2 20 144 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/448d8517e9ca68f07df1452eec947883.pdf 5534af9a9b545e7a7587c7c0c0504e3a PDF Text Text ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft of Nuclear Power—Some Ethical, Social and Political Dimensions Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://manuscripts.library.uq.edu.au/index.php/uqfl291" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Manuscript https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/f6c3d304b2d018293fdb7af1b751feb9.pdf 7497b1a142a2ee74e689488a2bfa234a PDF Text Text Inquiry, 21, 133-79 Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future R. and V. Routley Plumwood Mountain, Braidwood, Australia The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring longterm storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty and Lights-going-out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable. I. The Bus Example Suppose we consider a bus, a bus which we hope is to make a very long journey. This bus, a third world bus, carries both passengers and freight. The bus sets down and picks up many different passengers in the course of its long journey and the drivers change many times, but because of the way the bus line is managed and the poor service on the route it is nearly always full to overcrowded, with passengers hanging off the back, and as in Afghanistan, passengers riding on the roof, and chickens and goats in the freight compartment. Early in the bus's journey someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package containing a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is packaged in a very thin container, which as the consigner well knows is unlikely to contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the bus should encounter any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some 1 �134 R. and V. Routley passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight, as also frequently happens. All of these things, let us suppose, have happened on some of the bus's previous journeys. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people and animals on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. There does not seem much doubt about what most of us would say about the morality of the consigner's action, and there is certainly no doubt about what the passengers would say. The consigner's action in putting the safety of the occupants of the bus at risk is appalling. What could excuse such an action, what sort of circumstances might justify it, and what sort of case could the consigner reasonably put up? The consigner might say that it is by no means certain that the gas will escape; he himself is an optimist and therefore feels that such unfavourable possible outcomes should be ignored. In any case the bus might have an accident and the passengers be killed long before the container gets a chance to leak; or the passengers might change to another bus and leave the lethal parcel behind. He might say that it is the responsibility of the passengers and the driver to ensure that the journey is a smooth one, and that if they fail to do so, the results are not his fault. He might say that the journey is such a long one that many of the passengers may have become mere mindless vegetables or degenerate wretches about whose fate no decent person need concern himself, or that they might not care about losing their lives or health or possessions anyway by that time. Most of these excuses will seem little more than a bad joke, and certainly would not usually be reckoned any sort of justification. The main argument the consigner of the lethal parcel employs, however, is that his own pressing needs justify his actions. He has no option but to consign his potentially lethal parcel, he says, since the firm he owns, and which has produced the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits and cannot afford to produce a better container or to stop the production of the gas. If the firm goes out of business, the consigner says, his wife will leave him, and he will lose his family happiness, the comfortable way of life to which he has become accustomed and sees now as a necessity; his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others; not only will the firm's customers be inconvenienced but he, the consigner, will have to break some business contracts; the inhabitants of the local village through loss of spending and cancellation of the Multiplier Effect will suffer finan- �Obligations to the Future 135 cial hardship, and, worst of all, the tiny flow of droplets that the poor of the village might receive (theoretically at any rate) as a result of the trickling down of these good things would dry up entirely. In short, some basic and some perhaps uncomfortable changes will be needed in the village. Even if the consigner's story were accepted at face value - and it would be wise to look critically at his story - only someone whose moral sensibilities had been paralysed by the disease of galloping economism could see such a set of considerations, based on 'needs', comfort, and the goal of local prosperity, as justifying the consigner's action. One is not generally entitled to thus simply transfer the risks and costs arising from one's own life onto other uninvolved parties, to get oneself out of a hole of one's own making by creating harm or risk of harm to someone else who has had no share in creating the situation. To create serious risks and costs, especially risks to life or health for such others, simply to avoid having to make some changes to a comfortable life style, or even for a somewhat better reason, is usually thought deserving of moral condemnation, and sometimes considered a crime; for example, the action of a company in creating risks to the lives or health of its workers or customers to prevent itself from going bankrupt. What the consigner says may be an explanation of his behaviour, but it is not a justification. The problem raised by nuclear waste disposal is by no means a perfect analogy to the bus case, since, for example, the passengers on the nuclear bus cannot get off the bus or easily throw out the lethal package. In many crucial moral respects, however, the nuclear waste storage problem as it affects future people, the passengers in the bus we are considering, resembles the consignment of the faultily packaged lethal gas. Not only are rather similar moral principles involved, but a rather similar set of arguments to the lamentable excuses the consigner presents have been seriously put up to justify nuclear development, the difference being that in the nuclear case these arguments have been widely accepted. There is also some parallel in the risks involved; there is no known safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by nuclear plants that will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.1 The wastes problem will not be a slight one, with each one of the more than 2,000 reactors envisaged by the end of the century, producing on average annual wastes containing one thousand times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb.2 The wastes include not merely the spent fuels and their radioactive by-products, but also everything they contaminate, from fuel containers to the thousands of widely distributed decommissioned nuclear �136 R. and V. Routley reactors which will have to be abandoned, still in a highly radioactive condition, after the expiry of their expected lifetimes of about thirty years, and which have been estimated to require perhaps one and a half million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.3 The wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime; for fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or so, and for the actinides (transuranic elements) which include plutonium, there is a half-million to a million-year storage problem.4 Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed longterm methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste that have been produced over the last twenty years.5 With present known short-term surface methods of storage there is a continued need for human intervention to keep the material isolated from the environment, while with proposed longer-term methods such as storage in salt mines or granite to the risk of human interference there are added the risks of leakage, e.g. through water seepage, and of disturbance, for example through climatic change, earth movements, etc. The risks are significant: no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods involved. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period which has seen a number of ice ages and great fluctuations in climate for example, could be confident that the waste material could be safely stored for the vast periods of time required. Much of this waste is highly toxic; for example, even a beachball sized quantity of plutonium appropriately distributed is enough to give every person on the planet lung cancer - so that a leak of even a small part of this waste material could involve huge loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of immense areas of land.6 Given the enormous costs which could be involved for the future, it is plainly grossly inadequ'ate'to merely speculate concerning untested, but possibly or even probably, safe methods for disposal of wastes. Yet none of the proposed methods has been properly tested, and they may prove to involve all sorts of unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the �Obligations to the Future 137 geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long-term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be, especially if, as seems likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically, seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future not previously encountered in human affairs, and certainly not conspicuous in the nuclear industry.7 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long-term storage sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weapons-grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million-year storage period, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it. Our behaviour in creating this nightmare situation for the future is certainly no better than that of the consigner in the bus example. Industrialized countries, in order to get out of a mess of their own making essentially the creation of economies dependent on an abundance" of non-renewable energy in a situation where it is in fact in limited supply opt for a 'solution' which may enable them to avoid the making of uncomfortable changes during the lifetime of those now living, at the expense of passing heavy burdens on to the inhabitants of the earth at a future time burdens in the shape of costs and risks which, just as in the bus case, may adversely affect the life and health of future people and their opportunity to lead a decent life.8 It is sometimes suggested that analogies like the bus example are defective; that morally they are crucially different from the nuclear case, since future people, unlike the passengers in the bus, will benefit directly from nuclear development, which will provide an abundance of energy for the indefinite future. But this is incorrect. Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be seriously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks, without any corresponding benefits, in order to provide for the extravagant energy use of only five generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop-gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a �138 R. and V. Routley transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it.9 For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dream of global industrialization is realized, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy resource use, and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it. It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life, are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least indirect beneficiaries. The 'solution' then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Just as in the bus case, contemporary industrial society proposes to get itself out of a hole of its own making by creating risk of harm, and by transferring costs and risks, to someone else who has had no part in producing the situation and who will obtain no clear benefit. It has clear alternatives to this action. That it does not take them is due essentially to its unwillingness to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to its desire to protect the interests of those who benefit from them. If we apply to the nuclear situation the same standards of behaviour and moral principles that we acknowledge (in principle if perhaps often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it will not be easy to avoid the conclusion that the situation involves injustice with respect to future people on a grand scale. It seems to us that there are only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of our nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to say that there are no circumstances in which such an action might possibly be justifiable, or at least where the case is less clearcut. It is the same with the nuclear case. Just as in the case of the consigner of the �Obligations to the Future 139 package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We turn now to the first of these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development, to the philosophical question of our obligations to the future. II. Obligations to the Distant Future The area in which these philosophical problems arise is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, that is, the future with which people alive today will make no direct contact; the immediate future provides comparatively few problems for moral theories. The issues involved, although of far more than academic interest, have not received any great attention in recent philosophical literature, despite the fact that the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass, and also raises a number of questions in political philosophy concerning the adequacy of accepted institutions which leave out of account the interests of future people. Moral philosophers have predictably differed on the issue. But contrary to the picture painted in a recent, widely read, and influential work discussing it, Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature, a good many philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them less weight, those who deny, or who are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those like Passmore and Golding who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond those to the next generation. • According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained; there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply, that we don't have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, i.e. those who have opted for the uncon- �140 R. and V. Routley strained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligation is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also non-transitive. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or requirements for moral obligation, which would rule out obligations to the non-immediate future are these: First, there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariantly over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any contemporary institution would do it for them. Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out the distant future as a field of moral obligation, as they not only require a commonality, or some sort of common basis, which cannot be guaranteed in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange, the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive relations of short duration such as sympathy and love. There are some difficulties also about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who may well be committed to a life-style for which one has no sympathy. On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary �Obligations to the Future 141 people have no obligations to future people and can harm them as it suits them. What all these views have in common is a naturalistic picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).10 Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually thought to characterize it, such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features), are lost, especially where there is a choice of whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so of whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. However, the view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act as one likes with respect to them, is a very difficult one to sustain. Consider the example of a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb which is to be set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the action. The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being unduly expensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to future people. The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of examples: A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining, processing, and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problems for present people or their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm it does to future people. Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view might seem childishly obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not only have a number of philosophers writing on the issue endorsed this position, but it is the clear �142 R. and V. Routley implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of economic theory. It does not appear, on the other hand, that those who opt for the unconstrained position have considered such examples and endorsed them as morally acceptable, despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that when it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being free to act implies, among other things being free to inflict pointless harm, most of those who opted for the unconstrained position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives. The view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in cases such as those discussed above and the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so must acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future. The thesis seems thus to assume an incorrect model of an independent and unrelated future. Also, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have, or has not acquired, an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved - that one has no responsibility for his life - does not imply that one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some course of action of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him. These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the failure to make an important distinction between, on the one hand, acquired or assumed obligations towards somebody, for which some act of acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and on the other hand moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of acquisition is required. There is a considerable difference in the level and kind of responsibility involved. In the first case one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his �Obligations to the Future 143 action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist. While it may be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make special sacrifices of an heroic kind for future people, or even to help them especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained from harming them. Thus, to return to the bus example, the consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has never assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them, and that they are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue in respect of both the bus and the nuclear case is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility for the lives of the people involved. The confusion of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off non-acquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral obligation' in philosophy to indicate any type of deontic constraint, while in natural language it is used to indicate something which has to be assumed or acquired. Hence the equation and at least one root of the unconstrained position, that is of the belief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future. The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to a more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent position. Passmore's position in [1] is a striking example of the second ambivalent position. On the one hand Passmore regularly gives the impression of one championing future people; for example, in the final sentence of [1] he says, concerning men a century hence: My sole concern is that we should do nothing which will reduce their freedom of thought and action, whether by destroying.the natural world which makes that freedom possible or the social traditions which permit and encourage it. �144 R. and V. Routley Earlier (esp. pp. 84-85) Passmore appears to endorse the principle 'that we ought not to act so as certainly to harm posterity' and claims (p. 98) that, even where there are uncertainties, 'these uncertainties do not justify negligence'. Nevertheless, though obligations concerning non-immediate posterity are thus admitted, the main thrust of Passmore's argument is entirely different, being in favour of the unconstrained position according to which we have no obligations to non-immediate posterity. Thus his conclusion (p. 91): So whether we approach the problem of obligations to posterity by way of Bentham and Sidgwick, Rawls or Golding, we are led to something like the same conclusion: our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condition, and that is all.11 Passmore's position is, to all appearances, simply inconsistent. There are two ways one might try to render it consistent, but neither is readily available to Passmore. The first is by taking advantage of the distinction between moral constraints and acquired obligations, but a basis for this distinction is not evident in Passmore's work and indeed the distinction is antithetical to the analyses of obligation that Passmore tries to synthesize with his own analysis in terms of loves. The second, sceptical, route to consistency is by way of the argument that we shall consider shortly, that there is always gross uncertainty with respect to the distant future, uncertainty which relieves us in practice of any moral constraints regarding the distant future. But though Passmore's writing strongly suggests this uncertainty argument (especially his sympathetic discussion of the Premier of Queensland's argument against conservationists [p. 77]), he also rules it out with the claim that uncertainties do not justify negligence.12 Many of the accounts of moral obligation that give rise to the unconstrained position are fused in Passmore's work, again not entirely consistently, since the different accounts exploited do not give uniform results. Thus the primary account of obligation is said to be in terms of loves though the account is never satisfactorily formulated or developed - and it is suggested that because our loves do not extend into the distant future, neither do our obligations. This sentimental account of obligation will obviously lead to different results from utilitarian accounts of obligation, which however Passmore appeals to in his discussion of wilderness. In yet other places in [1], furthermore, social contract and moral community �Obligations to the Future 145 views are appealed to - see, e.g., the treatment of animals, of preservation, and of duties to nature. In the case of obligations to future people, however, Passmore does try to sketch an argument - what we call the convergence argument - that all the accounts lead in the end to the unconstrained position. As well as the convergence argument, and various uncertainty arguments to be considered later, Passmore appears to endorse several other arguments in favour of his theme that there are in practice no obligations to the distant future. In particular, he suggests that such obligations would in practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves, only to the succeeding generation. We outline three objections to this chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations, since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create individual responsibility, and which can't necessarily be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since they are non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters.13 Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense of disadvantages to people of the more distant future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors. Such cases can hardly be written off as 'never-never land' examples, since many cases of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overcropping. If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests. �146 R. and V. Routley Passmore tries to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation, this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm, than one is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from beating and robbing some stranger and leaving him to starve. Passmore's most sustained argument for the unconstrained position is a convergence argument, that different analyses of obligations, including his own, lead to the one conclusion. This style of argument is hardly convincing when there are well-known accounts of obligation which do not lead to the intended conclusion, e.g. deontological accounts such as those of Kant and of modern European schools, and teleological accounts such as those of Moore (in [8]). But such unfavourable positions are either rapidly passed over or ignored in Passmore's historical treatment and narrow selection of historical figures. The style of argument becomes even less persuasive when it is discovered that the accounts of the main authorities appealed to, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Rawls,14 do not lead, without serious distortion, to the intended conclusion. Indeed Passmore has twisted the historical and textual evidence to suit his case, as we now try to indicate. Consider Bentham first. Passmore's assumption, for which no textual evidence is cited, ls is that no Benthamite calculation can take account of a future more extensive than the immediate future (cf. pp. 87-88). The assumption seems to be based simply on the fact that Bentham remarked that 'the value of the pleasure or pain to each person to be considered in any estimate will be greater or less in virtue of the following circumstances'. '3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness' ([10], p. 16). But this does nothing to show that future persons are discounted: the certainty and propinquity do not concern persons, but the utilities of the persons concerned. As regards which persons are concerned in any calculation Bentham is quite explicit, detailing how to take an exact account. . . of the general tendency of any act.. . .5 . Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process [summation of values of pleasure and of pain] with respect to each. ([10], p. 16) �Obligations to the Future 147 It follows that Bentham's calculation takes account of everyone (and, in his larger scheme, every sentient creature) whose interests appear to be concerned: if the interests of people in the distant future appear to be concerned - as they are in conservation issues - they are to be included in the calculation. And there is independent evidence16 that in Bentham's view the principle of utility was not temporally restricted: 'that is useful which, taking all times and all persons into consideration, leaves a balance of happiness' ([10], pp. 17-18, our italics). Thus the future cut-off that Passmore has attributed to Bentham is contradicted by Bentham's own account. The case of Sidgwick is more complex, because there is isolated oscillation in his application of utilitarianism between use of utility and of (something like) expected utility (see [11], pp. 381,414): Sidgwick's utilitarianism is, in its general characterization, essentially that of Bentham: the conduct which . . . is objectively right is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all those whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ([11], p. 411) All includes all sentient beings, both existing and to exist, as Sidgwick goes on to explain (p. 414). In particular, in answer to the question 'How far are we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of existing human beings?' Sidgwick writes ([11], p. 414, our italics): It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be affected - must necessarily be more uncertain. But Passmore manages, first of all, to give a different sense to what Sidgwick is saying by adjusting the quotation, by omitting the clause we have italicized, which equalizes the degree of concern for present and future persons, and by italicizing the whole except-clause, thereby placing much greater emphasis than Sidgwick does on uncertainty. For according to Sidgwick's impartiality principle, 'the mere difference in time is not a �148 R. and V. Routley reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one -amount than to that of another' ([11], p. 381; see also p. 124). The apparent tension in Sidgwick's theory as to whether uncertainty should be taken into account is readily removed by resort to a modern distinction between values and expected values (i.e. probability weighted values); utilitarian rightness is defined as before in terms of the net happiness of all concerned over all time without mention of uncertainty or probabilities, but it is distinguished from probable rightness (given present information), in the utilitarian sense,17 which is defined in terms of the expected net happiness of those concerned, using present probabilities. It is the latter notion, of probable rightness, that practical reasoning is commonly concerned with and that decision theory studies; and it is this that Passmore supposes Sidgwick is using ([1], p. 84). But it is evident that the utilitarian determination of probable rightness, like that of rightness, will sometimes take into account the distant future - as Sidgwick's discussion of utilitarian determination of optimum population (immediately following his remark on uncertainty) does. So how does Passmore contrive to reverse matters, to have Sidgwick's position lead to his own unconstrained conclusion? The answer is: By inserting an additional assumption of his own - which Sidgwick would certainly have rejected - that the uncertainties entitle us to ignore the distant future. What Passmore has implicitly assumed in his claim ([1], p. 85) that 'utilitarian principles [such as Sidgwick's] are not strong enough' 'to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now call upon us to make' is his own thesis that 'The uncertainty of harms we are hoping to prevent would in general entitle us to ignore them.. .'. From a decision-theory viewpoint this is simply irrational18 unless the probabilities of damage are approaching zero. We will deal with the essentially sceptical uncertainty arguments on which Passmore's position depends shortly: here it is enough to observe that Sidgwick's position does not lead to anything like that which Passmore attributes to him - without uncertainty assumptions which Sidgwick would have rejected (for he thought that future people'will certainly have pleasure and suffer pain). We can also begin to gauge from Passmore's treatment of nineteenthcentury utilitarians, such as Bentham and Sidgwick, the extent of the distortion which underlies his more general historical case for the unconstrained position which, so he claims, represents accurately enough what, over the last two centuries, men have seen as their duty to posterity as a whole. . . . ([1], p. 91) �Obligations to the Future 149 The treatment accorded Rawls in only marginally more satisfactory. Passmore supposes that Rawls's theory of justice leads directly to the unconstrained position ([1], p. 87 and p. 91), whereas Rawls claims ([5], p. 293) that we have obligations to future people just as to present ones. But the situation is more complicated than Rawls's claim would indicate, as we now try to explain in a summary way (more detail is given in the Appendix). For, in order to justify this claim on his theory (with its present time-of-entry interpretation), Rawls has to invoke additional and dubious motivational assumptions; even so the theory which thus results does not yield the intended conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with Rawls's claim. However, by changing the time-of-entry interpretation to an omnitemporal one, Rawls's claim does result from the theory so amended. Moreover, the amended theory also yields, by exactly Rawls's argument for a just saving rate, a resource conservation policy, and also a case against nuclear development. Accordingly Passmore's other claims regarding Rawls are mistaken, e.g. that the theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation. Rawls does not emerge unscathed either. As on the issue of whether his contract is a necessary condition for obligations, so on obligations which the contract yields to the distant future, Rawls is far from consistent. Furthermore, institutions such as qualified market and voting systems are recommended as just though from a future perspective their results are far from that. Rawls, then, does not take obligations to the future with full seriousness. In sum, it is not true that the theory of Rawls, any more than the theories of the historical figures actually discussed by Passmore, unequivocally supports the unconstrained position. III. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Arguments Although there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position. According to the qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant future: there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present �150 R. and V. Routley people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are disadvantaged by them. The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in most modern economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of an (opportunity cost) discount rate. The attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal constraints, and cannot determine what those constraints are. There are, moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt one which discounts the future is to beg all the questions at issue. The discounting move often has the same result as the unconstrained position; if, for instance, we consider the cancer example and consider costs as payable compensation, it is evident that, over a sufficiently long period of time, discounting at current prices would lead to the conclusion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints. In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the application of discount rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no more than about fifteen years,19 and application of such rates would simply beg the question against the interests and rights of future people. Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type the whole method of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would violate moral constraints.20 Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.21 But then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people, except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much) higher probabilities obtain. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower �Obligations to the Future 151 probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming that anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it can't be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to obtain quite doubtful or trivial benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportunity to continue unnecessarily high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted, such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit approach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned, or for dealing with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results. For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any simple or general way from one party to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs ony ? - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted by some proponents of nuclear energy, who attempt to dismiss the costs to future people with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The transfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on by McCracken [16] in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risk, between nuclear risks and those from cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming extent* those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also those of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related to a person's extent of use. The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's �152 R. and V. Routley happiness sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties, and the introduction of probability considerations does not change the principles involved but merely complicates analyses. One might further object to the probability argument that probabilities involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes, and that the outcomes of some moral problems such as the bus example do not depend on a high level of probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the bus example reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important ones used by philosophers and others to argue for the position that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of separation, but frequently entangled. Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalized uncertainty argument which runs as follows: In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly, and highly speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. More formally and crudely: One only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information; there is no reliable information at present as regards the distant future; therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. The first argument is essentially a variation on a sceptical argument in epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace 'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and �Obligations to the Future 153 the adjacent future and present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly do act on the basis of such 'unreliable' information as the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels 'uncertainty'; for scepticproof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. A good example is again the bus case. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is a significant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and the prospects of the passengers quite uncertain; the resolution of the problem is still clearly in favour of the so-called 'speculative' and 'unreliable'. But if we do not require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require epistemic standards for the future which the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument, that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account, because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions upon it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can also be put in this way: If moral principles are, like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as 'if* has character h then x is wrong, for every (action) x', then what the argument claims is �154 R. and V. Routley that we can never obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action of the 'It is wrong to do x' type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument have to be conceded. If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the future, will not be applicable in practice for obtaining any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future is always so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point, noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of"a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in girls' names or men's footwear, or what brands of ice cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3,000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. For this sort of reason, the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. While it is true that there are many areas in which the morally relevant information needed is uncertain or unavailable, and in which we cannot therefore determine satisfactorily how to act, there are certainly others in �Obligations to the Future 155 which uncertainty in morally relevant areas is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, seems to be of the latter sort. Here there is no gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as we can see from the bus example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the corresponding defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probable harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would affect us (cf. Passmore [1]). But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are morally committed to. Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons or forever plugged into enjoyment- or other machines (Golding [12]). Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility - like the sceptic who says that the solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast �156 R. and V. Routley with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilization through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer, and the fact that this appears to be a real and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm in the example discussed above, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases, before such actions could be considered admissible, what would be required is far more than a possibility, real or not22 - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves. The strategy of most of these uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, and may be brought out by looking yet again at the bus example, where the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the bus may break down and they may all change to a different bus leaving the parcel behind, or the bus may crash, killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities, of course, but there is no positive reason to believe that they are any more than that, that is they are not real possibilities. The strategy is to stress such outside possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will �Obligations to the Future 157 break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners' taking account of the passengers' welfare and of the real possibility of harm from his parcel, and thereby excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints .This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty, or at least a very high probability, of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not so. An argument closely related to the uncertainty arguments is based on the non-existence and indeterminacy of the future.23 An item is indeterminate in a given respect if its properties in that respect are, as a matter of logic, not settled (nor are they settlable in a non-arbitrary fashion). The respects in which future items are indeterminate are well enough known for a few examples to serve as reminders: all the following are indeterminate: the population of Australia at 2001, its distribution, its age structure, the preferences of its members for folk music, wilderness, etc., the size and shape of Wollongong, the average number of rooms in its houses and in its office blocks, and so on. Philosophical discussion of such indeterminacy is as old as Aristotle's sea battle and as modern as truth-value gaps and fuzzy logics, and many positions have been adopted on the existence and determinacy of future items. Nevertheless theories that there are obligations to the future are not sensitive to the metaphysical position adopted concerning the existence or non-existence of the future. Any theory which denied obligations to the future on the metaphysical grounds that the future did not exist, and did not have properties, so that the present could not be related to it, would be committed to denying such obvious facts as that the present could causally influence the future, that present people could be great-grandparents of purely future people, and so on, and hence would have to be rejected on independent grounds. This is not to say that there are not important problems about the existence or non-existence of future items, problems which are perhaps most straightforwardly handled by a Meinongian position which allows that items which do not exist may have properties. The non-existence of the future �158 R. and V. Routley does raise problems for standard theories which buy the Ontological Assumption (the thesis that what does not exist does not have properties), especially given the natural (and correct) inclination to say that the future does not (now) exist; but such theories can adopt various strategies for coping with these problems (e.g. the adoption of a platonistic position according to which the future does now exist, or the allowance for certain sorts of relations between existents at different times), although the satisfactoriness of these strategies is open to question (cf. [4]). Thus whether or not the Ontological Assumption is assumed and however it is applied, it will be allowed that future items will have properties even if they do not have them now, and that is enough to provide the basis for moral concern about the future. Thus the thesis of obligations to the future does not presuppose any special metaphysical position on the existence of the future. If the non-existence of future items creates no special problems for obligations to the future, the same is not true of their indeterminacy. Whether the indeterminacy of future items is seen as a logical feature of the future which results from the non-existence of purely future items or whether one adopts a (mistaken) platonistic view of the future as existing and sees the indeterminacy as an epistemological one resulting from our inability to know the character of these entities - that is, we cannot completely know the future .though it exists and has a definite characterwhichever view we take indeterminacy still creates major difficulties for certain ethical theories and their treatment of the future. The difficulties arise for theories which appear to require a high level of determinacy with respect to the number and character of future items, in particular calculus-type theories such as utilitarianism in its usual forms, where the calculations are critically dependent on such information as numbers, totals, and averages, information which so far as the future is concerned is generally indeterminate. The fact that this numerical information is typically indeterminate means that insofar as head-count utilitarianism requires determinate information on numbers, it is in a similar position to theories discussed earlier; it may apply theoretically to future people, but since the calculations cannot be applied to them their interests will be left out of account. And, in fact, utilitarianism for the most part does not, and perhaps cannot, take future creatures and their interests seriously; there is little discussion as to how the difficulties or impossibility of calculations regarding the open future are to be obtained. Non-platonistic utilitarianism is in logical difficulty on this matter, while platonis- �Obligations to the Future 159 tic utilitarianism - which faces a range of other objections - is inapplicable because of epistemic indeterminacy. We have yet another case of a theory of the sort that applies theoretically but in practice doesn't take the future seriously. But far from this showing that future people's interests should be left out of account, what these considerations show are deficiencies in these sorts of theories, which require excessive determinacy of information. This kind of information is commonly equally unavailable for the accepted areas of moral constraint, the present and immediate future; and the resolution of moral issues is often not heavily dependent on knowledge of such specific determinate features as numbers or other determinate features. For example, we do not need to know how many people there will be on the bus, how intelligent they are, what their preferences are or how badly they will be injured, in order to reach the conclusion that the consigner's action in despatching his parcel is a bad one. Furthermore, it is only the ability of moral considerations to continue to apply in the absence of determinate information about such things as numbers that makes it possible to take account of the possible effects of action, as the risks associated with action - something which is quite essential even for the present if moral considerations are to apply in the normal and accepted way. For it is essential in order to apply moral considerations in the accepted way that we consider alternative worlds, in order to take account of options, risks, and alternative outcomes; but these alternative or counterfactual worlds are not in so different a position from the future with respect to determinacy; for example, there is indeterminacy with respect to the number of people who may be harmed in the bus case or in apossible nuclear reactor melt-down. These alternative worlds, like the distant future, are indeterminate in some respects, but not totally indeterminate. It might still be thought that the indeterminacy of the future, for example with respect to number and exact character, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests unknown, how can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by ignoring �160 R. and V. Routley such factors. Nor are such distributional problems as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It should be conceded then that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult or indeed impossible to resolve - a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e.g. the bus example which is a conflict case of a type. In particular, there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. Moreover, even where numbers are relevant often only bounds will be required, exact numerical counts only being required where, for instance, margins are narrow; e.g. issues may be resolved as in parliament where a detailed vote (or division) is only required when the issue is close. It is certainly not necessary then to have complete determinacy to resolve all cases of conflict. The question we must ask then is what features of future people could disqualify them from moral consideration or reduce their claims to it to below those of present people? The answer is: in principle None. Prima facie moral principles are universalizable, and lawlike, in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example.24 But universalizability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup such as (white-skinned) humans, etc. The only candidates for characteristics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, uncertainty and indeterminacy; what we have argued is that it would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only present information). In particular they do not affect cases of the sort being considered, the nuclear one, where highly determinate or certain information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be harmed or certainty of damage are not required. To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is not needed: it is enough to require that the temporal position of a person �Obligations to the Future 161 cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideration;25 inversely that it is without basis to discriminate morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this universalizability, there is the same obligation to future people as to the present; and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions' causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob future people of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not free us of these obligations. If, in a closely comparable case concerning the present, the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people. Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion tentatively reached in our first section, that proposals for nuclear development in the present state of technology for future waste disposal are immoral. IV. Overriding Consideration Arguments In the first part we noticed that the consigner's action could not be justified by purely economistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. We also observed that the principle on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to the nuclear case. For this reason the economistic arguments which are thus most commonly advanced to promote nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment, investment, and consumption-do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these economistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct (and there is reason to doubt that most of them are),26 the arguments would fail because economics must operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vice versa. �162 R. and V. Routley What one does have to consider, however, are moral conflict arguments, that is arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only possible outcome, and will ensue. For example, in the bus case, the consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is taken the village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing duties to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives), and upon showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument-for example, if in the bus case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way - then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. We want to argue that suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument, designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentation of false dichotomies. The first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of industrialized countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialized nations. The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the �Obligations to the Future 163 diversion of great amounts of available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. 27 The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment, while politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralized entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem.28 The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of people of the third world does not, of course, mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the westernized and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organized; but it is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. The poverty argument then is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used to help the poor.29 Both for the third world and for the industrialized countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources,30 alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor.31 The second major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technological, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out.32 . The lights-going-out argument raises rather sharply questions as to what is valuable in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary for a good society. These are questions which deserve much fuller treatment than we can allot them here, but a few brief points should be made. The argument adopts an extremely uncritical position with respect to existing high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable; it also assumes that technological society is unmodifiable, that it can't be changed in the direction of energy �164 R. and V. Routley conservation or alternative energy sources without collapse. Such a society has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of energy are essential to maintain this whole. These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technological society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all, it has survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western society's demands for energy are totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a programme of increasing destruction, but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary society. There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness; but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain existing high-technological society and its political institutions? but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things? While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably, that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence, e.g. from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we believe it is, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-going-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of wellbeing is required to consume less energy than at present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.33 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilization, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganza. In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy �Obligations to the Future 165 is obtained by nuclear-fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralized, controlled, and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Very persuasive arguments have been advanced by civil liberties groups and others in a number of countries to suggest that such a society would tend to become authoritarian, if only as an outcome of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation.34 There are reasons to believe then that with nuclear development what we would be passing on to future generations would be some of the worst aspects of our society (e.g. the consumerism, growing concentration of power, destruction of the natural environment, and latent authoritarianism), while certain valuable aspects would be lost or threatened. Political freedom is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives which do not involve such unacceptable consequences are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but the development of alternative technologies and life-styles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralized nuclear option.35 The lights-going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false dichotomy. Thus both the escape routes, the appeal to moral conflict and to the appeal to futurity, are closed. If then we apply the same standards of morality to the future as we acknowledge for the present - as we have argued we should - the conclusion that the proposal to develop nuclear energy on a large scale is a crime against the future is inevitable, since both the escape routes are closed. There are, of course, also many other grounds for ruling it out as morally unacceptable, for saying that it-is not only a crime against the distant future but also a crime against the present and immediate future. These other grounds for moral concern about nuclear energy, as it affects the present and immediate future, include problems arising from the possibility of catastrophic releases of radioactive fuel into the environment or of waste material following an accident such as reactor melt-down, of unscheduled discharges of radiation into the environment from a plant fault, of proli- �166 R. and V. Routley feration of nuclear weapons, and of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion. All these are important issues, of much moral interest. What we want to claim, however, is that on the basis of its effects on the future alone, the nuclear option is morally unacceptable. Appendix Passmore's Treatment ofRawls, and What Really Happens on Rawls's Theory Passmore takes it that Rawls's theory yields an unconstrained position but, according to Rawls, the theory leads to quite the opposite result; namely, persons in different generations [and not merely neighbouring generations] have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define justice between persons at different moments of time.. . . The derivation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat far-fetched application of the central doctrine. Nevertheless these requirements would be acknowledged in the original position [where the parties do not know to which generation they belong], and so the conception of justice as fairness covers these matters without any change in its basic idea. ([5], p. 293; the second insert is drawn from p. 287) Through judicious use of the veil of ignorance and the time of entry of parties to the original contract position, Rawls's contract theory, unlike simpler explicit contract theories, can yield definite obligations to distant future people,36 for example, we ought to save at a just rate for future people. But, as Rawls remarks (p. 284), 'the question of justice between generations . . . subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests'. It is doubtful that Rawls's theory as formulated passes the tests; for the theory as formulated does not yield the stated conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with the thesis that there are the same obligations to future people as to contemporaries. Exactly how these obligations arise from the initial agreement depends critically on the interpretation of the time of �Obligations to the Future 167 entry of the parties into the agreement. Insofar as Rawls insists upon the present-time-of-entry interpretation (p. 139), he has to introduce supplementary motivational assumptions in order to (try to) secure the desired bondings between generations, in particular to ensure that the generation of the original position saves for any later generation, even their immediate successors ([5], p. 140 and p. 292). Rawls falls back on-what is as we have seen inadequate to the task, since it does not exclude one generation damaging another remote generation in a way that bypasses mutually successive generations - 'ties of sentiment between successive generations' (p. 292): to this limited extent Passmore has a point, for such a social contract on its own (without additional assumptions about the motives of the parties to the agreement) does not furnish obligations even to our immediate successors. This is indicative also of the unsatisfactory instability of Rawls's theory under changes, its sensitivity to the way the original agreement is set up, to the motivation of parties, their time of entry, what they can know, etc. To arrive at a more adequate account of obligations to the distant future under Rawls's theory, let us adopt, to avoid the additional, dubious and unsatisfactory, motivational assumptions Rawls invokes, one of the alternative - and non -equivalent - time-of-entry interpretations that Rawls lists (p. 146), that of persons alive at some time in simultaneous agreement. Let us call this, following Rawls's notation (on p. 140), interpretation 4b (it is perhaps unnecessary to assume for 4b any more than 4a that all people need be involved: it may be enough given the equivalencizing effect of the veil of ignorance that some are, and as with the particular quantifier it is quite unnecessary to be specific about numbers). Then of course the parties, since they are, for all they know, of different generations, will presumably agree on a just savings rate, and also to other just distribution principles, simply on the basis of Rawlsian rationality, i.e. advancing their own interests, without additional motivation assumptions. This more appealing omnitemporal interpretation of time of entry into the agreement, which gives a superior account of obligation to the future consistent with Rawls's claim, Rawls in some places puts down as less than best (p. 292) but in his most detailed account of the original position simply dismisses (p. 139): To conceive of the original position [as a gathering of people living at different times] would be to stretch fantasy too far; the conception would cease to be a natural guide to intuition. �168 R. and V. Rout ley This we question: it would be a better guide to intuition than a position (like 4a) which brings out intuitively wrong results; it is a more satisfactory guide, for example, to justice between generations than the present-timeof-entry interpretation, which fails conspicuously to allow for the range of potential persons (all of whom are supposed to qualify on Rawls's account for just treatment, cf. § 77). Moreover, it stretches fantasy no further than science fiction or than some earlier contract accounts.36 But it does require changes in the way the original position is conceived, and it does generate metaphysical difficulties for orthodox ontological views (though not to the same extent for the Meinongian view we prefer); for, to consider the latter, either time travel is possible or the original hypothetical position is an impossible situation, with people who live at different times assembled at the same time. The difficulties - of such an impossible meeting help to reveal that what Rawls's theory offers is but a colourful representation of obligations in terms of a contract agreed upon at a meeting. The metaphysical difficulties do not concern merely possible people, because all those involved are sometime-actual people; nor are there really serious difficulties generated by the fact that very many of these people do not exist, i.e. exist now. The more serious difficulties are either those of time travel, e.g. that future parties relocated into the present may be able to interfere with their own history, or, if time travel is ruled out logically or otherwise, that future parties may be advantaged (or disadvantaged) by their knowledge of history and technology, and that accordingly fairness is lost. As there is considerable freedom in how we choose to (re)arrange the original position, we shall suppose that time travel is rejected as a means of entering the original position. For much less than travel is required; some sort of limited communicational network which filters out, for example, all historical data (and all cultural or species dependent material) would suffice; and in any case if time travel were not excluded essentially the present-time-of-entry interpretation would serve, though fairness would again be put in doubt. The filtered communicational hook-up by which the omnitemporal position is engineered still has - if fairness is to be seen to be built into the decision making - to be combined with a reinterpreted veil of ignorance, so that parties do not know where they are located temporally any more than they know who they are characterwise. This implies, among other things, limitations on the parties' knowledge of factual matters, such as available technology and world and local history; for otherwise parties could work out their location, temporal or spatial. For example, if some party knew, as Rawls supposes, �Obligations to the Future 169 the general social facts, then he would presumably be aware of the history of his time and so of where history ends, that is of the date of his generation, his time (his present), and so be aware of his temporal location. These are already problems for Rawls's so-called 'present-time-ofentry interpretation' - it is, rather, a variable-time-of-entry interpretation - given that the parties may be, as Rawls occasionally admits (e.g. p. 287), of any one generation, not necessarily the present: either they really do have to be ofthepresent time or they cannot be assumed to know as much as Rawls supposes.37 There is, however, no reason why the veil of ignorance should not be extended so as to avoid this problem; and virtually any extension that solves the problem for the variable-time-of-entry interpretation should serve, so it seems, for the omnitemporal one. We shall assume then that the parties know nothing which discloses their respective locations (i.e. in effect we write in conditions for universalizability of principles decided upon). There are still gaps between the assumptions of the omnitemporal position as roughly sketched and the desired conclusion concerning obligations to the future, but (the matter is beginning to look non-trivially provable given not widely implausible assumptions and) the intuitive arguments are as clear as those in [5], indeed they simply restate arguments to obligations given by Rawls. Rawls's theory, under interpretation 4b, admits of nice application to the problems of just distribution of material resources and of nuclear power. The just distribution, or rate of usage, of material resources38 over time is an important conservation issue to which Rawls's theory seems to apply, just as readily, and in a similar fashion, to that in which it applies to the issue of a just rate of savings. In fact the argument from the original position for a just rate of saving - whatever its adequacy - can by simply mimicked to yield an argument for just distribution of resources over generations. Thus, for example: persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much they would be willing to save [i.e. conserve] at each stage of advance on the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rate [conserve resources to the same extent]. . . . In effect, then, they must choose a just savings principle [resources distribution principle] that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to [degree of resource conservation at] each level of advance. ([5], p. 287; our bracketed options give the alternative argument) �170 R. and V. Routley Just as 'they try to piece together a just savings schedule' (p. 289), so they can try to piece together a just resource distribution policy. Just as a case for resource conservation can be made out by appeal to the original position, since it is going to be against the interests of, to the disadvantage of, later parties to find themselves in a resource depleted situation (thus, on Rawlsian assumptions, they will bargain hard for a share of resources), so, interestingly, a case against a rapid programme of nuclear power development can be devised. The basis of a case against large-scale nuclear development is implicit in Rawls's contract theory under interpretation 4b, though naturally the theory is not applied in this sort of way by Rawls. To state the case in its crude but powerful form: people from later generations in the original position are bound to take it as against their interests to simply carry the waste can for energy consumed by an earlier generation. (We have already argued that they will find no convincing overriding considerations that make it worth their while to carry the waste can.) Thus not only has Passmore misrepresented the obligations to the future that Rawls's theory admits; he is also wrong in suggesting (p. 87 and p. 91) that Rawls's theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation which includes reductions in present consumption. There is, in this connection, an accumulation of errors in Passmore, some of which spill over to Rawls, which it is worth trying to set out. First, Passmore claims ([1], p. 86; cf. also p. 90) that 'Rawls does not so much mention the saving of natural resources'. In fact the 'husbanding of natural resources' is very briefly considered ([5], p. 271). It is true, however, that Rawls does not reveal any of the considerable power that his theory, properly interpreted, has for natural resource conservation, as implying a just distribution of natural resources over time. Secondly, Passmore attempts ([1], pp. 87 ff.) to represent the calls of conservationists for a reduction in present resource usage and for a more just distribution as a call for heroic self-sacrifices; this is part of his more general attempt to represent every moral constraint with respect to the non-immediate future as a matter of self-sacrifice. 'Rawls's theory', Passmore says (on p. 87), 'leaves no room for heroic sacrifice', and so, he infers, leaves no room for conservation. Not only is the conclusion false, but the premiss also: Rawls's theory allows for supererogation, as Rawls explains ([5], p. 117). But resource conservation is, like refraining from nuclear development, not a question of heroic self-sacrifice; it is in part a question of obligations or duties to the distant future. And Rawls's theory allows not only for obligations as well as supererogation, but also for natural duties. Rawls's �Obligations to the Future 171 contract, unlike the contracts of what is usually meant by a 'contract theory', is by no means exhaustive of the moral sphere: But even this wider [contract] theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves towards,animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put them aside, (p. 17) The important class of obligations beyond the scope of the contract theory surely generates obligations between persons which even the wider contract theory likewise cannot explain. The upshot is that such a contract account, even if sufficient for the determination of obligations, is not necessary. To this extent Rawls' s theory is not a full social contract theory at all. However, Rawls appears to lose sight of the fact that his contract theory delivers only a sufficient condition when he claims, for example (p. 298), that 'one feature of the contract doctrine is that it places an upper bound on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of later generations'. For greater savings may sometimes be required to meet obligations beyond those that the contract doctrine delivers. In short, Rawls appears to have slipped into assuming, inconsistently, that his contract theory is a necessary condition. Although Rawls's theory caters for justice between generations and allows the derivation of important obligations to people in the distant future, the full theory is far from consistent on these matters and there are significant respects in which Rawls does not take justice to the future seriously. The most conspicuous symptoms of this are that justice to the future is reduced to a special case, justice between generations, and that the only aspect of justice between generations that Rawls actually considers is a just savings rate; there is, for example, no proper examination of the just distribution of resources among generations, though these resources, Rawls believes, provide the material base of the just institutions that he wants to see maintained. In fact Rawls strongly recommends a system of markets as a just means for the allocation of most goods and services, recognizing their well-known limitations only in the usual perfunctory fashion ([5], pp. 270 ff.). Yet market systems are limited by a narrow time horizon, and are quite ill-equipped to allocate resources in a just fashion �172 R. and V. Rout ley over a time span of several generations. Similarly Rawls's endorsement of democratic voting procedures as in many cases a just method of determining procedures depends upon the assumptions that everyone with ah interest is represented. But given his own assumptions about obligations to the future and in respect of potential persons this is evidently not the case. Catering in a just fashion for the interests of future people poses serious problems for any method of decision that depends upon people being present to represent their own interests. Some of the more conservative, indeed reactionary, economic assumptions in Rawls emerge with the assumption that all that is required for justice between generations is a just savings rate, that all we need to pass on to the future are the things that guarantee appropriate savings such as capital, factories, and machines. But the transmission of these things is quite insufficient for justice to the future, and neither necessary nor sufficient as a foundation for a good life for future generations. What is required for justice is the transmission in due measure of what is valuable. Rawls has, however, taken value accumulation as capital accumulation, thereby importing one of the grossest economic assumptions, that capital reflects value. But of course the accumulation of capital may conflict with the preservation of what is valuable. It is for this sort of reason (and thus, in essence, because of the introduction of supplementary economistic theses which are not part of the pure contract theory) that Rawls's theory is a reactionary one from an environmental point of view; on the theory as presented (i.e. the contract theory plus all the supplementary assumptions) there is no need to preserve such things as wilderness or natural beauty. The savings doctrine supposes that everything of value for transmission to the future is negotiable in the market or tradeable; but then transmission of savings can by no means guarantee that some valuable things, not properly represented in market systems, are not eliminated or not passed on, thereby making future people worse off. It becomes evident in this way, too, how culturally-bound Rawls's idea of ensuring justice to future generations through savings is. It is not just that the idea does not apply, without a complete overhaul, to non-industrial societies such as those of hunter-gatherers; it does not apply to genuinely post-industrial societies either. Consideration of such alternative societies suggests that whafis required, in place of capital accumulation, is that we pass on what is necessary for a good life, that we ensure that the basics are fairly distributed over time and not eroded, e.g. that in the case of the forest people that the forest is maintained. The narrowness of Rawls's picture, �Obligations to the Future 173 which makes no due allowance for social or cultural diversity (from the original contractual position on) or for individual diversity arises in part from his underlying and especially narrow socio-economic assumption as to what people want: What men want is meaningful work in free association with others, these associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just basic institutions. ([5], p. 290) This may be what many Harvard men want; but as a statement of what men want it supplies neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions.39 NOTES 1 Thus according to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110; our italics). There is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. . . . Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is regarded as the most likely solution, but has yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive releases following disturbances caused by natural processes or human activity. The Fox Report also quoted approvingly ([2], p. 187; our italics) the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report [6]: There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exist s to ensure the safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future. Although the absence of a satisfactory storage method has been conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development, e.g. Weinberg ([3], pp. 32-33), it is now disputed by others. In particular, the headline for Cohen [15], which reads 'A substantial body of evidence indicates that the high level radioactive wastes generated by U.S. nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geological formations', has suggested to many readers - what it was no doubt intended to suggest- that there is really no problem about the disposal of radioactive wastes after all. Cohen presents, however, no new hard evidence, no evidence not already available to the British and Australian Commissions ([2] and [6]). Moreover the evidence Cohen does outline fails conspicuously to measure up to the standards rightly required by the Flowers and Fox Reports. Does Cohen offer a commercial-scale procedure for waste disposal which can be demonstrated as safe? Far from it: �174 R. and V. Routley The detailed procedures for handling the high-level wastes are not yet definite, but present indications are that. . . . (Cohen [1], p. 24; our italics) Does Cohen 'demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt' the long-term safety of burial of wastes, deep underground? Again, far from it: On the face of it such an approach appears to be reasonably safe. . . . (p. 24; our italics) Cohen has apparently not realized what is required. At issue here are not so much scientific or empirical issues as questions of methodology, of standards of evidence required for claims of safety, and above all, of values, since claims of safety, for example, involve implicit evaluations concerning what counts as an acceptable risk, an admissible cost, etc. In the headline 'a substantial body of evidence . . . indicates that. . . wastes . . . can be stored satisfactorily' the key words (italicized) are evaluative or elastic, and the strategy of Cohen's case is to adopt very low standards for their application. But in view of what is at stake it is hardly acceptable to do this, to dress up in this way what are essentially optimistic assurances and untested speculations about storage, which in any case do little to meet the difficulties and uncertainties that have been widely pointed out as regards precisely the storage proposals Cohen outlines, namely human or natural interference or disturbance. 2 See [18], pp. 24-25. 3 On all these points, see [14], esp. p. 141. According to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110): Parts of the reactor structure will be highly radioactive and their disposal could be very difficult. There is at present no experience of dismantling a full size reactor. 4 See, in particular, The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Friends of the Earth Energy Paper, San Francisco 1973, p. 47; also [3], p. 32 and [14], p. 149. 5 As the discussion in [14], pp. 153-7, explains. 6 Cf. [17], pp. 35-36, [18] and, for much detail, J. R. Goffman and A. R. Tamplin, Poisoned Power, Rodale Press, Emmau Pa. 1971. 7 On the pollution and waste disposal record of the infant nuclear industry, see [14] and [17]. The record of many countries on pollution control, where in many cases available technologies for reducing or removing pollution are not applied because they are considered too expensive or because they adversely affect the interests of some powerful group, provides clear historical evidence that the problem of nuclear waste disposal would not end simply with the devising of a 'safe' technology for disposal, even if one could be devised which provided a sufficient guarantee of safety and was commercially feasible. The fact that present economic and political arrangements are overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the interests and concerns of (some) contemporary humans makes it not unrealistic to expect the long-term nuclear waste disposal, if it involved any significant cost at all, when public concern about the issue died down, would be seen to conflict with the interests of contemporary groups, and that these latter interests would in many cases be favoured. Nor, as the history of movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament shows, could generalized public concern in the absence of direct personal interest, be relied upon to be sustained for long enough to ensure implementation of costly or troublesome long-term disposal methods - even in those places where public concern exists and is a politically significant force. It must be stressed then that the problem is not merely one of disposal technique. Historical and other evidence points to the conclusion that many of the most important risks associated with nuclear waste disposal are not of the kind which might be amenable �Obligations to the Future 175 to technical solutions in the laboratory. A realistic assessment of potential costs to the future from nuclear development cannot overlook these important non-technical risk factors. 8 Of course the effect on people is not the only factor which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a moral judgment. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life. But since the harm nuclear development is likely to cause to non-human life can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way. 9 Proponents of nuclear power often try to give the impression that future people will not just bear costs from nuclear development but will also be beneficiaries, because nuclear powerprovides an 'abundant' or even 'unlimited' source of energy; thus Weinberg ([3], p. 34): 'an all but infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy'. A good example of an attempt to create the impression that 'abundant' and 'cheap' energy from nuclear fission will be available to 'our descendants', i.e. all future people, is found in the last paragraph of Cohen [15]. Such claims are most misleading, since fission power even with the breeder reactor has only about the same prospective lifetime as coal-produced electricity (a point that can be derived using data in A. Parker, 'World Energy Resources: A Survey', Energy Policy, Vol. 3 [1975], pp. 58-66), and it is quite illegitimate to assume that nuclear fusion, for which there are still major unsolved problems, will have a viable, clean technology by the time fission runs out, or, for that matter, that it ever will. Thus while some few generations of the immediate future may obtain some benefits as well as costs, there is a very substantial chance that tho se of the more distant future will obtain nothing but costs. 10 These feelings, of which Smith's and Hume's sympathy is representative, are but the feeling echoes of obligation. At most, sympathy explains the feeling of obligation or lack of it, and this provides little guide as to whether there is an obligation or not - unless one interprets moral sympathy, the feeling of having a obligation, or being obligated, itself as a sufficient indication of obligation, in which case moral sympathy is a non-explanatory correlate in the feelings department of obligation itself and cannot be truly explanatory of the ground of it; unless, in short, moral sympathy reduces to an emotive rewrite of moral obligation. 11 Elsewhere in [1] Passmore is especially exercised that our institutions and intellectual traditions - presumably only the better ones - should be passed on to posterity, and that we should strive to make the world a better place, if not eventually an ideal one. 12 This is not the only philosophically important issue in environmental ethics on which Passmore is inconsistent. Consider his: 'over-arching intention: to consider whether the solution of ecological problems demands a moral or metaphysical revolution' (p. x), whether the West needs a new ethic and a new metaphysics. Passmore's answer in [1] is an emphatic No. Only insofar as Western moralists have [made various erroneous suggestions] can the West plausibly be said to need a 'new ethic'. What it needs, for the most part, is not so much a 'new ethic' as adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic. For the major sources of our ecological disasters - apart from ignorance - are greed and shortsightedness, which amount to much the same thing. . . There is no novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much. (p. 187) 'The view that the West now needs. . . a new concept of nature' is similarly dismissed (p. 186, cf. p. 72). But in his paper [1*] (i.e. 'Attitudes to Nature', Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 8, Macmillan, London 1975), which is said to be an attempt to bring together and to reformulate some of the basic philosophical themes of [1], Passmore's answer is Yes, and quite different themes, inconsistent with those of [1], are advanced: �176 R. and V. Routley [T]he general conditions I have laid down . . . have not been satisfied in most of the traditional philosophies of nature. To that degree it is true, I think, that we do need a 'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric. . . . A 'new metaphysics', if it is not to falsify the facts, will have to be naturalistic, but not reductionist. The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy. ([1*], pp. 260-1) A new ethic accompanies this new metaphysics. The emergence of new moral attitudes to nature is bound up, then, with the emergence of a more realistic philosophy of nature. That is the only adequate foundation for effective ecological concern. ([1*], p. 264) This is a far cry from the theme of [1] that ecological problems can be solved within the traditions of the West. 13 Put differently, the causal linkage can bypass intermediate generations, especially given action at a temporal distance: the chain account implies that there are no moral constraints in initiating such causal linkages. The chain picture accordingly seems to presuppose an unsatisfactory Humean model of causation, demanding contiguity and excluding action at a distance. 14 Golding we shall concede to Passmore, though even here the case is not clearcut. For Golding writes towards the end of his article ([12], p. 96): My discussion, until this point, has proceeded on the view that we have obligations to future generations. But do we? I am not sure that the question can be answered in the affirmative with any certainty. I shall conclude this note with a very brief discussion of some of the difficulties. All of Passmore's material on Golding is drawn from this latter and, as Golding says, 'speculative' discussion. 15 There is no textual citation for Bentham at all for the chapter of [1] concerned, viz. Ch. 4, 'Conservation'. 16 As Passmore himself at first concedes ([1], p. 84): If, as Bentham tells us, in deciding how to act men ought to take account of the effects of their actions on every sentient being, they obviously ought to take account of the pleasure and pains of the as yet unborn. 17 Neither rightness nor probable lightness in the hedonistic senses correspond to these notions in the ordinary sense; so at least [13] argues, following much anti-utilitarian literature. 18 On this irrationality different theories agree: the rational procedure, for example according to the minimax rule for decision-making under uncertainty, is to minimize that outcome which maximizes harm. 19 Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market (cf. P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 1967, p. 351). Thus the rates have little moral relevance. 20 Cf. Rawls [5], p. 287: 'From a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting future well-being on the basis of pure time preference.' 21 What the probabilities would be depends on the theory of probability adopted: a Carnapian theory, e.g., would lead back to the unconstrained position. �Obligations to the Future 177 22 A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with mere logical possibility. 23 Thus, to take a simple special case, economists dismiss distant future people from their assessments of utility, welfare, etc., on the basis of their non-existence; cf. Ng ('the utility of a non-existent person is zero') and Harsanyi ('only existing people [not even "nonexisting potential individuals"] can have real utility levels since they are the only ones able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects with a negative utility, and feel indifferent to objects with zero utility') (see Appendix B of Y. K. Ng, 'Preference, Welfare, and Social Welfare', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977, pp. 24, 26-27). Non-existent people have no experiences, no preferences; distant future people do not exist; therefore distant future people have no utility assignments - so the sorites goes. But future people at least will have wants, preferences, and so on, and these have to be taken into account in adequate utility assessments (which should be assessed over afuture time horizon), no matter how much it may complicate or defeat calculations. 24 There are problems about formulating universalizability satisfactorily, but they hardly affect the point. The requisite universalizability can in fact be satisfactorily brought out from the semantical analysis of deontic notions such as obligation, and indeed argued for on the basis of such an analysis which is universal in form. The lawlikeness requirement, which can be similarly defended, is essentially that imposed on genuine scientific laws by logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap and Hempel), that such laws should contain no proper names or the like, no reference to specific locations or times. 25 Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick [11], p. 414), and in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and Rousseau toRawls ([5], p. 293). How the principle is argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlying theory; and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particular ethical theories. 26 See esp. R. Lanoue, NuclearPlants:The MoreTheyBuild, The More You Pay, Centerfor Study of Responsive Law, Washington DC 1976; also [14], pp. 212 ff. 27 On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy, Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC 1977, pp. 1-7, and also the details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner [7]. On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23. On the employment issues, see too H. E. Daly in [9], p. 149. A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich, Energy and Equality, Calder & Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need. 28 For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, Blond & Briggs, London 1973. As to the capital and other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and also [7] and [9]. For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy technology will tend to promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries, see the paper of Waiko and other papers in the Melanesian Environment (ed. by J. H. Winslow), Australian National University Press, Canberra 1977. 29 This fact is implicitly recognized in [2], p. 56. 30 A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, Friends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1976); see also [17], [6], [7], [14], pp. 233 ff., and Schumacher, op. cit. 31 This is also explained in [2], p. 56. 32 An argument like this is suggested in Passmore [1], Chs. 4 and 7, with respect to the question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the overriding importance of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned by what appears to be a future- �178 R. and V. Routley directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care of the present and immediate future. The argument has all the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others. 33 See [14], p. 66, p. 191, and also [7]. 34 For such arguments see esp. M. Flood and R. Grove-White, Nuclear Prospects. A Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London 1976. 35 For a recent sketch of one such alternative which is outside the framework of the conventional option of centralized bureaucratic socialism, see E. Callenbach's novel, Ecotopia, Banyan Tree Books, Berkeley, California 1975. For the outline of a liberation socialist alternative see Radical Technology (ed. by G. Boyle and P. Harper), Undercurrents Limited, London 1976, and references therein. 36 Some earlier contract theories also did. Burke's contract (in E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Dent, London 1910, pp. 93-94) 'becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are not yet born'. Thus Burke's contract certainly appears to lead to obligations to distant future generations. Needless to say, there are metaphysical difficulties, which however Burke never considers, about contracts between parties at widely separated temporal locations. 37 Several of the preceding points we owe to M. W. Jackson. 38 Resources such as soil fertility and petroleum could even be a primary social goods on Rawls's very hazy general account of these goods ([5], pp. 62, 97): are these 'something a rational man wants whatever else he wants'? The primary social goods should presumably be those which are necessary for the good and just life -which will however vary with culture. 39 We have benefited from discussion with Ian Hughes and Frank Muller and useful comments on the paper from Brian Martin and Derek Browne. REFERENCES [1] J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London 1974. [2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1977. [3] A. M. Weinberg, 'Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy", Science, Vol. 177 (July 1972), pp. 27-34. • [4] R. Routley, 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle II. Existence is Existence Now', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (to appear). [5] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971. [6] Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London 1976. [7] B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York 1976. [8] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903. [9] B. Commoner, H. Boksenbaum and M. Corr (Eds.), Energy and Human Welfare - A Critical Analysis, Vol. III, Macmillan, New York 1975. �Obligations to the Future 179 [10] J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, published under the superintendence of J. Bowring, with an intro. by J. H. Burton; William Tait, Edinburgh 1843. [11] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London 1962 (reissue). [12] M. P. Golding, 'Obligations to Future Generations', Monist, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 85-99. [13] R. and V. Routley, 'An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism', presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977. [14] R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne 1977. [15] B. L. Cohen, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reactors', Scientific American, Vol. 236 (June 1977), pp. 22-31. [16] S. McCracken, 'The Waragainst the Atom' .Commentary (September 1977), pp. 33-47. [17] A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco 1975. [18] A. Roberts, "The Politics of Nuclear Power', Arena, No. 41 (1976), pp. 22-47. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Published Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan formally published very little of his nuclear ethics and politics, although a nuclear imaginary is present throughout his ouevre. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Inquiry, 21, 133-79 Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future R. and V. Routley Plumwood Mountain, Braidwood, Australia The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring longterm storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty and Lights-going-out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable. I. The Bus Example Suppose we consider a bus, a bus which we hope is to make a very long journey. This bus, a third world bus, carries both passengers and freight. The bus sets down and picks up many different passengers in the course of its long journey and the drivers change many times, but because of the way the bus line is managed and the poor service on the route it is nearly always full to overcrowded, with passengers hanging off the back, and as in Afghanistan, passengers riding on the roof, and chickens and goats in the freight compartment. Early in the bus's journey someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package containing a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is packaged in a very thin container, which as the consigner well knows is unlikely to contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the bus should encounter any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some 1 134 R. and V. Routley passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight, as also frequently happens. All of these things, let us suppose, have happened on some of the bus's previous journeys. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people and animals on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. There does not seem much doubt about what most of us would say about the morality of the consigner's action, and there is certainly no doubt about what the passengers would say. The consigner's action in putting the safety of the occupants of the bus at risk is appalling. What could excuse such an action, what sort of circumstances might justify it, and what sort of case could the consigner reasonably put up? The consigner might say that it is by no means certain that the gas will escape; he himself is an optimist and therefore feels that such unfavourable possible outcomes should be ignored. In any case the bus might have an accident and the passengers be killed long before the container gets a chance to leak; or the passengers might change to another bus and leave the lethal parcel behind. He might say that it is the responsibility of the passengers and the driver to ensure that the journey is a smooth one, and that if they fail to do so, the results are not his fault. He might say that the journey is such a long one that many of the passengers may have become mere mindless vegetables or degenerate wretches about whose fate no decent person need concern himself, or that they might not care about losing their lives or health or possessions anyway by that time. Most of these excuses will seem little more than a bad joke, and certainly would not usually be reckoned any sort of justification. The main argument the consigner of the lethal parcel employs, however, is that his own pressing needs justify his actions. He has no option but to consign his potentially lethal parcel, he says, since the firm he owns, and which has produced the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits and cannot afford to produce a better container or to stop the production of the gas. If the firm goes out of business, the consigner says, his wife will leave him, and he will lose his family happiness, the comfortable way of life to which he has become accustomed and sees now as a necessity; his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others; not only will the firm's customers be inconvenienced but he, the consigner, will have to break some business contracts; the inhabitants of the local village through loss of spending and cancellation of the Multiplier Effect will suffer finan- Obligations to the Future 135 cial hardship, and, worst of all, the tiny flow of droplets that the poor of the village might receive (theoretically at any rate) as a result of the trickling down of these good things would dry up entirely. In short, some basic and some perhaps uncomfortable changes will be needed in the village. Even if the consigner's story were accepted at face value - and it would be wise to look critically at his story - only someone whose moral sensibilities had been paralysed by the disease of galloping economism could see such a set of considerations, based on 'needs', comfort, and the goal of local prosperity, as justifying the consigner's action. One is not generally entitled to thus simply transfer the risks and costs arising from one's own life onto other uninvolved parties, to get oneself out of a hole of one's own making by creating harm or risk of harm to someone else who has had no share in creating the situation. To create serious risks and costs, especially risks to life or health for such others, simply to avoid having to make some changes to a comfortable life style, or even for a somewhat better reason, is usually thought deserving of moral condemnation, and sometimes considered a crime; for example, the action of a company in creating risks to the lives or health of its workers or customers to prevent itself from going bankrupt. What the consigner says may be an explanation of his behaviour, but it is not a justification. The problem raised by nuclear waste disposal is by no means a perfect analogy to the bus case, since, for example, the passengers on the nuclear bus cannot get off the bus or easily throw out the lethal package. In many crucial moral respects, however, the nuclear waste storage problem as it affects future people, the passengers in the bus we are considering, resembles the consignment of the faultily packaged lethal gas. Not only are rather similar moral principles involved, but a rather similar set of arguments to the lamentable excuses the consigner presents have been seriously put up to justify nuclear development, the difference being that in the nuclear case these arguments have been widely accepted. There is also some parallel in the risks involved; there is no known safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by nuclear plants that will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.1 The wastes problem will not be a slight one, with each one of the more than 2,000 reactors envisaged by the end of the century, producing on average annual wastes containing one thousand times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb.2 The wastes include not merely the spent fuels and their radioactive by-products, but also everything they contaminate, from fuel containers to the thousands of widely distributed decommissioned nuclear 136 R. and V. Routley reactors which will have to be abandoned, still in a highly radioactive condition, after the expiry of their expected lifetimes of about thirty years, and which have been estimated to require perhaps one and a half million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.3 The wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime; for fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or so, and for the actinides (transuranic elements) which include plutonium, there is a half-million to a million-year storage problem.4 Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed longterm methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste that have been produced over the last twenty years.5 With present known short-term surface methods of storage there is a continued need for human intervention to keep the material isolated from the environment, while with proposed longer-term methods such as storage in salt mines or granite to the risk of human interference there are added the risks of leakage, e.g. through water seepage, and of disturbance, for example through climatic change, earth movements, etc. The risks are significant: no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods involved. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period which has seen a number of ice ages and great fluctuations in climate for example, could be confident that the waste material could be safely stored for the vast periods of time required. Much of this waste is highly toxic; for example, even a beachball sized quantity of plutonium appropriately distributed is enough to give every person on the planet lung cancer - so that a leak of even a small part of this waste material could involve huge loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of immense areas of land.6 Given the enormous costs which could be involved for the future, it is plainly grossly inadequ'ate'to merely speculate concerning untested, but possibly or even probably, safe methods for disposal of wastes. Yet none of the proposed methods has been properly tested, and they may prove to involve all sorts of unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the Obligations to the Future 137 geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long-term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be, especially if, as seems likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically, seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future not previously encountered in human affairs, and certainly not conspicuous in the nuclear industry.7 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long-term storage sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weapons-grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million-year storage period, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it. Our behaviour in creating this nightmare situation for the future is certainly no better than that of the consigner in the bus example. Industrialized countries, in order to get out of a mess of their own making essentially the creation of economies dependent on an abundance" of non-renewable energy in a situation where it is in fact in limited supply opt for a 'solution' which may enable them to avoid the making of uncomfortable changes during the lifetime of those now living, at the expense of passing heavy burdens on to the inhabitants of the earth at a future time burdens in the shape of costs and risks which, just as in the bus case, may adversely affect the life and health of future people and their opportunity to lead a decent life.8 It is sometimes suggested that analogies like the bus example are defective; that morally they are crucially different from the nuclear case, since future people, unlike the passengers in the bus, will benefit directly from nuclear development, which will provide an abundance of energy for the indefinite future. But this is incorrect. Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be seriously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks, without any corresponding benefits, in order to provide for the extravagant energy use of only five generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop-gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a 138 R. and V. Routley transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it.9 For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dream of global industrialization is realized, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy resource use, and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it. It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life, are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least indirect beneficiaries. The 'solution' then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Just as in the bus case, contemporary industrial society proposes to get itself out of a hole of its own making by creating risk of harm, and by transferring costs and risks, to someone else who has had no part in producing the situation and who will obtain no clear benefit. It has clear alternatives to this action. That it does not take them is due essentially to its unwillingness to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to its desire to protect the interests of those who benefit from them. If we apply to the nuclear situation the same standards of behaviour and moral principles that we acknowledge (in principle if perhaps often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it will not be easy to avoid the conclusion that the situation involves injustice with respect to future people on a grand scale. It seems to us that there are only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of our nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to say that there are no circumstances in which such an action might possibly be justifiable, or at least where the case is less clearcut. It is the same with the nuclear case. Just as in the case of the consigner of the Obligations to the Future 139 package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We turn now to the first of these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development, to the philosophical question of our obligations to the future. II. Obligations to the Distant Future The area in which these philosophical problems arise is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, that is, the future with which people alive today will make no direct contact; the immediate future provides comparatively few problems for moral theories. The issues involved, although of far more than academic interest, have not received any great attention in recent philosophical literature, despite the fact that the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass, and also raises a number of questions in political philosophy concerning the adequacy of accepted institutions which leave out of account the interests of future people. Moral philosophers have predictably differed on the issue. But contrary to the picture painted in a recent, widely read, and influential work discussing it, Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature, a good many philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them less weight, those who deny, or who are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those like Passmore and Golding who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond those to the next generation. • According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained; there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply, that we don't have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, i.e. those who have opted for the uncon- 140 R. and V. Routley strained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligation is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also non-transitive. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or requirements for moral obligation, which would rule out obligations to the non-immediate future are these: First, there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariantly over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any contemporary institution would do it for them. Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out the distant future as a field of moral obligation, as they not only require a commonality, or some sort of common basis, which cannot be guaranteed in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange, the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive relations of short duration such as sympathy and love. There are some difficulties also about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who may well be committed to a life-style for which one has no sympathy. On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary Obligations to the Future 141 people have no obligations to future people and can harm them as it suits them. What all these views have in common is a naturalistic picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).10 Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually thought to characterize it, such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features), are lost, especially where there is a choice of whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so of whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. However, the view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act as one likes with respect to them, is a very difficult one to sustain. Consider the example of a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb which is to be set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the action. The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being unduly expensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to future people. The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of examples: A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining, processing, and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problems for present people or their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm it does to future people. Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view might seem childishly obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not only have a number of philosophers writing on the issue endorsed this position, but it is the clear 142 R. and V. Routley implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of economic theory. It does not appear, on the other hand, that those who opt for the unconstrained position have considered such examples and endorsed them as morally acceptable, despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that when it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being free to act implies, among other things being free to inflict pointless harm, most of those who opted for the unconstrained position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives. The view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in cases such as those discussed above and the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so must acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future. The thesis seems thus to assume an incorrect model of an independent and unrelated future. Also, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have, or has not acquired, an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved - that one has no responsibility for his life - does not imply that one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some course of action of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him. These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the failure to make an important distinction between, on the one hand, acquired or assumed obligations towards somebody, for which some act of acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and on the other hand moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of acquisition is required. There is a considerable difference in the level and kind of responsibility involved. In the first case one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his Obligations to the Future 143 action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist. While it may be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make special sacrifices of an heroic kind for future people, or even to help them especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained from harming them. Thus, to return to the bus example, the consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has never assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them, and that they are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue in respect of both the bus and the nuclear case is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility for the lives of the people involved. The confusion of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off non-acquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral obligation' in philosophy to indicate any type of deontic constraint, while in natural language it is used to indicate something which has to be assumed or acquired. Hence the equation and at least one root of the unconstrained position, that is of the belief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future. The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to a more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent position. Passmore's position in [1] is a striking example of the second ambivalent position. On the one hand Passmore regularly gives the impression of one championing future people; for example, in the final sentence of [1] he says, concerning men a century hence: My sole concern is that we should do nothing which will reduce their freedom of thought and action, whether by destroying.the natural world which makes that freedom possible or the social traditions which permit and encourage it. 144 R. and V. Routley Earlier (esp. pp. 84-85) Passmore appears to endorse the principle 'that we ought not to act so as certainly to harm posterity' and claims (p. 98) that, even where there are uncertainties, 'these uncertainties do not justify negligence'. Nevertheless, though obligations concerning non-immediate posterity are thus admitted, the main thrust of Passmore's argument is entirely different, being in favour of the unconstrained position according to which we have no obligations to non-immediate posterity. Thus his conclusion (p. 91): So whether we approach the problem of obligations to posterity by way of Bentham and Sidgwick, Rawls or Golding, we are led to something like the same conclusion: our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condition, and that is all.11 Passmore's position is, to all appearances, simply inconsistent. There are two ways one might try to render it consistent, but neither is readily available to Passmore. The first is by taking advantage of the distinction between moral constraints and acquired obligations, but a basis for this distinction is not evident in Passmore's work and indeed the distinction is antithetical to the analyses of obligation that Passmore tries to synthesize with his own analysis in terms of loves. The second, sceptical, route to consistency is by way of the argument that we shall consider shortly, that there is always gross uncertainty with respect to the distant future, uncertainty which relieves us in practice of any moral constraints regarding the distant future. But though Passmore's writing strongly suggests this uncertainty argument (especially his sympathetic discussion of the Premier of Queensland's argument against conservationists [p. 77]), he also rules it out with the claim that uncertainties do not justify negligence.12 Many of the accounts of moral obligation that give rise to the unconstrained position are fused in Passmore's work, again not entirely consistently, since the different accounts exploited do not give uniform results. Thus the primary account of obligation is said to be in terms of loves though the account is never satisfactorily formulated or developed - and it is suggested that because our loves do not extend into the distant future, neither do our obligations. This sentimental account of obligation will obviously lead to different results from utilitarian accounts of obligation, which however Passmore appeals to in his discussion of wilderness. In yet other places in [1], furthermore, social contract and moral community Obligations to the Future 145 views are appealed to - see, e.g., the treatment of animals, of preservation, and of duties to nature. In the case of obligations to future people, however, Passmore does try to sketch an argument - what we call the convergence argument - that all the accounts lead in the end to the unconstrained position. As well as the convergence argument, and various uncertainty arguments to be considered later, Passmore appears to endorse several other arguments in favour of his theme that there are in practice no obligations to the distant future. In particular, he suggests that such obligations would in practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves, only to the succeeding generation. We outline three objections to this chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations, since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create individual responsibility, and which can't necessarily be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since they are non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters.13 Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense of disadvantages to people of the more distant future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors. Such cases can hardly be written off as 'never-never land' examples, since many cases of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overcropping. If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests. 146 R. and V. Routley Passmore tries to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation, this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm, than one is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from beating and robbing some stranger and leaving him to starve. Passmore's most sustained argument for the unconstrained position is a convergence argument, that different analyses of obligations, including his own, lead to the one conclusion. This style of argument is hardly convincing when there are well-known accounts of obligation which do not lead to the intended conclusion, e.g. deontological accounts such as those of Kant and of modern European schools, and teleological accounts such as those of Moore (in [8]). But such unfavourable positions are either rapidly passed over or ignored in Passmore's historical treatment and narrow selection of historical figures. The style of argument becomes even less persuasive when it is discovered that the accounts of the main authorities appealed to, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Rawls,14 do not lead, without serious distortion, to the intended conclusion. Indeed Passmore has twisted the historical and textual evidence to suit his case, as we now try to indicate. Consider Bentham first. Passmore's assumption, for which no textual evidence is cited, ls is that no Benthamite calculation can take account of a future more extensive than the immediate future (cf. pp. 87-88). The assumption seems to be based simply on the fact that Bentham remarked that 'the value of the pleasure or pain to each person to be considered in any estimate will be greater or less in virtue of the following circumstances'. '3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness' ([10], p. 16). But this does nothing to show that future persons are discounted: the certainty and propinquity do not concern persons, but the utilities of the persons concerned. As regards which persons are concerned in any calculation Bentham is quite explicit, detailing how to take an exact account. . . of the general tendency of any act.. . .5 . Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process [summation of values of pleasure and of pain] with respect to each. ([10], p. 16) Obligations to the Future 147 It follows that Bentham's calculation takes account of everyone (and, in his larger scheme, every sentient creature) whose interests appear to be concerned: if the interests of people in the distant future appear to be concerned - as they are in conservation issues - they are to be included in the calculation. And there is independent evidence16 that in Bentham's view the principle of utility was not temporally restricted: 'that is useful which, taking all times and all persons into consideration, leaves a balance of happiness' ([10], pp. 17-18, our italics). Thus the future cut-off that Passmore has attributed to Bentham is contradicted by Bentham's own account. The case of Sidgwick is more complex, because there is isolated oscillation in his application of utilitarianism between use of utility and of (something like) expected utility (see [11], pp. 381,414): Sidgwick's utilitarianism is, in its general characterization, essentially that of Bentham: the conduct which . . . is objectively right is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all those whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ([11], p. 411) All includes all sentient beings, both existing and to exist, as Sidgwick goes on to explain (p. 414). In particular, in answer to the question 'How far are we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of existing human beings?' Sidgwick writes ([11], p. 414, our italics): It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be affected - must necessarily be more uncertain. But Passmore manages, first of all, to give a different sense to what Sidgwick is saying by adjusting the quotation, by omitting the clause we have italicized, which equalizes the degree of concern for present and future persons, and by italicizing the whole except-clause, thereby placing much greater emphasis than Sidgwick does on uncertainty. For according to Sidgwick's impartiality principle, 'the mere difference in time is not a 148 R. and V. Routley reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one -amount than to that of another' ([11], p. 381; see also p. 124). The apparent tension in Sidgwick's theory as to whether uncertainty should be taken into account is readily removed by resort to a modern distinction between values and expected values (i.e. probability weighted values); utilitarian rightness is defined as before in terms of the net happiness of all concerned over all time without mention of uncertainty or probabilities, but it is distinguished from probable rightness (given present information), in the utilitarian sense,17 which is defined in terms of the expected net happiness of those concerned, using present probabilities. It is the latter notion, of probable rightness, that practical reasoning is commonly concerned with and that decision theory studies; and it is this that Passmore supposes Sidgwick is using ([1], p. 84). But it is evident that the utilitarian determination of probable rightness, like that of rightness, will sometimes take into account the distant future - as Sidgwick's discussion of utilitarian determination of optimum population (immediately following his remark on uncertainty) does. So how does Passmore contrive to reverse matters, to have Sidgwick's position lead to his own unconstrained conclusion? The answer is: By inserting an additional assumption of his own - which Sidgwick would certainly have rejected - that the uncertainties entitle us to ignore the distant future. What Passmore has implicitly assumed in his claim ([1], p. 85) that 'utilitarian principles [such as Sidgwick's] are not strong enough' 'to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now call upon us to make' is his own thesis that 'The uncertainty of harms we are hoping to prevent would in general entitle us to ignore them.. .'. From a decision-theory viewpoint this is simply irrational18 unless the probabilities of damage are approaching zero. We will deal with the essentially sceptical uncertainty arguments on which Passmore's position depends shortly: here it is enough to observe that Sidgwick's position does not lead to anything like that which Passmore attributes to him - without uncertainty assumptions which Sidgwick would have rejected (for he thought that future people'will certainly have pleasure and suffer pain). We can also begin to gauge from Passmore's treatment of nineteenthcentury utilitarians, such as Bentham and Sidgwick, the extent of the distortion which underlies his more general historical case for the unconstrained position which, so he claims, represents accurately enough what, over the last two centuries, men have seen as their duty to posterity as a whole. . . . ([1], p. 91) Obligations to the Future 149 The treatment accorded Rawls in only marginally more satisfactory. Passmore supposes that Rawls's theory of justice leads directly to the unconstrained position ([1], p. 87 and p. 91), whereas Rawls claims ([5], p. 293) that we have obligations to future people just as to present ones. But the situation is more complicated than Rawls's claim would indicate, as we now try to explain in a summary way (more detail is given in the Appendix). For, in order to justify this claim on his theory (with its present time-of-entry interpretation), Rawls has to invoke additional and dubious motivational assumptions; even so the theory which thus results does not yield the intended conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with Rawls's claim. However, by changing the time-of-entry interpretation to an omnitemporal one, Rawls's claim does result from the theory so amended. Moreover, the amended theory also yields, by exactly Rawls's argument for a just saving rate, a resource conservation policy, and also a case against nuclear development. Accordingly Passmore's other claims regarding Rawls are mistaken, e.g. that the theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation. Rawls does not emerge unscathed either. As on the issue of whether his contract is a necessary condition for obligations, so on obligations which the contract yields to the distant future, Rawls is far from consistent. Furthermore, institutions such as qualified market and voting systems are recommended as just though from a future perspective their results are far from that. Rawls, then, does not take obligations to the future with full seriousness. In sum, it is not true that the theory of Rawls, any more than the theories of the historical figures actually discussed by Passmore, unequivocally supports the unconstrained position. III. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Arguments Although there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position. According to the qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant future: there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present 150 R. and V. Routley people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are disadvantaged by them. The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in most modern economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of an (opportunity cost) discount rate. The attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal constraints, and cannot determine what those constraints are. There are, moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt one which discounts the future is to beg all the questions at issue. The discounting move often has the same result as the unconstrained position; if, for instance, we consider the cancer example and consider costs as payable compensation, it is evident that, over a sufficiently long period of time, discounting at current prices would lead to the conclusion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints. In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the application of discount rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no more than about fifteen years,19 and application of such rates would simply beg the question against the interests and rights of future people. Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type the whole method of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would violate moral constraints.20 Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.21 But then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people, except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much) higher probabilities obtain. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower Obligations to the Future 151 probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming that anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it can't be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to obtain quite doubtful or trivial benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportunity to continue unnecessarily high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted, such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit approach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned, or for dealing with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results. For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any simple or general way from one party to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs ony ? - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted by some proponents of nuclear energy, who attempt to dismiss the costs to future people with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The transfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on by McCracken [16] in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risk, between nuclear risks and those from cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming extent* those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also those of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related to a person's extent of use. The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's 152 R. and V. Routley happiness sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties, and the introduction of probability considerations does not change the principles involved but merely complicates analyses. One might further object to the probability argument that probabilities involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes, and that the outcomes of some moral problems such as the bus example do not depend on a high level of probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the bus example reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important ones used by philosophers and others to argue for the position that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of separation, but frequently entangled. Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalized uncertainty argument which runs as follows: In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly, and highly speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. More formally and crudely: One only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information; there is no reliable information at present as regards the distant future; therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. The first argument is essentially a variation on a sceptical argument in epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace 'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and Obligations to the Future 153 the adjacent future and present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly do act on the basis of such 'unreliable' information as the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels 'uncertainty'; for scepticproof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. A good example is again the bus case. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is a significant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and the prospects of the passengers quite uncertain; the resolution of the problem is still clearly in favour of the so-called 'speculative' and 'unreliable'. But if we do not require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require epistemic standards for the future which the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument, that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account, because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions upon it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can also be put in this way: If moral principles are, like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as 'if* has character h then x is wrong, for every (action) x', then what the argument claims is 154 R. and V. Routley that we can never obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action of the 'It is wrong to do x' type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument have to be conceded. If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the future, will not be applicable in practice for obtaining any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future is always so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point, noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of"a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in girls' names or men's footwear, or what brands of ice cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3,000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. For this sort of reason, the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. While it is true that there are many areas in which the morally relevant information needed is uncertain or unavailable, and in which we cannot therefore determine satisfactorily how to act, there are certainly others in Obligations to the Future 155 which uncertainty in morally relevant areas is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, seems to be of the latter sort. Here there is no gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as we can see from the bus example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the corresponding defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probable harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would affect us (cf. Passmore [1]). But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are morally committed to. Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons or forever plugged into enjoyment- or other machines (Golding [12]). Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility - like the sceptic who says that the solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast 156 R. and V. Routley with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilization through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer, and the fact that this appears to be a real and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm in the example discussed above, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases, before such actions could be considered admissible, what would be required is far more than a possibility, real or not22 - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves. The strategy of most of these uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, and may be brought out by looking yet again at the bus example, where the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the bus may break down and they may all change to a different bus leaving the parcel behind, or the bus may crash, killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities, of course, but there is no positive reason to believe that they are any more than that, that is they are not real possibilities. The strategy is to stress such outside possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will Obligations to the Future 157 break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners' taking account of the passengers' welfare and of the real possibility of harm from his parcel, and thereby excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints .This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty, or at least a very high probability, of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not so. An argument closely related to the uncertainty arguments is based on the non-existence and indeterminacy of the future.23 An item is indeterminate in a given respect if its properties in that respect are, as a matter of logic, not settled (nor are they settlable in a non-arbitrary fashion). The respects in which future items are indeterminate are well enough known for a few examples to serve as reminders: all the following are indeterminate: the population of Australia at 2001, its distribution, its age structure, the preferences of its members for folk music, wilderness, etc., the size and shape of Wollongong, the average number of rooms in its houses and in its office blocks, and so on. Philosophical discussion of such indeterminacy is as old as Aristotle's sea battle and as modern as truth-value gaps and fuzzy logics, and many positions have been adopted on the existence and determinacy of future items. Nevertheless theories that there are obligations to the future are not sensitive to the metaphysical position adopted concerning the existence or non-existence of the future. Any theory which denied obligations to the future on the metaphysical grounds that the future did not exist, and did not have properties, so that the present could not be related to it, would be committed to denying such obvious facts as that the present could causally influence the future, that present people could be great-grandparents of purely future people, and so on, and hence would have to be rejected on independent grounds. This is not to say that there are not important problems about the existence or non-existence of future items, problems which are perhaps most straightforwardly handled by a Meinongian position which allows that items which do not exist may have properties. The non-existence of the future 158 R. and V. Routley does raise problems for standard theories which buy the Ontological Assumption (the thesis that what does not exist does not have properties), especially given the natural (and correct) inclination to say that the future does not (now) exist; but such theories can adopt various strategies for coping with these problems (e.g. the adoption of a platonistic position according to which the future does now exist, or the allowance for certain sorts of relations between existents at different times), although the satisfactoriness of these strategies is open to question (cf. [4]). Thus whether or not the Ontological Assumption is assumed and however it is applied, it will be allowed that future items will have properties even if they do not have them now, and that is enough to provide the basis for moral concern about the future. Thus the thesis of obligations to the future does not presuppose any special metaphysical position on the existence of the future. If the non-existence of future items creates no special problems for obligations to the future, the same is not true of their indeterminacy. Whether the indeterminacy of future items is seen as a logical feature of the future which results from the non-existence of purely future items or whether one adopts a (mistaken) platonistic view of the future as existing and sees the indeterminacy as an epistemological one resulting from our inability to know the character of these entities - that is, we cannot completely know the future .though it exists and has a definite characterwhichever view we take indeterminacy still creates major difficulties for certain ethical theories and their treatment of the future. The difficulties arise for theories which appear to require a high level of determinacy with respect to the number and character of future items, in particular calculus-type theories such as utilitarianism in its usual forms, where the calculations are critically dependent on such information as numbers, totals, and averages, information which so far as the future is concerned is generally indeterminate. The fact that this numerical information is typically indeterminate means that insofar as head-count utilitarianism requires determinate information on numbers, it is in a similar position to theories discussed earlier; it may apply theoretically to future people, but since the calculations cannot be applied to them their interests will be left out of account. And, in fact, utilitarianism for the most part does not, and perhaps cannot, take future creatures and their interests seriously; there is little discussion as to how the difficulties or impossibility of calculations regarding the open future are to be obtained. Non-platonistic utilitarianism is in logical difficulty on this matter, while platonis- Obligations to the Future 159 tic utilitarianism - which faces a range of other objections - is inapplicable because of epistemic indeterminacy. We have yet another case of a theory of the sort that applies theoretically but in practice doesn't take the future seriously. But far from this showing that future people's interests should be left out of account, what these considerations show are deficiencies in these sorts of theories, which require excessive determinacy of information. This kind of information is commonly equally unavailable for the accepted areas of moral constraint, the present and immediate future; and the resolution of moral issues is often not heavily dependent on knowledge of such specific determinate features as numbers or other determinate features. For example, we do not need to know how many people there will be on the bus, how intelligent they are, what their preferences are or how badly they will be injured, in order to reach the conclusion that the consigner's action in despatching his parcel is a bad one. Furthermore, it is only the ability of moral considerations to continue to apply in the absence of determinate information about such things as numbers that makes it possible to take account of the possible effects of action, as the risks associated with action - something which is quite essential even for the present if moral considerations are to apply in the normal and accepted way. For it is essential in order to apply moral considerations in the accepted way that we consider alternative worlds, in order to take account of options, risks, and alternative outcomes; but these alternative or counterfactual worlds are not in so different a position from the future with respect to determinacy; for example, there is indeterminacy with respect to the number of people who may be harmed in the bus case or in apossible nuclear reactor melt-down. These alternative worlds, like the distant future, are indeterminate in some respects, but not totally indeterminate. It might still be thought that the indeterminacy of the future, for example with respect to number and exact character, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests unknown, how can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by ignoring 160 R. and V. Routley such factors. Nor are such distributional problems as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It should be conceded then that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult or indeed impossible to resolve - a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e.g. the bus example which is a conflict case of a type. In particular, there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. Moreover, even where numbers are relevant often only bounds will be required, exact numerical counts only being required where, for instance, margins are narrow; e.g. issues may be resolved as in parliament where a detailed vote (or division) is only required when the issue is close. It is certainly not necessary then to have complete determinacy to resolve all cases of conflict. The question we must ask then is what features of future people could disqualify them from moral consideration or reduce their claims to it to below those of present people? The answer is: in principle None. Prima facie moral principles are universalizable, and lawlike, in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example.24 But universalizability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup such as (white-skinned) humans, etc. The only candidates for characteristics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, uncertainty and indeterminacy; what we have argued is that it would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only present information). In particular they do not affect cases of the sort being considered, the nuclear one, where highly determinate or certain information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be harmed or certainty of damage are not required. To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is not needed: it is enough to require that the temporal position of a person Obligations to the Future 161 cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideration;25 inversely that it is without basis to discriminate morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this universalizability, there is the same obligation to future people as to the present; and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions' causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob future people of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not free us of these obligations. If, in a closely comparable case concerning the present, the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people. Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion tentatively reached in our first section, that proposals for nuclear development in the present state of technology for future waste disposal are immoral. IV. Overriding Consideration Arguments In the first part we noticed that the consigner's action could not be justified by purely economistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. We also observed that the principle on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to the nuclear case. For this reason the economistic arguments which are thus most commonly advanced to promote nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment, investment, and consumption-do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these economistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct (and there is reason to doubt that most of them are),26 the arguments would fail because economics must operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vice versa. 162 R. and V. Routley What one does have to consider, however, are moral conflict arguments, that is arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only possible outcome, and will ensue. For example, in the bus case, the consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is taken the village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing duties to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives), and upon showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument-for example, if in the bus case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way - then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. We want to argue that suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument, designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentation of false dichotomies. The first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of industrialized countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialized nations. The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the Obligations to the Future 163 diversion of great amounts of available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. 27 The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment, while politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralized entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem.28 The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of people of the third world does not, of course, mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the westernized and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organized; but it is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. The poverty argument then is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used to help the poor.29 Both for the third world and for the industrialized countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources,30 alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor.31 The second major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technological, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out.32 . The lights-going-out argument raises rather sharply questions as to what is valuable in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary for a good society. These are questions which deserve much fuller treatment than we can allot them here, but a few brief points should be made. The argument adopts an extremely uncritical position with respect to existing high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable; it also assumes that technological society is unmodifiable, that it can't be changed in the direction of energy 164 R. and V. Routley conservation or alternative energy sources without collapse. Such a society has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of energy are essential to maintain this whole. These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technological society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all, it has survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western society's demands for energy are totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a programme of increasing destruction, but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary society. There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness; but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain existing high-technological society and its political institutions? but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things? While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably, that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence, e.g. from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we believe it is, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-going-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of wellbeing is required to consume less energy than at present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.33 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilization, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganza. In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy Obligations to the Future 165 is obtained by nuclear-fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralized, controlled, and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Very persuasive arguments have been advanced by civil liberties groups and others in a number of countries to suggest that such a society would tend to become authoritarian, if only as an outcome of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation.34 There are reasons to believe then that with nuclear development what we would be passing on to future generations would be some of the worst aspects of our society (e.g. the consumerism, growing concentration of power, destruction of the natural environment, and latent authoritarianism), while certain valuable aspects would be lost or threatened. Political freedom is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives which do not involve such unacceptable consequences are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but the development of alternative technologies and life-styles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralized nuclear option.35 The lights-going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false dichotomy. Thus both the escape routes, the appeal to moral conflict and to the appeal to futurity, are closed. If then we apply the same standards of morality to the future as we acknowledge for the present - as we have argued we should - the conclusion that the proposal to develop nuclear energy on a large scale is a crime against the future is inevitable, since both the escape routes are closed. There are, of course, also many other grounds for ruling it out as morally unacceptable, for saying that it-is not only a crime against the distant future but also a crime against the present and immediate future. These other grounds for moral concern about nuclear energy, as it affects the present and immediate future, include problems arising from the possibility of catastrophic releases of radioactive fuel into the environment or of waste material following an accident such as reactor melt-down, of unscheduled discharges of radiation into the environment from a plant fault, of proli- 166 R. and V. Routley feration of nuclear weapons, and of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion. All these are important issues, of much moral interest. What we want to claim, however, is that on the basis of its effects on the future alone, the nuclear option is morally unacceptable. Appendix Passmore's Treatment ofRawls, and What Really Happens on Rawls's Theory Passmore takes it that Rawls's theory yields an unconstrained position but, according to Rawls, the theory leads to quite the opposite result; namely, persons in different generations [and not merely neighbouring generations] have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define justice between persons at different moments of time.. . . The derivation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat far-fetched application of the central doctrine. Nevertheless these requirements would be acknowledged in the original position [where the parties do not know to which generation they belong], and so the conception of justice as fairness covers these matters without any change in its basic idea. ([5], p. 293; the second insert is drawn from p. 287) Through judicious use of the veil of ignorance and the time of entry of parties to the original contract position, Rawls's contract theory, unlike simpler explicit contract theories, can yield definite obligations to distant future people,36 for example, we ought to save at a just rate for future people. But, as Rawls remarks (p. 284), 'the question of justice between generations . . . subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests'. It is doubtful that Rawls's theory as formulated passes the tests; for the theory as formulated does not yield the stated conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with the thesis that there are the same obligations to future people as to contemporaries. Exactly how these obligations arise from the initial agreement depends critically on the interpretation of the time of Obligations to the Future 167 entry of the parties into the agreement. Insofar as Rawls insists upon the present-time-of-entry interpretation (p. 139), he has to introduce supplementary motivational assumptions in order to (try to) secure the desired bondings between generations, in particular to ensure that the generation of the original position saves for any later generation, even their immediate successors ([5], p. 140 and p. 292). Rawls falls back on-what is as we have seen inadequate to the task, since it does not exclude one generation damaging another remote generation in a way that bypasses mutually successive generations - 'ties of sentiment between successive generations' (p. 292): to this limited extent Passmore has a point, for such a social contract on its own (without additional assumptions about the motives of the parties to the agreement) does not furnish obligations even to our immediate successors. This is indicative also of the unsatisfactory instability of Rawls's theory under changes, its sensitivity to the way the original agreement is set up, to the motivation of parties, their time of entry, what they can know, etc. To arrive at a more adequate account of obligations to the distant future under Rawls's theory, let us adopt, to avoid the additional, dubious and unsatisfactory, motivational assumptions Rawls invokes, one of the alternative - and non -equivalent - time-of-entry interpretations that Rawls lists (p. 146), that of persons alive at some time in simultaneous agreement. Let us call this, following Rawls's notation (on p. 140), interpretation 4b (it is perhaps unnecessary to assume for 4b any more than 4a that all people need be involved: it may be enough given the equivalencizing effect of the veil of ignorance that some are, and as with the particular quantifier it is quite unnecessary to be specific about numbers). Then of course the parties, since they are, for all they know, of different generations, will presumably agree on a just savings rate, and also to other just distribution principles, simply on the basis of Rawlsian rationality, i.e. advancing their own interests, without additional motivation assumptions. This more appealing omnitemporal interpretation of time of entry into the agreement, which gives a superior account of obligation to the future consistent with Rawls's claim, Rawls in some places puts down as less than best (p. 292) but in his most detailed account of the original position simply dismisses (p. 139): To conceive of the original position [as a gathering of people living at different times] would be to stretch fantasy too far; the conception would cease to be a natural guide to intuition. 168 R. and V. Rout ley This we question: it would be a better guide to intuition than a position (like 4a) which brings out intuitively wrong results; it is a more satisfactory guide, for example, to justice between generations than the present-timeof-entry interpretation, which fails conspicuously to allow for the range of potential persons (all of whom are supposed to qualify on Rawls's account for just treatment, cf. § 77). Moreover, it stretches fantasy no further than science fiction or than some earlier contract accounts.36 But it does require changes in the way the original position is conceived, and it does generate metaphysical difficulties for orthodox ontological views (though not to the same extent for the Meinongian view we prefer); for, to consider the latter, either time travel is possible or the original hypothetical position is an impossible situation, with people who live at different times assembled at the same time. The difficulties - of such an impossible meeting help to reveal that what Rawls's theory offers is but a colourful representation of obligations in terms of a contract agreed upon at a meeting. The metaphysical difficulties do not concern merely possible people, because all those involved are sometime-actual people; nor are there really serious difficulties generated by the fact that very many of these people do not exist, i.e. exist now. The more serious difficulties are either those of time travel, e.g. that future parties relocated into the present may be able to interfere with their own history, or, if time travel is ruled out logically or otherwise, that future parties may be advantaged (or disadvantaged) by their knowledge of history and technology, and that accordingly fairness is lost. As there is considerable freedom in how we choose to (re)arrange the original position, we shall suppose that time travel is rejected as a means of entering the original position. For much less than travel is required; some sort of limited communicational network which filters out, for example, all historical data (and all cultural or species dependent material) would suffice; and in any case if time travel were not excluded essentially the present-time-of-entry interpretation would serve, though fairness would again be put in doubt. The filtered communicational hook-up by which the omnitemporal position is engineered still has - if fairness is to be seen to be built into the decision making - to be combined with a reinterpreted veil of ignorance, so that parties do not know where they are located temporally any more than they know who they are characterwise. This implies, among other things, limitations on the parties' knowledge of factual matters, such as available technology and world and local history; for otherwise parties could work out their location, temporal or spatial. For example, if some party knew, as Rawls supposes, Obligations to the Future 169 the general social facts, then he would presumably be aware of the history of his time and so of where history ends, that is of the date of his generation, his time (his present), and so be aware of his temporal location. These are already problems for Rawls's so-called 'present-time-ofentry interpretation' - it is, rather, a variable-time-of-entry interpretation - given that the parties may be, as Rawls occasionally admits (e.g. p. 287), of any one generation, not necessarily the present: either they really do have to be ofthepresent time or they cannot be assumed to know as much as Rawls supposes.37 There is, however, no reason why the veil of ignorance should not be extended so as to avoid this problem; and virtually any extension that solves the problem for the variable-time-of-entry interpretation should serve, so it seems, for the omnitemporal one. We shall assume then that the parties know nothing which discloses their respective locations (i.e. in effect we write in conditions for universalizability of principles decided upon). There are still gaps between the assumptions of the omnitemporal position as roughly sketched and the desired conclusion concerning obligations to the future, but (the matter is beginning to look non-trivially provable given not widely implausible assumptions and) the intuitive arguments are as clear as those in [5], indeed they simply restate arguments to obligations given by Rawls. Rawls's theory, under interpretation 4b, admits of nice application to the problems of just distribution of material resources and of nuclear power. The just distribution, or rate of usage, of material resources38 over time is an important conservation issue to which Rawls's theory seems to apply, just as readily, and in a similar fashion, to that in which it applies to the issue of a just rate of savings. In fact the argument from the original position for a just rate of saving - whatever its adequacy - can by simply mimicked to yield an argument for just distribution of resources over generations. Thus, for example: persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much they would be willing to save [i.e. conserve] at each stage of advance on the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rate [conserve resources to the same extent]. . . . In effect, then, they must choose a just savings principle [resources distribution principle] that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to [degree of resource conservation at] each level of advance. ([5], p. 287; our bracketed options give the alternative argument) 170 R. and V. Routley Just as 'they try to piece together a just savings schedule' (p. 289), so they can try to piece together a just resource distribution policy. Just as a case for resource conservation can be made out by appeal to the original position, since it is going to be against the interests of, to the disadvantage of, later parties to find themselves in a resource depleted situation (thus, on Rawlsian assumptions, they will bargain hard for a share of resources), so, interestingly, a case against a rapid programme of nuclear power development can be devised. The basis of a case against large-scale nuclear development is implicit in Rawls's contract theory under interpretation 4b, though naturally the theory is not applied in this sort of way by Rawls. To state the case in its crude but powerful form: people from later generations in the original position are bound to take it as against their interests to simply carry the waste can for energy consumed by an earlier generation. (We have already argued that they will find no convincing overriding considerations that make it worth their while to carry the waste can.) Thus not only has Passmore misrepresented the obligations to the future that Rawls's theory admits; he is also wrong in suggesting (p. 87 and p. 91) that Rawls's theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation which includes reductions in present consumption. There is, in this connection, an accumulation of errors in Passmore, some of which spill over to Rawls, which it is worth trying to set out. First, Passmore claims ([1], p. 86; cf. also p. 90) that 'Rawls does not so much mention the saving of natural resources'. In fact the 'husbanding of natural resources' is very briefly considered ([5], p. 271). It is true, however, that Rawls does not reveal any of the considerable power that his theory, properly interpreted, has for natural resource conservation, as implying a just distribution of natural resources over time. Secondly, Passmore attempts ([1], pp. 87 ff.) to represent the calls of conservationists for a reduction in present resource usage and for a more just distribution as a call for heroic self-sacrifices; this is part of his more general attempt to represent every moral constraint with respect to the non-immediate future as a matter of self-sacrifice. 'Rawls's theory', Passmore says (on p. 87), 'leaves no room for heroic sacrifice', and so, he infers, leaves no room for conservation. Not only is the conclusion false, but the premiss also: Rawls's theory allows for supererogation, as Rawls explains ([5], p. 117). But resource conservation is, like refraining from nuclear development, not a question of heroic self-sacrifice; it is in part a question of obligations or duties to the distant future. And Rawls's theory allows not only for obligations as well as supererogation, but also for natural duties. Rawls's Obligations to the Future 171 contract, unlike the contracts of what is usually meant by a 'contract theory', is by no means exhaustive of the moral sphere: But even this wider [contract] theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves towards,animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put them aside, (p. 17) The important class of obligations beyond the scope of the contract theory surely generates obligations between persons which even the wider contract theory likewise cannot explain. The upshot is that such a contract account, even if sufficient for the determination of obligations, is not necessary. To this extent Rawls' s theory is not a full social contract theory at all. However, Rawls appears to lose sight of the fact that his contract theory delivers only a sufficient condition when he claims, for example (p. 298), that 'one feature of the contract doctrine is that it places an upper bound on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of later generations'. For greater savings may sometimes be required to meet obligations beyond those that the contract doctrine delivers. In short, Rawls appears to have slipped into assuming, inconsistently, that his contract theory is a necessary condition. Although Rawls's theory caters for justice between generations and allows the derivation of important obligations to people in the distant future, the full theory is far from consistent on these matters and there are significant respects in which Rawls does not take justice to the future seriously. The most conspicuous symptoms of this are that justice to the future is reduced to a special case, justice between generations, and that the only aspect of justice between generations that Rawls actually considers is a just savings rate; there is, for example, no proper examination of the just distribution of resources among generations, though these resources, Rawls believes, provide the material base of the just institutions that he wants to see maintained. In fact Rawls strongly recommends a system of markets as a just means for the allocation of most goods and services, recognizing their well-known limitations only in the usual perfunctory fashion ([5], pp. 270 ff.). Yet market systems are limited by a narrow time horizon, and are quite ill-equipped to allocate resources in a just fashion 172 R. and V. Rout ley over a time span of several generations. Similarly Rawls's endorsement of democratic voting procedures as in many cases a just method of determining procedures depends upon the assumptions that everyone with ah interest is represented. But given his own assumptions about obligations to the future and in respect of potential persons this is evidently not the case. Catering in a just fashion for the interests of future people poses serious problems for any method of decision that depends upon people being present to represent their own interests. Some of the more conservative, indeed reactionary, economic assumptions in Rawls emerge with the assumption that all that is required for justice between generations is a just savings rate, that all we need to pass on to the future are the things that guarantee appropriate savings such as capital, factories, and machines. But the transmission of these things is quite insufficient for justice to the future, and neither necessary nor sufficient as a foundation for a good life for future generations. What is required for justice is the transmission in due measure of what is valuable. Rawls has, however, taken value accumulation as capital accumulation, thereby importing one of the grossest economic assumptions, that capital reflects value. But of course the accumulation of capital may conflict with the preservation of what is valuable. It is for this sort of reason (and thus, in essence, because of the introduction of supplementary economistic theses which are not part of the pure contract theory) that Rawls's theory is a reactionary one from an environmental point of view; on the theory as presented (i.e. the contract theory plus all the supplementary assumptions) there is no need to preserve such things as wilderness or natural beauty. The savings doctrine supposes that everything of value for transmission to the future is negotiable in the market or tradeable; but then transmission of savings can by no means guarantee that some valuable things, not properly represented in market systems, are not eliminated or not passed on, thereby making future people worse off. It becomes evident in this way, too, how culturally-bound Rawls's idea of ensuring justice to future generations through savings is. It is not just that the idea does not apply, without a complete overhaul, to non-industrial societies such as those of hunter-gatherers; it does not apply to genuinely post-industrial societies either. Consideration of such alternative societies suggests that whafis required, in place of capital accumulation, is that we pass on what is necessary for a good life, that we ensure that the basics are fairly distributed over time and not eroded, e.g. that in the case of the forest people that the forest is maintained. The narrowness of Rawls's picture, Obligations to the Future 173 which makes no due allowance for social or cultural diversity (from the original contractual position on) or for individual diversity arises in part from his underlying and especially narrow socio-economic assumption as to what people want: What men want is meaningful work in free association with others, these associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just basic institutions. ([5], p. 290) This may be what many Harvard men want; but as a statement of what men want it supplies neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions.39 NOTES 1 Thus according to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110; our italics). There is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. . . . Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is regarded as the most likely solution, but has yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive releases following disturbances caused by natural processes or human activity. The Fox Report also quoted approvingly ([2], p. 187; our italics) the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report [6]: There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exist s to ensure the safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future. Although the absence of a satisfactory storage method has been conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development, e.g. Weinberg ([3], pp. 32-33), it is now disputed by others. In particular, the headline for Cohen [15], which reads 'A substantial body of evidence indicates that the high level radioactive wastes generated by U.S. nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geological formations', has suggested to many readers - what it was no doubt intended to suggest- that there is really no problem about the disposal of radioactive wastes after all. Cohen presents, however, no new hard evidence, no evidence not already available to the British and Australian Commissions ([2] and [6]). Moreover the evidence Cohen does outline fails conspicuously to measure up to the standards rightly required by the Flowers and Fox Reports. Does Cohen offer a commercial-scale procedure for waste disposal which can be demonstrated as safe? Far from it: 174 R. and V. Routley The detailed procedures for handling the high-level wastes are not yet definite, but present indications are that. . . . (Cohen [1], p. 24; our italics) Does Cohen 'demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt' the long-term safety of burial of wastes, deep underground? Again, far from it: On the face of it such an approach appears to be reasonably safe. . . . (p. 24; our italics) Cohen has apparently not realized what is required. At issue here are not so much scientific or empirical issues as questions of methodology, of standards of evidence required for claims of safety, and above all, of values, since claims of safety, for example, involve implicit evaluations concerning what counts as an acceptable risk, an admissible cost, etc. In the headline 'a substantial body of evidence . . . indicates that. . . wastes . . . can be stored satisfactorily' the key words (italicized) are evaluative or elastic, and the strategy of Cohen's case is to adopt very low standards for their application. But in view of what is at stake it is hardly acceptable to do this, to dress up in this way what are essentially optimistic assurances and untested speculations about storage, which in any case do little to meet the difficulties and uncertainties that have been widely pointed out as regards precisely the storage proposals Cohen outlines, namely human or natural interference or disturbance. 2 See [18], pp. 24-25. 3 On all these points, see [14], esp. p. 141. According to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110): Parts of the reactor structure will be highly radioactive and their disposal could be very difficult. There is at present no experience of dismantling a full size reactor. 4 See, in particular, The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Friends of the Earth Energy Paper, San Francisco 1973, p. 47; also [3], p. 32 and [14], p. 149. 5 As the discussion in [14], pp. 153-7, explains. 6 Cf. [17], pp. 35-36, [18] and, for much detail, J. R. Goffman and A. R. Tamplin, Poisoned Power, Rodale Press, Emmau Pa. 1971. 7 On the pollution and waste disposal record of the infant nuclear industry, see [14] and [17]. The record of many countries on pollution control, where in many cases available technologies for reducing or removing pollution are not applied because they are considered too expensive or because they adversely affect the interests of some powerful group, provides clear historical evidence that the problem of nuclear waste disposal would not end simply with the devising of a 'safe' technology for disposal, even if one could be devised which provided a sufficient guarantee of safety and was commercially feasible. The fact that present economic and political arrangements are overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the interests and concerns of (some) contemporary humans makes it not unrealistic to expect the long-term nuclear waste disposal, if it involved any significant cost at all, when public concern about the issue died down, would be seen to conflict with the interests of contemporary groups, and that these latter interests would in many cases be favoured. Nor, as the history of movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament shows, could generalized public concern in the absence of direct personal interest, be relied upon to be sustained for long enough to ensure implementation of costly or troublesome long-term disposal methods - even in those places where public concern exists and is a politically significant force. It must be stressed then that the problem is not merely one of disposal technique. Historical and other evidence points to the conclusion that many of the most important risks associated with nuclear waste disposal are not of the kind which might be amenable Obligations to the Future 175 to technical solutions in the laboratory. A realistic assessment of potential costs to the future from nuclear development cannot overlook these important non-technical risk factors. 8 Of course the effect on people is not the only factor which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a moral judgment. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life. But since the harm nuclear development is likely to cause to non-human life can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way. 9 Proponents of nuclear power often try to give the impression that future people will not just bear costs from nuclear development but will also be beneficiaries, because nuclear powerprovides an 'abundant' or even 'unlimited' source of energy; thus Weinberg ([3], p. 34): 'an all but infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy'. A good example of an attempt to create the impression that 'abundant' and 'cheap' energy from nuclear fission will be available to 'our descendants', i.e. all future people, is found in the last paragraph of Cohen [15]. Such claims are most misleading, since fission power even with the breeder reactor has only about the same prospective lifetime as coal-produced electricity (a point that can be derived using data in A. Parker, 'World Energy Resources: A Survey', Energy Policy, Vol. 3 [1975], pp. 58-66), and it is quite illegitimate to assume that nuclear fusion, for which there are still major unsolved problems, will have a viable, clean technology by the time fission runs out, or, for that matter, that it ever will. Thus while some few generations of the immediate future may obtain some benefits as well as costs, there is a very substantial chance that tho se of the more distant future will obtain nothing but costs. 10 These feelings, of which Smith's and Hume's sympathy is representative, are but the feeling echoes of obligation. At most, sympathy explains the feeling of obligation or lack of it, and this provides little guide as to whether there is an obligation or not - unless one interprets moral sympathy, the feeling of having a obligation, or being obligated, itself as a sufficient indication of obligation, in which case moral sympathy is a non-explanatory correlate in the feelings department of obligation itself and cannot be truly explanatory of the ground of it; unless, in short, moral sympathy reduces to an emotive rewrite of moral obligation. 11 Elsewhere in [1] Passmore is especially exercised that our institutions and intellectual traditions - presumably only the better ones - should be passed on to posterity, and that we should strive to make the world a better place, if not eventually an ideal one. 12 This is not the only philosophically important issue in environmental ethics on which Passmore is inconsistent. Consider his: 'over-arching intention: to consider whether the solution of ecological problems demands a moral or metaphysical revolution' (p. x), whether the West needs a new ethic and a new metaphysics. Passmore's answer in [1] is an emphatic No. Only insofar as Western moralists have [made various erroneous suggestions] can the West plausibly be said to need a 'new ethic'. What it needs, for the most part, is not so much a 'new ethic' as adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic. For the major sources of our ecological disasters - apart from ignorance - are greed and shortsightedness, which amount to much the same thing. . . There is no novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much. (p. 187) 'The view that the West now needs. . . a new concept of nature' is similarly dismissed (p. 186, cf. p. 72). But in his paper [1*] (i.e. 'Attitudes to Nature', Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 8, Macmillan, London 1975), which is said to be an attempt to bring together and to reformulate some of the basic philosophical themes of [1], Passmore's answer is Yes, and quite different themes, inconsistent with those of [1], are advanced: 176 R. and V. Routley [T]he general conditions I have laid down . . . have not been satisfied in most of the traditional philosophies of nature. To that degree it is true, I think, that we do need a 'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric. . . . A 'new metaphysics', if it is not to falsify the facts, will have to be naturalistic, but not reductionist. The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy. ([1*], pp. 260-1) A new ethic accompanies this new metaphysics. The emergence of new moral attitudes to nature is bound up, then, with the emergence of a more realistic philosophy of nature. That is the only adequate foundation for effective ecological concern. ([1*], p. 264) This is a far cry from the theme of [1] that ecological problems can be solved within the traditions of the West. 13 Put differently, the causal linkage can bypass intermediate generations, especially given action at a temporal distance: the chain account implies that there are no moral constraints in initiating such causal linkages. The chain picture accordingly seems to presuppose an unsatisfactory Humean model of causation, demanding contiguity and excluding action at a distance. 14 Golding we shall concede to Passmore, though even here the case is not clearcut. For Golding writes towards the end of his article ([12], p. 96): My discussion, until this point, has proceeded on the view that we have obligations to future generations. But do we? I am not sure that the question can be answered in the affirmative with any certainty. I shall conclude this note with a very brief discussion of some of the difficulties. All of Passmore's material on Golding is drawn from this latter and, as Golding says, 'speculative' discussion. 15 There is no textual citation for Bentham at all for the chapter of [1] concerned, viz. Ch. 4, 'Conservation'. 16 As Passmore himself at first concedes ([1], p. 84): If, as Bentham tells us, in deciding how to act men ought to take account of the effects of their actions on every sentient being, they obviously ought to take account of the pleasure and pains of the as yet unborn. 17 Neither rightness nor probable lightness in the hedonistic senses correspond to these notions in the ordinary sense; so at least [13] argues, following much anti-utilitarian literature. 18 On this irrationality different theories agree: the rational procedure, for example according to the minimax rule for decision-making under uncertainty, is to minimize that outcome which maximizes harm. 19 Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market (cf. P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 1967, p. 351). Thus the rates have little moral relevance. 20 Cf. Rawls [5], p. 287: 'From a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting future well-being on the basis of pure time preference.' 21 What the probabilities would be depends on the theory of probability adopted: a Carnapian theory, e.g., would lead back to the unconstrained position. Obligations to the Future 177 22 A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with mere logical possibility. 23 Thus, to take a simple special case, economists dismiss distant future people from their assessments of utility, welfare, etc., on the basis of their non-existence; cf. Ng ('the utility of a non-existent person is zero') and Harsanyi ('only existing people [not even "nonexisting potential individuals"] can have real utility levels since they are the only ones able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects with a negative utility, and feel indifferent to objects with zero utility') (see Appendix B of Y. K. Ng, 'Preference, Welfare, and Social Welfare', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977, pp. 24, 26-27). Non-existent people have no experiences, no preferences; distant future people do not exist; therefore distant future people have no utility assignments - so the sorites goes. But future people at least will have wants, preferences, and so on, and these have to be taken into account in adequate utility assessments (which should be assessed over afuture time horizon), no matter how much it may complicate or defeat calculations. 24 There are problems about formulating universalizability satisfactorily, but they hardly affect the point. The requisite universalizability can in fact be satisfactorily brought out from the semantical analysis of deontic notions such as obligation, and indeed argued for on the basis of such an analysis which is universal in form. The lawlikeness requirement, which can be similarly defended, is essentially that imposed on genuine scientific laws by logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap and Hempel), that such laws should contain no proper names or the like, no reference to specific locations or times. 25 Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick [11], p. 414), and in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and Rousseau toRawls ([5], p. 293). How the principle is argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlying theory; and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particular ethical theories. 26 See esp. R. Lanoue, NuclearPlants:The MoreTheyBuild, The More You Pay, Centerfor Study of Responsive Law, Washington DC 1976; also [14], pp. 212 ff. 27 On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy, Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC 1977, pp. 1-7, and also the details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner [7]. On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23. On the employment issues, see too H. E. Daly in [9], p. 149. A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich, Energy and Equality, Calder & Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need. 28 For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, Blond & Briggs, London 1973. As to the capital and other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and also [7] and [9]. For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy technology will tend to promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries, see the paper of Waiko and other papers in the Melanesian Environment (ed. by J. H. Winslow), Australian National University Press, Canberra 1977. 29 This fact is implicitly recognized in [2], p. 56. 30 A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, Friends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1976); see also [17], [6], [7], [14], pp. 233 ff., and Schumacher, op. cit. 31 This is also explained in [2], p. 56. 32 An argument like this is suggested in Passmore [1], Chs. 4 and 7, with respect to the question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the overriding importance of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned by what appears to be a future- 178 R. and V. Routley directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care of the present and immediate future. The argument has all the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others. 33 See [14], p. 66, p. 191, and also [7]. 34 For such arguments see esp. M. Flood and R. Grove-White, Nuclear Prospects. A Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London 1976. 35 For a recent sketch of one such alternative which is outside the framework of the conventional option of centralized bureaucratic socialism, see E. Callenbach's novel, Ecotopia, Banyan Tree Books, Berkeley, California 1975. For the outline of a liberation socialist alternative see Radical Technology (ed. by G. Boyle and P. Harper), Undercurrents Limited, London 1976, and references therein. 36 Some earlier contract theories also did. Burke's contract (in E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Dent, London 1910, pp. 93-94) 'becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are not yet born'. Thus Burke's contract certainly appears to lead to obligations to distant future generations. Needless to say, there are metaphysical difficulties, which however Burke never considers, about contracts between parties at widely separated temporal locations. 37 Several of the preceding points we owe to M. W. Jackson. 38 Resources such as soil fertility and petroleum could even be a primary social goods on Rawls's very hazy general account of these goods ([5], pp. 62, 97): are these 'something a rational man wants whatever else he wants'? The primary social goods should presumably be those which are necessary for the good and just life -which will however vary with culture. 39 We have benefited from discussion with Ian Hughes and Frank Muller and useful comments on the paper from Brian Martin and Derek Browne. REFERENCES [1] J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London 1974. [2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1977. [3] A. M. Weinberg, 'Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy", Science, Vol. 177 (July 1972), pp. 27-34. • [4] R. Routley, 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle II. Existence is Existence Now', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (to appear). [5] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971. [6] Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London 1976. [7] B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York 1976. [8] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903. [9] B. Commoner, H. Boksenbaum and M. Corr (Eds.), Energy and Human Welfare - A Critical Analysis, Vol. III, Macmillan, New York 1975. Obligations to the Future 179 [10] J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, published under the superintendence of J. Bowring, with an intro. by J. H. Burton; William Tait, Edinburgh 1843. [11] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London 1962 (reissue). [12] M. P. Golding, 'Obligations to Future Generations', Monist, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 85-99. [13] R. and V. Routley, 'An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism', presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977. [14] R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne 1977. [15] B. L. Cohen, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reactors', Scientific American, Vol. 236 (June 1977), pp. 22-31. [16] S. McCracken, 'The Waragainst the Atom' .Commentary (September 1977), pp. 33-47. [17] A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco 1975. [18] A. Roberts, "The Politics of Nuclear Power', Arena, No. 41 (1976), pp. 22-47.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear energy and obligations to the future Type The nature or genre of the resource Book Section Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Prometheus Books. <a href="https://manuscripts.library.uq.edu.au/index.php/uqfl291" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Richard Sylvan Papers, UQFL291</a>. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1981 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Manuscript https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6ef0b9e2ef93f843eb517882e681cbb3.pdf 7497b1a142a2ee74e689488a2bfa234a PDF Text Text Inquiry, 21, 133-79 Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future R. and V. Routley Plumwood Mountain, Braidwood, Australia The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring longterm storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty and Lights-going-out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable. I. The Bus Example Suppose we consider a bus, a bus which we hope is to make a very long journey. This bus, a third world bus, carries both passengers and freight. The bus sets down and picks up many different passengers in the course of its long journey and the drivers change many times, but because of the way the bus line is managed and the poor service on the route it is nearly always full to overcrowded, with passengers hanging off the back, and as in Afghanistan, passengers riding on the roof, and chickens and goats in the freight compartment. Early in the bus's journey someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package containing a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is packaged in a very thin container, which as the consigner well knows is unlikely to contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the bus should encounter any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some 1 �134 R. and V. Routley passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight, as also frequently happens. All of these things, let us suppose, have happened on some of the bus's previous journeys. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people and animals on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. There does not seem much doubt about what most of us would say about the morality of the consigner's action, and there is certainly no doubt about what the passengers would say. The consigner's action in putting the safety of the occupants of the bus at risk is appalling. What could excuse such an action, what sort of circumstances might justify it, and what sort of case could the consigner reasonably put up? The consigner might say that it is by no means certain that the gas will escape; he himself is an optimist and therefore feels that such unfavourable possible outcomes should be ignored. In any case the bus might have an accident and the passengers be killed long before the container gets a chance to leak; or the passengers might change to another bus and leave the lethal parcel behind. He might say that it is the responsibility of the passengers and the driver to ensure that the journey is a smooth one, and that if they fail to do so, the results are not his fault. He might say that the journey is such a long one that many of the passengers may have become mere mindless vegetables or degenerate wretches about whose fate no decent person need concern himself, or that they might not care about losing their lives or health or possessions anyway by that time. Most of these excuses will seem little more than a bad joke, and certainly would not usually be reckoned any sort of justification. The main argument the consigner of the lethal parcel employs, however, is that his own pressing needs justify his actions. He has no option but to consign his potentially lethal parcel, he says, since the firm he owns, and which has produced the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits and cannot afford to produce a better container or to stop the production of the gas. If the firm goes out of business, the consigner says, his wife will leave him, and he will lose his family happiness, the comfortable way of life to which he has become accustomed and sees now as a necessity; his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others; not only will the firm's customers be inconvenienced but he, the consigner, will have to break some business contracts; the inhabitants of the local village through loss of spending and cancellation of the Multiplier Effect will suffer finan- �Obligations to the Future 135 cial hardship, and, worst of all, the tiny flow of droplets that the poor of the village might receive (theoretically at any rate) as a result of the trickling down of these good things would dry up entirely. In short, some basic and some perhaps uncomfortable changes will be needed in the village. Even if the consigner's story were accepted at face value - and it would be wise to look critically at his story - only someone whose moral sensibilities had been paralysed by the disease of galloping economism could see such a set of considerations, based on 'needs', comfort, and the goal of local prosperity, as justifying the consigner's action. One is not generally entitled to thus simply transfer the risks and costs arising from one's own life onto other uninvolved parties, to get oneself out of a hole of one's own making by creating harm or risk of harm to someone else who has had no share in creating the situation. To create serious risks and costs, especially risks to life or health for such others, simply to avoid having to make some changes to a comfortable life style, or even for a somewhat better reason, is usually thought deserving of moral condemnation, and sometimes considered a crime; for example, the action of a company in creating risks to the lives or health of its workers or customers to prevent itself from going bankrupt. What the consigner says may be an explanation of his behaviour, but it is not a justification. The problem raised by nuclear waste disposal is by no means a perfect analogy to the bus case, since, for example, the passengers on the nuclear bus cannot get off the bus or easily throw out the lethal package. In many crucial moral respects, however, the nuclear waste storage problem as it affects future people, the passengers in the bus we are considering, resembles the consignment of the faultily packaged lethal gas. Not only are rather similar moral principles involved, but a rather similar set of arguments to the lamentable excuses the consigner presents have been seriously put up to justify nuclear development, the difference being that in the nuclear case these arguments have been widely accepted. There is also some parallel in the risks involved; there is no known safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by nuclear plants that will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.1 The wastes problem will not be a slight one, with each one of the more than 2,000 reactors envisaged by the end of the century, producing on average annual wastes containing one thousand times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb.2 The wastes include not merely the spent fuels and their radioactive by-products, but also everything they contaminate, from fuel containers to the thousands of widely distributed decommissioned nuclear �136 R. and V. Routley reactors which will have to be abandoned, still in a highly radioactive condition, after the expiry of their expected lifetimes of about thirty years, and which have been estimated to require perhaps one and a half million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.3 The wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime; for fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or so, and for the actinides (transuranic elements) which include plutonium, there is a half-million to a million-year storage problem.4 Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed longterm methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste that have been produced over the last twenty years.5 With present known short-term surface methods of storage there is a continued need for human intervention to keep the material isolated from the environment, while with proposed longer-term methods such as storage in salt mines or granite to the risk of human interference there are added the risks of leakage, e.g. through water seepage, and of disturbance, for example through climatic change, earth movements, etc. The risks are significant: no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods involved. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period which has seen a number of ice ages and great fluctuations in climate for example, could be confident that the waste material could be safely stored for the vast periods of time required. Much of this waste is highly toxic; for example, even a beachball sized quantity of plutonium appropriately distributed is enough to give every person on the planet lung cancer - so that a leak of even a small part of this waste material could involve huge loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of immense areas of land.6 Given the enormous costs which could be involved for the future, it is plainly grossly inadequ'ate'to merely speculate concerning untested, but possibly or even probably, safe methods for disposal of wastes. Yet none of the proposed methods has been properly tested, and they may prove to involve all sorts of unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the �Obligations to the Future 137 geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long-term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be, especially if, as seems likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically, seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future not previously encountered in human affairs, and certainly not conspicuous in the nuclear industry.7 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long-term storage sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weapons-grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million-year storage period, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it. Our behaviour in creating this nightmare situation for the future is certainly no better than that of the consigner in the bus example. Industrialized countries, in order to get out of a mess of their own making essentially the creation of economies dependent on an abundance" of non-renewable energy in a situation where it is in fact in limited supply opt for a 'solution' which may enable them to avoid the making of uncomfortable changes during the lifetime of those now living, at the expense of passing heavy burdens on to the inhabitants of the earth at a future time burdens in the shape of costs and risks which, just as in the bus case, may adversely affect the life and health of future people and their opportunity to lead a decent life.8 It is sometimes suggested that analogies like the bus example are defective; that morally they are crucially different from the nuclear case, since future people, unlike the passengers in the bus, will benefit directly from nuclear development, which will provide an abundance of energy for the indefinite future. But this is incorrect. Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be seriously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks, without any corresponding benefits, in order to provide for the extravagant energy use of only five generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop-gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a �138 R. and V. Routley transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it.9 For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dream of global industrialization is realized, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy resource use, and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it. It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life, are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least indirect beneficiaries. The 'solution' then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Just as in the bus case, contemporary industrial society proposes to get itself out of a hole of its own making by creating risk of harm, and by transferring costs and risks, to someone else who has had no part in producing the situation and who will obtain no clear benefit. It has clear alternatives to this action. That it does not take them is due essentially to its unwillingness to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to its desire to protect the interests of those who benefit from them. If we apply to the nuclear situation the same standards of behaviour and moral principles that we acknowledge (in principle if perhaps often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it will not be easy to avoid the conclusion that the situation involves injustice with respect to future people on a grand scale. It seems to us that there are only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of our nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to say that there are no circumstances in which such an action might possibly be justifiable, or at least where the case is less clearcut. It is the same with the nuclear case. Just as in the case of the consigner of the �Obligations to the Future 139 package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We turn now to the first of these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development, to the philosophical question of our obligations to the future. II. Obligations to the Distant Future The area in which these philosophical problems arise is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, that is, the future with which people alive today will make no direct contact; the immediate future provides comparatively few problems for moral theories. The issues involved, although of far more than academic interest, have not received any great attention in recent philosophical literature, despite the fact that the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass, and also raises a number of questions in political philosophy concerning the adequacy of accepted institutions which leave out of account the interests of future people. Moral philosophers have predictably differed on the issue. But contrary to the picture painted in a recent, widely read, and influential work discussing it, Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature, a good many philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them less weight, those who deny, or who are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those like Passmore and Golding who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond those to the next generation. • According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained; there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply, that we don't have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, i.e. those who have opted for the uncon- �140 R. and V. Routley strained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligation is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also non-transitive. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or requirements for moral obligation, which would rule out obligations to the non-immediate future are these: First, there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariantly over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any contemporary institution would do it for them. Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out the distant future as a field of moral obligation, as they not only require a commonality, or some sort of common basis, which cannot be guaranteed in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange, the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive relations of short duration such as sympathy and love. There are some difficulties also about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who may well be committed to a life-style for which one has no sympathy. On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary �Obligations to the Future 141 people have no obligations to future people and can harm them as it suits them. What all these views have in common is a naturalistic picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).10 Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually thought to characterize it, such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features), are lost, especially where there is a choice of whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so of whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. However, the view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act as one likes with respect to them, is a very difficult one to sustain. Consider the example of a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb which is to be set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the action. The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being unduly expensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to future people. The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of examples: A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining, processing, and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problems for present people or their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm it does to future people. Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view might seem childishly obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not only have a number of philosophers writing on the issue endorsed this position, but it is the clear �142 R. and V. Routley implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of economic theory. It does not appear, on the other hand, that those who opt for the unconstrained position have considered such examples and endorsed them as morally acceptable, despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that when it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being free to act implies, among other things being free to inflict pointless harm, most of those who opted for the unconstrained position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives. The view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in cases such as those discussed above and the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so must acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future. The thesis seems thus to assume an incorrect model of an independent and unrelated future. Also, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have, or has not acquired, an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved - that one has no responsibility for his life - does not imply that one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some course of action of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him. These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the failure to make an important distinction between, on the one hand, acquired or assumed obligations towards somebody, for which some act of acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and on the other hand moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of acquisition is required. There is a considerable difference in the level and kind of responsibility involved. In the first case one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his �Obligations to the Future 143 action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist. While it may be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make special sacrifices of an heroic kind for future people, or even to help them especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained from harming them. Thus, to return to the bus example, the consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has never assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them, and that they are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue in respect of both the bus and the nuclear case is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility for the lives of the people involved. The confusion of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off non-acquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral obligation' in philosophy to indicate any type of deontic constraint, while in natural language it is used to indicate something which has to be assumed or acquired. Hence the equation and at least one root of the unconstrained position, that is of the belief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future. The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to a more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent position. Passmore's position in [1] is a striking example of the second ambivalent position. On the one hand Passmore regularly gives the impression of one championing future people; for example, in the final sentence of [1] he says, concerning men a century hence: My sole concern is that we should do nothing which will reduce their freedom of thought and action, whether by destroying.the natural world which makes that freedom possible or the social traditions which permit and encourage it. �144 R. and V. Routley Earlier (esp. pp. 84-85) Passmore appears to endorse the principle 'that we ought not to act so as certainly to harm posterity' and claims (p. 98) that, even where there are uncertainties, 'these uncertainties do not justify negligence'. Nevertheless, though obligations concerning non-immediate posterity are thus admitted, the main thrust of Passmore's argument is entirely different, being in favour of the unconstrained position according to which we have no obligations to non-immediate posterity. Thus his conclusion (p. 91): So whether we approach the problem of obligations to posterity by way of Bentham and Sidgwick, Rawls or Golding, we are led to something like the same conclusion: our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condition, and that is all.11 Passmore's position is, to all appearances, simply inconsistent. There are two ways one might try to render it consistent, but neither is readily available to Passmore. The first is by taking advantage of the distinction between moral constraints and acquired obligations, but a basis for this distinction is not evident in Passmore's work and indeed the distinction is antithetical to the analyses of obligation that Passmore tries to synthesize with his own analysis in terms of loves. The second, sceptical, route to consistency is by way of the argument that we shall consider shortly, that there is always gross uncertainty with respect to the distant future, uncertainty which relieves us in practice of any moral constraints regarding the distant future. But though Passmore's writing strongly suggests this uncertainty argument (especially his sympathetic discussion of the Premier of Queensland's argument against conservationists [p. 77]), he also rules it out with the claim that uncertainties do not justify negligence.12 Many of the accounts of moral obligation that give rise to the unconstrained position are fused in Passmore's work, again not entirely consistently, since the different accounts exploited do not give uniform results. Thus the primary account of obligation is said to be in terms of loves though the account is never satisfactorily formulated or developed - and it is suggested that because our loves do not extend into the distant future, neither do our obligations. This sentimental account of obligation will obviously lead to different results from utilitarian accounts of obligation, which however Passmore appeals to in his discussion of wilderness. In yet other places in [1], furthermore, social contract and moral community �Obligations to the Future 145 views are appealed to - see, e.g., the treatment of animals, of preservation, and of duties to nature. In the case of obligations to future people, however, Passmore does try to sketch an argument - what we call the convergence argument - that all the accounts lead in the end to the unconstrained position. As well as the convergence argument, and various uncertainty arguments to be considered later, Passmore appears to endorse several other arguments in favour of his theme that there are in practice no obligations to the distant future. In particular, he suggests that such obligations would in practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves, only to the succeeding generation. We outline three objections to this chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations, since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create individual responsibility, and which can't necessarily be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since they are non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters.13 Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense of disadvantages to people of the more distant future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors. Such cases can hardly be written off as 'never-never land' examples, since many cases of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overcropping. If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests. �146 R. and V. Routley Passmore tries to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation, this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm, than one is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from beating and robbing some stranger and leaving him to starve. Passmore's most sustained argument for the unconstrained position is a convergence argument, that different analyses of obligations, including his own, lead to the one conclusion. This style of argument is hardly convincing when there are well-known accounts of obligation which do not lead to the intended conclusion, e.g. deontological accounts such as those of Kant and of modern European schools, and teleological accounts such as those of Moore (in [8]). But such unfavourable positions are either rapidly passed over or ignored in Passmore's historical treatment and narrow selection of historical figures. The style of argument becomes even less persuasive when it is discovered that the accounts of the main authorities appealed to, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Rawls,14 do not lead, without serious distortion, to the intended conclusion. Indeed Passmore has twisted the historical and textual evidence to suit his case, as we now try to indicate. Consider Bentham first. Passmore's assumption, for which no textual evidence is cited, ls is that no Benthamite calculation can take account of a future more extensive than the immediate future (cf. pp. 87-88). The assumption seems to be based simply on the fact that Bentham remarked that 'the value of the pleasure or pain to each person to be considered in any estimate will be greater or less in virtue of the following circumstances'. '3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness' ([10], p. 16). But this does nothing to show that future persons are discounted: the certainty and propinquity do not concern persons, but the utilities of the persons concerned. As regards which persons are concerned in any calculation Bentham is quite explicit, detailing how to take an exact account. . . of the general tendency of any act.. . .5 . Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process [summation of values of pleasure and of pain] with respect to each. ([10], p. 16) �Obligations to the Future 147 It follows that Bentham's calculation takes account of everyone (and, in his larger scheme, every sentient creature) whose interests appear to be concerned: if the interests of people in the distant future appear to be concerned - as they are in conservation issues - they are to be included in the calculation. And there is independent evidence16 that in Bentham's view the principle of utility was not temporally restricted: 'that is useful which, taking all times and all persons into consideration, leaves a balance of happiness' ([10], pp. 17-18, our italics). Thus the future cut-off that Passmore has attributed to Bentham is contradicted by Bentham's own account. The case of Sidgwick is more complex, because there is isolated oscillation in his application of utilitarianism between use of utility and of (something like) expected utility (see [11], pp. 381,414): Sidgwick's utilitarianism is, in its general characterization, essentially that of Bentham: the conduct which . . . is objectively right is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all those whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ([11], p. 411) All includes all sentient beings, both existing and to exist, as Sidgwick goes on to explain (p. 414). In particular, in answer to the question 'How far are we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of existing human beings?' Sidgwick writes ([11], p. 414, our italics): It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be affected - must necessarily be more uncertain. But Passmore manages, first of all, to give a different sense to what Sidgwick is saying by adjusting the quotation, by omitting the clause we have italicized, which equalizes the degree of concern for present and future persons, and by italicizing the whole except-clause, thereby placing much greater emphasis than Sidgwick does on uncertainty. For according to Sidgwick's impartiality principle, 'the mere difference in time is not a �148 R. and V. Routley reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one -amount than to that of another' ([11], p. 381; see also p. 124). The apparent tension in Sidgwick's theory as to whether uncertainty should be taken into account is readily removed by resort to a modern distinction between values and expected values (i.e. probability weighted values); utilitarian rightness is defined as before in terms of the net happiness of all concerned over all time without mention of uncertainty or probabilities, but it is distinguished from probable rightness (given present information), in the utilitarian sense,17 which is defined in terms of the expected net happiness of those concerned, using present probabilities. It is the latter notion, of probable rightness, that practical reasoning is commonly concerned with and that decision theory studies; and it is this that Passmore supposes Sidgwick is using ([1], p. 84). But it is evident that the utilitarian determination of probable rightness, like that of rightness, will sometimes take into account the distant future - as Sidgwick's discussion of utilitarian determination of optimum population (immediately following his remark on uncertainty) does. So how does Passmore contrive to reverse matters, to have Sidgwick's position lead to his own unconstrained conclusion? The answer is: By inserting an additional assumption of his own - which Sidgwick would certainly have rejected - that the uncertainties entitle us to ignore the distant future. What Passmore has implicitly assumed in his claim ([1], p. 85) that 'utilitarian principles [such as Sidgwick's] are not strong enough' 'to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now call upon us to make' is his own thesis that 'The uncertainty of harms we are hoping to prevent would in general entitle us to ignore them.. .'. From a decision-theory viewpoint this is simply irrational18 unless the probabilities of damage are approaching zero. We will deal with the essentially sceptical uncertainty arguments on which Passmore's position depends shortly: here it is enough to observe that Sidgwick's position does not lead to anything like that which Passmore attributes to him - without uncertainty assumptions which Sidgwick would have rejected (for he thought that future people'will certainly have pleasure and suffer pain). We can also begin to gauge from Passmore's treatment of nineteenthcentury utilitarians, such as Bentham and Sidgwick, the extent of the distortion which underlies his more general historical case for the unconstrained position which, so he claims, represents accurately enough what, over the last two centuries, men have seen as their duty to posterity as a whole. . . . ([1], p. 91) �Obligations to the Future 149 The treatment accorded Rawls in only marginally more satisfactory. Passmore supposes that Rawls's theory of justice leads directly to the unconstrained position ([1], p. 87 and p. 91), whereas Rawls claims ([5], p. 293) that we have obligations to future people just as to present ones. But the situation is more complicated than Rawls's claim would indicate, as we now try to explain in a summary way (more detail is given in the Appendix). For, in order to justify this claim on his theory (with its present time-of-entry interpretation), Rawls has to invoke additional and dubious motivational assumptions; even so the theory which thus results does not yield the intended conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with Rawls's claim. However, by changing the time-of-entry interpretation to an omnitemporal one, Rawls's claim does result from the theory so amended. Moreover, the amended theory also yields, by exactly Rawls's argument for a just saving rate, a resource conservation policy, and also a case against nuclear development. Accordingly Passmore's other claims regarding Rawls are mistaken, e.g. that the theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation. Rawls does not emerge unscathed either. As on the issue of whether his contract is a necessary condition for obligations, so on obligations which the contract yields to the distant future, Rawls is far from consistent. Furthermore, institutions such as qualified market and voting systems are recommended as just though from a future perspective their results are far from that. Rawls, then, does not take obligations to the future with full seriousness. In sum, it is not true that the theory of Rawls, any more than the theories of the historical figures actually discussed by Passmore, unequivocally supports the unconstrained position. III. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Arguments Although there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position. According to the qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant future: there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present �150 R. and V. Routley people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are disadvantaged by them. The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in most modern economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of an (opportunity cost) discount rate. The attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal constraints, and cannot determine what those constraints are. There are, moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt one which discounts the future is to beg all the questions at issue. The discounting move often has the same result as the unconstrained position; if, for instance, we consider the cancer example and consider costs as payable compensation, it is evident that, over a sufficiently long period of time, discounting at current prices would lead to the conclusion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints. In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the application of discount rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no more than about fifteen years,19 and application of such rates would simply beg the question against the interests and rights of future people. Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type the whole method of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would violate moral constraints.20 Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.21 But then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people, except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much) higher probabilities obtain. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower �Obligations to the Future 151 probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming that anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it can't be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to obtain quite doubtful or trivial benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportunity to continue unnecessarily high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted, such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit approach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned, or for dealing with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results. For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any simple or general way from one party to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs ony ? - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted by some proponents of nuclear energy, who attempt to dismiss the costs to future people with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The transfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on by McCracken [16] in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risk, between nuclear risks and those from cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming extent* those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also those of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related to a person's extent of use. The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's �152 R. and V. Routley happiness sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties, and the introduction of probability considerations does not change the principles involved but merely complicates analyses. One might further object to the probability argument that probabilities involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes, and that the outcomes of some moral problems such as the bus example do not depend on a high level of probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the bus example reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important ones used by philosophers and others to argue for the position that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of separation, but frequently entangled. Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalized uncertainty argument which runs as follows: In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly, and highly speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. More formally and crudely: One only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information; there is no reliable information at present as regards the distant future; therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. The first argument is essentially a variation on a sceptical argument in epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace 'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and �Obligations to the Future 153 the adjacent future and present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly do act on the basis of such 'unreliable' information as the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels 'uncertainty'; for scepticproof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. A good example is again the bus case. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is a significant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and the prospects of the passengers quite uncertain; the resolution of the problem is still clearly in favour of the so-called 'speculative' and 'unreliable'. But if we do not require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require epistemic standards for the future which the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument, that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account, because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions upon it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can also be put in this way: If moral principles are, like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as 'if* has character h then x is wrong, for every (action) x', then what the argument claims is �154 R. and V. Routley that we can never obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action of the 'It is wrong to do x' type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument have to be conceded. If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the future, will not be applicable in practice for obtaining any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future is always so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point, noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of"a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in girls' names or men's footwear, or what brands of ice cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3,000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. For this sort of reason, the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. While it is true that there are many areas in which the morally relevant information needed is uncertain or unavailable, and in which we cannot therefore determine satisfactorily how to act, there are certainly others in �Obligations to the Future 155 which uncertainty in morally relevant areas is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, seems to be of the latter sort. Here there is no gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as we can see from the bus example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the corresponding defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probable harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would affect us (cf. Passmore [1]). But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are morally committed to. Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons or forever plugged into enjoyment- or other machines (Golding [12]). Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility - like the sceptic who says that the solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast �156 R. and V. Routley with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilization through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer, and the fact that this appears to be a real and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm in the example discussed above, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases, before such actions could be considered admissible, what would be required is far more than a possibility, real or not22 - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves. The strategy of most of these uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, and may be brought out by looking yet again at the bus example, where the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the bus may break down and they may all change to a different bus leaving the parcel behind, or the bus may crash, killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities, of course, but there is no positive reason to believe that they are any more than that, that is they are not real possibilities. The strategy is to stress such outside possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will �Obligations to the Future 157 break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners' taking account of the passengers' welfare and of the real possibility of harm from his parcel, and thereby excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints .This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty, or at least a very high probability, of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not so. An argument closely related to the uncertainty arguments is based on the non-existence and indeterminacy of the future.23 An item is indeterminate in a given respect if its properties in that respect are, as a matter of logic, not settled (nor are they settlable in a non-arbitrary fashion). The respects in which future items are indeterminate are well enough known for a few examples to serve as reminders: all the following are indeterminate: the population of Australia at 2001, its distribution, its age structure, the preferences of its members for folk music, wilderness, etc., the size and shape of Wollongong, the average number of rooms in its houses and in its office blocks, and so on. Philosophical discussion of such indeterminacy is as old as Aristotle's sea battle and as modern as truth-value gaps and fuzzy logics, and many positions have been adopted on the existence and determinacy of future items. Nevertheless theories that there are obligations to the future are not sensitive to the metaphysical position adopted concerning the existence or non-existence of the future. Any theory which denied obligations to the future on the metaphysical grounds that the future did not exist, and did not have properties, so that the present could not be related to it, would be committed to denying such obvious facts as that the present could causally influence the future, that present people could be great-grandparents of purely future people, and so on, and hence would have to be rejected on independent grounds. This is not to say that there are not important problems about the existence or non-existence of future items, problems which are perhaps most straightforwardly handled by a Meinongian position which allows that items which do not exist may have properties. The non-existence of the future �158 R. and V. Routley does raise problems for standard theories which buy the Ontological Assumption (the thesis that what does not exist does not have properties), especially given the natural (and correct) inclination to say that the future does not (now) exist; but such theories can adopt various strategies for coping with these problems (e.g. the adoption of a platonistic position according to which the future does now exist, or the allowance for certain sorts of relations between existents at different times), although the satisfactoriness of these strategies is open to question (cf. [4]). Thus whether or not the Ontological Assumption is assumed and however it is applied, it will be allowed that future items will have properties even if they do not have them now, and that is enough to provide the basis for moral concern about the future. Thus the thesis of obligations to the future does not presuppose any special metaphysical position on the existence of the future. If the non-existence of future items creates no special problems for obligations to the future, the same is not true of their indeterminacy. Whether the indeterminacy of future items is seen as a logical feature of the future which results from the non-existence of purely future items or whether one adopts a (mistaken) platonistic view of the future as existing and sees the indeterminacy as an epistemological one resulting from our inability to know the character of these entities - that is, we cannot completely know the future .though it exists and has a definite characterwhichever view we take indeterminacy still creates major difficulties for certain ethical theories and their treatment of the future. The difficulties arise for theories which appear to require a high level of determinacy with respect to the number and character of future items, in particular calculus-type theories such as utilitarianism in its usual forms, where the calculations are critically dependent on such information as numbers, totals, and averages, information which so far as the future is concerned is generally indeterminate. The fact that this numerical information is typically indeterminate means that insofar as head-count utilitarianism requires determinate information on numbers, it is in a similar position to theories discussed earlier; it may apply theoretically to future people, but since the calculations cannot be applied to them their interests will be left out of account. And, in fact, utilitarianism for the most part does not, and perhaps cannot, take future creatures and their interests seriously; there is little discussion as to how the difficulties or impossibility of calculations regarding the open future are to be obtained. Non-platonistic utilitarianism is in logical difficulty on this matter, while platonis- �Obligations to the Future 159 tic utilitarianism - which faces a range of other objections - is inapplicable because of epistemic indeterminacy. We have yet another case of a theory of the sort that applies theoretically but in practice doesn't take the future seriously. But far from this showing that future people's interests should be left out of account, what these considerations show are deficiencies in these sorts of theories, which require excessive determinacy of information. This kind of information is commonly equally unavailable for the accepted areas of moral constraint, the present and immediate future; and the resolution of moral issues is often not heavily dependent on knowledge of such specific determinate features as numbers or other determinate features. For example, we do not need to know how many people there will be on the bus, how intelligent they are, what their preferences are or how badly they will be injured, in order to reach the conclusion that the consigner's action in despatching his parcel is a bad one. Furthermore, it is only the ability of moral considerations to continue to apply in the absence of determinate information about such things as numbers that makes it possible to take account of the possible effects of action, as the risks associated with action - something which is quite essential even for the present if moral considerations are to apply in the normal and accepted way. For it is essential in order to apply moral considerations in the accepted way that we consider alternative worlds, in order to take account of options, risks, and alternative outcomes; but these alternative or counterfactual worlds are not in so different a position from the future with respect to determinacy; for example, there is indeterminacy with respect to the number of people who may be harmed in the bus case or in apossible nuclear reactor melt-down. These alternative worlds, like the distant future, are indeterminate in some respects, but not totally indeterminate. It might still be thought that the indeterminacy of the future, for example with respect to number and exact character, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests unknown, how can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by ignoring �160 R. and V. Routley such factors. Nor are such distributional problems as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It should be conceded then that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult or indeed impossible to resolve - a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e.g. the bus example which is a conflict case of a type. In particular, there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. Moreover, even where numbers are relevant often only bounds will be required, exact numerical counts only being required where, for instance, margins are narrow; e.g. issues may be resolved as in parliament where a detailed vote (or division) is only required when the issue is close. It is certainly not necessary then to have complete determinacy to resolve all cases of conflict. The question we must ask then is what features of future people could disqualify them from moral consideration or reduce their claims to it to below those of present people? The answer is: in principle None. Prima facie moral principles are universalizable, and lawlike, in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example.24 But universalizability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup such as (white-skinned) humans, etc. The only candidates for characteristics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, uncertainty and indeterminacy; what we have argued is that it would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only present information). In particular they do not affect cases of the sort being considered, the nuclear one, where highly determinate or certain information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be harmed or certainty of damage are not required. To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is not needed: it is enough to require that the temporal position of a person �Obligations to the Future 161 cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideration;25 inversely that it is without basis to discriminate morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this universalizability, there is the same obligation to future people as to the present; and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions' causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob future people of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not free us of these obligations. If, in a closely comparable case concerning the present, the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people. Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion tentatively reached in our first section, that proposals for nuclear development in the present state of technology for future waste disposal are immoral. IV. Overriding Consideration Arguments In the first part we noticed that the consigner's action could not be justified by purely economistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. We also observed that the principle on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to the nuclear case. For this reason the economistic arguments which are thus most commonly advanced to promote nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment, investment, and consumption-do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these economistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct (and there is reason to doubt that most of them are),26 the arguments would fail because economics must operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vice versa. �162 R. and V. Routley What one does have to consider, however, are moral conflict arguments, that is arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only possible outcome, and will ensue. For example, in the bus case, the consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is taken the village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing duties to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives), and upon showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument-for example, if in the bus case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way - then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. We want to argue that suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument, designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentation of false dichotomies. The first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of industrialized countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialized nations. The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the �Obligations to the Future 163 diversion of great amounts of available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. 27 The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment, while politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralized entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem.28 The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of people of the third world does not, of course, mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the westernized and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organized; but it is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. The poverty argument then is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used to help the poor.29 Both for the third world and for the industrialized countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources,30 alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor.31 The second major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technological, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out.32 . The lights-going-out argument raises rather sharply questions as to what is valuable in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary for a good society. These are questions which deserve much fuller treatment than we can allot them here, but a few brief points should be made. The argument adopts an extremely uncritical position with respect to existing high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable; it also assumes that technological society is unmodifiable, that it can't be changed in the direction of energy �164 R. and V. Routley conservation or alternative energy sources without collapse. Such a society has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of energy are essential to maintain this whole. These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technological society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all, it has survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western society's demands for energy are totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a programme of increasing destruction, but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary society. There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness; but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain existing high-technological society and its political institutions? but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things? While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably, that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence, e.g. from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we believe it is, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-going-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of wellbeing is required to consume less energy than at present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.33 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilization, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganza. In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy �Obligations to the Future 165 is obtained by nuclear-fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralized, controlled, and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Very persuasive arguments have been advanced by civil liberties groups and others in a number of countries to suggest that such a society would tend to become authoritarian, if only as an outcome of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation.34 There are reasons to believe then that with nuclear development what we would be passing on to future generations would be some of the worst aspects of our society (e.g. the consumerism, growing concentration of power, destruction of the natural environment, and latent authoritarianism), while certain valuable aspects would be lost or threatened. Political freedom is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives which do not involve such unacceptable consequences are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but the development of alternative technologies and life-styles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralized nuclear option.35 The lights-going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false dichotomy. Thus both the escape routes, the appeal to moral conflict and to the appeal to futurity, are closed. If then we apply the same standards of morality to the future as we acknowledge for the present - as we have argued we should - the conclusion that the proposal to develop nuclear energy on a large scale is a crime against the future is inevitable, since both the escape routes are closed. There are, of course, also many other grounds for ruling it out as morally unacceptable, for saying that it-is not only a crime against the distant future but also a crime against the present and immediate future. These other grounds for moral concern about nuclear energy, as it affects the present and immediate future, include problems arising from the possibility of catastrophic releases of radioactive fuel into the environment or of waste material following an accident such as reactor melt-down, of unscheduled discharges of radiation into the environment from a plant fault, of proli- �166 R. and V. Routley feration of nuclear weapons, and of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion. All these are important issues, of much moral interest. What we want to claim, however, is that on the basis of its effects on the future alone, the nuclear option is morally unacceptable. Appendix Passmore's Treatment ofRawls, and What Really Happens on Rawls's Theory Passmore takes it that Rawls's theory yields an unconstrained position but, according to Rawls, the theory leads to quite the opposite result; namely, persons in different generations [and not merely neighbouring generations] have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define justice between persons at different moments of time.. . . The derivation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat far-fetched application of the central doctrine. Nevertheless these requirements would be acknowledged in the original position [where the parties do not know to which generation they belong], and so the conception of justice as fairness covers these matters without any change in its basic idea. ([5], p. 293; the second insert is drawn from p. 287) Through judicious use of the veil of ignorance and the time of entry of parties to the original contract position, Rawls's contract theory, unlike simpler explicit contract theories, can yield definite obligations to distant future people,36 for example, we ought to save at a just rate for future people. But, as Rawls remarks (p. 284), 'the question of justice between generations . . . subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests'. It is doubtful that Rawls's theory as formulated passes the tests; for the theory as formulated does not yield the stated conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with the thesis that there are the same obligations to future people as to contemporaries. Exactly how these obligations arise from the initial agreement depends critically on the interpretation of the time of �Obligations to the Future 167 entry of the parties into the agreement. Insofar as Rawls insists upon the present-time-of-entry interpretation (p. 139), he has to introduce supplementary motivational assumptions in order to (try to) secure the desired bondings between generations, in particular to ensure that the generation of the original position saves for any later generation, even their immediate successors ([5], p. 140 and p. 292). Rawls falls back on-what is as we have seen inadequate to the task, since it does not exclude one generation damaging another remote generation in a way that bypasses mutually successive generations - 'ties of sentiment between successive generations' (p. 292): to this limited extent Passmore has a point, for such a social contract on its own (without additional assumptions about the motives of the parties to the agreement) does not furnish obligations even to our immediate successors. This is indicative also of the unsatisfactory instability of Rawls's theory under changes, its sensitivity to the way the original agreement is set up, to the motivation of parties, their time of entry, what they can know, etc. To arrive at a more adequate account of obligations to the distant future under Rawls's theory, let us adopt, to avoid the additional, dubious and unsatisfactory, motivational assumptions Rawls invokes, one of the alternative - and non -equivalent - time-of-entry interpretations that Rawls lists (p. 146), that of persons alive at some time in simultaneous agreement. Let us call this, following Rawls's notation (on p. 140), interpretation 4b (it is perhaps unnecessary to assume for 4b any more than 4a that all people need be involved: it may be enough given the equivalencizing effect of the veil of ignorance that some are, and as with the particular quantifier it is quite unnecessary to be specific about numbers). Then of course the parties, since they are, for all they know, of different generations, will presumably agree on a just savings rate, and also to other just distribution principles, simply on the basis of Rawlsian rationality, i.e. advancing their own interests, without additional motivation assumptions. This more appealing omnitemporal interpretation of time of entry into the agreement, which gives a superior account of obligation to the future consistent with Rawls's claim, Rawls in some places puts down as less than best (p. 292) but in his most detailed account of the original position simply dismisses (p. 139): To conceive of the original position [as a gathering of people living at different times] would be to stretch fantasy too far; the conception would cease to be a natural guide to intuition. �168 R. and V. Rout ley This we question: it would be a better guide to intuition than a position (like 4a) which brings out intuitively wrong results; it is a more satisfactory guide, for example, to justice between generations than the present-timeof-entry interpretation, which fails conspicuously to allow for the range of potential persons (all of whom are supposed to qualify on Rawls's account for just treatment, cf. § 77). Moreover, it stretches fantasy no further than science fiction or than some earlier contract accounts.36 But it does require changes in the way the original position is conceived, and it does generate metaphysical difficulties for orthodox ontological views (though not to the same extent for the Meinongian view we prefer); for, to consider the latter, either time travel is possible or the original hypothetical position is an impossible situation, with people who live at different times assembled at the same time. The difficulties - of such an impossible meeting help to reveal that what Rawls's theory offers is but a colourful representation of obligations in terms of a contract agreed upon at a meeting. The metaphysical difficulties do not concern merely possible people, because all those involved are sometime-actual people; nor are there really serious difficulties generated by the fact that very many of these people do not exist, i.e. exist now. The more serious difficulties are either those of time travel, e.g. that future parties relocated into the present may be able to interfere with their own history, or, if time travel is ruled out logically or otherwise, that future parties may be advantaged (or disadvantaged) by their knowledge of history and technology, and that accordingly fairness is lost. As there is considerable freedom in how we choose to (re)arrange the original position, we shall suppose that time travel is rejected as a means of entering the original position. For much less than travel is required; some sort of limited communicational network which filters out, for example, all historical data (and all cultural or species dependent material) would suffice; and in any case if time travel were not excluded essentially the present-time-of-entry interpretation would serve, though fairness would again be put in doubt. The filtered communicational hook-up by which the omnitemporal position is engineered still has - if fairness is to be seen to be built into the decision making - to be combined with a reinterpreted veil of ignorance, so that parties do not know where they are located temporally any more than they know who they are characterwise. This implies, among other things, limitations on the parties' knowledge of factual matters, such as available technology and world and local history; for otherwise parties could work out their location, temporal or spatial. For example, if some party knew, as Rawls supposes, �Obligations to the Future 169 the general social facts, then he would presumably be aware of the history of his time and so of where history ends, that is of the date of his generation, his time (his present), and so be aware of his temporal location. These are already problems for Rawls's so-called 'present-time-ofentry interpretation' - it is, rather, a variable-time-of-entry interpretation - given that the parties may be, as Rawls occasionally admits (e.g. p. 287), of any one generation, not necessarily the present: either they really do have to be ofthepresent time or they cannot be assumed to know as much as Rawls supposes.37 There is, however, no reason why the veil of ignorance should not be extended so as to avoid this problem; and virtually any extension that solves the problem for the variable-time-of-entry interpretation should serve, so it seems, for the omnitemporal one. We shall assume then that the parties know nothing which discloses their respective locations (i.e. in effect we write in conditions for universalizability of principles decided upon). There are still gaps between the assumptions of the omnitemporal position as roughly sketched and the desired conclusion concerning obligations to the future, but (the matter is beginning to look non-trivially provable given not widely implausible assumptions and) the intuitive arguments are as clear as those in [5], indeed they simply restate arguments to obligations given by Rawls. Rawls's theory, under interpretation 4b, admits of nice application to the problems of just distribution of material resources and of nuclear power. The just distribution, or rate of usage, of material resources38 over time is an important conservation issue to which Rawls's theory seems to apply, just as readily, and in a similar fashion, to that in which it applies to the issue of a just rate of savings. In fact the argument from the original position for a just rate of saving - whatever its adequacy - can by simply mimicked to yield an argument for just distribution of resources over generations. Thus, for example: persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much they would be willing to save [i.e. conserve] at each stage of advance on the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rate [conserve resources to the same extent]. . . . In effect, then, they must choose a just savings principle [resources distribution principle] that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to [degree of resource conservation at] each level of advance. ([5], p. 287; our bracketed options give the alternative argument) �170 R. and V. Routley Just as 'they try to piece together a just savings schedule' (p. 289), so they can try to piece together a just resource distribution policy. Just as a case for resource conservation can be made out by appeal to the original position, since it is going to be against the interests of, to the disadvantage of, later parties to find themselves in a resource depleted situation (thus, on Rawlsian assumptions, they will bargain hard for a share of resources), so, interestingly, a case against a rapid programme of nuclear power development can be devised. The basis of a case against large-scale nuclear development is implicit in Rawls's contract theory under interpretation 4b, though naturally the theory is not applied in this sort of way by Rawls. To state the case in its crude but powerful form: people from later generations in the original position are bound to take it as against their interests to simply carry the waste can for energy consumed by an earlier generation. (We have already argued that they will find no convincing overriding considerations that make it worth their while to carry the waste can.) Thus not only has Passmore misrepresented the obligations to the future that Rawls's theory admits; he is also wrong in suggesting (p. 87 and p. 91) that Rawls's theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation which includes reductions in present consumption. There is, in this connection, an accumulation of errors in Passmore, some of which spill over to Rawls, which it is worth trying to set out. First, Passmore claims ([1], p. 86; cf. also p. 90) that 'Rawls does not so much mention the saving of natural resources'. In fact the 'husbanding of natural resources' is very briefly considered ([5], p. 271). It is true, however, that Rawls does not reveal any of the considerable power that his theory, properly interpreted, has for natural resource conservation, as implying a just distribution of natural resources over time. Secondly, Passmore attempts ([1], pp. 87 ff.) to represent the calls of conservationists for a reduction in present resource usage and for a more just distribution as a call for heroic self-sacrifices; this is part of his more general attempt to represent every moral constraint with respect to the non-immediate future as a matter of self-sacrifice. 'Rawls's theory', Passmore says (on p. 87), 'leaves no room for heroic sacrifice', and so, he infers, leaves no room for conservation. Not only is the conclusion false, but the premiss also: Rawls's theory allows for supererogation, as Rawls explains ([5], p. 117). But resource conservation is, like refraining from nuclear development, not a question of heroic self-sacrifice; it is in part a question of obligations or duties to the distant future. And Rawls's theory allows not only for obligations as well as supererogation, but also for natural duties. Rawls's �Obligations to the Future 171 contract, unlike the contracts of what is usually meant by a 'contract theory', is by no means exhaustive of the moral sphere: But even this wider [contract] theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves towards,animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put them aside, (p. 17) The important class of obligations beyond the scope of the contract theory surely generates obligations between persons which even the wider contract theory likewise cannot explain. The upshot is that such a contract account, even if sufficient for the determination of obligations, is not necessary. To this extent Rawls' s theory is not a full social contract theory at all. However, Rawls appears to lose sight of the fact that his contract theory delivers only a sufficient condition when he claims, for example (p. 298), that 'one feature of the contract doctrine is that it places an upper bound on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of later generations'. For greater savings may sometimes be required to meet obligations beyond those that the contract doctrine delivers. In short, Rawls appears to have slipped into assuming, inconsistently, that his contract theory is a necessary condition. Although Rawls's theory caters for justice between generations and allows the derivation of important obligations to people in the distant future, the full theory is far from consistent on these matters and there are significant respects in which Rawls does not take justice to the future seriously. The most conspicuous symptoms of this are that justice to the future is reduced to a special case, justice between generations, and that the only aspect of justice between generations that Rawls actually considers is a just savings rate; there is, for example, no proper examination of the just distribution of resources among generations, though these resources, Rawls believes, provide the material base of the just institutions that he wants to see maintained. In fact Rawls strongly recommends a system of markets as a just means for the allocation of most goods and services, recognizing their well-known limitations only in the usual perfunctory fashion ([5], pp. 270 ff.). Yet market systems are limited by a narrow time horizon, and are quite ill-equipped to allocate resources in a just fashion �172 R. and V. Rout ley over a time span of several generations. Similarly Rawls's endorsement of democratic voting procedures as in many cases a just method of determining procedures depends upon the assumptions that everyone with ah interest is represented. But given his own assumptions about obligations to the future and in respect of potential persons this is evidently not the case. Catering in a just fashion for the interests of future people poses serious problems for any method of decision that depends upon people being present to represent their own interests. Some of the more conservative, indeed reactionary, economic assumptions in Rawls emerge with the assumption that all that is required for justice between generations is a just savings rate, that all we need to pass on to the future are the things that guarantee appropriate savings such as capital, factories, and machines. But the transmission of these things is quite insufficient for justice to the future, and neither necessary nor sufficient as a foundation for a good life for future generations. What is required for justice is the transmission in due measure of what is valuable. Rawls has, however, taken value accumulation as capital accumulation, thereby importing one of the grossest economic assumptions, that capital reflects value. But of course the accumulation of capital may conflict with the preservation of what is valuable. It is for this sort of reason (and thus, in essence, because of the introduction of supplementary economistic theses which are not part of the pure contract theory) that Rawls's theory is a reactionary one from an environmental point of view; on the theory as presented (i.e. the contract theory plus all the supplementary assumptions) there is no need to preserve such things as wilderness or natural beauty. The savings doctrine supposes that everything of value for transmission to the future is negotiable in the market or tradeable; but then transmission of savings can by no means guarantee that some valuable things, not properly represented in market systems, are not eliminated or not passed on, thereby making future people worse off. It becomes evident in this way, too, how culturally-bound Rawls's idea of ensuring justice to future generations through savings is. It is not just that the idea does not apply, without a complete overhaul, to non-industrial societies such as those of hunter-gatherers; it does not apply to genuinely post-industrial societies either. Consideration of such alternative societies suggests that whafis required, in place of capital accumulation, is that we pass on what is necessary for a good life, that we ensure that the basics are fairly distributed over time and not eroded, e.g. that in the case of the forest people that the forest is maintained. The narrowness of Rawls's picture, �Obligations to the Future 173 which makes no due allowance for social or cultural diversity (from the original contractual position on) or for individual diversity arises in part from his underlying and especially narrow socio-economic assumption as to what people want: What men want is meaningful work in free association with others, these associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just basic institutions. ([5], p. 290) This may be what many Harvard men want; but as a statement of what men want it supplies neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions.39 NOTES 1 Thus according to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110; our italics). There is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. . . . Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is regarded as the most likely solution, but has yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive releases following disturbances caused by natural processes or human activity. The Fox Report also quoted approvingly ([2], p. 187; our italics) the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report [6]: There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exist s to ensure the safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future. Although the absence of a satisfactory storage method has been conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development, e.g. Weinberg ([3], pp. 32-33), it is now disputed by others. In particular, the headline for Cohen [15], which reads 'A substantial body of evidence indicates that the high level radioactive wastes generated by U.S. nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geological formations', has suggested to many readers - what it was no doubt intended to suggest- that there is really no problem about the disposal of radioactive wastes after all. Cohen presents, however, no new hard evidence, no evidence not already available to the British and Australian Commissions ([2] and [6]). Moreover the evidence Cohen does outline fails conspicuously to measure up to the standards rightly required by the Flowers and Fox Reports. Does Cohen offer a commercial-scale procedure for waste disposal which can be demonstrated as safe? Far from it: �174 R. and V. Routley The detailed procedures for handling the high-level wastes are not yet definite, but present indications are that. . . . (Cohen [1], p. 24; our italics) Does Cohen 'demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt' the long-term safety of burial of wastes, deep underground? Again, far from it: On the face of it such an approach appears to be reasonably safe. . . . (p. 24; our italics) Cohen has apparently not realized what is required. At issue here are not so much scientific or empirical issues as questions of methodology, of standards of evidence required for claims of safety, and above all, of values, since claims of safety, for example, involve implicit evaluations concerning what counts as an acceptable risk, an admissible cost, etc. In the headline 'a substantial body of evidence . . . indicates that. . . wastes . . . can be stored satisfactorily' the key words (italicized) are evaluative or elastic, and the strategy of Cohen's case is to adopt very low standards for their application. But in view of what is at stake it is hardly acceptable to do this, to dress up in this way what are essentially optimistic assurances and untested speculations about storage, which in any case do little to meet the difficulties and uncertainties that have been widely pointed out as regards precisely the storage proposals Cohen outlines, namely human or natural interference or disturbance. 2 See [18], pp. 24-25. 3 On all these points, see [14], esp. p. 141. According to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110): Parts of the reactor structure will be highly radioactive and their disposal could be very difficult. There is at present no experience of dismantling a full size reactor. 4 See, in particular, The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Friends of the Earth Energy Paper, San Francisco 1973, p. 47; also [3], p. 32 and [14], p. 149. 5 As the discussion in [14], pp. 153-7, explains. 6 Cf. [17], pp. 35-36, [18] and, for much detail, J. R. Goffman and A. R. Tamplin, Poisoned Power, Rodale Press, Emmau Pa. 1971. 7 On the pollution and waste disposal record of the infant nuclear industry, see [14] and [17]. The record of many countries on pollution control, where in many cases available technologies for reducing or removing pollution are not applied because they are considered too expensive or because they adversely affect the interests of some powerful group, provides clear historical evidence that the problem of nuclear waste disposal would not end simply with the devising of a 'safe' technology for disposal, even if one could be devised which provided a sufficient guarantee of safety and was commercially feasible. The fact that present economic and political arrangements are overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the interests and concerns of (some) contemporary humans makes it not unrealistic to expect the long-term nuclear waste disposal, if it involved any significant cost at all, when public concern about the issue died down, would be seen to conflict with the interests of contemporary groups, and that these latter interests would in many cases be favoured. Nor, as the history of movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament shows, could generalized public concern in the absence of direct personal interest, be relied upon to be sustained for long enough to ensure implementation of costly or troublesome long-term disposal methods - even in those places where public concern exists and is a politically significant force. It must be stressed then that the problem is not merely one of disposal technique. Historical and other evidence points to the conclusion that many of the most important risks associated with nuclear waste disposal are not of the kind which might be amenable �Obligations to the Future 175 to technical solutions in the laboratory. A realistic assessment of potential costs to the future from nuclear development cannot overlook these important non-technical risk factors. 8 Of course the effect on people is not the only factor which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a moral judgment. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life. But since the harm nuclear development is likely to cause to non-human life can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way. 9 Proponents of nuclear power often try to give the impression that future people will not just bear costs from nuclear development but will also be beneficiaries, because nuclear powerprovides an 'abundant' or even 'unlimited' source of energy; thus Weinberg ([3], p. 34): 'an all but infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy'. A good example of an attempt to create the impression that 'abundant' and 'cheap' energy from nuclear fission will be available to 'our descendants', i.e. all future people, is found in the last paragraph of Cohen [15]. Such claims are most misleading, since fission power even with the breeder reactor has only about the same prospective lifetime as coal-produced electricity (a point that can be derived using data in A. Parker, 'World Energy Resources: A Survey', Energy Policy, Vol. 3 [1975], pp. 58-66), and it is quite illegitimate to assume that nuclear fusion, for which there are still major unsolved problems, will have a viable, clean technology by the time fission runs out, or, for that matter, that it ever will. Thus while some few generations of the immediate future may obtain some benefits as well as costs, there is a very substantial chance that tho se of the more distant future will obtain nothing but costs. 10 These feelings, of which Smith's and Hume's sympathy is representative, are but the feeling echoes of obligation. At most, sympathy explains the feeling of obligation or lack of it, and this provides little guide as to whether there is an obligation or not - unless one interprets moral sympathy, the feeling of having a obligation, or being obligated, itself as a sufficient indication of obligation, in which case moral sympathy is a non-explanatory correlate in the feelings department of obligation itself and cannot be truly explanatory of the ground of it; unless, in short, moral sympathy reduces to an emotive rewrite of moral obligation. 11 Elsewhere in [1] Passmore is especially exercised that our institutions and intellectual traditions - presumably only the better ones - should be passed on to posterity, and that we should strive to make the world a better place, if not eventually an ideal one. 12 This is not the only philosophically important issue in environmental ethics on which Passmore is inconsistent. Consider his: 'over-arching intention: to consider whether the solution of ecological problems demands a moral or metaphysical revolution' (p. x), whether the West needs a new ethic and a new metaphysics. Passmore's answer in [1] is an emphatic No. Only insofar as Western moralists have [made various erroneous suggestions] can the West plausibly be said to need a 'new ethic'. What it needs, for the most part, is not so much a 'new ethic' as adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic. For the major sources of our ecological disasters - apart from ignorance - are greed and shortsightedness, which amount to much the same thing. . . There is no novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much. (p. 187) 'The view that the West now needs. . . a new concept of nature' is similarly dismissed (p. 186, cf. p. 72). But in his paper [1*] (i.e. 'Attitudes to Nature', Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 8, Macmillan, London 1975), which is said to be an attempt to bring together and to reformulate some of the basic philosophical themes of [1], Passmore's answer is Yes, and quite different themes, inconsistent with those of [1], are advanced: �176 R. and V. Routley [T]he general conditions I have laid down . . . have not been satisfied in most of the traditional philosophies of nature. To that degree it is true, I think, that we do need a 'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric. . . . A 'new metaphysics', if it is not to falsify the facts, will have to be naturalistic, but not reductionist. The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy. ([1*], pp. 260-1) A new ethic accompanies this new metaphysics. The emergence of new moral attitudes to nature is bound up, then, with the emergence of a more realistic philosophy of nature. That is the only adequate foundation for effective ecological concern. ([1*], p. 264) This is a far cry from the theme of [1] that ecological problems can be solved within the traditions of the West. 13 Put differently, the causal linkage can bypass intermediate generations, especially given action at a temporal distance: the chain account implies that there are no moral constraints in initiating such causal linkages. The chain picture accordingly seems to presuppose an unsatisfactory Humean model of causation, demanding contiguity and excluding action at a distance. 14 Golding we shall concede to Passmore, though even here the case is not clearcut. For Golding writes towards the end of his article ([12], p. 96): My discussion, until this point, has proceeded on the view that we have obligations to future generations. But do we? I am not sure that the question can be answered in the affirmative with any certainty. I shall conclude this note with a very brief discussion of some of the difficulties. All of Passmore's material on Golding is drawn from this latter and, as Golding says, 'speculative' discussion. 15 There is no textual citation for Bentham at all for the chapter of [1] concerned, viz. Ch. 4, 'Conservation'. 16 As Passmore himself at first concedes ([1], p. 84): If, as Bentham tells us, in deciding how to act men ought to take account of the effects of their actions on every sentient being, they obviously ought to take account of the pleasure and pains of the as yet unborn. 17 Neither rightness nor probable lightness in the hedonistic senses correspond to these notions in the ordinary sense; so at least [13] argues, following much anti-utilitarian literature. 18 On this irrationality different theories agree: the rational procedure, for example according to the minimax rule for decision-making under uncertainty, is to minimize that outcome which maximizes harm. 19 Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market (cf. P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 1967, p. 351). Thus the rates have little moral relevance. 20 Cf. Rawls [5], p. 287: 'From a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting future well-being on the basis of pure time preference.' 21 What the probabilities would be depends on the theory of probability adopted: a Carnapian theory, e.g., would lead back to the unconstrained position. �Obligations to the Future 177 22 A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with mere logical possibility. 23 Thus, to take a simple special case, economists dismiss distant future people from their assessments of utility, welfare, etc., on the basis of their non-existence; cf. Ng ('the utility of a non-existent person is zero') and Harsanyi ('only existing people [not even "nonexisting potential individuals"] can have real utility levels since they are the only ones able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects with a negative utility, and feel indifferent to objects with zero utility') (see Appendix B of Y. K. Ng, 'Preference, Welfare, and Social Welfare', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977, pp. 24, 26-27). Non-existent people have no experiences, no preferences; distant future people do not exist; therefore distant future people have no utility assignments - so the sorites goes. But future people at least will have wants, preferences, and so on, and these have to be taken into account in adequate utility assessments (which should be assessed over afuture time horizon), no matter how much it may complicate or defeat calculations. 24 There are problems about formulating universalizability satisfactorily, but they hardly affect the point. The requisite universalizability can in fact be satisfactorily brought out from the semantical analysis of deontic notions such as obligation, and indeed argued for on the basis of such an analysis which is universal in form. The lawlikeness requirement, which can be similarly defended, is essentially that imposed on genuine scientific laws by logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap and Hempel), that such laws should contain no proper names or the like, no reference to specific locations or times. 25 Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick [11], p. 414), and in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and Rousseau toRawls ([5], p. 293). How the principle is argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlying theory; and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particular ethical theories. 26 See esp. R. Lanoue, NuclearPlants:The MoreTheyBuild, The More You Pay, Centerfor Study of Responsive Law, Washington DC 1976; also [14], pp. 212 ff. 27 On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy, Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC 1977, pp. 1-7, and also the details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner [7]. On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23. On the employment issues, see too H. E. Daly in [9], p. 149. A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich, Energy and Equality, Calder & Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need. 28 For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, Blond & Briggs, London 1973. As to the capital and other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and also [7] and [9]. For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy technology will tend to promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries, see the paper of Waiko and other papers in the Melanesian Environment (ed. by J. H. Winslow), Australian National University Press, Canberra 1977. 29 This fact is implicitly recognized in [2], p. 56. 30 A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, Friends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1976); see also [17], [6], [7], [14], pp. 233 ff., and Schumacher, op. cit. 31 This is also explained in [2], p. 56. 32 An argument like this is suggested in Passmore [1], Chs. 4 and 7, with respect to the question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the overriding importance of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned by what appears to be a future- �178 R. and V. Routley directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care of the present and immediate future. The argument has all the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others. 33 See [14], p. 66, p. 191, and also [7]. 34 For such arguments see esp. M. Flood and R. Grove-White, Nuclear Prospects. A Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London 1976. 35 For a recent sketch of one such alternative which is outside the framework of the conventional option of centralized bureaucratic socialism, see E. Callenbach's novel, Ecotopia, Banyan Tree Books, Berkeley, California 1975. For the outline of a liberation socialist alternative see Radical Technology (ed. by G. Boyle and P. Harper), Undercurrents Limited, London 1976, and references therein. 36 Some earlier contract theories also did. Burke's contract (in E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Dent, London 1910, pp. 93-94) 'becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are not yet born'. Thus Burke's contract certainly appears to lead to obligations to distant future generations. Needless to say, there are metaphysical difficulties, which however Burke never considers, about contracts between parties at widely separated temporal locations. 37 Several of the preceding points we owe to M. W. Jackson. 38 Resources such as soil fertility and petroleum could even be a primary social goods on Rawls's very hazy general account of these goods ([5], pp. 62, 97): are these 'something a rational man wants whatever else he wants'? The primary social goods should presumably be those which are necessary for the good and just life -which will however vary with culture. 39 We have benefited from discussion with Ian Hughes and Frank Muller and useful comments on the paper from Brian Martin and Derek Browne. REFERENCES [1] J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London 1974. [2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1977. [3] A. M. Weinberg, 'Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy", Science, Vol. 177 (July 1972), pp. 27-34. • [4] R. Routley, 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle II. Existence is Existence Now', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (to appear). [5] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971. [6] Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London 1976. [7] B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York 1976. [8] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903. [9] B. Commoner, H. Boksenbaum and M. Corr (Eds.), Energy and Human Welfare - A Critical Analysis, Vol. III, Macmillan, New York 1975. �Obligations to the Future 179 [10] J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, published under the superintendence of J. Bowring, with an intro. by J. H. Burton; William Tait, Edinburgh 1843. [11] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London 1962 (reissue). [12] M. P. Golding, 'Obligations to Future Generations', Monist, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 85-99. [13] R. and V. Routley, 'An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism', presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977. [14] R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne 1977. [15] B. L. Cohen, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reactors', Scientific American, Vol. 236 (June 1977), pp. 22-31. [16] S. McCracken, 'The Waragainst the Atom' .Commentary (September 1977), pp. 33-47. [17] A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco 1975. [18] A. Roberts, "The Politics of Nuclear Power', Arena, No. 41 (1976), pp. 22-47. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Published Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan formally published very little of his nuclear ethics and politics, although a nuclear imaginary is present throughout his ouevre. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Inquiry, 21, 133-79 Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future R. and V. Routley Plumwood Mountain, Braidwood, Australia The paper considers the morality of nuclear energy development as it concerns future people, especially the creation of highly toxic nuclear wastes requiring longterm storage. On the basis of an example with many parallel moral features it is argued that the imposition of such costs and risks on the future is morally unacceptable. The paper goes on to examine in detail possible ways of escaping this conclusion, especially the escape route of denying that moral obligations of the appropriate type apply to future people. The bulk of the paper comprises discussion of this philosophical issue, including many arguments against assigning obligations to the future drawn both from analyses of obligation and from features of the future such as uncertainty and indeterminacy. A further escape through appeal to moral conflict is also considered, and in particular two conflict arguments, the Poverty and Lights-going-out arguments are briefly discussed. Both these escape routes are rejected and it is concluded that if the same standards of behaviour are applied to the future as to the present, nuclear energy development is morally unacceptable. I. The Bus Example Suppose we consider a bus, a bus which we hope is to make a very long journey. This bus, a third world bus, carries both passengers and freight. The bus sets down and picks up many different passengers in the course of its long journey and the drivers change many times, but because of the way the bus line is managed and the poor service on the route it is nearly always full to overcrowded, with passengers hanging off the back, and as in Afghanistan, passengers riding on the roof, and chickens and goats in the freight compartment. Early in the bus's journey someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package containing a highly toxic and explosive gas. This is packaged in a very thin container, which as the consigner well knows is unlikely to contain the gas for the full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the bus should encounter any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some 1 134 R. and V. Routley passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight, as also frequently happens. All of these things, let us suppose, have happened on some of the bus's previous journeys. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people and animals on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. There does not seem much doubt about what most of us would say about the morality of the consigner's action, and there is certainly no doubt about what the passengers would say. The consigner's action in putting the safety of the occupants of the bus at risk is appalling. What could excuse such an action, what sort of circumstances might justify it, and what sort of case could the consigner reasonably put up? The consigner might say that it is by no means certain that the gas will escape; he himself is an optimist and therefore feels that such unfavourable possible outcomes should be ignored. In any case the bus might have an accident and the passengers be killed long before the container gets a chance to leak; or the passengers might change to another bus and leave the lethal parcel behind. He might say that it is the responsibility of the passengers and the driver to ensure that the journey is a smooth one, and that if they fail to do so, the results are not his fault. He might say that the journey is such a long one that many of the passengers may have become mere mindless vegetables or degenerate wretches about whose fate no decent person need concern himself, or that they might not care about losing their lives or health or possessions anyway by that time. Most of these excuses will seem little more than a bad joke, and certainly would not usually be reckoned any sort of justification. The main argument the consigner of the lethal parcel employs, however, is that his own pressing needs justify his actions. He has no option but to consign his potentially lethal parcel, he says, since the firm he owns, and which has produced the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits and cannot afford to produce a better container or to stop the production of the gas. If the firm goes out of business, the consigner says, his wife will leave him, and he will lose his family happiness, the comfortable way of life to which he has become accustomed and sees now as a necessity; his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others; not only will the firm's customers be inconvenienced but he, the consigner, will have to break some business contracts; the inhabitants of the local village through loss of spending and cancellation of the Multiplier Effect will suffer finan- Obligations to the Future 135 cial hardship, and, worst of all, the tiny flow of droplets that the poor of the village might receive (theoretically at any rate) as a result of the trickling down of these good things would dry up entirely. In short, some basic and some perhaps uncomfortable changes will be needed in the village. Even if the consigner's story were accepted at face value - and it would be wise to look critically at his story - only someone whose moral sensibilities had been paralysed by the disease of galloping economism could see such a set of considerations, based on 'needs', comfort, and the goal of local prosperity, as justifying the consigner's action. One is not generally entitled to thus simply transfer the risks and costs arising from one's own life onto other uninvolved parties, to get oneself out of a hole of one's own making by creating harm or risk of harm to someone else who has had no share in creating the situation. To create serious risks and costs, especially risks to life or health for such others, simply to avoid having to make some changes to a comfortable life style, or even for a somewhat better reason, is usually thought deserving of moral condemnation, and sometimes considered a crime; for example, the action of a company in creating risks to the lives or health of its workers or customers to prevent itself from going bankrupt. What the consigner says may be an explanation of his behaviour, but it is not a justification. The problem raised by nuclear waste disposal is by no means a perfect analogy to the bus case, since, for example, the passengers on the nuclear bus cannot get off the bus or easily throw out the lethal package. In many crucial moral respects, however, the nuclear waste storage problem as it affects future people, the passengers in the bus we are considering, resembles the consignment of the faultily packaged lethal gas. Not only are rather similar moral principles involved, but a rather similar set of arguments to the lamentable excuses the consigner presents have been seriously put up to justify nuclear development, the difference being that in the nuclear case these arguments have been widely accepted. There is also some parallel in the risks involved; there is no known safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by nuclear plants that will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead.1 The wastes problem will not be a slight one, with each one of the more than 2,000 reactors envisaged by the end of the century, producing on average annual wastes containing one thousand times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb.2 The wastes include not merely the spent fuels and their radioactive by-products, but also everything they contaminate, from fuel containers to the thousands of widely distributed decommissioned nuclear 136 R. and V. Routley reactors which will have to be abandoned, still in a highly radioactive condition, after the expiry of their expected lifetimes of about thirty years, and which have been estimated to require perhaps one and a half million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity.3 The wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire active lifetime; for fission products the required storage period averages a thousand years or so, and for the actinides (transuranic elements) which include plutonium, there is a half-million to a million-year storage problem.4 Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed longterm methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste that have been produced over the last twenty years.5 With present known short-term surface methods of storage there is a continued need for human intervention to keep the material isolated from the environment, while with proposed longer-term methods such as storage in salt mines or granite to the risk of human interference there are added the risks of leakage, e.g. through water seepage, and of disturbance, for example through climatic change, earth movements, etc. The risks are significant: no reasonable person with even a limited acquaintance with the history of human affairs over the last 3,000 years could be confident of safe storage by methods involving human intervention over the enormous time periods involved. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period which has seen a number of ice ages and great fluctuations in climate for example, could be confident that the waste material could be safely stored for the vast periods of time required. Much of this waste is highly toxic; for example, even a beachball sized quantity of plutonium appropriately distributed is enough to give every person on the planet lung cancer - so that a leak of even a small part of this waste material could involve huge loss of life, widespread disease and genetic damage, and contamination of immense areas of land.6 Given the enormous costs which could be involved for the future, it is plainly grossly inadequ'ate'to merely speculate concerning untested, but possibly or even probably, safe methods for disposal of wastes. Yet none of the proposed methods has been properly tested, and they may prove to involve all sorts of unforeseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the Obligations to the Future 137 geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long-term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be, especially if, as seems likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically, seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection, and concern for the future not previously encountered in human affairs, and certainly not conspicuous in the nuclear industry.7 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long-term storage sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weapons-grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million-year storage period, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it. Our behaviour in creating this nightmare situation for the future is certainly no better than that of the consigner in the bus example. Industrialized countries, in order to get out of a mess of their own making essentially the creation of economies dependent on an abundance" of non-renewable energy in a situation where it is in fact in limited supply opt for a 'solution' which may enable them to avoid the making of uncomfortable changes during the lifetime of those now living, at the expense of passing heavy burdens on to the inhabitants of the earth at a future time burdens in the shape of costs and risks which, just as in the bus case, may adversely affect the life and health of future people and their opportunity to lead a decent life.8 It is sometimes suggested that analogies like the bus example are defective; that morally they are crucially different from the nuclear case, since future people, unlike the passengers in the bus, will benefit directly from nuclear development, which will provide an abundance of energy for the indefinite future. But this is incorrect. Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be seriously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks, without any corresponding benefits, in order to provide for the extravagant energy use of only five generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop-gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a 138 R. and V. Routley transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it.9 For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dream of global industrialization is realized, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy resource use, and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it. It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life, are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least indirect beneficiaries. The 'solution' then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Just as in the bus case, contemporary industrial society proposes to get itself out of a hole of its own making by creating risk of harm, and by transferring costs and risks, to someone else who has had no part in producing the situation and who will obtain no clear benefit. It has clear alternatives to this action. That it does not take them is due essentially to its unwillingness to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to its desire to protect the interests of those who benefit from them. If we apply to the nuclear situation the same standards of behaviour and moral principles that we acknowledge (in principle if perhaps often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it will not be easy to avoid the conclusion that the situation involves injustice with respect to future people on a grand scale. It seems to us that there are only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of our nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to say that there are no circumstances in which such an action might possibly be justifiable, or at least where the case is less clearcut. It is the same with the nuclear case. Just as in the case of the consigner of the Obligations to the Future 139 package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in the present case. We turn now to the first of these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development, to the philosophical question of our obligations to the future. II. Obligations to the Distant Future The area in which these philosophical problems arise is that of the distant (i.e. non-immediate) future, that is, the future with which people alive today will make no direct contact; the immediate future provides comparatively few problems for moral theories. The issues involved, although of far more than academic interest, have not received any great attention in recent philosophical literature, despite the fact that the question of obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass, and also raises a number of questions in political philosophy concerning the adequacy of accepted institutions which leave out of account the interests of future people. Moral philosophers have predictably differed on the issue. But contrary to the picture painted in a recent, widely read, and influential work discussing it, Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature, a good many philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them less weight, those who deny, or who are committed by their general moral position to denying, that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those like Passmore and Golding who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond those to the next generation. • According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained; there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply, that we don't have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, i.e. those who have opted for the uncon- 140 R. and V. Routley strained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some degree of temporal or spatial contiguity. Thus moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligation is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also non-transitive. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or requirements for moral obligation, which would rule out obligations to the non-immediate future are these: First, there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his rights or entitlement. People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing to enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement. But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariantly over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders, and there could be no guarantee that any contemporary institution would do it for them. Both the view that moral obligation requires the context of a moral community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rule out the distant future as a field of moral obligation, as they not only require a commonality, or some sort of common basis, which cannot be guaranteed in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange, the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive relations of short duration such as sympathy and love. There are some difficulties also about love and sympathy for (non-existent) people in the far distant future about whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who may well be committed to a life-style for which one has no sympathy. On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future people; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary Obligations to the Future 141 people have no obligations to future people and can harm them as it suits them. What all these views have in common is a naturalistic picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empathy).10 Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually thought to characterize it, such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features), are lost, especially where there is a choice of whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so of whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. However, the view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act as one likes with respect to them, is a very difficult one to sustain. Consider the example of a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb which is to be set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictable result of the action. The unconstrained position clearly implies that this is an acceptable moral enterprise, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being unduly expensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to future people. The unconstrained position also endorses as morally acceptable the following sorts of examples: A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining, processing, and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problems for present people or their immediate descendants, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm it does to future people. Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view might seem childishly obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not only have a number of philosophers writing on the issue endorsed this position, but it is the clear 142 R. and V. Routley implication of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of economic theory. It does not appear, on the other hand, that those who opt for the unconstrained position have considered such examples and endorsed them as morally acceptable, despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that when it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being free to act implies, among other things being free to inflict pointless harm, most of those who opted for the unconstrained position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not responsible for their lives. The view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in cases such as those discussed above and the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so must acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future. The thesis seems thus to assume an incorrect model of an independent and unrelated future. Also, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have, or has not acquired, an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved - that one has no responsibility for his life - does not imply that one is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some course of action of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him. These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the failure to make an important distinction between, on the one hand, acquired or assumed obligations towards somebody, for which some act of acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and on the other hand moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of acquisition is required. There is a considerable difference in the level and kind of responsibility involved. In the first case one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his Obligations to the Future 143 action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist. While it may be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make special sacrifices of an heroic kind for future people, or even to help them especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained from harming them. Thus, to return to the bus example, the consigner cannot argue in justification of his action that he has never assumed or acquired responsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them, and that they are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue in respect of both the bus and the nuclear case is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility for the lives of the people involved. The confusion of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off non-acquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral obligation' in philosophy to indicate any type of deontic constraint, while in natural language it is used to indicate something which has to be assumed or acquired. Hence the equation and at least one root of the unconstrained position, that is of the belief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future. The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to a more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent position. Passmore's position in [1] is a striking example of the second ambivalent position. On the one hand Passmore regularly gives the impression of one championing future people; for example, in the final sentence of [1] he says, concerning men a century hence: My sole concern is that we should do nothing which will reduce their freedom of thought and action, whether by destroying.the natural world which makes that freedom possible or the social traditions which permit and encourage it. 144 R. and V. Routley Earlier (esp. pp. 84-85) Passmore appears to endorse the principle 'that we ought not to act so as certainly to harm posterity' and claims (p. 98) that, even where there are uncertainties, 'these uncertainties do not justify negligence'. Nevertheless, though obligations concerning non-immediate posterity are thus admitted, the main thrust of Passmore's argument is entirely different, being in favour of the unconstrained position according to which we have no obligations to non-immediate posterity. Thus his conclusion (p. 91): So whether we approach the problem of obligations to posterity by way of Bentham and Sidgwick, Rawls or Golding, we are led to something like the same conclusion: our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condition, and that is all.11 Passmore's position is, to all appearances, simply inconsistent. There are two ways one might try to render it consistent, but neither is readily available to Passmore. The first is by taking advantage of the distinction between moral constraints and acquired obligations, but a basis for this distinction is not evident in Passmore's work and indeed the distinction is antithetical to the analyses of obligation that Passmore tries to synthesize with his own analysis in terms of loves. The second, sceptical, route to consistency is by way of the argument that we shall consider shortly, that there is always gross uncertainty with respect to the distant future, uncertainty which relieves us in practice of any moral constraints regarding the distant future. But though Passmore's writing strongly suggests this uncertainty argument (especially his sympathetic discussion of the Premier of Queensland's argument against conservationists [p. 77]), he also rules it out with the claim that uncertainties do not justify negligence.12 Many of the accounts of moral obligation that give rise to the unconstrained position are fused in Passmore's work, again not entirely consistently, since the different accounts exploited do not give uniform results. Thus the primary account of obligation is said to be in terms of loves though the account is never satisfactorily formulated or developed - and it is suggested that because our loves do not extend into the distant future, neither do our obligations. This sentimental account of obligation will obviously lead to different results from utilitarian accounts of obligation, which however Passmore appeals to in his discussion of wilderness. In yet other places in [1], furthermore, social contract and moral community Obligations to the Future 145 views are appealed to - see, e.g., the treatment of animals, of preservation, and of duties to nature. In the case of obligations to future people, however, Passmore does try to sketch an argument - what we call the convergence argument - that all the accounts lead in the end to the unconstrained position. As well as the convergence argument, and various uncertainty arguments to be considered later, Passmore appears to endorse several other arguments in favour of his theme that there are in practice no obligations to the distant future. In particular, he suggests that such obligations would in practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves, only to the succeeding generation. We outline three objections to this chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of constraints on individuals as opposed to whole generations, since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create individual responsibility, and which can't necessarily be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since they are non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters.13 Thirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense of disadvantages to people of the more distant future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors. Such cases can hardly be written off as 'never-never land' examples, since many cases of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overcropping. If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from the favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests. 146 R. and V. Routley Passmore tries to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self-sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation, this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more engaging in heroic self-sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm, than one is resorting to heroic self-sacrifice in refraining from beating and robbing some stranger and leaving him to starve. Passmore's most sustained argument for the unconstrained position is a convergence argument, that different analyses of obligations, including his own, lead to the one conclusion. This style of argument is hardly convincing when there are well-known accounts of obligation which do not lead to the intended conclusion, e.g. deontological accounts such as those of Kant and of modern European schools, and teleological accounts such as those of Moore (in [8]). But such unfavourable positions are either rapidly passed over or ignored in Passmore's historical treatment and narrow selection of historical figures. The style of argument becomes even less persuasive when it is discovered that the accounts of the main authorities appealed to, Bentham, Sidgwick, and Rawls,14 do not lead, without serious distortion, to the intended conclusion. Indeed Passmore has twisted the historical and textual evidence to suit his case, as we now try to indicate. Consider Bentham first. Passmore's assumption, for which no textual evidence is cited, ls is that no Benthamite calculation can take account of a future more extensive than the immediate future (cf. pp. 87-88). The assumption seems to be based simply on the fact that Bentham remarked that 'the value of the pleasure or pain to each person to be considered in any estimate will be greater or less in virtue of the following circumstances'. '3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness' ([10], p. 16). But this does nothing to show that future persons are discounted: the certainty and propinquity do not concern persons, but the utilities of the persons concerned. As regards which persons are concerned in any calculation Bentham is quite explicit, detailing how to take an exact account. . . of the general tendency of any act.. . .5 . Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process [summation of values of pleasure and of pain] with respect to each. ([10], p. 16) Obligations to the Future 147 It follows that Bentham's calculation takes account of everyone (and, in his larger scheme, every sentient creature) whose interests appear to be concerned: if the interests of people in the distant future appear to be concerned - as they are in conservation issues - they are to be included in the calculation. And there is independent evidence16 that in Bentham's view the principle of utility was not temporally restricted: 'that is useful which, taking all times and all persons into consideration, leaves a balance of happiness' ([10], pp. 17-18, our italics). Thus the future cut-off that Passmore has attributed to Bentham is contradicted by Bentham's own account. The case of Sidgwick is more complex, because there is isolated oscillation in his application of utilitarianism between use of utility and of (something like) expected utility (see [11], pp. 381,414): Sidgwick's utilitarianism is, in its general characterization, essentially that of Bentham: the conduct which . . . is objectively right is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all those whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ([11], p. 411) All includes all sentient beings, both existing and to exist, as Sidgwick goes on to explain (p. 414). In particular, in answer to the question 'How far are we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of existing human beings?' Sidgwick writes ([11], p. 414, our italics): It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings to be affected - must necessarily be more uncertain. But Passmore manages, first of all, to give a different sense to what Sidgwick is saying by adjusting the quotation, by omitting the clause we have italicized, which equalizes the degree of concern for present and future persons, and by italicizing the whole except-clause, thereby placing much greater emphasis than Sidgwick does on uncertainty. For according to Sidgwick's impartiality principle, 'the mere difference in time is not a 148 R. and V. Routley reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one -amount than to that of another' ([11], p. 381; see also p. 124). The apparent tension in Sidgwick's theory as to whether uncertainty should be taken into account is readily removed by resort to a modern distinction between values and expected values (i.e. probability weighted values); utilitarian rightness is defined as before in terms of the net happiness of all concerned over all time without mention of uncertainty or probabilities, but it is distinguished from probable rightness (given present information), in the utilitarian sense,17 which is defined in terms of the expected net happiness of those concerned, using present probabilities. It is the latter notion, of probable rightness, that practical reasoning is commonly concerned with and that decision theory studies; and it is this that Passmore supposes Sidgwick is using ([1], p. 84). But it is evident that the utilitarian determination of probable rightness, like that of rightness, will sometimes take into account the distant future - as Sidgwick's discussion of utilitarian determination of optimum population (immediately following his remark on uncertainty) does. So how does Passmore contrive to reverse matters, to have Sidgwick's position lead to his own unconstrained conclusion? The answer is: By inserting an additional assumption of his own - which Sidgwick would certainly have rejected - that the uncertainties entitle us to ignore the distant future. What Passmore has implicitly assumed in his claim ([1], p. 85) that 'utilitarian principles [such as Sidgwick's] are not strong enough' 'to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now call upon us to make' is his own thesis that 'The uncertainty of harms we are hoping to prevent would in general entitle us to ignore them.. .'. From a decision-theory viewpoint this is simply irrational18 unless the probabilities of damage are approaching zero. We will deal with the essentially sceptical uncertainty arguments on which Passmore's position depends shortly: here it is enough to observe that Sidgwick's position does not lead to anything like that which Passmore attributes to him - without uncertainty assumptions which Sidgwick would have rejected (for he thought that future people'will certainly have pleasure and suffer pain). We can also begin to gauge from Passmore's treatment of nineteenthcentury utilitarians, such as Bentham and Sidgwick, the extent of the distortion which underlies his more general historical case for the unconstrained position which, so he claims, represents accurately enough what, over the last two centuries, men have seen as their duty to posterity as a whole. . . . ([1], p. 91) Obligations to the Future 149 The treatment accorded Rawls in only marginally more satisfactory. Passmore supposes that Rawls's theory of justice leads directly to the unconstrained position ([1], p. 87 and p. 91), whereas Rawls claims ([5], p. 293) that we have obligations to future people just as to present ones. But the situation is more complicated than Rawls's claim would indicate, as we now try to explain in a summary way (more detail is given in the Appendix). For, in order to justify this claim on his theory (with its present time-of-entry interpretation), Rawls has to invoke additional and dubious motivational assumptions; even so the theory which thus results does not yield the intended conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with Rawls's claim. However, by changing the time-of-entry interpretation to an omnitemporal one, Rawls's claim does result from the theory so amended. Moreover, the amended theory also yields, by exactly Rawls's argument for a just saving rate, a resource conservation policy, and also a case against nuclear development. Accordingly Passmore's other claims regarding Rawls are mistaken, e.g. that the theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation. Rawls does not emerge unscathed either. As on the issue of whether his contract is a necessary condition for obligations, so on obligations which the contract yields to the distant future, Rawls is far from consistent. Furthermore, institutions such as qualified market and voting systems are recommended as just though from a future perspective their results are far from that. Rawls, then, does not take obligations to the future with full seriousness. In sum, it is not true that the theory of Rawls, any more than the theories of the historical figures actually discussed by Passmore, unequivocally supports the unconstrained position. III. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy Arguments Although there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible position. According to the qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant future: there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future. The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present 150 R. and V. Routley people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are disadvantaged by them. The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in most modern economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of an (opportunity cost) discount rate. The attempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionable in such an approach is that economics must operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just as in practice it operates within legal constraints, and cannot determine what those constraints are. There are, moreover, alternative economic theories and simply to adopt one which discounts the future is to beg all the questions at issue. The discounting move often has the same result as the unconstrained position; if, for instance, we consider the cancer example and consider costs as payable compensation, it is evident that, over a sufficiently long period of time, discounting at current prices would lead to the conclusion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints. In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the application of discount rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no more than about fifteen years,19 and application of such rates would simply beg the question against the interests and rights of future people. Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type the whole method of discounting is simply inapplicable, and its use would violate moral constraints.20 Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from cases of certain damage, comes from probability considerations.The distant future, it is argued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabilities are consequently lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.21 But then if we take account of probabilities in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people, except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbouring people where (much) higher probabilities obtain. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate future against a much lower Obligations to the Future 151 probability of indeterminate costs to an indeterminate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming that anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it can't be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to obtain quite doubtful or trivial benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportunity to continue unnecessarily high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted, such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. Such a cost-benefit approach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned, or for dealing with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results. For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any simple or general way from one party to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs ony ? - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted by some proponents of nuclear energy, who attempt to dismiss the costs to future people with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The transfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on by McCracken [16] in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear risk, between nuclear risks and those from cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelming extent* those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also those of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related to a person's extent of use. The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's 152 R. and V. Routley happiness sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties, and the introduction of probability considerations does not change the principles involved but merely complicates analyses. One might further object to the probability argument that probabilities involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes, and that the outcomes of some moral problems such as the bus example do not depend on a high level of probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the bus example reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important ones used by philosophers and others to argue for the position that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of separation, but frequently entangled. Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalized uncertainty argument which runs as follows: In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreliable, woolly, and highly speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. More formally and crudely: One only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information; there is no reliable information at present as regards the distant future; therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. The first argument is essentially a variation on a sceptical argument in epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace 'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and Obligations to the Future 153 the adjacent future and present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly do act on the basis of such 'unreliable' information as the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels 'uncertainty'; for scepticproof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. A good example is again the bus case. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is a significant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and the prospects of the passengers quite uncertain; the resolution of the problem is still clearly in favour of the so-called 'speculative' and 'unreliable'. But if we do not require certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require epistemic standards for the future which the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument, that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account, because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions upon it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can also be put in this way: If moral principles are, like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as 'if* has character h then x is wrong, for every (action) x', then what the argument claims is 154 R. and V. Routley that we can never obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action of the 'It is wrong to do x' type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument have to be conceded. If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the future, will not be applicable in practice for obtaining any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints on action. However, the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future is always so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point, noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of"a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in girls' names or men's footwear, or what brands of ice cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3,000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the face of the earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. For this sort of reason, the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. While it is true that there are many areas in which the morally relevant information needed is uncertain or unavailable, and in which we cannot therefore determine satisfactorily how to act, there are certainly others in Obligations to the Future 155 which uncertainty in morally relevant areas is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, seems to be of the latter sort. Here there is no gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as we can see from the bus example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the corresponding defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probable harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the things that would affect us (cf. Passmore [1]). But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are morally committed to. Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons or forever plugged into enjoyment- or other machines (Golding [12]). Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility - like the sceptic who says that the solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast 156 R. and V. Routley with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilization through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer, and the fact that this appears to be a real and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm in the example discussed above, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases, before such actions could be considered admissible, what would be required is far more than a possibility, real or not22 - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect themselves. The strategy of most of these uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, and may be brought out by looking yet again at the bus example, where the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the bus may break down and they may all change to a different bus leaving the parcel behind, or the bus may crash, killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities, of course, but there is no positive reason to believe that they are any more than that, that is they are not real possibilities. The strategy is to stress such outside possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will Obligations to the Future 157 break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners' taking account of the passengers' welfare and of the real possibility of harm from his parcel, and thereby excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints .This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty, or at least a very high probability, of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not so. An argument closely related to the uncertainty arguments is based on the non-existence and indeterminacy of the future.23 An item is indeterminate in a given respect if its properties in that respect are, as a matter of logic, not settled (nor are they settlable in a non-arbitrary fashion). The respects in which future items are indeterminate are well enough known for a few examples to serve as reminders: all the following are indeterminate: the population of Australia at 2001, its distribution, its age structure, the preferences of its members for folk music, wilderness, etc., the size and shape of Wollongong, the average number of rooms in its houses and in its office blocks, and so on. Philosophical discussion of such indeterminacy is as old as Aristotle's sea battle and as modern as truth-value gaps and fuzzy logics, and many positions have been adopted on the existence and determinacy of future items. Nevertheless theories that there are obligations to the future are not sensitive to the metaphysical position adopted concerning the existence or non-existence of the future. Any theory which denied obligations to the future on the metaphysical grounds that the future did not exist, and did not have properties, so that the present could not be related to it, would be committed to denying such obvious facts as that the present could causally influence the future, that present people could be great-grandparents of purely future people, and so on, and hence would have to be rejected on independent grounds. This is not to say that there are not important problems about the existence or non-existence of future items, problems which are perhaps most straightforwardly handled by a Meinongian position which allows that items which do not exist may have properties. The non-existence of the future 158 R. and V. Routley does raise problems for standard theories which buy the Ontological Assumption (the thesis that what does not exist does not have properties), especially given the natural (and correct) inclination to say that the future does not (now) exist; but such theories can adopt various strategies for coping with these problems (e.g. the adoption of a platonistic position according to which the future does now exist, or the allowance for certain sorts of relations between existents at different times), although the satisfactoriness of these strategies is open to question (cf. [4]). Thus whether or not the Ontological Assumption is assumed and however it is applied, it will be allowed that future items will have properties even if they do not have them now, and that is enough to provide the basis for moral concern about the future. Thus the thesis of obligations to the future does not presuppose any special metaphysical position on the existence of the future. If the non-existence of future items creates no special problems for obligations to the future, the same is not true of their indeterminacy. Whether the indeterminacy of future items is seen as a logical feature of the future which results from the non-existence of purely future items or whether one adopts a (mistaken) platonistic view of the future as existing and sees the indeterminacy as an epistemological one resulting from our inability to know the character of these entities - that is, we cannot completely know the future .though it exists and has a definite characterwhichever view we take indeterminacy still creates major difficulties for certain ethical theories and their treatment of the future. The difficulties arise for theories which appear to require a high level of determinacy with respect to the number and character of future items, in particular calculus-type theories such as utilitarianism in its usual forms, where the calculations are critically dependent on such information as numbers, totals, and averages, information which so far as the future is concerned is generally indeterminate. The fact that this numerical information is typically indeterminate means that insofar as head-count utilitarianism requires determinate information on numbers, it is in a similar position to theories discussed earlier; it may apply theoretically to future people, but since the calculations cannot be applied to them their interests will be left out of account. And, in fact, utilitarianism for the most part does not, and perhaps cannot, take future creatures and their interests seriously; there is little discussion as to how the difficulties or impossibility of calculations regarding the open future are to be obtained. Non-platonistic utilitarianism is in logical difficulty on this matter, while platonis- Obligations to the Future 159 tic utilitarianism - which faces a range of other objections - is inapplicable because of epistemic indeterminacy. We have yet another case of a theory of the sort that applies theoretically but in practice doesn't take the future seriously. But far from this showing that future people's interests should be left out of account, what these considerations show are deficiencies in these sorts of theories, which require excessive determinacy of information. This kind of information is commonly equally unavailable for the accepted areas of moral constraint, the present and immediate future; and the resolution of moral issues is often not heavily dependent on knowledge of such specific determinate features as numbers or other determinate features. For example, we do not need to know how many people there will be on the bus, how intelligent they are, what their preferences are or how badly they will be injured, in order to reach the conclusion that the consigner's action in despatching his parcel is a bad one. Furthermore, it is only the ability of moral considerations to continue to apply in the absence of determinate information about such things as numbers that makes it possible to take account of the possible effects of action, as the risks associated with action - something which is quite essential even for the present if moral considerations are to apply in the normal and accepted way. For it is essential in order to apply moral considerations in the accepted way that we consider alternative worlds, in order to take account of options, risks, and alternative outcomes; but these alternative or counterfactual worlds are not in so different a position from the future with respect to determinacy; for example, there is indeterminacy with respect to the number of people who may be harmed in the bus case or in apossible nuclear reactor melt-down. These alternative worlds, like the distant future, are indeterminate in some respects, but not totally indeterminate. It might still be thought that the indeterminacy of the future, for example with respect to number and exact character, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are indeterminate and their interests unknown, how can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, when the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by ignoring 160 R. and V. Routley such factors. Nor are such distributional problems as large and representative a class of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It should be conceded then that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult or indeed impossible to resolve - a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e.g. the bus example which is a conflict case of a type. In particular, there will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. Moreover, even where numbers are relevant often only bounds will be required, exact numerical counts only being required where, for instance, margins are narrow; e.g. issues may be resolved as in parliament where a detailed vote (or division) is only required when the issue is close. It is certainly not necessary then to have complete determinacy to resolve all cases of conflict. The question we must ask then is what features of future people could disqualify them from moral consideration or reduce their claims to it to below those of present people? The answer is: in principle None. Prima facie moral principles are universalizable, and lawlike, in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example.24 But universalizability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are capable of dealing satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e.g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup such as (white-skinned) humans, etc. The only candidates for characteristics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, uncertainty and indeterminacy; what we have argued is that it would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only present information). In particular they do not affect cases of the sort being considered, the nuclear one, where highly determinate or certain information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be harmed or certainty of damage are not required. To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is not needed: it is enough to require that the temporal position of a person Obligations to the Future 161 cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideration;25 inversely that it is without basis to discriminate morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this universalizability, there is the same obligation to future people as to the present; and thus there is the same obligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions' causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob future people of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy do not free us of these obligations. If, in a closely comparable case concerning the present, the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people. Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion tentatively reached in our first section, that proposals for nuclear development in the present state of technology for future waste disposal are immoral. IV. Overriding Consideration Arguments In the first part we noticed that the consigner's action could not be justified by purely economistic arguments, such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village would be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. We also observed that the principle on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to the nuclear case. For this reason the economistic arguments which are thus most commonly advanced to promote nuclear development - e.g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electricity utilities, and the need otherwise for uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment, investment, and consumption-do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these economistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct (and there is reason to doubt that most of them are),26 the arguments would fail because economics must operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vice versa. 162 R. and V. Routley What one does have to consider, however, are moral conflict arguments, that is arguments to the effect that, unless the prima facie unacceptable alternative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only possible outcome, and will ensue. For example, in the bus case, the consigner may argue that his action is justified because unless it is taken the village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing duties to present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternatives (or at least practical alternatives), and upon showing that the only alternatives to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument-for example, if in the bus case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living in some other way - then the argument is defective and cannot readily be patched. We want to argue that suppression of practicable alternatives has occurred in the argument, designed to show that the alternatives to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentation of false dichotomies. The first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of industrialized countries. Failure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemployment and poverty in the industrialized nations. The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the Obligations to the Future 163 diversion of great amounts of available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. 27 The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment, while politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralized entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem.28 The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of people of the third world does not, of course, mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, their rulers, the westernized and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organized; but it is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. The poverty argument then is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used to help the poor.29 Both for the third world and for the industrialized countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources,30 alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor.31 The second major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. Unless our high-technological, high-energy industrial society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out.32 . The lights-going-out argument raises rather sharply questions as to what is valuable in our society, and of what characteristics are necessary for a good society. These are questions which deserve much fuller treatment than we can allot them here, but a few brief points should be made. The argument adopts an extremely uncritical position with respect to existing high-technology societies, apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable; it also assumes that technological society is unmodifiable, that it can't be changed in the direction of energy 164 R. and V. Routley conservation or alternative energy sources without collapse. Such a society has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of energy are essential to maintain this whole. These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technological society's energy patterns are unmodifiable is especially so - after all, it has survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technological restructuring and consumption modification. If western society's demands for energy are totally unmodifiable without collapse, not only would it be committed to a programme of increasing destruction, but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would very likely, as a consequence of this destruction, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporary society. There is also difficulty with the assumption of uniform valuableness; but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain existing high-technological society and its political institutions? but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political institutions which are needed to maintain those valuable things? While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to argue that it is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably, that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence, e.g. from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. There is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical change in these directions is independently desirable, as we believe it is, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-going-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of wellbeing is required to consume less energy than at present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.33 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilization, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganza. In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high energy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy Obligations to the Future 165 is obtained by nuclear-fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralized, controlled, and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source, whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Very persuasive arguments have been advanced by civil liberties groups and others in a number of countries to suggest that such a society would tend to become authoritarian, if only as an outcome of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation.34 There are reasons to believe then that with nuclear development what we would be passing on to future generations would be some of the worst aspects of our society (e.g. the consumerism, growing concentration of power, destruction of the natural environment, and latent authoritarianism), while certain valuable aspects would be lost or threatened. Political freedom is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives which do not involve such unacceptable consequences are available. The alternative to the high technology-nuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but the development of alternative technologies and life-styles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralized nuclear option.35 The lights-going-out argument, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false dichotomy. Thus both the escape routes, the appeal to moral conflict and to the appeal to futurity, are closed. If then we apply the same standards of morality to the future as we acknowledge for the present - as we have argued we should - the conclusion that the proposal to develop nuclear energy on a large scale is a crime against the future is inevitable, since both the escape routes are closed. There are, of course, also many other grounds for ruling it out as morally unacceptable, for saying that it-is not only a crime against the distant future but also a crime against the present and immediate future. These other grounds for moral concern about nuclear energy, as it affects the present and immediate future, include problems arising from the possibility of catastrophic releases of radioactive fuel into the environment or of waste material following an accident such as reactor melt-down, of unscheduled discharges of radiation into the environment from a plant fault, of proli- 166 R. and V. Routley feration of nuclear weapons, and of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion. All these are important issues, of much moral interest. What we want to claim, however, is that on the basis of its effects on the future alone, the nuclear option is morally unacceptable. Appendix Passmore's Treatment ofRawls, and What Really Happens on Rawls's Theory Passmore takes it that Rawls's theory yields an unconstrained position but, according to Rawls, the theory leads to quite the opposite result; namely, persons in different generations [and not merely neighbouring generations] have duties and obligations to one another just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define justice between persons at different moments of time.. . . The derivation of these duties and obligations may seem at first a somewhat far-fetched application of the central doctrine. Nevertheless these requirements would be acknowledged in the original position [where the parties do not know to which generation they belong], and so the conception of justice as fairness covers these matters without any change in its basic idea. ([5], p. 293; the second insert is drawn from p. 287) Through judicious use of the veil of ignorance and the time of entry of parties to the original contract position, Rawls's contract theory, unlike simpler explicit contract theories, can yield definite obligations to distant future people,36 for example, we ought to save at a just rate for future people. But, as Rawls remarks (p. 284), 'the question of justice between generations . . . subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests'. It is doubtful that Rawls's theory as formulated passes the tests; for the theory as formulated does not yield the stated conclusion, but a conclusion inconsistent with the thesis that there are the same obligations to future people as to contemporaries. Exactly how these obligations arise from the initial agreement depends critically on the interpretation of the time of Obligations to the Future 167 entry of the parties into the agreement. Insofar as Rawls insists upon the present-time-of-entry interpretation (p. 139), he has to introduce supplementary motivational assumptions in order to (try to) secure the desired bondings between generations, in particular to ensure that the generation of the original position saves for any later generation, even their immediate successors ([5], p. 140 and p. 292). Rawls falls back on-what is as we have seen inadequate to the task, since it does not exclude one generation damaging another remote generation in a way that bypasses mutually successive generations - 'ties of sentiment between successive generations' (p. 292): to this limited extent Passmore has a point, for such a social contract on its own (without additional assumptions about the motives of the parties to the agreement) does not furnish obligations even to our immediate successors. This is indicative also of the unsatisfactory instability of Rawls's theory under changes, its sensitivity to the way the original agreement is set up, to the motivation of parties, their time of entry, what they can know, etc. To arrive at a more adequate account of obligations to the distant future under Rawls's theory, let us adopt, to avoid the additional, dubious and unsatisfactory, motivational assumptions Rawls invokes, one of the alternative - and non -equivalent - time-of-entry interpretations that Rawls lists (p. 146), that of persons alive at some time in simultaneous agreement. Let us call this, following Rawls's notation (on p. 140), interpretation 4b (it is perhaps unnecessary to assume for 4b any more than 4a that all people need be involved: it may be enough given the equivalencizing effect of the veil of ignorance that some are, and as with the particular quantifier it is quite unnecessary to be specific about numbers). Then of course the parties, since they are, for all they know, of different generations, will presumably agree on a just savings rate, and also to other just distribution principles, simply on the basis of Rawlsian rationality, i.e. advancing their own interests, without additional motivation assumptions. This more appealing omnitemporal interpretation of time of entry into the agreement, which gives a superior account of obligation to the future consistent with Rawls's claim, Rawls in some places puts down as less than best (p. 292) but in his most detailed account of the original position simply dismisses (p. 139): To conceive of the original position [as a gathering of people living at different times] would be to stretch fantasy too far; the conception would cease to be a natural guide to intuition. 168 R. and V. Rout ley This we question: it would be a better guide to intuition than a position (like 4a) which brings out intuitively wrong results; it is a more satisfactory guide, for example, to justice between generations than the present-timeof-entry interpretation, which fails conspicuously to allow for the range of potential persons (all of whom are supposed to qualify on Rawls's account for just treatment, cf. § 77). Moreover, it stretches fantasy no further than science fiction or than some earlier contract accounts.36 But it does require changes in the way the original position is conceived, and it does generate metaphysical difficulties for orthodox ontological views (though not to the same extent for the Meinongian view we prefer); for, to consider the latter, either time travel is possible or the original hypothetical position is an impossible situation, with people who live at different times assembled at the same time. The difficulties - of such an impossible meeting help to reveal that what Rawls's theory offers is but a colourful representation of obligations in terms of a contract agreed upon at a meeting. The metaphysical difficulties do not concern merely possible people, because all those involved are sometime-actual people; nor are there really serious difficulties generated by the fact that very many of these people do not exist, i.e. exist now. The more serious difficulties are either those of time travel, e.g. that future parties relocated into the present may be able to interfere with their own history, or, if time travel is ruled out logically or otherwise, that future parties may be advantaged (or disadvantaged) by their knowledge of history and technology, and that accordingly fairness is lost. As there is considerable freedom in how we choose to (re)arrange the original position, we shall suppose that time travel is rejected as a means of entering the original position. For much less than travel is required; some sort of limited communicational network which filters out, for example, all historical data (and all cultural or species dependent material) would suffice; and in any case if time travel were not excluded essentially the present-time-of-entry interpretation would serve, though fairness would again be put in doubt. The filtered communicational hook-up by which the omnitemporal position is engineered still has - if fairness is to be seen to be built into the decision making - to be combined with a reinterpreted veil of ignorance, so that parties do not know where they are located temporally any more than they know who they are characterwise. This implies, among other things, limitations on the parties' knowledge of factual matters, such as available technology and world and local history; for otherwise parties could work out their location, temporal or spatial. For example, if some party knew, as Rawls supposes, Obligations to the Future 169 the general social facts, then he would presumably be aware of the history of his time and so of where history ends, that is of the date of his generation, his time (his present), and so be aware of his temporal location. These are already problems for Rawls's so-called 'present-time-ofentry interpretation' - it is, rather, a variable-time-of-entry interpretation - given that the parties may be, as Rawls occasionally admits (e.g. p. 287), of any one generation, not necessarily the present: either they really do have to be ofthepresent time or they cannot be assumed to know as much as Rawls supposes.37 There is, however, no reason why the veil of ignorance should not be extended so as to avoid this problem; and virtually any extension that solves the problem for the variable-time-of-entry interpretation should serve, so it seems, for the omnitemporal one. We shall assume then that the parties know nothing which discloses their respective locations (i.e. in effect we write in conditions for universalizability of principles decided upon). There are still gaps between the assumptions of the omnitemporal position as roughly sketched and the desired conclusion concerning obligations to the future, but (the matter is beginning to look non-trivially provable given not widely implausible assumptions and) the intuitive arguments are as clear as those in [5], indeed they simply restate arguments to obligations given by Rawls. Rawls's theory, under interpretation 4b, admits of nice application to the problems of just distribution of material resources and of nuclear power. The just distribution, or rate of usage, of material resources38 over time is an important conservation issue to which Rawls's theory seems to apply, just as readily, and in a similar fashion, to that in which it applies to the issue of a just rate of savings. In fact the argument from the original position for a just rate of saving - whatever its adequacy - can by simply mimicked to yield an argument for just distribution of resources over generations. Thus, for example: persons in the original position are to ask themselves how much they would be willing to save [i.e. conserve] at each stage of advance on the assumption that all other generations are to save at the same rate [conserve resources to the same extent]. . . . In effect, then, they must choose a just savings principle [resources distribution principle] that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to [degree of resource conservation at] each level of advance. ([5], p. 287; our bracketed options give the alternative argument) 170 R. and V. Routley Just as 'they try to piece together a just savings schedule' (p. 289), so they can try to piece together a just resource distribution policy. Just as a case for resource conservation can be made out by appeal to the original position, since it is going to be against the interests of, to the disadvantage of, later parties to find themselves in a resource depleted situation (thus, on Rawlsian assumptions, they will bargain hard for a share of resources), so, interestingly, a case against a rapid programme of nuclear power development can be devised. The basis of a case against large-scale nuclear development is implicit in Rawls's contract theory under interpretation 4b, though naturally the theory is not applied in this sort of way by Rawls. To state the case in its crude but powerful form: people from later generations in the original position are bound to take it as against their interests to simply carry the waste can for energy consumed by an earlier generation. (We have already argued that they will find no convincing overriding considerations that make it worth their while to carry the waste can.) Thus not only has Passmore misrepresented the obligations to the future that Rawls's theory admits; he is also wrong in suggesting (p. 87 and p. 91) that Rawls's theory cannot justify a policy of resource conservation which includes reductions in present consumption. There is, in this connection, an accumulation of errors in Passmore, some of which spill over to Rawls, which it is worth trying to set out. First, Passmore claims ([1], p. 86; cf. also p. 90) that 'Rawls does not so much mention the saving of natural resources'. In fact the 'husbanding of natural resources' is very briefly considered ([5], p. 271). It is true, however, that Rawls does not reveal any of the considerable power that his theory, properly interpreted, has for natural resource conservation, as implying a just distribution of natural resources over time. Secondly, Passmore attempts ([1], pp. 87 ff.) to represent the calls of conservationists for a reduction in present resource usage and for a more just distribution as a call for heroic self-sacrifices; this is part of his more general attempt to represent every moral constraint with respect to the non-immediate future as a matter of self-sacrifice. 'Rawls's theory', Passmore says (on p. 87), 'leaves no room for heroic sacrifice', and so, he infers, leaves no room for conservation. Not only is the conclusion false, but the premiss also: Rawls's theory allows for supererogation, as Rawls explains ([5], p. 117). But resource conservation is, like refraining from nuclear development, not a question of heroic self-sacrifice; it is in part a question of obligations or duties to the distant future. And Rawls's theory allows not only for obligations as well as supererogation, but also for natural duties. Rawls's Obligations to the Future 171 contract, unlike the contracts of what is usually meant by a 'contract theory', is by no means exhaustive of the moral sphere: But even this wider [contract] theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves towards,animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put them aside, (p. 17) The important class of obligations beyond the scope of the contract theory surely generates obligations between persons which even the wider contract theory likewise cannot explain. The upshot is that such a contract account, even if sufficient for the determination of obligations, is not necessary. To this extent Rawls' s theory is not a full social contract theory at all. However, Rawls appears to lose sight of the fact that his contract theory delivers only a sufficient condition when he claims, for example (p. 298), that 'one feature of the contract doctrine is that it places an upper bound on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of later generations'. For greater savings may sometimes be required to meet obligations beyond those that the contract doctrine delivers. In short, Rawls appears to have slipped into assuming, inconsistently, that his contract theory is a necessary condition. Although Rawls's theory caters for justice between generations and allows the derivation of important obligations to people in the distant future, the full theory is far from consistent on these matters and there are significant respects in which Rawls does not take justice to the future seriously. The most conspicuous symptoms of this are that justice to the future is reduced to a special case, justice between generations, and that the only aspect of justice between generations that Rawls actually considers is a just savings rate; there is, for example, no proper examination of the just distribution of resources among generations, though these resources, Rawls believes, provide the material base of the just institutions that he wants to see maintained. In fact Rawls strongly recommends a system of markets as a just means for the allocation of most goods and services, recognizing their well-known limitations only in the usual perfunctory fashion ([5], pp. 270 ff.). Yet market systems are limited by a narrow time horizon, and are quite ill-equipped to allocate resources in a just fashion 172 R. and V. Rout ley over a time span of several generations. Similarly Rawls's endorsement of democratic voting procedures as in many cases a just method of determining procedures depends upon the assumptions that everyone with ah interest is represented. But given his own assumptions about obligations to the future and in respect of potential persons this is evidently not the case. Catering in a just fashion for the interests of future people poses serious problems for any method of decision that depends upon people being present to represent their own interests. Some of the more conservative, indeed reactionary, economic assumptions in Rawls emerge with the assumption that all that is required for justice between generations is a just savings rate, that all we need to pass on to the future are the things that guarantee appropriate savings such as capital, factories, and machines. But the transmission of these things is quite insufficient for justice to the future, and neither necessary nor sufficient as a foundation for a good life for future generations. What is required for justice is the transmission in due measure of what is valuable. Rawls has, however, taken value accumulation as capital accumulation, thereby importing one of the grossest economic assumptions, that capital reflects value. But of course the accumulation of capital may conflict with the preservation of what is valuable. It is for this sort of reason (and thus, in essence, because of the introduction of supplementary economistic theses which are not part of the pure contract theory) that Rawls's theory is a reactionary one from an environmental point of view; on the theory as presented (i.e. the contract theory plus all the supplementary assumptions) there is no need to preserve such things as wilderness or natural beauty. The savings doctrine supposes that everything of value for transmission to the future is negotiable in the market or tradeable; but then transmission of savings can by no means guarantee that some valuable things, not properly represented in market systems, are not eliminated or not passed on, thereby making future people worse off. It becomes evident in this way, too, how culturally-bound Rawls's idea of ensuring justice to future generations through savings is. It is not just that the idea does not apply, without a complete overhaul, to non-industrial societies such as those of hunter-gatherers; it does not apply to genuinely post-industrial societies either. Consideration of such alternative societies suggests that whafis required, in place of capital accumulation, is that we pass on what is necessary for a good life, that we ensure that the basics are fairly distributed over time and not eroded, e.g. that in the case of the forest people that the forest is maintained. The narrowness of Rawls's picture, Obligations to the Future 173 which makes no due allowance for social or cultural diversity (from the original contractual position on) or for individual diversity arises in part from his underlying and especially narrow socio-economic assumption as to what people want: What men want is meaningful work in free association with others, these associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just basic institutions. ([5], p. 290) This may be what many Harvard men want; but as a statement of what men want it supplies neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions.39 NOTES 1 Thus according to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110; our italics). There is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. . . . Permanent disposal of high-level solid wastes in stable geological formations is regarded as the most likely solution, but has yet to be demonstrated as feasible. It is not certain that such methods and disposal sites will entirely prevent radioactive releases following disturbances caused by natural processes or human activity. The Fox Report also quoted approvingly ([2], p. 187; our italics) the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report [6]: There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exist s to ensure the safe containment of long-lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future. Although the absence of a satisfactory storage method has been conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development, e.g. Weinberg ([3], pp. 32-33), it is now disputed by others. In particular, the headline for Cohen [15], which reads 'A substantial body of evidence indicates that the high level radioactive wastes generated by U.S. nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geological formations', has suggested to many readers - what it was no doubt intended to suggest- that there is really no problem about the disposal of radioactive wastes after all. Cohen presents, however, no new hard evidence, no evidence not already available to the British and Australian Commissions ([2] and [6]). Moreover the evidence Cohen does outline fails conspicuously to measure up to the standards rightly required by the Flowers and Fox Reports. Does Cohen offer a commercial-scale procedure for waste disposal which can be demonstrated as safe? Far from it: 174 R. and V. Routley The detailed procedures for handling the high-level wastes are not yet definite, but present indications are that. . . . (Cohen [1], p. 24; our italics) Does Cohen 'demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt' the long-term safety of burial of wastes, deep underground? Again, far from it: On the face of it such an approach appears to be reasonably safe. . . . (p. 24; our italics) Cohen has apparently not realized what is required. At issue here are not so much scientific or empirical issues as questions of methodology, of standards of evidence required for claims of safety, and above all, of values, since claims of safety, for example, involve implicit evaluations concerning what counts as an acceptable risk, an admissible cost, etc. In the headline 'a substantial body of evidence . . . indicates that. . . wastes . . . can be stored satisfactorily' the key words (italicized) are evaluative or elastic, and the strategy of Cohen's case is to adopt very low standards for their application. But in view of what is at stake it is hardly acceptable to do this, to dress up in this way what are essentially optimistic assurances and untested speculations about storage, which in any case do little to meet the difficulties and uncertainties that have been widely pointed out as regards precisely the storage proposals Cohen outlines, namely human or natural interference or disturbance. 2 See [18], pp. 24-25. 3 On all these points, see [14], esp. p. 141. According to the Fox Report ([2], p. 110): Parts of the reactor structure will be highly radioactive and their disposal could be very difficult. There is at present no experience of dismantling a full size reactor. 4 See, in particular, The Union of Concerned Scientists, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Friends of the Earth Energy Paper, San Francisco 1973, p. 47; also [3], p. 32 and [14], p. 149. 5 As the discussion in [14], pp. 153-7, explains. 6 Cf. [17], pp. 35-36, [18] and, for much detail, J. R. Goffman and A. R. Tamplin, Poisoned Power, Rodale Press, Emmau Pa. 1971. 7 On the pollution and waste disposal record of the infant nuclear industry, see [14] and [17]. The record of many countries on pollution control, where in many cases available technologies for reducing or removing pollution are not applied because they are considered too expensive or because they adversely affect the interests of some powerful group, provides clear historical evidence that the problem of nuclear waste disposal would not end simply with the devising of a 'safe' technology for disposal, even if one could be devised which provided a sufficient guarantee of safety and was commercially feasible. The fact that present economic and political arrangements are overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the interests and concerns of (some) contemporary humans makes it not unrealistic to expect the long-term nuclear waste disposal, if it involved any significant cost at all, when public concern about the issue died down, would be seen to conflict with the interests of contemporary groups, and that these latter interests would in many cases be favoured. Nor, as the history of movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament shows, could generalized public concern in the absence of direct personal interest, be relied upon to be sustained for long enough to ensure implementation of costly or troublesome long-term disposal methods - even in those places where public concern exists and is a politically significant force. It must be stressed then that the problem is not merely one of disposal technique. Historical and other evidence points to the conclusion that many of the most important risks associated with nuclear waste disposal are not of the kind which might be amenable Obligations to the Future 175 to technical solutions in the laboratory. A realistic assessment of potential costs to the future from nuclear development cannot overlook these important non-technical risk factors. 8 Of course the effect on people is not the only factor which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a moral judgment. Nuclear radiation, unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life. But since the harm nuclear development is likely to cause to non-human life can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the conventional way. 9 Proponents of nuclear power often try to give the impression that future people will not just bear costs from nuclear development but will also be beneficiaries, because nuclear powerprovides an 'abundant' or even 'unlimited' source of energy; thus Weinberg ([3], p. 34): 'an all but infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy'. A good example of an attempt to create the impression that 'abundant' and 'cheap' energy from nuclear fission will be available to 'our descendants', i.e. all future people, is found in the last paragraph of Cohen [15]. Such claims are most misleading, since fission power even with the breeder reactor has only about the same prospective lifetime as coal-produced electricity (a point that can be derived using data in A. Parker, 'World Energy Resources: A Survey', Energy Policy, Vol. 3 [1975], pp. 58-66), and it is quite illegitimate to assume that nuclear fusion, for which there are still major unsolved problems, will have a viable, clean technology by the time fission runs out, or, for that matter, that it ever will. Thus while some few generations of the immediate future may obtain some benefits as well as costs, there is a very substantial chance that tho se of the more distant future will obtain nothing but costs. 10 These feelings, of which Smith's and Hume's sympathy is representative, are but the feeling echoes of obligation. At most, sympathy explains the feeling of obligation or lack of it, and this provides little guide as to whether there is an obligation or not - unless one interprets moral sympathy, the feeling of having a obligation, or being obligated, itself as a sufficient indication of obligation, in which case moral sympathy is a non-explanatory correlate in the feelings department of obligation itself and cannot be truly explanatory of the ground of it; unless, in short, moral sympathy reduces to an emotive rewrite of moral obligation. 11 Elsewhere in [1] Passmore is especially exercised that our institutions and intellectual traditions - presumably only the better ones - should be passed on to posterity, and that we should strive to make the world a better place, if not eventually an ideal one. 12 This is not the only philosophically important issue in environmental ethics on which Passmore is inconsistent. Consider his: 'over-arching intention: to consider whether the solution of ecological problems demands a moral or metaphysical revolution' (p. x), whether the West needs a new ethic and a new metaphysics. Passmore's answer in [1] is an emphatic No. Only insofar as Western moralists have [made various erroneous suggestions] can the West plausibly be said to need a 'new ethic'. What it needs, for the most part, is not so much a 'new ethic' as adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic. For the major sources of our ecological disasters - apart from ignorance - are greed and shortsightedness, which amount to much the same thing. . . There is no novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much. (p. 187) 'The view that the West now needs. . . a new concept of nature' is similarly dismissed (p. 186, cf. p. 72). But in his paper [1*] (i.e. 'Attitudes to Nature', Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 8, Macmillan, London 1975), which is said to be an attempt to bring together and to reformulate some of the basic philosophical themes of [1], Passmore's answer is Yes, and quite different themes, inconsistent with those of [1], are advanced: 176 R. and V. Routley [T]he general conditions I have laid down . . . have not been satisfied in most of the traditional philosophies of nature. To that degree it is true, I think, that we do need a 'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric. . . . A 'new metaphysics', if it is not to falsify the facts, will have to be naturalistic, but not reductionist. The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy. ([1*], pp. 260-1) A new ethic accompanies this new metaphysics. The emergence of new moral attitudes to nature is bound up, then, with the emergence of a more realistic philosophy of nature. That is the only adequate foundation for effective ecological concern. ([1*], p. 264) This is a far cry from the theme of [1] that ecological problems can be solved within the traditions of the West. 13 Put differently, the causal linkage can bypass intermediate generations, especially given action at a temporal distance: the chain account implies that there are no moral constraints in initiating such causal linkages. The chain picture accordingly seems to presuppose an unsatisfactory Humean model of causation, demanding contiguity and excluding action at a distance. 14 Golding we shall concede to Passmore, though even here the case is not clearcut. For Golding writes towards the end of his article ([12], p. 96): My discussion, until this point, has proceeded on the view that we have obligations to future generations. But do we? I am not sure that the question can be answered in the affirmative with any certainty. I shall conclude this note with a very brief discussion of some of the difficulties. All of Passmore's material on Golding is drawn from this latter and, as Golding says, 'speculative' discussion. 15 There is no textual citation for Bentham at all for the chapter of [1] concerned, viz. Ch. 4, 'Conservation'. 16 As Passmore himself at first concedes ([1], p. 84): If, as Bentham tells us, in deciding how to act men ought to take account of the effects of their actions on every sentient being, they obviously ought to take account of the pleasure and pains of the as yet unborn. 17 Neither rightness nor probable lightness in the hedonistic senses correspond to these notions in the ordinary sense; so at least [13] argues, following much anti-utilitarian literature. 18 On this irrationality different theories agree: the rational procedure, for example according to the minimax rule for decision-making under uncertainty, is to minimize that outcome which maximizes harm. 19 Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market (cf. P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York 1967, p. 351). Thus the rates have little moral relevance. 20 Cf. Rawls [5], p. 287: 'From a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting future well-being on the basis of pure time preference.' 21 What the probabilities would be depends on the theory of probability adopted: a Carnapian theory, e.g., would lead back to the unconstrained position. Obligations to the Future 177 22 A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with mere logical possibility. 23 Thus, to take a simple special case, economists dismiss distant future people from their assessments of utility, welfare, etc., on the basis of their non-existence; cf. Ng ('the utility of a non-existent person is zero') and Harsanyi ('only existing people [not even "nonexisting potential individuals"] can have real utility levels since they are the only ones able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects with a negative utility, and feel indifferent to objects with zero utility') (see Appendix B of Y. K. Ng, 'Preference, Welfare, and Social Welfare', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977, pp. 24, 26-27). Non-existent people have no experiences, no preferences; distant future people do not exist; therefore distant future people have no utility assignments - so the sorites goes. But future people at least will have wants, preferences, and so on, and these have to be taken into account in adequate utility assessments (which should be assessed over afuture time horizon), no matter how much it may complicate or defeat calculations. 24 There are problems about formulating universalizability satisfactorily, but they hardly affect the point. The requisite universalizability can in fact be satisfactorily brought out from the semantical analysis of deontic notions such as obligation, and indeed argued for on the basis of such an analysis which is universal in form. The lawlikeness requirement, which can be similarly defended, is essentially that imposed on genuine scientific laws by logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap and Hempel), that such laws should contain no proper names or the like, no reference to specific locations or times. 25 Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick [11], p. 414), and in a range of contract and other theories from Kant and Rousseau toRawls ([5], p. 293). How the principle is argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlying theory; and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particular ethical theories. 26 See esp. R. Lanoue, NuclearPlants:The MoreTheyBuild, The More You Pay, Centerfor Study of Responsive Law, Washington DC 1976; also [14], pp. 212 ff. 27 On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy, Environmentalists for Full Employment, Washington DC 1977, pp. 1-7, and also the details supplied in substantiating the interesting case of Commoner [7]. On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23. On the employment issues, see too H. E. Daly in [9], p. 149. A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich, Energy and Equality, Calder & Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly the opposite of what the poor need. 28 For much more detail on the inappropriateness see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, Blond & Briggs, London 1973. As to the capital and other requirements, see [2], p. 48, and also [7] and [9]. For an illuminating look at the sort of development high-energy technology will tend to promote in the so-called underdeveloped countries, see the paper of Waiko and other papers in the Melanesian Environment (ed. by J. H. Winslow), Australian National University Press, Canberra 1977. 29 This fact is implicitly recognized in [2], p. 56. 30 A useful survey is given in A. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken, Friends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October 1976); see also [17], [6], [7], [14], pp. 233 ff., and Schumacher, op. cit. 31 This is also explained in [2], p. 56. 32 An argument like this is suggested in Passmore [1], Chs. 4 and 7, with respect to the question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the overriding importance of passing on contemporary culture is underpinned by what appears to be a future- 178 R. and V. Routley directed ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed be fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good intervention is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care of the present and immediate future. The argument has all the defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others. 33 See [14], p. 66, p. 191, and also [7]. 34 For such arguments see esp. M. Flood and R. Grove-White, Nuclear Prospects. A Comment on the Individual, the State and Nuclear Power, Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties, London 1976. 35 For a recent sketch of one such alternative which is outside the framework of the conventional option of centralized bureaucratic socialism, see E. Callenbach's novel, Ecotopia, Banyan Tree Books, Berkeley, California 1975. For the outline of a liberation socialist alternative see Radical Technology (ed. by G. Boyle and P. Harper), Undercurrents Limited, London 1976, and references therein. 36 Some earlier contract theories also did. Burke's contract (in E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Dent, London 1910, pp. 93-94) 'becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are not yet born'. Thus Burke's contract certainly appears to lead to obligations to distant future generations. Needless to say, there are metaphysical difficulties, which however Burke never considers, about contracts between parties at widely separated temporal locations. 37 Several of the preceding points we owe to M. W. Jackson. 38 Resources such as soil fertility and petroleum could even be a primary social goods on Rawls's very hazy general account of these goods ([5], pp. 62, 97): are these 'something a rational man wants whatever else he wants'? The primary social goods should presumably be those which are necessary for the good and just life -which will however vary with culture. 39 We have benefited from discussion with Ian Hughes and Frank Muller and useful comments on the paper from Brian Martin and Derek Browne. REFERENCES [1] J. Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London 1974. [2] Ranger Uranium Environmental Inquiry First Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1977. [3] A. M. Weinberg, 'Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy", Science, Vol. 177 (July 1972), pp. 27-34. • [4] R. Routley, 'Exploring Meinong's Jungle II. Existence is Existence Now', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (to appear). [5] J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971. [6] Nuclear Power and the Environment. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London 1976. [7] B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power, Knopf, New York 1976. [8] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1903. [9] B. Commoner, H. Boksenbaum and M. Corr (Eds.), Energy and Human Welfare - A Critical Analysis, Vol. III, Macmillan, New York 1975. Obligations to the Future 179 [10] J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, published under the superintendence of J. Bowring, with an intro. by J. H. Burton; William Tait, Edinburgh 1843. [11] H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan, London 1962 (reissue). [12] M. P. Golding, 'Obligations to Future Generations', Monist, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 85-99. [13] R. and V. Routley, 'An Expensive Repair Kit for Utilitarianism', presented at the Colloquium on Preference, Choice and Value Theory, RSSS, Australian National University, August 1977. [14] R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, Outback Press, Melbourne 1977. [15] B. L. Cohen, 'The Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from Fission Reactors', Scientific American, Vol. 236 (June 1977), pp. 22-31. [16] S. McCracken, 'The Waragainst the Atom' .Commentary (September 1977), pp. 33-47. [17] A. B. Lovins and J. H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy, Friends of the Earth International, San Francisco 1975. [18] A. Roberts, "The Politics of Nuclear Power', Arena, No. 41 (1976), pp. 22-47.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource c.1979 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Manuscript https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ed8352051a1e549600f0284f6200d6d0.pdf fd3cb0d6d36d314a2139ba942ebcae87 PDF Text Text RICHARD ROUTLEY metaphysical fallout from nuclear predicament the string of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically oriented works on nuclear war ’ The series is important for its deeper penetration mto the main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels; m this, the series contrasts with the superficialities of much of the political commentary. The most widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoudbtedly that of the slightest of the ’prophets&dquo;, A Schell’s The Fate of the Earth. This skillful piece of mediasome of the apparently Anders So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often be considered together. To criticize their assumptions is not of course to belittle their work. In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect m shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. philosophy unncannily redeploys deep phenomenological themes of Some of it is simply rubbish- to take one example, consider the claim that &dquo;without ... a worldwide program of action for preserving the [human] species, .. nothing else that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ...&dquo; (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues they do not cease to be so when compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges elsewhere, e g �p.130). And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected, however, because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: S 1. Nuclear war will eliminate I~fe, human life at least, (the extinction assumption) and on earth S2. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of mortality and values, but those of time and space for example, make no sense: or, to put it mto a more sympathefic philosophical form, these notions depend for their sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).22 of S2 which gave Anders’ and Schell’s works of their apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 It is applications some S1.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, to do good end evil, and to go on making sense! depend essentially on Granted, assumption S1 by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as the technological means appear available to make it true (to render Homo Sapiens extinct).4 Granted, the prospect of large-scale nuclear war does threaten leading is centers of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so, S1 unlikely m the light of present-admittedly inadequate-information Even m Canada, which lies on the polar appears route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). Schell’s argument to S1 is extremely flimsy. It de- pends, for example, 20 on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in the USA, or at least, to be more char~table, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, e , its entire human population will be eliminated in a nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in the ultraviolet radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North to South A factually superior study of nuclear �produced at about the same time as Schell’s, by and others, indicates that part of the Southern Hemisphere, such as New Zealand and southern latitudes of Latin Amenca, could escape relatively unscathed from even the most massive northern exchanges. disaster Preddy Doomsday prophets may appear to have gained new purchase through recent (if belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the extinction assumpt~on.55 On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example in many southern mid-latitude coastal regions outside zones of radiation fallout More generally, life will go on, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set, in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible Thus both Anders and Schell insist upon the &dquo;impossibility of unlearning&dquo; the means of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Damken’s theory of an earlier &dquo;h~gh&dquo; technology). In virtue of S2, they would, however, exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion no longer made sense. But what they again want to suggest with the i m possibility-of -u n learning message is the inevitability of the development and eventual use of the technology-as if having learned the means all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. Certainly such views have been advanced6, but they are not tenable There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalizations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, notably that they do not allow Even if this were true just of nuclear 11 experiment it is certainly not of smaller weapons-it weapons-and would not rebut the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell &dquo; 21 �hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere with observers and those outside the &dquo;laboratories.&dquo; Again they have latched onto major prints, m particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large-scale nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects, such as fireballs or firestorms, or changes m coupled atmospheric circulation and radiation fields. Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical in character. Nontheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of S1, and so undermine applications of S2. The penetration of human chauvinism, as thing peculiar to Schell and Anders, but is m S2, a product of West- is not some- philosophy, European philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders version of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p. 252ff.). It has also deeply penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of Wittgenstein’s ern work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are the alleged implications of extinction : but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are m no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. As with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingents ones: very many propositions about the world do not depend upon in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. _ 22 In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly powerful and obnoxious Kantian form. Thoughts and propositions, time and tenses, history and memories, values and morality all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings-past or future or merely potential humans are not enough. Thus, according to Schell (p 140, e.g), &dquo; . the thought ’Humanity is now extinct’ is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not In imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the stream of human tame....&dquo; The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later rational creature may well be able to have it truly. Schell erroneously denies that: there is no &dquo;later&dquo; &dquo;outside the human tenses of past, present, and future ... &dquo; (p 140) .7 Human extinction eliminates &dquo;the creature that divides time into past, present and �future&dquo; annihilation cannot &dquo;come to pass&dquo; (p.143). But it false that the tenses are human: the tenses depend simply on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). Annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans m the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. so is Anders’ argument for the demise of time, that &dquo;what has been will no longer be even what has been,&dquo; is also explicitly (and narrowly) verificatiomst: &dquo;for what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, if there is no one to remember the things that have been (AA p.245). There would still remain many sorts of differences; for one, the history recorded m many other organisms would be different Temporal themes do not lack wlegitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone&dquo;; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, m particular, verificationism and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties m talking about what does not exist Thus, for example, Schell takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom ’nt is mdeed impossible to imagine our own death: and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are m fact still present as spectators&dquo; (p 138) The second clause goes a good distance towards refuting the first In fact there is no great difficulty in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both of Freud’s claims. The same goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: &dquo; . the simple and basic fact (sic!) that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing, there must be life.&dquo; human life (p.171 ) These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have been exposed and criticized elsewhere, e.g , HC). Here, as other will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so forth But it is already gomg too far to sug- Naturally 23 many things �gest, as no Anders does, that there will accordingly be &dquo;no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, sacrifice, no image, no song...&dquo; For there are, and may thought, no continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs... Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been &dquo;all in vain,&dquo; meaningless, and already so to say dead The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not worthwhile.9 Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions S1 and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both. &dquo;The death of mankind,&dquo; under S1 , is reckoned a &dquo;second death,&dquo; because by S2 and S1 remamng life is rendered meaningless and already ’ seems to be dead (AA p.244, S p 166) and is already overhung with death&dquo; (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a person faces &dquo;a second death,&dquo; not merely one’s own but m addition that greater death of the species and all future generations (S p 166. p.1 15). However, even if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated, because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. From S1 , together with the minor principle that the extinction absolute does not differ m degree, comes the unibeing versality of peril theme that &dquo;we are all exposed to peril m the same degree,&dquo; which is accordingly &dquo;d~sgmsed~ and &dquo;difficult to recognize,&dquo; because there is no contrast (AE p 64; S p.150). This theme falls with S1. In any event, not all peoples are equally imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. an Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, a pernicious theme which Schell (m contrast to Anders) repeatedly filtrates. This is the Pogo theme, according to whichS3. co, 24 in- Responsibility for the present nuclear predIcament (flasreally) dlstnbutes onto everybody, It belongs to every hu- man lií the world ’o ...i �But there is also, mixed in, a weaker, more plausible claim that gives the lie to the stronger one, namely, that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared) An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme’ runs as follows: &dquo;... the world’s political leaders though they now menace the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies&dquo; (pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated elsewhere: &dquo;... we are the authors of that distinction (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of the non-nucleararmed world it is true only m the negative sense that they fail to try to do anything about the danger)&dquo; (p.152). But this is ... of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points: &dquo;... we are all potential mass killers. The moral cost of more nuclear armaments is that it makes all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions&dquo; (p 152) And again [at] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message .. that life not only is not sacred but it is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for everyone to be killed&dquo; (p 153) Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as is possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor does the responsibilityor the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone-fall on those who have done less. Responsibility for decisions taken in &dquo;literal democracies&dquo; even by representatives (m the unlikely event of this happening m the case of anything as important as defense) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterized package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only m the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to everyone in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible, namely, that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. 25 When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from �the accompanyng themes, part of what results along the right lines: namely, is decidedly S4 The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear mstltutlons. The sovereign system Is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8) Yet S4 forms part of Schell’s critique of the state which is, by and large, scattered and fragmentary. Schell arrives at the conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new political institutions more &dquo;consonant with the global reality&dquo; are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives. 12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control Solutions to the nuclear arms dilemma come, if not easily, m a similar simplistic way, from Top Down: those who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope m treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and m world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and especially p 227, bottom paragraph) Given the record of these organizations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-mdustrial organization and ways of life. 26 But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere. 13 The roots of the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies Both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial feature is the drive for power and domination (and, often, the accompanyng privilege). 14 Thus the push for [nuclear] superiority by the super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented science and technology, which involves and enables domination,in several interrelated forms The main �the large nation-state, where enough surplus be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and power-base product can is energy. 15 In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the proof nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downspect the main power-base, the nation-state: it is also imporgrade tant to alter key components of the state, and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded m all these social and political arrangements, namely, patterns of domination-patterns manifested not only in state political organization, but in white-coloured relations, male-female relations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations-to remove, m short, chauvinistic relations. However, not everything needs to be accomplished at once: the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately There the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between &dquo;raison d’etat&dquo; and the Socratic-Christian ethics The teaching that &dquo;the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort&dquo; (p 134). So &dquo;states may do virtually anything whatever m the name of [their] survival.&dquo; Schell then argues, however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under S1 ) ends could remain, for instance, for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The end-means argument can, however, be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is claimed that extinction 27 nullifies end-means justification by frustrating the realization of every relevant end-meaning by &dquo;relevant,&dquo; in this context, those ends the realization of which the state appeals to m justification of its nuclear policies. 16 A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realization of relevant state ends So even from an expediency perspective, super-state policies are open to severe criticism, for example, as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. �As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty m war, Schell leaves us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and power to go to war m defense or pursuit of its interests (p 187) War arises from how things are, from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states (p.188). Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people to organize for war. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the macro-state system is entrenched, it is, however, easy for conservatives (m particular) to argue from the &dquo;realties&dquo; of international life, which includes self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred. It is on this basis that peace arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell’s further theme that nuclear war is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state: for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterization of war as &dquo;a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end&dquo; (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is correct is that nuclear wars are very different from previous conventional (cf. WP). Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end which nuclear &dquo;war&dquo; does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games are won). It is also claimed that war depends on weakness, on one side being defeated on a decision by arms. But in a nuclear &dquo;war&dquo; this doesn’t happen, &dquo;no one’s strength fails until both sides have been annihilated&dquo; (p.190). But what these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell’s argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined &dquo;conventional&dquo; wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court has been removed (pp 192-193). The theme depends on a pair of mistaken propositions: that conwars 28 �cerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea that war of some sort has to be the final &dquo;court of appeal&dquo; between nations (for there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda) The theme also imports the social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the &dquo;log~c of war&dquo; theme) that war has to proceed to the technological limit-as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognized social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), and ruleless activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organizations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a 29 logic. Much capital has been made not merely from the logic of war&dquo; but from what is now called &dquo;the logic of deterrence&dquo; and the &dquo;logic of nuclear [strategic] planning.&dquo; The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound, rational. However, this represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There are logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planting; but they do not yeld specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically. There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not: but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency 17 . For the most part, however, &dquo;logic of&dquo; tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like &dquo;reasomng and rational considerations entering into the policy or strategy of.&dquo; In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term &dquo;logic of,&dquo; should write of &dquo;the illogic of deterrence,&dquo; for he emphasizes its unreasonableness. For instance, he stresses (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using them should the threat fail- 18 yet the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat of this unjustifiable and irrational use. Indeed Schell wants to go still further and locate a contradiction in deterrence (e g. pp.2012) ; but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,’9 along with the assumption �that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. The Australian National University NOTES *This is a revised version of "Appendix 1 On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders" of my monograph referred to as WP, where several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed References are by way of authors names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows 1 The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets. where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled but the total annihilation removes that all- important opportunity 2 A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ of S2 is made in Foley JS remarkably similar versions 3 Should S2 appeal, as it may. to suitable communities of humans. S1 will require reformulation in similar terms, and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals 4. Thus the Last Person environmental ethics (as HC for instance, the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics. at a deeper metaphysical level The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s box. explams), is no argument, important in longer merely hypothetical, awaiting, Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora’s box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive 30 exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios. with heavy targeting in particular of Southern Hemisphere sites (including internationally-recognized nuclear-free zones). �5 Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much The most intrepid of these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case circumstances, "the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded" (p 1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, "it seems unlikely Homo sapiens would be forced to extinction immediately," and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated In many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern midlatitudes very much milder forms in equivalent Southern latitudes For example, temperatures for regions with maritime climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps negligibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p 1287 case 29, and p 1286) Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes. such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity. after 100 days (cf the data in Benton and Partridge) particular, are reflected in No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many heads of states and strategists have an interest in minimizing them And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn For Crutzen (p 59) is right that "analysis of the environmental effects of a global thermonuclear war remain uncertain because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] The environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere," again among other things Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational The way to err is clear 6 Not worth, military merely by technological determinists of Marxist persuasion Hackformer US general, argues by straight induction that if the US a has a weapon it will use it appalling theme that humans create past, present and repeated elsewhere, e.g . p 173. 7 The 8 For a detailed refutation of these assumptions, is here (AA pp perseverance, criticized 9 Anders see future (etc ) is JB 244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from in detail in Routley and Griffin interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no responsible. the whole thing is out of control The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15) More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political 10 An one is in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear going, which enable responsibility to be distributed The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility. include the military weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf Barnaby) Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes The argument is flawed at its final stage For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests Thus. though there is no doubt some "lack of control," political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control control, but for reasons, things 31 11 Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows "The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or �sensible, nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan In certain circumstances to commit (p 185) Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan," but an unintended consequence, and most of us have little or no role in the planning : enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further "the world chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons" (p 194) the world? This connects the course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e g , for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation, and against socialism 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP8, where too the the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated case against explanation is elaborated in Foley, some of the themes are straightforwardly in Martin The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164 13 Anders’ presented more These motivating drives form a part of a larger integrated package. comprising maximization drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, enfor the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) ergy, speed, satisfaction, virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction. for instance, or utility And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but also as rational, which again it is not) Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximization of a suitable mix of these virtues 14 Maximization of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes The maximization of self-interest (individual or national) runs into Newcomb’s paradox and special cases of it such as Prisoner’s Dilemma situations The maximization of power, as symbolized in the Christian-Islamic God. encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel maximization of knowledge, paradoxes of omniscience. There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be the epitome of rationality. also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel s theorem and associated limitative theorems) 15 R & D, drives the though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also arms race Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral science 32 There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’sparallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix) It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-control machine, but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control But the technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists, it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not �of the nuclear age were not inevitable. but dechosen certain liberately by components of the large nation-states And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with The fashionable inevitability determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies They also admit of being made to look ridiculous If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined That is. the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation 1 Damaging technologies 16 This reformulation main 17 qualification can proposed by N Griffin, who suggested that the be inferred from Schell’s context was the usual game theory setting sees to this almost autothen assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her matically, own advantage Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that "the logic of deterrence" is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions Selecting for it is 18 Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been contested, e.g., it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p 204), namely, not a future retributive one, but an ideological one eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered for the conjectured targeting of Latin America 19 An appears confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration thinking, where US missiles are supposed incoming USSR missiles analogous in recent US "star-war" to " negate" Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction For although inupon perhaps questionable interconnections of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP 5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without, however. intending to proceed to war. though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number This paradox is technically removed&mdash;how satisfactorily is another matter&mdash; by a distinction between long-term aims and immediate practice, a timehonoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions volving negation, they depend REFERENCES 33 G Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C H Beck. Munchen, 1956, referred to as AA. �G Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende: Gendanken tion, C H Beck, Munchen, 1972, referred to as AE F. Barnaby, "Will there be a Nuclear War," in zur atomaren Situa- Australia and Nuclear War, (ed M Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37. I J Benton and G W Partridge,"’Twilight at Noon Overstated," Ambio 13 (1984) 49-51 B. Commoner, The New York, 1972 Closing Circle: Nature, PJ Crutzen, "Darkness after a Man and Technology, Knopf, Nuclear War," Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed ), Australia and Nuclear War Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P R Erlich and others, "Long-term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," Science 222 (1983) 1293-1300 Jonathan Schell Genius&mdash;Philosopher&mdash;Rewrite Man," type1982, referred to as JS Brisbane, script, G Foley, G Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983 D. Hackworth, "A Soldier’s Report," Australia and Nuclear War, (ed M Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12 K Jaspers. The Future of Mankind. (trans Chicago E B Ashton). University of Press, 1961 B Martin, Grass Roots ham, 1984 L Mumford, The 1970 Myth Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Notting- of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace. New York, Preddey and others, Future contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters. A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, G F New Zealand, 1982 Routley and N. Griffin. ’’Unravelling the Meanings of Life," Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy 3, Australian National University, CanR. berra, 1982 R Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences. Australian National University, 1980, referred to as JB R Routley. War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear Deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy 5, Australian National University, 1984, referred to as WP R and V Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," in Environmental Philosophy (ed D Mannison and others), Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1980, referred to as HC J Schell, The Fate of the Knopf, Earth, New York, 1982, referred to K P Turco and others, "Nuclear Winter, Global Consequences of Nuclear Explosions." Science 222 (1983) 1283-92 34 M Walzer, Just and Unjust as S F Multiple Wars Basic Books, New York, 1977. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Published Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan formally published very little of his nuclear ethics and politics, although a nuclear imaginary is present throughout his ouevre. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document RICHARD ROUTLEY metaphysical fallout from nuclear predicament the string of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically oriented works on nuclear war ’ The series is important for its deeper penetration mto the main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels; m this, the series contrasts with the superficialities of much of the political commentary. The most widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoudbtedly that of the slightest of the ’prophets&dquo;, A Schell’s The Fate of the Earth. This skillful piece of mediasome of the apparently Anders So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often be considered together. To criticize their assumptions is not of course to belittle their work. In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect m shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. philosophy unncannily redeploys deep phenomenological themes of Some of it is simply rubbish- to take one example, consider the claim that &dquo;without ... a worldwide program of action for preserving the [human] species, .. nothing else that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ...&dquo; (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues they do not cease to be so when compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges elsewhere, e g p.130). And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected, however, because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: S 1. Nuclear war will eliminate I~fe, human life at least, (the extinction assumption) and on earth S2. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of mortality and values, but those of time and space for example, make no sense: or, to put it mto a more sympathefic philosophical form, these notions depend for their sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).22 of S2 which gave Anders’ and Schell’s works of their apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 It is applications some S1.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, to do good end evil, and to go on making sense! depend essentially on Granted, assumption S1 by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as the technological means appear available to make it true (to render Homo Sapiens extinct).4 Granted, the prospect of large-scale nuclear war does threaten leading is centers of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so, S1 unlikely m the light of present-admittedly inadequate-information Even m Canada, which lies on the polar appears route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). Schell’s argument to S1 is extremely flimsy. It de- pends, for example, 20 on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in the USA, or at least, to be more char~table, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, e , its entire human population will be eliminated in a nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in the ultraviolet radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North to South A factually superior study of nuclear produced at about the same time as Schell’s, by and others, indicates that part of the Southern Hemisphere, such as New Zealand and southern latitudes of Latin Amenca, could escape relatively unscathed from even the most massive northern exchanges. disaster Preddy Doomsday prophets may appear to have gained new purchase through recent (if belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the extinction assumpt~on.55 On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example in many southern mid-latitude coastal regions outside zones of radiation fallout More generally, life will go on, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set, in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible Thus both Anders and Schell insist upon the &dquo;impossibility of unlearning&dquo; the means of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Damken’s theory of an earlier &dquo;h~gh&dquo; technology). In virtue of S2, they would, however, exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion no longer made sense. But what they again want to suggest with the i m possibility-of -u n learning message is the inevitability of the development and eventual use of the technology-as if having learned the means all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. Certainly such views have been advanced6, but they are not tenable There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalizations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, notably that they do not allow Even if this were true just of nuclear 11 experiment it is certainly not of smaller weapons-it weapons-and would not rebut the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell &dquo; 21 hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere with observers and those outside the &dquo;laboratories.&dquo; Again they have latched onto major prints, m particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large-scale nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects, such as fireballs or firestorms, or changes m coupled atmospheric circulation and radiation fields. Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical in character. Nontheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of S1, and so undermine applications of S2. The penetration of human chauvinism, as thing peculiar to Schell and Anders, but is m S2, a product of West- is not some- philosophy, European philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders version of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p. 252ff.). It has also deeply penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of Wittgenstein’s ern work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are the alleged implications of extinction : but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are m no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. As with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingents ones: very many propositions about the world do not depend upon in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. _ 22 In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly powerful and obnoxious Kantian form. Thoughts and propositions, time and tenses, history and memories, values and morality all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings-past or future or merely potential humans are not enough. Thus, according to Schell (p 140, e.g), &dquo; . the thought ’Humanity is now extinct’ is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not In imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the stream of human tame....&dquo; The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later rational creature may well be able to have it truly. Schell erroneously denies that: there is no &dquo;later&dquo; &dquo;outside the human tenses of past, present, and future ... &dquo; (p 140) .7 Human extinction eliminates &dquo;the creature that divides time into past, present and future&dquo; annihilation cannot &dquo;come to pass&dquo; (p.143). But it false that the tenses are human: the tenses depend simply on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). Annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans m the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. so is Anders’ argument for the demise of time, that &dquo;what has been will no longer be even what has been,&dquo; is also explicitly (and narrowly) verificatiomst: &dquo;for what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, if there is no one to remember the things that have been (AA p.245). There would still remain many sorts of differences; for one, the history recorded m many other organisms would be different Temporal themes do not lack wlegitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone&dquo;; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, m particular, verificationism and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties m talking about what does not exist Thus, for example, Schell takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom ’nt is mdeed impossible to imagine our own death: and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are m fact still present as spectators&dquo; (p 138) The second clause goes a good distance towards refuting the first In fact there is no great difficulty in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both of Freud’s claims. The same goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: &dquo; . the simple and basic fact (sic!) that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing, there must be life.&dquo; human life (p.171 ) These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have been exposed and criticized elsewhere, e.g , HC). Here, as other will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so forth But it is already gomg too far to sug- Naturally 23 many things gest, as no Anders does, that there will accordingly be &dquo;no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, sacrifice, no image, no song...&dquo; For there are, and may thought, no continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs... Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been &dquo;all in vain,&dquo; meaningless, and already so to say dead The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not worthwhile.9 Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions S1 and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both. &dquo;The death of mankind,&dquo; under S1 , is reckoned a &dquo;second death,&dquo; because by S2 and S1 remamng life is rendered meaningless and already ’ seems to be dead (AA p.244, S p 166) and is already overhung with death&dquo; (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a person faces &dquo;a second death,&dquo; not merely one’s own but m addition that greater death of the species and all future generations (S p 166. p.1 15). However, even if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated, because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. From S1 , together with the minor principle that the extinction absolute does not differ m degree, comes the unibeing versality of peril theme that &dquo;we are all exposed to peril m the same degree,&dquo; which is accordingly &dquo;d~sgmsed~ and &dquo;difficult to recognize,&dquo; because there is no contrast (AE p 64; S p.150). This theme falls with S1. In any event, not all peoples are equally imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. an Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, a pernicious theme which Schell (m contrast to Anders) repeatedly filtrates. This is the Pogo theme, according to whichS3. co, 24 in- Responsibility for the present nuclear predIcament (flasreally) dlstnbutes onto everybody, It belongs to every hu- man lií the world ’o ...i But there is also, mixed in, a weaker, more plausible claim that gives the lie to the stronger one, namely, that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared) An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme’ runs as follows: &dquo;... the world’s political leaders though they now menace the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies&dquo; (pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated elsewhere: &dquo;... we are the authors of that distinction (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of the non-nucleararmed world it is true only m the negative sense that they fail to try to do anything about the danger)&dquo; (p.152). But this is ... of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points: &dquo;... we are all potential mass killers. The moral cost of more nuclear armaments is that it makes all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions&dquo; (p 152) And again [at] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message .. that life not only is not sacred but it is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for everyone to be killed&dquo; (p 153) Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as is possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor does the responsibilityor the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone-fall on those who have done less. Responsibility for decisions taken in &dquo;literal democracies&dquo; even by representatives (m the unlikely event of this happening m the case of anything as important as defense) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterized package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only m the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to everyone in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible, namely, that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. 25 When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from the accompanyng themes, part of what results along the right lines: namely, is decidedly S4 The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear mstltutlons. The sovereign system Is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8) Yet S4 forms part of Schell’s critique of the state which is, by and large, scattered and fragmentary. Schell arrives at the conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new political institutions more &dquo;consonant with the global reality&dquo; are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives. 12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control Solutions to the nuclear arms dilemma come, if not easily, m a similar simplistic way, from Top Down: those who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope m treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and m world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and especially p 227, bottom paragraph) Given the record of these organizations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-mdustrial organization and ways of life. 26 But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere. 13 The roots of the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies Both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial feature is the drive for power and domination (and, often, the accompanyng privilege). 14 Thus the push for [nuclear] superiority by the super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented science and technology, which involves and enables domination,in several interrelated forms The main the large nation-state, where enough surplus be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and power-base product can is energy. 15 In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the proof nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downspect the main power-base, the nation-state: it is also imporgrade tant to alter key components of the state, and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded m all these social and political arrangements, namely, patterns of domination-patterns manifested not only in state political organization, but in white-coloured relations, male-female relations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations-to remove, m short, chauvinistic relations. However, not everything needs to be accomplished at once: the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately There the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between &dquo;raison d’etat&dquo; and the Socratic-Christian ethics The teaching that &dquo;the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort&dquo; (p 134). So &dquo;states may do virtually anything whatever m the name of [their] survival.&dquo; Schell then argues, however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under S1 ) ends could remain, for instance, for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The end-means argument can, however, be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is claimed that extinction 27 nullifies end-means justification by frustrating the realization of every relevant end-meaning by &dquo;relevant,&dquo; in this context, those ends the realization of which the state appeals to m justification of its nuclear policies. 16 A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realization of relevant state ends So even from an expediency perspective, super-state policies are open to severe criticism, for example, as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty m war, Schell leaves us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and power to go to war m defense or pursuit of its interests (p 187) War arises from how things are, from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states (p.188). Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people to organize for war. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the macro-state system is entrenched, it is, however, easy for conservatives (m particular) to argue from the &dquo;realties&dquo; of international life, which includes self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred. It is on this basis that peace arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell’s further theme that nuclear war is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state: for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterization of war as &dquo;a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end&dquo; (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is correct is that nuclear wars are very different from previous conventional (cf. WP). Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end which nuclear &dquo;war&dquo; does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games are won). It is also claimed that war depends on weakness, on one side being defeated on a decision by arms. But in a nuclear &dquo;war&dquo; this doesn’t happen, &dquo;no one’s strength fails until both sides have been annihilated&dquo; (p.190). But what these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell’s argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined &dquo;conventional&dquo; wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court has been removed (pp 192-193). The theme depends on a pair of mistaken propositions: that conwars 28 cerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea that war of some sort has to be the final &dquo;court of appeal&dquo; between nations (for there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda) The theme also imports the social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the &dquo;log~c of war&dquo; theme) that war has to proceed to the technological limit-as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognized social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), and ruleless activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organizations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a 29 logic. Much capital has been made not merely from the logic of war&dquo; but from what is now called &dquo;the logic of deterrence&dquo; and the &dquo;logic of nuclear [strategic] planning.&dquo; The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound, rational. However, this represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There are logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planting; but they do not yeld specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically. There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not: but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency 17 . For the most part, however, &dquo;logic of&dquo; tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like &dquo;reasomng and rational considerations entering into the policy or strategy of.&dquo; In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term &dquo;logic of,&dquo; should write of &dquo;the illogic of deterrence,&dquo; for he emphasizes its unreasonableness. For instance, he stresses (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using them should the threat fail- 18 yet the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat of this unjustifiable and irrational use. Indeed Schell wants to go still further and locate a contradiction in deterrence (e g. pp.2012) ; but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,’9 along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. The Australian National University NOTES *This is a revised version of "Appendix 1 On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders" of my monograph referred to as WP, where several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed References are by way of authors names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows 1 The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets. where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled but the total annihilation removes that all- important opportunity 2 A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ of S2 is made in Foley JS remarkably similar versions 3 Should S2 appeal, as it may. to suitable communities of humans. S1 will require reformulation in similar terms, and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals 4. Thus the Last Person environmental ethics (as HC for instance, the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics. at a deeper metaphysical level The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s box. explams), is no argument, important in longer merely hypothetical, awaiting, Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora’s box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive 30 exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios. with heavy targeting in particular of Southern Hemisphere sites (including internationally-recognized nuclear-free zones). 5 Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much The most intrepid of these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case circumstances, "the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded" (p 1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, "it seems unlikely Homo sapiens would be forced to extinction immediately," and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated In many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern midlatitudes very much milder forms in equivalent Southern latitudes For example, temperatures for regions with maritime climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps negligibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p 1287 case 29, and p 1286) Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes. such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity. after 100 days (cf the data in Benton and Partridge) particular, are reflected in No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many heads of states and strategists have an interest in minimizing them And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn For Crutzen (p 59) is right that "analysis of the environmental effects of a global thermonuclear war remain uncertain because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] The environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere," again among other things Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational The way to err is clear 6 Not worth, military merely by technological determinists of Marxist persuasion Hackformer US general, argues by straight induction that if the US a has a weapon it will use it appalling theme that humans create past, present and repeated elsewhere, e.g . p 173. 7 The 8 For a detailed refutation of these assumptions, is here (AA pp perseverance, criticized 9 Anders see future (etc ) is JB 244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from in detail in Routley and Griffin interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no responsible. the whole thing is out of control The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15) More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political 10 An one is in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear going, which enable responsibility to be distributed The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility. include the military weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf Barnaby) Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes The argument is flawed at its final stage For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests Thus. though there is no doubt some "lack of control," political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control control, but for reasons, things 31 11 Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows "The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible, nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan In certain circumstances to commit (p 185) Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan," but an unintended consequence, and most of us have little or no role in the planning : enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further "the world chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons" (p 194) the world? This connects the course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e g , for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation, and against socialism 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP8, where too the the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated case against explanation is elaborated in Foley, some of the themes are straightforwardly in Martin The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164 13 Anders’ presented more These motivating drives form a part of a larger integrated package. comprising maximization drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, enfor the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) ergy, speed, satisfaction, virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction. for instance, or utility And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but also as rational, which again it is not) Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximization of a suitable mix of these virtues 14 Maximization of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes The maximization of self-interest (individual or national) runs into Newcomb’s paradox and special cases of it such as Prisoner’s Dilemma situations The maximization of power, as symbolized in the Christian-Islamic God. encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel maximization of knowledge, paradoxes of omniscience. There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be the epitome of rationality. also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel s theorem and associated limitative theorems) 15 R & D, drives the though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also arms race Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral science 32 There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’sparallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix) It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-control machine, but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control But the technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists, it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not of the nuclear age were not inevitable. but dechosen certain liberately by components of the large nation-states And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with The fashionable inevitability determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies They also admit of being made to look ridiculous If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined That is. the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation 1 Damaging technologies 16 This reformulation main 17 qualification can proposed by N Griffin, who suggested that the be inferred from Schell’s context was the usual game theory setting sees to this almost autothen assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her matically, own advantage Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that "the logic of deterrence" is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions Selecting for it is 18 Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been contested, e.g., it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p 204), namely, not a future retributive one, but an ideological one eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered for the conjectured targeting of Latin America 19 An appears confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration thinking, where US missiles are supposed incoming USSR missiles analogous in recent US "star-war" to " negate" Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction For although inupon perhaps questionable interconnections of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP 5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without, however. intending to proceed to war. though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number This paradox is technically removed&mdash;how satisfactorily is another matter&mdash; by a distinction between long-term aims and immediate practice, a timehonoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions volving negation, they depend REFERENCES 33 G Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C H Beck. Munchen, 1956, referred to as AA. G Anders, Endzeit und Zeitenende: Gendanken tion, C H Beck, Munchen, 1972, referred to as AE F. Barnaby, "Will there be a Nuclear War," in zur atomaren Situa- Australia and Nuclear War, (ed M Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37. I J Benton and G W Partridge,"’Twilight at Noon Overstated," Ambio 13 (1984) 49-51 B. Commoner, The New York, 1972 Closing Circle: Nature, PJ Crutzen, "Darkness after a Man and Technology, Knopf, Nuclear War," Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed ), Australia and Nuclear War Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P R Erlich and others, "Long-term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," Science 222 (1983) 1293-1300 Jonathan Schell Genius&mdash;Philosopher&mdash;Rewrite Man," type1982, referred to as JS Brisbane, script, G Foley, G Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983 D. Hackworth, "A Soldier’s Report," Australia and Nuclear War, (ed M Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12 K Jaspers. The Future of Mankind. (trans Chicago E B Ashton). University of Press, 1961 B Martin, Grass Roots ham, 1984 L Mumford, The 1970 Myth Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Notting- of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace. New York, Preddey and others, Future contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters. A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, G F New Zealand, 1982 Routley and N. Griffin. ’’Unravelling the Meanings of Life," Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy 3, Australian National University, CanR. berra, 1982 R Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences. Australian National University, 1980, referred to as JB R Routley. War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear Deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy 5, Australian National University, 1984, referred to as WP R and V Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," in Environmental Philosophy (ed D Mannison and others), Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1980, referred to as HC J Schell, The Fate of the Knopf, Earth, New York, 1982, referred to K P Turco and others, "Nuclear Winter, Global Consequences of Nuclear Explosions." Science 222 (1983) 1283-92 34 M Walzer, Just and Unjust as S F Multiple Wars Basic Books, New York, 1977.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament Type The nature or genre of the resource Journal Article Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/search?query=Richard+Routley+&amp;query_type=keyword&amp;record_types%5B%5D=Item&amp;record_types%5B%5D=File&amp;record_types%5B%5D=Collection&amp;record_types%5B%5D=SimplePagesPage&amp;record_types%5B%5D=Exhibit&amp;record_types%5B%5D=ExhibitPage&amp;submit_search=Search">Richard Routley</a> PDF Text Text �������������������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Self-published Papers Description An account of the resource <span>Sylvan favoured the </span><span lang="EN-GB">highly-unorthodox practice of self-publishing a vast amount of his work<span>—</span><span></span>quite literally, using his own printing press!</span> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out Type The nature or genre of the resource Report Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984-01-01 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Manuscript https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2a58a736a0fbf8719d74d4ee50c7d4ca.pdf 07f4f100b518084f6934e2d356da87a8 PDF Text Text PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 0. Focal questions and deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate. In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering, many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on). Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). �Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however 2 3 4 For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see further Routley. I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial �3 through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently aligned paradigms. One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket): Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots many emergent problems interlinked proximate causes plural supporting sources multiple interlinked roots Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural.5 What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and other rational transmission connections.6) explanation, of them. History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there are plausible alternative histories. While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on). A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The �4 These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.8 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start. 7 See Sylvan and Bennett, GE. 8 As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. �5 problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very difficult situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), For details see again Greening of Ethics. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous account of culture see Sylvan 86. It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. �6 Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, ±rough Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) 13 This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. �7 I As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideosystems, eschews deontics.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective. Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong. TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies Source Defective practice answers Remedy Objections DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion D3a Defective paradigm answers Pl. i �8 Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P2b Mechanism Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment P6a Materialism Anti-materialism Spiritualism P8. P8a Patriarchy, Masculinism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) P6. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Typical remedy suggested Platonism New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism C onsequentialism Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy: reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism Continental philosophy Utilitarianism Economism New social science, or ethics Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely �9 separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’). Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick — in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted. The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology 14 15 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3. White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. �10 developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.19 16 17 18 19 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask, first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning, �11 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.21 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining 20 21 see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). �12 rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.22 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.23 But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. ♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without 22 23 24 25 26 27 For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. �13 any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.30 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see GEF. See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. �14 harmonious man-nature relationship.32 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation. D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a bad joke. Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling 32 33 34 35 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and Bennett. Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. �a 15 within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. P. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 36 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). �16 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example (much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness 37 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. �17 again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East. The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam (Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto­ 38 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna. �18 mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9 They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39 40 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings. TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems Transfer of technology, industry and problems to other regions Inflation intensification and spread of problems to larger regions Technologicalindustrial development within ideological cultural framework development within another , \ or different / • framework / Multiple sources of various regional problems 39 40 The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc. �19 Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus, in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated: TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) Jainism recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians, etc. Western philosophies: old Stoicism Spinozism new Deep green theories, such as deep ecology. under certain favourable interpretations Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large �20 families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class (neither, and perhaps both). DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms. To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3). Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Some family characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms: * Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. ‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. �21 abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43 Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46 43 44 45 46 Cottingham p.24, p.26. Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. Glacken p.506. Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only �22 * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47 The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it. It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49 Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.50 * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism);51 as a corollary, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * short-term framework; * maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects. Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as: * an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails. 47 48 49 50 51 Instead ecological forestry tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. Reese p. 102. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2. Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews. See Discourse VI. Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental crisis. �23 and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. • a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* via Bungendore, OZ. APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial environments. That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic) environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition 53 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under­ estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot philosophy, see Appendix 1. An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise. Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. �24 for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter, there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil See e.g. Hargrove, p.21. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of these claims will be made elsewhere. �25 ♦ quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value, denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59 APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and mistreatment of (mere) animals. Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian philosophy. Descartes cherished a scheme for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought, and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’: There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen— that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal, however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying). By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make 59 Hargrove, p.29. This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. �26 themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^® These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray, and do not sustain the conclusion drawn. Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals, whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language. Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”. There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not. Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not. None of reasoning, thought and understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60 61 For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate, including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort) documented. Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what they do or choose to do, and so on. Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly, 60 61 Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes. For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter 11. �27 but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an outcome of rectified method, Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62 As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics, despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’ moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology, whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’. Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology, was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s creation....63 So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward. environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted). However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones. Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64 Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes. Nonetheless, dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For, according to him, ...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and nature into an unequal relationship: Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the 62 63 64 Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g. concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get his rationalistic roadshow moving. Cottingham, ibid. On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11. �most curious moments of human imbecility.65 APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, 65 66 Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. �29 representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. �30 growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press, 1974. A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993. C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177 M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)! �31 A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany N.Y., 1993. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974 D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973; referred to as FF. R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EE. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982. P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986. R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred to as EP3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 0. Focal questions and deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate. In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering, many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on). Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however 2 3 4 For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see further Routley. I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial 3 through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently aligned paradigms. One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket): Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots many emergent problems interlinked proximate causes plural supporting sources multiple interlinked roots Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural.5 What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and other rational transmission connections.6) explanation, of them. History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there are plausible alternative histories. While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on). A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The 4 These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.8 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start. 7 See Sylvan and Bennett, GE. 8 As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. 5 problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very difficult situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), For details see again Greening of Ethics. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous account of culture see Sylvan 86. It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. 6 Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, ±rough Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) 13 This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. 7 I As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideosystems, eschews deontics.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective. Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong. TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies Source Defective practice answers Remedy Objections DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion D3a Defective paradigm answers Pl. i 8 Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P2b Mechanism Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment P6a Materialism Anti-materialism Spiritualism P8. P8a Patriarchy, Masculinism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) P6. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Typical remedy suggested Platonism New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism C onsequentialism Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy: reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism Continental philosophy Utilitarianism Economism New social science, or ethics Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely 9 separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’). Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick — in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted. The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology 14 15 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3. White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. 10 developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.19 16 17 18 19 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask, first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning, 11 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.21 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining 20 21 see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). 12 rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.22 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.23 But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. ♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without 22 23 24 25 26 27 For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. 13 any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.30 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see GEF. See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. 14 harmonious man-nature relationship.32 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation. D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a bad joke. Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling 32 33 34 35 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and Bennett. Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. a 15 within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. P. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 36 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). 16 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example (much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness 37 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. 17 again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East. The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam (Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto­ 38 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna. 18 mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9 They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39 40 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings. TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems Transfer of technology, industry and problems to other regions Inflation intensification and spread of problems to larger regions Technologicalindustrial development within ideological cultural framework development within another , \ or different / • framework / Multiple sources of various regional problems 39 40 The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc. 19 Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus, in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated: TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) Jainism recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians, etc. Western philosophies: old Stoicism Spinozism new Deep green theories, such as deep ecology. under certain favourable interpretations Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large 20 families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class (neither, and perhaps both). DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms. To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3). Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Some family characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms: * Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. ‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 21 abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43 Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46 43 44 45 46 Cottingham p.24, p.26. Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. Glacken p.506. Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only 22 * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47 The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it. It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49 Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.50 * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism);51 as a corollary, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * short-term framework; * maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects. Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as: * an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails. 47 48 49 50 51 Instead ecological forestry tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. Reese p. 102. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2. Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews. See Discourse VI. Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental crisis. 23 and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. • a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* via Bungendore, OZ. APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial environments. That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic) environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition 53 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under­ estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot philosophy, see Appendix 1. An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise. Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 24 for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter, there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil See e.g. Hargrove, p.21. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of these claims will be made elsewhere. 25 ♦ quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value, denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59 APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and mistreatment of (mere) animals. Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian philosophy. Descartes cherished a scheme for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought, and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’: There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen— that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal, however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying). By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make 59 Hargrove, p.29. This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. 26 themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^® These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray, and do not sustain the conclusion drawn. Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals, whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language. Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”. There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not. Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not. None of reasoning, thought and understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60 61 For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate, including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort) documented. Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what they do or choose to do, and so on. Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly, 60 61 Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes. For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter 11. 27 but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an outcome of rectified method, Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62 As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics, despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’ moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology, whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’. Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology, was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s creation....63 So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward. environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted). However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones. Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64 Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes. Nonetheless, dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For, according to him, ...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and nature into an unequal relationship: Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the 62 63 64 Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g. concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get his rationalistic roadshow moving. Cottingham, ibid. On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11. most curious moments of human imbecility.65 APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, 65 66 Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. 29 representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. 30 growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press, 1974. A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993. C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177 M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)! 31 A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany N.Y., 1993. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974 D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973; referred to as FF. R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EE. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982. P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986. R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred to as EP3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, item 951: Paradigmatic roots on environmental problems Subject The topic of the resource Uncorrected paper (typescript, photocopy). Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Paradigmatic Roots of Environmental Problems uncorrected ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 15, item 951 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 27.82 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:04c2bd6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:04c2bd6</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/68d29df80f9d20e41a77ef7fdb412966.pdf f2093594e525a6ba4c68813d0f8e0eb4 PDF Text Text GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY. ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be improved with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the back of moneying economics and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the Greenhouse problematique, upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches, range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, the substantially new socio-economic arrangements soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches, and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forests for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. But there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among those, a result of the increases of “greenhouse” gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture. The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. �2 Diagram 1. Spectrum of approaches: Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action1 Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. Breifly too the outcome is that there is no easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with argument. Investigative philosophy is applied philosophy, investigating arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes, but outside normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain arguments for severe dislocation pprobabilities, as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rational decision formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, and doomsday arguments. 1 Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. �3 The main run of arguments to considerable action are neo-Malthusian in character. The general form of these arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter encounters limits, with severe effects. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: limits growth parameter time exponential growth pattern J encountering limits subsequent varying unstable behavior The limits are often imposed just by finitude, e.g. finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General Malthusian arguments loom in the background in what follows. But a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following anthropic doomsday argument:• There is some probability that the Gaean “greenhouse effect”, generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or Lesser Venus Prospect, premiss). • That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans (Catastrophe Prospect). • Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans, such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (Catastrophe Probability). That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probability will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. �4 It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself is an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but one of a substantial raft of arguments that should have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual string, so to say, from the inconspicuous cosmological tail. Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:• Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but who -will exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) • Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the moral irrationality of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. Diagram 2. Macro-climatic setting. Bands: all boundaries fuzzy mean global temperature (degrees C) escalating emissions Disequilibrium: Venus prospect increasing dislocation possible adaptation increasing dislocation thermonuclear war disequilibrium: Mars prospect �5 1860 1990 The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear wars is entirely in place and indeed on alert. The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemo-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these nuclear arrangements - both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irrational, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested2 - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.3 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts, for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some “developing” nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than being the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggestions for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick most easily achieved no doubt on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backburning against out-of- control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, irrational expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that many who have some role in decision making For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace series in Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National UniversityGlobal warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. �6 (including both experts and politicians), lack a firm grasp on decision-making in conditions of uncertainty or possible risk.4 The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social paradigm, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 2 Broad policy responses to the Greenhouse problematique. Dominant paradigm Alternative paradigm Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, all the dominant approaches. • Procrastination, the prevailing response. In fact the main gooon mental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or “wait-and-see” as it is more benignly known.5 The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings in even the most elaborate general circulation models, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases, it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more “research”. It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act6 But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely consequences are also known. Theoretical consideration, have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outlines of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline, rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial Following Knight, some economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numberable probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards the global greenhouse effect. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, also say that ‘decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable’ (p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of ‘adaptation’. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymumies, for instance, scientists begin ‘threatening mankind with a rather swift “bad death’” as the universe random ‘Thus m. Aber, on ‘balant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves’ (Bernard p.9). �7 small-scale models of the Greenhouse effect in action. For example a city such as MexicoCity, which is situated in the bowl-like valley is placed in an environment traps heat as well as pollution. The ecological affects, like the human affects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or amelated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many scientists, that Greenhouse difficulties have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed even is the Villiers conference and statement of 1986 (e.g. Pittoch ....). Actually there have been Greenhouse warmings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inaction. Nor is any action of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climate logists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine Nature, not noted for its green sympathies, recorded that ‘the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, concemally, the most important environmental issue in the world today’ (May ? 1975). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserting that ‘the government must start dealing with this problem now’. They meant the United States government. “The” government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then scientists have been emphasizing that the greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the problem has happened. There has been more than a decade of inaction , during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive action disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to bark up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or may be, as some more reactionary modal-managering academics would have - a problem or two. Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that “scientific activity” is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not done in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making order uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unreputable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. ‘Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing ever problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found.’ Natural scientists �including dematologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous-reduction-toconlittainable-certainty trip. ‘This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption’ (Cyort and DeGroot p.l). But there are several classes of problematic situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty cannot be discarded by first, reduction strategeness or otherwise, notably:• inheritantly probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; • essentially unpredictable situations (which may be deterministic) such as those now under investigation chaos theory; • presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may turn into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumption being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not; there are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class. The standard approach of too many research scientists is a pathetic begging-bowl posture: Supply more funding so we can go on researching until we obtain certainty.7 There are some severe problems with this standard response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty if achieved may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non additive (non additive) and so incapable of delivering stable results over slightly fluctuating in strict data. The standard response is methodologically unsound. • Adaptation, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy ‘that tends to be favoured by most economists’ is an adaptive strategy: “Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance” We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strain [themselves] ... more widely adopted... ’ (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly restricted “adaptation” that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting them. It is assumed that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt these practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, “Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and 7 It does not seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money (even more per article) that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect is because their research results could, if unfavorable, act a serious drag on the industrial establishment. They are not going to be funded to delegitimize modem industrial society. �9 so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance.” Such “adaptative agriculture”, the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is antienvironmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't back natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you. Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism badaptation. Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say medaptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that unilateral action to prevent a warning is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation unattainble. Both contentions open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the World's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant domains) backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations could make a major difference. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential grown economists. In any case, international agreements such as those in whaling and Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptation proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force societies towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertainties are alleged to produce. Characteristic of adaptation too is a minimisation of the extent of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a rational course of action (instead of the seemingly irrational course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the law end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4°C - in a setting, furthermore, where fractions of a degree centigrade may well be linked ot macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, an average, on increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect, yielding a 4°C temperature increase.8 8 Sources. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas where atmospheric propostems really matter and whose present increase is excessive. �10 The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacities of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cities, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust-bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse conditions. The mid continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average, under greenhouse conditions they could be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dustbowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern com) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again. A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. • Intervention, high-tech Gaean engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include • New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like childrens' play. • Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, are far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. • Regulation, controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself, not so bureaucratically popular under that presentation in these latter days of economic irrationalism, is of course transparadigmatic, where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally-constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled prevention in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in �11 growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives, in effect without far-reaching systems and a devological adjustment. While such adjustment may be rational, it is unlikely. Power structures have too much to lose.9 This is an opposite point to record the chauvinism and environmental shallowness of the Greenhouse debate. Like heart disease and cancer, the Greenhouse effect is gaining much discussion and some funding because it just may severely effect the affluent, affluent people and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in North America especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global worming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex ecosystems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increase in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural environments and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests wetlands, maritime environments. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed (cf. Keeton pp.763-4). Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change,... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities Holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, to make much difference acting or their own. Some are too beg even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concerte. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers, as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. �12 of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Brown p.10). Of course the immediate climate patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. When natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However ‘several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn’ (p.19 ref?)10 Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behavior (as distinct from radioactivity levels) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be no similar recovery under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the impact,11 disequilibrium induced. An eventual longterm return to some different equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the “year” to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. Stability is defined in physics in terms of return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. �13 temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.12 Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at... in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometers of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees 13 The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early greenhouse or even pollution effects.14 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose effects are enhanced on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). The relevant point is that these features are likely to be accelerated given the additional impact of greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. There are several major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the delicacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is • nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear Winter. But there are of course other severe shocks the planet could suffer than those chemo-nuclear warfare, some human induced, some a “chance” matter of the planets' position in space, namely • a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentation (see Leslie) • a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertainties, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not rationally.. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblematic lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertainties do The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Reported by Recher on Earthworm. Thus coastline vegetational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. �14 appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate, ascribable to: • excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, etc, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagration.; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in desiccative systems under stress or strain. • excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others), [describe briefly] Such non-additive, or nonlinear, effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, are bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example. With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reactions and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected doubting of carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years15. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixation of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% 15 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO2 exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminority was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proposition of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). �15 bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits to continuation of present developmental practices. Now there can be no rational confidence with respect to complex dissipative systems - about the behavior of which we presently know comparatively little - that no other nonadditive effects will no be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essentially unexperienced and substantially unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from past times of such elevated temperatures as Green house effects will lead to, to draw upon. ‘There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years’. There is experience of much colder periods. ‘During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents’ (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in a warm interglacial period), ‘a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization’ (Schneider p.6) It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision makings, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small, though experience implies it is not always so but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing a strong antipathy for environmentalists.16 Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalation.17 ‘Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, Coupled with this, there is a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There is also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine barring to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is ‘tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable’, virtually indestructable (p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also 88? [detail] �16 finding a suitable’ destructive agent to bring about a ‘doom scenario’ ‘turns out to be an almost insoluble problem’ (p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all “life”, ‘down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria’ (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental ‘doomsday scenario’ is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scientific fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of ‘the US National Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own distinguished members, assisted by forty-eight other scientists chosen from those expert in the effects of nuclear explosions and all things subsequent to them’ (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the distinguished expert report the findings that ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter.. Not for the first time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground18 considerably in the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaia in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... Shifting ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honestly and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a caricuture of his own previous position to critics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever ‘fabrication’ which it was not); that it is ‘an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess (85 p.53). �17 It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp5354). The argument to the lesser Venus path, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a discipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present balance by a combination of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetation complanes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composition. TABLE 1. Substance Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen T R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Planetary comparisons (principal components per cent). Equilibrium Earth Venus Lifeless Earth Mass Present Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 95 2.7 0.03 79 0 1 trace 0.1 trace 0.1 0.13 2 21 1 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290±50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, pp37 and p.39. �18 The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behavior as locals increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress they system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire into what evidence we have on this case. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaia hypothesis). But for the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially the Earth would not be blessed with its present life-benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltios and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on, perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for what of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, but the mean global temperatures have exhibited no corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected consistency in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plants, [detail] Lovelock and collaberaters have devised an elementary daisy world model which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing energy input. The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. diagram Q Similarly several of the well-known chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sulphur, sodium and so forth depends for their maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as forests, which is severely disturbed then the cycle itself could be disrupted. There is some probability furthermore that the foregoing changes will disturb crucial equilibrium systems and chemical cycles. Some of these feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium by natural ecosystems (an example is Lovelock's daisy world model, which becomes unstable when temperature rises too high). Instability could ensue under disturbance [explain, include Greenhouse holism]. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness19 is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Natural richness is the main richness, much exceeding human artifice. �19 The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is nonzero,20 and indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows: there is a decent probability that a modest Gaia hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So containing probabilities, there at least a nonneglizible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it fast and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select text crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy nonelite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will breakdown and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.21 Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are aptly rarely Daedelian 4. The Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and the likely demise of homo sapiens, spp. economicus.. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: if anything can go wrong, it will, From logical theories of probability such as Carnap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be characteristed, to some extent, by restruction to physical models). The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the “bus analogy”, see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this opposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaians control systems. �20 was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting..22 Certain crucial qualifications are required:• Replacement of the certain (certainlistic) conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: namely, it probably will. • Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of ‘anything’ or ‘something’ put ‘some thing ... given a chancy situation’. The modified formulation is accordingly the following Mini-Furphy result:23 if some thing can genuinely go wrong, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. Here ‘chancy’ means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparatively low probability vis-a-vis its alternatives. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary bad situation, a suitable disaster. Let the possibility of D's happening something's going wrong - be represented by a non-zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small, otherwise the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the features that render the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D < C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which take the following form where there are n alternative hypotheses hi,...,hn including h: Pv(h) x P(i < h) P(h < i) X P(hr) X P(i < hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, is in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.24 P(h < i) is the probability of h 22 23 24 For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the “law”, which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aviation Mechanics, see the Encyclopaedia Americana', Chase's initial formulation in a 1955 issue read ‘If an aircraft part can be installed in correctly, someone will install it the way”. This little theorem was originally more accurately entitled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. This section is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie; for Leslie's debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his legitimate doomsday apprehensions. The next not indicates the limited extent to which Leslie's arguments are endorsed. The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. �21 given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, <, symbolises the condition involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: p(D < C) __________ P(D) x P(C < D)__________ P(D) x P(C < D) + P(D*) x P(C < D*)' = The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: Cases D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say Vd m/l, say 1/dl of outcome relative chance that C As it is the relative chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, I has some modest size; specifically let I exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D < C), is d x 1/d d x 1/d + (l-d)/dl where k = • 1 1+k _ “ That is» and P(D < C) | y when k < 1, i.e. when I [ p(D < C) = where k = 1, . Thud D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when I is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, In effect we shall look at the form P(h < i) = --------------- < h)------------------------------P(h) X P(i < h) + XP(hr) X P(i < hr)’ n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes ‘been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results’ thus: ‘This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common’ (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. �P(D [ C) 22 d x m d x m + (1-d) x m/l 1 1 + k’ 1 as before. That is m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little Furphy theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), they continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system ( in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the initial probability of D*, human “success”, is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Application Table 1. Cases D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, VlOO, i.e. .01 1/100 x l/l ofC Then the probability of human decline given .01 x ,01 P(D < C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1 !/2 , when I > 99. �23 It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that I is likely much much larger, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. a posteriori probable in the usual jargon. There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously that, of the Club of Rome) Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption,.... It is appropriate for estimate posterier probability relative to anyone of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterier probability is assessed relative to such matters as our being alive, humans being thus and so (Leslie's reference class), this being present energy use, present wast output, present forest destruction and so forth.25 The anthropic argument considers the environmentally invidious situation of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as estimated for instance through energy consumption. Let us consider the prospects given additional information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, is alive now. Chart: Our present population predictment on the two scenerios. Demise scenerio “Success” scenerio - representative zjs human numbers human numbers On of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropriate choice of relative class. For, the relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, e.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes cuh as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. �24 Humans have got themselves - to some extent put themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious and unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their pollution are both excessive - and all chose and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponential curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponential, with the present in the near vertical growth phase: graphs Many other similarly shaped graphs26 could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as methane, and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster. Those curves are tightly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of hugh urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in turn on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. 26 All the graphs exhibited are drawn from Boyden. �25 Nor, as observed, is there much effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other Malthusian factors; they are becoming very disasterprone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:• manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfard, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a min-Big-Bang; see Leslie). • Accumulated risk factors, such as the hugh relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc..27 Despite the ideological obstacles, enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change, major efforts should be put into reducing both these types of risks. Philosophers could have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. 5. What ought to be done about Greenhouse? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to rational Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge is not all that there is to try, that should rationally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and all that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing human-induced 27 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, neo-Malthusian and probabilistic in particular. �26 output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound upon temperature of importance, which can serve to supply a significant limit as output. That bound - which reduces risk taking by confining encountered situations to those where there is some past experiential basis - is given by estimated temperatures during Altithermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about 1°C. Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions beginning easily in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth paradigm; it means expensive re- and deindustrialisation. It is unlikely. Final corollary: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already guessed as much from the latest...... in the long history of human wars. References H.W. Bernard, The Greenhouse Effect, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Murphy's Law. Book Two, Magnum, Methuen, ... S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, State of the World 1989, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory, Rowman & Littfield, New Jersey, 1987. ‘Developing policies for responding to climatic change’, Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. Keeton, J. Leslie, ‘Risking and World's End’, Bulletin of the Curiadian Nuclear Society 10(3) (1989) 1-6; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaia. A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, ‘Are we destabilising world climate?’, The Ecologist 15(1985) 52-55. �27 J.Lovelock, ‘Man and Gaia’, The Earth Report Monitoring the Battle for Our Environment, (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilgard) Mitchell Benzley, London, 1988, 51-64. R. and V. Routley, ‘Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquirey 21(1978) 133R. Routley, ‘Ultralogic as universal?’ reprinted as an Appendix in Exploring Meinong's Jungle, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider ‘Not to decide is to decide’, in Greenhouse 1988: Planning for Climate Change (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R.P. Turco and others, ‘Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-1292. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY. ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be improved with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the back of moneying economics and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the Greenhouse problematique, upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches, range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, the substantially new socio-economic arrangements soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches, and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forests for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. But there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among those, a result of the increases of “greenhouse” gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture. The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. 2 Diagram 1. Spectrum of approaches: Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action1 Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. Breifly too the outcome is that there is no easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with argument. Investigative philosophy is applied philosophy, investigating arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes, but outside normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain arguments for severe dislocation pprobabilities, as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rational decision formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, and doomsday arguments. 1 Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. 3 The main run of arguments to considerable action are neo-Malthusian in character. The general form of these arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter encounters limits, with severe effects. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: limits growth parameter time exponential growth pattern J encountering limits subsequent varying unstable behavior The limits are often imposed just by finitude, e.g. finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General Malthusian arguments loom in the background in what follows. But a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following anthropic doomsday argument:• There is some probability that the Gaean “greenhouse effect”, generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or Lesser Venus Prospect, premiss). • That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans (Catastrophe Prospect). • Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans, such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (Catastrophe Probability). That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probability will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. 4 It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself is an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but one of a substantial raft of arguments that should have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual string, so to say, from the inconspicuous cosmological tail. Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:• Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but who -will exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) • Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the moral irrationality of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. Diagram 2. Macro-climatic setting. Bands: all boundaries fuzzy mean global temperature (degrees C) escalating emissions Disequilibrium: Venus prospect increasing dislocation possible adaptation increasing dislocation thermonuclear war disequilibrium: Mars prospect 5 1860 1990 The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear wars is entirely in place and indeed on alert. The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemo-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these nuclear arrangements - both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irrational, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested2 - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.3 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts, for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some “developing” nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than being the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggestions for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick most easily achieved no doubt on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backburning against out-of- control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, irrational expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that many who have some role in decision making For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace series in Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National UniversityGlobal warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. 6 (including both experts and politicians), lack a firm grasp on decision-making in conditions of uncertainty or possible risk.4 The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social paradigm, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 2 Broad policy responses to the Greenhouse problematique. Dominant paradigm Alternative paradigm Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, all the dominant approaches. • Procrastination, the prevailing response. In fact the main gooon mental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or “wait-and-see” as it is more benignly known.5 The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings in even the most elaborate general circulation models, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases, it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more “research”. It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act6 But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely consequences are also known. Theoretical consideration, have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outlines of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline, rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial Following Knight, some economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numberable probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards the global greenhouse effect. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, also say that ‘decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable’ (p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of ‘adaptation’. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymumies, for instance, scientists begin ‘threatening mankind with a rather swift “bad death’” as the universe random ‘Thus m. Aber, on ‘balant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves’ (Bernard p.9). 7 small-scale models of the Greenhouse effect in action. For example a city such as MexicoCity, which is situated in the bowl-like valley is placed in an environment traps heat as well as pollution. The ecological affects, like the human affects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or amelated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many scientists, that Greenhouse difficulties have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed even is the Villiers conference and statement of 1986 (e.g. Pittoch ....). Actually there have been Greenhouse warmings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inaction. Nor is any action of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climate logists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine Nature, not noted for its green sympathies, recorded that ‘the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, concemally, the most important environmental issue in the world today’ (May ? 1975). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserting that ‘the government must start dealing with this problem now’. They meant the United States government. “The” government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then scientists have been emphasizing that the greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the problem has happened. There has been more than a decade of inaction , during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive action disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to bark up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or may be, as some more reactionary modal-managering academics would have - a problem or two. Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that “scientific activity” is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not done in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making order uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unreputable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. ‘Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing ever problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found.’ Natural scientists including dematologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous-reduction-toconlittainable-certainty trip. ‘This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption’ (Cyort and DeGroot p.l). But there are several classes of problematic situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty cannot be discarded by first, reduction strategeness or otherwise, notably:• inheritantly probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; • essentially unpredictable situations (which may be deterministic) such as those now under investigation chaos theory; • presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may turn into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumption being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not; there are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class. The standard approach of too many research scientists is a pathetic begging-bowl posture: Supply more funding so we can go on researching until we obtain certainty.7 There are some severe problems with this standard response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty if achieved may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non additive (non additive) and so incapable of delivering stable results over slightly fluctuating in strict data. The standard response is methodologically unsound. • Adaptation, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy ‘that tends to be favoured by most economists’ is an adaptive strategy: “Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance” We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strain [themselves] ... more widely adopted... ’ (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly restricted “adaptation” that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting them. It is assumed that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt these practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, “Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and 7 It does not seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money (even more per article) that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect is because their research results could, if unfavorable, act a serious drag on the industrial establishment. They are not going to be funded to delegitimize modem industrial society. 9 so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance.” Such “adaptative agriculture”, the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is antienvironmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't back natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you. Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism badaptation. Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say medaptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that unilateral action to prevent a warning is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation unattainble. Both contentions open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the World's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant domains) backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations could make a major difference. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential grown economists. In any case, international agreements such as those in whaling and Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptation proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force societies towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertainties are alleged to produce. Characteristic of adaptation too is a minimisation of the extent of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a rational course of action (instead of the seemingly irrational course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the law end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4°C - in a setting, furthermore, where fractions of a degree centigrade may well be linked ot macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, an average, on increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect, yielding a 4°C temperature increase.8 8 Sources. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas where atmospheric propostems really matter and whose present increase is excessive. 10 The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacities of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cities, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust-bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse conditions. The mid continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average, under greenhouse conditions they could be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dustbowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern com) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again. A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. • Intervention, high-tech Gaean engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include • New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like childrens' play. • Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, are far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. • Regulation, controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself, not so bureaucratically popular under that presentation in these latter days of economic irrationalism, is of course transparadigmatic, where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally-constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled prevention in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in 11 growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives, in effect without far-reaching systems and a devological adjustment. While such adjustment may be rational, it is unlikely. Power structures have too much to lose.9 This is an opposite point to record the chauvinism and environmental shallowness of the Greenhouse debate. Like heart disease and cancer, the Greenhouse effect is gaining much discussion and some funding because it just may severely effect the affluent, affluent people and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in North America especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global worming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex ecosystems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increase in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural environments and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests wetlands, maritime environments. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed (cf. Keeton pp.763-4). Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change,... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities Holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, to make much difference acting or their own. Some are too beg even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concerte. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers, as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. 12 of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Brown p.10). Of course the immediate climate patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. When natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However ‘several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn’ (p.19 ref?)10 Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behavior (as distinct from radioactivity levels) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be no similar recovery under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the impact,11 disequilibrium induced. An eventual longterm return to some different equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the “year” to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. Stability is defined in physics in terms of return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. 13 temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.12 Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at... in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometers of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees 13 The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early greenhouse or even pollution effects.14 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose effects are enhanced on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). The relevant point is that these features are likely to be accelerated given the additional impact of greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. There are several major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the delicacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is • nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear Winter. But there are of course other severe shocks the planet could suffer than those chemo-nuclear warfare, some human induced, some a “chance” matter of the planets' position in space, namely • a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentation (see Leslie) • a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertainties, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not rationally.. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblematic lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertainties do The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Reported by Recher on Earthworm. Thus coastline vegetational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. 14 appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate, ascribable to: • excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, etc, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagration.; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in desiccative systems under stress or strain. • excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others), [describe briefly] Such non-additive, or nonlinear, effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, are bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example. With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reactions and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected doubting of carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years15. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixation of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% 15 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO2 exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminority was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proposition of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). 15 bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits to continuation of present developmental practices. Now there can be no rational confidence with respect to complex dissipative systems - about the behavior of which we presently know comparatively little - that no other nonadditive effects will no be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essentially unexperienced and substantially unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from past times of such elevated temperatures as Green house effects will lead to, to draw upon. ‘There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years’. There is experience of much colder periods. ‘During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents’ (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in a warm interglacial period), ‘a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization’ (Schneider p.6) It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision makings, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small, though experience implies it is not always so but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing a strong antipathy for environmentalists.16 Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalation.17 ‘Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, Coupled with this, there is a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There is also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine barring to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is ‘tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable’, virtually indestructable (p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also 88? [detail] 16 finding a suitable’ destructive agent to bring about a ‘doom scenario’ ‘turns out to be an almost insoluble problem’ (p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all “life”, ‘down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria’ (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental ‘doomsday scenario’ is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scientific fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of ‘the US National Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own distinguished members, assisted by forty-eight other scientists chosen from those expert in the effects of nuclear explosions and all things subsequent to them’ (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the distinguished expert report the findings that ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter.. Not for the first time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground18 considerably in the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaia in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... Shifting ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honestly and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a caricuture of his own previous position to critics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever ‘fabrication’ which it was not); that it is ‘an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess (85 p.53). 17 It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp5354). The argument to the lesser Venus path, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a discipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present balance by a combination of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetation complanes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composition. TABLE 1. Substance Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen T R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Planetary comparisons (principal components per cent). Equilibrium Earth Venus Lifeless Earth Mass Present Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 95 2.7 0.03 79 0 1 trace 0.1 trace 0.1 0.13 2 21 1 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290±50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, pp37 and p.39. 18 The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behavior as locals increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress they system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire into what evidence we have on this case. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaia hypothesis). But for the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially the Earth would not be blessed with its present life-benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltios and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on, perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for what of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, but the mean global temperatures have exhibited no corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected consistency in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plants, [detail] Lovelock and collaberaters have devised an elementary daisy world model which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing energy input. The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. diagram Q Similarly several of the well-known chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sulphur, sodium and so forth depends for their maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as forests, which is severely disturbed then the cycle itself could be disrupted. There is some probability furthermore that the foregoing changes will disturb crucial equilibrium systems and chemical cycles. Some of these feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium by natural ecosystems (an example is Lovelock's daisy world model, which becomes unstable when temperature rises too high). Instability could ensue under disturbance [explain, include Greenhouse holism]. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness19 is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Natural richness is the main richness, much exceeding human artifice. 19 The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is nonzero,20 and indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows: there is a decent probability that a modest Gaia hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So containing probabilities, there at least a nonneglizible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it fast and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select text crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy nonelite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will breakdown and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.21 Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are aptly rarely Daedelian 4. The Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and the likely demise of homo sapiens, spp. economicus.. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: if anything can go wrong, it will, From logical theories of probability such as Carnap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be characteristed, to some extent, by restruction to physical models). The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the “bus analogy”, see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this opposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaians control systems. 20 was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting..22 Certain crucial qualifications are required:• Replacement of the certain (certainlistic) conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: namely, it probably will. • Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of ‘anything’ or ‘something’ put ‘some thing ... given a chancy situation’. The modified formulation is accordingly the following Mini-Furphy result:23 if some thing can genuinely go wrong, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. Here ‘chancy’ means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparatively low probability vis-a-vis its alternatives. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary bad situation, a suitable disaster. Let the possibility of D's happening something's going wrong - be represented by a non-zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small, otherwise the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the features that render the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D < C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which take the following form where there are n alternative hypotheses hi,...,hn including h: Pv(h) x P(i < h) P(h < i) X P(hr) X P(i < hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, is in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.24 P(h < i) is the probability of h 22 23 24 For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the “law”, which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aviation Mechanics, see the Encyclopaedia Americana', Chase's initial formulation in a 1955 issue read ‘If an aircraft part can be installed in correctly, someone will install it the way”. This little theorem was originally more accurately entitled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. This section is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie; for Leslie's debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his legitimate doomsday apprehensions. The next not indicates the limited extent to which Leslie's arguments are endorsed. The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. 21 given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, <, symbolises the condition involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: p(D < C) __________ P(D) x P(C < D)__________ P(D) x P(C < D) + P(D*) x P(C < D*)' = The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: Cases D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say Vd m/l, say 1/dl of outcome relative chance that C As it is the relative chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, I has some modest size; specifically let I exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D < C), is d x 1/d d x 1/d + (l-d)/dl where k = • 1 1+k _ “ That is» and P(D < C) | y when k < 1, i.e. when I [ p(D < C) = where k = 1, . Thud D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when I is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, In effect we shall look at the form P(h < i) = --------------- < h)------------------------------P(h) X P(i < h) + XP(hr) X P(i < hr)’ n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes ‘been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results’ thus: ‘This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common’ (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. P(D [ C) 22 d x m d x m + (1-d) x m/l 1 1 + k’ 1 as before. That is m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little Furphy theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), they continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system ( in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the initial probability of D*, human “success”, is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Application Table 1. Cases D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, VlOO, i.e. .01 1/100 x l/l ofC Then the probability of human decline given .01 x ,01 P(D < C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1 !/2 , when I > 99. 23 It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that I is likely much much larger, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. a posteriori probable in the usual jargon. There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously that, of the Club of Rome) Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption,.... It is appropriate for estimate posterier probability relative to anyone of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterier probability is assessed relative to such matters as our being alive, humans being thus and so (Leslie's reference class), this being present energy use, present wast output, present forest destruction and so forth.25 The anthropic argument considers the environmentally invidious situation of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as estimated for instance through energy consumption. Let us consider the prospects given additional information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, is alive now. Chart: Our present population predictment on the two scenerios. Demise scenerio “Success” scenerio - representative zjs human numbers human numbers On of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropriate choice of relative class. For, the relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, e.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes cuh as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. 24 Humans have got themselves - to some extent put themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious and unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their pollution are both excessive - and all chose and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponential curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponential, with the present in the near vertical growth phase: graphs Many other similarly shaped graphs26 could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as methane, and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster. Those curves are tightly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of hugh urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in turn on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. 26 All the graphs exhibited are drawn from Boyden. 25 Nor, as observed, is there much effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other Malthusian factors; they are becoming very disasterprone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:• manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfard, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a min-Big-Bang; see Leslie). • Accumulated risk factors, such as the hugh relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc..27 Despite the ideological obstacles, enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change, major efforts should be put into reducing both these types of risks. Philosophers could have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. 5. What ought to be done about Greenhouse? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to rational Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge is not all that there is to try, that should rationally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and all that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing human-induced 27 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, neo-Malthusian and probabilistic in particular. 26 output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound upon temperature of importance, which can serve to supply a significant limit as output. That bound - which reduces risk taking by confining encountered situations to those where there is some past experiential basis - is given by estimated temperatures during Altithermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about 1°C. Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions beginning easily in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth paradigm; it means expensive re- and deindustrialisation. It is unlikely. Final corollary: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already guessed as much from the latest...... in the long history of human wars. References H.W. Bernard, The Greenhouse Effect, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Murphy's Law. Book Two, Magnum, Methuen, ... S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, State of the World 1989, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory, Rowman & Littfield, New Jersey, 1987. ‘Developing policies for responding to climatic change’, Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. Keeton, J. Leslie, ‘Risking and World's End’, Bulletin of the Curiadian Nuclear Society 10(3) (1989) 1-6; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaia. A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, ‘Are we destabilising world climate?’, The Ecologist 15(1985) 52-55. 27 J.Lovelock, ‘Man and Gaia’, The Earth Report Monitoring the Battle for Our Environment, (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilgard) Mitchell Benzley, London, 1988, 51-64. R. and V. Routley, ‘Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquirey 21(1978) 133R. Routley, ‘Ultralogic as universal?’ reprinted as an Appendix in Exploring Meinong's Jungle, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider ‘Not to decide is to decide’, in Greenhouse 1988: Planning for Climate Change (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R.P. Turco and others, ‘Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-1292.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 2064: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, and Anthropic Doomsday Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of paper published in Australian National University. Department of Philosophy (1990) Research series in unfashionable philosophy, 4. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, Anthropic Doomsday ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 2064 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1990-01-01. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [27] leaves. 18.58 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <div class="element-set"> <div id="dublin-core-identifier" class="element"> <div class="element-text"><a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fdb034b" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fdb034b</a></div> </div> </div> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Miscellaneous Box 14: Green Projects in Progress https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/cde186ea98d75f1919a922e23b67d38c.pdf 4bafab7486766f222f23545b86f15a15 PDF Text Text THE MODERN CITY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM It is widely assumed, for instance by philosophers, most of whom are urban creatures, that large modern cities are valuable institutions and whatever the very serious costs and deprivations of modern city living, the advantages considerably outweigh the costs. There are those who are not persuaded that that is so. The image of the mob is part of our image of the city,J and the city is the carrier of the best and the worst of civilization (S. Diamond, In Search for the Primitive p.167) - but the latter is also a pretty dubious customer according to Diamond. Note: 1. The modern city as a reducer of variety 2. The metropolitan state, with landscope dominated by the city. The drain, power relation, etc. 3. The loss of contact with the natural 4. The way commerce controls the city: the secondary and substitutional role of people. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document THE MODERN CITY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM It is widely assumed, for instance by philosophers, most of whom are urban creatures, that large modern cities are valuable institutions and whatever the very serious costs and deprivations of modern city living, the advantages considerably outweigh the costs. There are those who are not persuaded that that is so. The image of the mob is part of our image of the city,J and the city is the carrier of the best and the worst of civilization (S. Diamond, In Search for the Primitive p.167) - but the latter is also a pretty dubious customer according to Diamond. Note: 1. The modern city as a reducer of variety 2. The metropolitan state, with landscope dominated by the city. The drain, power relation, etc. 3. The loss of contact with the natural 4. The way commerce controls the city: the secondary and substitutional role of people.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 76, item 679: The modern city as an environmental problem Subject The topic of the resource Typescript. Description An account of the resource Note, one of two papers digitised from item 679. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 702.02 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c2681d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c2681d</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span>&nbsp;Box 76, item 679 Box 76: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/7b1c84739c22e1c37ca763396ee394af.pdf 2304fe555b3c35b58cc702e12a63a8a7 PDF Text Text MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV? Begond moraL extens ion isms. Some find us of mereig not ourseives at with odds mainstream environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg disastrous, not ontg for mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg, a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes. the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons Rgain wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne. extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL MoraL apparatus conventLonaL Lts begond (but certaLnLg subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed, certaLn confLnes to unwarranted) or eLse, more LLkeLg, has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend wag the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the assumptions vatue, (equaL appLLed to a wider cLass equat of rLghts, of adjustment, consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg equaL a (Rs subjects. moraL egaLLtarLan wLth tgpe, generaL moraL ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff., under and the tgpicaL and usefuL weapon movements of Liberation with proceed couLd Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a MoraLisms Nature LabLe more rLghts and accurate movements Less but equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL to moraLitg bend to iLLegitimate certain interests, etc), are equaLitg, standing, but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least on the boundaries, as it ex tens Lon isms endeavour not onLg do the since (rights, such impressive pubLLcLg extensLonLsms purposes, extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved (though is! from Seen a wider perspective, environmentaL not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go, in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted, it remains. The zones of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai as forests, species, ecosgstems, continue mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE, things be to p.llf.1). Nor can such substantiaL to open the sorts of invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite which extensions, extensions operate, such as sentience, LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe, the verg characteristics pain-receptivitg, idea of an on interests, environmentaL ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite respect for naturat sgstems and communities, founders on the moraL rights position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff). �Mang a Ls MoraLLtg weapon, purpose depLoged bg pressure and often interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to and justLfg wLde a actLvLtg of range and hostLLe practices ground naturaL to envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr needs generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met there though even are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu and PLgden - have a poLnt MoraLLtLes Lt when MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew and to coMes The MoraLLtg. such HLnckfuss through daMage of seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the often benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and work often the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts. Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk, conduct to LMpossLbLe concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the response to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg, tougher dLstLnctLon, (practLcaL hard j^s (whLch axLoLogg to to avoLd) MaLntaLn, between there Ls a further deontLc expressLons Rnd deontLes. and practLcat between expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth and such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a soLLd case agaLnst objectLve or absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks. Hagbe the net a carefuL practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?, LMpact soMe of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can doesn t MoraLLtg coLLect a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg constraLn that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest appear to be turned around through abuses, of an Ls Lnput on chauvLnLstLc, as such froM sLaverg, huMan MoraLLtg. huMan Even so the persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg posLtLveLg Ln thLngs contrLbute couLd that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar, MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the prospect of More, More protectLon, Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through verg channeLLed MoraL ftowLng, through aLL too LegaL often, rather to the than wrong dLfferent LnstLtutLons; wLth fraMeworks, part Les, such as the Lt Ls the benefLts strong and estabLLshed. HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls, Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for peace (MoraLLtg beLng a MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be. -2- �Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide an assauit on the environMent instead of other creatures, subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones, or a prettg easg feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern technoLogicaL LLke was that course, of is; Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom guns another or (huMan, Ls now deeptg natLonat, state or race), LLkeLg, More entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part supportLng of scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg socLaL can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg not and appLLed, successfuttg Must awaLt Ls Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on. There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars antL-MoraLLsts) equated) nottons: MoraL status, rLghts, sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs But the tern can scarceLg escape attogether MoraL def Ln Lt tons Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg reveaL) that tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe such MoraL group: narrower the ang Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the use ttght of as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL. Lssue coMMon cLuster consLderatLon, retevance, a on foLLowLng These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to . ... the standing, consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates perMissions, to are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns (often (guaLnt ethicai ) (hunan) actors, as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces Ln the Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM objects MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends to be shunned Ln The notion of deeper environMentaL theorg. SiMoraL RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies. standing, introduced notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag environMentaL heavg, but ethics. It is anaiogg questionabte bg a Major, with the RngLo-RMerLcan but d3Maging, danaging because, verg briefLg, rote it wouLd paint a rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that have not froM those territorg. that have MoraL standing - across Much conpLex More Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence criterion in of MoraL standing is probieM soLving; absoiuteLg basic reasonabLg addressing of a in environMentaL thinking and the Lssue of MoraL standLng Must be vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of thLs Ls so evLdent, especLaLLg gLven the MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL �standing. In the sane vein, an a necessarg condition ... for Lt is stated that ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing adequate Such statements are suretg overstatements. For, Ln pLace, fLrst the there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones, which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL ecoLogLcat Rodman s deep Naess s (e.g. ecotogg, sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg warranted make standing rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing. For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's moraL of notLon attempt (Ln NP) to a make standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic, part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii as ahistoricai, a piece of footnoted Regan s retrospective account of Legisiation). as But, it happens, standing, according to which a being has moraL morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the exposed (thus biconditionaL invoLved in the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the conditions tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest bg sgstem about be to buiidozed, or the Moon about to be bg tourized an Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags that wiii at Low we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be that affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps in a modified wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so, such a deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic; for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings, which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition standLng, something his footnoted for moraL account does not guarantee. The LegaListic notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL. Rn initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is for ang sufficientLg comprehensive notion of a sometimes entering into moraL consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason, some decidedtg restrictive assumptions, concerning interests and whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter assessment on modeL dubious it imports rights into ethicaL occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates terms of having of thing in certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests, sort of that couLd or be the have interests, even as derived (as in the case of LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often -4- indeed, �Legat have to standing to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc., is begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts. room Of course there ts constderabte standtng not ton the widen to Legat of tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and (which "cLaimants to admit, through representatton, other to the PresentLg, courts. for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag and persons of broadentng the standtng not ton objects, agatn because to encompass Limitations the the mang requisite environmentaL nottons of tnterests and rtghts impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs, the MonuMents, and bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of Ontg constderabtg. do, Like naturat these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the wodet Legat be overcome. coutd be recogntsed, account of the Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg anaLogg behtnd, Left unimpeded fresh a and now standtng woraL rather propose free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to an expLLcatton of Recordtng to them, can be construed atong these LLnes. whtch For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X fISl. tnterests Lts theg sag Ln that weLL-betng have postttve moraL weight stLpuLattng theg re the but this; theg re or (PP. p.3). RctuaLLg, not free simpig to given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg sttputate, recogntze Ln proceeding at once to consider various to their standard answers basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore in LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg a than effect substitute a tortuous Less nameLg account, generaLLtg (in interpretation) MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG: pureLg since future items mag have ancestors). Either wag the account is weight and having moraL continued some moraL circutar, or shouLd however be significance, since having X of wetfare has deLeted, as mag dead positive moraL standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster. p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg circutar, H33. But has X then as moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight. a expLication, the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg. Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do? -5- The troubie �Ls except that theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL partLcuLar on standing, the notion Ln fact does verg because hoMe Ma Ln whose eth Les, chauvLnLstLc base does whLch LLes wLthLn the not extend or traveL unsatLsfactorg; wLth as coMpetence, or m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL The personhood). are (such cLassLfLcatLons bLoLogLcaL socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or potentLaL standLng MoraL Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth spec Les the of the wLder to onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to not ctassLfLcatLons ethLcaL MeMbershLp are theg trad Lt LonaL of weLL for ethLcs, It Ls one of those confLnes envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed confuse envLronmentaL Ln work Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt. there not Lons, LLttLe enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE) DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then, no satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP - or Lt eLsewhere It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe, seens. non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng. Rather the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The for reason the needs what cost-benefLt LMperatLves be to Looked at presuppose a Morat Ln appLLcatLons assessments, (whLch thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present Lt wouLd decLsLvetg Ls evLdent enough: usefuL work, space, about enthusLasM and deLLMLt of the categorLcaL of deLLMLtatLons behLnd proposed some notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc foLd (partLg moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg bg use of the term achLeved Ls search unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so Morat search space towards the confLnes of the thLs MoraL confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes appLLcatLons the neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of Lts LLmLtatLons. ConsLder standLng moraL Lnstead of work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL standLng (m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X, e.g. Let to Lt theg otherwLse not atone, do not to confLne Lt or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but (cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around, thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of whereas Lf Lacks m-s, Lt Lt does not have thLs protectLon, 3 Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt . def Ln Lt Lon of moraL standLng ... Lf somethLng weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count Lts Lf a Lnterests, Lt does not count, .... Indeed, so Lt Ls Lacks (p.t+). The moraL saLd, standLng, defLnLtLon Bg Lts however deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng moraL wLthout pLcture of assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems m-s are dLscounted, and trade-offs contempLated, p.16). -6- of Ltems wLth m-s are soon �Such appLication an if division; accordingtg LmpLies an unfortunate aLL-or-nothing item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng Lf be and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd standing contrasted with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat such tgpoLogg, that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The as tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant such as having vaiue, weLL-being, appropriate p.!2).^ the character aLL-or-nothing from at Least Modified becomes evident of various (e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties capacities, so and and forth; to moraL standing distinctions soon duties) (direct to needs be introduced as opposed to (indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg regarding duties autonomg, and postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP ethicaL That preferences, features adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent boundarg consists in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing is assumed to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg PSI. floraL agents iff But have a presumptive dutg to X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.). presumptive are duties even more prone to be bg upset circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion the notion overriding expands); standing, p.S), the forged connections things than without much too simpLe, as wiLL are for appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required purposes so operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding moraL decentLg] X [to treat it moraLLg moraL a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties, which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue, and extent of vaLue (see SM). Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing account, and counted, perhaps (if sometimes that wouLd be taken into in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL attributes are evidentLg a subcLass commonpLace vaLue of surprising, vaLue as attributes, e.g. in the confiation CaLLicott). is Possessing intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant. Indeed PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to intrinsic vaLue with their being evident, and considerabLe, (p.S) and before Long has identified moraL standing of things vaLuabte prove in damaging. Goodpaster themseLves Towards Lapses (p.I6). Such equations are not the end of his essag, on being moraLLg from -7- moraL considerabiLitg into �that Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte, Ln vatue-for-itsetf, psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities sophLstLcated unnecessaritg seen Lt Ls true when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be Lts for vatued own (p.320); sake Lt not so obvious that theg are too but sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon at work Ln Goodpaster s hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of and vatue ontg — consLderabLLLtg to appears obtaLn where vatue Ls unreduced (LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter; for exanpte tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when as where, of conceptLon Lts (p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and noraL consLderabLLLtg vatue Ls no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter, characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion). The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is point even norat the obvioustg Less stopping vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has for estate no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat vatue verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg (a accessibte nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose (for further, what is not at att untiketg, that sgstens natch that Moon the has fornations sone shoutd be the that thensetves, into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of taken projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But insist or naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a the defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in which is considerabititg Lt woutd be LnptausLbte to Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes. It is just not the feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the circte have suggests different sone exanpte, For connotations. notions beLng Ln noraL the consLderabLe norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account, suitabte not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg requires the iten in question has interests or at Least a such tetos), an that agent discussion-setting can phrase be deserves norat weLL-being towards considerate notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31 does norat retevance, R different get nere artifacts are norattg etc., dependent, quarrg that (a Goodpaster s Rnd nornattg the notion do presunabtg nornattg woutd not. Nor, not it erroneoustg, reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains context Like that another different notion sonetines equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though since does nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3 inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect, appear, (as or consideration ). certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.) woutd norat an etusive, has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of -8- �high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto other chase. the however, Since these are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like notLons MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or - scrapped we qutetLg can bgpass the vaiue the nuances and differences. CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect, wider notion and Moraiitg, if wag theg inportant in which not at derivative, Least with R dependent. Most connect is through LiMitat ions on interference. MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue. LittLe R More preciseLg, a actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as MoraL to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a sensitive Matter MainLg because deontic principLes do not excLude soMe vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we of reduction - shaLL be obLiged to return. Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg, and standing Like, the vaLue notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists, in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it triviaL is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte vaLue circuMstances); the (in Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes soMething Morai. It this notion too that has induced the unwarranted narrow ing of focus, to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer, certainig wrong, to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather, etc. what is MoraL has to do with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with justice and goodness), features refLected fornaLLg in suitabLe universaLizabiiitg of principie.^ So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate at narrower certain ethicaL tgpes, which excLude the wider environnent. The width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing ethicaL*. equivaLent ethics a of (For coMparison, rec Lass ification as consider "environMentat bg MoraL its originaL the effect in environMentat MoraLs" environMentat or Moratitg"). $2. Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages. EthicaL standing does not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM door for hearing. a hearing; in an ethicaL it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even, if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse for identifging standing and rights (short assuMption that of the astonishing but prevaLent aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences are giossed over, having MoraL rights is equated with having MoraL standing �The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8) CaLLicott). (e.g. Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions (expioitation consideration free not exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie for Underneath consideration). MoraL these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions; triviaL MoraL deserving since wh3t is piausibie for costs, of for just not the More that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in one but the ethicaL door, consideration are assuMption the rendered that equivaLent having and rights standing or a coMMon Middie terM, such as through having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has iff it has (or even have) rights. (or can have) interests, i.e. iMpiicit appear but (with Minor Such equations quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things; but Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted of (huManoid) interest. notion If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights. But theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation. contrast Bg with anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk and institutions aitogether, and with Mang utiLitarians, who view notion of considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in g passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be (MoraL) rights with certain unduLg narrow theories rights, of which wouLd have, if theg stood, decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie view, Regan's particuLar the rights view (as if an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the attention, worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL it has score heaviLg been proMoted since in environMentat ethics Literature and it does exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs, in certain areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats. R theorg of rights a coMprises representation (in the fashion of other package, which can be given fornaL theories) genetic as containing the foLLowing coMponents: D. a definition of a right, and P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights. Rs MatheMaticaL exaMpLes (such as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL there is a good deat of stippage between D ord inarg usage controts and P. But because of the More on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg includes as weLL 0. a set of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C) R. a set of reduction scheMes for eiiMinating transLation, reduction ruLes, etc. -10- rights Locutions, e.g. bg �The of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends theory partLcuLar LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng genetLc such breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL, accordLng to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd It guarantee. Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of and treatment. respectfuL to patLents canonLcat RLthough expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form to [not] , where - onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt X[s] of The rLght as for Lnstance not Ln to permtts (the pLuraLLsatLon partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted the rLghts vLew features onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln back dLstrLbutLng context not are The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the harm . LncLuded forms Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of to actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated, unduLg agents moraL has a LLttLe more thLs LrreducLbLe the Ls Lt poLnt, (Ln rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the' sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.) be UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL crLtLcLsed, Ln sLgnLfLeant rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge. respects Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend theg and heavLLg upon - though do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of thLs defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs, to anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the certaLn Lssue of defLnLtLon. To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz. 11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag. of gLven rLghts sLmLLar core: hLm the Ln bg MLLL (whLch of ... account Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg possessLon The moraL somethLng socLetg to protect ought to defend...', MLLL provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does whLch Regan after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls, rLght not LncLude, and quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s Lnsurance cover Ls supposed to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out, Regan, now features of rLghts LmLtatLng FeLnberg s Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag. trLcks, trLes to puLL substantLve out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for -11- such acts �than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset: is entitied to treatment of a certain kind is to assert that someone... ... To wake a ciaim and that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To a make individuais, ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against... (p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a ciaim imports much the that ordinarg notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a transaction between individuais^, thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making directig to the ciaimant, such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend, at tea one sunset, doing ang of those things in ang straightforward not is sense. There is nothing significant due or owed, directed at other took individuais in the the demanding assertions wag, or at need not be aii; and no entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it as requires weii as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items tgpicaiig introduced bg or 'to . Someone who makes a that ciaims ciaim that something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements. Rnd if is it ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg). Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification of the definitions OED integration and it with Miii's definition. Upon of separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg much the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits: M2. Vaiid entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg). The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig, or have obtain or something, characteristic fiii to to in act a certain "justifiabie justifiabie to (to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each something entaiis and mag to be entitiement ciaims sufficient, ent ireig warrant vaiid. from Thirdig, and ang case entitiing ones, and that in are i.e. dubious ciaims-against preconceptions, without be regarded appears most need not ciaim restrict to on but aiso the ciaim because make or the sheds unduig and expected ciass of rights havers or haver of a it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing potentiaiig?) important entitiement hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the right as grounds morai ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that improves upon invoived an sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig some adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation has converseig an entitiement to have something. Secondig, is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement if (To) phrase wag , which gives the of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something, entitiement the stake that ciaims. Thus use of the term -12- can ciaim (at ieast makes it an �even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on behatf of wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade through indirectLg, representatives; the tern but representatives" suggests verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg wake the to interests" shouid not be afforded rights" to dubious inference from bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance. R Lot hangs on choice of basic (as then terms other in chaiienging phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to right' newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that entitLement cLaim' and are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries partLg in terms of the others) tautoLogous. and expticative satisfactorg UeLL, Like definitions that M2 definitions virtuaLLg are are but anaLgtic, preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of entitLement, putative entitLement' expression, right , i.e. it a since doesn t a becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is that appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe, better something, is write in To vaLiditg. avoid a is sLightLg a reaL or supposed to amounts sometimes cLaim cLaim' these probLems with avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression basic definition something, R vaLid in that something (after fiLL to into in M2) and avoid disappearance of the VaLid something, on to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights). term suitabie entitLement, titiement ; is which a or a is titiement aLLeged or putative mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6. That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a aLLeged (e.g. vacuitg quant ificationaL recognised right', Const, with cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation ground inf. of a or right; of to, suitabie hence, an of the thing in, deontic principLe, cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie [for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement [for X] R . Requirements for what conditions objects (Rs) and suitabiLitg, subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows. Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to), MiLL, as interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL titiements are to be vaLidated: depend on compLiance its independentLg estabLished' the vaLiditg of with (p.270), derivation from these correct moraL stack, the vaguer a right (to) moraL principLes us return a right, whose correct that he beiieves, takes up, must have been vaLiditg principLes. to as to how provides...guidance princ ip Les i.e. Let It is the removing the "moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version, is a M3. VaLid titiement, from correct moraL principLes, appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate: -13- to some (categoriaLLg �H3S. premLsses correct worst prtncLpLes SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as to R vaLLd dertvatton cone Lus con There Ls a tttLement to R RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R Ls then LmmedLate, bg f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff X has a tttLement, vaLLd Trow correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon wag estabLLsh. candLdates The fLLL to R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g. out freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg sound LLfe, needs, support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least severaL basLc restrLct the quaLLftcatLon, consLderabLe and categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that can have the purported tttLement. Such a scheme, as f13S not (whLLe entLretg wLthout adequate eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of and revests much about rtghts. derLved important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of ought to protect can hoLders, be regards as correct moraL rLght , of a requLrement and therefore rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon, dLffuse correLatLve dutLes 3pptg prtncLpLes, to Ls no doubt Ls thus a consequentLaL over vaLLd characterLstLc poLnt of R tLtLements. as socLetLes Lt transmLt uphoLd, feature. SLmLLarLg such obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not feature from thetr character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of that soctetg that that reLevant soctettes ought to part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent dertvatLve be separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to derLvatLons; to rtghts In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For true duLg 3 rLght, but somethtng foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance, Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve others, free from unnecessarg suffering then moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng; -14- �and prohLbLtLon the functor Ls transnLtted the down cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents R derLvatLon.^ Ls consequentLaL a feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe. (ThLs Ls whg Regan can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231). SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that seLf-evLdent puretg or rLghts. axLonatLc a aLwags defence It foLLows, then, that ang theorg rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons. cLaLns are no For ang rLght that stands up, that connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls Lags there of that seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts to (such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such as that RnerLcan) the announces seLf-evLdent rLghts, Ls nLstaken. RLghts are aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten. ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts, and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes, as there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds, are rLghts and generated fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns, etc. - but Ln the derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes. Because of theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg envLronnentaL ethLcaL enterprLses. not are But Ln essentLaL absoLuteLg a strongLg for LndLvLduaLLstLc rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg, Lt Ls a snart strategg to nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents. RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance, of the force theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of others (hence the Lnportance Ln a noraL consLderatLons, whLch noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and rotes, of Ln persuasLve so Lnsurance sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts prLncLpLes, and truno on. argunentatLve reasons too, Lnputed rLghts are Lnportant Ln reLnforcLng gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg, Ln The socLaL advantages LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon of rLghts accordLngLg offers not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest: -15- he �aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang is woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back Lt ts not a consequence that Me prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL, the can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there potnt no ts advantage or Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get theM. to to aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can get aLong wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us. R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having senttence, tnterest, as such etc. (a rather now rtghts, of faniLiar test). Constder tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive. Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln Ln the Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL theg coutd be incorporated, Ln defLntttons McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though (OED, vLctnttg other preMtss the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg RI is observes, not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has had Mang with notabtg rivaLs, interests repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing (rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^ How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings out), 1) inc Lud ing: we Usage; speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as don't possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg). and non-usage to has be backed In fact we do, bg other consideration if arbitrariness and prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp. 160-1). 2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM (again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^ it of and coupied 3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for right it cLaiM). Must have Nothing characteristicaLLg an interest however requires afford (FreedMan, is that reasoning a right is a sonething to a have p.16^., who upsets the inferred the protection rights that of an interest; as far as the Meaning of goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*) exercising roughig if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation with sgnongnous have; others and Confusion of having right with right a a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising or to cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted transition, such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate -16- to do with the �Mak Lng bg c La LMS of a hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns). R creature or LteM wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such as exercLsabLe rLghts, Lndeed Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe but reLevant actLvLtg), requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the such notLon of rLght. of For Lnstance, the Lnterest-protectLng aspect of tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not froM the notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests (especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of Lnterests). R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to rLghts restrLct to persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton that what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts to persons, or to LndLvLduaLs, or persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to LndLvLduaLs and "persons". RLL these restr Let Lons on rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon. or �§3. and rebuiLding environMentaLLg. the rLghts vLew Deconstructing Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts LndLvLduaL to Consider, a subjects, LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to cope decentLg spec Les, concernLng rare 3nd endangered (e.g. Regan s pp.395-6). prob Lens of our tines, such as those envLronnentaL Major wLth forest does restrLctLon ecosgsteMs, wLLderness, foLLow froM not even etc. hLs own defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg LnfLLtrated, as postuLates the concerning are eLaborated. It is not rights uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in p.39S) RR, a arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins, brief because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs (In sgLLogistic extended IndividuaLs forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs. not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species. do Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So the rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare endangered or species right-hoLders needn t be individuaLs, aniMais.) of so The restricted beginning after aLL, onLg the species (with a if are paradigMs MoraL the about or MeMbers species e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then treated, individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan view as Look undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone further non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species theiisetves. it Makes of announces, rights The Species are not individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of species to is view 3ngthing rights individuaLs. (p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation is actuaLLg offered), are not MereLg the right-hoLders; paradigMatic theg right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the exhaust iron-fisted thene of (p.361), according the to aLLeged individuaListic nature of MoraL rights which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL and LegaL usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction. Uhg trg to iMpose such an iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view? EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg. a rebuiit rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group, in virtue of princ ip Les such as that significant endangered species ought to be protected. creatures wouLd hoLd different But then different rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid, this, On but as a Matter of definition) in and basis (the of inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions. -18- of rights, �restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s The package, that can simpig be pee Led off. rLghts appt LeatLons of super-imposed theorg, the but Ls essentLaL wLth for the given coherence a super-individuaL, such as a specLes, If postuLates. equaLLtg hetd rLghts on an equaL basts It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major Lt, composLng LndLvLduaLs the then the wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL super-individuaL Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE on bLocentrLc egaLitarianism; DC, Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing p.3S). through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg. IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts view, theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and deconstructLon on of the rLghts exactLg view thLs Ls EquaLLtg done. assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to from dLrectLg dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg features absoLute are quaLLt Les, theg do Ls aspect ref Leets and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg rLghts foLLow that (p.368). It does not come Ln degrees not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of Ltems the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL bund Les equaL that have have rLghts of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a certain Ln LmpartLaLLtg treatment (often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm). equaLLtg NeLther nor assumptLons LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts To them fend we have to foLLow gLven. the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the rLght respectfuL to treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag, both beLng imported parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated as justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls rLght those of who have argued Ls basic the Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment (p.277), where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng aLL suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg. ConsLder subjects' vaLue as - what we LL caLL Lnherent LndLvLduaLs vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg p.23S ff.). (pp p.37; Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming sLmLLarLg to HR various postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent vaLue can be varied, pLace of Lnherent vaLue, LndLvLduaL as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then, Ln LnLtLaL or connate vaLue, X, or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X, defined, for ang Ltem if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt assumed that, for Ls ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came -17- �connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised, Ls Lt as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load. showing Before that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing (certain affairs individual tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or tgpes aLL positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd negative vaLue connate disboLicainess, if (their ontoLogicaL no nonexistence proofs objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate doubt have decidedLg to adding their the existence of top connate vaLue of are vaLues somewhat thus initiaL Like LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood, at an best initiaL assignment. The assignments Like those of initiaL are probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg vaLue; connate out themseLves presumptive those of inherent vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort their bg initiaL Life-stgLes, can which vaLue, then intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a be theg states worLd-Lines, posteriori a diminished as or increased receive probabiLLtg assignments. Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting prtncLpLes, features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant. 0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to carrg enough (not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect principLe. appears Examination to show that it can, at Least to this extent: insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on respectfuL fact, Ln individuat bg to item substitute connate made is principLe, principLe as aLso to repLace required, nameig resuLts defence of the modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the bg shows, where the the same substitutions as before. The modified principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items which have connate that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect wags in and presupposed argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon vaLue right throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the modified the features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg concerning respect to inherent for work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg those vaLue succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It treatment suffices, inherent principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for individuaLs, and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment. Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted, but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a fuLLer de- and re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded environmentaL rights theorg offered. But it which repLaces the moraL rights view wiLL be is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of -20- �the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts theorg (e.g. can PP,p.32), perhaps (minus remain totaLitg the cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence. But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact, most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of rLghts movement. Nonethe Less? animat the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe supererogatorg; Lt (p.351,p.3^.6) to thLs permLssLbLe Ls vegetarianism Ls (p.39!+); But (p.3^6). obLLgatorg' cone Lus Lon the appear to most the arguments the not Ls Lt that Ls estab LLsh not to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages). vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons Ls Lt given, wrong to purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a vegetarLan beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and, '16 ----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc ), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no proper of focus Regan's sLnce attach, such practLces tgpLcaLLg dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les of practLces huntLng-gatherLng LLfestgLes, of doubt Lead LncLude to the the gardenLng cuLtures of the Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes. Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page 3nd 351 with eatLng dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of (as these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes weLL as mtnor ones), newfangLed Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and so R chLef reason gLven Ls that on. end theLr LLves are brought to an untLmeLg antmaLs' (e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct tLme has come, vegetarLanLsm, that or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead. Mhat precLudes respectfuL use? Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more connected theorLes, such as aLL that consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as restrLctLons, wLthout further Large sent Lent utLLLtarLanLsm, are Longer no sentient or entaLL moraL deserve such dLetarg assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to which beLngs than eat dead creatures, things which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is aLreadg dead, but of causing prematureLg, Ln order death (or, to a Lesser extent, Letting die) to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product. For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate moraL standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg. Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to -21- �anLmaLs bauLk anLmaLs. Rnd at for sone patLents, Papuans the rLghts extensive to LLfe and LLveLhood to own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between Regan's noraL agents and moraL treatment, such admLttLng ground of treatment dLfferentLaL further and pLgs, a peopLe dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed. Regan s dLfferentLaL justLfgLng for So how tLght Ls Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst arguMent, tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk of the crucLaL argument ff.) dLd not treat resources. Nor dLd theg (p.3{+^); receptacLes does sLmpLg cuLtures tradLtLonaL renewabLe (p.3t*3 appLg. not anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as as anLmaLs treat Lnstruments mere excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that of tradLtLonaL unLLke peopLes, provLsLon (p.3t*3), are prLncLpLe dubLous admLtted commercLaL under derLved supposedLg who farmers Regan's from prLncLpLe LLbertg respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R the LncLudLng fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng requLres whLch that treatment creatures of vaLue Lnherent are however Some excLuded. Ls not of for prLncLpLe, the countervaLLLng respectfuL No excLuded. LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue persLst, come what mag. There use Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have (p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not wLth a (p.331, stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more the Ln practLces the vLoLate the respect crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs, food, Papua, pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not exchanged often or consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln who Large and Bg does rLghts are therebg a acquLre not Ln LndLctLons Lnterference rLght text Regan s to (and eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng tradLtLonaL the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons that Lt Ls LLfestgLes LnadmLssLbLe. Such are aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that LLfe anLmaLs brLnqtrg to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe use or harmfuL destructLve wLth LncompatLbLe bLoconatLvLst the vLoLence "LLbertg" assumptLons, no (p.287); prLncLpLes matter as Lnterpreted. dLffLcuLt how wouLd maxLMLae never to bLoconatLvLsm appears Lndeed to NonetheLess, LLve bg, are hLghLg appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg who an to mang vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or MorLd magbe a Ls not verg rendered LnadmLssLbLe. ilagbe The RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL; dLfferent predator-free sLn-eradLcated RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed? -22- post-naturaL worLd Ls �$4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts and substantiaL prob tews. tivehood: and predation, territoriatitg other the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers Despite have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that * Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the human as those of instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see for animats, sort sane e.g. RR, PR). * Rnimats have various For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that rights. humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and from excessive interference. these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg Mhite neither necessarg nor sufficient significant connections, inasmuch rights), having for as rights are nonethetess protect permissibie there to serve worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such de-foresters, as mag otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human practices sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their interests. For exampie, much animai suffering. causes experimentation unnecessarg quite there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare Thus and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced, and easier obtain to positive action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of sociai protection the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists. Granted animats have rights, some of them higher humans rights nohumans, widespread a have, main animats phenomenon of predation, a par with those that question (pace Freg) concerns which outstanding particutartg, on have. Because especiatig of the essential to the continued tivetihood of mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult one (and one comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest Regan induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when a herbivore s interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued sustenance, avoidabte others as in human Predation is not of course the ontg source of territoriatitg, slaughter of whates and dotphins. serious conflict of interests; for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected). Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population been converted into increase serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective the but integral part much of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's, hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic as themes probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism reduces an have individuats, that those items items such (constituting the base ctass) have a fixed -23- �(equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for and that vaLues (derived) Ls ecosystems, of whaLes additive an simpLy functLon the of aLLenabLe, such structures, organised and or atoms as Lt. within CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon and LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a infringing path, and maximization preservatLon enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to has that LndLvLduaL (Lnherent) LnLtLaL to everg simiLarLy woraL exLstence (and vaLue suboptimaL The rights view desLderata. contLnued Like the considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions, and the reasons for revising the vaLue eLsewhere than which are wore LncLude sun the of predators, theLr LndLvLduaL escaLation The the of theg though components, be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth mag LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn vaLue. detaLL Ln the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems, (Ln tgpLcaLLg expLaLned are assumptions, the through probLems wLthout system, reductLon of theorLes deserves, rights however, some eLaboratLon. R serLous cLash of Lnterest, as between carnLvores and herbLvores, fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg rLghts, of unLess too Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the many extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a Ln contLnuLng mistaken to eLevatLon that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls LnfrLnged bg LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe. a MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe cases of to Lnterfere some Ln predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be appLLed hoLd to gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated issues in these bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but at further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf, verg Least, dubiousLg permissibLe. High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are On contrary, the virtuaLLy aLL the remaining naturaL radicaLLg unsatisfactory. systems containing Large carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a Can t an rights to, right fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute though their rLghts to Life. to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some confLict, and inconsistency even, of rights, obLigations and so on, is inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags. Some can, but not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often -24- �significant) sorts of cases. In these terns, bg accommodated Mag of up confLLct sgstematic reguLar such confLLct anatogous S3tisfactoriig It Ls too reguLar, deontLc does sgstem not because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc cases, structures: for then much too much rather not of rLghts or prLncLpLes. confLLet sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent muLtipLg is predatton Ls time cases. R confLLct, repuzziing spent undermines MhLch fash Lon to deaL wLth sattsfactorg more redecLdLng and the point and force of prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach (no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach: right. feeL doesn't p.33) DC, at aLL Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek R Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature. R aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in superior excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood to right does not an give unquaLified Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse. In these terms, a Lion that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The different. Mith situation their take chances. rights to Life are not predatorg is essentiaLLg not LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find LJeak, themseives in threatening situations, such as traveL humans animats or wiiderness If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe therebg or action highspeed infringed animats where (and defending their animats are territories LnvoLved, not shouid be HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL, persecuted). except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their chances with naturaL predators. Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming with predation and Like issues happens, what grips is through zoning, or more generaLLg through bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface what to and eisewhere. is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves of out a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions big For wiiderness as Locus, Lt is much to think hoLLsticaLLg, easier predation as an LntegraL and significant part of such a rich naturaL the as to see structure rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting. (The adjustment of ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg; wiiderness is an appropriatetg generat notion, not get a proper name.) The action of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness areas, in taking preg conservativeLg, Ln defending their territories and so -25- on, �LnvoLves no LtseLf Ln infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a career. that tresspassLng Darwin Ln earLg hLs brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the a OnLg deng Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as with predatLon, to undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses and repLacenents of sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng naturaL MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde, thought Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg, huMan-engtneered that even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan breakdown, who efforts, whtch especLaLLg are prone to soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg can theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs the as there are and More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters norMaLLg straightforward huMan chLLdbirth, provide weLL-docuMented ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or the of evidence as MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one the ecoLogicaL Laws to of encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive huMan interference Ln naturaL regions. It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue a Lwags as poLiticaL high wickedness, evoLutionarg not it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of as Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not there inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate Long is process - that the no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved adapted in weLL wag a to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent it is far froM cLear that Nature of such huMans, provides rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL an optiMat sgsteM; Law" argued for eLsewhere: see SM). The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step with deontic best MoraLLtg, principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see were with that vaLue SH). Even it be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt. Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing environnent; naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite and often dazzLing, Lf LeveLs of vaLue. Richard SgLvan via Bungendore -26- for the adequate, �RustraLia 2621 NOTES 1- For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of that thought environmentaL Lt far of southern and western Rmerican schooLs, out fLows the surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that emerges typLcaLLy the froM prestigious More universities Ln LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres LLke Oxford. 2. May ThLs a strike MoraL as theorist aiMost cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics - as curious as a order in aLso and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are different. assessMents Cost/benefit depend on a vaLue theory of soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity. 3- EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and amounts what choice seLf-appointed chosen, (p.!*). makers entitLement a to in There are probiems according PP, to we free and rationaL use regarding of contexts, since entitLement moves in the these rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights. The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving a moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage. MoraL notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges and catagoriaL features are investigated and put to principLed work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the dLvisions of ref Leets cLassification things in terms of such features, where theg appLy, as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy these features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not. (Even if they were and a hierarchy aLL Not probiematic. resuLted, hierarchies are need that damaging, e.g. ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may oniy were when be. not be mereLy It is hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to, power or priviLege or favour, that theg warrant the criticism hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy been directed at certain power hierarchies are of this sort.) -27- hierarchies; but not aLL �UorrLes about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers an (west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth LMpoverLshed ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears both as deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such Ln where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts Regan's, Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon. 5. StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on standLng vaLue-Ln-LtseLf wLth Freg, Ln equates who worst and proceeds to bound Lt (p.!+S), beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs part happens as coLLapse of a of wore wLdespread huwanLstLc utLLLtarLan Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further casuaLLtg. 6. PossLbLLLtg and forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes probabtLLtg are basLc to the Ma Ln arguwents the to LMMoraLLtg of nucLear arrangements: see LiP. 7. But Fox has M3de a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an attempt Ls bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM woraLLtg as Ln a generaL bad Lnstttutton, cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much enMeshed whtch damage, Ls of has a poor thoroughtg Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg; Lt does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg. 8. UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But what are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features. 8. SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts taLk resuLt froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged that rLghts are verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg, prtncLpLe of such p3rstMong, as OccuM s weLL as provLdtng a pasttng such propertLes, such as betng objeettons of such crude LnstruMents as OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have have a razor, such ent Lt Les shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts (as bg derLvatLve rLghts; froM rLghts certaLn obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects. -28- �10. The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern Ls one, a verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20 right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to senses of the substantive brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN. RLthough the takes anaLgsis frow off one Ma Ln OED sense, the eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected 1.3 as whLch that MoraLLg just or due concerned Ls (as in LnvoLveMent activities); be no issues concerning opportunitg (as in rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights state-iMposed such equitg or ... which is right-doing ). But there wiLL Main Ln wLth senses, not to in participate are priMariig issues for MoraL these actors. 11. reLevant or coMMunities to capabie or individuats within theM, i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies. The status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such exact arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00 is or further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00 a is. 13. Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for who Leaps to the cone Lus ion that sentience, beings and the "higher ... is an the fact that huMan aniMats have experiences or MentaL states the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg (p.^3). No arguMent at aLL are possessors of MoraL rights than appeaL to (other is to be found for this ciatM, a authoritg) surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting for Freg, faiLure suppig to others arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the MereLg citing Light of his eartier reMarks that sentieneg as a criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe respects are provided ... arguMents in these subsequent chapters, such arguMents are . Rs we shaLL see in scarce on the ground (p.33). lit- Too Leg s anaLgsis standard account substituting can "right of for desires , an wouLd Mark out onLg subcLass rights, of be upgraded, and brought into Line with (adopted to" Ln EE, p.176), chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt iMportant roughLg consequentiai exercisabLe criticisM teLLs against EE). -2?- feature rLghts (a of a siMLLar �IS. Rn important exanpLe is the argunent which bg broken is concedLng to that vaLue, equat not p.33, PP aLL hunans, serLousLg genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss. 16. London,1932). RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega, the But qutte not Ls natter not a reputation of sLnpLe, so vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats decisive. carefuL definition, which wouLd however render nore R sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is 'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg OED account, so upon the vegetabie a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL foods; food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of Life'. 17. that not decisivetg support vegetartantsn, even inproved connerciat faming does UtLLitarianisn invoLving s Laugh ter and of so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive aninats, argunent). Ln Rnd fact fLawed the case utititarian vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work for of one choice of of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36). 13. sone Uhite such terntnoLogg distinction singuLarLg is unfortunate given the non-obsoiete patient . Most aninats are not patients. senses of the noun 13. the inportant, is For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict such as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and threats to rabid foxes to the crunch; hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the then strict norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane aLL and hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones for cases, for subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and respectfuL defective farngard greater C3n practices vaLue assunption be p.3^.2). condenned, R is snuggLed into the rights view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth (see DE, si). 20. On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn. 21. Predation bg Large carnivores can conpared with hunan travet be usefuLLg, sporting and predation (no accident of -30- course) favourabig, accidents. UhiLe the nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order aninaL and of nagnitude, appears to invoLve �rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though reduct ton tn vatue tn the removat tt tnvotve may some of on-gotng ttves, tt atso offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts. REFERENCES J.B. A t Catttcott, On the tntrtnstc vatues of nonhuman spectes' tn The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press, 1386; pp.138-172. R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London, 1377. J. Fetnberg, The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press; Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68. U. Fox, R postcrtpt on 2(1+) (1385) 17-23. deep ecotogy and tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs B. Freedman, Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168. R.G. Frey, Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats, 1880. K.E. Goodpaster, 308-325. Ctarendon, Oxford, On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378) I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con, Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386. J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373. H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good tn Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136. C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty, 1385. E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs 5(1383 )l+7-61. T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383; to as HR. T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs', Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP. J. Rodman, Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an -31- �ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56. J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.185-8. R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR. R. Rout Leg, In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC. R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB. R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU 1981+; referred to as UP. R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE. ' 1 T. Rgan, The case for animaL rights' in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39. % C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+. R. SgLvan, R critique of deep ecoiogg', 1+1(1985); referred to as DE. Radicatj^hiLosophg 1+0(1985) ana R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees, UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV? Begond moraL extens ion isms. Some find us of mereig not ourseives at with odds mainstream environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg disastrous, not ontg for mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg, a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes. the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons Rgain wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne. extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL MoraL apparatus conventLonaL Lts begond (but certaLnLg subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed, certaLn confLnes to unwarranted) or eLse, more LLkeLg, has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend wag the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the assumptions vatue, (equaL appLLed to a wider cLass equat of rLghts, of adjustment, consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg equaL a (Rs subjects. moraL egaLLtarLan wLth tgpe, generaL moraL ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff., under and the tgpicaL and usefuL weapon movements of Liberation with proceed couLd Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a MoraLisms Nature LabLe more rLghts and accurate movements Less but equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL to moraLitg bend to iLLegitimate certain interests, etc), are equaLitg, standing, but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least on the boundaries, as it ex tens Lon isms endeavour not onLg do the since (rights, such impressive pubLLcLg extensLonLsms purposes, extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved (though is! from Seen a wider perspective, environmentaL not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go, in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted, it remains. The zones of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai as forests, species, ecosgstems, continue mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE, things be to p.llf.1). Nor can such substantiaL to open the sorts of invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite which extensions, extensions operate, such as sentience, LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe, the verg characteristics pain-receptivitg, idea of an on interests, environmentaL ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite respect for naturat sgstems and communities, founders on the moraL rights position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff). Mang a Ls MoraLLtg weapon, purpose depLoged bg pressure and often interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to and justLfg wLde a actLvLtg of range and hostLLe practices ground naturaL to envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr needs generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met there though even are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu and PLgden - have a poLnt MoraLLtLes Lt when MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew and to coMes The MoraLLtg. such HLnckfuss through daMage of seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the often benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and work often the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts. Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk, conduct to LMpossLbLe concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the response to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg, tougher dLstLnctLon, (practLcaL hard j^s (whLch axLoLogg to to avoLd) MaLntaLn, between there Ls a further deontLc expressLons Rnd deontLes. and practLcat between expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth and such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a soLLd case agaLnst objectLve or absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks. Hagbe the net a carefuL practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?, LMpact soMe of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can doesn t MoraLLtg coLLect a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg constraLn that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest appear to be turned around through abuses, of an Ls Lnput on chauvLnLstLc, as such froM sLaverg, huMan MoraLLtg. huMan Even so the persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg posLtLveLg Ln thLngs contrLbute couLd that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar, MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the prospect of More, More protectLon, Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through verg channeLLed MoraL ftowLng, through aLL too LegaL often, rather to the than wrong dLfferent LnstLtutLons; wLth fraMeworks, part Les, such as the Lt Ls the benefLts strong and estabLLshed. HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls, Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for peace (MoraLLtg beLng a MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be. -2- Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide an assauit on the environMent instead of other creatures, subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones, or a prettg easg feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern technoLogicaL LLke was that course, of is; Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom guns another or (huMan, Ls now deeptg natLonat, state or race), LLkeLg, More entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part supportLng of scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg socLaL can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg not and appLLed, successfuttg Must awaLt Ls Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on. There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars antL-MoraLLsts) equated) nottons: MoraL status, rLghts, sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs But the tern can scarceLg escape attogether MoraL def Ln Lt tons Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg reveaL) that tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe such MoraL group: narrower the ang Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the use ttght of as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL. Lssue coMMon cLuster consLderatLon, retevance, a on foLLowLng These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to . ... the standing, consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates perMissions, to are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns (often (guaLnt ethicai ) (hunan) actors, as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces Ln the Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM objects MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends to be shunned Ln The notion of deeper environMentaL theorg. SiMoraL RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies. standing, introduced notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag environMentaL heavg, but ethics. It is anaiogg questionabte bg a Major, with the RngLo-RMerLcan but d3Maging, danaging because, verg briefLg, rote it wouLd paint a rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that have not froM those territorg. that have MoraL standing - across Much conpLex More Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence criterion in of MoraL standing is probieM soLving; absoiuteLg basic reasonabLg addressing of a in environMentaL thinking and the Lssue of MoraL standLng Must be vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of thLs Ls so evLdent, especLaLLg gLven the MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL standing. In the sane vein, an a necessarg condition ... for Lt is stated that ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing adequate Such statements are suretg overstatements. For, Ln pLace, fLrst the there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones, which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL ecoLogLcat Rodman s deep Naess s (e.g. ecotogg, sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg warranted make standing rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing. For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's moraL of notLon attempt (Ln NP) to a make standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic, part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii as ahistoricai, a piece of footnoted Regan s retrospective account of Legisiation). as But, it happens, standing, according to which a being has moraL morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the exposed (thus biconditionaL invoLved in the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the conditions tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest bg sgstem about be to buiidozed, or the Moon about to be bg tourized an Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags that wiii at Low we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be that affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps in a modified wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so, such a deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic; for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings, which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition standLng, something his footnoted for moraL account does not guarantee. The LegaListic notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL. Rn initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is for ang sufficientLg comprehensive notion of a sometimes entering into moraL consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason, some decidedtg restrictive assumptions, concerning interests and whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter assessment on modeL dubious it imports rights into ethicaL occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates terms of having of thing in certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests, sort of that couLd or be the have interests, even as derived (as in the case of LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often -4- indeed, Legat have to standing to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc., is begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts. room Of course there ts constderabte standtng not ton the widen to Legat of tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and (which "cLaimants to admit, through representatton, other to the PresentLg, courts. for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag and persons of broadentng the standtng not ton objects, agatn because to encompass Limitations the the mang requisite environmentaL nottons of tnterests and rtghts impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs, the MonuMents, and bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of Ontg constderabtg. do, Like naturat these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the wodet Legat be overcome. coutd be recogntsed, account of the Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg anaLogg behtnd, Left unimpeded fresh a and now standtng woraL rather propose free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to an expLLcatton of Recordtng to them, can be construed atong these LLnes. whtch For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X fISl. tnterests Lts theg sag Ln that weLL-betng have postttve moraL weight stLpuLattng theg re the but this; theg re or (PP. p.3). RctuaLLg, not free simpig to given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg sttputate, recogntze Ln proceeding at once to consider various to their standard answers basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore in LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg a than effect substitute a tortuous Less nameLg account, generaLLtg (in interpretation) MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG: pureLg since future items mag have ancestors). Either wag the account is weight and having moraL continued some moraL circutar, or shouLd however be significance, since having X of wetfare has deLeted, as mag dead positive moraL standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster. p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg circutar, H33. But has X then as moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight. a expLication, the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg. Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do? -5- The troubie Ls except that theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL partLcuLar on standing, the notion Ln fact does verg because hoMe Ma Ln whose eth Les, chauvLnLstLc base does whLch LLes wLthLn the not extend or traveL unsatLsfactorg; wLth as coMpetence, or m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL The personhood). are (such cLassLfLcatLons bLoLogLcaL socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or potentLaL standLng MoraL Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth spec Les the of the wLder to onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to not ctassLfLcatLons ethLcaL MeMbershLp are theg trad Lt LonaL of weLL for ethLcs, It Ls one of those confLnes envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed confuse envLronmentaL Ln work Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt. there not Lons, LLttLe enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE) DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then, no satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP - or Lt eLsewhere It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe, seens. non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng. Rather the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The for reason the needs what cost-benefLt LMperatLves be to Looked at presuppose a Morat Ln appLLcatLons assessments, (whLch thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present Lt wouLd decLsLvetg Ls evLdent enough: usefuL work, space, about enthusLasM and deLLMLt of the categorLcaL of deLLMLtatLons behLnd proposed some notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc foLd (partLg moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg bg use of the term achLeved Ls search unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so Morat search space towards the confLnes of the thLs MoraL confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes appLLcatLons the neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of Lts LLmLtatLons. ConsLder standLng moraL Lnstead of work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL standLng (m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X, e.g. Let to Lt theg otherwLse not atone, do not to confLne Lt or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but (cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around, thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of whereas Lf Lacks m-s, Lt Lt does not have thLs protectLon, 3 Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt . def Ln Lt Lon of moraL standLng ... Lf somethLng weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count Lts Lf a Lnterests, Lt does not count, .... Indeed, so Lt Ls Lacks (p.t+). The moraL saLd, standLng, defLnLtLon Bg Lts however deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng moraL wLthout pLcture of assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems m-s are dLscounted, and trade-offs contempLated, p.16). -6- of Ltems wLth m-s are soon Such appLication an if division; accordingtg LmpLies an unfortunate aLL-or-nothing item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng Lf be and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd standing contrasted with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat such tgpoLogg, that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The as tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant such as having vaiue, weLL-being, appropriate p.!2).^ the character aLL-or-nothing from at Least Modified becomes evident of various (e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties capacities, so and and forth; to moraL standing distinctions soon duties) (direct to needs be introduced as opposed to (indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg regarding duties autonomg, and postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP ethicaL That preferences, features adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent boundarg consists in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing is assumed to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg PSI. floraL agents iff But have a presumptive dutg to X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.). presumptive are duties even more prone to be bg upset circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion the notion overriding expands); standing, p.S), the forged connections things than without much too simpLe, as wiLL are for appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required purposes so operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding moraL decentLg] X [to treat it moraLLg moraL a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties, which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue, and extent of vaLue (see SM). Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing account, and counted, perhaps (if sometimes that wouLd be taken into in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL attributes are evidentLg a subcLass commonpLace vaLue of surprising, vaLue as attributes, e.g. in the confiation CaLLicott). is Possessing intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant. Indeed PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to intrinsic vaLue with their being evident, and considerabLe, (p.S) and before Long has identified moraL standing of things vaLuabte prove in damaging. Goodpaster themseLves Towards Lapses (p.I6). Such equations are not the end of his essag, on being moraLLg from -7- moraL considerabiLitg into that Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte, Ln vatue-for-itsetf, psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities sophLstLcated unnecessaritg seen Lt Ls true when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be Lts for vatued own (p.320); sake Lt not so obvious that theg are too but sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon at work Ln Goodpaster s hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of and vatue ontg — consLderabLLLtg to appears obtaLn where vatue Ls unreduced (LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter; for exanpte tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when as where, of conceptLon Lts (p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and noraL consLderabLLLtg vatue Ls no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter, characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion). The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is point even norat the obvioustg Less stopping vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has for estate no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat vatue verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg (a accessibte nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose (for further, what is not at att untiketg, that sgstens natch that Moon the has fornations sone shoutd be the that thensetves, into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of taken projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But insist or naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a the defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in which is considerabititg Lt woutd be LnptausLbte to Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes. It is just not the feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the circte have suggests different sone exanpte, For connotations. notions beLng Ln noraL the consLderabLe norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account, suitabte not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg requires the iten in question has interests or at Least a such tetos), an that agent discussion-setting can phrase be deserves norat weLL-being towards considerate notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31 does norat retevance, R different get nere artifacts are norattg etc., dependent, quarrg that (a Goodpaster s Rnd nornattg the notion do presunabtg nornattg woutd not. Nor, not it erroneoustg, reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains context Like that another different notion sonetines equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though since does nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3 inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect, appear, (as or consideration ). certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.) woutd norat an etusive, has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of -8- high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto other chase. the however, Since these are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like notLons MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or - scrapped we qutetLg can bgpass the vaiue the nuances and differences. CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect, wider notion and Moraiitg, if wag theg inportant in which not at derivative, Least with R dependent. Most connect is through LiMitat ions on interference. MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue. LittLe R More preciseLg, a actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as MoraL to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a sensitive Matter MainLg because deontic principLes do not excLude soMe vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we of reduction - shaLL be obLiged to return. Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg, and standing Like, the vaLue notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists, in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it triviaL is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte vaLue circuMstances); the (in Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes soMething Morai. It this notion too that has induced the unwarranted narrow ing of focus, to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer, certainig wrong, to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather, etc. what is MoraL has to do with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with justice and goodness), features refLected fornaLLg in suitabLe universaLizabiiitg of principie.^ So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate at narrower certain ethicaL tgpes, which excLude the wider environnent. The width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing ethicaL*. equivaLent ethics a of (For coMparison, rec Lass ification as consider "environMentat bg MoraL its originaL the effect in environMentat MoraLs" environMentat or Moratitg"). $2. Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages. EthicaL standing does not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM door for hearing. a hearing; in an ethicaL it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even, if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse for identifging standing and rights (short assuMption that of the astonishing but prevaLent aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences are giossed over, having MoraL rights is equated with having MoraL standing The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8) CaLLicott). (e.g. Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions (expioitation consideration free not exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie for Underneath consideration). MoraL these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions; triviaL MoraL deserving since wh3t is piausibie for costs, of for just not the More that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in one but the ethicaL door, consideration are assuMption the rendered that equivaLent having and rights standing or a coMMon Middie terM, such as through having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has iff it has (or even have) rights. (or can have) interests, i.e. iMpiicit appear but (with Minor Such equations quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things; but Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted of (huManoid) interest. notion If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights. But theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation. contrast Bg with anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk and institutions aitogether, and with Mang utiLitarians, who view notion of considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in g passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be (MoraL) rights with certain unduLg narrow theories rights, of which wouLd have, if theg stood, decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie view, Regan's particuLar the rights view (as if an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the attention, worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL it has score heaviLg been proMoted since in environMentat ethics Literature and it does exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs, in certain areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats. R theorg of rights a coMprises representation (in the fashion of other package, which can be given fornaL theories) genetic as containing the foLLowing coMponents: D. a definition of a right, and P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights. Rs MatheMaticaL exaMpLes (such as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL there is a good deat of stippage between D ord inarg usage controts and P. But because of the More on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg includes as weLL 0. a set of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C) R. a set of reduction scheMes for eiiMinating transLation, reduction ruLes, etc. -10- rights Locutions, e.g. bg The of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends theory partLcuLar LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng genetLc such breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL, accordLng to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd It guarantee. Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of and treatment. respectfuL to patLents canonLcat RLthough expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form to [not] , where - onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt X[s] of The rLght as for Lnstance not Ln to permtts (the pLuraLLsatLon partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted the rLghts vLew features onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln back dLstrLbutLng context not are The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the harm . LncLuded forms Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of to actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated, unduLg agents moraL has a LLttLe more thLs LrreducLbLe the Ls Lt poLnt, (Ln rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the' sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.) be UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL crLtLcLsed, Ln sLgnLfLeant rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge. respects Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend theg and heavLLg upon - though do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of thLs defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs, to anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the certaLn Lssue of defLnLtLon. To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz. 11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag. of gLven rLghts sLmLLar core: hLm the Ln bg MLLL (whLch of ... account Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg possessLon The moraL somethLng socLetg to protect ought to defend...', MLLL provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does whLch Regan after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls, rLght not LncLude, and quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s Lnsurance cover Ls supposed to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out, Regan, now features of rLghts LmLtatLng FeLnberg s Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag. trLcks, trLes to puLL substantLve out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for -11- such acts than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset: is entitied to treatment of a certain kind is to assert that someone... ... To wake a ciaim and that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To a make individuais, ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against... (p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a ciaim imports much the that ordinarg notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a transaction between individuais^, thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making directig to the ciaimant, such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend, at tea one sunset, doing ang of those things in ang straightforward not is sense. There is nothing significant due or owed, directed at other took individuais in the the demanding assertions wag, or at need not be aii; and no entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it as requires weii as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items tgpicaiig introduced bg or 'to . Someone who makes a that ciaims ciaim that something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements. Rnd if is it ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg). Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification of the definitions OED integration and it with Miii's definition. Upon of separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg much the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits: M2. Vaiid entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg). The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig, or have obtain or something, characteristic fiii to to in act a certain "justifiabie justifiabie to (to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each something entaiis and mag to be entitiement ciaims sufficient, ent ireig warrant vaiid. from Thirdig, and ang case entitiing ones, and that in are i.e. dubious ciaims-against preconceptions, without be regarded appears most need not ciaim restrict to on but aiso the ciaim because make or the sheds unduig and expected ciass of rights havers or haver of a it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing potentiaiig?) important entitiement hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the right as grounds morai ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that improves upon invoived an sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig some adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation has converseig an entitiement to have something. Secondig, is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement if (To) phrase wag , which gives the of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something, entitiement the stake that ciaims. Thus use of the term -12- can ciaim (at ieast makes it an even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on behatf of wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade through indirectLg, representatives; the tern but representatives" suggests verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg wake the to interests" shouid not be afforded rights" to dubious inference from bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance. R Lot hangs on choice of basic (as then terms other in chaiienging phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to right' newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that entitLement cLaim' and are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries partLg in terms of the others) tautoLogous. and expticative satisfactorg UeLL, Like definitions that M2 definitions virtuaLLg are are but anaLgtic, preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of entitLement, putative entitLement' expression, right , i.e. it a since doesn t a becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is that appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe, better something, is write in To vaLiditg. avoid a is sLightLg a reaL or supposed to amounts sometimes cLaim cLaim' these probLems with avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression basic definition something, R vaLid in that something (after fiLL to into in M2) and avoid disappearance of the VaLid something, on to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights). term suitabie entitLement, titiement ; is which a or a is titiement aLLeged or putative mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6. That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a aLLeged (e.g. vacuitg quant ificationaL recognised right', Const, with cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation ground inf. of a or right; of to, suitabie hence, an of the thing in, deontic principLe, cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie [for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement [for X] R . Requirements for what conditions objects (Rs) and suitabiLitg, subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows. Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to), MiLL, as interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL titiements are to be vaLidated: depend on compLiance its independentLg estabLished' the vaLiditg of with (p.270), derivation from these correct moraL stack, the vaguer a right (to) moraL principLes us return a right, whose correct that he beiieves, takes up, must have been vaLiditg principLes. to as to how provides...guidance princ ip Les i.e. Let It is the removing the "moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version, is a M3. VaLid titiement, from correct moraL principLes, appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate: -13- to some (categoriaLLg H3S. premLsses correct worst prtncLpLes SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as to R vaLLd dertvatton cone Lus con There Ls a tttLement to R RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R Ls then LmmedLate, bg f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff X has a tttLement, vaLLd Trow correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon wag estabLLsh. candLdates The fLLL to R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g. out freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg sound LLfe, needs, support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least severaL basLc restrLct the quaLLftcatLon, consLderabLe and categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that can have the purported tttLement. Such a scheme, as f13S not (whLLe entLretg wLthout adequate eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of and revests much about rtghts. derLved important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of ought to protect can hoLders, be regards as correct moraL rLght , of a requLrement and therefore rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon, dLffuse correLatLve dutLes 3pptg prtncLpLes, to Ls no doubt Ls thus a consequentLaL over vaLLd characterLstLc poLnt of R tLtLements. as socLetLes Lt transmLt uphoLd, feature. SLmLLarLg such obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not feature from thetr character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of that soctetg that that reLevant soctettes ought to part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent dertvatLve be separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to derLvatLons; to rtghts In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For true duLg 3 rLght, but somethtng foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance, Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve others, free from unnecessarg suffering then moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng; -14- and prohLbLtLon the functor Ls transnLtted the down cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents R derLvatLon.^ Ls consequentLaL a feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe. (ThLs Ls whg Regan can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231). SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that seLf-evLdent puretg or rLghts. axLonatLc a aLwags defence It foLLows, then, that ang theorg rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons. cLaLns are no For ang rLght that stands up, that connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls Lags there of that seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts to (such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such as that RnerLcan) the announces seLf-evLdent rLghts, Ls nLstaken. RLghts are aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten. ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts, and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes, as there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds, are rLghts and generated fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns, etc. - but Ln the derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes. Because of theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg envLronnentaL ethLcaL enterprLses. not are But Ln essentLaL absoLuteLg a strongLg for LndLvLduaLLstLc rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg, Lt Ls a snart strategg to nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents. RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance, of the force theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of others (hence the Lnportance Ln a noraL consLderatLons, whLch noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and rotes, of Ln persuasLve so Lnsurance sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts prLncLpLes, and truno on. argunentatLve reasons too, Lnputed rLghts are Lnportant Ln reLnforcLng gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg, Ln The socLaL advantages LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon of rLghts accordLngLg offers not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest: -15- he aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang is woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back Lt ts not a consequence that Me prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL, the can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there potnt no ts advantage or Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get theM. to to aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can get aLong wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us. R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having senttence, tnterest, as such etc. (a rather now rtghts, of faniLiar test). Constder tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive. Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln Ln the Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL theg coutd be incorporated, Ln defLntttons McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though (OED, vLctnttg other preMtss the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg RI is observes, not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has had Mang with notabtg rivaLs, interests repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing (rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^ How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings out), 1) inc Lud ing: we Usage; speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as don't possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg). and non-usage to has be backed In fact we do, bg other consideration if arbitrariness and prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp. 160-1). 2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM (again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^ it of and coupied 3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for right it cLaiM). Must have Nothing characteristicaLLg an interest however requires afford (FreedMan, is that reasoning a right is a sonething to a have p.16^., who upsets the inferred the protection rights that of an interest; as far as the Meaning of goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*) exercising roughig if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation with sgnongnous have; others and Confusion of having right with right a a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising or to cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted transition, such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate -16- to do with the Mak Lng bg c La LMS of a hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns). R creature or LteM wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such as exercLsabLe rLghts, Lndeed Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe but reLevant actLvLtg), requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the such notLon of rLght. of For Lnstance, the Lnterest-protectLng aspect of tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not froM the notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests (especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of Lnterests). R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to rLghts restrLct to persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton that what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts to persons, or to LndLvLduaLs, or persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to LndLvLduaLs and "persons". RLL these restr Let Lons on rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon. or §3. and rebuiLding environMentaLLg. the rLghts vLew Deconstructing Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts LndLvLduaL to Consider, a subjects, LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to cope decentLg spec Les, concernLng rare 3nd endangered (e.g. Regan s pp.395-6). prob Lens of our tines, such as those envLronnentaL Major wLth forest does restrLctLon ecosgsteMs, wLLderness, foLLow froM not even etc. hLs own defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg LnfLLtrated, as postuLates the concerning are eLaborated. It is not rights uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in p.39S) RR, a arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins, brief because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs (In sgLLogistic extended IndividuaLs forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs. not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species. do Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So the rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare endangered or species right-hoLders needn t be individuaLs, aniMais.) of so The restricted beginning after aLL, onLg the species (with a if are paradigMs MoraL the about or MeMbers species e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then treated, individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan view as Look undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone further non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species theiisetves. it Makes of announces, rights The Species are not individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of species to is view 3ngthing rights individuaLs. (p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation is actuaLLg offered), are not MereLg the right-hoLders; paradigMatic theg right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the exhaust iron-fisted thene of (p.361), according the to aLLeged individuaListic nature of MoraL rights which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL and LegaL usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction. Uhg trg to iMpose such an iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view? EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg. a rebuiit rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group, in virtue of princ ip Les such as that significant endangered species ought to be protected. creatures wouLd hoLd different But then different rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid, this, On but as a Matter of definition) in and basis (the of inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions. -18- of rights, restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s The package, that can simpig be pee Led off. rLghts appt LeatLons of super-imposed theorg, the but Ls essentLaL wLth for the given coherence a super-individuaL, such as a specLes, If postuLates. equaLLtg hetd rLghts on an equaL basts It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major Lt, composLng LndLvLduaLs the then the wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL super-individuaL Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE on bLocentrLc egaLitarianism; DC, Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing p.3S). through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg. IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts view, theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and deconstructLon on of the rLghts exactLg view thLs Ls EquaLLtg done. assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to from dLrectLg dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg features absoLute are quaLLt Les, theg do Ls aspect ref Leets and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg rLghts foLLow that (p.368). It does not come Ln degrees not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of Ltems the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL bund Les equaL that have have rLghts of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a certain Ln LmpartLaLLtg treatment (often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm). equaLLtg NeLther nor assumptLons LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts To them fend we have to foLLow gLven. the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the rLght respectfuL to treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag, both beLng imported parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated as justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls rLght those of who have argued Ls basic the Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment (p.277), where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng aLL suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg. ConsLder subjects' vaLue as - what we LL caLL Lnherent LndLvLduaLs vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg p.23S ff.). (pp p.37; Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming sLmLLarLg to HR various postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent vaLue can be varied, pLace of Lnherent vaLue, LndLvLduaL as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then, Ln LnLtLaL or connate vaLue, X, or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X, defined, for ang Ltem if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt assumed that, for Ls ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came -17- connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised, Ls Lt as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load. showing Before that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing (certain affairs individual tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or tgpes aLL positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd negative vaLue connate disboLicainess, if (their ontoLogicaL no nonexistence proofs objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate doubt have decidedLg to adding their the existence of top connate vaLue of are vaLues somewhat thus initiaL Like LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood, at an best initiaL assignment. The assignments Like those of initiaL are probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg vaLue; connate out themseLves presumptive those of inherent vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort their bg initiaL Life-stgLes, can which vaLue, then intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a be theg states worLd-Lines, posteriori a diminished as or increased receive probabiLLtg assignments. Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting prtncLpLes, features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant. 0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to carrg enough (not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect principLe. appears Examination to show that it can, at Least to this extent: insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on respectfuL fact, Ln individuat bg to item substitute connate made is principLe, principLe as aLso to repLace required, nameig resuLts defence of the modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the bg shows, where the the same substitutions as before. The modified principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items which have connate that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect wags in and presupposed argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon vaLue right throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the modified the features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg concerning respect to inherent for work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg those vaLue succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It treatment suffices, inherent principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for individuaLs, and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment. Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted, but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a fuLLer de- and re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded environmentaL rights theorg offered. But it which repLaces the moraL rights view wiLL be is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of -20- the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts theorg (e.g. can PP,p.32), perhaps (minus remain totaLitg the cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence. But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact, most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of rLghts movement. Nonethe Less? animat the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe supererogatorg; Lt (p.351,p.3^.6) to thLs permLssLbLe Ls vegetarianism Ls (p.39!+); But (p.3^6). obLLgatorg' cone Lus Lon the appear to most the arguments the not Ls Lt that Ls estab LLsh not to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages). vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons Ls Lt given, wrong to purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a vegetarLan beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and, '16 ----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc ), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no proper of focus Regan's sLnce attach, such practLces tgpLcaLLg dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les of practLces huntLng-gatherLng LLfestgLes, of doubt Lead LncLude to the the gardenLng cuLtures of the Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes. Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page 3nd 351 with eatLng dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of (as these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes weLL as mtnor ones), newfangLed Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and so R chLef reason gLven Ls that on. end theLr LLves are brought to an untLmeLg antmaLs' (e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct tLme has come, vegetarLanLsm, that or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead. Mhat precLudes respectfuL use? Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more connected theorLes, such as aLL that consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as restrLctLons, wLthout further Large sent Lent utLLLtarLanLsm, are Longer no sentient or entaLL moraL deserve such dLetarg assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to which beLngs than eat dead creatures, things which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is aLreadg dead, but of causing prematureLg, Ln order death (or, to a Lesser extent, Letting die) to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product. For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate moraL standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg. Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to -21- anLmaLs bauLk anLmaLs. Rnd at for sone patLents, Papuans the rLghts extensive to LLfe and LLveLhood to own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between Regan's noraL agents and moraL treatment, such admLttLng ground of treatment dLfferentLaL further and pLgs, a peopLe dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed. Regan s dLfferentLaL justLfgLng for So how tLght Ls Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst arguMent, tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk of the crucLaL argument ff.) dLd not treat resources. Nor dLd theg (p.3{+^); receptacLes does sLmpLg cuLtures tradLtLonaL renewabLe (p.3t*3 appLg. not anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as as anLmaLs treat Lnstruments mere excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that of tradLtLonaL unLLke peopLes, provLsLon (p.3t*3), are prLncLpLe dubLous admLtted commercLaL under derLved supposedLg who farmers Regan's from prLncLpLe LLbertg respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R the LncLudLng fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng requLres whLch that treatment creatures of vaLue Lnherent are however Some excLuded. Ls not of for prLncLpLe, the countervaLLLng respectfuL No excLuded. LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue persLst, come what mag. There use Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have (p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not wLth a (p.331, stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more the Ln practLces the vLoLate the respect crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs, food, Papua, pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not exchanged often or consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln who Large and Bg does rLghts are therebg a acquLre not Ln LndLctLons Lnterference rLght text Regan s to (and eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng tradLtLonaL the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons that Lt Ls LLfestgLes LnadmLssLbLe. Such are aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that LLfe anLmaLs brLnqtrg to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe use or harmfuL destructLve wLth LncompatLbLe bLoconatLvLst the vLoLence "LLbertg" assumptLons, no (p.287); prLncLpLes matter as Lnterpreted. dLffLcuLt how wouLd maxLMLae never to bLoconatLvLsm appears Lndeed to NonetheLess, LLve bg, are hLghLg appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg who an to mang vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or MorLd magbe a Ls not verg rendered LnadmLssLbLe. ilagbe The RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL; dLfferent predator-free sLn-eradLcated RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed? -22- post-naturaL worLd Ls $4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts and substantiaL prob tews. tivehood: and predation, territoriatitg other the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers Despite have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that * Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the human as those of instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see for animats, sort sane e.g. RR, PR). * Rnimats have various For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that rights. humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and from excessive interference. these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg Mhite neither necessarg nor sufficient significant connections, inasmuch rights), having for as rights are nonethetess protect permissibie there to serve worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such de-foresters, as mag otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human practices sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their interests. For exampie, much animai suffering. causes experimentation unnecessarg quite there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare Thus and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced, and easier obtain to positive action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of sociai protection the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists. Granted animats have rights, some of them higher humans rights nohumans, widespread a have, main animats phenomenon of predation, a par with those that question (pace Freg) concerns which outstanding particutartg, on have. Because especiatig of the essential to the continued tivetihood of mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult one (and one comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest Regan induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when a herbivore s interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued sustenance, avoidabte others as in human Predation is not of course the ontg source of territoriatitg, slaughter of whates and dotphins. serious conflict of interests; for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected). Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population been converted into increase serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective the but integral part much of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's, hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic as themes probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism reduces an have individuats, that those items items such (constituting the base ctass) have a fixed -23- (equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for and that vaLues (derived) Ls ecosystems, of whaLes additive an simpLy functLon the of aLLenabLe, such structures, organised and or atoms as Lt. within CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon and LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a infringing path, and maximization preservatLon enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to has that LndLvLduaL (Lnherent) LnLtLaL to everg simiLarLy woraL exLstence (and vaLue suboptimaL The rights view desLderata. contLnued Like the considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions, and the reasons for revising the vaLue eLsewhere than which are wore LncLude sun the of predators, theLr LndLvLduaL escaLation The the of theg though components, be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth mag LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn vaLue. detaLL Ln the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems, (Ln tgpLcaLLg expLaLned are assumptions, the through probLems wLthout system, reductLon of theorLes deserves, rights however, some eLaboratLon. R serLous cLash of Lnterest, as between carnLvores and herbLvores, fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg rLghts, of unLess too Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the many extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a Ln contLnuLng mistaken to eLevatLon that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls LnfrLnged bg LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe. a MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe cases of to Lnterfere some Ln predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be appLLed hoLd to gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated issues in these bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but at further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf, verg Least, dubiousLg permissibLe. High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are On contrary, the virtuaLLy aLL the remaining naturaL radicaLLg unsatisfactory. systems containing Large carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a Can t an rights to, right fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute though their rLghts to Life. to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some confLict, and inconsistency even, of rights, obLigations and so on, is inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags. Some can, but not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often -24- significant) sorts of cases. In these terns, bg accommodated Mag of up confLLct sgstematic reguLar such confLLct anatogous S3tisfactoriig It Ls too reguLar, deontLc does sgstem not because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc cases, structures: for then much too much rather not of rLghts or prLncLpLes. confLLet sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent muLtipLg is predatton Ls time cases. R confLLct, repuzziing spent undermines MhLch fash Lon to deaL wLth sattsfactorg more redecLdLng and the point and force of prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach (no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach: right. feeL doesn't p.33) DC, at aLL Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek R Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature. R aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in superior excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood to right does not an give unquaLified Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse. In these terms, a Lion that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The different. Mith situation their take chances. rights to Life are not predatorg is essentiaLLg not LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find LJeak, themseives in threatening situations, such as traveL humans animats or wiiderness If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe therebg or action highspeed infringed animats where (and defending their animats are territories LnvoLved, not shouid be HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL, persecuted). except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their chances with naturaL predators. Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming with predation and Like issues happens, what grips is through zoning, or more generaLLg through bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface what to and eisewhere. is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves of out a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions big For wiiderness as Locus, Lt is much to think hoLLsticaLLg, easier predation as an LntegraL and significant part of such a rich naturaL the as to see structure rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting. (The adjustment of ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg; wiiderness is an appropriatetg generat notion, not get a proper name.) The action of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness areas, in taking preg conservativeLg, Ln defending their territories and so -25- on, LnvoLves no LtseLf Ln infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a career. that tresspassLng Darwin Ln earLg hLs brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the a OnLg deng Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as with predatLon, to undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses and repLacenents of sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng naturaL MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde, thought Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg, huMan-engtneered that even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan breakdown, who efforts, whtch especLaLLg are prone to soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg can theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs the as there are and More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters norMaLLg straightforward huMan chLLdbirth, provide weLL-docuMented ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or the of evidence as MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one the ecoLogicaL Laws to of encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive huMan interference Ln naturaL regions. It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue a Lwags as poLiticaL high wickedness, evoLutionarg not it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of as Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not there inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate Long is process - that the no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved adapted in weLL wag a to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent it is far froM cLear that Nature of such huMans, provides rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL an optiMat sgsteM; Law" argued for eLsewhere: see SM). The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step with deontic best MoraLLtg, principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see were with that vaLue SH). Even it be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt. Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing environnent; naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite and often dazzLing, Lf LeveLs of vaLue. Richard SgLvan via Bungendore -26- for the adequate, RustraLia 2621 NOTES 1- For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of that thought environmentaL Lt far of southern and western Rmerican schooLs, out fLows the surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that emerges typLcaLLy the froM prestigious More universities Ln LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres LLke Oxford. 2. May ThLs a strike MoraL as theorist aiMost cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics - as curious as a order in aLso and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are different. assessMents Cost/benefit depend on a vaLue theory of soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity. 3- EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and amounts what choice seLf-appointed chosen, (p.!*). makers entitLement a to in There are probiems according PP, to we free and rationaL use regarding of contexts, since entitLement moves in the these rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights. The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving a moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage. MoraL notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges and catagoriaL features are investigated and put to principLed work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the dLvisions of ref Leets cLassification things in terms of such features, where theg appLy, as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy these features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not. (Even if they were and a hierarchy aLL Not probiematic. resuLted, hierarchies are need that damaging, e.g. ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may oniy were when be. not be mereLy It is hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to, power or priviLege or favour, that theg warrant the criticism hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy been directed at certain power hierarchies are of this sort.) -27- hierarchies; but not aLL UorrLes about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers an (west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth LMpoverLshed ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears both as deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such Ln where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts Regan's, Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon. 5. StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on standLng vaLue-Ln-LtseLf wLth Freg, Ln equates who worst and proceeds to bound Lt (p.!+S), beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs part happens as coLLapse of a of wore wLdespread huwanLstLc utLLLtarLan Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further casuaLLtg. 6. PossLbLLLtg and forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes probabtLLtg are basLc to the Ma Ln arguwents the to LMMoraLLtg of nucLear arrangements: see LiP. 7. But Fox has M3de a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an attempt Ls bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM woraLLtg as Ln a generaL bad Lnstttutton, cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much enMeshed whtch damage, Ls of has a poor thoroughtg Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg; Lt does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg. 8. UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But what are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features. 8. SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts taLk resuLt froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged that rLghts are verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg, prtncLpLe of such p3rstMong, as OccuM s weLL as provLdtng a pasttng such propertLes, such as betng objeettons of such crude LnstruMents as OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have have a razor, such ent Lt Les shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts (as bg derLvatLve rLghts; froM rLghts certaLn obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects. -28- 10. The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern Ls one, a verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20 right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to senses of the substantive brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN. RLthough the takes anaLgsis frow off one Ma Ln OED sense, the eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected 1.3 as whLch that MoraLLg just or due concerned Ls (as in LnvoLveMent activities); be no issues concerning opportunitg (as in rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights state-iMposed such equitg or ... which is right-doing ). But there wiLL Main Ln wLth senses, not to in participate are priMariig issues for MoraL these actors. 11. reLevant or coMMunities to capabie or individuats within theM, i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies. The status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such exact arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00 is or further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00 a is. 13. Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for who Leaps to the cone Lus ion that sentience, beings and the "higher ... is an the fact that huMan aniMats have experiences or MentaL states the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg (p.^3). No arguMent at aLL are possessors of MoraL rights than appeaL to (other is to be found for this ciatM, a authoritg) surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting for Freg, faiLure suppig to others arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the MereLg citing Light of his eartier reMarks that sentieneg as a criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe respects are provided ... arguMents in these subsequent chapters, such arguMents are . Rs we shaLL see in scarce on the ground (p.33). lit- Too Leg s anaLgsis standard account substituting can "right of for desires , an wouLd Mark out onLg subcLass rights, of be upgraded, and brought into Line with (adopted to" Ln EE, p.176), chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt iMportant roughLg consequentiai exercisabLe criticisM teLLs against EE). -2?- feature rLghts (a of a siMLLar IS. Rn important exanpLe is the argunent which bg broken is concedLng to that vaLue, equat not p.33, PP aLL hunans, serLousLg genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss. 16. London,1932). RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega, the But qutte not Ls natter not a reputation of sLnpLe, so vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats decisive. carefuL definition, which wouLd however render nore R sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is 'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg OED account, so upon the vegetabie a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL foods; food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of Life'. 17. that not decisivetg support vegetartantsn, even inproved connerciat faming does UtLLitarianisn invoLving s Laugh ter and of so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive aninats, argunent). Ln Rnd fact fLawed the case utititarian vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work for of one choice of of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36). 13. sone Uhite such terntnoLogg distinction singuLarLg is unfortunate given the non-obsoiete patient . Most aninats are not patients. senses of the noun 13. the inportant, is For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict such as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and threats to rabid foxes to the crunch; hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the then strict norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane aLL and hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones for cases, for subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and respectfuL defective farngard greater C3n practices vaLue assunption be p.3^.2). condenned, R is snuggLed into the rights view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth (see DE, si). 20. On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn. 21. Predation bg Large carnivores can conpared with hunan travet be usefuLLg, sporting and predation (no accident of -30- course) favourabig, accidents. UhiLe the nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order aninaL and of nagnitude, appears to invoLve rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though reduct ton tn vatue tn the removat tt tnvotve may some of on-gotng ttves, tt atso offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts. REFERENCES J.B. A t Catttcott, On the tntrtnstc vatues of nonhuman spectes' tn The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press, 1386; pp.138-172. R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London, 1377. J. Fetnberg, The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press; Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68. U. Fox, R postcrtpt on 2(1+) (1385) 17-23. deep ecotogy and tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs B. Freedman, Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168. R.G. Frey, Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats, 1880. K.E. Goodpaster, 308-325. Ctarendon, Oxford, On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378) I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con, Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386. J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373. H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good tn Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136. C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty, 1385. E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs 5(1383 )l+7-61. T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383; to as HR. T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs', Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP. J. Rodman, Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an -31- ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56. J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.185-8. R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR. R. Rout Leg, In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC. R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB. R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU 1981+; referred to as UP. R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE. ' 1 T. Rgan, The case for animaL rights' in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39. % C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+. R. SgLvan, R critique of deep ecoiogg', 1+1(1985); referred to as DE. Radicatj^hiLosophg 1+0(1985) ana R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees, UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 20, Item 1: Draft of Moral matters matter - environmentally? Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft. Paper published, Sylvan R (1997) 'Do moral matters matter- environmentally?', Between the species, 3(4):163-176. https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.1987v3n4.2 Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 20, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from ;-1 SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German, British or Fre nch) viewpoint. This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect the morality o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt. eitlH_•t t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e als o a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans, or for the American sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear ar r angemen ts involve. Mtwh o f U~A, CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n structure of the argument Pag e No §O. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral l. i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter. §1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the 2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war. War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt featur es o f nucle ar wars. 2 0 §2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations -~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war. The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted. Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus: s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated. Li mits of st ate e n titlement. §3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars. One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of the ke y argumen t elabo r ated. §L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ . Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality , p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles. § 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~· De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata: p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through <l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of 1. 5 11 1 !• 17 �Page No !,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es; separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle: the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism . AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence . piu,.,f Till·lll H. 56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas . The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode]. §7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their _supporl e rs. Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs 37 43 fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts. §8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e ethical res 1lts. Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it. FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention. Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r 1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons. 49 The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states. Appendix 1: On Scl1;!1l t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to and Anders. Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption . Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e. H 64 �.1,t . . .. Page No ~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y a nd on regional strat egies. Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration . Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons. Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes: what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social and po litical adjus tment. iii 73 �ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!) NtlCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated, ~ Ll o r n~ arly HO th11 n e of even t he larges d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war. invo l ve, and threatened sa id to so differ co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a CertFdnly ma s sive PX hAnges Gt1ch as nuc.le:ir wars exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of Muc h at forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often f r om eit her just wars. new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will se rv e as initial ethical ba se. Al though nuclear wars are, thus non ex i s tent (extrapolat e va r ie tiea, objects, 1 nuclear wa rs from n very limited Ia fnr, only a decidedly menac1.ng class of proper have several distinctive properties nu .lear experlence 2 ) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) - - - ------- ---- -1, The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forc e fully: 'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could ima g ine: we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y, peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to give it , e .g. sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence, pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds, ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality. �111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 • explosio n A large-sca le nuclear involv es war of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region; a [unction of two main parameter s: distr i bution. Such strnt.egic ) nuclear quant l t leo of a war war quantity diffe rs which explosivc n, ts markedly limited, nnd (megatonn age wh ere from by the a of t:,Hget.s it i s ex plosive) limited assumptio n, the to and (tactical much or smaller chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y arc cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in a given reg ion. Though t he focus in what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no nucl.car arsenal means a separate st r ike 1 s ince a is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1 waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns second iss ue , et c. ). 4 Because of these of follow -up or connecti ons, much of the ca se made acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent . How nuclear wars reHultlng d-Lffer from oth er war s: wars and states and th e -- ---------- - -- - -- llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war. of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c two party (or thinking, A model is th e severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or trib e bat tle ~. A picture of war thu s refle c tion r e quirement s for legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical on advances have trad iti ona l now theo ry ender ed of war, emerg ed, inapprop riate ha rdly and especiall y sometimes surprisin gly, as a result inapplica ble. of The made no allowance for such J. Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially the type of strike :lnvolved. Though the sequence is j_mportant for the mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge. 4. 'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars: t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European "theatre'' , is really a myth. 5. There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given, etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a mu h deeper wa y, �j phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s Tokyo. rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th And j t.' many occurred wi.th Dre s d e n and further crucial effects be yond mass bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions . Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument 1Jnchors, Lo historica l were accounted unjust war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control: the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n ar1ncd 'war' of content io n or comba t; cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience . but other are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8 proLagon ists, antag onists or players; means and or wrong. to elabo rate by means of forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ; noun linkages G to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter), and of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions Firstly , r e tain always a f nction of sens es of the States are the forces c omprising armed soldiers are the a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent Thus wars ar _ external or internal states or their rule. (c.ivi.l), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have transform ~d, and nuclear war has emerged with nuclear states. lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states : 6. An obvious :i.n short, wars ar e There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term 1 war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt ( OED) o n wa r, 7. But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of nation--s tates. 8. Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone .t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e. James proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12). What it boiled down to, howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil, especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness, con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast. Again specious arguments enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc . �.:1n uut ,~01•1p of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture, and are nltcr i ng by the s tructu r e. Wars j _Lu a t from c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of (other wi se defect ive) politi ca l organ isatio n of states ; they are a ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation . helps wa r arise War Thls seman t.ically based pictur e of exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and deterr ence d t: vo lves into an war-m akers , argume nt agains t aga.in st states . In the fact ( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d) on the war-d eclare rs and tradit ional theory , wars wer e r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as t heir r emoved t1 e right of r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es; states or the argume nt was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the c our ts 9, while states did not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of th e law courts ). But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim at e place of wars; ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc. Let. us a h OW\ ) V1_. r to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on - basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s tates or sets (axes) of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars. ·ompr litive game s, could be won. attent uated form for some "victo rs") Lhc World vfars. strate gy. surrou nding trad i tional ly firstl y for mass ive armed wa rs, Like exchan ges such as th •re may well be no winnin g in ar e as the of No r thern very hemisp here countr yside. Thus, and the second ly, for laying the was te _£Dint of of substa ntially substa ntiall y oblite rated 10 , (cxe rcl sed and most as nothin g all worse off than at the outset of the "play" . are huge war seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d: a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that prepar ed that: That assum ption still held good ~hough in Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds; is settle d with main protag onists player s It war; assume d An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n metro polita n agglom e ra tio ns 9. to main Hence elabor ately f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ; Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p . 776, top). The argume nt presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva te dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way, it looks as if it could be readil y t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern ment, or at least effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a t that time to be one state! �5 hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e. .:uid ot her Lhf' e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was not pu re de t e rr e nc e . to mil i tary Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff, Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in tar gets r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ; and military e xchanges. principle 11 This feature iG fundnnent al as for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality. ways to The special effects of nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear canno t w3rs be legitimat e ly confined. l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s uz0ne <lestr uc ti on, s hockwav es, suc h effe cts gign nt l c fum i gat i on s §2. a nd th e e nti re l y rapid ••. speed special effects (presente d in Schell) include radioacti vity, pu lses, fireball or firestorm e tc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s. The mora l s ituation: be c ome as el ec troma gnet1 c <lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s, com pounded Th e se the r ecent tend e ncy submerged in the context of war. of moral considera tions to It is particula rly important i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient distinctio n mo r a lity or local or nat :l. onal and ~ ..e5:..diency. What is done in war, especiall y between advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the l ') . There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves " suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on. Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective me d ical int e rvention (PL, p.313). Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons de veloped in the tex~. Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" . 11. In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc. �l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH' Much t.h at oug h t war , of or othenlis e 12, not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like . we liv e not go in a rat her bar barous age : unremarke d, if the th e horrors of the twentieth century will history Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd ge t s writt e n as wi pi ng moves : based on "stra t e gy" disad van t ages , of mor a lly excluded actions, ·a J.culaU o ns. charncterist i ca---1J:x its is. that rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in o t con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr d0.Lcrmi nes (accurately) str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e such Hllitarily its e xp<'di e n cy . by gains own i.t _o u~ !:_, morally, cons i d e r i n g and Eac h side only lo s 8e s a s a in a military encounter own its advantages and r e sult. of alterna tJve possible to consider those of the other side( s) as well. In t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality . I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted wa y, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of eLc.) . Such t he class lcal through "bald an inc r emental a distinct nrgumen t tc.tt1s . g a r gument from an t ha t th e It would And (bu t The externally wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e . ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed. the of li mit) escalation man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit. assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as enforced force, Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated. Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue, reall y this Thus t oo follow from i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable . c onfusion Nuclear 12. For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness. These t li cn1<•s run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r. 13. As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument Jike the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. Th e fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1.. �i' war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n . for the l anc, r or players Still the !irgument is inc onclu s ive; can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate, examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4 A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by of mo ·al i t y: lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y c<;p,~, f,11 ly t lw 1 constraint s from the ot her s'ido. 11w~Liou not onl y as to ma y well enc ount e r, So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps it wlw t o u g ht to do in mor a lly permi ss ibl e si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf. But the last question do e s not, in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y . There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having 0:x.pe<.lienc y, even under extreme to give way to circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war involves . Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of give to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often way morality eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations. t hcorc~ical fac t is that both deliver f r om us But the the vnlue the o q'.: . to Expedlency fact, but urg('s , tba t does foreign takes local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e conside rat i on s . proper charact risa t i on , a remote By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its much univ• r sa lizable mor e univ e rsal pr inciples . rePultan t i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y fairness, eq u ita billty and of value and, And morality thereby imposes, through principl e s, jus t ice. distributio n c ertain requ i rements of general Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly Ttie no t It assumes, or what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of or to cruci al simply narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable . even bound moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same, eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue miraculousl y are placed 1 :., . Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e of ·va l untioi1~:; pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under 14. 11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1 i nt e rr e pla cement, from the same As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war. �B . expr d 1e1cy assessm ents 16 • ic c~ n For expedie ncy loes not elude deontic presen tation: be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right", or ft lvcn tight formal rest•mb le charac terisat ion . The charac terisat ion will normal ly that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to, or arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds. Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity ~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi ned. util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as cnn Thus onside ring only expedie ncy; intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ; meet do it Lt does not, unlike the me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the individ ual uti.lity of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say. There are dc•ont.o .logis ts r egardin g war mora ll y howeve r signlfic a11t e.speci ally, 17 • which differe nces, between utilita rians serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have permis sible, or to seemed to effect some to rend er justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards ~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not permit. already and partisa nship , since utilita rians But this is would reject the descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly'; wherea s an a im in what follows is to avoid meta-e thical me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not there is a neutra lity. to achieve And morally large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn. S('Vcr al moral partisa nship, VJ.rtua ily all positio n s grc• that the obltter ation of major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous. If tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists who seem to feel no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for some Rus si a n ones, s imply increas e the costs involve d, up to loss of whole nations if l.5. The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ", nationa lism and pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which exces siv e applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi ng a person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards treatme nt. The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require ment of morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require ment to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte nds to strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry). Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72. 16. The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic . 17. Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, i.n Collen et al. by Pl ato ; see on �:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs Tile ncounlere d; _!: hen try to work down again. fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally oul of perspecti ve, morally. abandon or Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has tended to suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does not m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be Cons id er t he w11rld ,·inpl r1•. be so thern risi.ng (hemisphe re) no one's advant3ge . strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try nil lear to exchange in the North, There would southern to be waters encourage a hardly an of US all - out point then in securing institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much espe . ially given the apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts. tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e: lhc present point :1. has and tts power, limitatio ns, is an thnt ( t he fnct of) moral inadequat e But conse nsus const r aint without accompany ing struct ural adjus tments. For , typJrnlly , <lifferc11 tly to nationa l impose interest ls taken hosta ges or override morality, e ven holding civilian populatio ns kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ). unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian such as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitut ion of jus tificatio n; fails in The first, expedienc y , . C.!.BSSC,S And, regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overridin g for morality , of morality, which the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of :important or irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the mo r al interests , of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the case of LSN war. 18 . As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her than based on national interests . �Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis , Ii:!. It nol be pretended expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y , that tha t of it i.s "group but n montl basi, as distJnct from one of ego1 sm " ). There no 1s special moral d.ispensa ll on fo r governments. j ndiv iduals : ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or analys is of obligation. Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds; no di ff e r e nce organisation. extenuating killers: whether X is an · individual States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion reaso ns aside, be having just as beeu conce ded , special moral dispensations; more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism. cannot immorally makes system, grou p or of Lebano n) are, as brigands or mass there is no moral difference. Certainly t here are gro unds on which states or individual or and it f11rnish two (incompatibl e) their a gents 01: have claimed , but the excuses offered are no A moralities , a s atis factory state moral theory or public one and a private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual morality becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3 ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled Y are permuted . special 01 1t cover (e.g. to considerati.ons citizen Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or pe rson can be der iv ati ve damage For bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are der ivative prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly 1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency . particular, a sta te is not 1 morally) survivrd . In entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even ow n ( at for its Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge. 19 . There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or see Routley a nd Plumwood. multiple) morality Lines: �11 !-: ' ) 'j.J. The i_ni t i<d argument p:1cifli;m yield arguments to the tmmora1 lt.1_ of _ LSN wars. to tb e 1mmora1it.y of war. But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire controversi a l in an area where th ere is no go od r·ason to Argumen ts be for controve rsial. Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of LSN wars follows . All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime. nil wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling po litlcal issues between states . wa r s who Not are Among more or l es s admissible th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors volu11l'cer :w Ho ldlers nnd whos<' actfon does no t 6pi.ll ov er on to noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants were kjl.led in war. conscrip tlon, Since the esta bl i shme nt press-gangs and recruitment of such of the lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms; induction prac tices as near-d es titute, wars hav e modern massive war s are far removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ). imrnornl, Most s orts of wars are because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such a n exte nt as LS N war s . The first argument to th e immorality of LSN wars and of sufficientl y larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong. P2. LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts. P3. Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong . ( KA) LSN wnrs ar• wrong. The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set of Lhis type. the (KA ) t·cpL1ccs But the qu1. te 'kl.11:!.ng su ff i c l en tly 11v :i.l. crcH tu res' . Thu s t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or i. nvolvecl f ocus can destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a on arguments Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen. vadu tlo n of not ll fir s t uitable directly Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding �th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) . The argumenL Js valid, ,1L t a .kcd) on the basi :3 but of may each be attacked ( and of its p1·emisses. has in ef fe ct been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves 11 what is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are, in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said robbed; but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong, to "involve." providing For which instance, that person ' s assistance belng is also wrong. But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20 As aga inst P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that mi lit ary nuclear targets. wars can be encounters But given the character of nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets. net merely the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings. fnlloul There i s down-wlnd from military pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl tnrgcts US and For example, t he radioactive will affect large conc entratio ns o( European t argets , and may affe ct as Conn <l o. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal cffcrl ) 2 1. t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side If missiles wer e c haracte ristically r.eliAbly on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc diagn osed. 21. According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are rcs ponsJblc only for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even U these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended conseq uences . Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is pernicious , a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions . �whicl1 was intend ed unfort unatel y only went off to destro y an unma1H1<HI und e r g round Such claims shou ld be reject ed : ci ty. dou bl e effect Noneth e l ess the circum sta nc es differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo ns lbl f' ,1 for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce the the thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e ~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on. innkc silo course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under could missil e j t was not as if t he y had del iberat ely aimed at The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of] respo nsibil ity Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of the act. ~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of argued tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation . the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' . killin g and P2, it The equivo cation is induc ed by be conc eded that de libera te milJta ry , e . g. farmer s or goods or servic es bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs . used exclud ed as innoce nt . The s econd d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2. other. for re a sons, it by proper ly point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s Bec a use P2 s o amende d is less defen sible, is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'. What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status of what is mixtur e of tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs. requir e the qualif icatio n 'delib e rate' or done, So 'delib erate' gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so does Pl. not t he Second ly, it will be conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin g of t hos e a It no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi litary ef f ort, whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of not be charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin guish able, by and ma y of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will be made . will b are While it will Pl For Pl do es 'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22 Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none the worse for that, and Lhere is no seriou s p·o blem in markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s, people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and J.s, mnrco v'r, no need to adopt action chains . There the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic 22. Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ). The sugge stion depend s upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent ion, and wrong ness with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri ne. �,1 rlns:; ":'i ,c mnk.t~ t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try t:(, endenvourlng c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants. there Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met, .tr,~ for ;ir311mcnts the prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl and Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t tend will For examp le, one argument for v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory. Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one, (to poi.nt) , re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns mi n f nn l from -~_gume nts §4 . the understate sc,rio usly doing so 23 histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts on wars, just ur dreamed by conlemporary "free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and opponents communis t im portant the The conclusion t hat LS,' wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified - 1e that fail s to treat them with the .0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments . r.;omet. lti to of is Americ a inspired, me r ely not or et c), th e of same The conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al t:irnt•s , (or jusL wars. first One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the ;>1 :irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it to no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killc.:<l (cf. be Barnes , p .77.5) . A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be fought by morally which impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate killing of noncombatants . The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e legitimate of means , discrimination (betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) /. ~:, . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate ') ( I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' . 7.3. Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One ;.rngLP favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there in are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g. c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of See a l so PL , p.312, where a their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r. uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed . 2 1~. Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally usage. of �- - - -··---·-- Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f being that of net evil to net good: pro ro rLi on cor; tr-: up proporclonality, 'the damage to be infljcted and lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed the damage and costs , req 1irement: disproportio nate to goods moral pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R er i t1! rlon of the which doctrine through war . "improvement" ln achieved of confined, nationally no t ar that way. ov e r a ll co n sequences of abstaining i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts": c ondi. tion s "nmel.ioratlve " wn y the 'a nation wages war justly than Similarly on l y if the for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent s:1tisfy for bad, from war ' (Barnes, p.72) . LSN wars can in these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also wa rLl , nnd war According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no are Entangl ed with the justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less th e taking by p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this (PL, arms' the e :a mple that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r t!il' v0 ry d lf !<r<' n t'Jy, cx rhanges . 1 lmilcd prospccUJ of: succl'SS for whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in Wha t some sm11ll strictly state limited clltc , or nucl ea r is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right intention. Fo r One (by no means be arg ued to in various ways. c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that, 1 wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 25 . Til e principle can 26 . wars where t he targets ar e c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he For such wars remain unjust on pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect . on lif e several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were s ys tnms, etc. mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be nucl 'lH kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear ndded ). Zi. Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack, �t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what are se e n as b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars can b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed. Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion of medieva l theory oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e was no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf. lltt J e is wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc se nsitive howe ver, me rit, ( a nd when issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently). a r g uments are not do There .In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents, dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s h i st orica l r e quireme nts Barnes, p .778). not simply commit argumen t s matters underlyi ng the Finally , these argumen ts from any presc r iptive fallacy; from historic al autho r ity for to th e mo r al c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed, a nd nome times applied , were justifie d. As they are. I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the mo ral rightnes s or justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin e on co ntempor ary u n ti l times. Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and This ls the involve beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars : such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once remov ed ( a nd e ven, howr• vcr you look conse ns us violence 28 • Ht very f requentl y , when it is not) . il morally . a r gument; it The argume nt i.s not proceeds expedi.en cy that is duly They a re morally wrong the same as the weaker fr om similar results from the full sweep of ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion. The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case each type of moral theory. Fortuna tely deta ils can be de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents 28. one, from shortcu t. For for just war These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear. For the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it. The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may be co nd emned 'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311). Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780). �.l / whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate. w.1r were i_;ornctimes a rriv ed at or l n fact conditions for just defended through pr inciples of such moral th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative been done . work already The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is maxim j.sati on utl lHy has is final ly ac complished, LSN adopted, wars are howe ve r excluded ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an · g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1 l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ; wars Llw l involv e on LSN 1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure, tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in utllitarlan Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 • L1i; ldon. The arguments ovcrwhc .lming so moral far case outlined against such mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n principles are de riv able from agains t some LSN wa rs. LSN would su bstanti ally wo rse are tha n exhaust th e violate thes e of the theories just considered). These ac countable, condition not ( again th e obligation to maint a in earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems : we do For there are oth e r significant war pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns : p,cnera tions, to whom wars we the r.-esponsibility to futur e pas s to th e " recei ved the world it". Such on" not in conservative principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are bound to be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war. §5. The shi ft to nuclear deterrence: suppo rt nuclear arguments to its immorality . Those who arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars , by pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars. What i s being done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om war: deterrence is most important precisely engagement in preventing in LSN such wars from ever occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values. it is continued , deterrence is the .9nly practical d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments 29. For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail, complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'. are But compare Hardin. though not in �a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented in: mutually ;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31 Su,h c1aims as to the roles and dubious, for seve ral reasons. objective s of deterrence If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. s uperior ity. than th i s, and sometime s even a mili ta ry goal. In fac t there ha s renewed driv e for Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32 process decidedl y A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce, despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only - been a que st for more are Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate for dctct"rence . On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its" impu.ls e there has been almost unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318). A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what sold 31. is being 11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor: marketed a nd deterrence has It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es "flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic pulses. In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it. It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM, p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed [1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front, which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. �i.ncrt.:ascd the probability nrms-race type t hat of LSN war. More precis ely, deterrence of th e is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and hns to that ,,,·te nt least en hanced its prospect s of occurring . at r easons also, connected with pure original setting), the last 30 years. the deterrence and with the For other "cold war"' (its probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to main tain credibility overridden or with ''sacrificed" a population whos e real for military objectives; state of military readiness; etc. The situation has many ther e sober analysts century , i.e. think before 2000 . is a high There are s e veral interests are being the dangerous and risky now been reached where pr obability of an LSN war this routes to such a probability assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and Amer lean 2000. alerts, hav e been lucky already . In of nuclear markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that th e For the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucia l the arms of nuclear acci dent and human or t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf . :l.ncrease zones separating the superstates are increasing in sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and r e veals the exchange . number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l race, on sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in r e cent years. Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128). �20 conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) . s e em s no way Fof better or worse, ther e to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight; a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight . IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it proha bJ~ that LSN an war will d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it proba bl e that c entury. And that is enough a grossly occur this ce ntury. is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is i.mmoral. For then it follows ( by plausi ble that it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this warrant morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome. de terrence highly is evasiv e act.Lon. We ought That in turn implies taking steps , presently practised. Thus present That i.s but the first of several ways we shall nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies. The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of war h a s of cour s e been disputed. LSN The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows : Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying. The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with ar c improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much ava i lable evidence counters this More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper ). What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the ce r tnin ly Ther e by, through det errence, we si t uation, since have already got into t.h e probA.bility. immoral of r aising The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity of nucle ar deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense war, against evidence s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an LSN war . LSN a nd way of princ iple s mapping war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war. mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic connecti ng pr inciples . moral arg uments Such principles The fl rst of the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form: Cl. should If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only be pr ob3ble is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly �i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur . Thus, f or example , s i nc e is it wrong to ki l l a large noncomb atant po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k and wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out, which nuclea r de terre nce does . botl1 of For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t ho se of third part y no nal i gned most Like "' t tuations . defeat by example , 0 t a te s . sub s t an ti ve Unless mo ra l count erexamp l es, the second principl es oc c u r s. probabi lity that par t princ ipl e s in Cl runs into dilemma. and of a c c ord i ng l y, Cl e ncount e rs to require complic ation. For apparen t trouble where clash of Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the oc curs X ord er to apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 • nuclec1r ethi s, d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to t o avoid a greater evil. pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y c r ashes, in dct:crrcn ce , make that t he Cons i der for example the passeng er plane he ic flying sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of ihe r e (though the r e explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not ls a of fs e t clash or of principl e s, as §6 removed by its role in avoiding greate r e vil. I L can be a r gued that it is: argumen t from t he pr e vious a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le perhaps f rom more such is pa rt of succe s s credence t he de terrence . th a n the of the popular However this inductiv e racing world As Barnett argues, driver's argumen t, 'the happy acciden t has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war 34. point a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet (des pite some close calla ) , he won't, th a t of the in the coming era, This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D. Johnston . There are more dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es. For example , in inciting people to c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d. Thus, t o ta ke C, Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj. But surely Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence . But spelling out what 'dir ec tly' means in terms of short causal chains over which r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to ot her connect ing princ i ples. �·2 (p. 100) . lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power incrt.' ,ise 111 Russian strengt h, the ri se r e 1aU. ons, th e of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc . (cf. simllarly Cox ). There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Dl. De errencc will not continu e to work, and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that D2 . De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war. The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together : some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r. proliferati on, the emergence bu t the focus is on the ( in An initial of lesser nuc lear powers. reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that lt. -i~i us e of nuclear weapons by confrontation a 11 lesser very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th stat e . Moreover scarcitJ ;::i nd o f chea per suppli es, etc , weapo n systems, more or Lcrror s ltua ttons, deterrence power lnvolv e s 36 , being mainta.ined : costs Wi t h so many more Arms races, and interwoven balanc e of have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record. lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds . of resource A second group of reasons concerns the Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that pres en t for wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased. powrr opportunities growing nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to. wec1pons .lnltlnl to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline, and the of lead escalating eventually to arms war , races, with such as probabili.ty Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for 35. that deterrence practice increases It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf. n 1clcar p .. 2JO n. 36. supposi ng th e armed with Lackey, MM, The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for dcle rrenc e. Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled. �probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in poli c y, US especiall y th e rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides to rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being advantage of ov erwhelme d, USA the to take superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy the tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as hostages ), thereby war. also weakens the case against resort to nucle a r detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t of mutual understan ding, leaders, and even some nuclear. sha r ed principle s , cooperati on supe r-states. and soundness transmi ss i on Finally, impor tant) level judgement among of of and informati on between It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for instance, follow through on delusions of one sort or another. deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding the other It is al so tha t side , which slde ' s threat is to the other' (P L, p.313) . we think' • 38 But about what the o t her considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of evidence, that on e perceptio n of what is possible resul t As s ide side thinks e rror. Not thinks , there only not can be is a there sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n; must now be severe doubts cffectlvc ly. "conv inc ing " There is a grain of truth in the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other what be a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how one may as to whether rationa l principle s are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward defence) have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies : we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and i.rrntiona llty . J8. Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'. This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e. �24 idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA and in UK) that LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won. The suppor ter of det er rence connec ting rrlnci ple s ri val case. such J1as not onl y to defeat a rgumen ts Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing as For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly ~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_. t hr o ugh practic e of Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed ( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl), only a feeble case through the questio na b le obv ers e of Cl, Cl i. If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X, nppears open . • For it has to be shown that deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war , and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options . o The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill be argu e d. reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim. up i-hc v ery cond 1 t:1.ons probab ility of suc h for a an LSN war, it So , for When nuclear deterr e nce set s can ha rdly have reduced th e war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le. More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi e d, it i s c..! l1 0l l f',h refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong. LO out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t. altcrn1 1LJvc pe rmissi ble courses of a c tion condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ; to be no t merely alrigh t , bu t ;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA, r ig ht. But I t is not enough to make For t he re certain ly seem to withou t deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory. uniciue ne s s includi ng fright To surpass t hese option s, a nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown es tablish ing such a 39. LSN war s , withou t .(cf. Jl 11 claim, to fear or is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39 OED) 40 • For most people, portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough from be the costs or problem s of Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by t hr ea t s not the enormo us expense , t rouble vivid scenari os to deter t hem and wastage of An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre nce is the way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum stances . Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu res , the an s wl!r hn-, to be, No. �- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em. det t·r rl'ncc And deterren ce i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of by such means ourse not immoral . (whi ch miJit4ry (Sc.h e ll was not immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New Yo rk .) But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where this o bj e ct, a LSN war., itself is no t permiss ible. The argumen t for this is thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple C2 . l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong. Hence since p re para t i on, LS N wars nuc l ear are wrong and nuclear deterren ce deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong . claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X: wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn i Y• wi11at W.'.1 S wrong. complete It is not however being Y and Z may both be 41 i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1. " Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that L SN wa r implies complete prepara tion for Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls (which tr ied the major war c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added). But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the become J ncreasi ngly liable to question . wrongne ss implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty, deceptio n, mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally unde sirable traits. Li l . Nor a re ordered be cause wrong, equally degr e es of wrongne ss required : wrongs can simply be as reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally evil. Thus, e.g. William s: . partiall y labourin g are both wrong or . there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil a s the second. This is because both are held to be absolute ly forbidde n. Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to "S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z" and to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and 3 lg a numbe r; s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numeri c , lly from 3! �26 a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s. Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as sever~] other fea tures. LSN war , already writes in In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pret e nce. Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence. too sophistica t ed for bluff alone to Military succeed: t here preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in t he ot her hand , has to is now be serious deterr ence . But, on c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly: imply attemp t ed X. c omplete preparatio n for X does not It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed with wha l is prcpa·ed whell1er intelligenc e for under c ertain conditio ns. Comple te preparation , for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a (proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an be taken of connecting for granted . Principle C2 principles . is part way not the line in a series pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that A con necting X with a tt empted X: perh,ps down if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not . But the se ries ends ; off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to the (thoug h it cuts claims of various religious pos i tio ns. For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong then X the co n temp l ati on con sidcra t Jon of of is wrong carrying out Xis wrong. or that non-action- oriented The point ap plies equally to sexual fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares . no Lhing mere In particular, there is wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable , and in some senses are all too thinka ble. Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each common ly involves lt connects with. decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanyin g the increased probability are certain r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves; nol I ho:a· of mere pas s ! vc .o nt emµ l at f on I,, 1 '. Howev er oll the sets of these are connectl.ng �n prL nc lple s invoked except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased. c ho:;c n One rea son for th1s is that the means o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft . The inc r eased prohabi llty of an evil out come o l.mply makcB things worse . Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but thi s accompa nied by threats and a threaten ing posture . pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved, announce ment For some pa rty , th e if deterr e nce s ucce ed : the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible . n uc 1 L' i1 r deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le: CJ. of is to This aspect of if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also wr o ng ; or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng . The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form CG . If Xis wrong so is a cond itional r eq uires some further ex planati on. the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere of' • 4 3 thre ate ning ~ Apar t intensio n to A condit'o na l do intentio ns e . g. themselv es, 1 the t ha t ) . C to (or in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style: the most cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the oblj gati on form a are not impossi ble claim in whnt or even remote or imp r obable: (spe c ifica lly those involvin g cornmitn e nt) for follows certain is tha t s ort s there of discusse d an it is obligato ry conditio ns the conditi ons typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l fund ame ntal cred1ble functor: To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the involv ed whic h intensio n is a judgemen t of is some intensio nal functor, f rom X enemy . The are intensio nal funct ors threaten ing , intendin g , and whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate the immoral ity 42 . There is plenty of scope for f ur ther elabora tion here. Passiv e s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other worlds where e vil oc curs . 43. The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey strike : Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e theories of condi ti onality. of nuclear deterren ce. Natural ly again there are many �28 no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions c.ont. :•mplat J.on, t'1l nld.ng, dreaming, etc. of e.g . fail, those of The.r e is also a n interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) , expecting, awaiting and the like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:. Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is then threatcn.ing X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that to do into prac tic e (e.g. if wrong 'What is wrong putting something committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to that into pract i ce. beginning as fo] lows: The point ca n if worlds where alternative ly X happens be are put argued semanti cal ly, exclude d then so are adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen. The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons. nuclear war obta i n. However t he required c onditional form can be derived form, is through only c onditionall y threatened , i.e . the f ollowing wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if argument:- c. should certain cond itions particular, (of §§3-4) LSN oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it wrong, 44. so a lso is simple if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails arg uments the Observe, furthermore that if something Xis have b en wrong in the first place. ear lier from su bstitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions; by Firstly , threatening X if C, war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to e sta blish CG it is Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272. It i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and also, i.n view of CJ, not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t. S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops: se PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared "i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong. Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality mentione d below. �29 enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X. CG'. The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to ca us es more t roubl e . a serious threat, Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e is t l1r e o.tene d what l . i s wrong , to prevent t,1c occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion at all to pr oceed t o action on plaus ible Lhrc a t s . removes i t the support bas i s for of threats. s i mpl i f ied CJ. Insofar A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l. sense co nditi on s, is con s i de r a accide nt . intended, For the challenge grossly immo r al unconvincing, case wh e r e conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. ci rcum st ances th e result from improbable To bring this an intricat e Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her not . is in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious thr ea t s to under t a ke out is Principle CJ is not ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ. says this Hence the shift to serious one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible. which as it is way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the thr eat nor ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al more .. pra ctic al " rep r es e n t atives grounds. Further more, while states thei r and ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot: it moral principled agents they ar e or take natu r es , to t he kinds of th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains). i nsignif i c ant mora lly would run For su c h agents , who may counter to comprise their a not proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such a s CJ are no t in doubt. The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e --- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n. �30 t.hrcnt involved then is it Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t, inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no Lhen by CJ deterren ce depcn<l is wrong . The maintain ed. sub-argu ment on se ri ous threats is a practica l one: Lf it s no t seri ous Bu t if i t j s ser io us that nu c l ea r dete r re nce name l y , that if the t h rea t s were not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro ugh , then the op posit ion would flnd out, in one way or a nother. could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l wi LhouL A policy of bluff system , f or examp l e, coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n . Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems maintain ing such a po licy weapons , espec ially informa lion would clown during l i kel y times escape the of there would be ma jor di f fic u l t ies i.n chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear change through in gov e rn ing el i t es , a nd the op pos itio n i ntellige nce. But then , since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d . Ther e a re as we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s. On e is t hat nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts a bo ut the r ationa lity of carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity essentia l. to its effec t iven ess . To be effec tive then i t mu s t be s e r i ous ( c f. Benn). Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of one centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent. CG, Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e C4 . If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is n!so wr0ng. The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o die tionarie s, etc . ' . of 'a d claratio r of intent to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury, It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of deter rence, which in tend ing to go to war . princip l e , th a t turn 0 11 C4 is s ome pa r a doxes the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout Princ i ple C4 is j us t i f i e d th rough th e s i mplified inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s p inc.iple some an ex tr emel y position prevail. Si mplif i ed wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly. Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d to �Jl agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows : argue siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng to go to LSN wa r when the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong . Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows. He nc e nuclear deter rence is wrong. But like virtua lly every utilita rian princip les utiJita rian grounds . deontic t hems e lv es , princip le , princ i ples For it is not difficu lt to except thos e flowing from CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on outline str a tegic situati ons wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear det e rr ence. But on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon C4. For it likewis e fs not princip les C3 difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d by maximum expe cted a nd utility . pu rsuit Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism , scrappi ng the sp ots not by doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will trou bl e of wit h utilit a riani sm. enable So .i. t them to evade the worst is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its mo r al f avour depend s upon uti.lita rian ass umption s . Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of fwbst,r ntial 1itil.ita ri a n e l ements ' (PD, p.287). consequ e n tia l elemen ts systems incl ud e must infiltr ate, an with the ' ass umption if Eve n observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one e thic s thing this upon must hav e astonis hing confla ting utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e particu lar that assump tion produce s normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he a ct Kavka thereup on t ries the paradox es of · deterre nce'. wi t h maximum expecte d to The utility '( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great deal of utility - - 46. ·•---- ---- - Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip le (PD , p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler, Bentham , Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as to why the pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora l' (cf . Kavb p.29 1 ). It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les (espec iall y the maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka 's f irst paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see PD. �. , •" . 12 i.s s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87). :;t obj ec tions as This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h ut il i taria nism i self: it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e . usud l stratc ~y of of Kavka tries t he weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the ~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising u t i lit y can mora l ly e njo i u. But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies fo l Low fr om t he normative ( p . 28 7) • 11 7 what ov erridde n by C4 s u ppo sed u t il i t a rian to a ssumptio ns ' Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t and is assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e t h at .•. in produce , situa t i on s , are whe n moral c ombi ned dilemmas . in si tu a t i ons These are not s uc h th e f udg ed as sump ti on as special de t e rr e nt c a ses where one decnti c pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it int e nd right to to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) . wr ong : that judg ement is not ov e rr i den. Nuc lear de t e rr e nce is also t he case is t hat in r emai ns Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4 i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion, what is th e~e s pe cial p.290) . situations, Howeve r , t her e ar e count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives . For .ln t he s e is wrong . s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what Howe ver it is ha rdly ne ws, but a standing objection, that ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g . Spec ial s pons on s hip de t e rre nt may appea r s itua t i.on a, where under ntl lit a ri a n t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l. char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he 47 . deterrence de t e r r e nce is very likely As to Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 . Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles, but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s . �sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely tp lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well. This is ve ry far removed from the real world su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e. si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the deterrence probabiU.ty is of LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence . that <l1~ont <: principles sllbject Even if it were mistakenly to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working such RS supposed de ontic principles C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons. Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it equi. r es, by wa y of the following principle: CS. If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis The reason is that the commitment is a commitment circumstances; and that commitment is to act itself wrong . lso wrong. wrongly in cer-tain Nuclear deterrence is however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions . And as wi th conditional intention, so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt th a t su perstates and controlling commitmen t and their intention to use representatives nuclear weapons. did not occur) is enough to establish the relevant The dangerous strategy of launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a thut have response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence. Now the connecting principles suffice logically , but are nucl ar deterrence, for weighty principle would detachment from the by complete preparat i on fo r and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so parad ox ical: det e rrence. ir self By case . i nstance conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong. This sound wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles one applied: it ou t the connections between and not be engaged in (unl ess i ts ha s appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should chang ed, e.g . left bizarre nuclear war direct ion can be drastically at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare, �to purely mi l i t ary targe ts). Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different sort s of ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e . a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s I There wh i ch start from the commonplace ob se r va ti o n that ~ All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in favou r of nuclear deterrence are broadl y ut ilitar i an. In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many t hat inf iltra t ed hav e the e thi.c a l l i t erature , ar e those of ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the one playe r, t h r> USA. Utilitar ia nism , t hough s till looking of those expedie ncy -· advantage of basically at ~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of posi t io n, a nd consider [ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity sup po r t t d by o t he r na tional i ties othe rwi s e . The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains, dflrive s from ut il i tarianism. 118 Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst de terrence, either by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme , Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments. The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in f av our d ir ec tion: 48 . of de terrence. moral arguments Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second a ft e r all it is widely thought that u tilitarianism is a false, Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a much t oug her ent e rprise. Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was · cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes t.o deterre nce . An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological ~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily he way of <lcontic connecting pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail. In the light of these prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical positi ons would go. After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even. �seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition. pol it i ca l s yst em whic h depends in some uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo. It hardly does measure then for a upon consensus , to rely on Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e just thnt appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on: how it ls applied; with which maximisa tion recipes; along with what other r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well); genc>rous arc utll i.ty· assignmen ts or upon With different (and · a rguably superior) va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49 basic reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4). LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility. deterrenc e out to whi.c h increases th other recipes of feasible a how for such things as preservat l on of national sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc. assumptio ns , and on Any policy such The It is that as nuclear probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e alternati ves, conseque ntialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance , Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) . The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism o[ ut j lltaria nlsm, beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else 11t i l i tarla ni sm when applied One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this: by to addressin g s ome of the inadequac ies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e. on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the improbabi l ity of other options working. deep, uti ~itarlanis m If the deterrenc e probabili ty-well is morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are pro babl e. 49. Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the discussio n inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally opposed conclusio ns are reached. (Hardin 's approach tends however to expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-know n to repeat. Some of the main defects are considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilit arl.an ism'. The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to stand comes from L, Mirlin. �36 wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s likPly to work or not. indepe nde nt deterrence are decidedly essentially nowhere i.s Moral princi p~s not are through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be . depend .Lt If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter . det:crmlne<l whcrhc r of upon firm to stand. Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these a nd of the results util i ta r ianism delivers uncert ainty measures> util itari anism off ers In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle , utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and. The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism. (orm shows at special int e rests, such as conditions security (the of estimation rules are pulled in). probability- well state , have hi gh 1s deep , utilities, nat io n- s tat e and spe cial It does not yie ld a deterrence polici; ind eed hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ). 11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a o[ act most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s under very il The acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity; These seque nce di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left (as also associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd war breaks out. In this event it can hardl y be argued that deterrence is t he pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence. Along wit h the argument s, there are dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence. other concom.itant conventiona l wa rs . f or Firstly, the peace it has provided 011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re smaller-s cale reasons is no deep is s hort age of And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at any stage by a r ange of 51.. Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the simplificat ion . In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e (ref rred to in footnote 49 ). 52. Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open. becaus e �- - - -- - -- - - - - - · - 37 fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and t ec lrn1 .:fl.1, j)C:lc (_~ , p 0:i It thofl not offer genu i ne of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e ·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ). Secon dly, there enorm ous is cost, mora l -~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly Marx i st way, in terms of destr uctiv e capac i ty and what 'the ls contr a dic tion ne e ded f or betwe en what cons truct iv the is spent for devel opme nt' ( PL, p . 316) . §6. Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts from natio nal dange rs nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene sis of nucle ar dilem mas. to Whil e there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also counr c ·-arg ument s, that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe ciall y to Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l just:!.fiab ili ty of nucle ar war pr e para tion in the _p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es. The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift, of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and every bit a r gu1r.e nt from local dang ers. dom inati on ; a nd dubio us fir st of all seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 . atom ic s urren der and so avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ). prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more than these ; third eleme nt , name ly, loss of basic rig hts there with these . black mail of forei gn appea seme nt In fact nucle ar is ways a cruc ial of life This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the dange r of forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at e eleme nt from risk of Thoug h and (free dom, equa lity, etc .) and fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human dign ity, etc .) and int eg rat ed that The two go toget her, sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh t adop t a polic y or as It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be en tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er: forei gn as black mail. dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic value s it does imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin ation , freed om to choos e vario us natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta nce, as is comm onpla ce in the �"[ r •e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a nti clcnr prepnratlon incr easi ngly nuclear risks, state demands, extensive etc. But what nuclear destruction, also involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction ti, _ material of 53 of the cherJshed life-style. So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut bnse me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51• fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of lncku cogency an d rings ho 1 low, It is basic values and ri ghts hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c: oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like ci tati.o n of religious values at politica l ceremonies; clean cover for economic consideration of one sort from demand s of the military-indus trial of private wealth and vnl \les appealed to category: in and anot he r, them having However arising to do with th e an argument isn't, or associations. And the rights and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice . this of power. oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury that t he argument 1.s a omplex , many concerned with foreign domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many conccut ·at:1.on pious of "communism" of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of cnpi talism. communi.sm has What has been happened here confused with of course (the t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion , association, is reality basic information, that ( the of) state values, etc., ideal socialist namely etc.), of) and certain so does derivative~ threaten basic values. One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear LSN wa r, and indeed for rational way of preservtng nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life. 54 . The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1. .... , �'lQ J, Simi la r ci. ue s tions dominntion and arJs e as regard s blackmail. argumeq;; H from er, e Justification danger which is itself open questioned (i n §8 ), both from the to ser i ous point foreign of the methods of extensi ve nuclear preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e structure of of question, v iew of nation and basic states, a i s subsequently valu s, such as freedom, and oth r wise. But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or dangers are no t, t hese from natlonal those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear prcpnration, and jus tific, tlon. have They been have par t of many people ' s accepted in moral by policy outlook. particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar however , the makers as affording moral fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form Wi thi n frnmework the moral justification holds good . others, ar gumen t s arguments not a c onv entio nal Northern It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in preparatio n do such engenders establis h a moral fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people not also face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls specif ically moral one. ,1 impressed by And for ma ny other s again, who are who not so or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life, and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. peop)c Such live beyond For such the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged . Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated people who live in people. Consi de r some a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet) under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nucl~ar d ter r c nce (a s under pr inciple Cl). For such isolated people, who may ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no nucl ea r diJ emma , and nuclear lo cations may have problems problems people. as deterrence to natio nal is wro ng. dangers, genuine People in less fo r tu na te but in meeting these they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated In doing so i mmorally; and f or through similar nuclea r reasons deterrence , superstates the are proceeding conventi onal No rthern framework is �j_mpug rwd. conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l Tht'. same argument:: put a reflective i s olat e d pe rson, and check S! 11 ci> Amer ican the or- resulting by a substitution Russi.an 1n the position of such an asse ssment of nuclear deterrence. IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y transfixed, t h <~ c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality. The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending whc her on the arguments are appU.ed as rega rds a superstate or not. The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something Jn orde r t hP meet of the nuclear armoury that it has. Or, weakening the theme to ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it retain i1 t l east solid a ou~ core of the nu c 1ear devices it has. (moretlly] to For su bs equent argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for inst a nce be cause of the character the of pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of g rou nds to those di. sa rmame nL supporting ag ainst a the dangerous SS reason 55• prudent:ial the me nuclea r Northern values supposedly being On similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentiall y Jrralto nal. It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is a s11 hopLimal st rategy , li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games . that a su peri or would be cooperative For expen sive , re source s, dr ai ning of such t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1. 55. admitted arrangement s. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a ra nge of other r espects . future be strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the lik . could be achif?Ved , would agreeme nt So it should arrangement s would be much less risky , destructive of the environment , a nd so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. �rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~ unfortunate ly rather remote: only the ca make their polici es sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate : proceed, largely unabated . nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a one's a rsen a l, umbrella. nu c l ear pre paration , th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md for huddl es conf l.dencc in !ts and which under co ntrast s ncouragcd elsewhe r e . st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear grrH1nd one anoth e r's But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof, with nu clear in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly thr oug h some supcrstate 's nuclear COVt!r super-· ally Does a "d epe nd ent" on a s 1pc r -a lly, rather tha n strangely have that exchange on its territory? mu ch Jt s ally's opponen t ? Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or nuclear must stag e a Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d . Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e it <loes theme , not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers f rom SST nnd end s as follows: DST. Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally . ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd same goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ). Nor do the arguments of f ered for SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments striking l y illu str ated by the case the for DST. 56 This is more of more remot e nuclear dependent states. Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans of the Sovi et Union. Nor ar e they thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical 56. As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g. eco nomic consideratio ns such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs. �ca1 1acity to launc h mot j .ve Lo <.111y <l o look convincing . carries full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but R wc .i ght. reasons In fact, the with a rgumen t from of For there arg ument t he only is qucstLonable non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs. of 58 domina tion In this way too) the from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified . such supe r state foreign li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of a economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d. fore(• lack(ing] so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol For similar 1 it t le 'clearly danger because nuclear of umbrella, superstate dang er facilities and th e tha t would be removed wi th With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these sorts a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may b e defeated along analogous lines . The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and peoples, break theme the of a of monolithic West. differently situated This is a theme especially favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West, its freedom, as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n. und i.ffrrentiatcd unit. dep1!nd0nL i;tntes with But this l eadi ng idea, NATO desig ne d powers , and In this the West is a single in and part to align lesser to justify pu tting them at nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West. The West is not so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it (i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination. Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is now coming unde r attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the. und er lying retaliatory model that 0 Safety lies in weapons , More weapons i mply more. security59 , Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear. a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s from nuclear submar ines ) . Europe ans are ar guing in present of syslem is more a similar wa y, that the a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g. 57. For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 . 58 . The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2. 59 . Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson. argument for it, s ee Threats to �Thompson, p.251); envi s -1ged and thnt: w-ithou!: Lhcut.r e for a h\icJ. ,;,)ll'' instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l thf' is now seen by US ( ut not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are qu es tioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely ci Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular o Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed , say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or, takin g off from the previ ous point, ~ Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through ar e proper methods, armaments , etc.) or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resoLuti.on at the int er national level. It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no ordinary level do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and r e ally warranted, frontier ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60 and explana tion it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that already nation-states. While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c. nation-state system ': For 'forc e has [a] permanent plac,~ in the thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. Th resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites Ass~mbli.ng r eferred th~ to as themes the so far nuclear de v e lope d fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 ) to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east 60. yields the both and their supporters. deontic dilemma. often ought not to engage in it is immoral, and also ought for prudential reasons (as Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alter native systems , see su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s . argu ed using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, �·,,,,._ 44 SST and DST). tl w Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction of virtues parac.onsisteot logic), but ( c onc octed 61 prod uced by war itself 62 , or at war and its version of the deon tic least war which spr.·eads beyond purely mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably e . g. nuclear , a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions. ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense di 1 emma demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, t he ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on asper.ts to do (since ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) . military arrangeme nt s, The ma in dil emma arises from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of war. War is requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold); but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es . war can undPr also ce rtain justified. be se e n as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that ctrcumstanees Thus ' some these reall y ju tifications 0 evi l consequences Regis of war ' (Walls , p.260). accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic are morally of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible the The doctrine of " ju st But this argume nts when perfo rmed under is no better or mor e morally for uti l itorianism as bein g corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e . W;n· and preparedness for 61 . wa r als o gene rate s ubsidiary di.lemmas f or Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence the best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii). Green also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s down): though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue. Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops d :llemma; they s peak of ' th e dilemma of how to prev ent the use Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation i n terms of a mora l political paradox of de terrence •.. the of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13). In too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs. But it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework. 62. Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein. �. ... inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and difficult prohlcms au t ho f· t c y: 'one of th e ~0s t o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL, p.324). The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts. The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed by t he co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a ., " lnd.lvidual li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) . othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas , ( poll U ca l) obl lgations to s for example (the question the extent of one' s a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear res c•archer It also accentuates of politic a l obligation s armame nt s and processor or eva sion is their considered f urther in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re several ques Ions to 'Wh, t. should my sta t e be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e be doing and influence, d epending on who one is. I do? 1 one Jives, - do?', on whi c h one may exert influences, i.e. in what l it tle There is not only the question 'What shou ld a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending a nd ar e on whe re sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the questions ' What sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64 Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o act ion-or ien t ed questions . Each of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas . The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or di ffe rently, pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy. obliga tory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas. T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state. 64. For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate than they are . �moral d il emmas ure not l i t.t>r;,Lure f, !., • widely or well und er stood, p...." t'ticular]y __ e 1-1 ~ 1i in ca .1 Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which giv•s to rise them but the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y. d i lemma doe Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons a not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better a nd worse ways By 01t . wh c h assessments, contr a st f orm the with basis s uc h e thical theories , preanalytical oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s. Reactions an f rom the res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas fix. nuclear The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to <lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to temporary Thus , crutch . for as world' GG , that b st" j ethical RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o way a of neve r exerci s ing "mora lly ou r s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld . fu nctor s peak moral A similar th e 'strictly mor;il Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role but de t e er e nc: e th e c i rc um s t a nce s. de ter r .nc e, is be in a fallen to " second a acceptability ' object mus t cert ainly one str ictly and wrong, is of from th e conditional be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a optlon as to of what the to nucl ear do in Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion though a "morally try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And can shift 'moral c ond i tional ' while a ccepta bi U.ty , good", responsibility d~t c rrcnce fix. ·s (as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic of we gra s p examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e acceptable'' emerge neverthel e ss the policy to fix. awkward that war in the pursu e circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as Sar t re; a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood. 66. Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n 1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2. 6 7. As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable' hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s . The Australian, February 12-13 �!i '.rnp erior pol Ley ~ nsscrabled (in sufficien tly it is §5-§6), a dt! cidetlly reasons of ·1 }-toor the opti_ n, sort reasons i'o r that are decisive already for those, outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find no genuine of nuc le ar nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re, stal1.:s' own mald.n&_. fix a It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the Lhc escaJAtio n of In these respects the situation is like peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble relations hips , and build up though and U.:, A, has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by the USA and the USSR in in teractio n. th:1 t The one there by. It is build-up. The fact i programme is t o be in addition to existing ( which are to Sovi et that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does. esources myth, a some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response bui ld·-up, nucl~a · with onflJctin g obligatio ns generally agr eed The recent (1980) United to States' strategic be already in excess of Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) . The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly, state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. indicates especiall y that merely route by a taken advanced response to capita list t he nations, Soviets (or of USA and its NATO state socialism ). would not have been feasible without compleme nting And independe nt evidence, t l1 ere is then a direct outcome suc h as Soviet-Si no confronta tion, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist n.:.iti.ons . There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts nation-st.' .ltes and the nuclear f ix . arrangeme nts are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increa singly present wo rld polJU.cal structure . is widely promulgat ed .'.lrrangcm ents : it .is' seen On the dil emma as one hand, with t he these result through political that the i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state n world of sovereign states . • . which brought the �wo.ld to the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ). nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into On th e other hand, th e the statist form, into arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast. stutlst espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the and security, to defend national inter est s , reasons such as perpetuating the system advantageous of confrontation, st ate to (!), provid e but underneath there ore other sovereign st a tes and frame work the rlnd peace The military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and polit i cally favoured of inequa l ity it supports . The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e statist arrangements a nd interr e lations ( conomic ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock a rr nngcme nl.s of s overeign where the pa ttern world states And zones of inter e st . t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one . side the rivalries, into conflict i ng the present The argument to th1. s Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer . The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) . "We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also integrated with state appara tus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68 Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements, by th ing s S llCh as the SALT negotiation s ; shown there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a (growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a rule , partly held in place by deterrence . as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this , there are cases rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US i s 68 . of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e not over.duly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would free ly concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. �diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~ adj~c ~nt ~estcrn oil supp li es : concerning, were these lay within the US zone of interest (cf . th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212). §8 . Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: results. in itia l political fall-out from the ethical Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limJt~tions on the thu s inevitable. and more or power s of states. Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re The limitations may be reache d by agreement and negotiation , less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war. As with other fixes produced by there are suggested ways the structural ar rangements of states, ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts, inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure nnd power ·elations extrastate approaches . of state s (and, in the limit, remove t hem altogether) , All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" , attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations , etc . , are interstate ; sovereign state . The s ame goes (graduated) unilate ral disarmament . about the nation- state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for les s "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empi rical fact , is it part icula r ly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s. as a We are certainly free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s demise sacred it is not a particularl y well justified political form; it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers, lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like these . Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders regarded the institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration between city-st a t es , not seeing its social, structurally -emergent, characte r. �50 approaches take one of Extrnstr1te ittlernat ional of slate s. r.ol two rou tes, way ~Ile to l~, ge nuine power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0 The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; ,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e . but they are Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to world governmen t, is alre ady there in the international law-courts. Wer e the courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal acl ion, that· medie val principle theo ri. t s saw to all disputes, could in be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T. given intrastate s n fflcienl least jilitial]y) But if the law courts were power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t upon war deterrence , though not by military means. perhaps Law courts, as usually conceived, are not effective without police and jails or their and equiva l ent supcr-statist back-up eq uivalent for of economic other penalties; and the either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will typicnlJy be organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other In pa rt i es. repC'ilt uninvolved short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to rt . Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying ec:t t. n gri.ps with the nuclear though mostly 1n passing to be to problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned, dismi ss ed 71 , in orthodox strategic texts on -·--------- - - - -- -70. Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the uni on. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR , UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together; and the one recent attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e . The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns .illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification of Germany should be resi sted; instead a more rational regional deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border regio n, and so on. 71 . Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical , etc. Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations. �5l thermonuclear war . By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like the new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions, combined with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls: unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s considered however beginning to be cf. Way and is more sometimes The Way Up, sympatheti cally by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing inte rna tiona l system'; and 'the 'towards a no but lt is making Galtung). much by Up mora lly There is integrated missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320). A main argume nt for the Way Up is just a repetition of that which is commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners' Tragedy of t he Commons. traditionally, ecological order. not herdsmen as best solutions regards to problems as the of organisation, public order and, more rec ently, as to So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are but nation·-states , and one of the prospects is destruction of a r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now sort such It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the state - a r e r equired to ensure espe cially, Dilemma, of superstnt e. said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some of thcjr be order-imposing corr espo, dingly weakened. ar gum ent s are role, and But all political this is obligation to There a re, then, many problems through these A further theoretical with h:1.tch the is Way that Up, a both "tragedy" theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated 72 . will 72. stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only that states good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. prac t ical. assume to See further loutley and Routley especially Griffin. and material referred to a level therein, up and The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital. �again . The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h no prospect at all of getting su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose. Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century ago , In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before Wo rld War TI. The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui, pp.2-3 ). The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line . future For t he foreseeable nuclea r ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of opcrnt l vc world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear hostlllt i es . extre~ely I n some ways, this is just as well. monol ithic, woul d World gov ernme n t would cer t ainly , whatever it s ( g ray?) politic al colour, {~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e impose damage on to It undesira b le l eve l Ideological, r equ1 site the world an many remaining of inde e d u nity political and parad 'gmatic , cannot be and, e c o nomi c sepa r atio n expect e d in some crucial respects, unity. of Moreover , give n Northern main within nuclea r dea dlines. swee ping more sovereig nty , c o ul d blockages and agr ~ements, be negotiated? dea dl ocks i1 the involving genuine There an way is When not even endless of of that state series of s uch state reconciliation. a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e the of The s ame Way Up nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged • - through the Unit ed Nations); 73. it limitations almost the cultures, nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is (e .g . would systems. 7 3 The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly much be f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism. ·1 n .:ltur.:iL an 7 11 Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world gov e rnment, see Galtung. Naturall y the objections to world gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf . Ma zrui ). Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can be genuinely s yn thesized with the Way Down. �jJ There is arrnrgemant s regrettably and als o conventions much are e~ tdert ce frequ ently concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are scntJments signed does slide smoothly that not not 1nce rnational observed (especially those worth into despicable dee d s . bode well ever be rcc1chcd. ln <'nnv,•11t f< n any great deal: openly violated. I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one fon·C!, of lofty It for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t wl 1I C'h tn nl1 the following intEirna t i ona l i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en, w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc includes a Even agreements states have are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or not tr ea tie s , 1 , t h ton genocide. Genoc i de ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group as such: ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life to bring about physical destruction i.n who l e or i n pa rt. f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e : dJrcct and public shall Beside genoc ide th e c onspira cy to commit be Persons committing genocide o r any of punl.shed , whether they are the othe r act s responsible rul er s, priva te individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue nucl~ar genocide, inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e , complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de. mentioned ca lculat ed that a larg er st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. conspir acy repr:esentati .v 'S does to some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear deterrence stands indicted pa r ticular it of the and as involving i.ncitement . nuclea r s t a tes acts ass oci a ted with genocide, in Some wel.i - known political and military would thus ap pear to be li.able to indictment . and punishment und er internation al law . 7L1. Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp. 210- 13). Reasons include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n drlvc f or strategic super ior ity . 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports. in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden. 76. The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff . Most of the points text of the �The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the appare11t I mpot ence interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation ne:.rer to nuclear the " brink" is now taken to ind ica te contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l tias gi v en new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions . The According to can reorganise the radical namely n iclear in Sc.hell ' s 1 unsatis factoriness situat .l on The should the foundations of politic c l thought' pollllcal t.iicy opvrate •. , the indicates inst itutions Fate lead political of to req u i red a t he Earth . ' ful l-sca le to make 't he co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ... its political li fe' (p.219). However Schell himself tri e s to avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by the of the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed stands, Schell reexaminatio n o f world ' c and book a new a rrangements, thesis that the nuc l ear problem national ( f r om and work of our age' else overimpressed by political t he oris ts. the 7 Z history, c onstitute So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or real ities of (unstable) nation-states , do most But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation. There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too 11nthinklngly) with an an tiquated s ystem many present state arrangements, representative century communications •ery different condition; in a 77. when and the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier. of ( a llegedly 17th we re willing ly , The feat ures go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he especially , us even of poli t ical a rrangements which t he nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion . best of even dem ocratic) techno log y, more were t he and primit i v e d iscerned, In the br iefs prese nt ed A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l ( sec Co x , p. 225). Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival " bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1. �for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged . But such systems con tinue to opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es und c r mi ne<l. prese nt Nuclear problems rep r esentative have political emphasized have been several other defici encies in arrangement s. In particular, they have rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles Euro pe a n countri es. cen tury ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved. issues, ~ i s sues. The least, be reduced. reduced excessive power back at dev e lopme nts , pro cedures, But the route down through issue-regul ated large i mposes and complex other modern requirement s. states What lnl t .t1-1.l s maller a s iL ls to inf or med citizens gro uping than approx i mate of a g lant satisfa ctory good will. As the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n the l.nf ormation by are stn tes, government recent tec hnologic al called for a re smaller Firstly, in present information and democratic progressive procedure, of control, nation-stat es, channels, and so f o r.th. ncc e ptable the from These upon nuclear problems have again made patent, even ·release the and distributio n distortion r estrictive of most liberal of them (and Aga in, especi a lly with new and less systems , there is little excuse for thls. information , upward depends But there ar e e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited pub} l t:1 y and Secondly , democracy, insofar political rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on). flow major li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation. a nd on of governments would, to that ex tent at grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education. cx pe n,, ive lea st governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e poss ibl e ev en in mu ch elected wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer polic:y th e It is past time for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once (i n some Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major 19tl1 in of data featu res in have a vailab ility major communicati on helped in making present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e �56 co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's nuclear superstates are often seen to be gJlemma type situation th e locked into (on which see, e.g., llardin1. A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for political questi oning current arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at le~sl), takes the following shape:• Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain j,rnt iff.-.d 111 te1·ms of dolng ut .eas t where and are so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those arrangement s, requirement s (as certainly in who operate under the muc h of the West) the basic mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met . • l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have these requirement s. For guarnntce the prospect of arrangement s. nation-stat es, good meaningful lives those to under their yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a meet at least in the North, can no longer such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way. support to A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ; m.-iny and ceased s tate to Furthermore a acquiesc e in or engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn) . Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have should be amended . have their justificatio n, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though not all) natlon-stat es: natio n- s t ate f orfeited it ls not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed . There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control stght of, or worse have lost don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the irn lerlyi.ng politica l theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68). �r;7 rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both c lai m popular Ln and mandate ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! , power~. put a value hi3 lier where, nlrea y illustrated milita ry situa ti ons: viol.1ted the 'IH' t:.1k er s on some have more often , they act without it or as The sit1.1at-ton has been reached sove reignty nation al survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210; is -✓ hl.'lfe where than 'nuc l ear: they do on human for copio us evidence see Kupe r). Thi s by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear the principles of just warfare repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples. much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l have been blatantJ.y Such states have forfeited respect or internal political obedienc e; so, on other grounds, have many other state s . It could just be, of course, as is oft en a lt er nat ives, that have been re s arc hlng glimpsed, though of world go vernment). dismissed, for s tirc withou very no possibly better alterna tives . but little As to whether all has such are no been expended on opportunity do to work, a nd not Appea r to give we alternative s w~y Down. There working tow ar d s the wea kening es pec .i.ally can be the may and ha ve been given know very little a bou t how humans suff icicnt org anisi ng and trying out alternative accessi ble alter natives instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely operate under su bstantially different arrangement s. But, t ime arrangemen t s, to even once again, proc eed thos e nuclear very far on of the mor e be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in breakdown of t he large r s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem. ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd while t here But alternat i ves the r e are, effor t toking the risk of being dogmati c; little d e ad ii ne[, tha t t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e 0 op Li. on or insinuated , nuclear st a tes, Thus i t woul d be s oc i a l arrangemen t s, theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x. But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of dll emrna to th t: exclusion of all olh .rs: quite the contra r y . t he nuclear We can no t only afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her ) con st rain ts ; Indeed, given the urge ncy, the direness of t he si tuat i on , we �58 :,hou1d ~s be fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such boRged rlown ( a nd v ery on a rms limitations ner,ot inti o n s m"thod::i should si~nifica nt be undemocratic perservered concessions unrepr•sentativ e) between main nuclear states. wi.th, from cert ai nly tJ nd and the attemp t s superstates, made to e.g . No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even s uch a wring further jointly signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially new . The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have la rg e r eve r y liberal or huma nitarian been on issue that has matte r ed: from ou tside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or nnd it ' by furnishing self ·- organising characte r is tically Bottom-Up famiL l ar cons i de rations are methods an alternatives practically wi t hout which never virtually upon bypass it , Top-Down. Such but part of the more general , and very effective, case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to supply, but whic h effectively and [or can almost t hat invariably mnttcr le ss be obta i ned, where required, more e x pensive ly without them (and their monopo1 i.es) • In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions, impo sed , or acqulc s ced and nuclear weapons . frequently from time being , movement have in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations The opposition to th e local a nd neighbourhood esca lating grou ps, nuclear fix has come some of them now feder a ted :1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate). !we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1 that These groups have in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the some a ga inst nuclear-free nu c le a r neighbourhoods . equipment The patchwo r k grass-roo ts is strongest in Europe, which is - as the mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American Europe will E11 ropc wil l these mnke it a saf er place : American shores. nuclear r emoved installations in on the contrary it seems probable that bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements installations It is succeed a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free. g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced. Ln having The chances of �mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and Exc:c•p l in the case of Eu ope, where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication . 8Cr i ou s ly And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is failing partly g iant fashioned military-in dustrial allianc e. inc r easJ. ngly dominated and largely domi na t ed financially ideo l ogically. much propped exaggerat ed. no t nnd c1d c quatcJJ and ec onomically some of and, in some mea sure, Indeed much of the "free" world countered as mil.itary by The means . i .," in basic any mode of mUitary . But mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by the Sovi e ts is a problem, t here are several ways other predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it. on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down alternative is it domina ted economicall y , by the US A. doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant in sofa r a up by the NATO powers ' i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and ls anyon' Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA , c a1;e Does expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a or Brasil say? Th Rt other? social methods but also some and much r eliance on These should include not state-suppl ied social decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of orga nlsat{ons, than me thods, or r estructurin g, such as power to dispersed local mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and East e rn Europe. Part of the point of whether external or r es tructuring internal, so is especiall y situa tions, is to st a t e-contrived 79. break make any military takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of int e rch1nge, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to s abotage the West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options. �60 ot.hC'r motl ves fo r, and Western popul ar suppor t Eu r ope , for f or, long j. much Uitary too adventures partial to and military advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean nucl e ar umbrella for its defe nce . Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least, 1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging t he world in the i nterests of its own security . extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European impositlon. There wo rl<l, wha t LS N war is no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing othe r parts of t he Europe, rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d. which has long exporte d There ar e better. options than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe. -·-·- ----- --·- . ·-- 80. Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated uni ts it in tegra t e d. The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c. The net effect (as c. Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high. One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62). Ycl th 1 9 112 (wa r r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81 . In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l supporting deterrenc e policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would b e further co rroded. In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas, to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gi.( t pro Jee ts . If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g. as part of the strnteg y of the "cold war". ~ �6J What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press b,oa rl out1 i.nc; fof ::tccordingly i.ic> perceptive t r ansarmamen t, to i.e. conversion outer edges of graduat e d the movements, alternative social defence arrangements). Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go, t hrough in i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more wa y clear namely all the disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's s ur t~cc , inc luding especially Europe. For once the state is demoted , its i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance on dec i s i on- making its diminished de ci s ion-making - once all that is happe n ) , one in duly favour of allowed more localised cont r ol and for (it does not need to major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty . Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers. What is important and wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the stn r- c . The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying features s uch as mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation . On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments fr om nat iona l conce rni ng part i cul a r. dangers .lndividual also and grou p rights and In their freedoms, by t he that nation- s tate . matter The are to arguments liberties in for t hem, as sma ller or exclusivel y nation-state is neith r sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not? ri sks are civil necessarily th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties nec e ss ary pl ace None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None o f ti e rights and freedoms g ua r a n te ed disintegrate. in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln: To be sure, th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not ---~------ ----82. The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s. The ste ps to disarmament ;ire well-known , e.g. the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as Euro pe, et c . �62 hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of moslly to wont be sure t hat nucle or arc othe r outsiders. People t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course, i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be Russ nns natlon- states. t controlle d by Amiirican s or Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives not a rational rout e to these ends . In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way dilemmas the as nuclear out of such deo ntic fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of things those the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare and a ut onomy; wc,1pons. but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by The main reasons are fam il iar : threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values, such the removal nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstanc es as welfare and autonomy, for many cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another with nuclear weapons ). ideological party the o pportunity armed There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons; example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of remain welfare for (because costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e accompanyin g sec urity measures). Thus the appropriate ly de vi ces and nuclea r fix limiting weapo ns is resolv ed , theoretical ly it can deploy, and how ), and rate, by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be s ince any sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty . pra ctice , at strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e au s pices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act aga i nsl the state . Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since sovereignt y reduction in ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons . 83. the Ind eed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s. Until human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty. �agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) . to far with the superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further: for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation. i.nto both milita ry s yst ems - and ( c ivil) Rather it is industrial production of the states So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being concerned. ti ed solidly resisted by super states. Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s and espec i ally against the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r. variety of organ is ed forms. These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or wld •l y, from such s t e ps ns Once again it will take a The indir ect l y. the forms of action range block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s, t he to withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes. They inc l ud e as we ll the whole r a ng e nuclea r facilities i nstal l a tions and of nonviolent (methods protest which method s against do exclude not i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new model . 8'~ resistance and de f e nce organisations). It is important to realise that petitioning of powe r state representat i ves and ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored, th e r esul t s disco u r aging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a mor e com prehensive politi c al strategy, which also involves withdrawing s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially alternative defence forms. 85 Sufficient d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp. 85. For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g. fu rt her Appe ndix 2. Martin . As to what to do, see �64 APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE or MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Sch e ll, and to Anders. A ncrtes of nucl cn r prophet s lw a pr odu c ed a EJ e r:les of ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary. The most wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th. This skillful piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable f or i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e defects . Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage: to selec t one example , consider the claim that ' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e [ human] spec i.es nothing else t hat we undertake together can make any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense (p.1 73, rearranged ). Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds. Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r presently a rrang ed nuclear ho l oca usts . l. The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire to the be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination, A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity . But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such: a l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it , While the sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e) w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all f al l Rcy. J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all: t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1. �was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes, two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers: Sl. Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on arth (the 2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and S2. 111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon). It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Th ·-- exDmp l e Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of con tracting the world to North Arner.lea . (All that matters, all worthwhile civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schel l's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4 Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions o( S2 , se Foley JS. 3. Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box . Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pando ra's box. Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing t'r""l . �66 th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense. But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e . Ther e are man y examples of technological advances that have not been t ak en adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns . Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons i t would not tell aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and the limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work , to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the " J.abnrn t.ories". Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r weapons in concer t, e . g . for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war, and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested and lypothelical in chara ct er. The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially. This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2 being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl Such ar e all eged imp lications of ex tinction ; but the fact is that the truths of arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of gods or g iraffes . In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form. Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the strea m of huma n t.ime, The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and futur e (p . 14 0) 6 • Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass' (p. lli3) . But it: is simply false that the tenses are human; the tens e s depend on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons). And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor there were any human beings. - •••-- - - H•--- - --- - - - - - S. Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry ha s a wea pon it will u se it. 6. Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73. (etc.) is �Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been, if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n mm1y other org anisms would be differe n t. Temporal themes do not la c k ' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or verified] by anyone'; truth, signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion. be Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in talki ng ab out what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims. The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [si c!] th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) . These are no facts, but deeply entrenche d philo sophical dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d elsewhere 7. Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans: trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles , songs , Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss , and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not worthwhi. le. 8 Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both. 'The death of mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166) a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d, becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of prec edi ng lif e and on the very questiona ble represent ation of this mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e . From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that ' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly 'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+; S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental Ph i l oso n~ (ed i ted D. Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980. 8. Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of the argument from �68 rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e . 1 011 Nor are all pe opl e C<JuaJJy locked in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d, th e po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR. Nor, --- 1 i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme, (in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go theme, ,iccord ing to which -S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really) distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9 B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows: ' t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated e l sewhere : we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) . But this is more of an argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points: we are pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152). And again '[ as] perpe trators we co nvey t he steady message that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that it had bee n judg ed acceptable fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e less . Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among wi ll c :1 Schell --- ·------·---- - - - 9. An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng, whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry, a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of political control . 10. Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows: 'The self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning . Fur ther 't he world chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194): the world'? This connec ts of course with the ideological argument from defence of fuodamental s, e .g. for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against soc inli.sm. In the' .nurse of th:fA argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) . �mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility, st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s, part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc. (the whole ea r th theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed, unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scatter ed and fragmentary. As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternative s. At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Wa y Up. So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns ( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-indus trial organisation and ways of life . But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd , more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies . And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial feature Ls the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear] supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base, the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state, and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, ma le- female re l ations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything 11. Sec p.225ff. 12. In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin. The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164. and especially p.227, bottom paragraph . j �nee ds to be accompl ished at once; and the clus~~ - of damaging power and do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of sta tes. [n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics. The teaching that 'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times, ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134). So 'stat es may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions . Even if all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is 13. These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated packag e, compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, ('TI C" rgy, sp ecr, sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the newer Enlightenme nt (but Faustian ) vlr tues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues . Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel maximls ation of knowledge paradoxes of omniscience . There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative t heo rems). IL, . R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral science. There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single, source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false . Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and promoted , while other alternative s were not. Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable, but dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitran t technologie s. They also admit of being made t o look r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation. �7l claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context, t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its n uc l ear pol i cies . 15 An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state ends. So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational. As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war, Schell leave s us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187). Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred. It is on this basis th a t peace ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as •xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185). Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an end' ( p .189 ): but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends ( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games a r e wo n). It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests tha t coul d s e rv e , and there is also th e possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit as if war and violence were thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of understandl ngs , conventions and rules . The y are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if no t a logic . Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic] plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd, 15. Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context. - j �72 rcnGonab.le, rational. However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap semn nti.cal trJ.ck . Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion (as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning; but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extraloglca lly. There are various ways these va lue assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirement s or not; but in nuclear s tr ~tegic planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng 11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat of thi s unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t . 16. Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly; for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions . 17. Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g . it wishful]y thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix radioactiv ~ ashes . has be en f rom th e The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e one, but a n ideological one: eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture dominance of the riva i deo l ogy . 18. An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "'negate" incoming USSR missiles . Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction; although involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention to proceed. Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed how satisfactor ily in another matter by a dis ti nction between longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing �.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility and on Regional ~~rategie ~ What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be . So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt• pol te l. cs . The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states, a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people many for th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s, r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of ce r tain soci al a r r angements . Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t. They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l argument take s t he following lin es: 1. The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore 2. Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a differenc e . Hence 3. Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when thint s go wr ong. There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can " t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e . While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many other i. nd lvidua ls do. In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in ma nner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly. Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in ways t hat do make a differenc e. An i ndividual is not exonerate d from r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument . While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical di s obedi enc e. An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards defenc e or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g. nuc lear weapons productio n and de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace fun ds, Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities. 1. Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood. - II �.,I<,' Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under Ro1ne sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s, etc., and o such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individua l need bear.) One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear wea pon s to, fo example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the we~pons for such war. The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through d e fence taxes . The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be : Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns? Or with making c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like? What follows applies primarily to people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people . Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions , perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the national defenc e effort? It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ; for in this case moral obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts. \n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n this: to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing ower from ind ividuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is Seattle in �"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more that ch:ing,.. tha t . H T ~~ s intact, and deeper (ecological ) sch emes Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper se t of cha nge s in the superstates . For those whose very limited political i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow goa ] ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er c ontr ol . The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war, whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers). There i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps towards s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated. Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance, wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ). That much is easy, in pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of d e t erre nc e ' • 6 More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of 1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e 5. Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1. How slight t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA . Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated: from a Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe ( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important. A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series . and alternative s, �76 whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even dh,r ,, r t i ng "d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive. I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with Northern nuclear powers 8 , a nd s hould be preparing now, socia lly and e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war. Howev er ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield poli t i c al powe r . But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj so why bot he r". One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic . A mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o bcf;1l l th e m. These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them. It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e : rather i t is that i t seems unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes ~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear. war. Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in 6. Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture , as Hawke~ notes. The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is not in any do u bt: 'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e; quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17). Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk. ' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f . Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has a non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk .for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s . A worthwhile re presenta tive government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term co mme r c ial considerati ons. 7. As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment. 8. Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e. �77 achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t. -yen those who believe tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life) do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessmen t: . 9 Richard Routle y* 9. Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g. Mart in . There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts . * The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C. Pigden , R. Good in, N. Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through cor r espondenc e with G. Fo ley. J. Norma n has helped in its final organisat ion. The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y in 1982 . �REFERENCES c;. Anders, Die __Ant_~q •i erthe!.t des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; to a$ A/i,. G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE. Situation , referred c.u. Beck, T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71. D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions Hale & Iremonger , Sydney, 1980. in Australia , J. Barnes, 'The just war' in N. Kretzmann , A. Kenny and J . Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press, 1982, pp . 771-784. R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon s. & Schuster , New York, 1981 . Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? Or, on trying to be rational about war', Appl led Philosoph y, to appear. nuclear P. Berg, Re!:._1::habitlng a Sepa_rate Countr.y, Pl anet Drum, San Francisco , 1979. M, Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlan Pr inceton, Princeton UP, 19 74. (eds.), War and H.C. Coombs, 'The ec onomi c and social consequen ces of (Septembe r 1983) 8-9. Moral nuclear Responsi bility, Natuni war ', 5 A.i'!. Cox, Russian Roulette: the Superpowe r Game , Times Books, London, 1982 . J. Dahlltz, Nuclear Arms Control: with McPhec Gribble, Melbourne , 1983. effective internati onal G. Foley, ' Jonathan Schell : Genius - Phi losop her - Rewrite Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Man ', agreemen ts. t ypescript , G. Foley, Nucl ea r Prophets. The True and the False_, typescrip t, Bri sbane, 1983. J. Galtung, The True Worlds, Free Press, New Yo r k, 1981. D, Gautier, 'Deterren ce, maximisa tion , and rationali ty ' , in The Security Gamble: Deterrenc e Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, (ed. D. MacLean), Rowman and Littlefie ld , To t owa, N.J ., to appear ; also f ort hcoming in Et hics, April 198/¼. R.E . Goodin, 'Disarmin g nuclear apo l ogists', typescr i pt , 1982 . R.E. Goodin, 'Disarmam ent as a moral certainty ', Et_l2ics 95 ( 1984 ) , to appear. P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic : The Theory Universit y Press, Columbus, 1966. of Nuclear Deterrenc e, Ohio State N. Griffi n, ' Lifeboat USA', Discussio n Papers in Environme ntal Philosoph y fi8, Research School of SociRl Sciences, Australia n National Universit y , 1983. Grou nd Ze ro Orgnnisat ion, Nuclear War: What's lo It For York, 1982. You? Pocke t Books , New R. Bardin, 'Unilater al vers us mutual disarmame nt', Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 (1983) 236-54. J.E. Hare nnd C.B. Joynt, Ethi c s and Internati onal Affairs, 1982. Macmillan , London , �79 R.M. ll;,r.e, Applicati ons o[ Moral Philosop ~, M&Q1t1illan, l,~rn,hin , 1972. R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decis~on, McGraw-H ill, York, 1965. New H. Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960. G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal 285-302; referred to as PD. of Philosol?.!"1y G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory (1980) 41-60; referred to as RC . and 75 (1978) Decision 12 G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU. L. Kuper, Genoclde: its Eoli~ical use Jn the Twentieth Century, Yale UP, 1982 . D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e', Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. in Moral Problems (ed. James D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' , Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM. D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64. a nd Har de n', Phil osopl'l_ B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to appear. A.A. Mazrui , A World Federatio n of Cultures: An African Pe rspective , Free Press, New York , 1976. J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War, Affairs , New York, 1959. Cou ncil on Reli.gi on and Inte r nati onal T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre ', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narveson, 'Vlolence and War ', i n Regan, pp.109 -146. National Conferenc e of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Wa r and Peace, ' The challenge of peace: God's promise and our re s ponse' , Origins 12 (20) (1982) 306-328; refer red to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter '. Oxford E_i~~lish Dictionar y, Oxford, 1971; referred to as QED. B. Paski.ns and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth , London, 1979. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingen cies 4. Nuclear Disasters , A Rep o rt to the Comn1issio n for the Future, Governmen t Printer, Wel lington, New Zealand, 1982. P. Ramsay, The Just War : force and political responsib il itt, Scribner, New York, 1968. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 . T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980. R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley and V. Routley , 'The Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8. irrefutab ility of ana rchism' , Social �80 R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984. R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House, York, 1982. New J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker, February 48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book. 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-11 3, T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 . G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971. D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983. F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 . T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An 19 72. American Tr agedy, Times (ed. Books, F.T. London, E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York, 198 1. Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981. probabi lity, Austral ian R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960. M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview , Colorado . 1979. Boulder , t M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970. B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982. ( Nov . 18, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document l 89 - .r 1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N. Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from ;-1 SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German, British or Fre nch) viewpoint. This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect the morality o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt. eitlH_•t t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e als o a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans, or for the American sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear ar r angemen ts involve. Mtwh o f U~A, CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n structure of the argument Pag e No §O. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral l. i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter. §1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the 2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war. War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt featur es o f nucle ar wars. 2 0 §2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations -~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war. The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted. Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus: s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated. Li mits of st ate e n titlement. §3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars. One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of the ke y argumen t elabo r ated. §L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ . Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality , p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles. § 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~· De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata: p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through <l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of 1. 5 11 1 !• 17 Page No !,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es; separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle: the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism . AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence . piu,.,f Till·lll H. 56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas . The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode]. §7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their _supporl e rs. Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs 37 43 fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts. §8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e ethical res 1lts. Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it. FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention. Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r 1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons. 49 The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states. Appendix 1: On Scl1;!1l t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to and Anders. Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption . Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e. H 64 .1,t . . .. Page No ~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y a nd on regional strat egies. Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration . Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons. Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes: what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social and po litical adjus tment. iii 73 ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!) NtlCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated, ~ Ll o r n~ arly HO th11 n e of even t he larges d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war. invo l ve, and threatened sa id to so differ co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a CertFdnly ma s sive PX hAnges Gt1ch as nuc.le:ir wars exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of Muc h at forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often f r om eit her just wars. new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will se rv e as initial ethical ba se. Al though nuclear wars are, thus non ex i s tent (extrapolat e va r ie tiea, objects, 1 nuclear wa rs from n very limited Ia fnr, only a decidedly menac1.ng class of proper have several distinctive properties nu .lear experlence 2 ) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) - - - ------- ---- -1, The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forc e fully: 'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could ima g ine: we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y, peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to give it , e .g. sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence, pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds, ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality. 111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 • explosio n A large-sca le nuclear involv es war of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region; a [unction of two main parameter s: distr i bution. Such strnt.egic ) nuclear quant l t leo of a war war quantity diffe rs which explosivc n, ts markedly limited, nnd (megatonn age wh ere from by the a of t:,Hget.s it i s ex plosive) limited assumptio n, the to and (tactical much or smaller chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y arc cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in a given reg ion. Though t he focus in what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no nucl.car arsenal means a separate st r ike 1 s ince a is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1 waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns second iss ue , et c. ). 4 Because of these of follow -up or connecti ons, much of the ca se made acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent . How nuclear wars reHultlng d-Lffer from oth er war s: wars and states and th e -- ---------- - -- - -- llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war. of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c two party (or thinking, A model is th e severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or trib e bat tle ~. A picture of war thu s refle c tion r e quirement s for legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical on advances have trad iti ona l now theo ry ender ed of war, emerg ed, inapprop riate ha rdly and especiall y sometimes surprisin gly, as a result inapplica ble. of The made no allowance for such J. Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially the type of strike :lnvolved. Though the sequence is j_mportant for the mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge. 4. 'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars: t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European "theatre'' , is really a myth. 5. There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given, etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a mu h deeper wa y, j phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s Tokyo. rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th And j t.' many occurred wi.th Dre s d e n and further crucial effects be yond mass bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions . Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument 1Jnchors, Lo historica l were accounted unjust war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control: the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n ar1ncd 'war' of content io n or comba t; cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience . but other are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8 proLagon ists, antag onists or players; means and or wrong. to elabo rate by means of forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ; noun linkages G to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter), and of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions Firstly , r e tain always a f nction of sens es of the States are the forces c omprising armed soldiers are the a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent Thus wars ar _ external or internal states or their rule. (c.ivi.l), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have transform ~d, and nuclear war has emerged with nuclear states. lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states : 6. An obvious :i.n short, wars ar e There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term 1 war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt ( OED) o n wa r, 7. But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of nation--s tates. 8. Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone .t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e. James proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12). What it boiled down to, howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil, especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness, con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast. Again specious arguments enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc . .:1n uut ,~01•1p of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture, and are nltcr i ng by the s tructu r e. Wars j _Lu a t from c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of (other wi se defect ive) politi ca l organ isatio n of states ; they are a ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation . helps wa r arise War Thls seman t.ically based pictur e of exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and deterr ence d t: vo lves into an war-m akers , argume nt agains t aga.in st states . In the fact ( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d) on the war-d eclare rs and tradit ional theory , wars wer e r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as t heir r emoved t1 e right of r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es; states or the argume nt was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the c our ts 9, while states did not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of th e law courts ). But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim at e place of wars; ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc. Let. us a h OW\ ) V1_. r to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on - basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s tates or sets (axes) of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars. ·ompr litive game s, could be won. attent uated form for some "victo rs") Lhc World vfars. strate gy. surrou nding trad i tional ly firstl y for mass ive armed wa rs, Like exchan ges such as th •re may well be no winnin g in ar e as the of No r thern very hemisp here countr yside. Thus, and the second ly, for laying the was te _£Dint of of substa ntially substa ntiall y oblite rated 10 , (cxe rcl sed and most as nothin g all worse off than at the outset of the "play" . are huge war seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d: a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that prepar ed that: That assum ption still held good ~hough in Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds; is settle d with main protag onists player s It war; assume d An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n metro polita n agglom e ra tio ns 9. to main Hence elabor ately f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ; Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p . 776, top). The argume nt presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva te dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way, it looks as if it could be readil y t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern ment, or at least effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a t that time to be one state! 5 hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e. .:uid ot her Lhf' e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was not pu re de t e rr e nc e . to mil i tary Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff, Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in tar gets r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ; and military e xchanges. principle 11 This feature iG fundnnent al as for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality. ways to The special effects of nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear canno t w3rs be legitimat e ly confined. l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s uz0ne <lestr uc ti on, s hockwav es, suc h effe cts gign nt l c fum i gat i on s §2. a nd th e e nti re l y rapid ••. speed special effects (presente d in Schell) include radioacti vity, pu lses, fireball or firestorm e tc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s. The mora l s ituation: be c ome as el ec troma gnet1 c <lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s, com pounded Th e se the r ecent tend e ncy submerged in the context of war. of moral considera tions to It is particula rly important i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient distinctio n mo r a lity or local or nat :l. onal and ~ ..e5:..diency. What is done in war, especiall y between advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the l ') . There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves " suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on. Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective me d ical int e rvention (PL, p.313). Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons de veloped in the tex~. Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" . 11. In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc. l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH' Much t.h at oug h t war , of or othenlis e 12, not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like . we liv e not go in a rat her bar barous age : unremarke d, if the th e horrors of the twentieth century will history Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd ge t s writt e n as wi pi ng moves : based on "stra t e gy" disad van t ages , of mor a lly excluded actions, ·a J.culaU o ns. charncterist i ca---1J:x its is. that rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in o t con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr d0.Lcrmi nes (accurately) str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e such Hllitarily its e xp<'di e n cy . by gains own i.t _o u~ !:_, morally, cons i d e r i n g and Eac h side only lo s 8e s a s a in a military encounter own its advantages and r e sult. of alterna tJve possible to consider those of the other side( s) as well. In t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality . I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted wa y, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of eLc.) . Such t he class lcal through "bald an inc r emental a distinct nrgumen t tc.tt1s . g a r gument from an t ha t th e It would And (bu t The externally wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e . ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed. the of li mit) escalation man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit. assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as enforced force, Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated. Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue, reall y this Thus t oo follow from i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable . c onfusion Nuclear 12. For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness. These t li cn1<•s run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r. 13. As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument Jike the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. Th e fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1.. i' war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n . for the l anc, r or players Still the !irgument is inc onclu s ive; can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate, examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4 A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by of mo ·al i t y: lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y c<;p,~, f,11 ly t lw 1 constraint s from the ot her s'ido. 11w~Liou not onl y as to ma y well enc ount e r, So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps it wlw t o u g ht to do in mor a lly permi ss ibl e si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf. But the last question do e s not, in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y . There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having 0:x.pe<.lienc y, even under extreme to give way to circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war involves . Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of give to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often way morality eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations. t hcorc~ical fac t is that both deliver f r om us But the the vnlue the o q'.: . to Expedlency fact, but urg('s , tba t does foreign takes local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e conside rat i on s . proper charact risa t i on , a remote By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its much univ• r sa lizable mor e univ e rsal pr inciples . rePultan t i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y fairness, eq u ita billty and of value and, And morality thereby imposes, through principl e s, jus t ice. distributio n c ertain requ i rements of general Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly Ttie no t It assumes, or what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of or to cruci al simply narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable . even bound moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same, eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue miraculousl y are placed 1 :., . Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e of ·va l untioi1~:; pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under 14. 11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1 i nt e rr e pla cement, from the same As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war. B . expr d 1e1cy assessm ents 16 • ic c~ n For expedie ncy loes not elude deontic presen tation: be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right", or ft lvcn tight formal rest•mb le charac terisat ion . The charac terisat ion will normal ly that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to, or arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds. Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity ~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi ned. util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as cnn Thus onside ring only expedie ncy; intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ; meet do it Lt does not, unlike the me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the individ ual uti.lity of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say. There are dc•ont.o .logis ts r egardin g war mora ll y howeve r signlfic a11t e.speci ally, 17 • which differe nces, between utilita rians serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have permis sible, or to seemed to effect some to rend er justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards ~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not permit. already and partisa nship , since utilita rians But this is would reject the descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly'; wherea s an a im in what follows is to avoid meta-e thical me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not there is a neutra lity. to achieve And morally large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn. S('Vcr al moral partisa nship, VJ.rtua ily all positio n s grc• that the obltter ation of major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous. If tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists who seem to feel no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for some Rus si a n ones, s imply increas e the costs involve d, up to loss of whole nations if l.5. The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ", nationa lism and pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which exces siv e applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi ng a person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards treatme nt. The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require ment of morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require ment to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte nds to strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry). Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72. 16. The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic . 17. Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, i.n Collen et al. by Pl ato ; see on :iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs Tile ncounlere d; _!: hen try to work down again. fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally oul of perspecti ve, morally. abandon or Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has tended to suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does not m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be Cons id er t he w11rld ,·inpl r1•. be so thern risi.ng (hemisphe re) no one's advant3ge . strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try nil lear to exchange in the North, There would southern to be waters encourage a hardly an of US all - out point then in securing institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much espe . ially given the apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts. tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e: lhc present point :1. has and tts power, limitatio ns, is an thnt ( t he fnct of) moral inadequat e But conse nsus const r aint without accompany ing struct ural adjus tments. For , typJrnlly , <lifferc11 tly to nationa l impose interest ls taken hosta ges or override morality, e ven holding civilian populatio ns kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ). unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian such as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitut ion of jus tificatio n; fails in The first, expedienc y , . C.!.BSSC,S And, regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overridin g for morality , of morality, which the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of :important or irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the mo r al interests , of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the case of LSN war. 18 . As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her than based on national interests . Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis , Ii:!. It nol be pretended expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y , that tha t of it i.s "group but n montl basi, as distJnct from one of ego1 sm " ). There no 1s special moral d.ispensa ll on fo r governments. j ndiv iduals : ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or analys is of obligation. Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds; no di ff e r e nce organisation. extenuating killers: whether X is an · individual States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion reaso ns aside, be having just as beeu conce ded , special moral dispensations; more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism. cannot immorally makes system, grou p or of Lebano n) are, as brigands or mass there is no moral difference. Certainly t here are gro unds on which states or individual or and it f11rnish two (incompatibl e) their a gents 01: have claimed , but the excuses offered are no A moralities , a s atis factory state moral theory or public one and a private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual morality becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3 ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled Y are permuted . special 01 1t cover (e.g. to considerati.ons citizen Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or pe rson can be der iv ati ve damage For bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are der ivative prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly 1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency . particular, a sta te is not 1 morally) survivrd . In entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even ow n ( at for its Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge. 19 . There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or see Routley a nd Plumwood. multiple) morality Lines: 11 !-: ' ) 'j.J. The i_ni t i<d argument p:1cifli;m yield arguments to the tmmora1 lt.1_ of _ LSN wars. to tb e 1mmora1it.y of war. But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire controversi a l in an area where th ere is no go od r·ason to Argumen ts be for controve rsial. Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of LSN wars follows . All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime. nil wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling po litlcal issues between states . wa r s who Not are Among more or l es s admissible th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors volu11l'cer :w Ho ldlers nnd whos<' actfon does no t 6pi.ll ov er on to noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants were kjl.led in war. conscrip tlon, Since the esta bl i shme nt press-gangs and recruitment of such of the lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms; induction prac tices as near-d es titute, wars hav e modern massive war s are far removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ). imrnornl, Most s orts of wars are because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such a n exte nt as LS N war s . The first argument to th e immorality of LSN wars and of sufficientl y larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong. P2. LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts. P3. Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong . ( KA) LSN wnrs ar• wrong. The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set of Lhis type. the (KA ) t·cpL1ccs But the qu1. te 'kl.11:!.ng su ff i c l en tly 11v :i.l. crcH tu res' . Thu s t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or i. nvolvecl f ocus can destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a on arguments Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen. vadu tlo n of not ll fir s t uitable directly Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) . The argumenL Js valid, ,1L t a .kcd) on the basi :3 but of may each be attacked ( and of its p1·emisses. has in ef fe ct been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves 11 what is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are, in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said robbed; but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong, to "involve." providing For which instance, that person ' s assistance belng is also wrong. But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20 As aga inst P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that mi lit ary nuclear targets. wars can be encounters But given the character of nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets. net merely the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings. fnlloul There i s down-wlnd from military pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl tnrgcts US and For example, t he radioactive will affect large conc entratio ns o( European t argets , and may affe ct as Conn <l o. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal cffcrl ) 2 1. t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side If missiles wer e c haracte ristically r.eliAbly on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc diagn osed. 21. According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are rcs ponsJblc only for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even U these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended conseq uences . Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is pernicious , a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions . whicl1 was intend ed unfort unatel y only went off to destro y an unma1H1<HI und e r g round Such claims shou ld be reject ed : ci ty. dou bl e effect Noneth e l ess the circum sta nc es differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo ns lbl f' ,1 for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce the the thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e ~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on. innkc silo course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under could missil e j t was not as if t he y had del iberat ely aimed at The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of] respo nsibil ity Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of the act. ~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of argued tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation . the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' . killin g and P2, it The equivo cation is induc ed by be conc eded that de libera te milJta ry , e . g. farmer s or goods or servic es bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs . used exclud ed as innoce nt . The s econd d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2. other. for re a sons, it by proper ly point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s Bec a use P2 s o amende d is less defen sible, is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'. What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status of what is mixtur e of tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs. requir e the qualif icatio n 'delib e rate' or done, So 'delib erate' gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so does Pl. not t he Second ly, it will be conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin g of t hos e a It no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi litary ef f ort, whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of not be charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin guish able, by and ma y of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will be made . will b are While it will Pl For Pl do es 'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22 Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none the worse for that, and Lhere is no seriou s p·o blem in markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s, people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and J.s, mnrco v'r, no need to adopt action chains . There the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic 22. Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ). The sugge stion depend s upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent ion, and wrong ness with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri ne. ,1 rlns:; ":'i ,c mnk.t~ t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try t:(, endenvourlng c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants. there Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met, .tr,~ for ;ir311mcnts the prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl and Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t tend will For examp le, one argument for v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory. Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one, (to poi.nt) , re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns mi n f nn l from -~_gume nts §4 . the understate sc,rio usly doing so 23 histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts on wars, just ur dreamed by conlemporary "free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and opponents communis t im portant the The conclusion t hat LS,' wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified - 1e that fail s to treat them with the .0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments . r.;omet. lti to of is Americ a inspired, me r ely not or et c), th e of same The conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al t:irnt•s , (or jusL wars. first One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the ;>1 :irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it to no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killc.:<l (cf. be Barnes , p .77.5) . A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be fought by morally which impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate killing of noncombatants . The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e legitimate of means , discrimination (betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) /. ~:, . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate ') ( I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' . 7.3. Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One ;.rngLP favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there in are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g. c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of See a l so PL , p.312, where a their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r. uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed . 2 1~. Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally usage. of - - - -··---·-- Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f being that of net evil to net good: pro ro rLi on cor; tr-: up proporclonality, 'the damage to be infljcted and lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed the damage and costs , req 1irement: disproportio nate to goods moral pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R er i t1! rlon of the which doctrine through war . "improvement" ln achieved of confined, nationally no t ar that way. ov e r a ll co n sequences of abstaining i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts": c ondi. tion s "nmel.ioratlve " wn y the 'a nation wages war justly than Similarly on l y if the for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent s:1tisfy for bad, from war ' (Barnes, p.72) . LSN wars can in these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also wa rLl , nnd war According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no are Entangl ed with the justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less th e taking by p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this (PL, arms' the e :a mple that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r t!il' v0 ry d lf !<r<' n t'Jy, cx rhanges . 1 lmilcd prospccUJ of: succl'SS for whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in Wha t some sm11ll strictly state limited clltc , or nucl ea r is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right intention. Fo r One (by no means be arg ued to in various ways. c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that, 1 wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 25 . Til e principle can 26 . wars where t he targets ar e c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he For such wars remain unjust on pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect . on lif e several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were s ys tnms, etc. mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be nucl 'lH kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear ndded ). Zi. Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack, t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what are se e n as b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars can b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed. Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion of medieva l theory oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e was no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf. lltt J e is wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc se nsitive howe ver, me rit, ( a nd when issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently). a r g uments are not do There .In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents, dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s h i st orica l r e quireme nts Barnes, p .778). not simply commit argumen t s matters underlyi ng the Finally , these argumen ts from any presc r iptive fallacy; from historic al autho r ity for to th e mo r al c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed, a nd nome times applied , were justifie d. As they are. I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the mo ral rightnes s or justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin e on co ntempor ary u n ti l times. Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and This ls the involve beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars : such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once remov ed ( a nd e ven, howr• vcr you look conse ns us violence 28 • Ht very f requentl y , when it is not) . il morally . a r gument; it The argume nt i.s not proceeds expedi.en cy that is duly They a re morally wrong the same as the weaker fr om similar results from the full sweep of ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion. The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case each type of moral theory. Fortuna tely deta ils can be de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents 28. one, from shortcu t. For for just war These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear. For the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it. The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may be co nd emned 'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311). Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780). .l / whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate. w.1r were i_;ornctimes a rriv ed at or l n fact conditions for just defended through pr inciples of such moral th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative been done . work already The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is maxim j.sati on utl lHy has is final ly ac complished, LSN adopted, wars are howe ve r excluded ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an · g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1 l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ; wars Llw l involv e on LSN 1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure, tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in utllitarlan Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 • L1i; ldon. The arguments ovcrwhc .lming so moral far case outlined against such mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n principles are de riv able from agains t some LSN wa rs. LSN would su bstanti ally wo rse are tha n exhaust th e violate thes e of the theories just considered). These ac countable, condition not ( again th e obligation to maint a in earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems : we do For there are oth e r significant war pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns : p,cnera tions, to whom wars we the r.-esponsibility to futur e pas s to th e " recei ved the world it". Such on" not in conservative principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are bound to be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war. §5. The shi ft to nuclear deterrence: suppo rt nuclear arguments to its immorality . Those who arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars , by pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars. What i s being done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om war: deterrence is most important precisely engagement in preventing in LSN such wars from ever occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values. it is continued , deterrence is the .9nly practical d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments 29. For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail, complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'. are But compare Hardin. though not in a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented in: mutually ;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31 Su,h c1aims as to the roles and dubious, for seve ral reasons. objective s of deterrence If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. s uperior ity. than th i s, and sometime s even a mili ta ry goal. In fac t there ha s renewed driv e for Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32 process decidedl y A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce, despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only - been a que st for more are Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate for dctct"rence . On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its" impu.ls e there has been almost unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318). A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what sold 31. is being 11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor: marketed a nd deterrence has It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es "flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic pulses. In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it. It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM, p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed [1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front, which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. i.ncrt.:ascd the probability nrms-race type t hat of LSN war. More precis ely, deterrence of th e is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and hns to that ,,,·te nt least en hanced its prospect s of occurring . at r easons also, connected with pure original setting), the last 30 years. the deterrence and with the For other "cold war"' (its probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to main tain credibility overridden or with ''sacrificed" a population whos e real for military objectives; state of military readiness; etc. The situation has many ther e sober analysts century , i.e. think before 2000 . is a high There are s e veral interests are being the dangerous and risky now been reached where pr obability of an LSN war this routes to such a probability assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and Amer lean 2000. alerts, hav e been lucky already . In of nuclear markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that th e For the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucia l the arms of nuclear acci dent and human or t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf . :l.ncrease zones separating the superstates are increasing in sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and r e veals the exchange . number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l race, on sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in r e cent years. Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128). 20 conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) . s e em s no way Fof better or worse, ther e to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight; a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight . IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it proha bJ~ that LSN an war will d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it proba bl e that c entury. And that is enough a grossly occur this ce ntury. is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is i.mmoral. For then it follows ( by plausi ble that it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this warrant morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome. de terrence highly is evasiv e act.Lon. We ought That in turn implies taking steps , presently practised. Thus present That i.s but the first of several ways we shall nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies. The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of war h a s of cour s e been disputed. LSN The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows : Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying. The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with ar c improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much ava i lable evidence counters this More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper ). What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the ce r tnin ly Ther e by, through det errence, we si t uation, since have already got into t.h e probA.bility. immoral of r aising The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity of nucle ar deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense war, against evidence s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an LSN war . LSN a nd way of princ iple s mapping war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war. mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic connecti ng pr inciples . moral arg uments Such principles The fl rst of the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form: Cl. should If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only be pr ob3ble is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur . Thus, f or example , s i nc e is it wrong to ki l l a large noncomb atant po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k and wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out, which nuclea r de terre nce does . botl1 of For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t ho se of third part y no nal i gned most Like "' t tuations . defeat by example , 0 t a te s . sub s t an ti ve Unless mo ra l count erexamp l es, the second principl es oc c u r s. probabi lity that par t princ ipl e s in Cl runs into dilemma. and of a c c ord i ng l y, Cl e ncount e rs to require complic ation. For apparen t trouble where clash of Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the oc curs X ord er to apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 • nuclec1r ethi s, d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to t o avoid a greater evil. pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y c r ashes, in dct:crrcn ce , make that t he Cons i der for example the passeng er plane he ic flying sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of ihe r e (though the r e explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not ls a of fs e t clash or of principl e s, as §6 removed by its role in avoiding greate r e vil. I L can be a r gued that it is: argumen t from t he pr e vious a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le perhaps f rom more such is pa rt of succe s s credence t he de terrence . th a n the of the popular However this inductiv e racing world As Barnett argues, driver's argumen t, 'the happy acciden t has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war 34. point a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet (des pite some close calla ) , he won't, th a t of the in the coming era, This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D. Johnston . There are more dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es. For example , in inciting people to c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d. Thus, t o ta ke C, Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj. But surely Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence . But spelling out what 'dir ec tly' means in terms of short causal chains over which r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to ot her connect ing princ i ples. ·2 (p. 100) . lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power incrt.' ,ise 111 Russian strengt h, the ri se r e 1aU. ons, th e of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc . (cf. simllarly Cox ). There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Dl. De errencc will not continu e to work, and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that D2 . De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war. The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together : some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r. proliferati on, the emergence bu t the focus is on the ( in An initial of lesser nuc lear powers. reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that lt. -i~i us e of nuclear weapons by confrontation a 11 lesser very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th stat e . Moreover scarcitJ ;::i nd o f chea per suppli es, etc , weapo n systems, more or Lcrror s ltua ttons, deterrence power lnvolv e s 36 , being mainta.ined : costs Wi t h so many more Arms races, and interwoven balanc e of have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record. lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds . of resource A second group of reasons concerns the Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that pres en t for wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased. powrr opportunities growing nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to. wec1pons .lnltlnl to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline, and the of lead escalating eventually to arms war , races, with such as probabili.ty Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for 35. that deterrence practice increases It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf. n 1clcar p .. 2JO n. 36. supposi ng th e armed with Lackey, MM, The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for dcle rrenc e. Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled. probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in poli c y, US especiall y th e rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides to rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being advantage of ov erwhelme d, USA the to take superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy the tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as hostages ), thereby war. also weakens the case against resort to nucle a r detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t of mutual understan ding, leaders, and even some nuclear. sha r ed principle s , cooperati on supe r-states. and soundness transmi ss i on Finally, impor tant) level judgement among of of and informati on between It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for instance, follow through on delusions of one sort or another. deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding the other It is al so tha t side , which slde ' s threat is to the other' (P L, p.313) . we think' • 38 But about what the o t her considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of evidence, that on e perceptio n of what is possible resul t As s ide side thinks e rror. Not thinks , there only not can be is a there sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n; must now be severe doubts cffectlvc ly. "conv inc ing " There is a grain of truth in the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other what be a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how one may as to whether rationa l principle s are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward defence) have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies : we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and i.rrntiona llty . J8. Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'. This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e. 24 idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA and in UK) that LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won. The suppor ter of det er rence connec ting rrlnci ple s ri val case. such J1as not onl y to defeat a rgumen ts Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing as For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly ~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_. t hr o ugh practic e of Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed ( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl), only a feeble case through the questio na b le obv ers e of Cl, Cl i. If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X, nppears open . • For it has to be shown that deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war , and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options . o The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill be argu e d. reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim. up i-hc v ery cond 1 t:1.ons probab ility of suc h for a an LSN war, it So , for When nuclear deterr e nce set s can ha rdly have reduced th e war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le. More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi e d, it i s c..! l1 0l l f',h refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong. LO out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t. altcrn1 1LJvc pe rmissi ble courses of a c tion condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ; to be no t merely alrigh t , bu t ;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA, r ig ht. But I t is not enough to make For t he re certain ly seem to withou t deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory. uniciue ne s s includi ng fright To surpass t hese option s, a nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown es tablish ing such a 39. LSN war s , withou t .(cf. Jl 11 claim, to fear or is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39 OED) 40 • For most people, portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough from be the costs or problem s of Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by t hr ea t s not the enormo us expense , t rouble vivid scenari os to deter t hem and wastage of An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre nce is the way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum stances . Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu res , the an s wl!r hn-, to be, No. - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em. det t·r rl'ncc And deterren ce i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of by such means ourse not immoral . (whi ch miJit4ry (Sc.h e ll was not immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New Yo rk .) But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where this o bj e ct, a LSN war., itself is no t permiss ible. The argumen t for this is thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple C2 . l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong. Hence since p re para t i on, LS N wars nuc l ear are wrong and nuclear deterren ce deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong . claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X: wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn i Y• wi11at W.'.1 S wrong. complete It is not however being Y and Z may both be 41 i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1. " Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that L SN wa r implies complete prepara tion for Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls (which tr ied the major war c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added). But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the become J ncreasi ngly liable to question . wrongne ss implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty, deceptio n, mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally unde sirable traits. Li l . Nor a re ordered be cause wrong, equally degr e es of wrongne ss required : wrongs can simply be as reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally evil. Thus, e.g. William s: . partiall y labourin g are both wrong or . there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil a s the second. This is because both are held to be absolute ly forbidde n. Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to "S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z" and to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and 3 lg a numbe r; s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numeri c , lly from 3! 26 a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s. Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as sever~] other fea tures. LSN war , already writes in In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pret e nce. Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence. too sophistica t ed for bluff alone to Military succeed: t here preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in t he ot her hand , has to is now be serious deterr ence . But, on c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly: imply attemp t ed X. c omplete preparatio n for X does not It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed with wha l is prcpa·ed whell1er intelligenc e for under c ertain conditio ns. Comple te preparation , for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a (proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an be taken of connecting for granted . Principle C2 principles . is part way not the line in a series pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that A con necting X with a tt empted X: perh,ps down if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not . But the se ries ends ; off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to the (thoug h it cuts claims of various religious pos i tio ns. For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong then X the co n temp l ati on con sidcra t Jon of of is wrong carrying out Xis wrong. or that non-action- oriented The point ap plies equally to sexual fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares . no Lhing mere In particular, there is wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable , and in some senses are all too thinka ble. Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each common ly involves lt connects with. decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanyin g the increased probability are certain r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves; nol I ho:a· of mere pas s ! vc .o nt emµ l at f on I,, 1 '. Howev er oll the sets of these are connectl.ng n prL nc lple s invoked except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased. c ho:;c n One rea son for th1s is that the means o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft . The inc r eased prohabi llty of an evil out come o l.mply makcB things worse . Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but thi s accompa nied by threats and a threaten ing posture . pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved, announce ment For some pa rty , th e if deterr e nce s ucce ed : the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible . n uc 1 L' i1 r deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le: CJ. of is to This aspect of if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also wr o ng ; or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng . The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form CG . If Xis wrong so is a cond itional r eq uires some further ex planati on. the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere of' • 4 3 thre ate ning ~ Apar t intensio n to A condit'o na l do intentio ns e . g. themselv es, 1 the t ha t ) . C to (or in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style: the most cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the oblj gati on form a are not impossi ble claim in whnt or even remote or imp r obable: (spe c ifica lly those involvin g cornmitn e nt) for follows certain is tha t s ort s there of discusse d an it is obligato ry conditio ns the conditi ons typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l fund ame ntal cred1ble functor: To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the involv ed whic h intensio n is a judgemen t of is some intensio nal functor, f rom X enemy . The are intensio nal funct ors threaten ing , intendin g , and whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate the immoral ity 42 . There is plenty of scope for f ur ther elabora tion here. Passiv e s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other worlds where e vil oc curs . 43. The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey strike : Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e theories of condi ti onality. of nuclear deterren ce. Natural ly again there are many 28 no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions c.ont. :•mplat J.on, t'1l nld.ng, dreaming, etc. of e.g . fail, those of The.r e is also a n interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) , expecting, awaiting and the like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:. Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is then threatcn.ing X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that to do into prac tic e (e.g. if wrong 'What is wrong putting something committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to that into pract i ce. beginning as fo] lows: The point ca n if worlds where alternative ly X happens be are put argued semanti cal ly, exclude d then so are adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen. The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons. nuclear war obta i n. However t he required c onditional form can be derived form, is through only c onditionall y threatened , i.e . the f ollowing wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if argument:- c. should certain cond itions particular, (of §§3-4) LSN oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it wrong, 44. so a lso is simple if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails arg uments the Observe, furthermore that if something Xis have b en wrong in the first place. ear lier from su bstitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions; by Firstly , threatening X if C, war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to e sta blish CG it is Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272. It i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and also, i.n view of CJ, not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t. S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops: se PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared "i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong. Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality mentione d below. 29 enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X. CG'. The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to ca us es more t roubl e . a serious threat, Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e is t l1r e o.tene d what l . i s wrong , to prevent t,1c occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion at all to pr oceed t o action on plaus ible Lhrc a t s . removes i t the support bas i s for of threats. s i mpl i f ied CJ. Insofar A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l. sense co nditi on s, is con s i de r a accide nt . intended, For the challenge grossly immo r al unconvincing, case wh e r e conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. ci rcum st ances th e result from improbable To bring this an intricat e Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her not . is in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious thr ea t s to under t a ke out is Principle CJ is not ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ. says this Hence the shift to serious one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible. which as it is way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the thr eat nor ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al more .. pra ctic al " rep r es e n t atives grounds. Further more, while states thei r and ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot: it moral principled agents they ar e or take natu r es , to t he kinds of th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains). i nsignif i c ant mora lly would run For su c h agents , who may counter to comprise their a not proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such a s CJ are no t in doubt. The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e --- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n. 30 t.hrcnt involved then is it Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t, inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no Lhen by CJ deterren ce depcn<l is wrong . The maintain ed. sub-argu ment on se ri ous threats is a practica l one: Lf it s no t seri ous Bu t if i t j s ser io us that nu c l ea r dete r re nce name l y , that if the t h rea t s were not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro ugh , then the op posit ion would flnd out, in one way or a nother. could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l wi LhouL A policy of bluff system , f or examp l e, coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n . Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems maintain ing such a po licy weapons , espec ially informa lion would clown during l i kel y times escape the of there would be ma jor di f fic u l t ies i.n chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear change through in gov e rn ing el i t es , a nd the op pos itio n i ntellige nce. But then , since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d . Ther e a re as we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s. On e is t hat nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts a bo ut the r ationa lity of carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity essentia l. to its effec t iven ess . To be effec tive then i t mu s t be s e r i ous ( c f. Benn). Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of one centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent. CG, Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e C4 . If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is n!so wr0ng. The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o die tionarie s, etc . ' . of 'a d claratio r of intent to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury, It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of deter rence, which in tend ing to go to war . princip l e , th a t turn 0 11 C4 is s ome pa r a doxes the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout Princ i ple C4 is j us t i f i e d th rough th e s i mplified inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s p inc.iple some an ex tr emel y position prevail. Si mplif i ed wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly. Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d to Jl agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows : argue siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng to go to LSN wa r when the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong . Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows. He nc e nuclear deter rence is wrong. But like virtua lly every utilita rian princip les utiJita rian grounds . deontic t hems e lv es , princip le , princ i ples For it is not difficu lt to except thos e flowing from CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on outline str a tegic situati ons wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear det e rr ence. But on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon C4. For it likewis e fs not princip les C3 difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d by maximum expe cted a nd utility . pu rsuit Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism , scrappi ng the sp ots not by doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will trou bl e of wit h utilit a riani sm. enable So .i. t them to evade the worst is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its mo r al f avour depend s upon uti.lita rian ass umption s . Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of fwbst,r ntial 1itil.ita ri a n e l ements ' (PD, p.287). consequ e n tia l elemen ts systems incl ud e must infiltr ate, an with the ' ass umption if Eve n observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one e thic s thing this upon must hav e astonis hing confla ting utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e particu lar that assump tion produce s normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he a ct Kavka thereup on t ries the paradox es of · deterre nce'. wi t h maximum expecte d to The utility '( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great deal of utility - - 46. ·•---- ---- - Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip le (PD , p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler, Bentham , Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as to why the pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora l' (cf . Kavb p.29 1 ). It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les (espec iall y the maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka 's f irst paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see PD. . , •" . 12 i.s s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87). :;t obj ec tions as This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h ut il i taria nism i self: it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e . usud l stratc ~y of of Kavka tries t he weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the ~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising u t i lit y can mora l ly e njo i u. But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies fo l Low fr om t he normative ( p . 28 7) • 11 7 what ov erridde n by C4 s u ppo sed u t il i t a rian to a ssumptio ns ' Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t and is assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e t h at .•. in produce , situa t i on s , are whe n moral c ombi ned dilemmas . in si tu a t i ons These are not s uc h th e f udg ed as sump ti on as special de t e rr e nt c a ses where one decnti c pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it int e nd right to to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) . wr ong : that judg ement is not ov e rr i den. Nuc lear de t e rr e nce is also t he case is t hat in r emai ns Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4 i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion, what is th e~e s pe cial p.290) . situations, Howeve r , t her e ar e count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives . For .ln t he s e is wrong . s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what Howe ver it is ha rdly ne ws, but a standing objection, that ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g . Spec ial s pons on s hip de t e rre nt may appea r s itua t i.on a, where under ntl lit a ri a n t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l. char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he 47 . deterrence de t e r r e nce is very likely As to Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 . Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles, but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s . sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely tp lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well. This is ve ry far removed from the real world su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e. si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the deterrence probabiU.ty is of LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence . that <l1~ont <: principles sllbject Even if it were mistakenly to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working such RS supposed de ontic principles C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons. Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it equi. r es, by wa y of the following principle: CS. If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis The reason is that the commitment is a commitment circumstances; and that commitment is to act itself wrong . lso wrong. wrongly in cer-tain Nuclear deterrence is however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions . And as wi th conditional intention, so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt th a t su perstates and controlling commitmen t and their intention to use representatives nuclear weapons. did not occur) is enough to establish the relevant The dangerous strategy of launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a thut have response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence. Now the connecting principles suffice logically , but are nucl ar deterrence, for weighty principle would detachment from the by complete preparat i on fo r and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so parad ox ical: det e rrence. ir self By case . i nstance conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong. This sound wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles one applied: it ou t the connections between and not be engaged in (unl ess i ts ha s appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should chang ed, e.g . left bizarre nuclear war direct ion can be drastically at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare, to purely mi l i t ary targe ts). Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different sort s of ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e . a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s I There wh i ch start from the commonplace ob se r va ti o n that ~ All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in favou r of nuclear deterrence are broadl y ut ilitar i an. In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many t hat inf iltra t ed hav e the e thi.c a l l i t erature , ar e those of ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the one playe r, t h r> USA. Utilitar ia nism , t hough s till looking of those expedie ncy -· advantage of basically at ~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of posi t io n, a nd consider [ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity sup po r t t d by o t he r na tional i ties othe rwi s e . The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains, dflrive s from ut il i tarianism. 118 Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst de terrence, either by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme , Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments. The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in f av our d ir ec tion: 48 . of de terrence. moral arguments Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second a ft e r all it is widely thought that u tilitarianism is a false, Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a much t oug her ent e rprise. Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was · cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes t.o deterre nce . An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological ~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily he way of <lcontic connecting pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail. In the light of these prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical positi ons would go. After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even. seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition. pol it i ca l s yst em whic h depends in some uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo. It hardly does measure then for a upon consensus , to rely on Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e just thnt appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on: how it ls applied; with which maximisa tion recipes; along with what other r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well); genc>rous arc utll i.ty· assignmen ts or upon With different (and · a rguably superior) va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49 basic reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4). LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility. deterrenc e out to whi.c h increases th other recipes of feasible a how for such things as preservat l on of national sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc. assumptio ns , and on Any policy such The It is that as nuclear probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e alternati ves, conseque ntialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance , Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) . The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism o[ ut j lltaria nlsm, beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else 11t i l i tarla ni sm when applied One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this: by to addressin g s ome of the inadequac ies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e. on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the improbabi l ity of other options working. deep, uti ~itarlanis m If the deterrenc e probabili ty-well is morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are pro babl e. 49. Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the discussio n inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally opposed conclusio ns are reached. (Hardin 's approach tends however to expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-know n to repeat. Some of the main defects are considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilit arl.an ism'. The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to stand comes from L, Mirlin. 36 wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s likPly to work or not. indepe nde nt deterrence are decidedly essentially nowhere i.s Moral princi p~s not are through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be . depend .Lt If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter . det:crmlne<l whcrhc r of upon firm to stand. Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these a nd of the results util i ta r ianism delivers uncert ainty measures> util itari anism off ers In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle , utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and. The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism. (orm shows at special int e rests, such as conditions security (the of estimation rules are pulled in). probability- well state , have hi gh 1s deep , utilities, nat io n- s tat e and spe cial It does not yie ld a deterrence polici; ind eed hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ). 11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a o[ act most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s under very il The acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity; These seque nce di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left (as also associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd war breaks out. In this event it can hardl y be argued that deterrence is t he pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence. Along wit h the argument s, there are dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence. other concom.itant conventiona l wa rs . f or Firstly, the peace it has provided 011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re smaller-s cale reasons is no deep is s hort age of And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at any stage by a r ange of 51.. Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the simplificat ion . In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e (ref rred to in footnote 49 ). 52. Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open. becaus e - - - -- - -- - - - - - · - 37 fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and t ec lrn1 .:fl.1, j)C:lc (_~ , p 0:i It thofl not offer genu i ne of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e ·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ). Secon dly, there enorm ous is cost, mora l -~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly Marx i st way, in terms of destr uctiv e capac i ty and what 'the ls contr a dic tion ne e ded f or betwe en what cons truct iv the is spent for devel opme nt' ( PL, p . 316) . §6. Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts from natio nal dange rs nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene sis of nucle ar dilem mas. to Whil e there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also counr c ·-arg ument s, that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe ciall y to Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l just:!.fiab ili ty of nucle ar war pr e para tion in the _p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es. The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift, of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and every bit a r gu1r.e nt from local dang ers. dom inati on ; a nd dubio us fir st of all seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 . atom ic s urren der and so avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ). prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more than these ; third eleme nt , name ly, loss of basic rig hts there with these . black mail of forei gn appea seme nt In fact nucle ar is ways a cruc ial of life This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the dange r of forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at e eleme nt from risk of Thoug h and (free dom, equa lity, etc .) and fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human dign ity, etc .) and int eg rat ed that The two go toget her, sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh t adop t a polic y or as It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be en tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er: forei gn as black mail. dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic value s it does imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin ation , freed om to choos e vario us natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta nce, as is comm onpla ce in the "[ r •e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a nti clcnr prepnratlon incr easi ngly nuclear risks, state demands, extensive etc. But what nuclear destruction, also involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction ti, _ material of 53 of the cherJshed life-style. So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut bnse me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51• fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of lncku cogency an d rings ho 1 low, It is basic values and ri ghts hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c: oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like ci tati.o n of religious values at politica l ceremonies; clean cover for economic consideration of one sort from demand s of the military-indus trial of private wealth and vnl \les appealed to category: in and anot he r, them having However arising to do with th e an argument isn't, or associations. And the rights and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice . this of power. oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury that t he argument 1.s a omplex , many concerned with foreign domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many conccut ·at:1.on pious of "communism" of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of cnpi talism. communi.sm has What has been happened here confused with of course (the t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion , association, is reality basic information, that ( the of) state values, etc., ideal socialist namely etc.), of) and certain so does derivative~ threaten basic values. One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear LSN wa r, and indeed for rational way of preservtng nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life. 54 . The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1. .... , 'lQ J, Simi la r ci. ue s tions dominntion and arJs e as regard s blackmail. argumeq;; H from er, e Justification danger which is itself open questioned (i n §8 ), both from the to ser i ous point foreign of the methods of extensi ve nuclear preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e structure of of question, v iew of nation and basic states, a i s subsequently valu s, such as freedom, and oth r wise. But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or dangers are no t, t hese from natlonal those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear prcpnration, and jus tific, tlon. have They been have par t of many people ' s accepted in moral by policy outlook. particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar however , the makers as affording moral fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form Wi thi n frnmework the moral justification holds good . others, ar gumen t s arguments not a c onv entio nal Northern It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in preparatio n do such engenders establis h a moral fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people not also face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls specif ically moral one. ,1 impressed by And for ma ny other s again, who are who not so or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life, and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. peop)c Such live beyond For such the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged . Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated people who live in people. Consi de r some a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet) under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nucl~ar d ter r c nce (a s under pr inciple Cl). For such isolated people, who may ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no nucl ea r diJ emma , and nuclear lo cations may have problems problems people. as deterrence to natio nal is wro ng. dangers, genuine People in less fo r tu na te but in meeting these they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated In doing so i mmorally; and f or through similar nuclea r reasons deterrence , superstates the are proceeding conventi onal No rthern framework is j_mpug rwd. conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l Tht'. same argument:: put a reflective i s olat e d pe rson, and check S! 11 ci> Amer ican the or- resulting by a substitution Russi.an 1n the position of such an asse ssment of nuclear deterrence. IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y transfixed, t h <~ c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality. The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending whc her on the arguments are appU.ed as rega rds a superstate or not. The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something Jn orde r t hP meet of the nuclear armoury that it has. Or, weakening the theme to ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it retain i1 t l east solid a ou~ core of the nu c 1ear devices it has. (moretlly] to For su bs equent argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for inst a nce be cause of the character the of pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of g rou nds to those di. sa rmame nL supporting ag ainst a the dangerous SS reason 55• prudent:ial the me nuclea r Northern values supposedly being On similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentiall y Jrralto nal. It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is a s11 hopLimal st rategy , li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games . that a su peri or would be cooperative For expen sive , re source s, dr ai ning of such t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1. 55. admitted arrangement s. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a ra nge of other r espects . future be strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the lik . could be achif?Ved , would agreeme nt So it should arrangement s would be much less risky , destructive of the environment , a nd so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~ unfortunate ly rather remote: only the ca make their polici es sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate : proceed, largely unabated . nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a one's a rsen a l, umbrella. nu c l ear pre paration , th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md for huddl es conf l.dencc in !ts and which under co ntrast s ncouragcd elsewhe r e . st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear grrH1nd one anoth e r's But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof, with nu clear in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly thr oug h some supcrstate 's nuclear COVt!r super-· ally Does a "d epe nd ent" on a s 1pc r -a lly, rather tha n strangely have that exchange on its territory? mu ch Jt s ally's opponen t ? Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or nuclear must stag e a Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d . Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e it <loes theme , not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers f rom SST nnd end s as follows: DST. Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally . ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd same goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ). Nor do the arguments of f ered for SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments striking l y illu str ated by the case the for DST. 56 This is more of more remot e nuclear dependent states. Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans of the Sovi et Union. Nor ar e they thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical 56. As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g. eco nomic consideratio ns such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs. ca1 1acity to launc h mot j .ve Lo <.111y <l o look convincing . carries full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but R wc .i ght. reasons In fact, the with a rgumen t from of For there arg ument t he only is qucstLonable non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs. of 58 domina tion In this way too) the from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified . such supe r state foreign li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of a economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d. fore(• lack(ing] so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol For similar 1 it t le 'clearly danger because nuclear of umbrella, superstate dang er facilities and th e tha t would be removed wi th With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these sorts a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may b e defeated along analogous lines . The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and peoples, break theme the of a of monolithic West. differently situated This is a theme especially favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West, its freedom, as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n. und i.ffrrentiatcd unit. dep1!nd0nL i;tntes with But this l eadi ng idea, NATO desig ne d powers , and In this the West is a single in and part to align lesser to justify pu tting them at nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West. The West is not so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it (i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination. Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is now coming unde r attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the. und er lying retaliatory model that 0 Safety lies in weapons , More weapons i mply more. security59 , Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear. a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s from nuclear submar ines ) . Europe ans are ar guing in present of syslem is more a similar wa y, that the a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g. 57. For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 . 58 . The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2. 59 . Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson. argument for it, s ee Threats to Thompson, p.251); envi s -1ged and thnt: w-ithou!: Lhcut.r e for a h\icJ. ,;,)ll'' instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l thf' is now seen by US ( ut not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are qu es tioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely ci Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular o Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed , say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or, takin g off from the previ ous point, ~ Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through ar e proper methods, armaments , etc.) or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resoLuti.on at the int er national level. It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no ordinary level do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and r e ally warranted, frontier ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60 and explana tion it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that already nation-states. While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c. nation-state system ': For 'forc e has [a] permanent plac,~ in the thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. Th resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites Ass~mbli.ng r eferred th~ to as themes the so far nuclear de v e lope d fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 ) to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east 60. yields the both and their supporters. deontic dilemma. often ought not to engage in it is immoral, and also ought for prudential reasons (as Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alter native systems , see su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s . argu ed using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, ·,,,,._ 44 SST and DST). tl w Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction of virtues parac.onsisteot logic), but ( c onc octed 61 prod uced by war itself 62 , or at war and its version of the deon tic least war which spr.·eads beyond purely mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably e . g. nuclear , a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions. ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense di 1 emma demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, t he ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on asper.ts to do (since ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) . military arrangeme nt s, The ma in dil emma arises from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of war. War is requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold); but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es . war can undPr also ce rtain justified. be se e n as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that ctrcumstanees Thus ' some these reall y ju tifications 0 evi l consequences Regis of war ' (Walls , p.260). accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic are morally of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible the The doctrine of " ju st But this argume nts when perfo rmed under is no better or mor e morally for uti l itorianism as bein g corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e . W;n· and preparedness for 61 . wa r als o gene rate s ubsidiary di.lemmas f or Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence the best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii). Green also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s down): though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue. Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops d :llemma; they s peak of ' th e dilemma of how to prev ent the use Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation i n terms of a mora l political paradox of de terrence •.. the of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13). In too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs. But it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework. 62. Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein. . ... inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and difficult prohlcms au t ho f· t c y: 'one of th e ~0s t o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL, p.324). The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts. The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed by t he co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a ., " lnd.lvidual li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) . othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas , ( poll U ca l) obl lgations to s for example (the question the extent of one' s a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear res c•archer It also accentuates of politic a l obligation s armame nt s and processor or eva sion is their considered f urther in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re several ques Ions to 'Wh, t. should my sta t e be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e be doing and influence, d epending on who one is. I do? 1 one Jives, - do?', on whi c h one may exert influences, i.e. in what l it tle There is not only the question 'What shou ld a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending a nd ar e on whe re sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the questions ' What sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64 Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o act ion-or ien t ed questions . Each of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas . The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or di ffe rently, pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy. obliga tory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas. T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state. 64. For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate than they are . moral d il emmas ure not l i t.t>r;,Lure f, !., • widely or well und er stood, p...." t'ticular]y __ e 1-1 ~ 1i in ca .1 Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which giv•s to rise them but the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y. d i lemma doe Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons a not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better a nd worse ways By 01t . wh c h assessments, contr a st f orm the with basis s uc h e thical theories , preanalytical oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s. Reactions an f rom the res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas fix. nuclear The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to <lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to temporary Thus , crutch . for as world' GG , that b st" j ethical RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o way a of neve r exerci s ing "mora lly ou r s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld . fu nctor s peak moral A similar th e 'strictly mor;il Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role but de t e er e nc: e th e c i rc um s t a nce s. de ter r .nc e, is be in a fallen to " second a acceptability ' object mus t cert ainly one str ictly and wrong, is of from th e conditional be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a optlon as to of what the to nucl ear do in Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion though a "morally try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And can shift 'moral c ond i tional ' while a ccepta bi U.ty , good", responsibility d~t c rrcnce fix. ·s (as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic of we gra s p examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e acceptable'' emerge neverthel e ss the policy to fix. awkward that war in the pursu e circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as Sar t re; a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood. 66. Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n 1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2. 6 7. As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable' hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s . The Australian, February 12-13 !i '.rnp erior pol Ley ~ nsscrabled (in sufficien tly it is §5-§6), a dt! cidetlly reasons of ·1 }-toor the opti_ n, sort reasons i'o r that are decisive already for those, outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find no genuine of nuc le ar nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re, stal1.:s' own mald.n&_. fix a It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the Lhc escaJAtio n of In these respects the situation is like peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble relations hips , and build up though and U.:, A, has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by the USA and the USSR in in teractio n. th:1 t The one there by. It is build-up. The fact i programme is t o be in addition to existing ( which are to Sovi et that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does. esources myth, a some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response bui ld·-up, nucl~a · with onflJctin g obligatio ns generally agr eed The recent (1980) United to States' strategic be already in excess of Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) . The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly, state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. indicates especiall y that merely route by a taken advanced response to capita list t he nations, Soviets (or of USA and its NATO state socialism ). would not have been feasible without compleme nting And independe nt evidence, t l1 ere is then a direct outcome suc h as Soviet-Si no confronta tion, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist n.:.iti.ons . There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts nation-st.' .ltes and the nuclear f ix . arrangeme nts are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increa singly present wo rld polJU.cal structure . is widely promulgat ed .'.lrrangcm ents : it .is' seen On the dil emma as one hand, with t he these result through political that the i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state n world of sovereign states . • . which brought the wo.ld to the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ). nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into On th e other hand, th e the statist form, into arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast. stutlst espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the and security, to defend national inter est s , reasons such as perpetuating the system advantageous of confrontation, st ate to (!), provid e but underneath there ore other sovereign st a tes and frame work the rlnd peace The military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and polit i cally favoured of inequa l ity it supports . The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e statist arrangements a nd interr e lations ( conomic ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock a rr nngcme nl.s of s overeign where the pa ttern world states And zones of inter e st . t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one . side the rivalries, into conflict i ng the present The argument to th1. s Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer . The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) . "We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also integrated with state appara tus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68 Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements, by th ing s S llCh as the SALT negotiation s ; shown there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a (growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a rule , partly held in place by deterrence . as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this , there are cases rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US i s 68 . of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e not over.duly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would free ly concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~ adj~c ~nt ~estcrn oil supp li es : concerning, were these lay within the US zone of interest (cf . th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212). §8 . Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: results. in itia l political fall-out from the ethical Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limJt~tions on the thu s inevitable. and more or power s of states. Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re The limitations may be reache d by agreement and negotiation , less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war. As with other fixes produced by there are suggested ways the structural ar rangements of states, ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts, inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure nnd power ·elations extrastate approaches . of state s (and, in the limit, remove t hem altogether) , All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" , attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations , etc . , are interstate ; sovereign state . The s ame goes (graduated) unilate ral disarmament . about the nation- state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for les s "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empi rical fact , is it part icula r ly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s. as a We are certainly free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s demise sacred it is not a particularl y well justified political form; it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers, lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like these . Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders regarded the institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration between city-st a t es , not seeing its social, structurally -emergent, characte r. 50 approaches take one of Extrnstr1te ittlernat ional of slate s. r.ol two rou tes, way ~Ile to l~, ge nuine power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0 The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; ,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e . but they are Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to world governmen t, is alre ady there in the international law-courts. Wer e the courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal acl ion, that· medie val principle theo ri. t s saw to all disputes, could in be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T. given intrastate s n fflcienl least jilitial]y) But if the law courts were power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t upon war deterrence , though not by military means. perhaps Law courts, as usually conceived, are not effective without police and jails or their and equiva l ent supcr-statist back-up eq uivalent for of economic other penalties; and the either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will typicnlJy be organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other In pa rt i es. repC'ilt uninvolved short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to rt . Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying ec:t t. n gri.ps with the nuclear though mostly 1n passing to be to problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned, dismi ss ed 71 , in orthodox strategic texts on -·--------- - - - -- -70. Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the uni on. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR , UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together; and the one recent attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e . The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns .illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification of Germany should be resi sted; instead a more rational regional deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border regio n, and so on. 71 . Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical , etc. Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations. 5l thermonuclear war . By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like the new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions, combined with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls: unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s considered however beginning to be cf. Way and is more sometimes The Way Up, sympatheti cally by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing inte rna tiona l system'; and 'the 'towards a no but lt is making Galtung). much by Up mora lly There is integrated missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320). A main argume nt for the Way Up is just a repetition of that which is commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners' Tragedy of t he Commons. traditionally, ecological order. not herdsmen as best solutions regards to problems as the of organisation, public order and, more rec ently, as to So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are but nation·-states , and one of the prospects is destruction of a r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now sort such It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the state - a r e r equired to ensure espe cially, Dilemma, of superstnt e. said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some of thcjr be order-imposing corr espo, dingly weakened. ar gum ent s are role, and But all political this is obligation to There a re, then, many problems through these A further theoretical with h:1.tch the is Way that Up, a both "tragedy" theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated 72 . will 72. stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only that states good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. prac t ical. assume to See further loutley and Routley especially Griffin. and material referred to a level therein, up and The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital. again . The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h no prospect at all of getting su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose. Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century ago , In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before Wo rld War TI. The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui, pp.2-3 ). The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line . future For t he foreseeable nuclea r ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of opcrnt l vc world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear hostlllt i es . extre~ely I n some ways, this is just as well. monol ithic, woul d World gov ernme n t would cer t ainly , whatever it s ( g ray?) politic al colour, {~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e impose damage on to It undesira b le l eve l Ideological, r equ1 site the world an many remaining of inde e d u nity political and parad 'gmatic , cannot be and, e c o nomi c sepa r atio n expect e d in some crucial respects, unity. of Moreover , give n Northern main within nuclea r dea dlines. swee ping more sovereig nty , c o ul d blockages and agr ~ements, be negotiated? dea dl ocks i1 the involving genuine There an way is When not even endless of of that state series of s uch state reconciliation. a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e the of The s ame Way Up nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged • - through the Unit ed Nations); 73. it limitations almost the cultures, nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is (e .g . would systems. 7 3 The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly much be f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism. ·1 n .:ltur.:iL an 7 11 Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world gov e rnment, see Galtung. Naturall y the objections to world gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf . Ma zrui ). Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can be genuinely s yn thesized with the Way Down. jJ There is arrnrgemant s regrettably and als o conventions much are e~ tdert ce frequ ently concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are scntJments signed does slide smoothly that not not 1nce rnational observed (especially those worth into despicable dee d s . bode well ever be rcc1chcd. ln <'nnv,•11t f< n any great deal: openly violated. I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one fon·C!, of lofty It for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t wl 1I C'h tn nl1 the following intEirna t i ona l i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en, w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc includes a Even agreements states have are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or not tr ea tie s , 1 , t h ton genocide. Genoc i de ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group as such: ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life to bring about physical destruction i.n who l e or i n pa rt. f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e : dJrcct and public shall Beside genoc ide th e c onspira cy to commit be Persons committing genocide o r any of punl.shed , whether they are the othe r act s responsible rul er s, priva te individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue nucl~ar genocide, inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e , complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de. mentioned ca lculat ed that a larg er st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. conspir acy repr:esentati .v 'S does to some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear deterrence stands indicted pa r ticular it of the and as involving i.ncitement . nuclea r s t a tes acts ass oci a ted with genocide, in Some wel.i - known political and military would thus ap pear to be li.able to indictment . and punishment und er internation al law . 7L1. Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp. 210- 13). Reasons include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n drlvc f or strategic super ior ity . 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports. in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden. 76. The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff . Most of the points text of the The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the appare11t I mpot ence interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation ne:.rer to nuclear the " brink" is now taken to ind ica te contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l tias gi v en new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions . The According to can reorganise the radical namely n iclear in Sc.hell ' s 1 unsatis factoriness situat .l on The should the foundations of politic c l thought' pollllcal t.iicy opvrate •. , the indicates inst itutions Fate lead political of to req u i red a t he Earth . ' ful l-sca le to make 't he co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ... its political li fe' (p.219). However Schell himself tri e s to avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by the of the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed stands, Schell reexaminatio n o f world ' c and book a new a rrangements, thesis that the nuc l ear problem national ( f r om and work of our age' else overimpressed by political t he oris ts. the 7 Z history, c onstitute So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or real ities of (unstable) nation-states , do most But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation. There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too 11nthinklngly) with an an tiquated s ystem many present state arrangements, representative century communications •ery different condition; in a 77. when and the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier. of ( a llegedly 17th we re willing ly , The feat ures go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he especially , us even of poli t ical a rrangements which t he nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion . best of even dem ocratic) techno log y, more were t he and primit i v e d iscerned, In the br iefs prese nt ed A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l ( sec Co x , p. 225). Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival " bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1. for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged . But such systems con tinue to opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es und c r mi ne<l. prese nt Nuclear problems rep r esentative have political emphasized have been several other defici encies in arrangement s. In particular, they have rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles Euro pe a n countri es. cen tury ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved. issues, ~ i s sues. The least, be reduced. reduced excessive power back at dev e lopme nts , pro cedures, But the route down through issue-regul ated large i mposes and complex other modern requirement s. states What lnl t .t1-1.l s maller a s iL ls to inf or med citizens gro uping than approx i mate of a g lant satisfa ctory good will. As the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n the l.nf ormation by are stn tes, government recent tec hnologic al called for a re smaller Firstly, in present information and democratic progressive procedure, of control, nation-stat es, channels, and so f o r.th. ncc e ptable the from These upon nuclear problems have again made patent, even ·release the and distributio n distortion r estrictive of most liberal of them (and Aga in, especi a lly with new and less systems , there is little excuse for thls. information , upward depends But there ar e e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited pub} l t:1 y and Secondly , democracy, insofar political rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on). flow major li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation. a nd on of governments would, to that ex tent at grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education. cx pe n,, ive lea st governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e poss ibl e ev en in mu ch elected wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer polic:y th e It is past time for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once (i n some Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major 19tl1 in of data featu res in have a vailab ility major communicati on helped in making present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e 56 co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's nuclear superstates are often seen to be gJlemma type situation th e locked into (on which see, e.g., llardin1. A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for political questi oning current arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at le~sl), takes the following shape:• Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain j,rnt iff.-.d 111 te1·ms of dolng ut .eas t where and are so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those arrangement s, requirement s (as certainly in who operate under the muc h of the West) the basic mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met . • l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have these requirement s. For guarnntce the prospect of arrangement s. nation-stat es, good meaningful lives those to under their yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a meet at least in the North, can no longer such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way. support to A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ; m.-iny and ceased s tate to Furthermore a acquiesc e in or engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn) . Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have should be amended . have their justificatio n, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though not all) natlon-stat es: natio n- s t ate f orfeited it ls not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed . There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control stght of, or worse have lost don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the irn lerlyi.ng politica l theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68). r;7 rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both c lai m popular Ln and mandate ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! , power~. put a value hi3 lier where, nlrea y illustrated milita ry situa ti ons: viol.1ted the 'IH' t:.1k er s on some have more often , they act without it or as The sit1.1at-ton has been reached sove reignty nation al survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210; is -✓ hl.'lfe where than 'nuc l ear: they do on human for copio us evidence see Kupe r). Thi s by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear the principles of just warfare repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples. much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l have been blatantJ.y Such states have forfeited respect or internal political obedienc e; so, on other grounds, have many other state s . It could just be, of course, as is oft en a lt er nat ives, that have been re s arc hlng glimpsed, though of world go vernment). dismissed, for s tirc withou very no possibly better alterna tives . but little As to whether all has such are no been expended on opportunity do to work, a nd not Appea r to give we alternative s w~y Down. There working tow ar d s the wea kening es pec .i.ally can be the may and ha ve been given know very little a bou t how humans suff icicnt org anisi ng and trying out alternative accessi ble alter natives instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely operate under su bstantially different arrangement s. But, t ime arrangemen t s, to even once again, proc eed thos e nuclear very far on of the mor e be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in breakdown of t he large r s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem. ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd while t here But alternat i ves the r e are, effor t toking the risk of being dogmati c; little d e ad ii ne[, tha t t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e 0 op Li. on or insinuated , nuclear st a tes, Thus i t woul d be s oc i a l arrangemen t s, theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x. But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of dll emrna to th t: exclusion of all olh .rs: quite the contra r y . t he nuclear We can no t only afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her ) con st rain ts ; Indeed, given the urge ncy, the direness of t he si tuat i on , we 58 :,hou1d ~s be fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such boRged rlown ( a nd v ery on a rms limitations ner,ot inti o n s m"thod::i should si~nifica nt be undemocratic perservered concessions unrepr•sentativ e) between main nuclear states. wi.th, from cert ai nly tJ nd and the attemp t s superstates, made to e.g . No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even s uch a wring further jointly signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially new . The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have la rg e r eve r y liberal or huma nitarian been on issue that has matte r ed: from ou tside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or nnd it ' by furnishing self ·- organising characte r is tically Bottom-Up famiL l ar cons i de rations are methods an alternatives practically wi t hout which never virtually upon bypass it , Top-Down. Such but part of the more general , and very effective, case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to supply, but whic h effectively and [or can almost t hat invariably mnttcr le ss be obta i ned, where required, more e x pensive ly without them (and their monopo1 i.es) • In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions, impo sed , or acqulc s ced and nuclear weapons . frequently from time being , movement have in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations The opposition to th e local a nd neighbourhood esca lating grou ps, nuclear fix has come some of them now feder a ted :1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate). !we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1 that These groups have in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the some a ga inst nuclear-free nu c le a r neighbourhoods . equipment The patchwo r k grass-roo ts is strongest in Europe, which is - as the mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American Europe will E11 ropc wil l these mnke it a saf er place : American shores. nuclear r emoved installations in on the contrary it seems probable that bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements installations It is succeed a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free. g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced. Ln having The chances of mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and Exc:c•p l in the case of Eu ope, where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication . 8Cr i ou s ly And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is failing partly g iant fashioned military-in dustrial allianc e. inc r easJ. ngly dominated and largely domi na t ed financially ideo l ogically. much propped exaggerat ed. no t nnd c1d c quatcJJ and ec onomically some of and, in some mea sure, Indeed much of the "free" world countered as mil.itary by The means . i .," in basic any mode of mUitary . But mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by the Sovi e ts is a problem, t here are several ways other predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it. on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down alternative is it domina ted economicall y , by the US A. doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant in sofa r a up by the NATO powers ' i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and ls anyon' Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA , c a1;e Does expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a or Brasil say? Th Rt other? social methods but also some and much r eliance on These should include not state-suppl ied social decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of orga nlsat{ons, than me thods, or r estructurin g, such as power to dispersed local mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and East e rn Europe. Part of the point of whether external or r es tructuring internal, so is especiall y situa tions, is to st a t e-contrived 79. break make any military takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of int e rch1nge, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to s abotage the West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options. 60 ot.hC'r motl ves fo r, and Western popul ar suppor t Eu r ope , for f or, long j. much Uitary too adventures partial to and military advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean nucl e ar umbrella for its defe nce . Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least, 1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging t he world in the i nterests of its own security . extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European impositlon. There wo rl<l, wha t LS N war is no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing othe r parts of t he Europe, rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d. which has long exporte d There ar e better. options than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe. -·-·- ----- --·- . ·-- 80. Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated uni ts it in tegra t e d. The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c. The net effect (as c. Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high. One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62). Ycl th 1 9 112 (wa r r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81 . In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l supporting deterrenc e policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would b e further co rroded. In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas, to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gi.( t pro Jee ts . If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g. as part of the strnteg y of the "cold war". ~ 6J What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press b,oa rl out1 i.nc; fof ::tccordingly i.ic> perceptive t r ansarmamen t, to i.e. conversion outer edges of graduat e d the movements, alternative social defence arrangements). Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go, t hrough in i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more wa y clear namely all the disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's s ur t~cc , inc luding especially Europe. For once the state is demoted , its i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance on dec i s i on- making its diminished de ci s ion-making - once all that is happe n ) , one in duly favour of allowed more localised cont r ol and for (it does not need to major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty . Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers. What is important and wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the stn r- c . The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying features s uch as mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation . On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments fr om nat iona l conce rni ng part i cul a r. dangers .lndividual also and grou p rights and In their freedoms, by t he that nation- s tate . matter The are to arguments liberties in for t hem, as sma ller or exclusivel y nation-state is neith r sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not? ri sks are civil necessarily th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties nec e ss ary pl ace None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None o f ti e rights and freedoms g ua r a n te ed disintegrate. in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln: To be sure, th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not ---~------ ----82. The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s. The ste ps to disarmament ;ire well-known , e.g. the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as Euro pe, et c . 62 hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of moslly to wont be sure t hat nucle or arc othe r outsiders. People t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course, i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be Russ nns natlon- states. t controlle d by Amiirican s or Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives not a rational rout e to these ends . In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way dilemmas the as nuclear out of such deo ntic fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of things those the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare and a ut onomy; wc,1pons. but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by The main reasons are fam il iar : threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values, such the removal nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstanc es as welfare and autonomy, for many cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another with nuclear weapons ). ideological party the o pportunity armed There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons; example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of remain welfare for (because costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e accompanyin g sec urity measures). Thus the appropriate ly de vi ces and nuclea r fix limiting weapo ns is resolv ed , theoretical ly it can deploy, and how ), and rate, by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be s ince any sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty . pra ctice , at strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e au s pices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act aga i nsl the state . Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since sovereignt y reduction in ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons . 83. the Ind eed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s. Until human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty. agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) . to far with the superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further: for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation. i.nto both milita ry s yst ems - and ( c ivil) Rather it is industrial production of the states So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being concerned. ti ed solidly resisted by super states. Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s and espec i ally against the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r. variety of organ is ed forms. These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or wld •l y, from such s t e ps ns Once again it will take a The indir ect l y. the forms of action range block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s, t he to withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes. They inc l ud e as we ll the whole r a ng e nuclea r facilities i nstal l a tions and of nonviolent (methods protest which method s against do exclude not i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new model . 8'~ resistance and de f e nce organisations). It is important to realise that petitioning of powe r state representat i ves and ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored, th e r esul t s disco u r aging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a mor e com prehensive politi c al strategy, which also involves withdrawing s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially alternative defence forms. 85 Sufficient d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp. 85. For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g. fu rt her Appe ndix 2. Martin . As to what to do, see 64 APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE or MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Sch e ll, and to Anders. A ncrtes of nucl cn r prophet s lw a pr odu c ed a EJ e r:les of ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary. The most wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th. This skillful piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable f or i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e defects . Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage: to selec t one example , consider the claim that ' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e [ human] spec i.es nothing else t hat we undertake together can make any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense (p.1 73, rearranged ). Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds. Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r presently a rrang ed nuclear ho l oca usts . l. The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire to the be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination, A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity . But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such: a l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it , While the sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e) w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all f al l Rcy. J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all: t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1. was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes, two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers: Sl. Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on arth (the 2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and S2. 111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon). It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Th ·-- exDmp l e Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of con tracting the world to North Arner.lea . (All that matters, all worthwhile civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schel l's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4 Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions o( S2 , se Foley JS. 3. Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box . Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pando ra's box. Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing t'r""l . 66 th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense. But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e . Ther e are man y examples of technological advances that have not been t ak en adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns . Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons i t would not tell aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and the limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work , to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the " J.abnrn t.ories". Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r weapons in concer t, e . g . for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war, and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested and lypothelical in chara ct er. The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially. This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2 being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl Such ar e all eged imp lications of ex tinction ; but the fact is that the truths of arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of gods or g iraffes . In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form. Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the strea m of huma n t.ime, The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and futur e (p . 14 0) 6 • Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass' (p. lli3) . But it: is simply false that the tenses are human; the tens e s depend on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons). And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor there were any human beings. - •••-- - - H•--- - --- - - - - - S. Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry ha s a wea pon it will u se it. 6. Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73. (etc.) is Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been, if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n mm1y other org anisms would be differe n t. Temporal themes do not la c k ' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or verified] by anyone'; truth, signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion. be Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in talki ng ab out what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims. The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [si c!] th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) . These are no facts, but deeply entrenche d philo sophical dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d elsewhere 7. Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans: trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles , songs , Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss , and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not worthwhi. le. 8 Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both. 'The death of mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166) a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d, becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of prec edi ng lif e and on the very questiona ble represent ation of this mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e . From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that ' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly 'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+; S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental Ph i l oso n~ (ed i ted D. Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980. 8. Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of the argument from 68 rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e . 1 011 Nor are all pe opl e C<JuaJJy locked in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d, th e po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR. Nor, --- 1 i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme, (in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go theme, ,iccord ing to which -S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really) distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9 B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows: ' t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated e l sewhere : we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) . But this is more of an argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points: we are pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152). And again '[ as] perpe trators we co nvey t he steady message that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that it had bee n judg ed acceptable fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e less . Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among wi ll c :1 Schell --- ·------·---- - - - 9. An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng, whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry, a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of political control . 10. Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows: 'The self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning . Fur ther 't he world chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194): the world'? This connec ts of course with the ideological argument from defence of fuodamental s, e .g. for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against soc inli.sm. In the' .nurse of th:fA argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) . mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility, st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s, part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc. (the whole ea r th theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed, unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scatter ed and fragmentary. As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternative s. At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Wa y Up. So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns ( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-indus trial organisation and ways of life . But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd , more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies . And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial feature Ls the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear] supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base, the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state, and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, ma le- female re l ations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything 11. Sec p.225ff. 12. In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin. The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164. and especially p.227, bottom paragraph . j nee ds to be accompl ished at once; and the clus~~ - of damaging power and do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of sta tes. [n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics. The teaching that 'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times, ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134). So 'stat es may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions . Even if all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is 13. These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated packag e, compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, ('TI C" rgy, sp ecr, sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the newer Enlightenme nt (but Faustian ) vlr tues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues . Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel maximls ation of knowledge paradoxes of omniscience . There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative t heo rems). IL, . R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral science. There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single, source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false . Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and promoted , while other alternative s were not. Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable, but dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitran t technologie s. They also admit of being made t o look r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation. 7l claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context, t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its n uc l ear pol i cies . 15 An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state ends. So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational. As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war, Schell leave s us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187). Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred. It is on this basis th a t peace ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as •xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185). Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an end' ( p .189 ): but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends ( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games a r e wo n). It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests tha t coul d s e rv e , and there is also th e possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit as if war and violence were thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of understandl ngs , conventions and rules . The y are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if no t a logic . Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic] plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd, 15. Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context. - j 72 rcnGonab.le, rational. However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap semn nti.cal trJ.ck . Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion (as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning; but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extraloglca lly. There are various ways these va lue assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirement s or not; but in nuclear s tr ~tegic planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng 11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat of thi s unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t . 16. Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly; for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions . 17. Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g . it wishful]y thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix radioactiv ~ ashes . has be en f rom th e The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e one, but a n ideological one: eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture dominance of the riva i deo l ogy . 18. An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "'negate" incoming USSR missiles . Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction; although involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention to proceed. Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed how satisfactor ily in another matter by a dis ti nction between longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing .PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility and on Regional ~~rategie ~ What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be . So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt• pol te l. cs . The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states, a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people many for th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s, r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of ce r tain soci al a r r angements . Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t. They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l argument take s t he following lin es: 1. The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore 2. Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a differenc e . Hence 3. Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when thint s go wr ong. There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can " t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e . While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many other i. nd lvidua ls do. In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in ma nner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly. Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in ways t hat do make a differenc e. An i ndividual is not exonerate d from r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument . While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical di s obedi enc e. An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards defenc e or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g. nuc lear weapons productio n and de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace fun ds, Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities. 1. Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood. - II .,I<,' Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under Ro1ne sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s, etc., and o such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individua l need bear.) One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear wea pon s to, fo example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the we~pons for such war. The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through d e fence taxes . The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be : Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns? Or with making c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like? What follows applies primarily to people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people . Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions , perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the national defenc e effort? It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ; for in this case moral obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts. \n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n this: to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing ower from ind ividuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is Seattle in "co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more that ch:ing,.. tha t . H T ~~ s intact, and deeper (ecological ) sch emes Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper se t of cha nge s in the superstates . For those whose very limited political i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow goa ] ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er c ontr ol . The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war, whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers). There i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps towards s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated. Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance, wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ). That much is easy, in pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of d e t erre nc e ' • 6 More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of 1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e 5. Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1. How slight t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA . Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated: from a Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe ( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important. A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series . and alternative s, 76 whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even dh,r ,, r t i ng "d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive. I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with Northern nuclear powers 8 , a nd s hould be preparing now, socia lly and e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war. Howev er ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield poli t i c al powe r . But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj so why bot he r". One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic . A mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o bcf;1l l th e m. These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them. It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e : rather i t is that i t seems unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes ~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear. war. Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in 6. Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture , as Hawke~ notes. The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is not in any do u bt: 'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e; quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17). Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk. ' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f . Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has a non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk .for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s . A worthwhile re presenta tive government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term co mme r c ial considerati ons. 7. As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment. 8. Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e. 77 achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t. -yen those who believe tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life) do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessmen t: . 9 Richard Routle y* 9. Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g. Mart in . There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts . * The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C. Pigden , R. Good in, N. Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through cor r espondenc e with G. Fo ley. J. Norma n has helped in its final organisat ion. The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y in 1982 . REFERENCES c;. Anders, Die __Ant_~q •i erthe!.t des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; to a$ A/i,. G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE. Situation , referred c.u. Beck, T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71. D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions Hale & Iremonger , Sydney, 1980. in Australia , J. Barnes, 'The just war' in N. Kretzmann , A. Kenny and J . Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press, 1982, pp . 771-784. R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon s. & Schuster , New York, 1981 . Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? 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Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960. G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal 285-302; referred to as PD. of Philosol?.!"1y G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory (1980) 41-60; referred to as RC . and 75 (1978) Decision 12 G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU. L. Kuper, Genoclde: its Eoli~ical use Jn the Twentieth Century, Yale UP, 1982 . D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e', Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. in Moral Problems (ed. James D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' , Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM. D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64. a nd Har de n', Phil osopl'l_ B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to appear. A.A. 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Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book. 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-11 3, T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 . G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971. D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983. F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 . T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An 19 72. American Tr agedy, Times (ed. Books, F.T. London, E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York, 198 1. Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981. probabi lity, Austral ian R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960. M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview , Colorado . 1979. Boulder , t M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970. B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982. ( Nov . 18,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy) draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'War and peace. 1: on the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 5. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 59, Item 1894 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource iii, [80] leaves. 43.93 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7122938">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7122938</a> https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ad201336c70df57d8530257a28f9c7e9.pdf 2cf05c0cc5f0c0bbaa9c9eaf56116252 PDF Text Text �������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 60, Item 1883: Draft of Metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament', Philosophy & Social Criticism, 10(3-4):19-34, https://doi.org/10.1177/019145378401000303. Description An account of the resource Draft paper housed in blue folder of large bundle of older papers on various topics. Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1883. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 60, Item 1883 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [12] leaves. 21.61 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:78f73ce">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:78f73ce</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Top Shelf > Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/81ee8015160149176a29c6e7277d4166.pdf f8dbfafa04f175a0e96dc872f5237aae PDF Text Text ��������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 60, Item 1883: My engagement with social and political theory Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy). Description An account of the resource Draft paper housed in blue folder of large bundle of older papers on various topics. Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1883. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 60, Item 1883 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [9] leaves. 10.13 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a549cf5">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a549cf5</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Top Shelf > Pile 3 Box 60: Ethics and Theoretical Ethics https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2b38bc4efae0110cc5e5bf7b4c1634c5.pdf 7bf7240e3a4c52b99ad1eaa3b4a045f3 PDF Text Text / y Z^ Z^i_ z/z/ ���� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document / y Z^ Z^i_ z/z/  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 61, Item 1415: Notes on environmental ethics Subject The topic of the resource Miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not included in PDF access file. Notes housed in folder of "Further ethical ado Ts & xc + some RS mss". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 61, Item 1415 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves. 1.87 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f67601f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f67601f</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Main Bookshelves > Fourth Shelf > Pile 2 Box 61: Ethics and Theoretical Ethics https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/da79e877dfd528d678ba527ad6c2d477.pdf b61884f3fdbb2ccbdfb99fd2eead7fd1 PDF Text Text BRIEF CORRECTION VERSION THE END OF THE WORLD of the grandest philosophical problems are formulated In terms of the Hany way of the world, how the world Is, what there Is In the world - using, that vs, an uncritical and pre-analytic notion of the world. Thus It Is with questcons as to the nature the world, the basic stuff and components of the world, the of arguments for realism, the Issue of universals and categories, of the objectivity and of ethics (e.g. whether values and directives are In the world); values thus It Is especially with the foundations semantics of supposedly (meaning being determined through what Is In or corresponds In the world); and so on. But the under dissolves notion critical Investigation, and therewith many grand problems - often pressing on always on-going reductionist agendas such of empiricism - are. the The world one God, as that If not resolved, at least relocated. goes the the way of the good life, the meaning of life, the Bomb, one 1?^ ... theory, (a)<^ . For there are many worlds, a whole lattice of worlds, bottoming on the null world Into which all the apparent richness encountered Is worlds projected, allegedly ascending through the austere of the nominalism and empiricism, through the richer world of Platonism, to the very rich worlds of romanticism and Hegelianism, as lllustrated:- Lattlce of putatively actual worlds (p-actuaI worIds) Rn example of an austere world Is Smart's world, the world Smart would see for adequate Individuals science composed by (which Is set-theoretic all that upon to a world of certain counts), operations Uke them, but with no properties or relations (except set membership), no propositions, no beliefs, no lntent(s )lons, categories, no values, consciousness, nothing Insofar else. unlikely null world everything else - values, as It matters, reduces; the rest comprises constructions, projections, and the like. Rs apparently For where well everything -1- as the bottom world, the Is somehow fabricated from �nothing (even extreme Idealists contractions start projections), and with batch some Ideas of their tor Is a top world, but a trivial one which there Includes everything, all properties true and false and other, all objects both as existing and not, etc. Before details proceed very far, then, distinctions are usually Introduced, belongs In a world, to Its domain or one of Its domains, and what what between holds In It In one way or another ordinance, the In outlined type slgnlfleantly, (truly, Imperatively or by This refinement leads to a more complex theory of worlds (of etc.). which Integrates the apparently separate worlds of JB) Wittgenstein’s Tractalus, “the" world that comprises the domain of objects with “the" world as everything that Is the case, the totality of true propositions or of facts. But the salient point Is that after this Integrating there remain many worlds, many not merely possible and Impossible worlds, but many candidates for "the" actual world, wang actual worlds1. For Instance, whatever physically adequate worlds are contained In the selected actual world of a theory will also be actual. If Incomplete. These If that s what they are, do not prevent us re levatIons, distressing speaking as we normally do, sensibly and significantly, of and about the any than more fact that there are several sorts and styles of meaningful the Ilves along with a variety of modern lifestyles that are logical particles (Imp I les, not, every, most very not all at or us from thinking and talking about the meaning of life. Like stops meaningful, world, ...), the world Is a determinable, with the worlds of the refined lattice Its determinates. this By protested, that's ways and rendering of the world we unique enough?! we share’, empiricists philosophers, pretty mad, and ready to especially, are usually objections earlier, stage,or the world burst In and realists with a unique. Surely, suitably though perhaps narrowing the class of determinates under us, the world But descriptions like the world we live In , are still far from uniquely discriminating. It s and around live In, the world we share, out there of range the world , That Is to forget about culture for one thing; much depends on who we are, which subculture belong we to. Tribal will find themselves In a spIrIt-saturated landscape, where Qulneans aborigines live In a highly Impoverished '‘land". (But the aborigines mistake. But mistake or not, either can be what Is but about spoken Is a primitive those by speaking about the world In which they dwell. ) There’s unless we re something phenomenologlstIc something else. That, the theories, there, out which theories, though Is there Idealistic), objection what Is has a Isn't there? Something or other (we grant, but continues, Is uniquely to determining jA Is conflate worlds with been going on here all along. No worlds are not partial Isomorphism. But worlds too have a multiplicity, [to elaborate] What Is neglected Is that ’world’ Itself Is -2- a theoretical term, not an �observational one, there are Important observational components In any though determination of this or that world. There can be well as one (actual) world theory, since theories multiple world theories as Indeed not merely as well as but better than, data commonsense match multiple better, and only defective ontological themes force retreat to one world theories. to save the world, from radical fragmentat Ion, Ua Ismann Perhaps levels of descriptions and Ryle talked doubt, a given sizeable enough thick bag high enough, successful of of thin and thick talked of No descriptions. enough level of worlds? or corresponding reductions, this sort of trick will work, [explain trick] But It Is not how we do commonly talk. Ue talk - and this Just two world sort of talk was what the levels of description theory was designed to get of - of the physicists' (or Eddington's) world and the commonsense (or rid StebbIngs') world, find descriptions do describe, look we when at what correspond Ing the levels of It Is these different worlds. i i i » If a determinate world Is not given, what guides selection Is the choice of base for world 3nd semantical philosophical Investigations. As for theory choice, a range of factors do so. But there Is considerable virtue In taking the object-theoretic minimizing direction, which Is dlametrIcally opposed the to main directIonof empirical and positivistic philosophy, namely the way of richness, diversity ecologies I-type and features, complexity. subject The recipe Is: Satlslze those on naturally to common-sens lea I constraints on what exists and what Is true. Richard Sy Ivan NOTES 1. At least on 3 pluralist view of things, such as Is taken In PPP. Of course any non-trlvlal theory will rule some rivals centrally true from Its stance. For Instance Platonic out as not object-theory true so or not rules out worlds with their existent universals and Lewis s theory wtth Its Implausible existent counterpart worlds. (These other theories are at best plural1stIcally-true). 2. While Ualsmann's levels or strata are discrete, Ryle s account appears to- allow for a continuous alternative. Ryle s suggestions are explained and applied In Ceertz, p.Bff. 3. Hence the max ImIzIng of reductions? which has great technical appeal. I*. As will be explained In a later version of this paper, the theory of worlds 3- �given has very little In common with Goodman s ways of world Making. Indeed Goodman’s fletlonallsm-cum-conventlonallsm will be severely criticised. REFERENCES C. Geertz, The InterpretatIon of Cultures, Basic Books, Hew York, 1373. N. GoodMan, Problems and Projects, BObbs-Merrlll, New York, N. GoodMan, Ways of Uorldmaklng, Harvester, Sussex, R. Rout ley, 1372. 1378. Exploring Melnong's Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1380; referred to as JB. 6. Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume 2 the relevant essays are J Thinking and reflecting and The thinking of thoughts ’ . R. Sylvan, Philosophy, politics and pluralism: relevant modellings and arguments , Research Series In Logic and Metaphysics #2, Research bchool of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1385; referred to as PPP. A. F. Ualsmann, Flew)/Serles , Blackwell, Oxford, -4- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document BRIEF CORRECTION VERSION THE END OF THE WORLD of the grandest philosophical problems are formulated In terms of the Hany way of the world, how the world Is, what there Is In the world - using, that vs, an uncritical and pre-analytic notion of the world. Thus It Is with questcons as to the nature the world, the basic stuff and components of the world, the of arguments for realism, the Issue of universals and categories, of the objectivity and of ethics (e.g. whether values and directives are In the world); values thus It Is especially with the foundations semantics of supposedly (meaning being determined through what Is In or corresponds In the world); and so on. But the under dissolves notion critical Investigation, and therewith many grand problems - often pressing on always on-going reductionist agendas such of empiricism - are. the The world one God, as that If not resolved, at least relocated. goes the the way of the good life, the meaning of life, the Bomb, one 1?^ ... theory, (a)<^ . For there are many worlds, a whole lattice of worlds, bottoming on the null world Into which all the apparent richness encountered Is worlds projected, allegedly ascending through the austere of the nominalism and empiricism, through the richer world of Platonism, to the very rich worlds of romanticism and Hegelianism, as lllustrated:- Lattlce of putatively actual worlds (p-actuaI worIds) Rn example of an austere world Is Smart's world, the world Smart would see for adequate Individuals science composed by (which Is set-theoretic all that upon to a world of certain counts), operations Uke them, but with no properties or relations (except set membership), no propositions, no beliefs, no lntent(s )lons, categories, no values, consciousness, nothing Insofar else. unlikely null world everything else - values, as It matters, reduces; the rest comprises constructions, projections, and the like. Rs apparently For where well everything -1- as the bottom world, the Is somehow fabricated from nothing (even extreme Idealists contractions start projections), and with batch some Ideas of their tor Is a top world, but a trivial one which there Includes everything, all properties true and false and other, all objects both as existing and not, etc. Before details proceed very far, then, distinctions are usually Introduced, belongs In a world, to Its domain or one of Its domains, and what what between holds In It In one way or another ordinance, the In outlined type slgnlfleantly, (truly, Imperatively or by This refinement leads to a more complex theory of worlds (of etc.). which Integrates the apparently separate worlds of JB) Wittgenstein’s Tractalus, “the" world that comprises the domain of objects with “the" world as everything that Is the case, the totality of true propositions or of facts. But the salient point Is that after this Integrating there remain many worlds, many not merely possible and Impossible worlds, but many candidates for "the" actual world, wang actual worlds1. For Instance, whatever physically adequate worlds are contained In the selected actual world of a theory will also be actual. If Incomplete. These If that s what they are, do not prevent us re levatIons, distressing speaking as we normally do, sensibly and significantly, of and about the any than more fact that there are several sorts and styles of meaningful the Ilves along with a variety of modern lifestyles that are logical particles (Imp I les, not, every, most very not all at or us from thinking and talking about the meaning of life. Like stops meaningful, world, ...), the world Is a determinable, with the worlds of the refined lattice Its determinates. this By protested, that's ways and rendering of the world we unique enough?! we share’, empiricists philosophers, pretty mad, and ready to especially, are usually objections earlier, stage,or the world burst In and realists with a unique. Surely, suitably though perhaps narrowing the class of determinates under us, the world But descriptions like the world we live In , are still far from uniquely discriminating. It s and around live In, the world we share, out there of range the world , That Is to forget about culture for one thing; much depends on who we are, which subculture belong we to. Tribal will find themselves In a spIrIt-saturated landscape, where Qulneans aborigines live In a highly Impoverished '‘land". (But the aborigines mistake. But mistake or not, either can be what Is but about spoken Is a primitive those by speaking about the world In which they dwell. ) There’s unless we re something phenomenologlstIc something else. That, the theories, there, out which theories, though Is there Idealistic), objection what Is has a Isn't there? Something or other (we grant, but continues, Is uniquely to determining jA Is conflate worlds with been going on here all along. No worlds are not partial Isomorphism. But worlds too have a multiplicity, [to elaborate] What Is neglected Is that ’world’ Itself Is -2- a theoretical term, not an observational one, there are Important observational components In any though determination of this or that world. There can be well as one (actual) world theory, since theories multiple world theories as Indeed not merely as well as but better than, data commonsense match multiple better, and only defective ontological themes force retreat to one world theories. to save the world, from radical fragmentat Ion, Ua Ismann Perhaps levels of descriptions and Ryle talked doubt, a given sizeable enough thick bag high enough, successful of of thin and thick talked of No descriptions. enough level of worlds? or corresponding reductions, this sort of trick will work, [explain trick] But It Is not how we do commonly talk. Ue talk - and this Just two world sort of talk was what the levels of description theory was designed to get of - of the physicists' (or Eddington's) world and the commonsense (or rid StebbIngs') world, find descriptions do describe, look we when at what correspond Ing the levels of It Is these different worlds. i i i » If a determinate world Is not given, what guides selection Is the choice of base for world 3nd semantical philosophical Investigations. As for theory choice, a range of factors do so. But there Is considerable virtue In taking the object-theoretic minimizing direction, which Is dlametrIcally opposed the to main directIonof empirical and positivistic philosophy, namely the way of richness, diversity ecologies I-type and features, complexity. subject The recipe Is: Satlslze those on naturally to common-sens lea I constraints on what exists and what Is true. Richard Sy Ivan NOTES 1. At least on 3 pluralist view of things, such as Is taken In PPP. Of course any non-trlvlal theory will rule some rivals centrally true from Its stance. For Instance Platonic out as not object-theory true so or not rules out worlds with their existent universals and Lewis s theory wtth Its Implausible existent counterpart worlds. (These other theories are at best plural1stIcally-true). 2. While Ualsmann's levels or strata are discrete, Ryle s account appears to- allow for a continuous alternative. Ryle s suggestions are explained and applied In Ceertz, p.Bff. 3. Hence the max ImIzIng of reductions? which has great technical appeal. I*. As will be explained In a later version of this paper, the theory of worlds 3- given has very little In common with Goodman s ways of world Making. Indeed Goodman’s fletlonallsm-cum-conventlonallsm will be severely criticised. REFERENCES C. Geertz, The InterpretatIon of Cultures, Basic Books, Hew York, 1373. N. GoodMan, Problems and Projects, BObbs-Merrlll, New York, N. GoodMan, Ways of Uorldmaklng, Harvester, Sussex, R. Rout ley, 1372. 1378. Exploring Melnong's Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1380; referred to as JB. 6. Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume 2 the relevant essays are J Thinking and reflecting and The thinking of thoughts ’ . R. Sylvan, Philosophy, politics and pluralism: relevant modellings and arguments , Research Series In Logic and Metaphysics #2, Research bchool of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1385; referred to as PPP. A. F. Ualsmann, Flew)/Serles , Blackwell, Oxford, -4-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 69, Item 3: Draft, brief correction version of The end of the world Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 69, Item 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves. 2.8 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:957e4c8">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:957e4c8</a> Box 69: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/67b27de117524030d45b6db0a625bad2.pdf a92ad477704fdf667fdab4a346c2f0f2 PDF Text Text WORKING DRAFT CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT Many of you know that Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is dedicated by designed simply not an key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially making Servant the Nature of Man, 'land to ... be the accorded He rejected 'concentration discerned instead elements of a and His approach was holistic, and different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the and architect designer but one of Australia’s early deeper ecologists. landscape Burley You may not know that Griffin, an to him. American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was on Walter respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as mere section of a map’. a Canberra, now no mere section of map, is perhaps the best approximation anywhere to a deeper ecological city; but it is not only removed from Griffin’s original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is part, to gauge the extent to Australian which contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin under which many a sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the suffers. political course interested in charted as environmentally alternative structures: or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, talk those of the best of attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to �increasing ecological resistance [negative action j against environment like^and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the and vandalism^/ There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for the especially hope, damage^?, grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has It is worth trying to pull together somehow emerged among the people. some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes different towards practices, and cultures have the approaches, different different Indeed appreciation of, environment. practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: for compare, American Jews and American Indians. instance, Most nonimperial cultures had ~ and where they still survive uncorrupted still havi. less much exploitative industrial and to not practices whose North, exploitation approaches the merely environmental control lost their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained gross permit the of those than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. vandalism Mostly these more benign cultures have however environments, environment sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous certain for cultural instance land rights movements. differences to support way of Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid and, more a comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social �The question arises whether paradigms. elsewhere the in also can differences serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different less environmentally social exploitative paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. a Such cultural Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis is there both the / land in </* U culture, and things and the <L- appear sufficiently different from that in the cultures A of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for Of the for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some need semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that is, there differentiation. cultural in is It platitudinous becoming the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems unless the in we Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised loose work North and towards establishment of a elements of regionalism in the North, despite a in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. destructive concern less different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone as Nor is it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in the Australia because as well as the advantage of the ground and its southern KJ and seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. But A like, most] new and more fragile developments they need attention and^if speedy location, careful cultivation Such a task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 0 environmental and human concern, not but colossal biological losses st the gathering signs of nuclear ykthrough rapid destruction of, e.g. r 3 war, tropical �rainforests, indeed, mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to & A ; alter approaches to the environment? As i/ the title of the ^lk it operates in organising principles L okr the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge^which lifts the the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design environmental way on the ropes of regional links A culture. working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across the is that of a bridge suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: exclude ' -hew that important overlap.) The different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges the picture doesn’t connecting bridges may be of very good for careful foot traffic, �through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. the But it is structure of all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons particularly. ot culture if you will. So different witii different cultures, carrying bridges see the,component in the middle d philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of approaches. It is better different to the nuts and bolts and rivets of the bridges, but rather as the design and engineering of the structures. types, computing It has its analytical parts, looking at the the loads stresses and on them; them - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject is then the architecture and engineering of the business. 5 their and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of components, �philosophy figuratively, Less assumptions that is, to be considered for deep ecology, asks deeper of assumptions assumptions replacement, and deeper questions, of example free fundamenta] the other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions all paradigms. for extracting embodied in a culture or social way or life, i.e. social operative Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not or marxist philosophies. enterprise the assembles ancl culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, a of isolates In what are sometimes called the tills respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, logic, as the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation 1'he assumptions deeper such when put together yield a philosophy in extracts, ci c^y the more popular sense (as e.g. in philosophy of life or , the free enterprise 4 philosophy): any in case the will be a philosophical theory or the result rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, of assumptions the techniques we try with contrasted operative test to apparent we trij.ce Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of and especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some base. results are illustrated in diagram^ • J. s. Details of other positions, the old /and culture positions (as typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative And from are left and the counter included in the diagram the while new the dominant it may Wester/l paradigm appear to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the and by sociological assemblage, the organise the intermediate steps is not so great; each and the steps can, and have, been �To illustrate the way transitions can taken one at a time. of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. details construed components package typically includes environmient , as this to minimal quality life of But the and with subtractions for externalities such as noise and and pollution, perhaps *--- —, M with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive si Mew left thinking with the objective subject to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back philosophy; Greek to In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the hippies and Yippiesy for example, though idea the objective functin to be maximized gets much complicated, A the so such in a rough way stanadard of living. representing as consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being made, be the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing goals At the macroeconopic level, the idea gets^represented by the goal of a steady-state or sustain able economy, though the alternative environmental objective will be for something much less inflexible and ^rationalistic than economists have so tar sketched. I In fact the "emerging steady-state paradigm", which Daly/ ' for example^/advocates, affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and paradigms would include steady state position; remove the transition. convenient reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of among others such advanced corporate capitalism - the so it would involve a JI simplification over higher-dimensional diagram, and of the two dimensional left-right However, the high" dimensional diagram indicates how a better argued A transition ,can be made; essentially by combining steady-state arguments against 0 macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions with the Left -yocialist case against Even so, even with the combin/catioms, which does touch themes. Cl human relations , ^anthropocentric framework would not have been left behind, microeconomic T deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter 7 G-fiP �Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying model takes us towards the following familiar picture: social society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. certain a to ability few but of these At bottom, these individuals have calculate). utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and competitive (by virtue of scarcity). are they so that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the means Their other feature is production, of to this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. this are individuals competing these approximating matter of particularly nurture, abstract nature. not of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result oi training, not human nature, as a comparison where their To ensure the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive is apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, land, of the American model is of course is that feature individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. entitlement e.g. individuals are like not helps this, individuals embody rationality either: with othei' show. traditional cultures, lior do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain The relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do not left omit models are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. That recognising is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, Western value theories do not accommodate. 8 and that mainstream underpinning �The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated the and paradigms cultures such as those models Melanesia of them. underlie that and directed Polynesia, the In traditional of many against the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect more thwarting of destructive practices. environmentally Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already observable features distinctive unscathed World in questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, even or lesser, of features not exhaust features of the accompanying out leave There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual to icing. be This discerned, sure, does affords European culture This alternatives. a have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives the basis of the aesthetic route to environmental But there are as well more important omissions and discrepancies In particular, the dominant American paradigm religion; but Northern features. precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So conspicuous other usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying classes The incomplete social paradigms outlined do cultural features to be considered surprisingly Although the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. rather now cultures, World New is Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently dominant the less environmentally peoples of predominantly European stock. by governed of assumptions and New also neglected are many prominent values of American culture. 9 omits reference to established of the connected older and formerly more �The American search tor environmentally acceptable has alternatives regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or Indeed the primary attempts to spiritual elements, and associated past values . "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken establish a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and sample (For example, Nash provides a list of the books he considers important in the rise of the representative virtually all that proceed beyond ecology new environmentalism: depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to proportion do act in accordance and, unlike with response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. has features For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; substantial religious This sort of that conflict the was Australia, socially precepts approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the a case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was ... torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-interest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ... It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. 10 There is Religion tor most is a separate thing �fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the business standard week. such as human poverty: to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly penetrate deep. escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions the within American population, and^reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. but even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and domination nature were be negative Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. scientific world Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would "the view". scientific (as for the case for its much virtue front-end-in. shape. trying in It return to the There is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). rival view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so called scientific cannot account for; dominant to the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no testifies). Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: view could explain. Watt In any case such a reversal world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a to narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. 11 �There is a set second quasi-religious character reasons of of some not tor sort, a These the on turn irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion success. is unlikely to have much understood as (the a barely relevant generally impose Pantheistic or Jewish, Christian, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly to endeavouring first) ’. irreligious Australia, post-Christian has it society, in which religion (is) Even if that formulation character of understanding much else about the culture, the e.g. an is the exaggeration is a fact and is the society the ’best is said, been curious to extent the state’s protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened j paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcen f1 ism excluded for analogous reasons and because of the the earthiness There are other significant features culture - what alternatives are open? of the culture running against major elements of the dominant Western which can be perhaps applied approaches to turn matters features of the culture around. to more much detach effectively indicate To of from than quasi-religious prospects the paradigms, dominant paradigm, of applying consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way along the leftward is not merely that the It than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left—displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists �TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE —-- —> SCALE OF INCREASE individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive relevant) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE {practices, such as dedication of wilderness ITEMS administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items 13 in the �contrast. themes Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first for opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed This better. important environmental spectators the applying culture are theme requires ela^boration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: for the rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as of diagram in an with there is much work empirical here both and for environmental bent activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and their eommund'B, distinguishing theses: / Let us focus on transition theses, ought to be done (ideologically) what and normative and factual transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is weak A firstly confirmation, ^/undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; paradigm, social has been Presumably similar or Marsh). but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field in Another Australia. weak transition factual thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the also ertreii human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm, come but again comparative—figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than OSA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for �Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been largely taken granted, for that generally, l&ght to^undergoing Western and paradigms an towards and to rguments. the repeat furthermore alternative. environmental thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and time dominant from away variations (such as those of advocated corporate their capitalism an.d of the post-industrial society) , transitivity* shift, paradigm major a culture, indeed Western culture Australian to ought be complex normative That isn’t there fortunately It is also argued against there, but> to sum up the opposition case, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, and to ought going be on, ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how indeed do environmental activists emerging are enough. clear it encourage in Australia. Preliminary answers Not only should activists be continuing with what I they are directing doing organisations the and environmental and those like, to supposed action (public) further them, of industrial prluwryprimarily, regulate not merely by membership drives and environmental influence to and swing the should education. be dominant^ regional culture , for the w potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change been achieved. sources They should also be aiming to increase their support bases , but organisations. endeavouring the against than has thus/ There are two major parts to this further practice which can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: 0 More negatively.it z involves curring down and countering the flow propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especiall the North. That is important in reversing the extent It includes Northern from co-^option a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as gently lopping anti-American of of off the tall poppies and anti-Nor them activities. 15 pedalling the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should �not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence environmental regional other with policies • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other despised features It alternative paradigms commonly is intellectuals Northern are, of course, like those nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, of appreciation natural local The features to tye Lawrence). cultural characters are held (e.g I the egalitarian, along environments. with the consider the effects of these, decently applied, in or antiauthoritarian, A rapidly increasing taken to things, conomics, in local As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a pain problem being its I hra/sv restriction in communities promoted in Fair go and Enough* s with egalitarian methods as combines markets. cultural Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She’ll be right and It'11 do approach dften enough: and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the ambassadors, and commonly culture that work directly towards themes of Australian of also to male relationships: (including cultural transformation: nonhumans). but encourage its extension So, to conclude, the potential is^for we must help to realise it FOOTNOTES 1. The term ’approaches’ is intended to include both theory and practice, espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. 16 both �4. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 17 �P X c 3 & X O P P x X 3 C P HX X 5 O 3 P4 Hrt CD P P4 H* CD X P H CD X p. P X O SS CD X CD X H> CJ4 F—1 CD Hi CD Qu Hp CD CD p X H P P H« P CD 3 nJ P4 P X C H CD . 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For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WORKING DRAFT CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT Many of you know that Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is dedicated by designed simply not an key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially making Servant the Nature of Man, 'land to ... be the accorded He rejected 'concentration discerned instead elements of a and His approach was holistic, and different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the and architect designer but one of Australia’s early deeper ecologists. landscape Burley You may not know that Griffin, an to him. American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was on Walter respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as mere section of a map’. a Canberra, now no mere section of map, is perhaps the best approximation anywhere to a deeper ecological city; but it is not only removed from Griffin’s original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is part, to gauge the extent to Australian which contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin under which many a sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the suffers. political course interested in charted as environmentally alternative structures: or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, talk those of the best of attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to increasing ecological resistance [negative action j against environment like^and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the and vandalism^/ There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for the especially hope, damage^?, grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has It is worth trying to pull together somehow emerged among the people. some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes different towards practices, and cultures have the approaches, different different Indeed appreciation of, environment. practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: for compare, American Jews and American Indians. instance, Most nonimperial cultures had ~ and where they still survive uncorrupted still havi. less much exploitative industrial and to not practices whose North, exploitation approaches the merely environmental control lost their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained gross permit the of those than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. vandalism Mostly these more benign cultures have however environments, environment sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous certain for cultural instance land rights movements. differences to support way of Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid and, more a comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether paradigms. elsewhere the in also can differences serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different less environmentally social exploitative paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. a Such cultural Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis is there both the / land in </* U culture, and things and the <L- appear sufficiently different from that in the cultures A of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for Of the for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some need semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that is, there differentiation. cultural in is It platitudinous becoming the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems unless the in we Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised loose work North and towards establishment of a elements of regionalism in the North, despite a in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. destructive concern less different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone as Nor is it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in the Australia because as well as the advantage of the ground and its southern KJ and seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. But A like, most] new and more fragile developments they need attention and^if speedy location, careful cultivation Such a task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 0 environmental and human concern, not but colossal biological losses st the gathering signs of nuclear ykthrough rapid destruction of, e.g. r 3 war, tropical rainforests, indeed, mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to & A ; alter approaches to the environment? As i/ the title of the ^lk it operates in organising principles L okr the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge^which lifts the the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design environmental way on the ropes of regional links A culture. working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across the is that of a bridge suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: exclude ' -hew that important overlap.) The different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges the picture doesn’t connecting bridges may be of very good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. the But it is structure of all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons particularly. ot culture if you will. So different witii different cultures, carrying bridges see the,component in the middle d philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of approaches. It is better different to the nuts and bolts and rivets of the bridges, but rather as the design and engineering of the structures. types, computing It has its analytical parts, looking at the the loads stresses and on them; them - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject is then the architecture and engineering of the business. 5 their and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of components, philosophy figuratively, Less assumptions that is, to be considered for deep ecology, asks deeper of assumptions assumptions replacement, and deeper questions, of example free fundamenta] the other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions all paradigms. for extracting embodied in a culture or social way or life, i.e. social operative Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not or marxist philosophies. enterprise the assembles ancl culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, a of isolates In what are sometimes called the tills respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, logic, as the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation 1'he assumptions deeper such when put together yield a philosophy in extracts, ci c^y the more popular sense (as e.g. in philosophy of life or , the free enterprise 4 philosophy): any in case the will be a philosophical theory or the result rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, of assumptions the techniques we try with contrasted operative test to apparent we trij.ce Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of and especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some base. results are illustrated in diagram^ • J. s. Details of other positions, the old /and culture positions (as typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative And from are left and the counter included in the diagram the while new the dominant it may Wester/l paradigm appear to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the and by sociological assemblage, the organise the intermediate steps is not so great; each and the steps can, and have, been To illustrate the way transitions can taken one at a time. of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. details construed components package typically includes environmient , as this to minimal quality life of But the and with subtractions for externalities such as noise and and pollution, perhaps *--- —, M with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive si Mew left thinking with the objective subject to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back philosophy; Greek to In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the hippies and Yippiesy for example, though idea the objective functin to be maximized gets much complicated, A the so such in a rough way stanadard of living. representing as consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being made, be the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing goals At the macroeconopic level, the idea gets^represented by the goal of a steady-state or sustain able economy, though the alternative environmental objective will be for something much less inflexible and ^rationalistic than economists have so tar sketched. I In fact the "emerging steady-state paradigm", which Daly/ ' for example^/advocates, affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and paradigms would include steady state position; remove the transition. convenient reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of among others such advanced corporate capitalism - the so it would involve a JI simplification over higher-dimensional diagram, and of the two dimensional left-right However, the high" dimensional diagram indicates how a better argued A transition ,can be made; essentially by combining steady-state arguments against 0 macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions with the Left -yocialist case against Even so, even with the combin/catioms, which does touch themes. Cl human relations , ^anthropocentric framework would not have been left behind, microeconomic T deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter 7 G-fiP Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying model takes us towards the following familiar picture: social society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. certain a to ability few but of these At bottom, these individuals have calculate). utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and competitive (by virtue of scarcity). are they so that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the means Their other feature is production, of to this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. this are individuals competing these approximating matter of particularly nurture, abstract nature. not of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result oi training, not human nature, as a comparison where their To ensure the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive is apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, land, of the American model is of course is that feature individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. entitlement e.g. individuals are like not helps this, individuals embody rationality either: with othei' show. traditional cultures, lior do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain The relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do not left omit models are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. That recognising is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, Western value theories do not accommodate. 8 and that mainstream underpinning The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated the and paradigms cultures such as those models Melanesia of them. underlie that and directed Polynesia, the In traditional of many against the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect more thwarting of destructive practices. environmentally Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already observable features distinctive unscathed World in questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, even or lesser, of features not exhaust features of the accompanying out leave There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual to icing. be This discerned, sure, does affords European culture This alternatives. a have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives the basis of the aesthetic route to environmental But there are as well more important omissions and discrepancies In particular, the dominant American paradigm religion; but Northern features. precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So conspicuous other usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying classes The incomplete social paradigms outlined do cultural features to be considered surprisingly Although the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. rather now cultures, World New is Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently dominant the less environmentally peoples of predominantly European stock. by governed of assumptions and New also neglected are many prominent values of American culture. 9 omits reference to established of the connected older and formerly more The American search tor environmentally acceptable has alternatives regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or Indeed the primary attempts to spiritual elements, and associated past values . "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken establish a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and sample (For example, Nash provides a list of the books he considers important in the rise of the representative virtually all that proceed beyond ecology new environmentalism: depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to proportion do act in accordance and, unlike with response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. has features For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; substantial religious This sort of that conflict the was Australia, socially precepts approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the a case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was ... torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-interest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ... It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. 10 There is Religion tor most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the business standard week. such as human poverty: to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly penetrate deep. escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions the within American population, and^reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. but even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and domination nature were be negative Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. scientific world Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would "the view". scientific (as for the case for its much virtue front-end-in. shape. trying in It return to the There is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). rival view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so called scientific cannot account for; dominant to the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no testifies). Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: view could explain. Watt In any case such a reversal world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a to narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. 11 There is a set second quasi-religious character reasons of of some not tor sort, a These the on turn irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion success. is unlikely to have much understood as (the a barely relevant generally impose Pantheistic or Jewish, Christian, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly to endeavouring first) ’. irreligious Australia, post-Christian has it society, in which religion (is) Even if that formulation character of understanding much else about the culture, the e.g. an is the exaggeration is a fact and is the society the ’best is said, been curious to extent the state’s protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened j paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcen f1 ism excluded for analogous reasons and because of the the earthiness There are other significant features culture - what alternatives are open? of the culture running against major elements of the dominant Western which can be perhaps applied approaches to turn matters features of the culture around. to more much detach effectively indicate To of from than quasi-religious prospects the paradigms, dominant paradigm, of applying consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way along the leftward is not merely that the It than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left—displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE —-- —> SCALE OF INCREASE individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive relevant) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE {practices, such as dedication of wilderness ITEMS administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items 13 in the contrast. themes Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first for opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed This better. important environmental spectators the applying culture are theme requires ela^boration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: for the rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as of diagram in an with there is much work empirical here both and for environmental bent activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and their eommund'B, distinguishing theses: / Let us focus on transition theses, ought to be done (ideologically) what and normative and factual transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is weak A firstly confirmation, ^/undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; paradigm, social has been Presumably similar or Marsh). but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field in Another Australia. weak transition factual thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the also ertreii human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm, come but again comparative—figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than OSA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been largely taken granted, for that generally, l&ght to^undergoing Western and paradigms an towards and to rguments. the repeat furthermore alternative. environmental thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and time dominant from away variations (such as those of advocated corporate their capitalism an.d of the post-industrial society) , transitivity* shift, paradigm major a culture, indeed Western culture Australian to ought be complex normative That isn’t there fortunately It is also argued against there, but> to sum up the opposition case, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, and to ought going be on, ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how indeed do environmental activists emerging are enough. clear it encourage in Australia. Preliminary answers Not only should activists be continuing with what I they are directing doing organisations the and environmental and those like, to supposed action (public) further them, of industrial prluwryprimarily, regulate not merely by membership drives and environmental influence to and swing the should education. be dominant^ regional culture , for the w potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change been achieved. sources They should also be aiming to increase their support bases , but organisations. endeavouring the against than has thus/ There are two major parts to this further practice which can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: 0 More negatively.it z involves curring down and countering the flow propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especiall the North. That is important in reversing the extent It includes Northern from co-^option a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as gently lopping anti-American of of off the tall poppies and anti-Nor them activities. 15 pedalling the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence environmental regional other with policies • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other despised features It alternative paradigms commonly is intellectuals Northern are, of course, like those nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, of appreciation natural local The features to tye Lawrence). cultural characters are held (e.g I the egalitarian, along environments. with the consider the effects of these, decently applied, in or antiauthoritarian, A rapidly increasing taken to things, conomics, in local As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a pain problem being its I hra/sv restriction in communities promoted in Fair go and Enough* s with egalitarian methods as combines markets. cultural Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She’ll be right and It'11 do approach dften enough: and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the ambassadors, and commonly culture that work directly towards themes of Australian of also to male relationships: (including cultural transformation: nonhumans). but encourage its extension So, to conclude, the potential is^for we must help to realise it FOOTNOTES 1. The term ’approaches’ is intended to include both theory and practice, espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. 16 both 4. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 17 P X c 3 & X O P P x X 3 C P HX X 5 O 3 P4 Hrt CD P P4 H* CD X P H CD X p. P X O SS CD X CD X H> CJ4 F—1 CD Hi CD Qu Hp CD CD p X H P P H« P CD 3 nJ P4 P X C H CD . 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For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 71, Item 2: Working draft of Culture, philosophy, and approaches to the natural environment Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 71, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [19] leaves. 12.25 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:32ab889">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:32ab889</a> Box 71: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4a68c59658b0327290244eaa123b1a1c.pdf 9cdae0065a05f92db97d3155a90e0b6b PDF Text Text ■k METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, r’own to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts The most transient superficialities of much of the political commentary, circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the with the widely slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth, This skillful piece of unc annily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle be considered together, media-philosophy In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, their work. is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of arrangements. the exhibits, both the claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ...’ of aftermath nuclear Unfortunately attack. it also philosophically and factually, severe defects. ’without is it Some of simply rubbish: to take one example, consider ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. compared with Moral more issues remain moral issues: important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as they don’t cease to be so when Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders. 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption) . their sense on an �2 S2 which give Anders’ It is applications of philosophical depth, paradoxical and Schell’s work some of its apparent and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the propositions But generated. the frequent applications S2 of depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! the Granted that assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as technological means appear available extinct;^ granted centres of prospect the of to make it large-scale nuclear Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - true, to render Homo sapiens war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in Even in Canada, which information. lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, Schell’s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of contracting the world to North America. all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of (All that matters, its human population will be the data upon, Schell relies for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the .ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, Southern Hemisphere, such as New Zealand and southern at indicates that parts of the latitudes of Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets may appear to have gained new purchase through recent belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, extinction assumption3. they do not sustain the On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example^ in many southern mid-latitude coastal reqions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, life will go on, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the /r �3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist the upon of "impossibility unlearning” the Thus both Anders and Schell means of manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van theory Daniken’s of an "high" earlier In virtue technology). they would of S2, however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion no longer made impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of sense. But what message is the - as if technology the they again want inevitability having learnt to suggest have been advanced.But technological advances cases of they that have are not not been tenable. the development and else was of the the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views with There all Certainly such are many taken advantage of, and examples of there are even technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear Even if this were true just "experiments". weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments" of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut And in fact the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, 1to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not Again they have interfere with the■ observers and those outside the "laboratories" . latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects, such circulation and enough with it in character, or changes in coupled atmospheric Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely radiation fields. these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical as fireballs or firestorms, Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2 . The penetration Schell and Anders, of but in S2, is not something peculiar to Western philosophy, European philosophy human chauvinism, as is product a of This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version It has also deeply of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of especially. Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged MB �4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. As very many propositions with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In Schell, Kantian obnoxious is chauvinism human dished Thoughts and form. up a in particularly time propositions, powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings - future or merely potential past or humans are certainly not enough. humans are not enough, persons that are not Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, a later rational Though we no doubt have it into past, (p.143). local may well be able to truly. it have Schell there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)*^. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ divides time creature The thought is however ... ’. perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a present and future’: so annihilation cannot ’come to pass’ But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. argument for the demise of time, that ’what has been will no longer be Anders’ even what has been’ , is also explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verificationist : would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the to many sorts of things difference; organisms would be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would recorded in many still other ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and �ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about does what exist) not Thus, for metaphysics from Freud, according to whom example, takes Schell dubious over it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting the (p.138). fact In first. clause goes second The is there counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s distance difficulty great no a good describing in The claims. towards same, goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, ’... the simple and basic fact [sic!] harm, or service lamenting rejoicing or that before there can be good or must there be life , human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have (p.171). been exposed and criticised elsewhere/, e.g. HC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. accordingly be ’no thought, no love, sacrifice, no image, no song ...'. For there are, and may continue to exist, other than humans with emotion, creatures no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been ’all in vain’, meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human A activities were not worthwhile.* Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, is reckoned meaningless rendered and S2. a and species death’, and all extinction came redeployed by both. ’second death’ , already already ’overhung with death’ ’a second It is these that underlie the biblical notion ’seems (S p.166). because to Thus, not merely one’s own but future to pass, generations the (S stronger be by ’The death of mankind , S2 and dead’ (AA SI p.244, remaining S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. �6 From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute in degree, doesn’t differ theme that the universality of peril comes ’we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to with SI. In situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because recognise’, event, any are peoples southern Patagonia Indians of the all not This theme falls S p.150). by imperilled equally the better placed being rather nuclear than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or Germans of northern Europe. incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. likewise, Nor, Schell are all contrast (in to people equally responsible, a pernicious repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) This is theme^ which, the theme, Pogo according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme11 runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... they though now menace the earth with nuclear At least, this is weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies' (pp.229-30). pose since we pay for extinction and sense, threat of it, the ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a positive theme is elaborated elsewhere: The while for support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger) (p.152). But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its allegedly govern, insensitivity not to and unresponsiveness to affected by mention those its the activities populace who are they not But Schell conveniently neglects all such represented at all (namely foreigners). points: of many '... we are potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions' And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life (p.152), that not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility attributes decisions to certainly — or everyone taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of potential to worth done less. Schell illegitimately Responsibility for even by representatives (in the unlikely �event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) can responsibility, event of a clear still of a qualified single issue referendum, which is adopted, sort, be for it, not to everyone in the community. sheeted home, to those who voted While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important critique of the theme (indicated state whi?V the conclusion arrives at is, that by and pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered large, the nation-state and has outlasted Schell fragmentary. its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come, way, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). if not easily, in a similar simplistic those who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and especially p.227, treaties, bottom paragraph). Given the record of these organisations and the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and , more generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders$f and elsewhere.13 The roots of the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their �8 and controlling classes, their military, their supporting bureaucracies. And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the power and domination (and, often, superiority by the [nuclear] science interrelated forms. surplus product nature) to super-states, to involves accumulated can be is enables is the for Thus the push for domination, large nation-state, at home (from the drive be achieved through military-oriented and main power-base The feature the accompanying privilege). which technology, and and crucial a conspicuous and from abroad, several in where enough and bled from proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high- technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changing the prospect of to eliminate arrangements structural the nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, the nation­ state; it sweepingly, also is important remove to state relations, political alter trouble-making political arrangements, in to key components patterns embedded namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal relations, but in of in state, and, all these social and patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature more the relations; to male-female in remove, short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and chauvinistic relations. the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states. In what analysis he does offer of the contrast of familiar false "raison d’etat" and the justifies the means is themselves to problem with states, state expediency with morality, Socratic-Christian ethics. every sort’ (p.134). anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. argument is as a contrast between teaching that ’the end the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed commit crimes of extinction nullifies The Schell repeats the So ’states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by ’relevant’, in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its nuclear policies.a nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. �9 So even expediency an from perspective, policies super-state are open severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). power War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity^ (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people sovereignty. is impossible side, without war it On the other for war. to preserve Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. the macro-state system is entrenched, it Now that easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace readily are arrangements aggression, dismissed as of international It is on this basis hatred. fear, is however unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell’s further nuclear "war" that theme is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is correct is that nuclear wars are very different from previous conventional wars (cf. WP) . that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim Schell goes on But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side ’no one’s happen, But being defeated what these on a decision by arms. strength fails sorts of until considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear "war this doesn’t both sides have been annihilated’ contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. have persisted into nuclear times does damage to That conventional wars Schell's argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp.192-193). The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea �10 that war of some sort has to be the final court of appeal between nations (for there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda). The social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the 'logic of war theme also imports the theme) that war has to proceed to the technological limit — as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), and ruleless activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly sound, logical, rational. However Logic in no way justifies the represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. logics of decision (as presented, e.g., be applied planning; in strategic but this There are for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can they do not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency^?. For the most part, however, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like ’reasoning and rational considerations entering into the In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with policy or strategy of’. the term ’logic of’, should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes its unreasonableness. supposed rationality (even from a national fail:^ yet threat of the this further and For of stresses (p.213) instance he threatening use interest viewpoint) success of deterrence unjustifiable and of nuclear the disparity between the weapons and the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.201-2); Nuclear deterrence may well be �11 NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders’ of my monograph referred to as WP, where Several points, only touched ijpcn in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors’ names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. 1. The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up) , it still gives humans a further chance for goou lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper’s idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. 2. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley Ju. 3. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. 4. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy �targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies. Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worstQ ' case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1287 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain ... uncertain ... because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... the environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere’, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. marxist persuasion, determinists of merely by technological 6. Not induction that if the argues by straight Hackworth, a former US general, use it. US military has a weapon it will present and future (etc.) is 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military �13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further ’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’ (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the 'free enterprise (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP §8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmqj'is elaborated. 13. Anders’ explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, . .., for the newer Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference—satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. C Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it. consists in maximisation,.a suitable mix of these virtues. * 4 Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes, runs into Newcomb ’s paraj^dox and special cases (individual or national) situations. The maximisation of power, as such as Prisoners Dilemma Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of the symbolised in parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of the omnipotence, or no consistent objects which are omnipotent There are omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads leads to to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also �14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. (ar 18. Even the irrationality of /retaliatory * first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thougnt that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered -tor the conjecturAL targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although �15 involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which Implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as AA. G. Anders, Zeitenende: Endzeitand Gedanken atomaren zur Situation, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. 7 ' F. Barnaby, ’Will be there a War' ,//» Aus tralia Nuclear Nuclear War, J (ed. M. Denborough) , Croom Helm, Australia, 1983? I.J. Benton and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" overstated’, 13 Ambio (1984) 49-51. B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man P.J. Crutzen, Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. ’Darkness after a nuclear war’, Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, Science 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, ’Jonathan Schell: Genius - Philosopher - Rewrite Man’, typescript, Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. �16 in ’A Soldier’s Refragfljt’, , Australia D. Hackworth, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983 vi^vC Nuclear War, (ed. M. Denborough), /zor-/z » K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, 1961. B. Martin, Strategy Against Roots Grass War, Freedom Press, 1984, "ter Nottingham, a-p-peax. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brifce , New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Meinong’s Exploring Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984j R. and V. Routley, Philosophy (ed. 'Human chauvinism D. Manujson and and Environmental others), Research ethics’, School of in Environmental Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: global consequences explosions’ , Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear �Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and tht?_ _ea£_t]i, according to SchelT~and Anders. Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption. Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro­ pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence. �METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT* A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels; with the widely in this the series contrasts transient superficialities of much of the political commentary. circulated influential and text the of series is undoubtedly that uncannily some of the the apparently deep phenomenological So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often themes of Anders. be considered together. their work. redeploys of This skillful piece of slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth. media-philosophy The most To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its arrangements. the aftermath of nuclear vivid and horrifying scenarios of Unfortunately attack. it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. Some of ’without is it simply rubbish: to take one example, consider the ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense . . . ’ (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become Moral morally neutral. compared with more issues remain moral issues: they don’t cease to be so when important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. value, In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a form, for their X 2 actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption). more sympathetic philosophical these notions depend sense on an �2 S2 which give Anders’ and Schell’s work some of its apparent It is applications of and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the philosophical depth, paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Granted that assumption SI the technological means appear extinctgranted the prospect is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as available to of make it nuclear large-scale to render Homo sapiens true, war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in centres of Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. for example, It depends, Schell s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North Zunerican thing, of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced at to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, latitudes of such as New Zealand and southern Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets belated) scientific may appear forecasts of to have gained new purchase through recent a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the extinction assumption3. On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and mid-latitude coastal life will go on, for example in many southern regions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, simplifications, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the �3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist upon unlearning" of "impossibility the Thus both Anders and Schell means of the manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Daniken’s of an theory "high" earlier they would of S2, In virtue technology). however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion longer no made sense. But what message is the - as if impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of the technology they to suggest again want learnt having the of inevitability with the development and all the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views have been advanced. technological advances cases of But are not they that have been not tenable. Certainly such are many There taken advantage of, was else examples of there are even and technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments". Even if this were true just of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut the argument against previous inevitability the of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear work, scientific large-scale to weapons and independent experiments which interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories". latched onto major points: cumulative such effects, of effects as in particular, fireballs or Again they have we have at present no way of testing the wreapons in concert, firestorms, or changes nuclear large do not e.g. in for more holistic atmospheric coupled circulation and radiation fields. enough with these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical it, in character. Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2. The Schell penetration and Anders, of human but is a chauvinism, product of as in S2, Western is not something peculiar philosophy, European to philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version of just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). S2 being penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended It has also deeply under the influence of Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged �4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: As very many propositions about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In human Schell, obnoxious Kantian form. dished is chauvinism and Thoughts up in propositions, a particularly time powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings future or merely potential humans are not enough, - past or that are not persons Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), humans are certainly not enough. ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as it soon as is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, ... ’. a later rational erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ into past, divides time may well be to able ordering time it have Schell truly. there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)7. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that present and future’: so annihilation cannot But it is simply false that the tenses are human; (p.143). local creature The thought is however Though we no doubt have it perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a (perceptible to many creatures ’come to pass’ the tenses depend on a other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. Anders’ argument for the demise of time, even what has been’, is also that ’what has been will no longer be explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verif icationist: would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the things to many sorts organisms would of difference; be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would still many other recorded in ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and �5 ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about exist)0. not does what Thus, Schell example, for takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting (p.138). fact In first. the clause goes second The there is great no situations which undermine both Freud’s counterfactual a good distance difficulty claims. in towards describing The same goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, '... the simple and basic fact [sic!] or service (p.171). lamenting harm, rejoicing or that before there can be good or there be must life’, human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have been exposed and criticised elsewhere, e.g. LIC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. ’no thought, accordingly be no love, sacrifice, no image, no song no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no For there are, and may continue to exist, other ...’. creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human 9 activities were not worthwhile. Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, rendered is and S2. reckoned meaningless a and species and all extinction came redeployed 'second death', already already 'overhung with death' 'a second death', It is these that underlie the biblical notion 'seems (S p.166). because by to to pass, generations the (S stronger be Thus, not merely one's own but future by both. 'The death of mankind', S2 and dead' (AA SI remaining p.244, S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of. this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. �6 together with the minor principle From SI, doesn’t differ in degree, comes extinction being an absolute that the universality of peril theme that we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to recognise’, with In SI. situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because any event, not Indians of the peoples all Germans of northern Europe. ihis theme falls imperilled equally are southern Patagonia S p.150). being rather by nuclear the better placed than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. Nor, Schell likewise, contrast (in all are to people equally responsible, a repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) pernicious This is the theme which Pogo theme, according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed a weaker more in, plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeH runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... though they now menace weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies’ (pp.229-30). positive pose the since we sense, threat of it, At least, this is theme is elaborated elsewhere: The ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a with nuclear the earth pay for extinction and support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is while for true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger/ But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by (p.152). revealing insensitivity its unresponsiveness and to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such ’... we are potential mass killers. points: that it makes of all of us underwriters of (p.152). The moral cost of nuclear armaments is the slaughter of hundreds of millions And again ’[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; (p.153). everyone to be killed’ that ... .it had been judged acceptable for Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility certainly — or everyone attributes to decisions taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of to done potential worth Schell less. even by representatives illegitimately Responsibility for (in the unlikely �7 event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted can responsibility, for it, not to everyone in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important arrives at state which is, the critique of theme (indicated pp.187-8). the conclusion that by and large, Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered and the nation-state has outlasted fragmentary. Schell its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to way, the nuclear dilemma come, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). those if not easily, in a similar simplistic who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, especially p.227, bottom paragraph). through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and Given the record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more The roots of generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere. the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically —aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their �8 and their supporting bureaucracies. their controlling classes, military, And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the science for super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented in several enables domination, and which involves superiority by the and technology, forms. interrelated surplus the drive Thus the push for the accompanying privilege). power and domination (and, often, [nuclear] feature is a conspicuous and crucial product can be accumulated at home (from where enough large nation-state, is the The main power-base from abroad, and and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the highj 15 technology research and development means to ever more expendable powei and energy* prospect of nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mam power-base, the nation­ state; it is also important to alter key components of the state, and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and In changing the structural political arrangements, in state relations, political arrangements chauvinistic relations . relations, but in the eliminate namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal to patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature relations; to remove, male-female in short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of separately. states and certain key components of states. analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between The teaching that 'the end "raison d’etat" and the Socratic—Christian ethics. justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed In what themselves to commit crimes of every sort’ (p.134). So 'states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such actual or not. objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of I6 its nuclear policies. A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. �9 So even from an perspective, expediency policies super-state open are severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people for war. sovereignty. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve The Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small the macro-state Now that nonmilitary states. system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace are arrangements aggression, readily fear, hatred. as dismissed of international is on this basis It unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.L85). Schell’s further theme nuclear that "war" is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. theme needs much qualification, Fortunately the not-war and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. very different What is correct is that nuclear wars are from previous conventional wars (cf. WP). Schell goes on that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side being defeated ’no happen, But what one’s these on a decision by arms. strength sorts of fails war this doesn t until both sides have been annihilated’ considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success anu improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. that conventional wars have argument persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell’s that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp. 192—193) • The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea �10 that war of some sort has to be final "court of appeal" between nations (for the there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, joint referenda). e.g. imports the The theme also social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war that war has to theme) proceed to the technological limit ~ as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations and ruleless activities. such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is entangled now in are perfectly sound, logical, represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. rational. however this Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There are logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning; but yield specific results without they do not desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency however, to cover something like ’reasoning (even from a national fail:18 yet threat of further and of stresses (p.213) threatening use interest viewpoint) the success this considerations entering into the ’the illogic of deterrence’, for he emphasizes For instance he unreasonableness. rationality rational and In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term ’logic of’, should write of supposed lor the most pait, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, policy or strategy of’. its . of deterrence unjustifiable and the disparity between the weapons and of nuclear the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.z-01~2>; Nuclear deterrence may well be ft �NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders' of my monograph referred to as WP, where several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors' names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. . The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. . A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley JS. . Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. . Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora's box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy �12 targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately ’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid­ latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1237 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain . . . uncertain .. . because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... The environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere*, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. 6. Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction that if the US military has a weapon it will use it. 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future (etc.) is repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military �13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further 'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP ^8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated. 13. Anders' explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, ..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisation, of a suitable mix of these virtues. Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes (individual or national) runs into Newcomb's paradox and special cases of The maximisation of power, as it such as Prisoners Dilemma situations. the Christian-lslamic God, encounters the paradox of symbolised in the parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of omnipotence, or There are no consistent objects which arc omnipotent omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also �14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytlc) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. 18. Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered for the conjectured targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although �involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, AA. Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. G. z\nders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. zur Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as atomaren F. Barnaby, ’Will there be a Nuclear War’, in Australia M. Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37. I.J. Benton 49-51. and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" Situation, and Beck, C.H. War, Nuclear overstated', Ambio (ed. (1984) 13 B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. P.J. Crutzen, ’Darkness after a nuclear war', Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, 'Jonathan Schell: Genius Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Philosopher - Rewrite Man', Science typescript, G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. D. Hackworth, 'A Soldier's Report’, Australia and Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12. (ed. M. Denborough), K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, �16 1961. B. Martin, Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Nottingham, 1984. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace, New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, ’Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. of Social R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as WP. R. and V. Routley, ’Human chauvinism and Environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, ’Nuclear winter: global explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. consequences M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Text Any textual data included in the document ■k METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, r’own to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts The most transient superficialities of much of the political commentary, circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the with the widely slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth, This skillful piece of unc annily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle be considered together, media-philosophy In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, their work. is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of arrangements. the exhibits, both the claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ...’ of aftermath nuclear Unfortunately attack. it also philosophically and factually, severe defects. ’without is it Some of simply rubbish: to take one example, consider ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. compared with Moral more issues remain moral issues: important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as they don’t cease to be so when Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders. 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption) . their sense on an 2 S2 which give Anders’ It is applications of philosophical depth, paradoxical and Schell’s work some of its apparent and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the propositions But generated. the frequent applications S2 of depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! the Granted that assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as technological means appear available extinct;^ granted centres of prospect the of to make it large-scale nuclear Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - true, to render Homo sapiens war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in Even in Canada, which information. lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, Schell’s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of contracting the world to North America. all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of (All that matters, its human population will be the data upon, Schell relies for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the .ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, Southern Hemisphere, such as New Zealand and southern at indicates that parts of the latitudes of Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets may appear to have gained new purchase through recent belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, extinction assumption3. they do not sustain the On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example^ in many southern mid-latitude coastal reqions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, life will go on, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the /r 3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist the upon of "impossibility unlearning” the Thus both Anders and Schell means of manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van theory Daniken’s of an "high" earlier In virtue technology). they would of S2, however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion no longer made impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of sense. But what message is the - as if technology the they again want inevitability having learnt to suggest have been advanced.But technological advances cases of they that have are not not been tenable. the development and else was of the the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views with There all Certainly such are many taken advantage of, and examples of there are even technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear Even if this were true just "experiments". weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments" of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut And in fact the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, 1to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not Again they have interfere with the■ observers and those outside the "laboratories" . latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects, such circulation and enough with it in character, or changes in coupled atmospheric Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely radiation fields. these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical as fireballs or firestorms, Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2 . The penetration Schell and Anders, of but in S2, is not something peculiar to Western philosophy, European philosophy human chauvinism, as is product a of This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version It has also deeply of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of especially. Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged MB 4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. As very many propositions with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In Schell, Kantian obnoxious is chauvinism human dished Thoughts and form. up a in particularly time propositions, powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings - future or merely potential past or humans are certainly not enough. humans are not enough, persons that are not Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, a later rational Though we no doubt have it into past, (p.143). local may well be able to truly. it have Schell there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)*^. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ divides time creature The thought is however ... ’. perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a present and future’: so annihilation cannot ’come to pass’ But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. argument for the demise of time, that ’what has been will no longer be Anders’ even what has been’ , is also explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verificationist : would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the to many sorts of things difference; organisms would be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would recorded in many still other ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about does what exist) not Thus, for metaphysics from Freud, according to whom example, takes Schell dubious over it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting the (p.138). fact In first. clause goes second The is there counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s distance difficulty great no a good describing in The claims. towards same, goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, ’... the simple and basic fact [sic!] harm, or service lamenting rejoicing or that before there can be good or must there be life , human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have (p.171). been exposed and criticised elsewhere/, e.g. HC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. accordingly be ’no thought, no love, sacrifice, no image, no song ...'. For there are, and may continue to exist, other than humans with emotion, creatures no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been ’all in vain’, meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human A activities were not worthwhile.* Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, is reckoned meaningless rendered and S2. a and species death’, and all extinction came redeployed by both. ’second death’ , already already ’overhung with death’ ’a second It is these that underlie the biblical notion ’seems (S p.166). because to Thus, not merely one’s own but future to pass, generations the (S stronger be by ’The death of mankind , S2 and dead’ (AA SI p.244, remaining S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. 6 From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute in degree, doesn’t differ theme that the universality of peril comes ’we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to with SI. In situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because recognise’, event, any are peoples southern Patagonia Indians of the all not This theme falls S p.150). by imperilled equally the better placed being rather nuclear than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or Germans of northern Europe. incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. likewise, Nor, Schell are all contrast (in to people equally responsible, a pernicious repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) This is theme^ which, the theme, Pogo according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme11 runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... they though now menace the earth with nuclear At least, this is weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies' (pp.229-30). pose since we pay for extinction and sense, threat of it, the ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a positive theme is elaborated elsewhere: The while for support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger) (p.152). But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its allegedly govern, insensitivity not to and unresponsiveness to affected by mention those its the activities populace who are they not But Schell conveniently neglects all such represented at all (namely foreigners). points: of many '... we are potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions' And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life (p.152), that not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility attributes decisions to certainly — or everyone taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of potential to worth done less. Schell illegitimately Responsibility for even by representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) can responsibility, event of a clear still of a qualified single issue referendum, which is adopted, sort, be for it, not to everyone in the community. sheeted home, to those who voted While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important critique of the theme (indicated state whi?V the conclusion arrives at is, that by and pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered large, the nation-state and has outlasted Schell fragmentary. its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come, way, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). if not easily, in a similar simplistic those who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and especially p.227, treaties, bottom paragraph). Given the record of these organisations and the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and , more generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders$f and elsewhere.13 The roots of the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their 8 and controlling classes, their military, their supporting bureaucracies. And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the power and domination (and, often, superiority by the [nuclear] science interrelated forms. surplus product nature) to super-states, to involves accumulated can be is enables is the for Thus the push for domination, large nation-state, at home (from the drive be achieved through military-oriented and main power-base The feature the accompanying privilege). which technology, and and crucial a conspicuous and from abroad, several in where enough and bled from proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high- technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changing the prospect of to eliminate arrangements structural the nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, the nation­ state; it sweepingly, also is important remove to state relations, political alter trouble-making political arrangements, in to key components patterns embedded namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal relations, but in of in state, and, all these social and patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature more the relations; to male-female in remove, short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and chauvinistic relations. the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states. In what analysis he does offer of the contrast of familiar false "raison d’etat" and the justifies the means is themselves to problem with states, state expediency with morality, Socratic-Christian ethics. every sort’ (p.134). anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. argument is as a contrast between teaching that ’the end the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed commit crimes of extinction nullifies The Schell repeats the So ’states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by ’relevant’, in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its nuclear policies.a nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. 9 So even expediency an from perspective, policies super-state are open severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). power War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity^ (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people sovereignty. is impossible side, without war it On the other for war. to preserve Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. the macro-state system is entrenched, it Now that easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace readily are arrangements aggression, dismissed as of international It is on this basis hatred. fear, is however unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell’s further nuclear "war" that theme is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is correct is that nuclear wars are very different from previous conventional wars (cf. WP) . that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim Schell goes on But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side ’no one’s happen, But being defeated what these on a decision by arms. strength fails sorts of until considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear "war this doesn’t both sides have been annihilated’ contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. have persisted into nuclear times does damage to That conventional wars Schell's argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp.192-193). The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea 10 that war of some sort has to be the final court of appeal between nations (for there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda). The social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the 'logic of war theme also imports the theme) that war has to proceed to the technological limit — as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), and ruleless activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly sound, logical, rational. However Logic in no way justifies the represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. logics of decision (as presented, e.g., be applied planning; in strategic but this There are for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can they do not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency^?. For the most part, however, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like ’reasoning and rational considerations entering into the In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with policy or strategy of’. the term ’logic of’, should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes its unreasonableness. supposed rationality (even from a national fail:^ yet threat of the this further and For of stresses (p.213) instance he threatening use interest viewpoint) success of deterrence unjustifiable and of nuclear the disparity between the weapons and the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.201-2); Nuclear deterrence may well be 11 NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders’ of my monograph referred to as WP, where Several points, only touched ijpcn in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors’ names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. 1. The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up) , it still gives humans a further chance for goou lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper’s idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. 2. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley Ju. 3. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. 4. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora’s box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies. Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worstQ ' case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1287 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain ... uncertain ... because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... the environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere’, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. marxist persuasion, determinists of merely by technological 6. Not induction that if the argues by straight Hackworth, a former US general, use it. US military has a weapon it will present and future (etc.) is 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military 13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further ’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’ (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the 'free enterprise (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP §8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmqj'is elaborated. 13. Anders’ explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, . .., for the newer Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference—satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. C Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it. consists in maximisation,.a suitable mix of these virtues. * 4 Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes, runs into Newcomb ’s paraj^dox and special cases (individual or national) situations. The maximisation of power, as such as Prisoners Dilemma Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of the symbolised in parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of the omnipotence, or no consistent objects which are omnipotent There are omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads leads to to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also 14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. (ar 18. Even the irrationality of /retaliatory * first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thougnt that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered -tor the conjecturAL targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although 15 involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which Implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as AA. G. Anders, Zeitenende: Endzeitand Gedanken atomaren zur Situation, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. 7 ' F. Barnaby, ’Will be there a War' ,//» Aus tralia Nuclear Nuclear War, J (ed. M. Denborough) , Croom Helm, Australia, 1983? I.J. Benton and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" overstated’, 13 Ambio (1984) 49-51. B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man P.J. Crutzen, Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. ’Darkness after a nuclear war’, Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, Science 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, ’Jonathan Schell: Genius - Philosopher - Rewrite Man’, typescript, Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. 16 in ’A Soldier’s Refragfljt’, , Australia D. Hackworth, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983 vi^vC Nuclear War, (ed. M. Denborough), /zor-/z » K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, 1961. B. Martin, Strategy Against Roots Grass War, Freedom Press, 1984, "ter Nottingham, a-p-peax. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brifce , New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Meinong’s Exploring Jungle and Beyond, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984j R. and V. Routley, Philosophy (ed. 'Human chauvinism D. Manujson and and Environmental others), Research ethics’, School of in Environmental Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: global consequences explosions’ , Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and tht?_ _ea£_t]i, according to SchelT~and Anders. Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption. Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro­ pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence. METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT* A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels; with the widely in this the series contrasts transient superficialities of much of the political commentary. circulated influential and text the of series is undoubtedly that uncannily some of the the apparently deep phenomenological So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often themes of Anders. be considered together. their work. redeploys of This skillful piece of slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth. media-philosophy The most To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear It is especially valuable for its arrangements. the aftermath of nuclear vivid and horrifying scenarios of Unfortunately attack. it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. Some of ’without is it simply rubbish: to take one example, consider the ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] nothing else claim that species .... that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense . . . ’ (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become Moral morally neutral. compared with more issues remain moral issues: they don’t cease to be so when important elsewhere, e.g. p.130). moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts. The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. value, In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a form, for their X 2 actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption). more sympathetic philosophical these notions depend sense on an 2 S2 which give Anders’ and Schell’s work some of its apparent It is applications of and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the philosophical depth, paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 depend essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Granted that assumption SI the technological means appear extinctgranted the prospect is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as available to of make it nuclear large-scale to render Homo sapiens true, war does threaten leading Even so SI appears unlikely in centres of Western civilization with obliteration. the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). SI is extremely flimsy. for example, It depends, Schell s argument to on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North Zunerican thing, of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of date even when he wrote. Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well from North A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced at to South. about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, latitudes of such as New Zealand and southern Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. Doomsday prophets belated) scientific may appear forecasts of to have gained new purchase through recent a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war. (if But although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the extinction assumption3. On the available evidence, human life will continue, though no doubt with new complications and mid-latitude coastal life will go on, for example in many southern regions outside zones of radiation fall-out. More generally, simplifications, though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures. Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as already set , in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe. Much of the 3 way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible. insist upon unlearning" of "impossibility the Thus both Anders and Schell means of the manufacturing nuclear It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good bombs. medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Daniken’s of an theory "high" earlier they would of S2, In virtue technology). however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that the notion longer no made sense. But what message is the - as if impossibility-of-unlearning eventual use of the technology they to suggest again want learnt having the of inevitability with the development and all the means determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. views have been advanced. technological advances cases of But are not they that have been not tenable. Certainly such are many There taken advantage of, was else examples of there are even and technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments". Even if this were true just of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut the argument against previous inevitability the of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear work, scientific large-scale to weapons and independent experiments which interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories". latched onto major points: cumulative such effects, of effects as in particular, fireballs or Again they have we have at present no way of testing the wreapons in concert, firestorms, or changes nuclear large do not e.g. in for more holistic atmospheric coupled circulation and radiation fields. enough with these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical it, in character. Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of S2. The Schell penetration and Anders, of human but is a chauvinism, product of as in S2, Western is not something peculiar philosophy, European to philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version of just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). S2 being penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended It has also deeply under the influence of Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged 4 implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones: As very many propositions about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans or their communities. In human Schell, obnoxious Kantian form. dished is chauvinism and Thoughts up in propositions, a particularly time powerful history and tenses, and and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings future or merely potential humans are not enough, - past or that are not persons Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), humans are certainly not enough. ’... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as it soon as is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead moment that is still within the stream of human time, ... ’. a later rational erroneously denies that: present, and future ...’ into past, divides time may well be to able ordering time it have Schell truly. there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past, (p.140)7. Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that present and future’: so annihilation cannot But it is simply false that the tenses are human; (p.143). local creature The thought is however Though we no doubt have it perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. falsely, to a (perceptible to many creatures ’come to pass’ the tenses depend on a other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, the present, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. Anders’ argument for the demise of time, even what has been’, is also that ’what has been will no longer be explicitly (and narrowly) ’for what verif icationist: would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, is no remain one remember the things to many sorts organisms would of difference; be different. that have been’ for one, Temporal the (AA p.245). history themes do not lack if there There would still many other recorded in ’legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and 5 ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about exist)0. not does what Thus, Schell example, for takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present spectators" as refuting (p.138). fact In first. the clause goes second The there is great no situations which undermine both Freud’s counterfactual a good distance difficulty claims. in towards describing The same goes for Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: evil, '... the simple and basic fact [sic!] or service (p.171). lamenting harm, rejoicing or that before there can be good or there be must life’, human life These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have been exposed and criticised elsewhere, e.g. LIC). Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will forth. ’no thought, accordingly be no love, sacrifice, no image, no song no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no For there are, and may continue to exist, other ...’. creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs, ... Nor will the ending of . all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human 9 activities were not worthwhile. Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI of a Second Death, (in Revelations) under SI, rendered is and S2. reckoned meaningless a and species and all extinction came redeployed 'second death', already already 'overhung with death' 'a second death', It is these that underlie the biblical notion 'seems (S p.166). because by to to pass, generations the (S stronger be Thus, not merely one's own but future by both. 'The death of mankind', S2 and dead' (AA SI remaining p.244, S p.166) life is and is too, more trivially, a person faces in addition that greater death of the p.166, p.115). However even notion would not be vindicated, if nuclear because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of. this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. 6 together with the minor principle From SI, doesn’t differ in degree, comes extinction being an absolute that the universality of peril theme that we are all exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult to recognise’, with In SI. situation, there is no contrast (AE p.64; because any event, not Indians of the peoples all Germans of northern Europe. ihis theme falls imperilled equally are southern Patagonia S p.150). being rather by nuclear the better placed than the Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places. Nor, Schell likewise, contrast (in all are to people equally responsible, a repeatedly infiltrates. Anders) pernicious This is the theme which Pogo theme, according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed a weaker more in, plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeH runs as follows: ’... the world’s leaders political ... though they now menace weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. true for democracies’ (pp.229-30). positive pose the since we sense, threat of it, At least, this is theme is elaborated elsewhere: The ... we are (For the populations of the superpowers this is true the authors of that extinction. in a with nuclear the earth pay for extinction and support the governments that the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is while for true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger/ But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by (p.152). revealing insensitivity its unresponsiveness and to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such ’... we are potential mass killers. points: that it makes of all of us underwriters of (p.152). The moral cost of nuclear armaments is the slaughter of hundreds of millions And again ’[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; (p.153). everyone to be killed’ that ... .it had been judged acceptable for Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible, destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor and the are like, does responsibility certainly — or everyone attributes to decisions taken — not the the unlikely fall in "liberal on authors opinions as those democracies" who have of to done potential worth Schell less. even by representatives illegitimately Responsibility for (in the unlikely 7 event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted can responsibility, for it, not to everyone in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person. When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important arrives at state which is, the critique of theme (indicated pp.187-8). the conclusion that by and large, Yet S4 forms part of Schell s scattered and the nation-state has outlasted fragmentary. Schell its usefulness, and that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up to world political control. Solutions to way, the nuclear dilemma come, from the Top Down; (cf. p.230). those if not easily, in a similar simplistic who can must appeal to the Top, to those who govern Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations, such as SALT, and in world government, especially p.227, bottom paragraph). through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and Given the record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more The roots of generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere. the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically —aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their 8 and their supporting bureaucracies. their controlling classes, military, And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of states, the science for super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented in several enables domination, and which involves superiority by the and technology, forms. interrelated surplus the drive Thus the push for the accompanying privilege). power and domination (and, often, [nuclear] feature is a conspicuous and crucial product can be accumulated at home (from where enough large nation-state, is the The main power-base from abroad, and and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the highj 15 technology research and development means to ever more expendable powei and energy* prospect of nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mam power-base, the nation­ state; it is also important to alter key components of the state, and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and In changing the structural political arrangements, in state relations, political arrangements chauvinistic relations . relations, but in the eliminate namely patterns of domination, organisation, human-animal to patterns manifested not only relations, white-coloured human-nature relations; to remove, male-female in short, However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of separately. states and certain key components of states. analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between The teaching that 'the end "raison d’etat" and the Socratic—Christian ethics. justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed In what themselves to commit crimes of every sort’ (p.134). So 'states may do virtually Schell then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’. with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such actual or not. objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of I6 its nuclear policies. A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. 9 So even from an perspective, expediency policies super-state open are severe to criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and no doubt. power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity (p.188). to wage war. to organise On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people for war. sovereignty. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve The Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands. first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small the macro-state Now that nonmilitary states. system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities life, which include self-interest, that peace are arrangements aggression, readily fear, hatred. as dismissed of international is on this basis It unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.L85). Schell’s further theme nuclear that "war" is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity. theme needs much qualification, Fortunately the not-war and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. very different What is correct is that nuclear wars are from previous conventional wars (cf. WP). Schell goes on that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. to claim But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on not all wars or games are won). one side being defeated ’no happen, But what one’s these on a decision by arms. strength sorts of fails war this doesn t until both sides have been annihilated’ considerations nuclear wars are not wars, but But in nuclear contribute to showing is (p.190). again that they are not wars of certain sorts, not that e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success anu improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. that conventional wars have argument persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell’s that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war court has left no means of appeal has mistaken propositions: been to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final removed (pp. 192—193) • The theme depends on a pair of that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea 10 that war of some sort has to be final "court of appeal" between nations (for the there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, joint referenda). e.g. imports the The theme also social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war that war has to theme) proceed to the technological limit ~ as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.), On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations and ruleless activities. such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning . The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the world is entangled now in are perfectly sound, logical, represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. rational. however this Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There are logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning; but yield specific results without they do not desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically . There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency however, to cover something like ’reasoning (even from a national fail:18 yet threat of further and of stresses (p.213) threatening use interest viewpoint) the success this considerations entering into the ’the illogic of deterrence’, for he emphasizes For instance he unreasonableness. rationality rational and In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term ’logic of’, should write of supposed lor the most pait, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation, policy or strategy of’. its . of deterrence unjustifiable and the disparity between the weapons and of nuclear the irrationality of actually using them should the threat doctrine depends on the credibility of irrational use. the Indeed Schell wants to go still locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation, along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. pp.z-01~2>; Nuclear deterrence may well be ft NOTES This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell, and to Anders' of my monograph referred to as WP, where several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed. References are by way of authors' names or else through obvious acronyms, given in the list of references which follows. . The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. . A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of S2 is made in Foley JS. . Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals. . Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora's box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy 12 targeting in particular of Southern Hemispheric internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones). sites (including 5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much. The most intrepid of these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded’ (p.1299). The study admits that, in the scenario described, ’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions immediately ’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human survival are exaggerated. In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid­ latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern latitudes. For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1237 case 29, and p.1286). Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge). No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and strategists have an interest in minimizing them. And there is certainly substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn. For Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a global nuclear war remain . . . uncertain .. . because of a lack of information on various important processes [among other things] ... The environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked changes in the composition of the atmosphere*, again among other things. Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational. The way to err is clear. 6. Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction that if the US military has a weapon it will use it. 7. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future (etc.) is repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. 8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB. 9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. 10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military 13 weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby). Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument is flawed at its final stage. For many influential politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus, though there is no doubt some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further 'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation, and against socialism. 12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP ^8, where too the case against the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated. 13. Anders' explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are presented more straightforwardly in Martin. The incomplete list of items given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, ..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction, for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisation, of a suitable mix of these virtues. Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation The maximisation of self-interest theorems and associated paradoxes (individual or national) runs into Newcomb's paradox and special cases of The maximisation of power, as it such as Prisoners Dilemma situations. the Christian-lslamic God, encounters the paradox of symbolised in the parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of omnipotence, or There are no consistent objects which arc omnipotent omniscience. the The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be omniscient. epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems). 15. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also 14 drives the arms race. science. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the ecological fix). It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytlc) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation! 16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context. 17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions. 18. Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes. There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered for the conjectured targeting of Latin America. 19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction. For although involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. REFERENCES G. Anders, AA. Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. G. z\nders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. zur Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as atomaren F. Barnaby, ’Will there be a Nuclear War’, in Australia M. Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37. I.J. Benton 49-51. and G.W. Partridge, ’"Twilight at Noon" Situation, and Beck, C.H. War, Nuclear overstated', Ambio (ed. (1984) 13 B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972. P.J. Crutzen, ’Darkness after a nuclear war', Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4. M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983. P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’, 222 (1983) 1293-1300. G. Foley, 'Jonathan Schell: Genius Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Philosopher - Rewrite Man', Science typescript, G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983. D. Hackworth, 'A Soldier's Report’, Australia and Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12. (ed. M. Denborough), K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press, 16 1961. B. Martin, Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Nottingham, 1984. L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace, New York, 1970. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, ’Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. of Social R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as WP. R. and V. Routley, ’Human chauvinism and Environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F. R.P. Turco and others, ’Nuclear winter: global explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-92. consequences M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. of multiple nuclear  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 71, Item 4: Two drafts of Metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament Subject The topic of the resource Two typescript drafts, one with handwritten emendations, the other with typed corrections. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament', Philosophy & Social Criticism, 10(3-4):19-34, https://doi.org/10.1177/019145378401000303. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 71, Item 4 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [33] leaves. 26.34 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:223e07d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:223e07d</a> Box 71: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4fe1fe98ae8c68a6133b900b99cc64c3.pdf 6d0edff22c3ea28d0c8ed53a3961f5b8 PDF Text Text AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a Long time. This is partly because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance or subsidization); it is also because education in the humanities can lead to dissatisfac­ tion with established ways, and criticism of them^i.e. "rocking the boat . While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling case can nonetheless be made. There tends to be little dispute about some of the things humanities' subjects teach, much better than other areas: competence and skills in composition and communication, for example, both essential for many roles in modern technological society. University courses Ln humanities teach these things, mostly as a by—product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conceded minimal level that questions are asked: Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects English, other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, humanities is being used in its narrower modern sense. This artificial separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. �2 living? It is obvious enough why they should be offered and taught: because they comprise a significant part of knowledge. But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture, to "the utilization of the intellect as an end", to the desirability of having cultivated and civilized men and women in the community. Higher education in the humanities was taken to be distinctively fitted to confer these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the tedious objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "dreamers who can converse well over cocktails;" moreover, it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In particular, it requires underpinning by an argument, independently called for, which counteracts the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps to enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is: these industrial activities and makes them valuable? What justifies To put it bluntly, these activities are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and �- 3 - and natural environments, etc.)- And it is to these same values that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident, without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it, that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best., that the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. All the older response generally implies is that an educated person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called "culture"—a supply of allegedly factual information, views, and prejudices on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities teach s at its best is much more, and more important than this: namely, the acquisition of a range of critical and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to its components and determine the basic assumptions, to work out the presuppositions made, to draw out the implications of the matter, and to view the problem from various angles. They include such critical skills as the ability to assess a problem or work analysed; for instance the ability to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the �4 ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, and to research new areas and new problems independently of a teacher. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this, they should teach the awareness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, and worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of options, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts of modern linguistics, specifically semantics, take this whole enterprise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of possible worlds, render it systematic. Indeed, a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, an argument is valid if there are no alternative situations where its premisses hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too, it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving, �- 5 - and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly; a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through the medium of literary criticism; languages, in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which involves similar interpretative skills in the investigation of far-removed societies. What is the virtue of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance of these skills to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc.? Not only will there be many problems for firms and services to handle and try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered, and sometimes adopted. newer problems include two important overlapping types: mental problems and resource problems. These environ­ The resource problems are �- 6 - due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil^but also lumber, etc. As a result, industry and government, as well as the private individual, will have to be re­ conciled to, and make, very considerable adaptations and adjustments (of kinds still to be determined), to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environ­ mental problems arise because present and historical practices are often damaging, sometimes destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it, and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and injurious pollution, are not going to be tolerated^ indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theore­ tical sciences—though the critical skills usually in a lesser way, much as compositional skills are acquired in a lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans—of people as people and not merely as statistics. Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, �-7 - that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce important elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often not sought and are sometimes deliberately devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities— degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating serious weaknesses in prevailing practices and revealing the range of alternatives open in one way or another. Nor do universities make much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to �8 - entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry^ instead of a more discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. on the other side as well. Faults of similar magnitude appear For example, even where senior management does recognize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff are usually unequipped to select for such skills. A further corollary is that an integral part of a modern technological education is a training in the humanities. 2 'Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman's The Idea of a University. �/ AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley* Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a long time, in part because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance and subsidization), but also because it can lead to (sometimes warranted) dissatisfaction with established ways and criticism of them (e.g. to "rocking the boat"). While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling caye can nonetheless be made. About some of the things humanities* subjects teach, much better than other areas such as the sciences and technologies, competence and skills in composition and communication—essential for many roles in modern technological society—there tends to be little dispute. University courses in humanities teach these things, sometimes, initially, directly, but more often as a by-product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conced ed minimal level that questions are asked:—Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects— such as English, and other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy^—when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day living? It is obvious enough '"The author is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities and Senior Fellow in Philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is visiting the University of Victoria as a Canadian Commonwealth Fellow. ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, 'humanities' is being used in its narrower modern sense. This (artificial) separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic, education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. �2 - why they should be offered and taught: cant part of knowledge. because they comprise a signifi­ But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture and of "the utilization of the intellect as an end", of having cultivated and civilized men (and women) in the community, higher education in the humanities being taken to be distinctively fitted to confer, at least often, these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the %ne^riiag objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "god-damn dreamers who can converse well over cocktails," and it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In addition, it requires underpinning by a move, independently called for, which takes on the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is what justifies these industrial activities and makes them valuable when they are (which is far from always the case). To put it bluntly, they are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and natural environments, etc.). And it is to these values, that industrial activities themselves have ultimately to answer, that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident , �- 3 - / without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it., that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best, coat the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. response sometimes says, an educated For all tae older person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called culture, a supply of (allegedly) factual information, views, and also prejudices, on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities, at its best, teaches is much more, and more important than this; namely the acquisition of a range of crff*Ktal and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to^components and determine the basic assumptions; to work out the presuppositions made, and to draw out the implications of the matter; to view the problem from various They include such critical skills as the ability to assess angles. critically a problem or w^rk analysed, for instance to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, the ability to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, to research independently of a teacher in new areas and on new problems. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this they (should) t.^ctch the aware­ ness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly that way, the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of alternatives, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts �4 of modern linguistics (specifically semantics) take this whole enter­ prise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of (possible) worlds, render it systematic: but a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted (it can now be seen) in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, whether an argument is valid or not is a matter of there are not or are alternative situations where its premises hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly: a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through, for instance, the medium of literary criticism, languages in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which often involves similar interpretative skills, e.g. in the investigation of some period in the history of a society as far removed from modern societies as that of ancient Athens. What is the virtue, or relevance, of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc. Not only will there be many many problems for firms and services to handle and �5 try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered and sometimes adopted. These newer problems include two important (overlapping) types, environmental problems and resource problems. The resource problems are due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil (but also, e.g., lumber)—as a result of which industry and government (as well as the private individual) will have to be reconciled to and niaoke very considerably, adaptations and adjustments of kinds still to be determined, to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environmental problems arise because present practices are frequently damaging, * - ' 1 destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it (e.g. through pollution and effects such as cancer), and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and ser^oct^s pollution, are not going to be tolerated indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much, innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead, for example, to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand, among other things, substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theoretical sciences—though usually in a m^rked^-lesser way, piuch as compositional skills (which typically increase with further training in the humanities) are acquired in a-de-eide<Hy lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans people and not merely as statistics. of people as Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce importune �6 -- elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often (e.g. in language ers) not sought and are sometimes (deliberately) devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities—degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating < ; in prevailing practices and.the range of alternatives open in one way A or another. Nor do universities fticke much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the. critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry (not altogether unexpected given the performances and attitudes of some industries), instead of a mere discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. of similar magnitude appear on the other side as well. Faults For example, even where senior management does re&o<? nize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff (who often have a technological background) are usually § unequipped to select for such skills and reluctant to do so. �§Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman' s Tire Idea of a University. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a Long time. This is partly because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance or subsidization); it is also because education in the humanities can lead to dissatisfac­ tion with established ways, and criticism of them^i.e. "rocking the boat . While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling case can nonetheless be made. There tends to be little dispute about some of the things humanities' subjects teach, much better than other areas: competence and skills in composition and communication, for example, both essential for many roles in modern technological society. University courses Ln humanities teach these things, mostly as a by—product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conceded minimal level that questions are asked: Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects English, other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, humanities is being used in its narrower modern sense. This artificial separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. 2 living? It is obvious enough why they should be offered and taught: because they comprise a significant part of knowledge. But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture, to "the utilization of the intellect as an end", to the desirability of having cultivated and civilized men and women in the community. Higher education in the humanities was taken to be distinctively fitted to confer these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the tedious objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "dreamers who can converse well over cocktails;" moreover, it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In particular, it requires underpinning by an argument, independently called for, which counteracts the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps to enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is: these industrial activities and makes them valuable? What justifies To put it bluntly, these activities are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and - 3 - and natural environments, etc.)- And it is to these same values that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident, without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it, that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best., that the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. All the older response generally implies is that an educated person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called "culture"—a supply of allegedly factual information, views, and prejudices on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities teach s at its best is much more, and more important than this: namely, the acquisition of a range of critical and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to its components and determine the basic assumptions, to work out the presuppositions made, to draw out the implications of the matter, and to view the problem from various angles. They include such critical skills as the ability to assess a problem or work analysed; for instance the ability to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the 4 ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, and to research new areas and new problems independently of a teacher. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this, they should teach the awareness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, and worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of options, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts of modern linguistics, specifically semantics, take this whole enterprise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of possible worlds, render it systematic. Indeed, a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, an argument is valid if there are no alternative situations where its premisses hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too, it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving, - 5 - and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly; a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through the medium of literary criticism; languages, in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which involves similar interpretative skills in the investigation of far-removed societies. What is the virtue of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance of these skills to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc.? Not only will there be many problems for firms and services to handle and try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered, and sometimes adopted. newer problems include two important overlapping types: mental problems and resource problems. These environ­ The resource problems are - 6 - due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil^but also lumber, etc. As a result, industry and government, as well as the private individual, will have to be re­ conciled to, and make, very considerable adaptations and adjustments (of kinds still to be determined), to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environ­ mental problems arise because present and historical practices are often damaging, sometimes destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it, and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and injurious pollution, are not going to be tolerated^ indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theore­ tical sciences—though the critical skills usually in a lesser way, much as compositional skills are acquired in a lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans—of people as people and not merely as statistics. Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, -7 - that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce important elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often not sought and are sometimes deliberately devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities— degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating serious weaknesses in prevailing practices and revealing the range of alternatives open in one way or another. Nor do universities make much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to 8 - entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry^ instead of a more discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. on the other side as well. Faults of similar magnitude appear For example, even where senior management does recognize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff are usually unequipped to select for such skills. A further corollary is that an integral part of a modern technological education is a training in the humanities. 2 'Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman's The Idea of a University. / AN ALTERNATIVE ANGLE ON THE HUMANITIES by Richard Routley* Higher education in the humanities, beyond the basics of literacy, has been under attack for a long time, in part because it costs money and public resources that might be otherwise invested (e.g. for technological education, for industrial assistance and subsidization), but also because it can lead to (sometimes warranted) dissatisfaction with established ways and criticism of them (e.g. to "rocking the boat"). While it is impossible to develop a definitive argument for extensive education in the humanities—any more than it is possible to mount a conclusive argument against it—a telling caye can nonetheless be made. About some of the things humanities* subjects teach, much better than other areas such as the sciences and technologies, competence and skills in composition and communication—essential for many roles in modern technological society—there tends to be little dispute. University courses in humanities teach these things, sometimes, initially, directly, but more often as a by-product of the other topics they rightly focus upon. It is about subjects and topics beyond this usually conced ed minimal level that questions are asked:—Why should universities teach, or teach so much of, typical humanities' subjects— such as English, and other languages and literatures, linguistics, history and philosophy^—when a university education in these areas affords direct access to but few jobs, and is, it is assumed, inessential for most day-to-day living? It is obvious enough '"The author is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities and Senior Fellow in Philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is visiting the University of Victoria as a Canadian Commonwealth Fellow. ^The social sciences, which are sometimes grouped with the humanities, have been excluded from consideration; that is, 'humanities' is being used in its narrower modern sense. This (artificial) separation sharpens the issues; for the case for university, or at least polytechnic, education in economics, for instance, is straightforward in much the way that forestry and engineering is. 2 - why they should be offered and taught: cant part of knowledge. because they comprise a signifi­ But this reply does not meet the complaint that they are still too much taught. The older response to this type of challenge appealed to the importance of culture and of "the utilization of the intellect as an end", of having cultivated and civilized men (and women) in the community, higher education in the humanities being taken to be distinctively fitted to confer, at least often, these virtues. The older response has force, but it has to meet the %ne^riiag objection that much humanities' education merely delivers "god-damn dreamers who can converse well over cocktails," and it needs supplementation if it is to be sustained nowadays. In addition, it requires underpinning by a move, independently called for, which takes on the narrow industrial utilitarianism into the framework of which answers are all too often supposed to fit. According to this type of industrial philosophy, university education is important if it contributes directly to such things as providing (typically at public expense) a technically skilled but not surplus workforce, if it helps enlarge the industrial base, enables expansion or improvements in sales and marketing of industrial products, and so on—taking it for granted that all these industrial activities are worthwhile. But the further and deeper issue is what justifies these industrial activities and makes them valuable when they are (which is far from always the case). To put it bluntly, they are valuable not for the profits they inequitably distribute, but rather for what they add to the communities they should serve, in the way of net value (such as a richer life for members of the community, making some allowance for the costs involved, by way of pollution, despoiliation of urban, rural and natural environments, etc.). And it is to these values, that industrial activities themselves have ultimately to answer, that higher education in the humanities should also answer—not, to consider a worst case, to the direct demands of a damaging and undesirable industry furnishing dangerous or alienated jobs. If we do look at these more ultimate values, the attainment of rich and rewarding and varied lifestyles, then it is evident , - 3 - / without much elaboration, that higher education in the humanities has much to recommend it., that people whose lives are fuller and richer and who add to the variety and culture of the communities in which they live will be produced by humanities education at its best, coat the older argument can be pushed through. There are, however, further responses, reinforcing the older response, which it is now necessary to indicate. response sometimes says, an educated For all tae older person can simply be pumped full of a stuff called culture, a supply of (allegedly) factual information, views, and also prejudices, on this or that area. What higher education in the humanities, at its best, teaches is much more, and more important than this; namely the acquisition of a range of crff*Ktal and analytical skills of practical value. These include such analytical skills as being able to dissect an issue or problem, to break it down to^components and determine the basic assumptions; to work out the presuppositions made, and to draw out the implications of the matter; to view the problem from various They include such critical skills as the ability to assess angles. critically a problem or w^rk analysed, for instance to criticise the assumptions made and to locate and evaluate alternatives to them, the ability to weigh evidence, to see faults in arguments and fallacies when they occur, and so on. They also include such skills as the ability to obtain further information and to apply the methods, to research independently of a teacher in new areas and on new problems. In short, the humanities, properly done, teach an analytical and critical method, and above all the ability "to reason well in all matters". As an integral part of this they (should) t.^ctch the aware­ ness of alternatives, an appreciation of alternative situations, cultures, worlds. A first step in the critical evaluation of an institution, for example, is often the awareness of alternatives, that things do not have to be exactly that way, the way the institution is, but that there are alternative situations where the institution is variously modified or even eliminated. It is not difficult to see how depth education in history or the languages leads to an appreciation of alternatives, by placing the student in contexts where things are done and seen differently. Philosophy and parts 4 of modern linguistics (specifically semantics) take this whole enter­ prise much further and now, in the explicit investigation of (possible) worlds, render it systematic: but a significant part of the history of philosophy has consisted (it can now be seen) in the envisaging and following through of certain such alternatives. And such a devising of alternative situations is tied intimately to reasoning. For example, whether an argument is valid or not is a matter of there are not or are alternative situations where its premises hold but its conclusion does not. Finally, the critical method, in particular the ability to discern alternatives, helps people to become aware of their own intellectual assumptions, and where necessary to change them. Thus too it leads to an intellectual flexibility and adaptability, which is increasingly important for modern, practical problem-solving and for the adjustments in lifestyle many of us may confront. Systematic philosophy teaches critical reasoning explicitly: a central part of philosophy is the assessment of arguments and the detection of fallacies. Other humanities' disciplines teach the analytic and critical method also, though less directly, and more by example. English does it through, for instance, the medium of literary criticism, languages in analogous ways, by the analysis and critical evaluation of "foreign" literature and the critical examination of the practices, customs, and thought of a culture with a different language and literature. A good language education can not only introduce people to alternatives, but can in the process reveal to them their own cultural assumptions, and so open the way to alternative possibilities they have not previously considered. So it is also with history, which often involves similar interpretative skills, e.g. in the investigation of some period in the history of a society as far removed from modern societies as that of ancient Athens. What is the virtue, or relevance, of critical and analytical reasoning, of being able to think in a concentrated, systematic imaginative way, of being able to approach problems from several angles? What, in particular, is the relevance to that obtrusive part of the practical world, business, commerce, etc. Not only will there be many many problems for firms and services to handle and 5 try to resolve, problems often best dealt with using just such skills, but the problems arising will increasingly be of a different character, of a type for which purely technological educations are inappropriate or inadequate, and where new alternatives will have to be devised, seriously considered and sometimes adopted. These newer problems include two important (overlapping) types, environmental problems and resource problems. The resource problems are due to increasing scarcity and escalating prices of materials, especially oil (but also, e.g., lumber)—as a result of which industry and government (as well as the private individual) will have to be reconciled to and niaoke very considerably, adaptations and adjustments of kinds still to be determined, to adopt alternative practices and solutions to problems on a wide range of fronts. The environmental problems arise because present practices are frequently damaging, * - ' 1 destructive, to the environment or the people who live in it (e.g. through pollution and effects such as cancer), and because these practices, such as rapacious forestry and ser^oct^s pollution, are not going to be tolerated indefinitely, but will require much modification at the very least. In each case, resource and environmental, much, innovation will be essential, much new and alternative thinking required, far better if it is analytical and critical, and so does not lead, for example, to a compounding of old and bad technological fixes. In sum, the problems to be faced, many of them of considerable complexity, are of a different character: successful resolution of them, where it can be accomplished, and superior decision-making will more and more demand, among other things, substantial and imaginatively-deployed analytical and critical skills. The requisite skills are inculcated in a good education in the humanities. Of course, some of these skills are acquired in the theoretical sciences—though usually in a m^rked^-lesser way, piuch as compositional skills (which typically increase with further training in the humanities) are acquired in a-de-eide<Hy lesser way in the sciences. What further distinguishes most of the humanities is the way they relate to, and take account of, humans people and not merely as statistics. of people as Those educated in the humanities tend to have a sensitivity to people, and understanding of them, that technologists often lack. So it is that they can introduce importune 6 -- elements into problem-solving, due respect for persons (and not mere fobbing off by public relations exercises), that technological resolutions of problems frequently, but inadmissibly, neglect. A corollary of all this is that there is a sound case for deploying people well educated in the humanities more widely in organizations engaged in research and problem solving. It would be rash to pretend that either industry, governments, and so on (the potential employers) on the one side, or the universities (the potential suppliers of humanities graduates) on the other, are entirely ready for this already initiated scenario. It is not that universities do not always teach humanities at their best (that could hardly be expected), but that the skills and methods called for, analytical and critical, are often (e.g. in language ers) not sought and are sometimes (deliberately) devalued. Sometimes indeed the critical method is forgotten and university education—not just in the humanities—degenerates into something approaching a brainwashing process, reinforcing prevailing practices, attitudes and ideologies instead of indicating < ; in prevailing practices and.the range of alternatives open in one way A or another. Nor do universities fticke much effort, so far, to prepare students for the possibility that the. critical skills they acquire may be put into practice outside class assignments, not just in their day-to-day living, but in the workplace and in their attempts to enter it (e.g. by being duly prepared for interviews). There is also apparently some resistance by humanities' students to entering employment in industry, owing to a blanket condemnation of industry (not altogether unexpected given the performances and attitudes of some industries), instead of a mere discriminating attitude which makes due criticism where it is warranted. of similar magnitude appear on the other side as well. Faults For example, even where senior management does re&o<? nize the modern relevance of the skills humanities' students acquire, personnel selection staff (who often have a technological background) are usually § unequipped to select for such skills and reluctant to do so. §Both Professor Raymond Bradley of Simon Fraser University and the Editor of this Newsletter made many useful suggestions which have been incorporated in the text. The main quotations are from Cardinal Newman' s Tire Idea of a University.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 72, Item 3: Two drafts of An alternate angle on the humanities Subject The topic of the resource Two typescript drafts, handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 72, Item 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [15] leaves. 32.46 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8054ad6">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8054ad6</a> Box 72: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/29b8b561ea429ccf267b3803785e7d59.pdf 614ef7072f3a25aa048d1c2b523b8e46 PDF Text Text �I ' Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full plurallism_. _ _ ~---- ------ -- �{/'-'t~lr& t/1-:; . . . . __ -,,L ~ l),.,v,r✓L., J /4 _ -- ~ ~-: - - , · /4.. I -~ J 1/ f -4.:i, :f ' · · · =_ · .~ e source of our obligations to respect and protect wor ks of art can be established in the type of value [ theory foun . <;,c.Ae.-n-..e.d m deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of world proposed by Richard "Sylva-ft-, where a diverse range of enti ties are seen to have. inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of 'this ~eta phy sica l pict ure. We have also seen that the kind of valuatio n framework described by ~ylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective valu e of works of art, which is of importa nt practical 11-i(,_.L f J;_ a_.,-,Jfl't--'.? lA/} 16 ~ j ~ - . h,,, ~ -:,;~ i ~ ul; , C--..__<:_~/ J"~ ,-r,_._,, 1.,' ,r f-f .1f.,,,__1J ,-rt _:_..f'"Ltc.--t~.----..,, 4.... lri/2::;J._-1 ,,____, , ~~ , -?(, ".~A ✓ ~~ _} Y d-v..AJ -_ 6--1 #?..,.....1-4 ~_ a_?_.__ __ �In making an evaluation of the wort h of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. Whil e that value is inher ent in the work itself, it is at the same time mani feste d in certain non-natural quali ties which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. Thes e qualities, whic h are fund amen tal chara cteris tics of a work of art, prov ide us with a crite ria for asses sing value . This value , howe ver, is not reduc ible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expre ssed by two essen tial types of qualities perta ining to art work s, being firstly the qualities assoc iated with aesth etic value, and secondly the quali ties assoc iated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relate s to the tende ncy of a work of art to chall enge , instru ct, give valuable insig ht, or enlig hten. Whil e these two types of value may prim a facie look like they constitute a distin ction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work , I believe that they could neve rthel ess be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we need n't conc lude from this that the didactic value consists solel y in the relation betw een the art work and the subje ct experiencing it. It seem s quite cons isten t to hold that the didac tic value of an art work is deriv ed from its inher ent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. Wha t Sylvan refers to as emotional prese ntatio n, woul d then be best cons trued with regard to artistic evalu ation as the presentation of an art work s intrin sic value~ a value whic h is manifested in term s of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. Thes e qualities can be asses sed in terms of a comp rehen sive set of criter ia for deter mini ng value. Such criteria woul d inclu de for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, stren gth of expression, balance, harm ony, comp ositio n, vividness and uniqu eness , and for instru ctive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valua ble insig ht into the nature of life or existence. After ident ifyin g the various comp onen ts of an artist ic presentation, the evaluating agen t is requi red to enga ge intel lectu ally in a furth er asses smen t. This stage is what Sylv an refer red to as coherence proce ssing , and it is the stage at whic h the surfa ce characteristics of a work of art are asses sed for addit ional comp lexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work whic h are not intuited directly, such as the symb olism of a painting or the mess age of a powe rful drama, will be asses sed at this point . Cohe rence proce ssing is espec ially impo rtant in making an evalu ation of the instru ctive or intellectual comp onen t of an art �work. In th~ context of the type of'theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possi ble to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made . One objection to the proposal that it-is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretati ~n of 1s an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solvi ng arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admi t that there· i's plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusion_s about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-w orks value, and thereby come' to a not- too- diffe rent judg emen t ·o f that value. This assum ption is supp orted by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes go.od art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all indep endently come to respect and admire their value. Anot her difficulty regarding the attrib ution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for instit utions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and whic h will not. While the . t judgement of any person who makes a considered evalu ation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision maki ng to the artists and admirers of art who have the most extensive backgroun d knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artist ic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved. • art • r � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document I ' Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full plurallism_. _ _ ~---- ------ -- {/'-'t~lr& t/1-:; . . . . __ -,,L ~ l),.,v,r✓L., J /4 _ -- ~ ~-: - - , · /4.. I -~ J 1/ f -4.:i, :f ' · · · =_ · .~ e source of our obligations to respect and protect wor ks of art can be established in the type of value [ theory foun . <;,c.Ae.-n-..e.d m deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of world proposed by Richard "Sylva-ft-, where a diverse range of enti ties are seen to have. inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of 'this ~eta phy sica l pict ure. We have also seen that the kind of valuatio n framework described by ~ylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective valu e of works of art, which is of importa nt practical 11-i(,_.L f J;_ a_.,-,Jfl't--'.? lA/} 16 ~ j ~ - . h,,, ~ -:,;~ i ~ ul; , C--..__<:_~/ J"~ ,-r,_._,, 1.,' ,r f-f .1f.,,,__1J ,-rt _:_..f'"Ltc.--t~.----..,, 4.... lri/2::;J._-1 ,,____, , ~~ , -?(, ".~A ✓ ~~ _} Y d-v..AJ -_ 6--1 #?..,.....1-4 ~_ a_?_.__ __ In making an evaluation of the wort h of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. Whil e that value is inher ent in the work itself, it is at the same time mani feste d in certain non-natural quali ties which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. Thes e qualities, whic h are fund amen tal chara cteris tics of a work of art, prov ide us with a crite ria for asses sing value . This value , howe ver, is not reduc ible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expre ssed by two essen tial types of qualities perta ining to art work s, being firstly the qualities assoc iated with aesth etic value, and secondly the quali ties assoc iated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relate s to the tende ncy of a work of art to chall enge , instru ct, give valuable insig ht, or enlig hten. Whil e these two types of value may prim a facie look like they constitute a distin ction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work , I believe that they could neve rthel ess be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we need n't conc lude from this that the didactic value consists solel y in the relation betw een the art work and the subje ct experiencing it. It seem s quite cons isten t to hold that the didac tic value of an art work is deriv ed from its inher ent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. Wha t Sylvan refers to as emotional prese ntatio n, woul d then be best cons trued with regard to artistic evalu ation as the presentation of an art work s intrin sic value~ a value whic h is manifested in term s of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. Thes e qualities can be asses sed in terms of a comp rehen sive set of criter ia for deter mini ng value. Such criteria woul d inclu de for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, stren gth of expression, balance, harm ony, comp ositio n, vividness and uniqu eness , and for instru ctive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valua ble insig ht into the nature of life or existence. After ident ifyin g the various comp onen ts of an artist ic presentation, the evaluating agen t is requi red to enga ge intel lectu ally in a furth er asses smen t. This stage is what Sylv an refer red to as coherence proce ssing , and it is the stage at whic h the surfa ce characteristics of a work of art are asses sed for addit ional comp lexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work whic h are not intuited directly, such as the symb olism of a painting or the mess age of a powe rful drama, will be asses sed at this point . Cohe rence proce ssing is espec ially impo rtant in making an evalu ation of the instru ctive or intellectual comp onen t of an art work. In th~ context of the type of'theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possi ble to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made . One objection to the proposal that it-is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretati ~n of 1s an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solvi ng arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admi t that there· i's plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusion_s about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-w orks value, and thereby come' to a not- too- diffe rent judg emen t ·o f that value. This assum ption is supp orted by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes go.od art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all indep endently come to respect and admire their value. Anot her difficulty regarding the attrib ution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for instit utions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and whic h will not. While the . t judgement of any person who makes a considered evalu ation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision maki ng to the artists and admirers of art who have the most extensive backgroun d knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artist ic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved. • art • r  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 76, item 39: Notes on ethical ecology "Aesthetics 2000" Subject The topic of the resource Miscellaneous handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. Notes housed in folder on 'aesthetics - notes + article by M. Anderson'. Note, only notes from item 39 digitised. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 76, item 39 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 5.62 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cecf313">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cecf313</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Desk - Right Drawer 3 Box 76: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes Como House Como House > Desk > Right Drawer 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e5ad5dac90a81bc96f507e5d96051a0a.pdf 532d28ceec4d28da93082a77138bddbf PDF Text Text �Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full pluralism. �£■ Jhe source of our obligations to respect and protect works of art can be established in the type of value ^theory found in deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of w^ld ^proposed by Richard •Syfvan, where a diverse range of entities are seen to have inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of this metaphysical picture. We have also seen that the kind of valuation framework described by Sylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective value of works of art, which is of important practical ff JZ -7^ �In making an evaluation of the worth of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. While that value is inherent in the work itself, it is at the same time manifested in certain non-natural qualities which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. These qualities, which are fundamental characteristics of a work of art, provide us with a criteria for assessing value. This value, however, is not reducible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expressed by two essential types of qualities pertaining to art works, being firstly the qualities associated with aesthetic value, and secondly the qualities associated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relates to the tendency of a work of art to challenge, instruct, give valuable insight, or enlighten. While these two types of value may prima facie look like they constitute a distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work, I believe that they could nevertheless be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we needn't conclude from this that the didactic value consists solely in the relation between the art work and the subject experiencing it. It seems quite consistent to hold that the didactic value of an art work is derived from its inherent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. What Sylvan refers to as emotional presentation, would then be best construed with regard to artistic evaluation as the presentation of an art works intrinsic value; a value which is manifested in terms of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. These qualities can be assessed in terms of a comprehensive set of criteria for determining value. Such criteria would include for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, strength of expression, balance, harmony, composition, vividness and uniqueness, and for instructive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valuable insight into the nature of life or existence. After identifying the various components of an artistic presentation, the evaluating agent is required to engage intellectually in a further assessment. This stage is what Sylvan referred to as coherence processing, and it is the stage at which the surface characteristics of a work of art arc assessed for additional complexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work which are not intuited directly, such as the symbolism of a painting or the message of a powerful drama, will be assessed at this point. Coherence processing is especially important in making an evaluation of the instructive or intellectual component of an art �work. In the context of the type of theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possible to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made. One objection to the proposal that it'is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretation of art is an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solving arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admit that there is plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusions about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-works value, and thereby come to a not- too- different judgement of that value. This assumption is supported by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes good art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all independently come to respect and admire their value. Another difficulty regarding the attribution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for institutions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and which will not. While the judgement of any person who makes a considered evaluation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision making to the artists and admirers ol art who have the most extensive background knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artistic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Deep theory naturally delivers an aesthetics. Rudiments of such a deep aesthetics are readily assembled from elsewhere. They include: • a theory of aesthetic objects, fictions, art works, etc., drawn from item-theory (as in JB). • a value theory, of rich non-reductionistic form, drawn from deep-green theory • a full pluralism. £■ Jhe source of our obligations to respect and protect works of art can be established in the type of value ^theory found in deep-green philosophy. Given the kind of w^ld ^proposed by Richard •Syfvan, where a diverse range of entities are seen to have inherent value, it seems quite plausible to believe that artistic works could also be valuable in themselves, and that our obligations towards them are grounded in a recognition of this metaphysical picture. We have also seen that the kind of valuation framework described by Sylvan could be usefully employed to assess the objective value of works of art, which is of important practical ff JZ -7^ In making an evaluation of the worth of a work of art, we are assessing the intrinsic value of an item. While that value is inherent in the work itself, it is at the same time manifested in certain non-natural qualities which can be intuited by those engaged with the work. These qualities, which are fundamental characteristics of a work of art, provide us with a criteria for assessing value. This value, however, is not reducible to those fundamental characteristics by themselves. The value of a work of art is expressed by two essential types of qualities pertaining to art works, being firstly the qualities associated with aesthetic value, and secondly the qualities associated with instructional (or didactic) value. This second type of value relates to the tendency of a work of art to challenge, instruct, give valuable insight, or enlighten. While these two types of value may prima facie look like they constitute a distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of an art work, I believe that they could nevertheless be both construed as elements of an art works intrinsic value. It is certainly true to say that the instructive qualities of a work of art have instrumental value, but we needn't conclude from this that the didactic value consists solely in the relation between the art work and the subject experiencing it. It seems quite consistent to hold that the didactic value of an art work is derived from its inherent constitution to to provoke certain ideas, and thus is part of its intrinsic value. What Sylvan refers to as emotional presentation, would then be best construed with regard to artistic evaluation as the presentation of an art works intrinsic value; a value which is manifested in terms of both aesthetic and didactic qualities. These qualities can be assessed in terms of a comprehensive set of criteria for determining value. Such criteria would include for aesthetic qualities such characteristics as beauty, strength of expression, balance, harmony, composition, vividness and uniqueness, and for instructive qualities such characteristics as the vivid encapsulation of an idea or a valuable insight into the nature of life or existence. After identifying the various components of an artistic presentation, the evaluating agent is required to engage intellectually in a further assessment. This stage is what Sylvan referred to as coherence processing, and it is the stage at which the surface characteristics of a work of art arc assessed for additional complexity or meaning. The qualities of an art work which are not intuited directly, such as the symbolism of a painting or the message of a powerful drama, will be assessed at this point. Coherence processing is especially important in making an evaluation of the instructive or intellectual component of an art work. In the context of the type of theory of intrinsic value and accompanying evaluative framework advocated by Richard Sylvan, it seems possible to establish a set of criteria for assessing the value of works of art, and in doing so enable practical value judgements to be made. One objection to the proposal that it'is possible to make value judgements about art works which are objectively true, is that the interpretation of art is an especially subjective experience. It is often held that judgements about artistic merit are nothing more than a matter of personal opinion, and that there is no real way of solving arguments about artistic value. While Sylvan is quite willing to admit that there is plenty of room for error in his conceptual scheme, and that it is inevitable that people will come to different conclusions about the value of the same work of art, there is no need to admit that we are doomed to artistic relativism. Given a comprehensive criteria for assessing value, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of people will recognize at least part of the central core of characteristics which reflect an art-works value, and thereby come to a not- too- different judgement of that value. This assumption is supported by the observation that admirers of art can and frequently do come to some level of agreement over what constitutes good art. It is important to note that a great many of the finest paintings, symphonies, sculptures and plays have been held in high esteem for many centuries by countless individuals, who have all independently come to respect and admire their value. Another difficulty regarding the attribution of value to works of art is to determine who should get to make practical decisions about the value of certain works of art. This kind of decision making is crucial for institutions like art-galleries and museums, for it will determine which items will be protected, and which will not. While the judgement of any person who makes a considered evaluation of a work of art is important, it seems appropriate that we should leave the final decision making to the artists and admirers ol art who have the most extensive background knowledge and understanding of what makes a work of art valuable. We must trust that in their capacity as 'experts' on art, such people have a finely tuned appreciation of artistic value, and that when in positions of responsibility, such as that of being curator of an art gallery, these people will do their utmost to ensure that valuable art is preserved.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 76, Item 679: Miscellaneous notes on architecture and philosophy Subject The topic of the resource Miscellaneous handwritten and typescript notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. Note, one of two papers digitised from item 679. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 76, Item 679 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 2.71 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:b2a4573">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:b2a4573</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 76: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/94dbbe314c3a666c558816df0b3201bc.pdf 135af6157b7d49f9fd133871991691f6 PDF Text Text ::r ¾ ' 1 ~--~ ' ......_ ..... The worldwide peace movement faces a new era in 1984. -Since 1979, there has been a massive revival of the peace movement in response to the preparations for a limited nuclear war in Europe. Up to now the movement has concentrated successfully on consciousness ra1s1ng. J-bwever, the challenge now is to present practical new ideas to end the anns race. Mr. Allan McKnight has undertaken a comparison of the separate draft treaties tabled by the Soviet Union and the United States at the United Nations (UN) in 1962. ~ has now c001piled them into one practical draft plan, whkhis the most feasible to date because it is based on the actual proposals of the two world powers. The progran111e should ensure t~at the nations have sufficient non-nuclear arms to protect their citizens yet reduce the military expenditure dramatically and not present an invading threat to neighbouring countries. It is interesting to note that ~eden, ~itzerland and Yugoslavia have defence forces · structured in this ay but this has never received the publicity it deserves. The plan is based on 3 stages of mutual reductions. All measures of disannament would be balanced so that at no stage during the implementation would any nation gain military advantage. The treaty provides a timetable. It also provides for an establishment of a peace force and disannament organisation independent of the UN. Dr. Suter says that it is only when we perceive the alternative that we can see how important it is to give consideration to grand schemes for disannament. Mr. McKnight's book is available from the Law Council of Ns.J. 'U ~ J~ \--., ~ �....... � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ::r ¾ ' 1 ~--~ ' ......_ ..... The worldwide peace movement faces a new era in 1984. -Since 1979, there has been a massive revival of the peace movement in response to the preparations for a limited nuclear war in Europe. Up to now the movement has concentrated successfully on consciousness ra1s1ng. J-bwever, the challenge now is to present practical new ideas to end the anns race. Mr. Allan McKnight has undertaken a comparison of the separate draft treaties tabled by the Soviet Union and the United States at the United Nations (UN) in 1962. ~ has now c001piled them into one practical draft plan, whkhis the most feasible to date because it is based on the actual proposals of the two world powers. The progran111e should ensure t~at the nations have sufficient non-nuclear arms to protect their citizens yet reduce the military expenditure dramatically and not present an invading threat to neighbouring countries. It is interesting to note that ~eden, ~itzerland and Yugoslavia have defence forces · structured in this ay but this has never received the publicity it deserves. The plan is based on 3 stages of mutual reductions. All measures of disannament would be balanced so that at no stage during the implementation would any nation gain military advantage. The treaty provides a timetable. It also provides for an establishment of a peace force and disannament organisation independent of the UN. Dr. Suter says that it is only when we perceive the alternative that we can see how important it is to give consideration to grand schemes for disannament. Mr. McKnight's book is available from the Law Council of Ns.J. 'U ~ J~ \--., ~ .......  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 88, Item 1455: Reference card, summary of Suter K (1984) 'A practical plan for the world disarmament', Kurana Subject The topic of the resource Reference written on card index, with typescript summary taped to index. Description An account of the resource Card index part of item 1455, "Index card box - abstracts of articles on development". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 88, Item 1455 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] card. 1.32 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:03ccc9b">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:03ccc9b</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - not listed on manuscript finding aid Box 88: Old Papers: Letters - Slog 1 Proofs - Misc. XCs