily been
cultural
assimilation.
the
And
by
cultural
arsenal of defences, ranging from explicit claims of cultural
claims
through
down
superiority
of democratic cultural adjustment .(tribal voting with the feet)
tn the face of technological superiority and improved "standards of living"
least
registered
as
imported
by
e.g.
relatively easy to shatter;
dominant
culture
ranked
highly,
concerning local environments);
etc.
economics).
the
of
Many
superiority
is
these
only
(at
defences are
in
the
things
not in other matters (such as discrimination
the improved "standards of living" often enough
from leisurely lives of primitive affluence to "wage slaves",
people
converted
and
been backed up by
has
domination
cultural
domination
Some of the evangelical defences are harder to break.
While it is easy in
hindsight to see that there was little justification for imposing religions like
various forms of Christianity in the way they were imposed on other
gentler
or
militarily weaker cultures, the same is not seen in regard to ideologies such as
positivistic science of mainstream economics.
Perhaps most
more
that
dangerous
than
pretentious
the
idea
main Western culture is the
guardian of the truth, is the idea that it has a special
Rationality
is
tool
a
all,
of
dangerous
hold
on
rationality.
that can be applied to justify convergence to orthodox
Western norms.
A world federation of cultures - an Integrated world culture, so almost
to
say - appears to afford a viable alternative to world government, as a source of
world order in particular.
firstly,
it
is
a
what
'we
it
less remote prospect:
than we were a century ago;
Secondly,
Moreover,
should
is
preferable
alternative,
-'we are no nearer a world government
but we are much nearer to world culture'
be
since,
(t
p.2).
aiming for are internalised controls [those of
culture], based on new human inclinations,
rather
organisational mechanisms [government]' (M p.2).
than
external
not.
governmental,
typically
by
Thirdly, cultural controls and
liaisons permit flexibility, regional autonomy, and so on,
rigid
controls
in
ways
that
more
authoritive and externally imposed, controls do
There is evidence, furthermore, from a
range
of
indigenous
cultures
-
Melanesian cultures are ]ust one group of examples - that culture can substitute
Hie vision of a well-ordered
for government.
cultures
government
without
it
anarchists;
especially
is
goes
of
federation
back,
of
course,
prominent
in
the
organisations
to
the
century
and
of
convergence
to
Bakunin
of
work
19th
or
Kroprotkin.
To make the vision work does not however require
the
Mazrui
extent
imagines;
it
does not require a single shared culture
essence, a single characterising feature
is wanted
in
the
rope
strands [the regional cultures
need
as
sought
where a family resemblance is what
A model for a world federation is given Wittgenstein s rope picture.
strands
Various
erroneously
Mazrui has
shared cultural universe, or one world culture
an
cultura1
overlap and criss-cross
It is this overlap of
that give the rope its strength
usually does, run through the length of the rope.
But no
strand
So similarly there
need be no shared or common culture for a world federation, or rope, of culttires
to have strength, and to ensure thereby world order.
regional cultures overlap one another suitably.
it
will
not
follow
that
It is enough that adjacent
Nor is overlap transitive;
there must be something shared.
so
This rope model of
cultures may be alternatively described in other family ways , e.g
in terms
of
a network of cultures.
FOOTNOTES
1.
For these objectives see Mazrui's Introduction, p.l ff. Here as elsewhere in
text, author's names double as references.
2.
On the generalisation see Routley.
3.
For methods of adjustment, e.g. completing rankings, see again Routley.
REFERENCES
O. Lint, 'Keynote Address', Australia and the South Pacific,
Proceedings on a
Conference
held
at the Australian National University, Centre for
Continuing Education, Canberra, 1982.
A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press,
New York" 1*976. All page references prefixed M are to this work.
R. Routley, 'On the impossibility of an orthodox social theory and of an
orthodox solution to environmental problems', Logique et Analyse 23 (1980)
145-166.
K. Lehrer and C. Wagner, Rational consensus
Rolland, 1981.
Science
in
and
Society,
Re Idel,
1. It is widely assumed that cultural convergence is a good thing, to
NOTES
promoted.
This
is the operational assumption in Lehrer and Wanner, who want to
see the conditions for
everywhere
their
(fortunately,
fail for important real
excessive
be
cultural
Markov
convergence
theorem
applying
virtually
of course, the conditions are pretty restrictive, and
life
cases).
convergence
is
There
not
are
good
reasons
for
thinking
a good thing. Certainly some cases of
convergence are undecidable.
Experimental testing of convergence (Defi groups) showed that
when
convergence,
occurred, tended to confirm the status quo. Methods of convergence are
it
essentially conservative. Both locally and on a larger scene such methods can be
damaging,
in several respects. They undercut the perhaps otherwise positions of
minorities. And they can reinforce the posltLon of dangerous power triggers.
Consider what would happen - what appears to be happening -
scene
the
world
where we have, in some measure, "enforced convergence". What we would be
headed for - what we are headed for ts imposition
western
in
paradigm,
with
its
economism,
5
everywhere
violence
of
and
the
dominant
environmental
* "
destructiveness. Lower cultures are progressively undermined.
buddhism,
which
stand
opposed
to
main
afford just one conspicuous example. (The
useful
working
example.)
Buddhism
is
Those
practicing
directions of the dominant paradigm,
American
right
out
impact
of-
on
step
Thailand
with
is
a
economism,
encouraging as it does removal of consumerist ambitions, and it is dianetrically
opposed
to
violence and like destructive practices. (Thus to pull Buddhism out
of the educational curriculum, as in the fairly recent American-inspired,
constitution,
their
is not the enlightened step it is usually seen as: to be sure, it
is "progressive" enough, but in a direction more of us should not be headed.)
2. Total consensus represents a limit of convergence. Consensus also
its serious limitations then.
6
has
WORLD ORDER, CULTURAL CONVERGENCE
AND REGIONAL CULTURAL AUTONOMY
The success of Australia's relations with the Pacific Island States
will be based upon the practical and sustained recognition that no one
culture is basically superior to another, that each and every
[traditional]
culture, together with its social, political and
economic ingredients, have a measuring and value ...
that our new
found freedoms [and independence] were fought so that to a significant
degree a renaissance of Melanesian values, principles and expectations
can take place (Lini, p.ll and p.6).
World order with regional cultural autonomy is a highly desirable goal.
It
is an objective not only of political leaders such as Lini but also of ambitious
proposals such as Mazrui's world federation of cultures.But there is
evidence
that, despite its prima facie plausibility and appeal, it is an impossible goal.
There are various routes to this most unwelcome conclusion.
Consider first Mazrui's cultural paradox.
appears
to
have
Mazrui admits that his 'approach
But it is worse than that:
contradictory aims' (M p.9).
approach is contradictory, almost as it stands, and Mazrui
way out.
to
the
next premiss:
calculations.
reform
as
a
problem of building up
on
'To get mankind to agree to a new world system [one with
social
reasoning
and
Consensus behind three or four values will need consensus
behind many more supporting values and perspectives.
world
clear
In Mazrui's terms, which lead
order], we need to give mankind that shared framework of
social
no
The argument proceeds as follows:
World order implies a certain consensus.
Pl.
indicates
the
problem
of
supporting
mobilizing
values;
...
consensus;
and
we
see
In
summary,
we
see
we see consensus as a
this
latter
as
an
outgrowth of cultural convergence' (M p.l).
P2.
Such consensus implies [substantial]
cultural
convergence.
In
Mazrui's
formulation,
'Consensus
behind much-needed world reforms is impossible without
substantial cultural convergence on a global scale' (M p.9).
[Substantial]
P3.
cultural
formulation:
Mazrui's
'the
implies
convergence
cultural
dependence.
cultural
In
which the world has so far
convergence
attained carries with it the evil of dependency'.
P4.
Cultural dependence is incompatible with regional cultural autonomy.
Hence, by P1-P4, world order is incompatible with
and
cultural
world order with such regional autonomy is impossible.
hence
is valid, but some of the premisses can
of P2 with Pl.
produce
regional
certainly
shaken,
be
autonomy,
The argument
especially
the
Even so, no matter how hard they are shaken the problem
cannot be entirely removed.
*****
problem
There is no general solution to the
regional
This
autonomy.
cultural
result
of
order
world
maintaining
is an application of a generalised
Arrow's Theorem.in the application, world options or courses-of-action are the
alternatives,
regional cultures are the factors.
and
Then the factor rankings
are different cultural rankings of the world options.
that
is
there
no
dominant
culture,
no
cultural dictator.
conditions can be assumed satisfied, or satisfied by
result
Regional autonomy implies
Since the other
adjustments 3,
the
dismal
given that world order it taken to require overall rankings of
follows,
world options.
Although a general solution is impossible, a solution
possible
confront.
however
for
all
the
choices
world
a
federation
Given the environmental and economic
that
seems
increasingly
unlikely:
choices
more
may
be
nonetheless
cultures ever has to
of
that
and
are
more,
being
made
because
environmental dependence, choices made by one culture spill over into others.
2
of
The resolutions hitherto have primarily been
cultural
the
And
assimilation.
cultural
by
cultural
arsenal of defences, ranging from explicit claims of cultural
claims
through
down
superiority
of democratic cultural adjustment (tribal voting with the feet)
in the face of technological superiority and improved "standards of living"
least
registered
as
ranked
culture
e.g.
people
converted
etc.
the
superiority
of
is
these
only
(at
defences are
in
things
the
not in other matters (such as discrimination
highly,
concerning local environments);
Many
economics).
imported
by
relatively easy to shatter;
dominant
and
been backed up by
has
domination
domination
the improved "standards of living" often enough
from leisurely lives of primitive affluence to "wage slaves",
Some of the evangelical defences are harder to break.
While it is easy in
hindsight to see that there was little justification for imposing religions like
various forms of Christianity in the way they were imposed on other
gentler
or
militarily weaker cultures, the same is not seen in regard to ideologies such as
positivistic science of mainstream economics.
more
dangerous
than
pretentious
the
idea
Perhaps most
that
is
tool
a
all,
main Western culture is the
guardian of the truth, is the idea that it has a special
Rationality
of
dangerous
hold
on
rationality.
that can be applied to justify convergence to orthodox
Western norms.
A world federation of cultures - an integrated world culture, so almost
to
say - appears to afford a viable alternative to world government, as a source of
world order in particular.
firstly,
it
is
a
what
'we
it
less remote prospect:
than we were a century ago;
Secondly,
Moreover,
should
is
preferable
alternative,
'we are no nearer a world government
but we are much nearer to world culture'
be
since,
(M
p.2).
aiming for are internalised controls [those of
3
culture], based on new human inclinations,
than
rather
organisational mechanisms [government]' (M p.2).
typically
governmental,
in
ways
more
that
authoritive and externally imposed, controls do
There is evidence, furthermore, from a
not.
by
Thirdly, cultural controls and
liaisons permit flexibility, regional autonomy, and so on,
rigid
controls
external
range
of
indigenous
cultures
-
Melanesian cultures are just one group of examples — that culture can substitute
The vision of a well-ordered
for government.
government
without
cultures
it
anarchists;
especially
is
back,
of
course,
prominent
in
the
goes
organisations
of
federation
the
to
century
and
of
convergence
to
Bakunin
of
work
19th
or
Kroprotkin.
To make the vision work does not however require
Mazrui
extent
the
imagines;
does not require a single shared culture , a
it
shared cultural universe, or one world culture.
an
cultural
erroneously
Mazrui has
sought
essence, a single characterising feature, where a family resemblance is what
is wanted.
Various
A model for a world federation is given Wittgenstein's rope picture.
strands
in
the
rope
overlap and criss-cross.
It is this overlap of
strands [the regional cultures] that give the rope its strength.
need,
as
usually does, run through the length of the rope.
But no
strand
So similarly there
need be no shared or common culture for a world federation, or rope, of cultures
to have strength, and to ensure thereby world order.
regional cultures overlap one another suitably.
it
will
not
follow
that
It is enough that adjacent
Nor is overlap transitive;
there must be something shared.
so
This rope model of
cultures may be alternatively described in other family ways, e.g.
in terms
of
a network of cultures.
FOOTNOTES
1.
For these objectives see Mazrui's Introduction, p.l ff. Here as elsewhere in
text, author's names double as references.
4
2.
On the generalisation see Routley.
3.
For methods of adjustment, e.g. completing rankings, see again Routley.
REFERENCES
W. Lini, 'Keynote Address', Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings on a
Conference
held
at the Australian National University, Centre for
Continuing Education, Canberra, 1982.
A.A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press,
New York, 1976. All page references prefixed M are to this work.
R. Routley, 'On the impossibility of an orthodox social theory and of an
orthodox solution to environmental problems', Logique et Analyse 23 (1980)
145-166.
K. Lehrer and C. Wagner, Rational consensus
in
Science
and
Society,
Reidel,
Holland, 1981.
1. It is widely assumed that cultural convergence is a good thing, to
NOTES
promoted.
This
is the operational assumption in Lehrer and Wagner, who want to
see the conditions for
everywhere
their
(fortunately,
fail for important real
excessive
be
cultural
Markov
convergence
theorem
applying
virtually
of course, the conditions are pretty restrictive, and
life
cases).
convergence
is
There
not
are
good
reasons
for
thinking
a good thing. Certainly some cases of
convergence are undecidable.
Experimental testing of convergence (Defi groups) showed that
occurred, tended to confirm the status quo. Methods of convergence are
it
when
convergence,
essentially conservative. Both locally and on a larger scene such methods can be
damaging,
in several respects. They undercut the perhaps otherwise positions of
minorities. And they can reinforce the position of dangerous power triggers.
Consider what would happen - what appears to be happening -
scene,
the
world
where we have, in some measure, "enforced convergence". What we would be
headed for - what we are headed for is imposition
western
in
paradigm,
with
its
economism,
5
everywhere
violence
of
and
the
dominant
environmental
destructiveness. Lower cultures are progressively undermined.
which
Buddhism,
stand
opposed
to
main
afford just one conspicuous example. (The
useful
working
example.)
Buddhism
is
Those
practicing
directions of the dominant paradigm,
American
right
out
impact
of
on
step
Thailand
with
is
a
economism,
encouraging as it does removal of consumerist ambitions, and it is dianetrically
opposed
to
violence and like destructive practices. (Thus to pull Buddhism out
of the educational curriculum, as in the fairly recent American-inspired,
constitution,
their
is not the enlightened step it is usually seen as: to be sure, it
is "progressive" enough, but in a direction more of us should not be headed.)
2. Total consensus represents a limit of convergence. Consensus also
its serious limitations then
has
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Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
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https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e697a58c0c0eb658f0859e812161a780.pdf
6e6025285db216731a09bd2dbbf3c02f
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Box 139, Item 1: Richard Sylvan to Tom Cahill, Editor, Anarchist Studies, 5 Jan 1993 and peer review of paper
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Box 139: Anarchy
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)
The Australian National University
■The Research School of Social Sciences
Department of Philosophy
reference
Post Office Box 4 Canberra ACT 2600
Telegrams & cables natuniv Canberra
Telex aa 62694 sopac
'telephone 062-49 $111
22 July 1983
John Martin
10 Alamein Avenue
WARRACKNABEAL
VIC
3393
Dear John,
Thank you for the July 83 copy of The Deep Ecologist.
I
certainly think that such a network newsletter is a fine idea (and
my sub. follows under separate cover).
I should confess, however, that I was alarmed by the extent
to which shallow ecology - which already has an excellent press had crept into the issue. In particular, the centerpiece article,
purportedly on wilderness (signed P. Conroy) contained themes
directly antithetical to deeper ecology, some of which I shall
note. I really hope the article was intended as some sort of
test or as a spoof; but I fear it wasn't.
1.
'The wonders of creation exist in the minds of humans'. The
three step argument to this, from the granted 'Nature is wondrous,
...' is quite fallacious. For one thing, it smuggles in the
assumption of a creation. Deep ecologists don't have to buy into
creation, or (what Conroy goes on to, in a version of the argument
from design I suppose) God(s). More important, the wonders of
nature are not confined to, and do not require, the minds of humans.
A core theme of deep ecology is that some natural things are
intrinsically valuable, worthwhile in themselves, independently of
any creatures, including humans. An alpine gentian does not owe
its value, its importance to humans.
For similar reasons the deep ecologist, who may embrace some
one of the more orthodox religions but need not, rejects both parts
of Conroy's supporting comparison:
'As light needs our eyes to give it reality, so [nature] around
us needs our constant assent', human affirmation. There was light,
as an element of nature, before humans evolved; there will be
light, and still some wonders of nature, when humans are gone, for
instance after nuclear annihilation.
It is the same on the genesis
account as it is on deep ecological assumptions: nature and light
were real, and also good, before man appeared on the scene (on the
seventh day).
2.
Admittedly some deeper ecological themes are picked up by
Conroy, for example 'the importance of relationships', especially
those of ecosystems. Unfortunately Conroy almost at once tries to
2/...
�2.
undermine this theme (a theme that runs counter to a main thrust
of Western philosophy, concerning the eliminability or secondary
character of relations) and in a human chauvinist way:
'Let us not
delude ourselves as to the basis for this'.
Relations too are
alleged to answer back to humans, and owe their importance to them:
again shallow, and surely mistaken, anthrocentricism. But Conroy
wants us to proceed to a strong form of this‘shallow doctrine:
'To
recognise the importance of our environment is to recognise the
importance of ourselves'. No; and certainly not on deeper thinking.
Environments free of humans, such as pure wilderness, can be
important; worlds devoid of humans beautiful, or ugly.
3.
'Humans do hold dominion over the earth';
'recognise your
kingship of the earth'. The dominion position, with which Conroy
gets quite carried away, is only one of various positions that the
shallow ecologist can adopt; others (delineated by Passmore) are
the stewardship and the perfectionist positions. It is however the
position most antithetical to the concerns of deep ecology.
4.
Conroy repudiates the theme of biological (or biospheric)
egalitarianism, often taken to be an ingredient of deep ecology, in
a decidedly arrogant way:
'To pretend we can treat ourselves as
equals with other organisms in our cohabitation of this planet is to
show an ignorance of the inevitable forces that continue to shape
human destinies everywhere' (it reminds me of the worst reaches of
German Ubermensch philosophy, Nietzsche to Hitler). An egalitarian
theme was tendered by Naess in his introduction of deep ecology, and
has certainly been built into the West Coast understanding of the
notion. And as Singer's work on "equality of consideration", and
other nonutilitarian work on respect has made plain, the theme can
be given relatively palatable construals. It remains however something
of an open question whether the theme is an essential ingredient of
deep ecology. My view is also that it is not; but I should not want
to have anything much to do with Conroy's human chauvinist (and
sometimes human fascist) case for ditching the theme.
Regrettably Naess's more recent account of deep ecology, in
terms of asking 'deeper and deeper questions', has further muddied
what started out by being d valuable and sufficiently clear notion.
Now a nuclear engineer who asks deeper questions, or any shallow
ecologist who 'probes the deepness of the human psyche', stands a
fair chance of passing perself off as a deep ecologist. I hope
however that Ths Deep Ecologist can maintain a deep relationship
with deep ecology.
Best wishes,
Richard
�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, John Martin to Richard Sylvan, 30 July 1983 re Martin replies to Sylvan's letter and
comments on an article published in The Deep Ecologist. (1 leaf)
�
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Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
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✓
f
/
/ Z
)
The Australian National University
■The Research School of Social Sciences
Department of Philosophy
reference
Post Office Box 4 Canberra ACT 2600
Telegrams & cables natuniv Canberra
Telex aa 62694 sopac
'telephone 062-49 $111
22 July 1983
John Martin
10 Alamein Avenue
WARRACKNABEAL
VIC
3393
Dear John,
Thank you for the July 83 copy of The Deep Ecologist.
I
certainly think that such a network newsletter is a fine idea (and
my sub. follows under separate cover).
I should confess, however, that I was alarmed by the extent
to which shallow ecology - which already has an excellent press had crept into the issue. In particular, the centerpiece article,
purportedly on wilderness (signed P. Conroy) contained themes
directly antithetical to deeper ecology, some of which I shall
note. I really hope the article was intended as some sort of
test or as a spoof; but I fear it wasn't.
1.
'The wonders of creation exist in the minds of humans'. The
three step argument to this, from the granted 'Nature is wondrous,
...' is quite fallacious. For one thing, it smuggles in the
assumption of a creation. Deep ecologists don't have to buy into
creation, or (what Conroy goes on to, in a version of the argument
from design I suppose) God(s). More important, the wonders of
nature are not confined to, and do not require, the minds of humans.
A core theme of deep ecology is that some natural things are
intrinsically valuable, worthwhile in themselves, independently of
any creatures, including humans. An alpine gentian does not owe
its value, its importance to humans.
For similar reasons the deep ecologist, who may embrace some
one of the more orthodox religions but need not, rejects both parts
of Conroy's supporting comparison:
'As light needs our eyes to give it reality, so [nature] around
us needs our constant assent', human affirmation. There was light,
as an element of nature, before humans evolved; there will be
light, and still some wonders of nature, when humans are gone, for
instance after nuclear annihilation.
It is the same on the genesis
account as it is on deep ecological assumptions: nature and light
were real, and also good, before man appeared on the scene (on the
seventh day).
2.
Admittedly some deeper ecological themes are picked up by
Conroy, for example 'the importance of relationships', especially
those of ecosystems. Unfortunately Conroy almost at once tries to
2/...
2.
undermine this theme (a theme that runs counter to a main thrust
of Western philosophy, concerning the eliminability or secondary
character of relations) and in a human chauvinist way:
'Let us not
delude ourselves as to the basis for this'.
Relations too are
alleged to answer back to humans, and owe their importance to them:
again shallow, and surely mistaken, anthrocentricism. But Conroy
wants us to proceed to a strong form of this‘shallow doctrine:
'To
recognise the importance of our environment is to recognise the
importance of ourselves'. No; and certainly not on deeper thinking.
Environments free of humans, such as pure wilderness, can be
important; worlds devoid of humans beautiful, or ugly.
3.
'Humans do hold dominion over the earth';
'recognise your
kingship of the earth'. The dominion position, with which Conroy
gets quite carried away, is only one of various positions that the
shallow ecologist can adopt; others (delineated by Passmore) are
the stewardship and the perfectionist positions. It is however the
position most antithetical to the concerns of deep ecology.
4.
Conroy repudiates the theme of biological (or biospheric)
egalitarianism, often taken to be an ingredient of deep ecology, in
a decidedly arrogant way:
'To pretend we can treat ourselves as
equals with other organisms in our cohabitation of this planet is to
show an ignorance of the inevitable forces that continue to shape
human destinies everywhere' (it reminds me of the worst reaches of
German Ubermensch philosophy, Nietzsche to Hitler). An egalitarian
theme was tendered by Naess in his introduction of deep ecology, and
has certainly been built into the West Coast understanding of the
notion. And as Singer's work on "equality of consideration", and
other nonutilitarian work on respect has made plain, the theme can
be given relatively palatable construals. It remains however something
of an open question whether the theme is an essential ingredient of
deep ecology. My view is also that it is not; but I should not want
to have anything much to do with Conroy's human chauvinist (and
sometimes human fascist) case for ditching the theme.
Regrettably Naess's more recent account of deep ecology, in
terms of asking 'deeper and deeper questions', has further muddied
what started out by being d valuable and sufficiently clear notion.
Now a nuclear engineer who asks deeper questions, or any shallow
ecologist who 'probes the deepness of the human psyche', stands a
fair chance of passing perself off as a deep ecologist. I hope
however that Ths Deep Ecologist can maintain a deep relationship
with deep ecology.
Best wishes,
Richard
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, John Martin to Richard Sylvan, 30 July 1983 re Martin replies to Sylvan's letter and
comments on an article published in The Deep Ecologist. (1 leaf)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 14, Item 1765: Correspondence between Richard Sylvan and John Martin, 2 letters, Jul 1983
Subject
The topic of the resource
Letter 1: Typescript on a Australian National University letter head. Letter dated 22 July 1983 to John Martin, Warracknabeal, VIC 3393. From Richard Sylvan, The Research School of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, The Australian National University. Sylvan sends feedback to Martin about an article published in The Deep Ecologist (July 183). John Martin was the founding editor of the Australian based newsletter, The Deep Ecologist. One of three copies of letter held in collection, two copies with annotations: Deep ecology notes ; Fred, please return newsletter [?]. Thanks for your comments, [?] things. [Richard?]. Letter 2: Handwritten letter dated 30 Jul 1983 to Richard Sylvan. From John Martin, Warracknabeal, VIC 3393. Martin replies to Sylvan's letter and comments on an article published in The Deep Ecologist.
Description
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Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1765. Letter from John Martin redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 14, Item 1765
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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July 23, 1983
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4660a51">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4660a51</a>
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Second Shelf > Bottom Shelf
Box 14: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8a962b5798d431ed7a49e3c965d3293d.pdf
3793cc17bc61a17cc2d746104329864a
PDF Text
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Computer printout, draft paper with emendations and annotations, Intrinsic value, quantum
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Professor Routley from J. Baird Callicott. (37 pages) Paper published, Callicott J B (1985)
‘Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics’, Environmental Ethics, 7(3): 257275. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19857334
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Computer printout, draft paper with emendations and annotations, Intrinsic value, quantum
theory, and environmental ethics by J. Baird Callicott. Includes annotation addressed to
Professor Routley from J. Baird Callicott. (37 pages) Paper published, Callicott J B (1985)
‘Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics’, Environmental Ethics, 7(3): 257275. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19857334
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Box 14, Item 1765: Letter, Richard Sylvan to J. Baird Callicott, 25 Oct c1985 ; Draft of Intrinsic value, quantum theory, and environmental ethics by J. Baird Callicott
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Computer printout of draft paper with emendations and annotations. Includes annotation on title page, addressed to Professor Routley from J. Baird Callicott. Paper published, Callicott J B (1985) 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics', Environmental Ethics, 7(3): 257-275, https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19857334.
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Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1765. Paper by J. Baird Callicott redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 14, Item 1765
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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October 25
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f77bd00">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f77bd00</a>
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Australian National University - Second Shelf - Bottom Shelf
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Second Shelf > Bottom Shelf
Box 14: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/87ae026d1b7eb1686912cf50e2b4c625.pdf
da91a8a30bfeb69bfdd62ed9f6cc3aeb
PDF Text
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. a new democratic public sphere of empowered,
decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of
national and regional state structures to facilitate
legal, economic, educational and cultural values and
practices, to support those local citizens lacking in
material and cultural resources, and to settle the many
disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of
any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local,
direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures
at the national level will make life for traditional
political parties very difficult if not impossible.
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in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of
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As one of a range of far’strong democracy'.
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�8.2.95
A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL
THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES
There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to
For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and
commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift
of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their
implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be
guaranteed.
__
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is
put in a sharp form as follows:1*
Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can
there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will
yield a way of protecting environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which
effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even
democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic
ocout-r
outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for
instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an
antidemocratic tyrant.3
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon
holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green
theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic,
political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly
from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the
‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which
3
Goodin condensing Saward p.168.
( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few
absolutes and little certainty.)
Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
nullified in UTD.
�make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain
their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a
common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of
democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens.
These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their
importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values
which the imperative represents.4
As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien,
and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As
more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic,
authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are
offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of
which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
\ first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to
convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through
‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable
principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well
beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the
interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore,
there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given
the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect
these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7
Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5.
Cf. p.12 essay.
[Reference]
[Reference]
�3
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.).
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
CO
l
Qf~
(it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers).
Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society,
given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees
the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as
desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and
the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The
basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our
communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and
other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined
by ecological imperatives’8
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie
with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted
democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand,
they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while
revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but
rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are
inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values,
laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have
instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable
canonical force.9
familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
What Skyward proposes instead is dep
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
8
9
[Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of
Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage.
[ref].
�4
... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests
that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit
is unjustifiable.10
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a
central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed
decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical
requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances
where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be
required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is
certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously
represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun
(again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures,
attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby
removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
)
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.11
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal
change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans.
10
11
Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of
principles, policy objectives or the like.
[Ref. and page]
.
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/’
�11
4.
Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating
structures.
The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which
organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating
the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford
Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is
constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure
itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts.
Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of
seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-
dissipating structure.
To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R,
where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of
worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my
world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued
items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and
perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is
a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where
such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an
element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of
Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to
subsets or types within Q.33)
Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops.
Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here
is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory.
+1
X
/ \
„ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2}
R = — is as shown by arrows.
T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component
-1
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
33
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t
but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T).
�11
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
in
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10.
n
�12
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t.
t
c
Cl
C4
a
C2
c3
b
at
b2
a2
bi
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
absolutism
realism
objectivism
in
rough
contrast
respectively
with
maximizing rationalism
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
pluralism
nonrealism
nonjectivism
satisizing rationalism
Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we
might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10.
�13
actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards
centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic,
implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument
here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional
arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The
state is organisationally otiose.
Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised
functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work
discloses.36
36
Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to
putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is
explained) and Sylvan 95.
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
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. a new democratic public sphere of empowered,
decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of
national and regional state structures to facilitate
legal, economic, educational and cultural values and
practices, to support those local citizens lacking in
material and cultural resources, and to settle the many
disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of
any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local,
direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures
at the national level will make life for traditional
political parties very difficult if not impossible.
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in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of
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local level^?.
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a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to
revitalise local participation and local political power in his
As one of a range of far’strong democracy'.
reaching reforms,, including the establishment of 'neigborhood
assemblies', he advocates 'a national civic communications
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8.2.95
A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL
THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES
There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to
For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and
commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift
of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their
implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be
guaranteed.
__
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is
put in a sharp form as follows:1*
Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can
there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will
yield a way of protecting environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which
effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even
democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic
ocout-r
outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for
instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an
antidemocratic tyrant.3
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon
holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green
theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic,
political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly
from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the
‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which
3
Goodin condensing Saward p.168.
( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few
absolutes and little certainty.)
Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
nullified in UTD.
make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain
their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a
common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of
democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens.
These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their
importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values
which the imperative represents.4
As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien,
and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As
more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic,
authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are
offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of
which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
\ first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to
convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through
‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable
principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well
beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the
interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore,
there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given
the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect
these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7
Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5.
Cf. p.12 essay.
[Reference]
[Reference]
3
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.).
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
CO
l
Qf~
(it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers).
Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society,
given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees
the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as
desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and
the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The
basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our
communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and
other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined
by ecological imperatives’8
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie
with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted
democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand,
they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while
revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but
rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are
inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values,
laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have
instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable
canonical force.9
familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
What Skyward proposes instead is dep
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
8
9
[Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of
Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage.
[ref].
4
... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests
that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit
is unjustifiable.10
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a
central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed
decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical
requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances
where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be
required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is
certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously
represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun
(again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures,
attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby
removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
)
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.11
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal
change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans.
10
11
Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of
principles, policy objectives or the like.
[Ref. and page]
.
/
/“■
w
/’
11
4.
Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating
structures.
The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which
organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating
the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford
Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is
constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure
itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts.
Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of
seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-
dissipating structure.
To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R,
where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of
worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my
world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued
items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and
perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is
a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where
such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an
element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of
Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to
subsets or types within Q.33)
Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops.
Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here
is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory.
+1
X
/ \
„ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2}
R = — is as shown by arrows.
T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component
-1
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
33
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t
but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T).
11
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
in
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10.
n
12
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t.
t
c
Cl
C4
a
C2
c3
b
at
b2
a2
bi
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
absolutism
realism
objectivism
in
rough
contrast
respectively
with
maximizing rationalism
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
pluralism
nonrealism
nonjectivism
satisizing rationalism
Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we
might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10.
13
actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards
centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic,
implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument
here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional
arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The
state is organisationally otiose.
Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised
functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work
discloses.36
36
Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to
putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is
explained) and Sylvan 95.
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Handwritten notes and typescript papers with handwritten emendations and annotations, 'A fundamental dilemma for (deep-) green political theory? Democratic or authoritarian procedures' (dated 8.2.95), and 'Technical interlude, strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures'.
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 977
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 14: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/adac1ea1e18dbc6bbd0afb6f54567c38.pdf
1f9efcf459d357d53c0fc4e0007d46a2
PDF Text
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�-125
TABLE 2.
Populations of Australia at 2040 under
various assumptions as to population at
2000 and various growth rates.
Population in
Hypothesis as
Population in
millions at 2000
to growth rate
millions at 2040
more \
likely) •'
range /'
17-3
1.1% from 1970
26.8
17.8
1.2% from 1970
28.7
18.9
1.1% from 2000
29.2
18.9
1.2% from 2000
30.4
20.0
1.1% from 2000
30.9
20.0
1.2% from 2000
32.2
21.0
1.1% from 2000
32.5
21.0
1.2% from 2000
33.8
21.0
1.4% from 2000
36.6
22.0
1.7% from 2000
38.2
22.0
1.5% from 2000
39.6
22.4
1.87% from 2000
46.99
probable
range
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�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, Dick Coutinho, Royal Vangorcum to Dr Richard Routley, Australian National University,
1974? re Routhley's manuscript on environmental ethics. (1 leaf)
�u*^
•f-—
Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?
§1.
It is increasingly said that civilization, Western
civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and
derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's
relations to the natural environment, in Leopold's words
'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the
animals and plants which grow upon it'
([1], p.238).
It
is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature:
they do, and on the prevailing
view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his
relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect
others, are not subject to moral censure.
Thus assertions
such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least
as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are
false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense,
It is to this, to the values and evaluations
moral objects.
*
of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact
take exception.
Leopold regards as subject to moral crit
icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally
permissible.
But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that
such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics
and that an extension of traditional morality is required to
cover such cases,to fill a moral void.
If Leopold is right
in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is
a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations.
For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel
morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield,
and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere
with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others.
'A
* A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house
spirits.
�2
farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his
cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks,
and soil into the community creek, is still (if other
wise decent) a respected member of society.'
([1], p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad
itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally
wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose
What is not so clear is that a new ethic
is required even for such radical judgements.
For one thing
of the argument.
it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic,
much as it is often unclear whether a new development in
physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification
or extension of the old.
For, notoriously, ethics are not
clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the
application of identity criteria for ethics may remain
*
obscure.
Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of
ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental
principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain
ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of
differing and even competing systems.
In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental
ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that
of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics
or that of the development of principles that are already
encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic.
The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be
incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within)
the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because
there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in
* To the consternation no doubt of Quineans.
But the fact
is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and
fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter
minate .
�3.
Western civilization:
on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights
and drugs, there are competing sets of principles.
Talk
of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a
sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing
ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three
important traditions in Western ethical views concerning
man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic
position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser
traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian,
and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor
are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and
both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent
with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is
the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he
pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine
view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ
mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases.
But
it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can
*
not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions.
Part of
the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means
adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the
religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for
and responsible to?
However both traditions are inconsistent
with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of
complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic
some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be
preserved from substantial human interference, whether of
�4.
the "improving" sort or not.
Both traditions would in
fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along
the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small
farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative
position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and
perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out
its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily
usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship
view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make
nature productive by his efforts though not by means that
will deliberately degrade its resources.
Although these
positions both depart from the dominant position in a way
which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an
environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the
irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough:
for in
the present situation of expanding populations confined to
finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the
perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough
going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of
total use, implying that every natural area should be culti
vated or otherwise used
*
for human ends, "humanized".
As the important Western traditions exclude an
environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic,
not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright.
The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic
has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is
not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically
interferes with others.
Maybe some such proviso was implicit
all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was
* If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use
for preservation, this total use principle is rendered
inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note
that the total use principle is tied to the resource view
of nature.
�simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural
items would not affect others (the non-interference
assumption).
Be this as it may, the modified dominant
position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi
tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ
mental ethic.
For example, the farmer's polluting of a
community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that
it physically interferes with others who use or would use
the stream.
Likewise business enterprises which destroy
the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which
cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans,
can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that
of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on.
The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family
size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation
excessive population levels will interfere with future people.
Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its
Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser
traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall
A new ethic is wanted.
e
As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between
try to show.
§2.
a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic
notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.
*
An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system
(i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which
includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values
and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu
ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is
obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights^what
* A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super
ethics, their features and fundamental notions.
�6.
is valued, and so forth.
A general or lawlike proposition
of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S| and
S2 contain different principles then they are different
systems.
It follows that any environmental ethic differs
from the important traditional ethics outlined.
Moreover
if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems
on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then
these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised)
- in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a
new ethic is wanted.
It suffices then to locate a core
principle and to provide environmental counter examples to
it.
It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount
to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles
that will accordingly belong to the super ethic.
The fair-
ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one
example.
Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core
principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of
4- A'/Z
the modified dominance position:.
A recent formulation
*
runs
as follows ([3], p.58):
'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds
that one should be able to do what he wishesproviding (1)
that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely
to harm himself irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism -because
under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a
bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a
freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a
wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the
environment and natural things) providing they do not harm
* A related principle is that (modified)
can operate within similar limits.
t
X
/< > /Cy
,
.... r -r-
free enterprise
'i-
�others.
In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of
proof to others.
It is worth remarking that harming others
in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the
(usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in
my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing;
you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because
it does not harm me.
There remains a problem however as to
exactly what counts as harm or interference.
Moreover the
width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may
be filled out in significantly different ways:
it makes a
difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism
whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too
restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient
-hv
being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the
principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to
which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future
others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether
to possible others.
The latter would make the principle
completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it
applies at most to present and future others,
7/v
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples
to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis
of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out
over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon
sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and
what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation.
But the
main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is
that ethical principles if correct are universal and are
�assessed over the class of ideal situations.
(i)
The last man (or person)
surviving the collapse of the world system lays
about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every
The last man example.
living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs) .
What he does
is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong.
Moreover one does not have to be committed to esot
eric
values
to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving
badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking
and values have shifted in an environmental direction
in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation
of fundamental evaluative principles).
(ii)
The last people example.
The last man example can
be broadened to the last people example.
We can
assume that they know they are the last people, e.g.
because they are aware that radiation effects have
blocked any chance of reproduction.
One considers
the last people in order to rule out the possibility
that what these people do harms or somehow physically
interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as
well consider science fiction cases where people
arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems,
whether with good intentions such as perfecting the
planet for their ends and making it more fruitful
or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the
hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are
very numerous.
They humanely exterminate every wild
�9.
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they
put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and
all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries
or plantations, and so on.
They may give various
familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is
the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are
simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it
is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied
so that they do not worry too much about their impending
extinctions.
On an environmental ethic the last
people have behaved badly; they have simplified and
largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and
with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and
largely wrecked place.
But this conduct may conform
with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with
the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions.
Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv
inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation
principles.
The conflict may be removed it seems by
conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle,
to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy
natural resources.
But as the last people do not
destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the
best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally
inadequate.
(iii)
The great entrepreneur example.
The last man example
can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3).
The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant
complex of automated factories and farms which he
�10.
proceeds to extend.
He produces automobiles among
other things, from renewable and recyclable resources
of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly
after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead
of putting them on the road for a short time as we
do.
Of course he has the best of reasons for his
activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product,
or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and
he will be increasing his own and general welfare
since he much prefers increased output and product
ivity.
The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly
thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto
optimality requirements given prevailing notions of
being "better off".
Just as we can extend the last man example
to a class of last people, so we can extend this
example to the industrial society example:
looks rather like
Civ)
the society
ours.
The vanishing species example. Consider the blue
whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The
blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of
his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue
whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or
physically interfere with others in any good sense,
though it may upset them and they may be prepared to
compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale
hunting be wilful destruction.
(Slightly different
examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
�11.
blue whale example are provided by cases where a
species is eliminated or threatened through destruc
tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ
ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-
dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.)
The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this
magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite
permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism.
But on an environmental ethic it is not.
However the
free-market mechanism will not cease allocating
whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ
mental economics would; instead the market model will
grind inexorably
*
along the private demand curve until
the blue whale population is no longer viable - if
’r <
that point has not already been passed.
7/7 /
(U•
‘
In sum'
class of permissible actions that
/rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed
on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super
ethic.
But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim
ing that these people, those of the examples and respected
industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when
engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the
sort described, in a morally impermissible way?
these people do is
No, what
to a greater or lesser extent evil,
and hence in serious cases morally impermissible.
For example,
insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive
peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is
morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the
slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private
profit.
But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a
* For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained
in [3] .
�13.
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capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig
ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or
restraining or designed to injure other persons'.
But this
sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting
the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects,
since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the
definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and
accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same
defective principle.
Accordingly an environmental ethic would
have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from
straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to
animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect
to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic
�14.
morally, through obligations
practically anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions
which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic
behaviour calculable is easily brought out.
These positions typ
ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi
ness, as a summum banum; characteristically each individual of
some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future
humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in
question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is
supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be
done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under
the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule
utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to
the collective ranking.
The species bias is transparent from the
selection of the base class.
And even if the base class is extended
to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of
including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the
positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of
the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust
principles.
For example if every member of the base class detests
dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour,
ive
then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states
where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will
generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the
evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway).
Likewise it would
just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori
zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy
with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing
J
�15.
private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened
to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
"rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent
their extinction.
Whether the blue whale survives should not have
to depend on what humans know or what they see on television.
Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide
a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally
desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in
their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going
meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories,
try to offer some rationale for their basic principles.
For
instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter
of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on
a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the
application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on
a Kantian position.which has some vogue-obligations somehow
arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.
In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-
disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad
for them; that is (rough) justice.
R. Routley
Australian National University
�REFERENCES
[1]
A. Leopold,
A Sand Country Almenac with other essays
on Conservation,
[2]
J. Passmore,
New York (196 6) .
Ecological Problems and Western Traditions
(unpublished).
[3]
P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and
Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem,
New York (1972).
[4]
S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors),
Men and Morals.
hon-humans,
[5]
Animals,
An enquiry into the maltreatment of
London (1971).
H.L.A. Hart,
‘Are there any natural rights?',
reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy,
Oxford (1967).
����The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, S. I. Benn, Acting Head of Department of Philosophy to Dr. R. Rosenkrantz, Department
of Philosophy, University of South Caroline, 6 Sep 1973 re fellowship at the Research School of
Social Sciences, supervised by Richard Routley. (3 pages)
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�Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?
§1.
It is increasingly said that civilization, Western
civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and
derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's
relations to the natural environment, in Leopold’s words
’an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the
animals and plants which grow upon it'
([1], p.238).
It
is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature:
they do, and on the prevailing
view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his
relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect
others, are not subject to moral censure.
such as
Thus assertions
Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least
as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are
false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense,
It is to this, to the values and evaluations
moral oojects.
*
of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact
take exception.
Leopold regards as subject to moral crit
icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally
permissible.
But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that
such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics
and that an extension of traditional morality is required to
cover such cases,to fill a moral void.
If Leopold is right
in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is
a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations.
For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel
morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield,
and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere
with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others.
'A
* A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house
* spirits.
�2.
fanner who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his
cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks,
and soil into the community creek, is still (if other
wise decent) a respected member of society.'
([1], p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad
itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally
wrong, and the fanner subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose
of the argument.
What is not so clear is that a new ethic
is required even for such radical judgements.
For one thing
it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic,
much as it is often unclear whether a new development in
physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification
or extension of the old.
For, notoriously, ethics are not
clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the
application of identity criteria for ethics may remain
*
obscure.
Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of
ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental
principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain
ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of
differing and even competing systems.
In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental
ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that
of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics
or that of the development of principles that are already
encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic.
The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be
incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within)
the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because
there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in
* To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact
is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and
fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter
minate .
�3.
Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights
and drugs, there are competing sets of principles.
Talk
of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a
sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing
ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three
important traditions in Western ethical views concerning
man's relation to nature? a dominant tradition, the despotic
position, with man as despot (or tyrant^ and two lesser
traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, ■
and tne co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor
are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and
both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent
with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is
the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he
pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine
view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ
mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases,
it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can
not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of
the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means
adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the
religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for
and responsible to?
However both traditions are inconsistent
with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of
complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic
some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be
preserved *
rom substantial human interference, whether of
�4.
the "improving" sort or not.
Both traditions would in
fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along
the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small
farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative
position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and
perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out
its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily
usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship
view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make
nature productive by his efforts though not by means that
will deliberately degrade its resources.
Although these
positions both depart from the dominant position in a way
which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an
environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the
irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough:
for in
the present situation of expanding populations confined to
finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the
perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough
going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of
total use, implying that every natural area should be culti
vated or otherwise used
*
for human ends, "humanized".
As the important Western traditions exclude an
environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic,
not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright,
h//
The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic
has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is
not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically
interferes with others.
Maybe some such proviso was implicit
all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was
* If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use
for preservation, this total use principle is rendered
inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note
that the total use principle is tied to the resource view
of nature.
�simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural
items would not affect others (the non-interference
assumption).
Be this as it may, the modified dominant
position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi
tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ
mental ethic.
For example, the farmer's polluting of a
community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that
it physically interferes with others who use or would use
the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy
the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which
cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans,
can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that
of(j[3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on.
The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family
size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation
excessive population levels will interfere with future people.
Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its
Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser
traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall
try to show.
A new ethic is wanted.
§2.
As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between
a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic
notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.
*
An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system
(i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which
includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values
and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu
ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is
obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rightsr what
* A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super
ethics, their features and fundamental notions.
�6.
is valued, and so forth.
A general or lawlike proposition
of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and
S2 contain different principles then they are different
systems.
It follows that any environmental ethic differs
from the important traditional ethics outlined.
Moreover
if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems
on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then
these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised)
- in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a
new ethic is wanted.
It suffices then to locate a core
principle and to provide environmental counter examples to
it.
It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount
to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles
that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair
ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one
example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core
principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of
the modified dominance position.
A recent formulation
*
runs
as follows ([3], p.58):
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The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds
that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1)
that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely
to harm himself irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because
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under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a
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bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a
freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a
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�7.
others.
In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of
proof to others.
It is worth remarking that harming others
in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the
(usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in
£my interests, because I detest you?, that you stop breathing «
I-
you are free to breathe , for the time being anyway, because
it does not harm me
There remains a problem however as to
exactly what counts as harm or interference
Moreover the
width of the principle is so far obscure because ’other' may
be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a
difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism
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whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too
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restrictive - <or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient
being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the
principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to
which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future
others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether
to possible others,
The latter would make the principle
completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it
applies at most to present and future others.
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples
to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis
of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out
over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon
sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and
what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation.
But the
main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is
that ethical principles if correct are universal and are
�8.
assessed over the class of ideal situations.
The last man example.
(1)
The last man (or person)
surviving the collapse of the world system lays
. .
--------.................................... I
about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every
living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly i
you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does
is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong.
Moreover one does not have to be committed to eso
values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving
I badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking
‘r- l C-a values have shifted in an environ-nt.l direction
h-
■
eric
'°f -^responding shifts in the formulation
fundamental evaluative principles).
The last people example.
The last man example can
be broadened to the last people example. We can
assume that they know they are the last people, e.g.
because they are aware that radiation effects have
blocked any chance of reproduction. One const ers
the last people in order to rule out the posslbt 1 y
that what these people do harms or somehow physically
interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as
well consider science fiction cases where people
arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems
whether with good intentions such as perfecting the
planet for their ends and making it more fruit.u
or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the
hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are
very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
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animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they
put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and
all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries
or plantations, and so on. They may give various
V, familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is
the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are
simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it
is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied
so that they do not worry too much about their impending
extinctions.
On an environmental ethic the last
people have behaved badly; they have simplified and
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largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and
with their demise the world will soon bean ugly and
largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform
witlCthe^basic chauvinist principle, and as well with
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the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions.
Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
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because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv
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inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation
principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by
conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, b’J
to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy^
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But as_____________
the last people do not
natural resources.
--------------------------------------------- -------- —..... —
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destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the
the variant is still environmentallW^,^
best of reasons",
inadequate.
The great entrepreneur example. The last man example
can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3) .
The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant,
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complex of automated factories and farms which he
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�10.
proceeds to extend.
He produces automobiles among
other things, from renewable and recyclable resources
of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly
after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead
of putting them on the road for a short time as we
do.
A
Of coarse he has the best of reasons for his
activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product,
or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and
he will be increasing his own and general welfare
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since he much prefers increased output and product
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ivity.
The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
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ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonlyj'bovtW',
thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto
optimality requirements given prevailing notions of
being "better off".
Just as we can extend the last man example
to a class of last people, so we can extend this
C^S/XU-i
example to the industrial society example:
looks rather like ours.
(iv)
The vanishing species example.
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the society
Consider the blue
whale, a mixed good on the economic picture.
The
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blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of
X
his qualities as a private good, as a source of valu-
able oil and meat.
The catching and marketing of blue
whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or
physically interfere with others in any good sense,
7
though it may upset them and they may be prepared to
compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale
hunting be wilful destruction.
(Slightly different
examples which eliminate the hunting aspect rf the
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�11.
blue whale example are provided by cases where a
species is eliminated or threatened through destruc—
tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ
ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plainsdwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.)
The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this
magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite
permissible — at least according to basic chauvinism.
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But on an environmental ethic it is not.
However the
free-market mechanism will not cease allocating
whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ
mental economics would; instead the market model will
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grind inexorably
*
along the private demand curve until
the blue whale population is no longer viable - if
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that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that
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rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed
on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super
ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim
ing that these people, those of the examples and respected
industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when
engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the
sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what
these people do is
to a greater or lesser extent evil,
and hence in serious cases morally impermissible.
For example,
insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive
peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is
morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the
slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private
profit.
But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a
* For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained
in [ 3 ] .
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extending (2) to rnclu
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would be so affected by the action in
It may be preferand (3) to exclude speciej&de.
the environment
in vieW of the way the freedom
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imply to scrap it altogether, and mate
proof, s of rights and permissible conduct, as in a b
classes
theory sometimes forces changes
§3
a radical change in a
rejects the Reference
in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
a modification of the
Theory in a
Reference Theory and
usual -ta-tdef-eh^also^aeee
Jat simllt pheno^nCseens to occur in the case of a neta-
A somewhat s nxl
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ethlc.
Quite apart from
ethl°de’“ several environmentally important notions, such as
introducing several
meta—
n 4.4™ arowth and preservation, for mec»
conservation, pollut^COTp^e-examinatlon
I
ethical analysis, an ,< of such characteristic(actions) as natural
and modified analyses
3 of obligation and
round of right, and of the relations
right■
may well require re-assessment of
permissibility to rights; it
notions as value and right, espectraditional analyses of such
on chauvinist assumptions; and it
ially where these are based
of the more prominent meta-ethical
forces the rejection of many
illustrated by a very brief exam
positions. These points are
then by a sketch of the
ination of accounts of nature^ right an
speciess bias of some major positions.
*
positions.
to defeating conditions
Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject
doctrine of natural rights
here irrelevant, the classical
which are
'anv adult human ■.•
to
which,
among
other
things,
according
are developed by those protesting about
points are oevei p
especially the essay s
Some of these
ltreatment of animals; see especial y
human ma
collected in [4] .
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capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig
ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or
restraining or designed to injure other persons'.
But this
sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting
the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects,
since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the
definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and
accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same
defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would
have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from
straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to
animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect
.. to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view
that natural objects such as trees^have rights (though such a view
is occasionally held, e.g. by partheists.
since artefacts are not alive).
But p^/theism is false
For moral prohibitions forbidding
certairTactions with respect to an object do not award that object
a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given
tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of
property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without
seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views
can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are
coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing
obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e.,
has a right also has responsibilities and thereat least , whatever____________
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fore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests, Thus
although any person may have a right by no means every living thing
can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects
other than persons cannot have rights.
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But persons can relate
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�14.
morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to
practically anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions
which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic
behaviour calculable is easily brought out.
These positions typ
ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi
ness, as a summum bgnum; characteristically each individual of
soine base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future
humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in
question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is
supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be
done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under
the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule
utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to
The species bias is transparent from the
the collective ranking.
selection of the base class.
And even if the base class is extended
to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of
including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the
positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of
the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust
principles.
For example if every member of the base class detests
dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour,
ive
then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states
where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will
generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the
evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway).
Likewise it would
just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori
zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy
with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing
*
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private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened
to kr^ow that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
"rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent
their extinction.
Whether the blue whale survives should not have
to depend on what humans know or what they see on television.
Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide
a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally
desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in
their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going
meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories,
try to offer some rationale for their basic principles.
For
instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter
of mutual agreements between individuals of .the base class; on
a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the
application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on
a Kantian position which has some vogue obligations somehow
arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.
In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-
disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad
for them: that is
R. Routley
(rough) justice.
Australian National University
�REFERENCES
[1]
A. Leopold,
A Sand Country Almenac with other essays
on Conservation,
New York (1966) .
[2]
J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions
(unpublished).
[3]
P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier,
Environmental Decay.
New York (1972).
[4]
The Solution becomes the Problem,
S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors),
Men and Morals.
hon-humans,
[5]
Economic Growth and
H.L.A. Hart,
An enquiry into the maltreatment of
London (1971) .
'Are there any natural rights?',
reprinted in A. Quinton (editor),
Oxford (1967).
Animals,
Political Philosophy,
�The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of
conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions
typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum;
characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including
future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, Of
the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as
in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism,
in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is
transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace
persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing
testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that-the whole of the base class may
be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base
class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto
ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly,
from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of
most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective
demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue
whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in
the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
“rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the
blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi
sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for
deciding on what is environmentally desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not aione in their species chauvinism; much the
same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer
some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a
matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights
and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some
vigue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case
if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is
too bad for them: that is (rough) justice.
/
REFERENCES
1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966).
2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished).
3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the
Problem, New York (1972).
4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment
of non-humans, London (1971).
5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford
(1967).
�§ 3. A radical change in a teory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for
logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a
meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen
tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation,for meta-ethical
analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such
characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as
XT
value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec
tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very
brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some *
6
major positions.7
A
Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical
doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human . . . capable of
choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a
human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental
ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural
right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes *
the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the
classical notion of a natural right, a farzfrom straight forward matter now that human rights with'
respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that
long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees
have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since
artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object
do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or
piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be
mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with
mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and
so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever
has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in
terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can
(significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have
rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically
anything at all.
H Some of these points are developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays
collected in [4]
�/§ 2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic,
and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S
3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least
as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature
4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions
is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in
cludes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general
evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong,
of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a
principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2contain different principles, then they are different
systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin
ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle
embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) — in which case if an environmental
ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environmental counter examples to it.
It is commonly assumed that there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical
systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed
in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle,
is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent for
mulation5 runs as follows ( [31, p. 58):
’The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he
wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself
irreparably.’
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people,
come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom
principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which
mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to
cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restric
tion is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my
interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being t
anywav, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts
as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ‘other’ may
be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the
chauvinism whethe^ ‘other’ expands to ‘other human’ - which is too restrictive - or to ‘other’person’ or to ‘other’seritient being’; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and in
versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable
future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely un
workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others.
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a
semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations *
(which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal
situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles
if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations.
(i)
The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system
lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit
ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra
dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding
shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles).
(ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out
the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where peonle arrive at a new planet and
5 A related principle is that (modified) free enterprise can operate v. ithin similar limits
�destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation,
and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en
vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck
ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the
principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co
operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the
basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.
(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’.
Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex
ample to the Industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours.
(iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic
ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a
source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the
whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up
set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun
ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through
destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many
plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in
eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to
basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will
not cease allocating whalep to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics
would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the
blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly
circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en
vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in
dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac
tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a
greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar
as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial
development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain
ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory
6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3]
freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be
made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by
the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be
preferable, in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it
altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights.
�CJ\^<.
& ’
�§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new
ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people’s relations to the natural environ
ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and
plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal
with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as
he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject
to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe’s actions do not interfere with
others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to
this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex
ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing
views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is
beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required
to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct
what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand,
as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not
taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the
woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into
the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be
accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a
new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics
may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a
1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits
- To the consternation modoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary
systems the identity of which may be indeterminate
205
�single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin
ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserv
ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com
fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that wiil deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions
both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some
evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they
do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite
natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a
principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for
human ends, “humanized”.
As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so
straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such
proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump
tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi
tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa
tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.
�
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-125
TABLE 2.
Populations of Australia at 2040 under
various assumptions as to population at
2000 and various growth rates.
Population in
Hypothesis as
Population in
millions at 2000
to growth rate
millions at 2040
more \
likely) •'
range /'
17-3
1.1% from 1970
26.8
17.8
1.2% from 1970
28.7
18.9
1.1% from 2000
29.2
18.9
1.2% from 2000
30.4
20.0
1.1% from 2000
30.9
20.0
1.2% from 2000
32.2
21.0
1.1% from 2000
32.5
21.0
1.2% from 2000
33.8
21.0
1.4% from 2000
36.6
22.0
1.7% from 2000
38.2
22.0
1.5% from 2000
39.6
22.4
1.87% from 2000
46.99
probable
range
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, Dick Coutinho, Royal Vangorcum to Dr Richard Routley, Australian National University,
1974? re Routhley's manuscript on environmental ethics. (1 leaf)
u*^
•f-—
Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?
§1.
It is increasingly said that civilization, Western
civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and
derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's
relations to the natural environment, in Leopold's words
'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the
animals and plants which grow upon it'
([1], p.238).
It
is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature:
they do, and on the prevailing
view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his
relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect
others, are not subject to moral censure.
Thus assertions
such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least
as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are
false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense,
It is to this, to the values and evaluations
moral objects.
*
of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact
take exception.
Leopold regards as subject to moral crit
icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally
permissible.
But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that
such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics
and that an extension of traditional morality is required to
cover such cases,to fill a moral void.
If Leopold is right
in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is
a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations.
For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel
morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield,
and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere
with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others.
'A
* A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house
spirits.
2
farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his
cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks,
and soil into the community creek, is still (if other
wise decent) a respected member of society.'
([1], p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad
itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally
wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose
What is not so clear is that a new ethic
is required even for such radical judgements.
For one thing
of the argument.
it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic,
much as it is often unclear whether a new development in
physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification
or extension of the old.
For, notoriously, ethics are not
clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the
application of identity criteria for ethics may remain
*
obscure.
Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of
ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental
principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain
ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of
differing and even competing systems.
In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental
ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that
of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics
or that of the development of principles that are already
encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic.
The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be
incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within)
the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because
there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in
* To the consternation no doubt of Quineans.
But the fact
is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and
fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter
minate .
3.
Western civilization:
on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights
and drugs, there are competing sets of principles.
Talk
of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a
sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing
ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three
important traditions in Western ethical views concerning
man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic
position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser
traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian,
and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor
are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and
both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent
with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is
the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he
pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine
view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ
mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases.
But
it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can
*
not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions.
Part of
the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means
adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the
religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for
and responsible to?
However both traditions are inconsistent
with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of
complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic
some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be
preserved from substantial human interference, whether of
4.
the "improving" sort or not.
Both traditions would in
fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along
the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small
farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative
position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and
perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out
its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily
usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship
view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make
nature productive by his efforts though not by means that
will deliberately degrade its resources.
Although these
positions both depart from the dominant position in a way
which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an
environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the
irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough:
for in
the present situation of expanding populations confined to
finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the
perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough
going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of
total use, implying that every natural area should be culti
vated or otherwise used
*
for human ends, "humanized".
As the important Western traditions exclude an
environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic,
not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright.
The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic
has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is
not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically
interferes with others.
Maybe some such proviso was implicit
all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was
* If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use
for preservation, this total use principle is rendered
inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note
that the total use principle is tied to the resource view
of nature.
simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural
items would not affect others (the non-interference
assumption).
Be this as it may, the modified dominant
position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi
tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ
mental ethic.
For example, the farmer's polluting of a
community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that
it physically interferes with others who use or would use
the stream.
Likewise business enterprises which destroy
the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which
cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans,
can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that
of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on.
The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family
size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation
excessive population levels will interfere with future people.
Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its
Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser
traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall
A new ethic is wanted.
e
As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between
try to show.
§2.
a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic
notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.
*
An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system
(i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which
includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values
and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu
ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is
obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights^what
* A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super
ethics, their features and fundamental notions.
6.
is valued, and so forth.
A general or lawlike proposition
of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S| and
S2 contain different principles then they are different
systems.
It follows that any environmental ethic differs
from the important traditional ethics outlined.
Moreover
if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems
on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then
these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised)
- in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a
new ethic is wanted.
It suffices then to locate a core
principle and to provide environmental counter examples to
it.
It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount
to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles
that will accordingly belong to the super ethic.
The fair-
ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one
example.
Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core
principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of
4- A'/Z
the modified dominance position:.
A recent formulation
*
runs
as follows ([3], p.58):
'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds
that one should be able to do what he wishesproviding (1)
that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely
to harm himself irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism -because
under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a
bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a
freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a
wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the
environment and natural things) providing they do not harm
* A related principle is that (modified)
can operate within similar limits.
t
X
/< > /Cy
,
.... r -r-
free enterprise
'i-
others.
In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of
proof to others.
It is worth remarking that harming others
in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the
(usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in
my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing;
you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because
it does not harm me.
There remains a problem however as to
exactly what counts as harm or interference.
Moreover the
width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may
be filled out in significantly different ways:
it makes a
difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism
whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too
restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient
-hv
being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the
principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to
which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future
others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether
to possible others.
The latter would make the principle
completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it
applies at most to present and future others,
7/v
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples
to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis
of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out
over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon
sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and
what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation.
But the
main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is
that ethical principles if correct are universal and are
assessed over the class of ideal situations.
(i)
The last man (or person)
surviving the collapse of the world system lays
about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every
The last man example.
living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs) .
What he does
is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong.
Moreover one does not have to be committed to esot
eric
values
to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving
badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking
and values have shifted in an environmental direction
in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation
of fundamental evaluative principles).
(ii)
The last people example.
The last man example can
be broadened to the last people example.
We can
assume that they know they are the last people, e.g.
because they are aware that radiation effects have
blocked any chance of reproduction.
One considers
the last people in order to rule out the possibility
that what these people do harms or somehow physically
interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as
well consider science fiction cases where people
arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems,
whether with good intentions such as perfecting the
planet for their ends and making it more fruitful
or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the
hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are
very numerous.
They humanely exterminate every wild
9.
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they
put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and
all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries
or plantations, and so on.
They may give various
familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is
the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are
simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it
is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied
so that they do not worry too much about their impending
extinctions.
On an environmental ethic the last
people have behaved badly; they have simplified and
largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and
with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and
largely wrecked place.
But this conduct may conform
with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with
the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions.
Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv
inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation
principles.
The conflict may be removed it seems by
conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle,
to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy
natural resources.
But as the last people do not
destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the
best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally
inadequate.
(iii)
The great entrepreneur example.
The last man example
can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3).
The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant
complex of automated factories and farms which he
10.
proceeds to extend.
He produces automobiles among
other things, from renewable and recyclable resources
of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly
after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead
of putting them on the road for a short time as we
do.
Of course he has the best of reasons for his
activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product,
or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and
he will be increasing his own and general welfare
since he much prefers increased output and product
ivity.
The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly
thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto
optimality requirements given prevailing notions of
being "better off".
Just as we can extend the last man example
to a class of last people, so we can extend this
example to the industrial society example:
looks rather like
Civ)
the society
ours.
The vanishing species example. Consider the blue
whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The
blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of
his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue
whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or
physically interfere with others in any good sense,
though it may upset them and they may be prepared to
compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale
hunting be wilful destruction.
(Slightly different
examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
11.
blue whale example are provided by cases where a
species is eliminated or threatened through destruc
tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ
ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-
dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.)
The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this
magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite
permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism.
But on an environmental ethic it is not.
However the
free-market mechanism will not cease allocating
whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ
mental economics would; instead the market model will
grind inexorably
*
along the private demand curve until
the blue whale population is no longer viable - if
’r <
that point has not already been passed.
7/7 /
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‘
In sum'
class of permissible actions that
/rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed
on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super
ethic.
But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim
ing that these people, those of the examples and respected
industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when
engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the
sort described, in a morally impermissible way?
these people do is
No, what
to a greater or lesser extent evil,
and hence in serious cases morally impermissible.
For example,
insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive
peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is
morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the
slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private
profit.
But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a
* For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained
in [3] .
13.
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capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig
ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or
restraining or designed to injure other persons'.
But this
sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting
the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects,
since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the
definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and
accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same
defective principle.
Accordingly an environmental ethic would
have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from
straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to
animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect
to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic
14.
morally, through obligations
practically anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions
which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic
behaviour calculable is easily brought out.
These positions typ
ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi
ness, as a summum banum; characteristically each individual of
some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future
humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in
question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is
supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be
done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under
the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule
utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to
the collective ranking.
The species bias is transparent from the
selection of the base class.
And even if the base class is extended
to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of
including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the
positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of
the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust
principles.
For example if every member of the base class detests
dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour,
ive
then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states
where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will
generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the
evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway).
Likewise it would
just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori
zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy
with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing
J
15.
private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened
to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
"rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent
their extinction.
Whether the blue whale survives should not have
to depend on what humans know or what they see on television.
Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide
a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally
desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in
their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going
meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories,
try to offer some rationale for their basic principles.
For
instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter
of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on
a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the
application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on
a Kantian position.which has some vogue-obligations somehow
arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.
In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-
disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad
for them; that is (rough) justice.
R. Routley
Australian National University
REFERENCES
[1]
A. Leopold,
A Sand Country Almenac with other essays
on Conservation,
[2]
J. Passmore,
New York (196 6) .
Ecological Problems and Western Traditions
(unpublished).
[3]
P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and
Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem,
New York (1972).
[4]
S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors),
Men and Morals.
hon-humans,
[5]
Animals,
An enquiry into the maltreatment of
London (1971).
H.L.A. Hart,
‘Are there any natural rights?',
reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy,
Oxford (1967).
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, S. I. Benn, Acting Head of Department of Philosophy to Dr. R. Rosenkrantz, Department
of Philosophy, University of South Caroline, 6 Sep 1973 re fellowship at the Research School of
Social Sciences, supervised by Richard Routley. (3 pages)
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Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?
§1.
It is increasingly said that civilization, Western
civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and
derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's
relations to the natural environment, in Leopold’s words
’an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the
animals and plants which grow upon it'
([1], p.238).
It
is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal
with man's relation to nature:
they do, and on the prevailing
view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his
relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect
others, are not subject to moral censure.
such as
Thus assertions
Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least
as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are
false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense,
It is to this, to the values and evaluations
moral oojects.
*
of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact
take exception.
Leopold regards as subject to moral crit
icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally
permissible.
But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that
such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics
and that an extension of traditional morality is required to
cover such cases,to fill a moral void.
If Leopold is right
in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is
a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations.
For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel
morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield,
and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere
with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others.
'A
* A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house
* spirits.
2.
fanner who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his
cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks,
and soil into the community creek, is still (if other
wise decent) a respected member of society.'
([1], p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad
itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally
wrong, and the fanner subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose
of the argument.
What is not so clear is that a new ethic
is required even for such radical judgements.
For one thing
it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic,
much as it is often unclear whether a new development in
physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification
or extension of the old.
For, notoriously, ethics are not
clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the
application of identity criteria for ethics may remain
*
obscure.
Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of
ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental
principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain
ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of
differing and even competing systems.
In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental
ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that
of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics
or that of the development of principles that are already
encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic.
The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be
incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within)
the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because
there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in
* To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact
is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and
fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter
minate .
3.
Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights
and drugs, there are competing sets of principles.
Talk
of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a
sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing
ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three
important traditions in Western ethical views concerning
man's relation to nature? a dominant tradition, the despotic
position, with man as despot (or tyrant^ and two lesser
traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, ■
and tne co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor
are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and
both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent
with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is
the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he
pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine
view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ
mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases,
it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can
not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of
the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means
adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the
religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for
and responsible to?
However both traditions are inconsistent
with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of
complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic
some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be
preserved *
rom substantial human interference, whether of
4.
the "improving" sort or not.
Both traditions would in
fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along
the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small
farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative
position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and
perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out
its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily
usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship
view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make
nature productive by his efforts though not by means that
will deliberately degrade its resources.
Although these
positions both depart from the dominant position in a way
which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an
environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the
irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough:
for in
the present situation of expanding populations confined to
finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the
perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough
going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of
total use, implying that every natural area should be culti
vated or otherwise used
*
for human ends, "humanized".
As the important Western traditions exclude an
environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic,
not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright,
h//
The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic
has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is
not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically
interferes with others.
Maybe some such proviso was implicit
all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was
* If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use
for preservation, this total use principle is rendered
inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note
that the total use principle is tied to the resource view
of nature.
simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural
items would not affect others (the non-interference
assumption).
Be this as it may, the modified dominant
position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi
tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ
mental ethic.
For example, the farmer's polluting of a
community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that
it physically interferes with others who use or would use
the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy
the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which
cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans,
can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that
of(j[3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on.
The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family
size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation
excessive population levels will interfere with future people.
Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its
Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser
traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall
try to show.
A new ethic is wanted.
§2.
As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between
a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic
notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.
*
An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system
(i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which
includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values
and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu
ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is
obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rightsr what
* A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super
ethics, their features and fundamental notions.
6.
is valued, and so forth.
A general or lawlike proposition
of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and
S2 contain different principles then they are different
systems.
It follows that any environmental ethic differs
from the important traditional ethics outlined.
Moreover
if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems
on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then
these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised)
- in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a
new ethic is wanted.
It suffices then to locate a core
principle and to provide environmental counter examples to
it.
It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount
to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles
that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair
ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one
example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core
principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of
the modified dominance position.
A recent formulation
*
runs
as follows ([3], p.58):
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The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds
that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1)
that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely
to harm himself irreparably.'
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because
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under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a
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bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a
freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a
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others.
In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of
proof to others.
It is worth remarking that harming others
in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the
(usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in
£my interests, because I detest you?, that you stop breathing «
I-
you are free to breathe , for the time being anyway, because
it does not harm me
There remains a problem however as to
exactly what counts as harm or interference
Moreover the
width of the principle is so far obscure because ’other' may
be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a
difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism
•
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whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too
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restrictive - <or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient
being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the
principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to
which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future
others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether
to possible others,
The latter would make the principle
completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it
applies at most to present and future others.
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples
to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis
of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out
over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon
sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and
what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation.
But the
main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is
that ethical principles if correct are universal and are
8.
assessed over the class of ideal situations.
The last man example.
(1)
The last man (or person)
surviving the collapse of the world system lays
. .
--------.................................... I
about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every
living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly i
you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does
is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong.
Moreover one does not have to be committed to eso
values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving
I badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking
‘r- l C-a values have shifted in an environ-nt.l direction
h-
■
eric
'°f -^responding shifts in the formulation
fundamental evaluative principles).
The last people example.
The last man example can
be broadened to the last people example. We can
assume that they know they are the last people, e.g.
because they are aware that radiation effects have
blocked any chance of reproduction. One const ers
the last people in order to rule out the posslbt 1 y
that what these people do harms or somehow physically
interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as
well consider science fiction cases where people
arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems
whether with good intentions such as perfecting the
planet for their ends and making it more fruit.u
or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the
hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are
very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
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animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they
put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and
all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries
or plantations, and so on. They may give various
V, familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is
the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are
simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it
is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied
so that they do not worry too much about their impending
extinctions.
On an environmental ethic the last
people have behaved badly; they have simplified and
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largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and
with their demise the world will soon bean ugly and
largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform
witlCthe^basic chauvinist principle, and as well with
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the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions.
Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
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because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv
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inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation
principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by
conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, b’J
to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy^
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But as_____________
the last people do not
natural resources.
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destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the
the variant is still environmentallW^,^
best of reasons",
inadequate.
The great entrepreneur example. The last man example
can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3) .
The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant,
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complex of automated factories and farms which he
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10.
proceeds to extend.
He produces automobiles among
other things, from renewable and recyclable resources
of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly
after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead
of putting them on the road for a short time as we
do.
A
Of coarse he has the best of reasons for his
activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product,
or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and
he will be increasing his own and general welfare
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since he much prefers increased output and product
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ivity.
The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western
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ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonlyj'bovtW',
thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto
optimality requirements given prevailing notions of
being "better off".
Just as we can extend the last man example
to a class of last people, so we can extend this
C^S/XU-i
example to the industrial society example:
looks rather like ours.
(iv)
The vanishing species example.
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the society
Consider the blue
whale, a mixed good on the economic picture.
The
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blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of
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his qualities as a private good, as a source of valu-
able oil and meat.
The catching and marketing of blue
whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or
physically interfere with others in any good sense,
7
though it may upset them and they may be prepared to
compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale
hunting be wilful destruction.
(Slightly different
examples which eliminate the hunting aspect rf the
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11.
blue whale example are provided by cases where a
species is eliminated or threatened through destruc—
tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ
ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plainsdwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.)
The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this
magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite
permissible — at least according to basic chauvinism.
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But on an environmental ethic it is not.
However the
free-market mechanism will not cease allocating
whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ
mental economics would; instead the market model will
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grind inexorably
*
along the private demand curve until
the blue whale population is no longer viable - if
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that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that
Ola
rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed
on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super
ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim
ing that these people, those of the examples and respected
industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when
engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the
sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what
these people do is
to a greater or lesser extent evil,
and hence in serious cases morally impermissible.
For example,
insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive
peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is
morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the
slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private
profit.
But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a
* For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained
in [ 3 ] .
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extending (2) to rnclu
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would be so affected by the action in
It may be preferand (3) to exclude speciej&de.
the environment
in vieW of the way the freedom
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imply to scrap it altogether, and mate
proof, s of rights and permissible conduct, as in a b
classes
theory sometimes forces changes
§3
a radical change in a
rejects the Reference
in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
a modification of the
Theory in a
Reference Theory and
usual -ta-tdef-eh^also^aeee
Jat simllt pheno^nCseens to occur in the case of a neta-
A somewhat s nxl
P
ethlc.
Quite apart from
ethl°de’“ several environmentally important notions, such as
introducing several
meta—
n 4.4™ arowth and preservation, for mec»
conservation, pollut^COTp^e-examinatlon
I
ethical analysis, an ,< of such characteristic(actions) as natural
and modified analyses
3 of obligation and
round of right, and of the relations
right■
may well require re-assessment of
permissibility to rights; it
notions as value and right, espectraditional analyses of such
on chauvinist assumptions; and it
ially where these are based
of the more prominent meta-ethical
forces the rejection of many
illustrated by a very brief exam
positions. These points are
then by a sketch of the
ination of accounts of nature^ right an
speciess bias of some major positions.
*
positions.
to defeating conditions
Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject
doctrine of natural rights
here irrelevant, the classical
which are
'anv adult human ■.•
to
which,
among
other
things,
according
are developed by those protesting about
points are oevei p
especially the essay s
Some of these
ltreatment of animals; see especial y
human ma
collected in [4] .
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13.
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capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig
ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or
restraining or designed to injure other persons'.
But this
sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting
the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects,
since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the
definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and
accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same
defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would
have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from
straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to
animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect
.. to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view
that natural objects such as trees^have rights (though such a view
is occasionally held, e.g. by partheists.
since artefacts are not alive).
But p^/theism is false
For moral prohibitions forbidding
certairTactions with respect to an object do not award that object
a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given
tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of
property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without
seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views
can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are
coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing
obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e.,
has a right also has responsibilities and thereat least , whatever____________
'J
fore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests, Thus
although any person may have a right by no means every living thing
can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects
other than persons cannot have rights.
r \fhO<
*
But persons can relate
AT
***.
A-
*/Z
/»
A '^s" fa
. ... 8(^
14.
morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to
practically anything at all.
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions
which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic
behaviour calculable is easily brought out.
These positions typ
ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi
ness, as a summum bgnum; characteristically each individual of
soine base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future
humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in
question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is
supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be
done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under
the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule
utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to
The species bias is transparent from the
the collective ranking.
selection of the base class.
And even if the base class is extended
to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of
including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the
positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of
the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust
principles.
For example if every member of the base class detests
dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour,
ive
then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states
where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will
generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the
evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway).
Likewise it would
just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori
zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy
with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing
*
b'v
d(k^
V10'"
hU
•x'5
5
15.
oP ,
X»
private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened
to kr^ow that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
"rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent
their extinction.
Whether the blue whale survives should not have
to depend on what humans know or what they see on television.
Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide
a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally
desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not alone in
their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going
meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories,
try to offer some rationale for their basic principles.
For
instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter
of mutual agreements between individuals of .the base class; on
a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the
application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on
a Kantian position which has some vogue obligations somehow
arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.
In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-
disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad
for them: that is
R. Routley
(rough) justice.
Australian National University
REFERENCES
[1]
A. Leopold,
A Sand Country Almenac with other essays
on Conservation,
New York (1966) .
[2]
J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions
(unpublished).
[3]
P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier,
Environmental Decay.
New York (1972).
[4]
The Solution becomes the Problem,
S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors),
Men and Morals.
hon-humans,
[5]
Economic Growth and
H.L.A. Hart,
An enquiry into the maltreatment of
London (1971) .
'Are there any natural rights?',
reprinted in A. Quinton (editor),
Oxford (1967).
Animals,
Political Philosophy,
The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of
conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions
typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum;
characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including
future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, Of
the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in
terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as
in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism,
in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is
transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace
persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing
testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that-the whole of the base class may
be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base
class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto
ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly,
from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of
most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective
demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue
whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in
the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then
“rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the
blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi
sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for
deciding on what is environmentally desirable.
These ethical and economic theories are not aione in their species chauvinism; much the
same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer
some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a
matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights
and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the
base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some
vigue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case
if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is
too bad for them: that is (rough) justice.
/
REFERENCES
1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966).
2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished).
3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the
Problem, New York (1972).
4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment
of non-humans, London (1971).
5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford
(1967).
§ 3. A radical change in a teory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which
rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for
logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a
meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen
tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation,for meta-ethical
analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such
characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as
XT
value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec
tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very
brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some *
6
major positions.7
A
Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical
doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human . . . capable of
choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one
coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a
human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental
ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural
right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes *
the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the
classical notion of a natural right, a farzfrom straight forward matter now that human rights with'
respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that
long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation.
An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees
have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since
artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object
do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or
piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be
mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with
mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and
so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever
has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in
terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can
(significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have
rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically
anything at all.
H Some of these points are developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays
collected in [4]
/§ 2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic,
and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S
3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least
as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature
4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions
is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in
cludes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general
evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong,
of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a
principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2contain different principles, then they are different
systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin
ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle
embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming,
what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) — in which case if an environmental
ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide
environmental counter examples to it.
It is commonly assumed that there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical
systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed
in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle,
is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent for
mulation5 runs as follows ( [31, p. 58):
’The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he
wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself
irreparably.’
Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people,
come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom
principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which
mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to
cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restric
tion is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my
interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being t
anywav, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts
as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ‘other’ may
be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the
chauvinism whethe^ ‘other’ expands to ‘other human’ - which is too restrictive - or to ‘other’person’ or to ‘other’seritient being’; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and in
versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to
future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable
future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely un
workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others.
It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a
semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations *
(which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal
situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal
situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles
if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations.
(i)
The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system
lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if
you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism,
but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit
ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra
dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding
shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles).
(ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example.
We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation
effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out
the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people.
Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where peonle arrive at a new planet and
5 A related principle is that (modified) free enterprise can operate v. ithin similar limits
destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends
and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it.
Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild
animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation,
and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give
various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they
are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or
occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en
vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed
all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck
ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the
principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is
because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co
operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the
basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last
people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still
environmentally inadequate.
(iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul
of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and
farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable
and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture
and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of
course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is
improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he
much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western
ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even
meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’.
Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex
ample to the Industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours.
(iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic
ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a
source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the
whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up
set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun
ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the
blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through
destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many
plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in
eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to
basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will
not cease allocating whalep to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics
would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the
blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed.
In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly
circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en
vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in
dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac
tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a
greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar
as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial
development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain
ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory
6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3]
freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be
made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by
the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be
preferable, in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it
altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights.
CJ\^<.
& ’
§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new
ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people’s relations to the natural environ
ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and
plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal
with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as
he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject
to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are
significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe’s actions do not interfere with
others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to
this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex
ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing
views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is
beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required
to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct
what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand,
as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they
maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not
taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the
woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into
the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245)
Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be
accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism.
Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a
new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is
going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics
counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are
not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics
may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not
differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is
an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there
are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the
evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the
development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The
second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological
problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a
1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits
- To the consternation modoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary
systems the identity of which may be indeterminate
205
single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on
controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin
ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a
uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have.
Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views
concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as
despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and
the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is
another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.
The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according
to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the
mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental
ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental
ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser
traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious
backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are
inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference,
whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserv
ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions
would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com
fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position
man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing
out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on
the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his
efforts though not by means that wiil deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions
both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some
evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they
do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite
natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas.
Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a
principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for
human ends, “humanized”.
As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that
such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so
straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not
always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such
proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that
doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump
tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have
supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further
towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may
be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the
stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory
returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the
sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi
tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa
tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified
dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is
adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.
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Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes 2 draft copies of 'Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?' by Sylvan, with handwritten emendations and annotations; and 2 letters.
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The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
[75] leaves. 57.42 MB.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Australian National University Office - Second Bookcase - Third Shelf - Second Pile
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Third Shelf > Second Pile
Box 15: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b87130a29f9b52af42c4cef275532629.pdf
b0bf742ca1521f0e62f99c840366ccf4
PDF Text
Text
I
I
1
/
I
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
CENTRE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION
23 May 1983
Professor Peter Karmel,
Vice-Chancellor.
Dear Professor Karmel,
Publi .. Affairs Conference: The consequences of nuclear war.
I have to advise you that I have serious concerns about several aspects
of this conference, which takes place next Monday-Tuesday 30-31 May.
Despit the unusual amount of time that it has taken in an attempt to
establish and agree upon the programme, and an unprecedented level of
involvement_ of the Assistant Vice-Chancellor in an attempt to enlist
more senior authority to hold the programme to what is agreed, it has
not proved possible for the Centre for Continuing Education effectively
to be responsible for the programme, or indeed even to be sure what the
programme is.
I respect and personally happen to be in agreement with Dr Denborough in
his commitment to the cause of peace and prevention of nuclear war. The
large enrolment of the conference (well in excess of 300) is due to his
very considerable efforts in publicising it as well as to its intrinsic
contemporary interest and importance.
His commitment however is such as
to override all normal conventions of cooperative behaviour, and it leaves
me unable to give assurances that the conference will be ah activity proper
and appropriate to the University.
The programme as it now appears to be is the result of a succession of
compromises extracted through pressures of various kinds.
Those involved
in the Centre are by no means happy with the result, and fear that it has
now become over-crowded, as we have been nbliged to honour agreements entered
into, as I believe, illegitimately on behalf of the University.
The likely
high level of interest and energy among those taking part, and the frustration
of a crowded programme and little opportunity till late on for floor contribution,
may well make for an explosive situation.
Much of this I have accepted, as I believe has the Assistant Vice-Chancellor,
reluctantly and finding the alternatives still less attractive.
As the
programme now reads, my most serious concern is that Dr Denborough is to
chair the final session.
I believe that he is too dedicated to a point of
view, and too embedded in the whole emotional side of the subject, the planning
and the conference, to be able to take this part satisfactorily.
I am also
concerned that Dr Millar is apparently being limited in his participation to
chairing the session at which Dr Ball is to speak.
I consider that a strong
chairperson and a well balanced panel are very important for the final session
to be satisfactory from a University point of view.
The various kinds of
moral and other blackmail that have been employed may make this impossible,
but in this and some other respects the conference remains, for all the efforts
of CCE to retain balance and authoritative presentations, highly volatile.
One reason for writing is to alert you to this, as even now it may not be too
late to enhance the quality of what at any rate is certain to be a high profile
event.
The other is to anticipate and if possible avert a consequence of
any embarrassment which might be caused by the conference: a natural reaction
away from attempting any other important but controversial theme in public
affairs and extension conferences.
The cornmi ttee which was developing thi_s
conference came to be replaced by one man, and the attempt of Mr Plowman and
myself, with CCE colleagues, to fill the vacant place naturally proved less
than satisfactory.
The lesson should be not again to allow any member of
the University with a particular personal commitment of this kind to capture
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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I
I
1
/
I
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
CENTRE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION
23 May 1983
Professor Peter Karmel,
Vice-Chancellor.
Dear Professor Karmel,
Publi .. Affairs Conference: The consequences of nuclear war.
I have to advise you that I have serious concerns about several aspects
of this conference, which takes place next Monday-Tuesday 30-31 May.
Despit the unusual amount of time that it has taken in an attempt to
establish and agree upon the programme, and an unprecedented level of
involvement_ of the Assistant Vice-Chancellor in an attempt to enlist
more senior authority to hold the programme to what is agreed, it has
not proved possible for the Centre for Continuing Education effectively
to be responsible for the programme, or indeed even to be sure what the
programme is.
I respect and personally happen to be in agreement with Dr Denborough in
his commitment to the cause of peace and prevention of nuclear war. The
large enrolment of the conference (well in excess of 300) is due to his
very considerable efforts in publicising it as well as to its intrinsic
contemporary interest and importance.
His commitment however is such as
to override all normal conventions of cooperative behaviour, and it leaves
me unable to give assurances that the conference will be ah activity proper
and appropriate to the University.
The programme as it now appears to be is the result of a succession of
compromises extracted through pressures of various kinds.
Those involved
in the Centre are by no means happy with the result, and fear that it has
now become over-crowded, as we have been nbliged to honour agreements entered
into, as I believe, illegitimately on behalf of the University.
The likely
high level of interest and energy among those taking part, and the frustration
of a crowded programme and little opportunity till late on for floor contribution,
may well make for an explosive situation.
Much of this I have accepted, as I believe has the Assistant Vice-Chancellor,
reluctantly and finding the alternatives still less attractive.
As the
programme now reads, my most serious concern is that Dr Denborough is to
chair the final session.
I believe that he is too dedicated to a point of
view, and too embedded in the whole emotional side of the subject, the planning
and the conference, to be able to take this part satisfactorily.
I am also
concerned that Dr Millar is apparently being limited in his participation to
chairing the session at which Dr Ball is to speak.
I consider that a strong
chairperson and a well balanced panel are very important for the final session
to be satisfactory from a University point of view.
The various kinds of
moral and other blackmail that have been employed may make this impossible,
but in this and some other respects the conference remains, for all the efforts
of CCE to retain balance and authoritative presentations, highly volatile.
One reason for writing is to alert you to this, as even now it may not be too
late to enhance the quality of what at any rate is certain to be a high profile
event.
The other is to anticipate and if possible avert a consequence of
any embarrassment which might be caused by the conference: a natural reaction
away from attempting any other important but controversial theme in public
affairs and extension conferences.
The cornmi ttee which was developing thi_s
conference came to be replaced by one man, and the attempt of Mr Plowman and
myself, with CCE colleagues, to fill the vacant place naturally proved less
than satisfactory.
The lesson should be not again to allow any member of
the University with a particular personal commitment of this kind to capture
Dublin Core
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Title
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Box 17, Item 1: Richard Routley? to Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor, Australian National University, 23 May 1983
Subject
The topic of the resource
Letter missing pages. Possibly written by Richard Routley (later Sylvan). Routley writes to Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor of ANU, about his concerns of the university's involvement in the Public Affairs Conference (30-31 May), in relation to the consequences of nuclear war and Dr Denborough, the conference chair. Typescript letter, written on Australian National University (ANU) Centre for Continuing Education letter head. Marked private and confidential.
Description
An account of the resource
Unnumbered manuscript from collection, item number assigned by library staff.
The rightsholder for this work cannot be identified, or is identifiable but cannot be found, after a reasonable good faith search. If you believe you have a valid claim to the rights in this work, please contact us by email copyright@library.uq.edu.au
Creator
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 1
Publisher
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Date
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May 23, 1993
Contributor
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Richard Sylvan
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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Letter, 1 leaf [962.77 KB]
Type
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Correspondences
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7af99ef">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7af99ef</a>
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5cb229c3d9affba38077a07c721b6799.pdf
864475d38dc9bafca72f1f6da54ba711
PDF Text
Text
��������
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Box 17, Item 1264: Characterizing anarchism
Subject
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Handwritten on scrap paper.
Description
An account of the resource
Verso of leaves not digitised
Creator
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 1264
Publisher
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Contributor
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<span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span>
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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[8] leaves. 4.58 MB.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:709ee89">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:709ee89</a>
Coverage
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Australian National University - Bookcase - 1st on Right - 3rd Shelf Down - First Pile
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Bookcase > 1st on Right > 3rd Shelf Down > First Pile
Box 17: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/47290a949d35cf80426b62ad11ea2f02.pdf
4bf0c098455f06e841302b4c0e11fc65
PDF Text
Text
ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions”
project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts Anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of an
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present best-practice democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems
are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB 683
Bungendore Australia 2621
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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ABSTRACT OF
PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY
A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal
and certainly commonly anti-environmental is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in
Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions”
project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread
disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put
radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change.
A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several
problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side,
increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent
upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower
impact organisation, which halts Anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A
functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of an
encephaletic organisation.
Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in
present best-practice democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems
are sketched and defended.
R. Sylvan
RMB 683
Bungendore Australia 2621
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 17, Item 984: Abstract of Problems and solutions in deep ecopolitical theory
Subject
The topic of the resource
Typescript
Description
An account of the resource
Note, one item digitised from item 984.
Creator
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 984
Publisher
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Contributor
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<span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span>
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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[1] leaf. 539.65 KB.
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Manuscript
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1281ef1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1281ef1</a>
Box 17: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d238dd79bb3f1ee48d89a9ee1eaafa0d.pdf
e2faa9a5b7a1df99c3768418e2d7768c
PDF Text
Text
����
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 17, Item 984: Miscellaneous notes on anark
Subject
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Handwritten notes on scrap paper.
Description
An account of the resource
Verso of leaves not digitised. Note, one item digitised from item 984.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 984
Publisher
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Contributor
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<span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span>
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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[4] leaves. 1.84 MB.
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Manuscript
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5c3aeec">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5c3aeec</a>
Box 17: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ead82de895e579a8e06b9cd889bf5470.pdf
33e8c3b195bf1de721f623ec3ef5dab1
PDF Text
Text
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��PREFACE.
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This text is written in deep anger, anger not just at what humans have done to so much
of the face of the Earth, but still more at what they continue to do.
ar
Much of the Earth is now a mess.,) Mess is due to humans, some humans. Worse,
much of the Earth's environment continues to be destroyed or seriously degraded. Again the
main direct or indirect cause is human activity. Humans continue to foul, degrade, or
destroy not only their own habitats but the environments of most other forms of life as well.
That did not need to happen. It does not have to go on happening. There were paths
not taken. There were significant options not even properly considered. In some cases,
there still are such options, not being seriously considered, not being taken. 1
(
That should be changed. But present socio-political arrangements, throughout entire
complex or states that covers the Earth, depend upon, are premiss^ upon, features that lead to
precisely such destruction^ and degradation^. For many states such resully are both
^4
occurring in their own territories, and spilling over into those of others. Present socio
political arrangements accordingly have to be changed, changed radically. But here we
encounter an evident obstacle. It is unlikely that those in power, or with privilege, will go
qui^ly, will let their class subside from its materially advantages position, or wither away
environmentally. An appropriate revolution may be needed in certain key places to affect due
changes. But that is a very controversial idea.
There is no need to recite yet again the litany of environmental disasters that have
^co
occurred or the even more calamitous stack thafare already activated. Almost every day there
A
is something new or still news. Another oil spill, wiping out the lives ojf present habitats of
birds and fish. Through deforestation,^landslides here, flooding there. More whales taken
by the Japanese, Ozone holes grow. And so it goes on, with much more in store. But now
nearly every sizeable introductory textbook in biology or geography includes a large and
largely depressing section on environmental "problems" (at least too some of the devastation
and depredation is at last seen as constituting a "problem"). So do many other books; an
excellent easy high ted introduction is Ear?Asropg. And more and more popular periodicals
and newspapers^/e on environmental disasters and problems or run feature articles.' With
new threats to the collective human future the environment has become highly fashionable.
,
Now, with some appreciation of the inconvenience to business and businessmen of a nuclear
winter, runaway greenhouse, or like catastrophe even cautious conservatives are beginning
1
The intellectual who does most to bring this out, the arbitrariness even of present institutional
arrangements, is no doubt I^acault.
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to recognise that there may be ^ome problems, that }a major nuclear exchange will have
among its plausible efforts, the greatest biological and physical disruptions of this planet in
the last 65 million years'. But the apparent fact is that the very course we are 3a,
any further catastrophe, without a nuclear exchange, will cause the greatest biological
Z) 6 Ar.
disruption of the planet in the last 65 million years. It is enough to
and compare
data for species loss.
It is now a relatively easy matter to .... the considerable array of environmental
problems and outrages that we so far know something about. It is another, much more
difficult, matter to do something worthwhile about them.
While many environmental problems may now be sufficiently clear, and stark, how to
react to them, what to do, what practice and theory to pursue are seldom so clear. [Nor is
there any very grave difficulty about some of what needs to be done in order to avert or
reduce some of the worst problems, and some of the major disasters in store. What is
lacking is sufficient motivation, or opportunity among main power brokers (political will,
.<............... ..... ................................................ .................... .................................................................... ——— ----------------------- - —
political blockages,<etc)]
Th& text aims to develop the assemble requisite theory and indicate resultant practices
Ensuing political theory^
which will lead to relevant change. But)
There is much theoretical work to be accomplished, both critical and constructive.
Critical work criticizing present and prevailing assumptions and practices, and the acclaimed
justification and alleged reasonableness of these practices. Constructive activity outlining
ernative idea-<
idea-e^clicism,
alternative practices and way of reaching
alternative structures, alternative
'
. The present exercise aims to be a part of that endeavors. It is a
them from
where we——
are.
..
______________ ——
-------------- A/
philosophical, theoretical book^ It concentrates on the theory, especially the
theory, of /
.. ......................................................................................................
I.....
.......
. ^4—environmentalisin.\ While it offers a purework for environmental action, it says little directly
Ar
no
c
.
on such action. Those are one practical details zmd recipes for saving a forest froim
.
_
eismAiSSUfi
/
hen?
destructive logging interests, for example, ways to proceed abouTihal are forever become
increasingly appreciated. What is still lacking is the wider p^lifactory structure which
explains and justifies opposition and resistance.
The run of environmental ethics text do little of what is required. They contain
insufficient criticism, little analysis of depth, no vision or elaboration of alternatives. They
are so sweetly, eminently reasonable^ fiddling while environmental Rome bums. Too many
seek "blame"
and all that sort of crap.
Or, where they would shake
" with
........ - development
r
r
near ihA
present predatory arrangements, it is only in one respect, and that not getting to bottom of the
troubles, reat^ meat eating. For, while some problems work be ^t-&ough^(^
----- other
generals thereby), it is evident that the rape of most of the Earth could construe
vegetarian way.
ace in a
, .
�Environmental ethics texts have no anger, no outrage at what is Being being done to
the Earth. Put crudely, they lack guts. Indeed some suggest that things are proceeding
rather well, as it not so well, as well as could be expected. (If the latter it coop very little for
managing humans competent as managers/organisers). Al! is vary/ivr from well. There is
cause not merely for concern, but for deep anger. (Such anger may be un-American.)
The dominant way, re^our^ism,
if not successfully opposed, will ultimately
destroy the ecosphere and then humans
among other species
Intellectuals, philosophers especially, lately economists even more,2 deal to answer
for, socially and environmentally. They encouraged permit of present damaging practices;
they proceeded to provide the intellectual and attitudinal underpinnings that helped motivate
and continue^ to justify the practices.
Nor, with the evidence of environmental crisis so manifest, have things changed much.
Most intellectuals continue as if nothing had happened apart from the beneficial advancement
of science and technology. Most economists continue to produce or partificate upon various
growth (or maximal equilibrium) pmf^tonals. Most philosophers - most are AngloAmerican in background - continue in their hopeless efforts to prop up or impede upon what
is fundamentally anfhdi d awedy^basicaiiyv Humean empiricism (thus recently in the on-going
display of Humean fashions, evolutionary epistemology, belief as reduced to desire, causal
reductions, etc). Most have said, or done, very little about the^..^./ environmental
situations; those who have, like Naess, are often ridiculed by the comfortable professionals.
4
This book tries to retell, in a more organised and coherent way what deep-green
theory, an environmental theory that has emerged in a sporadic and scattered way over the
last couple of decades, is all about. But not everything is told; only the predominantly ethical
pa^ts. Later parts of this series on deep-green theory will cover political and economics
theory and social theory more generally.
Untila century ago philosophy and economics were not separate disciplines. The significant
economists were almost invariably philosophers (neeerds may be the one main^,...).
�X\^7c-vr/
?^7<!k^<
/7,^ -7^ . r^/
7^r^7
c)/-^^ //^A^-. ;
/ C/ A
A'
�Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative
environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in
radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It
offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an
intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical
theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory.
But the ethic' issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political
economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical
decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and
agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often
considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no
part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to
comprehensiveness.
The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of
(acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory and
relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and
„--------- -—-sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory moBe^gen^ahy can A
avoid them„ (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast m a more classical
Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form^ Nor will these background
advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background
will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or
proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more
technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices.
LA^to d^ep theory-—
Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory.
There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting
of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the
way deep-green theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident,
particularly with the intertwining of truth and value t&at
it is worth giving an example.
Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future
generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in
the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet)
e
�exist in "suitable" determinate form in the second. Deep object-theory slices straight through
these issues, removing the problem-generating ontological assumptions.
is a grander theory lying in the background, which significantly influences
the philosophical approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it.
There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden
agenda. The background theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply
For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory:
deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical
endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep
positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on
dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc.) With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a
fairly comprehensive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate
comprehensiveness as regards present philosophical problems would come a certain
completeness; but I've come to thinkjhat a total philosophy is an illusion, like
at
it
Deep theory is no doubt a presumptuous title (there are worse about, e.g. Total
philosophy", 'ecosophy'^, ^o( it is altogether satisfactory, given the problems and obscurities,
.to be encountered, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did not exactly
good to refuse. It emerged from a terminological confluence of several e&eas in which I'd
thought, or environmental philosophy^with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory,
deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens
object-theory).
To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main
features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelations, and some of their
revolutionary potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been
assumed or presupposed in Western philosophy, and particularly in Enlightenmented
contemporary philosophy.
For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:* the Ontological Assumption, that truth, and also/ meaning, are functions of reference, and
thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can
perfectlv well talk and think trulv aboutS items that do not exist, and' also about items that are
impossible. ^Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionally favoured full-back from
enttcalism, namely possibilism, which assumes
�* the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals#
there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away.
Bound up with possibilism are
* the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute
Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or
paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The
transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of
moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate
requirement of consistency.
under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs.
Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that
* entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality
amounts to a modal function of material implication^. The rejection of such themes and their
jeourses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic.
While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially
reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded
does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to
ependent development and analysis.
//yyy-
1
Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially
implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the
necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies
B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B.
,.
A,
�/ re/
��
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
<L^
80993
o/
Methods
reZ#Z:ons
carrot <-
->
stick
Back-up
possibly
Transparent
BENIGN
PaciEst
opposition
T
^2---------------------------- ---
4,
opaque
Enlightenment
opposition
Liberal
\ opposition
PREFACE.
A
roc/ </'<:/'
This text is written in deep anger, anger not just at what humans have done to so much
of the face of the Earth, but still more at what they continue to do.
ar
Much of the Earth is now a mess.,) Mess is due to humans, some humans. Worse,
much of the Earth's environment continues to be destroyed or seriously degraded. Again the
main direct or indirect cause is human activity. Humans continue to foul, degrade, or
destroy not only their own habitats but the environments of most other forms of life as well.
That did not need to happen. It does not have to go on happening. There were paths
not taken. There were significant options not even properly considered. In some cases,
there still are such options, not being seriously considered, not being taken. 1
(
That should be changed. But present socio-political arrangements, throughout entire
complex or states that covers the Earth, depend upon, are premiss^ upon, features that lead to
precisely such destruction^ and degradation^. For many states such resully are both
^4
occurring in their own territories, and spilling over into those of others. Present socio
political arrangements accordingly have to be changed, changed radically. But here we
encounter an evident obstacle. It is unlikely that those in power, or with privilege, will go
qui^ly, will let their class subside from its materially advantages position, or wither away
environmentally. An appropriate revolution may be needed in certain key places to affect due
changes. But that is a very controversial idea.
There is no need to recite yet again the litany of environmental disasters that have
^co
occurred or the even more calamitous stack thafare already activated. Almost every day there
A
is something new or still news. Another oil spill, wiping out the lives ojf present habitats of
birds and fish. Through deforestation,^landslides here, flooding there. More whales taken
by the Japanese, Ozone holes grow. And so it goes on, with much more in store. But now
nearly every sizeable introductory textbook in biology or geography includes a large and
largely depressing section on environmental "problems" (at least too some of the devastation
and depredation is at last seen as constituting a "problem"). So do many other books; an
excellent easy high ted introduction is Ear?Asropg. And more and more popular periodicals
and newspapers^/e on environmental disasters and problems or run feature articles.' With
new threats to the collective human future the environment has become highly fashionable.
,
Now, with some appreciation of the inconvenience to business and businessmen of a nuclear
winter, runaway greenhouse, or like catastrophe even cautious conservatives are beginning
1
The intellectual who does most to bring this out, the arbitrariness even of present institutional
arrangements, is no doubt I^acault.
/<M
J?
^7/ ^7W/
, 7
^*/
,
., 7^ ^,/
, „
y^j.
^7 /.
-^M_
y.-y
</?
^7' '"^
,
r.A-/^-.
^. ^1
/<A—,
,
l-"^-
'—^-/^7
2
to recognise that there may be ^ome problems, that }a major nuclear exchange will have
among its plausible efforts, the greatest biological and physical disruptions of this planet in
the last 65 million years'. But the apparent fact is that the very course we are 3a,
any further catastrophe, without a nuclear exchange, will cause the greatest biological
Z) 6 Ar.
disruption of the planet in the last 65 million years. It is enough to
and compare
data for species loss.
It is now a relatively easy matter to .... the considerable array of environmental
problems and outrages that we so far know something about. It is another, much more
difficult, matter to do something worthwhile about them.
While many environmental problems may now be sufficiently clear, and stark, how to
react to them, what to do, what practice and theory to pursue are seldom so clear. [Nor is
there any very grave difficulty about some of what needs to be done in order to avert or
reduce some of the worst problems, and some of the major disasters in store. What is
lacking is sufficient motivation, or opportunity among main power brokers (political will,
.<............... ..... ................................................ .................... .................................................................... ——— ----------------------- - —
political blockages,<etc)]
Th& text aims to develop the assemble requisite theory and indicate resultant practices
Ensuing political theory^
which will lead to relevant change. But)
There is much theoretical work to be accomplished, both critical and constructive.
Critical work criticizing present and prevailing assumptions and practices, and the acclaimed
justification and alleged reasonableness of these practices. Constructive activity outlining
ernative idea-<
idea-e^clicism,
alternative practices and way of reaching
alternative structures, alternative
'
. The present exercise aims to be a part of that endeavors. It is a
them from
where we——
are.
..
______________ ——
-------------- A/
philosophical, theoretical book^ It concentrates on the theory, especially the
theory, of /
.. ......................................................................................................
I.....
.......
. ^4—environmentalisin.\ While it offers a purework for environmental action, it says little directly
Ar
no
c
.
on such action. Those are one practical details zmd recipes for saving a forest froim
.
_
eismAiSSUfi
/
hen?
destructive logging interests, for example, ways to proceed abouTihal are forever become
increasingly appreciated. What is still lacking is the wider p^lifactory structure which
explains and justifies opposition and resistance.
The run of environmental ethics text do little of what is required. They contain
insufficient criticism, little analysis of depth, no vision or elaboration of alternatives. They
are so sweetly, eminently reasonable^ fiddling while environmental Rome bums. Too many
seek "blame"
and all that sort of crap.
Or, where they would shake
" with
........ - development
r
r
near ihA
present predatory arrangements, it is only in one respect, and that not getting to bottom of the
troubles, reat^ meat eating. For, while some problems work be ^t-&ough^(^
----- other
generals thereby), it is evident that the rape of most of the Earth could construe
vegetarian way.
ace in a
, .
Environmental ethics texts have no anger, no outrage at what is Being being done to
the Earth. Put crudely, they lack guts. Indeed some suggest that things are proceeding
rather well, as it not so well, as well as could be expected. (If the latter it coop very little for
managing humans competent as managers/organisers). Al! is vary/ivr from well. There is
cause not merely for concern, but for deep anger. (Such anger may be un-American.)
The dominant way, re^our^ism,
if not successfully opposed, will ultimately
destroy the ecosphere and then humans
among other species
Intellectuals, philosophers especially, lately economists even more,2 deal to answer
for, socially and environmentally. They encouraged permit of present damaging practices;
they proceeded to provide the intellectual and attitudinal underpinnings that helped motivate
and continue^ to justify the practices.
Nor, with the evidence of environmental crisis so manifest, have things changed much.
Most intellectuals continue as if nothing had happened apart from the beneficial advancement
of science and technology. Most economists continue to produce or partificate upon various
growth (or maximal equilibrium) pmf^tonals. Most philosophers - most are AngloAmerican in background - continue in their hopeless efforts to prop up or impede upon what
is fundamentally anfhdi d awedy^basicaiiyv Humean empiricism (thus recently in the on-going
display of Humean fashions, evolutionary epistemology, belief as reduced to desire, causal
reductions, etc). Most have said, or done, very little about the^..^./ environmental
situations; those who have, like Naess, are often ridiculed by the comfortable professionals.
4
This book tries to retell, in a more organised and coherent way what deep-green
theory, an environmental theory that has emerged in a sporadic and scattered way over the
last couple of decades, is all about. But not everything is told; only the predominantly ethical
pa^ts. Later parts of this series on deep-green theory will cover political and economics
theory and social theory more generally.
Untila century ago philosophy and economics were not separate disciplines. The significant
economists were almost invariably philosophers (neeerds may be the one main^,...).
X\^7c-vr/
?^7<!k^<
/7,^ -7^ . r^/
7^r^7
c)/-^^ //^A^-. ;
/ C/ A
A'
Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative
environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in
radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It
offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an
intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical
theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory.
But the ethic' issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political
economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical
decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and
agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often
considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no
part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to
comprehensiveness.
The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of
(acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory and
relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and
„--------- -—-sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory moBe^gen^ahy can A
avoid them„ (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast m a more classical
Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form^ Nor will these background
advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background
will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or
proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more
technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices.
LA^to d^ep theory-—
Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory.
There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting
of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the
way deep-green theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident,
particularly with the intertwining of truth and value t&at
it is worth giving an example.
Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future
generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in
the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet)
e
exist in "suitable" determinate form in the second. Deep object-theory slices straight through
these issues, removing the problem-generating ontological assumptions.
is a grander theory lying in the background, which significantly influences
the philosophical approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it.
There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden
agenda. The background theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply
For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory:
deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical
endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep
positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on
dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc.) With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a
fairly comprehensive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate
comprehensiveness as regards present philosophical problems would come a certain
completeness; but I've come to thinkjhat a total philosophy is an illusion, like
at
it
Deep theory is no doubt a presumptuous title (there are worse about, e.g. Total
philosophy", 'ecosophy'^, ^o( it is altogether satisfactory, given the problems and obscurities,
.to be encountered, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did not exactly
good to refuse. It emerged from a terminological confluence of several e&eas in which I'd
thought, or environmental philosophy^with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory,
deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens
object-theory).
To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main
features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelations, and some of their
revolutionary potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been
assumed or presupposed in Western philosophy, and particularly in Enlightenmented
contemporary philosophy.
For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:* the Ontological Assumption, that truth, and also/ meaning, are functions of reference, and
thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can
perfectlv well talk and think trulv aboutS items that do not exist, and' also about items that are
impossible. ^Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionally favoured full-back from
enttcalism, namely possibilism, which assumes
* the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals#
there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away.
Bound up with possibilism are
* the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute
Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or
paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The
transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of
moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate
requirement of consistency.
under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs.
Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that
* entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality
amounts to a modal function of material implication^. The rejection of such themes and their
jeourses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic.
While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially
reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded
does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to
ependent development and analysis.
//yyy-
1
Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially
implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the
necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies
B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B.
,.
A,
/ re/
Dublin Core
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Title
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Box 17, Item 993: Revision of Green anarkism, notes, possibilities
Subject
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Handwritten and typescript drafts, with handwritten emendations, and handwritten notes.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 17, Item 993
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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<span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span>
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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[14] leaves. 28.28 MB.
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a82519e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a82519e</a>
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 17: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7