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The strategy of the first section of the book is to see where we might
fnd up if we began with a state of nature as described by Locke and
ttuck within the constraints of the Lockean "laws of nature". We "focus
a nonstate situation in which peopie generally satisfy moral conuratnts and generally act as they ought. Such an assumption is not wildly
'Wmistic... Yet it is the best anarchic situation one could reasonably ! )
for... If one could show that the State would be superior event to
most favored situation of anarchy... it would justify the state." (5)
J
why should we do this? Presumably Locke and before him
painted their pictures of the state of nature as they did because
thought that's the way people really were. Nozick doesn't seem to
that, thought he also seems to think that Hobbes' characterization
^mptjusibte or unreliable. But if truth to fact isn't the motive, then what
there is. in short, the question of how we are to
the alternatives
. *hat ^nteria of superiority one is going to use. And here lies the rub.
^jrcty Locke and Hobbes were trying to paint a picture of the "state
^*!urc which wou!d not only provide a point of comparison but also
-2993>
�<M-C
avC-
��3.
In §2 introduce contrast between left-leaning and right-leaning anarchisms.
In the enlarged version will carry both of these through the arguments, comparing
The main initial, and striking, differences concern replace
and contrasting them.
ment.
The following, for example, is how mere right-leaning replacement will tend
to look:[A ?irst complication of the simulation argument:-
A properly democratic
state can be simulated, in that all it accomplishes that is considered
worthwhile can be duplicated.
The argument is as before for services for
which the means can be obtained.
_ ___ ___ __
.
Otherwise let S'
be a service for which
s^L-Lici. und.it cnjmpu_L so ry caxarion Or tLie
, -
But if it is in the collective interest then it will obtain the means, e.g. it
generates these by its own operation, as a telephone service does, or it raises
the equivalent of subscriptions as a community television station or magazine may.
Then however the network n may be replaced by a network n* of relations of operators
who choose to do the work without state directives and n' accomplishes a service
s^ which duplicates s.^
Given the means, which the collective interest assumed,
state authority is nowhere required for such a service, as is evident from examples
where community or private services grow up alongside state services where permitted
to do so.
Often anarchists have such services will be performed better than the
A
H
state services they replace.
Note that the left-leaning argument does not assume
that organisation is unnecessary or that people
in their 0^1 interest.
It assumes
will always and inevi/j&6 ly act
that people themselves,
and net some power
ful elite in charge, are best placed to determine what is in their
and to pMcfe it
though VcJunhiry
04M interest
organisation and cooperation.
However people will do things themselves in an organised way, instead of
being, as often now, passive recipients of welfare.
Beneficial services, such as community-access radio and television stations,
and also welfare arrangements, would in general be reorganised so that all the
necessary infrastructure became community owned, and those wishing to use the
service would
and^ to operate it, would carry out much of the operation
themselves - taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the
passive recipients of good things metered out to them by powerful agencies or
professionals who take it upon themselves to judge what is in their [best!]
interests.
�3.^
the means are not forthcoming.
Then the state would not be able to
supply means either unless it exceeded its democratic mandate.]
Let service s, e.g. a telephone or postal or transport service, be some state
activity which is in the collective interest, and let it be accomplished by network
n which will include a system of operators standing in various relations.
Picture
the network that makes up a state postal system or a local radio station.
Such a
system does not require the authority of the state of operate:
what it may require
is means to operate acquired by methods other than compulsory taxation or the like.
But if it is in the collective interest then it will obtain the means, e.g. it
generates these by its own operation, as a telephone service does, or it raises
the equivalent of subscriptions as a community television station or magazine may.
Then however the network n may be replaced by a network n of relations of operators
who choose to do the work without state directives and n' accomplishes a service
s^ which duplicates s.^
Given the means, which the collective interest assumed,
state authority is nowhere required for such a service, as is evident from examples
where community or private services grow up alongside state services where permitted
to do so.
/a?
Often anarchists have such services will be performed better than the
n
A
state services they replace.
Note that the left-leaning argument does not assume
that organisation is unnecessary or that people
in their 0^1 interest.
It assumes
will always and inevi/a.bly act
that people themselves,
and not some power
ful elite in charge, are best placed to determine what is in their
and to pn?$qe it
tliough V<7?un?ary
OMH interest
organisation and cooperation.
However people will do things themselves in an organised way, instead of
being, as often now, passive recipients of welfare.
Beneficial services, such as community—access radio and television stations,
and also welfare arrangements, would in general be reorganised so that all the
necessary infrastructure became community owned, and those wishing to use the
service would
and^to operate it, would carry out much of the operation
themselves - taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the
passive recipients of good things metered out to them by powerful agencies or
professionals who take it upon themselves to judge what is in their [best!]
interests.
�7^
Arguments from freedom, autonomy and personhood.
Re §8:
Observe that these
arguments do not require the rejection of society or of voluntary cooperation:
it is the (claim to supreme) authority of the State that is essential to the
Nor do the arguments depend on individualistic assumptions, such as
argument.
that persons stand in isolation and are not intensionally inter-related to one
another:
all that is supposed is that responsibility for actions can be (largely)
individually assigned.^
8.
Re §9:
It is likely to be objected that most of the experience is of pre
industrial societies.
experience.
First, this is not true:
there is now lots of local
Secondly, insofar as it is true regarding large-scale industrial
societies, it is not damaging.
For it is precisely the structures of these
societies that the aim is to change.
Etc.
Re §10.
The replacement (or substitution) argument when duly followed through
i)
that is elaborated in requisite detail for each component of State actually that
9.
is in the collective interest, shows that the State is not necessary.
There are finitely many components which can be readily enumerated.
In the
case of each component anarchist replacements or alternatives have already been
worked out, often in some detail;
Put alternatively,
see especially Kropotkin's work.
the replacements enable the construction of a model
which reveals a society functioning without the State, the design of,
what can be arrived at in other less constructive ways, a practically
possible stateless world;
(practically) necessary.
and this shows that the State is not
But it can always be claimed that the modelling
procedure has left out some critical feature of real world circumstances
especially as to human psychology, that makes the model inapplicable to
real world circumstances.
This is a further point where^ appeal to the argument fjc/pi experience,
that at various times and places anarchism has worked.
Examples of
Were the argument to depend on individualistic assumptions, it could be re-presented in an interesting reductio form, beginning: Suppose, as arguments for the
State do, that persons are individuals (of the following cast; purely selfinterested, competing, ...). Then ...
�10.
such organisation with.a State suffice to show that critical real-
world features have not been omitted.
Criticism of Undirected Happening, and Anarchism with^Organistion
In §10.
10.
In particular, the Roszak position of an undirected change just happening is
inadequate.
The conditions for change have to be determined in some detail at
least, and nurtured.
No more satisfactory than the Let's Leave Everything Open,
and so excessively to chance, is the Blueprint for the Future idea which tries to
set everything into place.
For example, how untried arrangements will work is
uncertain, and in future possibilities may arise which have not yet been clearly
envisaged.
A much
more flexible model is wanted:
model is intended to provide.
(See also 13).
Beware of arguments concering organisation based &n efficiency (as usually
11.
Need replacement for efficiency as for several other organis
defined E = 0/1).
ational values.
Similarly for economic terms
:
optimum quantity of as defined in economic terms.
quantities of nuclear power.
12.
this the forest succession
e.g.
(in §3) be
This may
i of
eid^e.g.^to optimum
Point same as with respect to efficiency.
Although the forest succession model (pp.11-13) is attractive, you do not
seem to have provided any gripping arguments for its superiority, which might run
along the lines of the moral value of anarchist means reflecting anarchist ends,
or more concretely in terms of a political analysis of contemporary society (e.g.
as done by Dennis Altman).
as a relevant one.
In short, the model needs to be justified in some way
More generally, the basic thrust of the paper is on the
superiority of anarchism as an end state.
The part on strategy opens up a vast
new area, including for example the tactics of anarchists in relation to elections,
to mass uprisings, to opportunities opened by social cataclysms (e.g. Germany
after WWI), to heavily authoritarian governments, etc. - which you don't treat
so far.
13.
Re
6:
The Tragedy of Commons issues arise again between States, e.g. over
fisheries, air pollution, etc., as well as war (cf. also Sinking Ark, p.105).
�11.
14.
In footnote 14.
Th^s Bakunin urged a revolution everywhere at once:
other
wise there remained a continual risk and worry of State colonisation of adjacent
areas, as of State imperialism.
In footnote 12:
There are steps towards locally managed legal arrangements,
on which see Stone in Nemos XIX.
15.
2)
On self-managed medicine, see Illych.
Footnotes not fully taken up (through some overlap):
A detailed argument to this conclusion is presented in Taylor, who also points
out how the "Tragedy of the Commons" is the same general type.
In fact Taylor
Contends that arguments of the type -represent 'the strongest ca$e which can be made
for the desirability of the State'
5)
The small f^rms of economic
(p.9), and that they are wanting.
theory and the natipn states of political theory
also, of course, satisfy the independence requirements.
An independence require
ment is retained in Hobbes' theory, though an individual's payoff is supposed to
depend as well on the individual's eminence.
[Marxists on social determinism?]
Such organisations could in any case be valuable, not only in improving the
Some.
e/*
eV"
lot of those $*tuck in dilemma situations, but in providing ^situations, a matter
8)
?)
about which there is increasing speculations and argument.
9)
We don't of course wish to suggest that working within the system is just a
waste of time, and we should watch it all go while we sit back and wait for the
revolution.
But in each urgent battle it's easy to lose sight of fact that each
hard won victory is only temporary, to lose sight of the urgent necessity to
begin constructing the sort of society in which they will not be so temporary.
This is not and cannot be a matter of imposing some sort of Boy Scout 'Conservation
Ethic' or minor changes in the direction of energy saving on a society which
produces environmental degradation as a matter of its fundamental structure.
12)
It also overlooks the extent to which the structure generates its own style
of politicians and its own self-supporting procedures and mechanisms.
16.
Opposition to the theoretical in Australian intellectual life runs right up
through the universities even to research institutes, e.g. the Research School of
Social Sciences at the Australian National University.
�12.
17.
None of the ways are original, all being found in at least rudimentary form
in 19th century anarchist writings.
original.
18.
But no more were the ways of Aquinas
[Ties with several footnotes.]
Re detailed replacement:
In the contemporary situations of privatisation
of wealth and resources (by State distribution and enforcement thereof) nonstatist
public and community organisations all struggle, even given a supply of voluntary
labour, for want of community infrastructure, which under alternative social
arrangements would be provided.
Because under (&. g.) left-leaning (communal)
forms of anarchism, wealth, resources, etc., are held or controlled by the
community, there is no need to apply coercion to wrest these from often unwilling
privatised individuals in order to /^rnisA infrastructure, etc.
The situation in right-leaning anarchism is very different.
19.
The extent to which States operate in the public good is vastly exaggerated.
The situation as regards wealth, large corporations, etc, are only some examples.
Cities are another:
they are not designed so that they operate in the interests
of people, of all those who dwell in them or visit them, but are dominated at
present by the interests of commerce.
Compare also modern metropolitan, where
cities dominate life of the countrysides.
20.
Serious defects in Wolff's arguments:
a) reasons on p.78 are quite inadequate,
b) false dichotomy between voluntary/constracts.
21.
Conclusion:
the State has
the myth of legitimacy.
no legitimacy.
Weber has material (essay?) on
This should be compared with Edelman's material on bogus
legitimacy obtained by symbolic means.
The transformation of the State is through the State;
the removal of the
State is by the State.
22.
Rewiode!:
(1)
In some of these things alternative groups work with the
State or its representatives (as rainforest patches grow within a eucalypt
forest).
This does not imply recognition of the State as legitimate, as a power
de jure;
but its de facto power is hard to avoid, and like the judo expert
alternative groups will try to take advantage of the power of the operation.
points OK:
reeXD/-e$$*. ]
[Seme
�13.
(2)
An appropriate natural evolution model exonerates us from the difficult -
and unnecessary - task of setting down a blueprint for change, or for trying to
predict how things should go.
false dichotomy.
23.
It shows that revolution/evolution presents a
In between is, e.g. Encouraged of speeded-up evolution
Further questions.
Re §1:
a) All current States are evil,
but is even
the best State attainable seriously flawed? While ideal states with ideal
citizens are not evil (as model worlds will show), the ideal is unattainable?
Otherwise, where is the necessity (of evil)?
one-world necessity, virtually:
Also "necessity" contracts to
in all worlds like the real one is having states,
there are states, so "necessarily" there are states,
b)
of upturns to individuals is over intensional features.
The reduction failure
The point deserves
expanding.
Re §10:
The extent to which the new organisations permit punishment, or
a)
constraints, or rely upon it, is a ticklish issue, especially given the
argument,
b)
Generally there are various ways of changing or regulating an
organisation, e.g. external/internal.
For instance, outside, state,regulation
is replaced by group regulation, e.g. worker-consumer, which is an intery)a^*eA&Mrn<t/
mix.
24.
How
useful is this distinction?
An important prerequisite for directed (i.e. unaimless) change is an alter
native view, such as the Alternative Paradigm affords, the rudiments of theory,
where some goals are indicated.
Once such a view is obtained, in rough outline,
efforts can be made to further it, e.g. to put into practice with, for example,
more people attempting to introduce changes into their own lives.
In the energy case, to take a major example, the goals are clear enough:
maih"T.y to lead less energy consumptive lives. Ways to do this are well enough
known, e.g. to wear sweaters instead of switching on radiators, to reduce motor
commuting by living nearer one's work and friends or going less frequently or
using alternative transport, e.g. public or bicycle.
But— though most Australians
�14.
(e.g.) are in favour of energy conservation, in principle - social arrangements
are so structured that some of the alternatives are impossibly difficult or are
arduous, e.g. a may may have little option but to commute long distances when
the factory at which he works moves to an outer industrial suburb, and all his
commitments lie in the areas to which he is mortgaged.
Similarly packaging is
increasingly difficult if not impossible to avoid, even in essential purchases
and those designed to lead the good life.
Thus an effective change is often
going to have to be part of a more far-reaching change.
For a working example - reforming and restructuring forest services - see
Anarchism letter, p.3 ff.
Further Arguments for the State, not already taken up explicitly:-
25.
The argument from efficiency, growth, etc:
(1)
isation !
really the argument from organ
Efficiency is little double edged as e.g. in efficiency ys employment:
There is a trade-off.
(Griffin
on 6?ff,C4C7tcyof smaM-scale argiculture).
itarian states more efficient, etc. (disputed).
Total
Maximization of efficiency is not
that the game is about - antifreedom, antidemocratic, anti-good-life, and what is
valuable.
Also reward for initiative in terms of grossly inequitable distrib
ution of wealth is not required.
Work is often undesirable.
No way in which the
the upper<$ worth the salaries they get.
The argument from political possiblity, "reality".
(2)
argument from the status quo, from^Old Paradigm.
invalidity.
realistic" or
The argument is really an
An historical comparison shows
Life without the Church would no doubt have been dismissed as "un
impossible" by many of those who lived in the Middle
Ages.
More generally different economies are extar)t and many more are possible.
Supply demand theory and theory of historic market will work without profit
maxim assumption, but instead e.g. certain satisfactions (satisfying).
is needed is an assu_jnption of rea SO/) able return.
All that
A range of other assumptions.
However, marginal (calculus) theory builds in assumption of profit op* return
�15.
Maximisation.
There are several Myths concerning the Market to dispose of here:
a) it s historic
b) it's efficient: depends how assess:
e.g. net
of new technology.
Paradigm differences, deep differences in what is considered valuable, begin
to emerge rather quickly in arguments for the State, once discussion of their
the Dominant Paradigm organisational goals of
In particular,
adequacy begins.
efficiency and growth (on which see Scott), instead of being taken for granted as
formerly, are up for debate and overturning.
Is it possible to obtain an exhaustive diversification of arguments for
26.
the State?
It is doubtful that theoretical classifications so far are of nh/cA
merit.
Classification Scheme 1:-
Empiricist (pragmatist)
*Non empiricist
( ?
Idealist
*Nonidealist
Classification 2:-
?
?
*Non-u^itarian
?
?
Empirical survey gives
Contract
U^.ity
economic
Idealist
Don't often
get State, but only
Society,as e.g. in Green.
And it is important to distinguish these: for anarchism admits Society.
27.
a)
Russell, History of \N. Phil, makes some useful points:
Glorification of the State begins, so far as modern times are concerned, with
the Reformation.
In the Roman Empire, The Emperor was defied, and the State
�/
16.
thereby acquired a sacred character;
but the philosophers of the Middle Ages,
with few exceptions, were ecclesiastical, and therefore put the Church before
the State.
Luther began the opposite practice ... Hobbes ... developed the
doctrine of the supremacy of the State, and Spinoza, on the whole, agreed with
him.
u.
Rosseau ... thought that the State should not tolerate other political
organisations.
Hegel ... goes to lengths which are astonishing (p.739).
that these are all protestants that are cited.)
(Note
On p.742 there is a goodish
page on Hegel's doctrine of State including:
' If shj} follow
from Hegel's principles that every interested which
is not Aatmftll ^the community and which can be promoted by cooperation,
have its appropriate organisation ... 'jjhere is also some good stuff in
Russell on holism (trad, logic) ett. on pp.744-5 and p.732 bettei^J
�Comment on collectivism
"Collectivism -the doctrine that the means of production
should be collectively owned - is,
like many other
features of radical dogma, the bastard child of
capitalist parents.
Collectivism is the doctrine of
people who imagine production as taking place in large
collectively operated units - it's a factory or production-line
picture.
Historically it arose after the industrial
revolution had driven people off the land and created
workers for the large-scale factory enterprises set up
by capitalists for their own profit.
The class which
supported it were the urban workers in such enterprises,
not the peasants, and others in self-directed employment,
such as craftspeople, carpenters and shoemakers - the
latter group were mostly mutualists, later anarchists.
This is why Marxism, which lays heavy stress on collectivism,
also emphasises the role of the urban proletariat at the
expense of other non-capitalist groups, and also stresses
the idiocy of rural life, the blessings of progress,
technology, and industrialism generally.
Collectivism essentially buys the large-scale, mass-producticn
technology-dependent character of capitalist economic
organisation.
It does not see that if one does not have
such a structure, collectivism amounts to an otiose,
damaging and unjustifiable restriction on possible forms
of non-capitalist social and economic organisation, ruling
out particularly the self-directed type of option for
production and various combination cooperative forms."- Richard
Routley and Vai Routley
�The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Cutting of Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Social
Alternatives, 2(3):23-29. (9 leaves)
2. Annotated cutting (photocopy) of Grofman B (1980) 'Review, Taylor, Michael, Anarchy
and Cooperation, John Wiley and Sons, London, 1976', Theory and decision, 12(1):107114, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154661. (5 leaves)
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�. * The state is necessary ybr this or that, for the optimal provision of public goods (including,
but not merely, preservation of public order). Notice that this important type of argument need
/ot presume to establish necessity. It is obvious, from the operation of nastier states, that
' societies can function not only without optimal provision of public goods, but indeed with very
little
provision of any such goods. It would, moreover, be a rash archist who pretended
that modern states deliver anything remotely approaching optimal allocations of public goods.
Competition for anarchistic alternatives is accordingly not with opdmal allocations, but perhaps
only a matter of exceeding rather poor provision. More generally, it is enough that these
alternatives do well enough, satisize not maximize.
Most of the arguments from provision of public good depend not only upon maximization
assumptions, just rejected, but also upon, what flows from individualism, a false private/public
dichotomy, with the private delivered by individuals or individual firms, and the public by the
state. In between, however, lie many social groupings: clubs, communities, unions, societies,
clans, tribes, and so on. Such groups can deliver social goods.
As the modern state developed more or less at the time of the rise of individualism in its
extreme modem forms, it is hardly surprising that there is a heavy individualistic setting
presumed in most arguments to the state. An important group of the arguments alluded to
(variations upon Prisoners' Dilemma, Tragedy of the Commons,...) take the following broad
form:- individuals operating on their own, in a certain prearranged settings which involve
relations to other individuals also operating independently, will make seriously suboptimal
�18
decisions or follow suboptimal practices - unless brought into line by an outside authority,
swiftly presumed to be a surrogate of the state. It should be evident, even without proper details
of the arguments, that the state is neither sufficient nor necessary for resolution of the problems
that issue from independent individual operations and from individual competition. It is not
sufficient because commons' tragedies, such as the overexploitation of commons' resources by
individual competing firms, can proceed apace in the presence of the state and may even be
encouraged through state activity. It is not necessary because the dependence-relations of
individuals in dilemma or tragedy situations can be exposed, and restored, in a variety of ways
into which the state does not enter; for example, by establishing communication linkages, by
social activity or arbitration by engaged societies, special groups, and so on. (Commonly such
relations are, in any case, evident in analogous real-life situations before the state becomes
involved, or can be persuaded or pushed into being involved.) Also indicated thereby is how
anarchism can resolve such dilemmas as need to be resolved in the absence of the state, namely
by having alternative arrangements and organisation in place which will serve instead.
One of the major deceits of modern political theory hides in the persistent theme that the
state, with a centralised monopoly of force, is necessary in order to assure adequate public
goods, including public order. But the most that appears required, the most that arguments
would deliver, are specific organisations that look after specific kinds of goods. There is no
inherent reason why societies should not institute and regulate specialised bodies, coordinated
among themselves by negotiation, or failing that by recognised arbitrators, to ensure the
adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of
damaging crime. Each such institution would gain community standing from its support base,
for instance through possessing fairly general democratically-generated recognition. Such an
institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and
like means, and for this it could mobilize in co-operation with other recognised institutions.
spheres
postal and communication arrangements (Kropotkin's favourite examples) to sport.
Each major sport has its international [organisation] that regulates a variety
of matters ranging from the rules of the game to the administration of
competitions. Such bodies are, of course, open to schisms and rivalries,
but these are rarely a major problem, in spite of the fact that they have no
sanctions to enforce their authority other than excluding competitors from
participation in the events they organise (Burnheim p.221, whom the
whole preceding paragraph paraphrases).
�* An apparently powerful argument for the state, again from public order concerns, advances
the following claim:- The state is required to control and limit such social evils as crime and
corruption. Observe, it is not supposed these features of life are eliminated under the state; so
questions arise about tolerable levels, cost-benefit ratios upon varying levels of controls (down
to the point of any controls at all), and so on. Observe again that the typical state, so far from
limiting corruption and crime, is itself a major source of them. The state structure, by virtue of
its power, expanse and character, indMcay much of the evil it is supposed to remove, such as the
extent of crime. There are several different reasons for this. For one, the state tends to become
the guardian of a partisan morality, and tried to prosecute what, outside a "moral minority", are
not offences at all, are victimless "crimes", and so on. Thus a range of medical, sexual and
drug "offences". For another, the state acts to protect its questionable monopolies, whence a
range of banking, gambling, gaming and other offences. Differently, state-supported or
sponsored social outcomes, such as gross inequalities, and privatization of wealth and
resources, encourage property crime.
Anarchists agree that the major background source of these crimes, the state and its legion
of "law and order" officers, should be removed. Over what, if anything, replaces this extensive
apparatus, they differ. Different forms of anarchism are bound to offer different suggestions.
For example, under communist forms, where an extensive institution of private property
vanishes, property crimes will therewith disappear also; but under individualistic forms which
sanction unlimited accumulation of property, some procedures for safeguarding property will
need to be provided. There are again many ways, much less demanding than resort to the state
to achieve some requisite protection of property. One is what effectively operates in many
places that also waste their finances paying for police protection, namely insurance. Another is
private, neighbourhood, or community security.
�n/Q^-
--T'-
;
��Sojustified or not, there is no practical aiternative to the state. A/^e .f ika
* Anarchism has not worked in practice, and is unworkable.^ Meiiher is true. Before the
modern era of states it seemed to work well enough in some places, for instance in parts of the
Americas and of the Pacific. Since the modem advent of states, it has been afforded but little
opportunity to work at the national level, but it remains operative - a most striking example - at
the transnational level.
According to a condescending pragmatic argument, simple primitive societies may have
been able to struggle along without state structure or organisation, but it is entirely out of the
question for the practical operation for modem industrial societies. No recent anarchist societies
have worked. A short response is that but few have had an opportunity to succeed. There is
extroardinarily little room for social experiment in modem state dominated societies. Moreover,
where anarchist societies have had some chance to flourish, as briefly in Spain before they were
�4^^
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suppressed, they appear to have functioned moderately well.
At the international level, anarchy has operated for many generations, although few would
wish to argue that the arrangements, though they
though successful in a sense, are
particularly satisfactory. The international order is anarchistic, because there is no coercive
government or authoritiative political body, with the authority backed by enforcing power.
International order is instead a prime example of anarchy (not a wonderful example, but then nor
are many states terrific examples of archy). And it affords a conspicuous counterexample to
stock arguments, like that of Hobbes, to some sort of well-ordering authority such as the state.
Granted, then, international order leaves much to be desired (though it is not significantly
worse than order in some states); so there are repeated calls for new world orders of one sort or
another. It has been persuasively argued (through a sort of top-down argument against states)
that international order is as bad as it is because of the power and intransigence of states. One
way to an improved world order is through the erosion of states, diminution of state
sovereignty.
As for real testing in practice, there is now no experimental space outside states. There
used to be some room in the world for sizeable political experimentation, for testing different
arrangements. We are now locked into large, overpopulated states with little room to move, let
alone experiment without states. There is however space w/r/un more liberal states for limited
experimentation, and there is increasing scope for simulation and modellings as computer power
and versatility grow. Most of the experimentation has been with small commune arrangements.
[What practice has shown, about all it has shown negatively, is that communistic arrangements
do not tend to work well for long with present humans, unless they are committed to an
authoritarian ideology.]
*
As some stage as the dialectic advances, argument merges, as here, with responses to
criticism. But before criticisms are considered in more detail, it is important to examine
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��The prob!em of cont robing the
power of the state and preventing
the State once established from
usurping further power to the
State in the mandate, is oniy
satisfactorily solved by not ceding
power to the State in the first
place.
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated cutting (photocopy) of Meyers DT (1981) 'The inevitability of the state', Analysis,
41:46-47, https://doi.org/10.2307/3327871. (3 leaves)
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
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The strategy of the first section of the book is to see where we might
fnd up if we began with a state of nature as described by Locke and
ttuck within the constraints of the Lockean "laws of nature". We "focus
a nonstate situation in which peopie generally satisfy moral conuratnts and generally act as they ought. Such an assumption is not wildly
'Wmistic... Yet it is the best anarchic situation one could reasonably ! )
for... If one could show that the State would be superior event to
most favored situation of anarchy... it would justify the state." (5)
J
why should we do this? Presumably Locke and before him
painted their pictures of the state of nature as they did because
thought that's the way people really were. Nozick doesn't seem to
that, thought he also seems to think that Hobbes' characterization
^mptjusibte or unreliable. But if truth to fact isn't the motive, then what
there is. in short, the question of how we are to
the alternatives
. *hat ^nteria of superiority one is going to use. And here lies the rub.
^jrcty Locke and Hobbes were trying to paint a picture of the "state
^*!urc which wou!d not only provide a point of comparison but also
-2993>
<M-C
avC-
3.
In §2 introduce contrast between left-leaning and right-leaning anarchisms.
In the enlarged version will carry both of these through the arguments, comparing
The main initial, and striking, differences concern replace
and contrasting them.
ment.
The following, for example, is how mere right-leaning replacement will tend
to look:[A ?irst complication of the simulation argument:-
A properly democratic
state can be simulated, in that all it accomplishes that is considered
worthwhile can be duplicated.
The argument is as before for services for
which the means can be obtained.
_ ___ ___ __
.
Otherwise let S'
be a service for which
s^L-Lici. und.it cnjmpu_L so ry caxarion Or tLie
, -
But if it is in the collective interest then it will obtain the means, e.g. it
generates these by its own operation, as a telephone service does, or it raises
the equivalent of subscriptions as a community television station or magazine may.
Then however the network n may be replaced by a network n* of relations of operators
who choose to do the work without state directives and n' accomplishes a service
s^ which duplicates s.^
Given the means, which the collective interest assumed,
state authority is nowhere required for such a service, as is evident from examples
where community or private services grow up alongside state services where permitted
to do so.
Often anarchists have such services will be performed better than the
A
H
state services they replace.
Note that the left-leaning argument does not assume
that organisation is unnecessary or that people
in their 0^1 interest.
It assumes
will always and inevi/j&6 ly act
that people themselves,
and net some power
ful elite in charge, are best placed to determine what is in their
and to pMcfe it
though VcJunhiry
04M interest
organisation and cooperation.
However people will do things themselves in an organised way, instead of
being, as often now, passive recipients of welfare.
Beneficial services, such as community-access radio and television stations,
and also welfare arrangements, would in general be reorganised so that all the
necessary infrastructure became community owned, and those wishing to use the
service would
and^ to operate it, would carry out much of the operation
themselves - taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the
passive recipients of good things metered out to them by powerful agencies or
professionals who take it upon themselves to judge what is in their [best!]
interests.
3.^
the means are not forthcoming.
Then the state would not be able to
supply means either unless it exceeded its democratic mandate.]
Let service s, e.g. a telephone or postal or transport service, be some state
activity which is in the collective interest, and let it be accomplished by network
n which will include a system of operators standing in various relations.
Picture
the network that makes up a state postal system or a local radio station.
Such a
system does not require the authority of the state of operate:
what it may require
is means to operate acquired by methods other than compulsory taxation or the like.
But if it is in the collective interest then it will obtain the means, e.g. it
generates these by its own operation, as a telephone service does, or it raises
the equivalent of subscriptions as a community television station or magazine may.
Then however the network n may be replaced by a network n of relations of operators
who choose to do the work without state directives and n' accomplishes a service
s^ which duplicates s.^
Given the means, which the collective interest assumed,
state authority is nowhere required for such a service, as is evident from examples
where community or private services grow up alongside state services where permitted
to do so.
/a?
Often anarchists have such services will be performed better than the
n
A
state services they replace.
Note that the left-leaning argument does not assume
that organisation is unnecessary or that people
in their 0^1 interest.
It assumes
will always and inevi/a.bly act
that people themselves,
and not some power
ful elite in charge, are best placed to determine what is in their
and to pn?$qe it
tliough V<7?un?ary
OMH interest
organisation and cooperation.
However people will do things themselves in an organised way, instead of
being, as often now, passive recipients of welfare.
Beneficial services, such as community—access radio and television stations,
and also welfare arrangements, would in general be reorganised so that all the
necessary infrastructure became community owned, and those wishing to use the
service would
and^to operate it, would carry out much of the operation
themselves - taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the
passive recipients of good things metered out to them by powerful agencies or
professionals who take it upon themselves to judge what is in their [best!]
interests.
7^
Arguments from freedom, autonomy and personhood.
Re §8:
Observe that these
arguments do not require the rejection of society or of voluntary cooperation:
it is the (claim to supreme) authority of the State that is essential to the
Nor do the arguments depend on individualistic assumptions, such as
argument.
that persons stand in isolation and are not intensionally inter-related to one
another:
all that is supposed is that responsibility for actions can be (largely)
individually assigned.^
8.
Re §9:
It is likely to be objected that most of the experience is of pre
industrial societies.
experience.
First, this is not true:
there is now lots of local
Secondly, insofar as it is true regarding large-scale industrial
societies, it is not damaging.
For it is precisely the structures of these
societies that the aim is to change.
Etc.
Re §10.
The replacement (or substitution) argument when duly followed through
i)
that is elaborated in requisite detail for each component of State actually that
9.
is in the collective interest, shows that the State is not necessary.
There are finitely many components which can be readily enumerated.
In the
case of each component anarchist replacements or alternatives have already been
worked out, often in some detail;
Put alternatively,
see especially Kropotkin's work.
the replacements enable the construction of a model
which reveals a society functioning without the State, the design of,
what can be arrived at in other less constructive ways, a practically
possible stateless world;
(practically) necessary.
and this shows that the State is not
But it can always be claimed that the modelling
procedure has left out some critical feature of real world circumstances
especially as to human psychology, that makes the model inapplicable to
real world circumstances.
This is a further point where^ appeal to the argument fjc/pi experience,
that at various times and places anarchism has worked.
Examples of
Were the argument to depend on individualistic assumptions, it could be re-presented in an interesting reductio form, beginning: Suppose, as arguments for the
State do, that persons are individuals (of the following cast; purely selfinterested, competing, ...). Then ...
10.
such organisation with.a State suffice to show that critical real-
world features have not been omitted.
Criticism of Undirected Happening, and Anarchism with^Organistion
In §10.
10.
In particular, the Roszak position of an undirected change just happening is
inadequate.
The conditions for change have to be determined in some detail at
least, and nurtured.
No more satisfactory than the Let's Leave Everything Open,
and so excessively to chance, is the Blueprint for the Future idea which tries to
set everything into place.
For example, how untried arrangements will work is
uncertain, and in future possibilities may arise which have not yet been clearly
envisaged.
A much
more flexible model is wanted:
model is intended to provide.
(See also 13).
Beware of arguments concering organisation based &n efficiency (as usually
11.
Need replacement for efficiency as for several other organis
defined E = 0/1).
ational values.
Similarly for economic terms
:
optimum quantity of as defined in economic terms.
quantities of nuclear power.
12.
this the forest succession
e.g.
(in §3) be
This may
i of
eid^e.g.^to optimum
Point same as with respect to efficiency.
Although the forest succession model (pp.11-13) is attractive, you do not
seem to have provided any gripping arguments for its superiority, which might run
along the lines of the moral value of anarchist means reflecting anarchist ends,
or more concretely in terms of a political analysis of contemporary society (e.g.
as done by Dennis Altman).
as a relevant one.
In short, the model needs to be justified in some way
More generally, the basic thrust of the paper is on the
superiority of anarchism as an end state.
The part on strategy opens up a vast
new area, including for example the tactics of anarchists in relation to elections,
to mass uprisings, to opportunities opened by social cataclysms (e.g. Germany
after WWI), to heavily authoritarian governments, etc. - which you don't treat
so far.
13.
Re
6:
The Tragedy of Commons issues arise again between States, e.g. over
fisheries, air pollution, etc., as well as war (cf. also Sinking Ark, p.105).
11.
14.
In footnote 14.
Th^s Bakunin urged a revolution everywhere at once:
other
wise there remained a continual risk and worry of State colonisation of adjacent
areas, as of State imperialism.
In footnote 12:
There are steps towards locally managed legal arrangements,
on which see Stone in Nemos XIX.
15.
2)
On self-managed medicine, see Illych.
Footnotes not fully taken up (through some overlap):
A detailed argument to this conclusion is presented in Taylor, who also points
out how the "Tragedy of the Commons" is the same general type.
In fact Taylor
Contends that arguments of the type -represent 'the strongest ca$e which can be made
for the desirability of the State'
5)
The small f^rms of economic
(p.9), and that they are wanting.
theory and the natipn states of political theory
also, of course, satisfy the independence requirements.
An independence require
ment is retained in Hobbes' theory, though an individual's payoff is supposed to
depend as well on the individual's eminence.
[Marxists on social determinism?]
Such organisations could in any case be valuable, not only in improving the
Some.
e/*
eV"
lot of those $*tuck in dilemma situations, but in providing ^situations, a matter
8)
?)
about which there is increasing speculations and argument.
9)
We don't of course wish to suggest that working within the system is just a
waste of time, and we should watch it all go while we sit back and wait for the
revolution.
But in each urgent battle it's easy to lose sight of fact that each
hard won victory is only temporary, to lose sight of the urgent necessity to
begin constructing the sort of society in which they will not be so temporary.
This is not and cannot be a matter of imposing some sort of Boy Scout 'Conservation
Ethic' or minor changes in the direction of energy saving on a society which
produces environmental degradation as a matter of its fundamental structure.
12)
It also overlooks the extent to which the structure generates its own style
of politicians and its own self-supporting procedures and mechanisms.
16.
Opposition to the theoretical in Australian intellectual life runs right up
through the universities even to research institutes, e.g. the Research School of
Social Sciences at the Australian National University.
12.
17.
None of the ways are original, all being found in at least rudimentary form
in 19th century anarchist writings.
original.
18.
But no more were the ways of Aquinas
[Ties with several footnotes.]
Re detailed replacement:
In the contemporary situations of privatisation
of wealth and resources (by State distribution and enforcement thereof) nonstatist
public and community organisations all struggle, even given a supply of voluntary
labour, for want of community infrastructure, which under alternative social
arrangements would be provided.
Because under (&. g.) left-leaning (communal)
forms of anarchism, wealth, resources, etc., are held or controlled by the
community, there is no need to apply coercion to wrest these from often unwilling
privatised individuals in order to /^rnisA infrastructure, etc.
The situation in right-leaning anarchism is very different.
19.
The extent to which States operate in the public good is vastly exaggerated.
The situation as regards wealth, large corporations, etc, are only some examples.
Cities are another:
they are not designed so that they operate in the interests
of people, of all those who dwell in them or visit them, but are dominated at
present by the interests of commerce.
Compare also modern metropolitan, where
cities dominate life of the countrysides.
20.
Serious defects in Wolff's arguments:
a) reasons on p.78 are quite inadequate,
b) false dichotomy between voluntary/constracts.
21.
Conclusion:
the State has
the myth of legitimacy.
no legitimacy.
Weber has material (essay?) on
This should be compared with Edelman's material on bogus
legitimacy obtained by symbolic means.
The transformation of the State is through the State;
the removal of the
State is by the State.
22.
Rewiode!:
(1)
In some of these things alternative groups work with the
State or its representatives (as rainforest patches grow within a eucalypt
forest).
This does not imply recognition of the State as legitimate, as a power
de jure;
but its de facto power is hard to avoid, and like the judo expert
alternative groups will try to take advantage of the power of the operation.
points OK:
reeXD/-e$$*. ]
[Seme
13.
(2)
An appropriate natural evolution model exonerates us from the difficult -
and unnecessary - task of setting down a blueprint for change, or for trying to
predict how things should go.
false dichotomy.
23.
It shows that revolution/evolution presents a
In between is, e.g. Encouraged of speeded-up evolution
Further questions.
Re §1:
a) All current States are evil,
but is even
the best State attainable seriously flawed? While ideal states with ideal
citizens are not evil (as model worlds will show), the ideal is unattainable?
Otherwise, where is the necessity (of evil)?
one-world necessity, virtually:
Also "necessity" contracts to
in all worlds like the real one is having states,
there are states, so "necessarily" there are states,
b)
of upturns to individuals is over intensional features.
The reduction failure
The point deserves
expanding.
Re §10:
The extent to which the new organisations permit punishment, or
a)
constraints, or rely upon it, is a ticklish issue, especially given the
argument,
b)
Generally there are various ways of changing or regulating an
organisation, e.g. external/internal.
For instance, outside, state,regulation
is replaced by group regulation, e.g. worker-consumer, which is an intery)a^*eA&Mrn<t/
mix.
24.
How
useful is this distinction?
An important prerequisite for directed (i.e. unaimless) change is an alter
native view, such as the Alternative Paradigm affords, the rudiments of theory,
where some goals are indicated.
Once such a view is obtained, in rough outline,
efforts can be made to further it, e.g. to put into practice with, for example,
more people attempting to introduce changes into their own lives.
In the energy case, to take a major example, the goals are clear enough:
maih"T.y to lead less energy consumptive lives. Ways to do this are well enough
known, e.g. to wear sweaters instead of switching on radiators, to reduce motor
commuting by living nearer one's work and friends or going less frequently or
using alternative transport, e.g. public or bicycle.
But— though most Australians
14.
(e.g.) are in favour of energy conservation, in principle - social arrangements
are so structured that some of the alternatives are impossibly difficult or are
arduous, e.g. a may may have little option but to commute long distances when
the factory at which he works moves to an outer industrial suburb, and all his
commitments lie in the areas to which he is mortgaged.
Similarly packaging is
increasingly difficult if not impossible to avoid, even in essential purchases
and those designed to lead the good life.
Thus an effective change is often
going to have to be part of a more far-reaching change.
For a working example - reforming and restructuring forest services - see
Anarchism letter, p.3 ff.
Further Arguments for the State, not already taken up explicitly:-
25.
The argument from efficiency, growth, etc:
(1)
isation !
really the argument from organ
Efficiency is little double edged as e.g. in efficiency ys employment:
There is a trade-off.
(Griffin
on 6?ff,C4C7tcyof smaM-scale argiculture).
itarian states more efficient, etc. (disputed).
Total
Maximization of efficiency is not
that the game is about - antifreedom, antidemocratic, anti-good-life, and what is
valuable.
Also reward for initiative in terms of grossly inequitable distrib
ution of wealth is not required.
Work is often undesirable.
No way in which the
the upper<$ worth the salaries they get.
The argument from political possiblity, "reality".
(2)
argument from the status quo, from^Old Paradigm.
invalidity.
realistic" or
The argument is really an
An historical comparison shows
Life without the Church would no doubt have been dismissed as "un
impossible" by many of those who lived in the Middle
Ages.
More generally different economies are extar)t and many more are possible.
Supply demand theory and theory of historic market will work without profit
maxim assumption, but instead e.g. certain satisfactions (satisfying).
is needed is an assu_jnption of rea SO/) able return.
All that
A range of other assumptions.
However, marginal (calculus) theory builds in assumption of profit op* return
15.
Maximisation.
There are several Myths concerning the Market to dispose of here:
a) it s historic
b) it's efficient: depends how assess:
e.g. net
of new technology.
Paradigm differences, deep differences in what is considered valuable, begin
to emerge rather quickly in arguments for the State, once discussion of their
the Dominant Paradigm organisational goals of
In particular,
adequacy begins.
efficiency and growth (on which see Scott), instead of being taken for granted as
formerly, are up for debate and overturning.
Is it possible to obtain an exhaustive diversification of arguments for
26.
the State?
It is doubtful that theoretical classifications so far are of nh/cA
merit.
Classification Scheme 1:-
Empiricist (pragmatist)
*Non empiricist
( ?
Idealist
*Nonidealist
Classification 2:-
?
?
*Non-u^itarian
?
?
Empirical survey gives
Contract
U^.ity
economic
Idealist
Don't often
get State, but only
Society,as e.g. in Green.
And it is important to distinguish these: for anarchism admits Society.
27.
a)
Russell, History of \N. Phil, makes some useful points:
Glorification of the State begins, so far as modern times are concerned, with
the Reformation.
In the Roman Empire, The Emperor was defied, and the State
/
16.
thereby acquired a sacred character;
but the philosophers of the Middle Ages,
with few exceptions, were ecclesiastical, and therefore put the Church before
the State.
Luther began the opposite practice ... Hobbes ... developed the
doctrine of the supremacy of the State, and Spinoza, on the whole, agreed with
him.
u.
Rosseau ... thought that the State should not tolerate other political
organisations.
Hegel ... goes to lengths which are astonishing (p.739).
that these are all protestants that are cited.)
(Note
On p.742 there is a goodish
page on Hegel's doctrine of State including:
' If shj} follow
from Hegel's principles that every interested which
is not Aatmftll ^the community and which can be promoted by cooperation,
have its appropriate organisation ... 'jjhere is also some good stuff in
Russell on holism (trad, logic) ett. on pp.744-5 and p.732 bettei^J
Comment on collectivism
"Collectivism -the doctrine that the means of production
should be collectively owned - is,
like many other
features of radical dogma, the bastard child of
capitalist parents.
Collectivism is the doctrine of
people who imagine production as taking place in large
collectively operated units - it's a factory or production-line
picture.
Historically it arose after the industrial
revolution had driven people off the land and created
workers for the large-scale factory enterprises set up
by capitalists for their own profit.
The class which
supported it were the urban workers in such enterprises,
not the peasants, and others in self-directed employment,
such as craftspeople, carpenters and shoemakers - the
latter group were mostly mutualists, later anarchists.
This is why Marxism, which lays heavy stress on collectivism,
also emphasises the role of the urban proletariat at the
expense of other non-capitalist groups, and also stresses
the idiocy of rural life, the blessings of progress,
technology, and industrialism generally.
Collectivism essentially buys the large-scale, mass-producticn
technology-dependent character of capitalist economic
organisation.
It does not see that if one does not have
such a structure, collectivism amounts to an otiose,
damaging and unjustifiable restriction on possible forms
of non-capitalist social and economic organisation, ruling
out particularly the self-directed type of option for
production and various combination cooperative forms."- Richard
Routley and Vai Routley
The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
1. Cutting of Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Social
Alternatives, 2(3):23-29. (9 leaves)
2. Annotated cutting (photocopy) of Grofman B (1980) 'Review, Taylor, Michael, Anarchy
and Cooperation, John Wiley and Sons, London, 1976', Theory and decision, 12(1):107114, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154661. (5 leaves)
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. * The state is necessary ybr this or that, for the optimal provision of public goods (including,
but not merely, preservation of public order). Notice that this important type of argument need
/ot presume to establish necessity. It is obvious, from the operation of nastier states, that
' societies can function not only without optimal provision of public goods, but indeed with very
little
provision of any such goods. It would, moreover, be a rash archist who pretended
that modern states deliver anything remotely approaching optimal allocations of public goods.
Competition for anarchistic alternatives is accordingly not with opdmal allocations, but perhaps
only a matter of exceeding rather poor provision. More generally, it is enough that these
alternatives do well enough, satisize not maximize.
Most of the arguments from provision of public good depend not only upon maximization
assumptions, just rejected, but also upon, what flows from individualism, a false private/public
dichotomy, with the private delivered by individuals or individual firms, and the public by the
state. In between, however, lie many social groupings: clubs, communities, unions, societies,
clans, tribes, and so on. Such groups can deliver social goods.
As the modern state developed more or less at the time of the rise of individualism in its
extreme modem forms, it is hardly surprising that there is a heavy individualistic setting
presumed in most arguments to the state. An important group of the arguments alluded to
(variations upon Prisoners' Dilemma, Tragedy of the Commons,...) take the following broad
form:- individuals operating on their own, in a certain prearranged settings which involve
relations to other individuals also operating independently, will make seriously suboptimal
18
decisions or follow suboptimal practices - unless brought into line by an outside authority,
swiftly presumed to be a surrogate of the state. It should be evident, even without proper details
of the arguments, that the state is neither sufficient nor necessary for resolution of the problems
that issue from independent individual operations and from individual competition. It is not
sufficient because commons' tragedies, such as the overexploitation of commons' resources by
individual competing firms, can proceed apace in the presence of the state and may even be
encouraged through state activity. It is not necessary because the dependence-relations of
individuals in dilemma or tragedy situations can be exposed, and restored, in a variety of ways
into which the state does not enter; for example, by establishing communication linkages, by
social activity or arbitration by engaged societies, special groups, and so on. (Commonly such
relations are, in any case, evident in analogous real-life situations before the state becomes
involved, or can be persuaded or pushed into being involved.) Also indicated thereby is how
anarchism can resolve such dilemmas as need to be resolved in the absence of the state, namely
by having alternative arrangements and organisation in place which will serve instead.
One of the major deceits of modern political theory hides in the persistent theme that the
state, with a centralised monopoly of force, is necessary in order to assure adequate public
goods, including public order. But the most that appears required, the most that arguments
would deliver, are specific organisations that look after specific kinds of goods. There is no
inherent reason why societies should not institute and regulate specialised bodies, coordinated
among themselves by negotiation, or failing that by recognised arbitrators, to ensure the
adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of
damaging crime. Each such institution would gain community standing from its support base,
for instance through possessing fairly general democratically-generated recognition. Such an
institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and
like means, and for this it could mobilize in co-operation with other recognised institutions.
spheres
postal and communication arrangements (Kropotkin's favourite examples) to sport.
Each major sport has its international [organisation] that regulates a variety
of matters ranging from the rules of the game to the administration of
competitions. Such bodies are, of course, open to schisms and rivalries,
but these are rarely a major problem, in spite of the fact that they have no
sanctions to enforce their authority other than excluding competitors from
participation in the events they organise (Burnheim p.221, whom the
whole preceding paragraph paraphrases).
* An apparently powerful argument for the state, again from public order concerns, advances
the following claim:- The state is required to control and limit such social evils as crime and
corruption. Observe, it is not supposed these features of life are eliminated under the state; so
questions arise about tolerable levels, cost-benefit ratios upon varying levels of controls (down
to the point of any controls at all), and so on. Observe again that the typical state, so far from
limiting corruption and crime, is itself a major source of them. The state structure, by virtue of
its power, expanse and character, indMcay much of the evil it is supposed to remove, such as the
extent of crime. There are several different reasons for this. For one, the state tends to become
the guardian of a partisan morality, and tried to prosecute what, outside a "moral minority", are
not offences at all, are victimless "crimes", and so on. Thus a range of medical, sexual and
drug "offences". For another, the state acts to protect its questionable monopolies, whence a
range of banking, gambling, gaming and other offences. Differently, state-supported or
sponsored social outcomes, such as gross inequalities, and privatization of wealth and
resources, encourage property crime.
Anarchists agree that the major background source of these crimes, the state and its legion
of "law and order" officers, should be removed. Over what, if anything, replaces this extensive
apparatus, they differ. Different forms of anarchism are bound to offer different suggestions.
For example, under communist forms, where an extensive institution of private property
vanishes, property crimes will therewith disappear also; but under individualistic forms which
sanction unlimited accumulation of property, some procedures for safeguarding property will
need to be provided. There are again many ways, much less demanding than resort to the state
to achieve some requisite protection of property. One is what effectively operates in many
places that also waste their finances paying for police protection, namely insurance. Another is
private, neighbourhood, or community security.
n/Q^-
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;
Sojustified or not, there is no practical aiternative to the state. A/^e .f ika
* Anarchism has not worked in practice, and is unworkable.^ Meiiher is true. Before the
modern era of states it seemed to work well enough in some places, for instance in parts of the
Americas and of the Pacific. Since the modem advent of states, it has been afforded but little
opportunity to work at the national level, but it remains operative - a most striking example - at
the transnational level.
According to a condescending pragmatic argument, simple primitive societies may have
been able to struggle along without state structure or organisation, but it is entirely out of the
question for the practical operation for modem industrial societies. No recent anarchist societies
have worked. A short response is that but few have had an opportunity to succeed. There is
extroardinarily little room for social experiment in modem state dominated societies. Moreover,
where anarchist societies have had some chance to flourish, as briefly in Spain before they were
4^^
// c
20
suppressed, they appear to have functioned moderately well.
At the international level, anarchy has operated for many generations, although few would
wish to argue that the arrangements, though they
though successful in a sense, are
particularly satisfactory. The international order is anarchistic, because there is no coercive
government or authoritiative political body, with the authority backed by enforcing power.
International order is instead a prime example of anarchy (not a wonderful example, but then nor
are many states terrific examples of archy). And it affords a conspicuous counterexample to
stock arguments, like that of Hobbes, to some sort of well-ordering authority such as the state.
Granted, then, international order leaves much to be desired (though it is not significantly
worse than order in some states); so there are repeated calls for new world orders of one sort or
another. It has been persuasively argued (through a sort of top-down argument against states)
that international order is as bad as it is because of the power and intransigence of states. One
way to an improved world order is through the erosion of states, diminution of state
sovereignty.
As for real testing in practice, there is now no experimental space outside states. There
used to be some room in the world for sizeable political experimentation, for testing different
arrangements. We are now locked into large, overpopulated states with little room to move, let
alone experiment without states. There is however space w/r/un more liberal states for limited
experimentation, and there is increasing scope for simulation and modellings as computer power
and versatility grow. Most of the experimentation has been with small commune arrangements.
[What practice has shown, about all it has shown negatively, is that communistic arrangements
do not tend to work well for long with present humans, unless they are committed to an
authoritarian ideology.]
*
As some stage as the dialectic advances, argument merges, as here, with responses to
criticism. But before criticisms are considered in more detail, it is important to examine
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The prob!em of cont robing the
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usurping further power to the
State in the mandate, is oniy
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Box 13, item 997: Draft argument chapters on anarchism
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/73ae60638a5fd08b1f6f3ce2164e80f2.pdf
138ef73ff6dc2fdca4027cfd05cc1e49
PDF Text
Text
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Annotated photocopy of 'State' from Dictionary of Philosophy, 300-301. Publisher and
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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y
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00959
Z^r^y
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Annotated photocopy of 'State' from Dictionary of Philosophy, 300-301. Publisher and
publication not identified. (1 leaf)
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Dublin Core
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Box 13, item 959: Miscellaneous notes on the state
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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Published work redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Clipping of misc notes on the state.
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 13, item 959
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 6
Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 6
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ea5584898451dfadd5c2086d5089f315.pdf
1802ee4e30bd63b1dd432df2e71defea
PDF Text
Text
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when;inhis Q a'cyr-ce-i?ac /a
have been by Pierre Joseph Proudh
an anarchist
propricie ? (WAat is properry?,
ris, 1840), he described himself
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because he believed that politic<d organization based on Authority sho
ement (Woodcoci t
social
economic organisation based on voluntary con
p.lll).
/
According to a rival encyclopaedia, however,
The world "anarchy" described a stateless society was for the
st time by Louis
Armand de Labort_ in his iVoreveMMS vogage^ dans /' Amer/iya^cptentr/ena/e
(1703), describing thb\Indians living in a society without state, laws, pilons, priests?
private property, in sho in anarchy" (Lehiing p.71).
A glance at the OED reveals the falsityx?f these interesting contentions [detail]^
]^rimary works
x"
Drigina/ and esposifary worEs
Secondary works^
H/s/ories and Ais/or/
o/ ideas
Textbooks
textbook anarchism, which takes a jauhdiccd-view-ofit^--
REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Heid, and C. Pollitt, New Forms o/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, 77ie Soria/ Conlraci: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/ections /rom die Prison
NoieAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment/ PAi/o^opAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcA/sm, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAeEnnctiona/ TAeory o/*Po/il/cs, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and Oh/'ecdv/ly, Oslo University Press,
Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Soc/a/ A/ternat/vcs,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
�29
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology',
Z^apgry in
ZTnvAvnnt^nta/ PAi/oyopAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990.
R.P. Wolff, Zn De/ence o/*AnarcAM?n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an Annotate BiAAograpAy o/*AnarcAtynt , Greenwood Press, 1992.
�REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system", in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms <9/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, TAe Social Contract a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/eczAms /ram tAe Prison
AoteAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Fnvironmenra/ PAdosopAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcAism, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAe Functional TAeory o/Po/itics, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and OAyectivity, Oslo University Press,
Primary works
Original and espositary worAs
Secondary works
#istories and Ais/ories o/ ideas
Textbooks
Textbook anarchism, which takes a jaundiced view of it.?
J
�Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', 5acta/ A/ternahvey,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dtycayytan Papery tn
jEnvtronmenfa/ P/w/ayapAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990, rc
R.P. Wolff, /n De/ence p/Anarc/ny/n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an AnnotareJPtbPograpAy o/AnarcAiy/n , Greenwood Press, 1992.
�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of four pages from Ritter A (1980) Anarchism : a theoretical analysis, Cambridge
University Press. (2 leaves)
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
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C051Y
18 cm x 25 cm x 2 mm
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AZ-
(New
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ork: Qmll, 198^).
Quill is a branch of Wm. Morrow.
_<^i-—
/7
1
Toward an Fco/ogica/ Society
28
when;inhis Q a'cyr-ce-i?ac /a
have been by Pierre Joseph Proudh
an anarchist
propricie ? (WAat is properry?,
ris, 1840), he described himself
be replaced b; /
because he believed that politic<d organization based on Authority sho
ement (Woodcoci t
social
economic organisation based on voluntary con
p.lll).
/
According to a rival encyclopaedia, however,
The world "anarchy" described a stateless society was for the
st time by Louis
Armand de Labort_ in his iVoreveMMS vogage^ dans /' Amer/iya^cptentr/ena/e
(1703), describing thb\Indians living in a society without state, laws, pilons, priests?
private property, in sho in anarchy" (Lehiing p.71).
A glance at the OED reveals the falsityx?f these interesting contentions [detail]^
]^rimary works
x"
Drigina/ and esposifary worEs
Secondary works^
H/s/ories and Ais/or/
o/ ideas
Textbooks
textbook anarchism, which takes a jauhdiccd-view-ofit^--
REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system', in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Heid, and C. Pollitt, New Forms o/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, 77ie Soria/ Conlraci: a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/ections /rom die Prison
NoieAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment/ PAi/o^opAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcA/sm, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAeEnnctiona/ TAeory o/*Po/il/cs, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and Oh/'ecdv/ly, Oslo University Press,
Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Soc/a/ A/ternat/vcs,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
29
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology',
Z^apgry in
ZTnvAvnnt^nta/ PAi/oyopAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990.
R.P. Wolff, Zn De/ence o/*AnarcAM?n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an Annotate BiAAograpAy o/*AnarcAtynt , Greenwood Press, 1992.
REFERENCES
J. Bumheim, 'Democracy, nation states and the world system", in NFD pp.218-239.
D. Held, and C. Pollitt, New Forms <9/Democracy, Sage, London 1986; referred to as NFD.
J.W. Gough, TAe Social Contract a critical study of its development, Oxford, Claredon Press,
1936.
A Gramsci, The intellectuals' and 'The modern prison' in Se/eczAms /ram tAe Prison
AoteAooAs (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971.
D. Mannison and others (eds.), Fnvironmenra/ PAdosopAy, Research School of Social Science,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP.
D. Miller, AnarcAism, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M.
D. Mitrany, TAe Functional TAeory o/Po/itics, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.
A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /deo/ogy and OAyectivity, Oslo University Press,
Primary works
Original and espositary worAs
Secondary works
#istories and Ais/ories o/ ideas
Textbooks
Textbook anarchism, which takes a jaundiced view of it.?
J
Norway, 1956.
R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism', 5acta/ A/ternahvey,
R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems', in EP;
referred to as SM.
R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dtycayytan Papery tn
jEnvtronmenfa/ P/w/ayapAy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National
University, 1990, rc
R.P. Wolff, /n De/ence p/Anarc/ny/n, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
P. Nursey-Bray, an AnnotareJPtbPograpAy o/AnarcAiy/n , Greenwood Press, 1992.
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of four pages from Ritter A (1980) Anarchism : a theoretical analysis, Cambridge
University Press. (2 leaves)
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 13: Green Projects in Progress
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�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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1161
• I
3.7.95
GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES:
an initial report.1
Much of what follows is organised around the following anti-mainstream thesis, which it
aims to further, to sharpen and to support:
mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news,
or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio-
environmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream
Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that
inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries,
among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should
be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and
universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives.
Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis.
All the qualifications prove to be important. Mainstream, because there are lesser or
recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. Grander, because small-scale analytic
philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or
no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the
unexpected examination problem). Western, because classical Taoism affords a counter
example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.2 However the
qualification Western is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading
impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is
also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as
well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made
out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization.
Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in
terms of crises, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even critical, to
the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough
that severe degradation or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford
a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice.
1
The main title evolved from that of Caldera, Philosophy and Crisis, who was searching (rather
unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. Some of this report was thought through in
Brasil, under the partial support of FASPEC.
2
See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD.
�2
But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.3 There are crises conditions in
many places in many regards (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious
documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises
conditions.
Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring
under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not
obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine ‘that we are passing through an unusually
severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public
investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private
investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and
social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or
temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then
ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave).
Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar
from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be
substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us
will be ‘better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics).
Comparisons, features and pedigree.
Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice,
and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems.
It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked
out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high
Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does not have to
answer, by contrast with other impacts.
Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what
were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so
on. Take women.
Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before
contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of
women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages,
Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his
utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the
3
For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see
Paleocrassas.
4
Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices.
�3
interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed,
for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works.
Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be
brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti
mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and
rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples:
• the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where
destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.5
Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science,
sociology and economics. For example
• the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm
was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm.
• the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive
schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm.
All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of
paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists
were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing
or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has
changed philosophically).
It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic
shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic
theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example
• a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a
member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to
documenting the present environmental crises {environment construed in a wide sense, to
encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation).
Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once
perhaps appropriate, but no longer so.7 But there is more, much more to it than that.
5
Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak.
documentation then, see their work.
6
Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven.
Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive
individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social
ideology.
7
Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around ‘the current development model’, what
went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or
For
�4
The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main,
an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly
underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.8 It is not enough to simply change the
development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy.
Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy.
Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology,
on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in
mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.9 Heavily
targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of
empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and ‘the limiting
ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment’. In effect the criticisms
extended to mainstream Western civilization.
But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep
positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to
some extent under shallow cover,10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in
some way responsible for gathering environmental crises.
More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare,
and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.11 To the late Heidegger we
appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows:
Western philosophy
— or some such, with
-*
technological mastery (supremacy, dominance)
-»
environmental destruction
’ symbolising leads to, or yields (granted leads to faces a validity
issue).
to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant
social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as ‘expendable raw
materials or even worse as free goods’ (p.24), in effect as without initial value.
8
For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95.
9
Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9.
10
Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism
coupled with heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed.
11
See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text.
It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how
little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and
Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim.
�5
If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a different thesis: Western
philosophy should end.12 That argument is by contraposition, and then should transmission
from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed
company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very
dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the
argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation:
notably excess human population and excess human consumption.
In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasimystical “thought”—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by
exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of
German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy
influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended,
however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little
influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial
revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of
artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:)
But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for
change.
There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through
its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law.
With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the
further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of
appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and
so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of
modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession
and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to
exploitative corporations.
Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for
industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural
landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by
industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt
12
The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore’s end-of-philosophy address (thanks to
Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger’s later
work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an
extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p. 17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was
presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note
however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of
equivocation.
�6
many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance
philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals).
Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have
helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have
been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served
negatively, as a prime element of resistance.13 That too could be a significant role for
philosophy today.
Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge,
main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for
environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or
another, in several contemporary sources.14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated,
in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental
reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature
appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has
ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby
leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the
criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has
excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially
correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist
attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably
more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than
mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is
worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself
weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in
the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of
operative ideas and paradigms.
There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would
remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to
dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of
Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature
seriously’:Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are
13
On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the
discussion of Rodman’s preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p,146ff.
14
For example, see Hargrove, p.21.
�7
philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers,
and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of
mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions:
• minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and
speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans.
• figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and
Evelyn.
• medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in
fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management
or perfection.
Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has
regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or
environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or
stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says
and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental
sensitivity and concern.
As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers
(Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and
even sympathetic.
Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or
cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that
he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation
on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.16
Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges,
Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.17
The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils
in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural
world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real
and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior,
of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic
15
In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources,
are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims
will be attempted elsewhere.
16
Hargrove, p.29.
17
This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish.
There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove’s historical “excess” needs to be
sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified.
�8
ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast
with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a
corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which
gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings,
was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the
human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in
opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and
concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—
rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature
at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens
to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.18
A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and
important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an
insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back
and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to
mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if
social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such
damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the
recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into
“process” philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to
be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise.
While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat
misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the
sort is essential.
But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as
mainstream! How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently
straightforward, an abstract definition of ‘mainstream’ in terms of the principal course or flow
less helpful.
By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the
context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and
schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets
shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western
philosophy.19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought
For requisite
18
On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood.
elaboration, see Gare.
19
One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell’s Wisdom of the West, a popular work with a
title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity.
�9
mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a supervaluational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories
usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their
judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on.
The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer
. in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of
Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy.
The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of
the special place of human beings in the divine plan:
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of
the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth
upon the earth.
And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and
multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion
over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every
living thing that moveth upon the earth.
Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of ‘dominion’; and those
concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license
to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after
them on God’s behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat
them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an
interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every
animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no
wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing
worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of
dominion in more ominous language:
And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of
the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon
the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they
delivered.
The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything
that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God
given decree.
The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man’s
dominion was to be understood. ‘Doth God care for oxen?’ asked Paul, in the
course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one’s ox on the
sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the
answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of
some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to
stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a
herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended
to teach us that ‘to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of
plants is the height of superstition’.
It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other
inhabitants, should pervade Russell’s work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate
and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power.
�10
When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of
the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was
entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics,
Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with
the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those
with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more:
Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of
man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any
rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as
clothing and various tools.
Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably
true that she has made all animals for sake of man.
In his own major work, the Summa Theologica, Aquinas followed this passage
from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with
God’s command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has
room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no
possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world.
This was the thinking of mainstream Christianity for at least its first eighteen
centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom,
and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no
significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising
... major features of this dominant Western tradition, because these features can
serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural
environment.
According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the
benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural
world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only
morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value,
and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this
destruction we harm humans beings.20
Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition
need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history
it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship
and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural
world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards
retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and
enhancement of biodiversity.
As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French
enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell,
Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in
leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say).
Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and
domination.
20
Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers tradition discourse to the substantially equivalent
(historical linkage diminished) paradigm discourse.
�11
Outline of a main argument
Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case,
through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools.
Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or
less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many
others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example,
among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes
(along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive
material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz.
As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case
by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take
again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as
examples. Descartes’ significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that
Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental piece.21 Owing to
the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza’s contribution, the blacker
environmental feature of Spinoza’s theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a
jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little:
Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation
of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the Ethics where Spinoza
says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These
authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric,
the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in
Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of
Spinoza toward other animals: “Spinoza’s contempt for animals, as mere
things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly
Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and
abominable.” Arne Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his
criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what
we would now call a “speciesist”, his system is not speciesist.22
If Spinoza’s system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an
ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray.
The negative character of Spinoza’s contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in
basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding ‘double
standards’ in its
one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza,
for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in
the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more
affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this
great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep
21
Thus for example by Drengson.
22
Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240.
�12
ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter
any attempt to explain Spinoza’s extraordinary statement: “Besides man, we
know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and
whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of
fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard
for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy
according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we
may.”23
So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza
appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing.
So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re
appraisal (in an overdue green history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz’s position
can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is
liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of
the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz’s overall
position does just that. Consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz
(though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was
heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and
human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar
impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence
for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all
round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate
obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human
pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of
which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast;
he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had
all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the characteristica universalis intended to encapsulate all of
knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well
numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for
himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his
own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the
23
Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza’s Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin.
24
For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application
of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172.
25
‘Leibnitz’s interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines,
which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’,
Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological
activities, see Aiton.
�13
more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright
lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26
No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle
commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have
independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments.
There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of
Leibnitz’s philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental
bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily.
Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent
friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism.
Thus he was opposed to
mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to
isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of
living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order
too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the
presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order,
variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as
benign as it has superficially appeared.
Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing
inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental
activities, that they could not ‘cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.27 Leibnitz
joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term
advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts
deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now
widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal
stimulus ... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing
to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia
hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of
nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an
orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.28
An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no
panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms.
Not merely neutral
26
Cottingham p.24, p.26.
27
Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The
preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of
the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock.
28
Glacken p.506.
�14
metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are
compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life
styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of
Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29
Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that
succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy
for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the
prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a
supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism
and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics
comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and
even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed
reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also
underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those
afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is
widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant
were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of
Aryan or super-race chauvinism.
Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modem England, but in most
environmental respects hardly better.
But no doubt a different example is furnished by
mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English
speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly
empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism
characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally
expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive
individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30
Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in
recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all
committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime
29
Leibnitz’s standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement,
setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic
work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incomputable) metaphysics, of which only
tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving
supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and
Berkeley for instance.
30
For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94.
�15
philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow
utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences,
including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on.
Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary
universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places
are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without
exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main
movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic
philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they
leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31
Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many
respects worse.
Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German
philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well
as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at
least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the
communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and
excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles.
Modest out-fall.
No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers
care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who
would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not:
not without a serious confusion of change—or end in present dominant form—with end, end
period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification,
have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion.
Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from
considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of
grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it
is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and
brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand
and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like.
31
Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies,
with even more force, to environmental matters.
32
Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no
viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to
an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful
alternative, soviet “communism”. And so on; see also above.
�16
Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured
alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy,
environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly
pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with
local aspirations and regional cultures.33
Once again, there are philosophies and
philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by
local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions).
Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies
at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances.
Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy
teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of
historical approaches would be transformed. “Great thinker” and like series would vanish.
Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the
mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from
history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their
arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy,
different in different regions, with their own pantheons ofprominent philosophers, pantheons
not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational
framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented.
There would be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including
logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a
reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for
Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with
Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The
mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place,
namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French
philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its
flashy fashionability.
Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what
they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or
nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong
base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive
incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in
delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a
33
No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed.
Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy.
�17
regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated
or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to
achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions.
Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the
arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of
ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization
transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are
forms of imperialism.34
None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve
against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas,
are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple;
there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation,
pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas.
References
Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
Attfield, R., ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’, Environmental
Ethics 13(1991) 127-137.
Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of
Georgia Press, Athens, 1991.
Bookchin, M., ‘Rediscovering evolution’, Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261.
Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia iatino-americana, Editora Vozes,
Petropolis, Brasil, 1984.
Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985.
Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary
Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989.
Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993.
Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a
study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959.
Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley,
1967.
Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989.
Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973.
34
Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the world car
(despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of
mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting.
�Hruschka, J., ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of
utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177.
Passmore, J., ‘The end of philosophy’, address on the occasion of his 80th birthday,
Australian National University, 1994.
Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and
punishment.
Towards a new
development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994.
Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993.
Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972.
Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its
social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959.
Routley, R., ‘Roles and limits ofparadigms in environmental thought and action ’,Green Series
#1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982.
Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds.), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World
Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993.
Sylvan, R., ‘Dominant British ideology, with relevant environmental corollaries’, typescript,
Canberra, 1994.
Sylvan, R., ‘Impact of alternative systems on the Enlightenment Project’, typescript, Canberra,
1995.
Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994:
referred to as GE.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Green Series #19, Research
School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.
�
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1161
• I
3.7.95
GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES:
an initial report.1
Much of what follows is organised around the following anti-mainstream thesis, which it
aims to further, to sharpen and to support:
mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news,
or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio-
environmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream
Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that
inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries,
among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should
be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and
universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives.
Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis.
All the qualifications prove to be important. Mainstream, because there are lesser or
recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. Grander, because small-scale analytic
philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or
no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the
unexpected examination problem). Western, because classical Taoism affords a counter
example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.2 However the
qualification Western is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading
impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is
also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as
well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made
out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization.
Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in
terms of crises, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even critical, to
the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough
that severe degradation or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford
a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice.
1
The main title evolved from that of Caldera, Philosophy and Crisis, who was searching (rather
unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. Some of this report was thought through in
Brasil, under the partial support of FASPEC.
2
See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD.
2
But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.3 There are crises conditions in
many places in many regards (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious
documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises
conditions.
Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring
under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not
obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine ‘that we are passing through an unusually
severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public
investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private
investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and
social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or
temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then
ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave).
Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar
from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be
substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us
will be ‘better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics).
Comparisons, features and pedigree.
Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice,
and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems.
It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked
out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high
Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does not have to
answer, by contrast with other impacts.
Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what
were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so
on. Take women.
Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before
contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of
women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages,
Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his
utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the
3
For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see
Paleocrassas.
4
Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices.
3
interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed,
for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works.
Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be
brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti
mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and
rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples:
• the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where
destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.5
Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science,
sociology and economics. For example
• the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm
was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm.
• the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive
schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm.
All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of
paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists
were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing
or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has
changed philosophically).
It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic
shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic
theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example
• a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a
member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to
documenting the present environmental crises {environment construed in a wide sense, to
encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation).
Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once
perhaps appropriate, but no longer so.7 But there is more, much more to it than that.
5
Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak.
documentation then, see their work.
6
Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven.
Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive
individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social
ideology.
7
Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around ‘the current development model’, what
went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or
For
4
The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main,
an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly
underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.8 It is not enough to simply change the
development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy.
Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy.
Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology,
on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in
mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.9 Heavily
targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of
empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and ‘the limiting
ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment’. In effect the criticisms
extended to mainstream Western civilization.
But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep
positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to
some extent under shallow cover,10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in
some way responsible for gathering environmental crises.
More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare,
and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.11 To the late Heidegger we
appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows:
Western philosophy
— or some such, with
-*
technological mastery (supremacy, dominance)
-»
environmental destruction
’ symbolising leads to, or yields (granted leads to faces a validity
issue).
to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant
social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as ‘expendable raw
materials or even worse as free goods’ (p.24), in effect as without initial value.
8
For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95.
9
Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9.
10
Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism
coupled with heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed.
11
See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text.
It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how
little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and
Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim.
5
If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a different thesis: Western
philosophy should end.12 That argument is by contraposition, and then should transmission
from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed
company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very
dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the
argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation:
notably excess human population and excess human consumption.
In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasimystical “thought”—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by
exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of
German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy
influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended,
however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little
influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial
revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of
artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:)
But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for
change.
There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through
its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law.
With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the
further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of
appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and
so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of
modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession
and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to
exploitative corporations.
Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for
industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural
landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by
industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt
12
The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore’s end-of-philosophy address (thanks to
Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger’s later
work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an
extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p. 17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was
presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note
however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of
equivocation.
6
many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance
philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals).
Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have
helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have
been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served
negatively, as a prime element of resistance.13 That too could be a significant role for
philosophy today.
Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge,
main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for
environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or
another, in several contemporary sources.14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated,
in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental
reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature
appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has
ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby
leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the
criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has
excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially
correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist
attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably
more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than
mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is
worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself
weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in
the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of
operative ideas and paradigms.
There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would
remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to
dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of
Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature
seriously’:Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are
13
On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the
discussion of Rodman’s preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p,146ff.
14
For example, see Hargrove, p.21.
7
philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers,
and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of
mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions:
• minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and
speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans.
• figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and
Evelyn.
• medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in
fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management
or perfection.
Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has
regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or
environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or
stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says
and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental
sensitivity and concern.
As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers
(Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and
even sympathetic.
Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or
cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that
he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation
on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.16
Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges,
Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.17
The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils
in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural
world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real
and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior,
of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic
15
In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources,
are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims
will be attempted elsewhere.
16
Hargrove, p.29.
17
This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish.
There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove’s historical “excess” needs to be
sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified.
8
ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast
with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a
corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which
gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings,
was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the
human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in
opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and
concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—
rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature
at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens
to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.18
A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and
important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an
insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back
and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to
mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if
social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such
damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the
recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into
“process” philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to
be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise.
While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat
misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the
sort is essential.
But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as
mainstream! How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently
straightforward, an abstract definition of ‘mainstream’ in terms of the principal course or flow
less helpful.
By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the
context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and
schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets
shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western
philosophy.19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought
For requisite
18
On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood.
elaboration, see Gare.
19
One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell’s Wisdom of the West, a popular work with a
title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity.
9
mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a supervaluational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories
usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their
judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on.
The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer
. in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of
Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy.
The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of
the special place of human beings in the divine plan:
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of
the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth
upon the earth.
And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and
multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion
over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every
living thing that moveth upon the earth.
Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of ‘dominion’; and those
concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license
to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after
them on God’s behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat
them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an
interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every
animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no
wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing
worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of
dominion in more ominous language:
And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of
the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon
the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they
delivered.
The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything
that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God
given decree.
The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man’s
dominion was to be understood. ‘Doth God care for oxen?’ asked Paul, in the
course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one’s ox on the
sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the
answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of
some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to
stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a
herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended
to teach us that ‘to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of
plants is the height of superstition’.
It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other
inhabitants, should pervade Russell’s work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate
and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power.
10
When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of
the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was
entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics,
Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with
the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those
with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more:
Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of
man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any
rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as
clothing and various tools.
Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably
true that she has made all animals for sake of man.
In his own major work, the Summa Theologica, Aquinas followed this passage
from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with
God’s command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has
room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no
possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world.
This was the thinking of mainstream Christianity for at least its first eighteen
centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom,
and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no
significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising
... major features of this dominant Western tradition, because these features can
serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural
environment.
According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the
benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural
world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only
morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value,
and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this
destruction we harm humans beings.20
Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition
need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history
it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship
and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural
world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards
retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and
enhancement of biodiversity.
As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French
enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell,
Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in
leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say).
Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and
domination.
20
Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers tradition discourse to the substantially equivalent
(historical linkage diminished) paradigm discourse.
11
Outline of a main argument
Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case,
through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools.
Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or
less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many
others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example,
among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes
(along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive
material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz.
As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case
by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take
again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as
examples. Descartes’ significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that
Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental piece.21 Owing to
the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza’s contribution, the blacker
environmental feature of Spinoza’s theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a
jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little:
Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation
of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the Ethics where Spinoza
says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These
authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric,
the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in
Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of
Spinoza toward other animals: “Spinoza’s contempt for animals, as mere
things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly
Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and
abominable.” Arne Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his
criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what
we would now call a “speciesist”, his system is not speciesist.22
If Spinoza’s system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an
ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray.
The negative character of Spinoza’s contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in
basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding ‘double
standards’ in its
one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza,
for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in
the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more
affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this
great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep
21
Thus for example by Drengson.
22
Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240.
12
ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter
any attempt to explain Spinoza’s extraordinary statement: “Besides man, we
know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and
whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of
fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard
for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy
according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we
may.”23
So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza
appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing.
So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re
appraisal (in an overdue green history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz’s position
can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is
liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of
the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz’s overall
position does just that. Consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz
(though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was
heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and
human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar
impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence
for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all
round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate
obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human
pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of
which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast;
he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had
all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the characteristica universalis intended to encapsulate all of
knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well
numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for
himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his
own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the
23
Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza’s Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin.
24
For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application
of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172.
25
‘Leibnitz’s interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines,
which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’,
Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological
activities, see Aiton.
13
more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright
lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26
No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle
commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have
independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments.
There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of
Leibnitz’s philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental
bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily.
Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent
friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism.
Thus he was opposed to
mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to
isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of
living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order
too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the
presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order,
variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as
benign as it has superficially appeared.
Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing
inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental
activities, that they could not ‘cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.27 Leibnitz
joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term
advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts
deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now
widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal
stimulus ... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing
to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia
hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of
nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an
orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.28
An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no
panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms.
Not merely neutral
26
Cottingham p.24, p.26.
27
Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The
preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of
the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock.
28
Glacken p.506.
14
metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are
compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life
styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of
Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29
Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that
succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy
for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the
prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a
supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism
and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics
comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and
even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed
reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also
underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those
afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is
widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant
were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of
Aryan or super-race chauvinism.
Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modem England, but in most
environmental respects hardly better.
But no doubt a different example is furnished by
mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English
speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly
empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism
characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally
expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive
individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30
Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in
recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all
committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime
29
Leibnitz’s standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement,
setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic
work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incomputable) metaphysics, of which only
tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving
supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and
Berkeley for instance.
30
For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94.
15
philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow
utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences,
including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on.
Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary
universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places
are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without
exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main
movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic
philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they
leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31
Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many
respects worse.
Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German
philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well
as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at
least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the
communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and
excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles.
Modest out-fall.
No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers
care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who
would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not:
not without a serious confusion of change—or end in present dominant form—with end, end
period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification,
have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion.
Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from
considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of
grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it
is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and
brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand
and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like.
31
Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies,
with even more force, to environmental matters.
32
Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no
viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to
an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful
alternative, soviet “communism”. And so on; see also above.
16
Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured
alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy,
environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly
pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with
local aspirations and regional cultures.33
Once again, there are philosophies and
philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by
local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions).
Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies
at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances.
Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy
teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of
historical approaches would be transformed. “Great thinker” and like series would vanish.
Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the
mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from
history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their
arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy,
different in different regions, with their own pantheons ofprominent philosophers, pantheons
not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational
framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented.
There would be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including
logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a
reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for
Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with
Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The
mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place,
namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French
philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its
flashy fashionability.
Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what
they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or
nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong
base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive
incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in
delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a
33
No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed.
Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy.
17
regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated
or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to
achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions.
Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the
arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of
ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization
transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are
forms of imperialism.34
None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve
against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas,
are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple;
there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation,
pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas.
References
Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
Attfield, R., ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’, Environmental
Ethics 13(1991) 127-137.
Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of
Georgia Press, Athens, 1991.
Bookchin, M., ‘Rediscovering evolution’, Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261.
Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia iatino-americana, Editora Vozes,
Petropolis, Brasil, 1984.
Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985.
Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary
Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989.
Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993.
Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a
study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959.
Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley,
1967.
Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989.
Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973.
34
Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the world car
(despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of
mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting.
Hruschka, J., ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of
utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177.
Passmore, J., ‘The end of philosophy’, address on the occasion of his 80th birthday,
Australian National University, 1994.
Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and
punishment.
Towards a new
development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994.
Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993.
Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972.
Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its
social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959.
Routley, R., ‘Roles and limits ofparadigms in environmental thought and action ’,Green Series
#1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982.
Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds.), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World
Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993.
Sylvan, R., ‘Dominant British ideology, with relevant environmental corollaries’, typescript,
Canberra, 1994.
Sylvan, R., ‘Impact of alternative systems on the Enlightenment Project’, typescript, Canberra,
1995.
Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994:
referred to as GE.
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Green Series #19, Research
School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.
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1165
PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental
problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not
be adequately addressed.
Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade,
impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why
the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More
immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep
enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More
thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question
entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread
problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly
recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper
paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers
lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow
band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more
satisfactory answer can be broached.
Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant
paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems,
and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the
problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers,
fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the
important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the
present investigation.
. . .
A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial
answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally
friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to
characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking,
philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental
news.
3.7.95
�2
PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
of
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Broaching focal questions, and searching for deeper answers.
Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate
(liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modem times
humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system
degradation.
Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering,
many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption
encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have
developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through
need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave
entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so
on).
Whence arises an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More
explicitly, why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their
environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a
long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps
in jeopardy through human enterprise? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the
unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this: because
too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain
committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigm?, diverse paradigms but all
displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the
earth.
Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental
impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring
through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies,
and so on.
While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in
combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are
nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do
not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or
why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes.
Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to
1
In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such
as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or
impoverish their own environments. Introduced “pest” species, such as rabbits and mynahs in
the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well.
�3
pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood
production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”, and market ideology
does economic practice, even so-called “environmental economics”.2
An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating
action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea
systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever.
Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect
termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are
opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an
elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes
of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are
also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social
paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s
routing procedures.
Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding
topography on action space.
Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also
correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new
species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically
engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they
facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may
work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this
even feasible, but of getting right paradigms.
The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures,
creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a
technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of
humans are governed by background ideosystems.
It is in terms of these background
ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments
can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4
That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been
supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned
paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single
2
3
4
For more on this style of explanation, see further RP.
It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as
Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated
that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies.
What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in
this regard.
Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap.
How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or
superficial explanation, of them.
As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which
paradigms are, serve in explanation justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson.
�4
role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly
overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic
plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to
seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are
plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are
plural.
As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier
working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of
a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a
fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned,
those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes.
Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as
supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a
multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics.
What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local
pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be
the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for
such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea
structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and
sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are ‘‘A
is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated?
While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or
developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially
buried metaphors of roots and sources . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful
introductory text, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism. Although this text presents itself
specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots
metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of
environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which
environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is
apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it
into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements
(from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of
freedom and authority’ (p. 193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make
an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an
idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite
independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic)
causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: post hoc, propter hoc.
Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to
be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for
�5
roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the
metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants
have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above
them, and so on. Both differ from another popular basis-beginning buried metaphor, that of
foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative
permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely
passively support, not sustain supported superstructure).
So foundations, for all their
importance in epistemology and elsewhere if foundationalism is correct, can be set aside.
So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short
listing for the figurature use of ‘root’ runs: ‘the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that
which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc. (Concise English Dictionary).
Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should
substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to
mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum
and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as
more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained.
Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source
book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may
have further sources (hence the search for ’‘deeper”, even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and
source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got
to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from
which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system,
gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix
of buried metaphors.
Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should
they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly
locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will
also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning
environmental problems.
There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaboratedincluding a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions,
and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal
questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are
already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere.
1. Problems and paradigms.
5
Despite a referee’s suggestion that discussion of “roots” ‘could be improved by a contrast of the
“roots” metaphor with the “foundations” metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not
concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see
them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying
interpretations offoundations, an emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm.
�6
Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are
different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation.
la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions.
Definitions of ‘environmental problem’, and classifications of such problems, have already
been ventured.6 What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value
framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but
a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such
indicator problems, ones here taken as serious problems, are those of
• sustaining biodiversity and
• maintaining significant wilderness.7
Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee
comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There
would be outstanding problems.
In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are
(at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how
they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive
classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant
impact parameters.
Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very
little spent, despite all the talk.8 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys
us, are not however satisfactory stopping points.
How is it, given so much scientific
information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially
destroying, their habitats.
To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on
offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers
are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to
the questions are however important, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there
is even less prospect of satisfactory action to mm around a difficult and deteriorating situation.
That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing
dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of
habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence)
derive from and are supported by particular ideologies.
lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on.
A paradigm can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.9
6
7
8
9
See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and
proximate solutions.
As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The
Wildlands Project.
See e.g. The cost of past environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24.
See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained.
�7
That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a
general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational
structure. Naturally it is required to be faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms,
scientific research programs, or whatever. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific
paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes
and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social
paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part
of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of
formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures;
from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models.
The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a
complex universal10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g.
metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen
that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have
repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures
under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of
consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions
(Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess),
traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies,
programs, .... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-
system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative,
from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated.
Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a
tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example:
TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant
paradigm: an initial capsule formulation -11
Taoism
Deep Ecology
Dominant (Western)
Paradigm
Harmony with nature,
through Tao
Harmony with nature
Domination over nature
Nature valuable in itself;
“humanism” rejected
Natural environment
valued for itself
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
10
11
It resembles a structured universal; compare e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex
ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are
historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual
schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of
paradigmatic sort.
This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly
expanded.
�8
Levelling of differences;
wide impartiality
Biocentric egalitarianism
Human supremacy
Supplies ample
Earth supplies limited
Ample resources with
substitutes
Following Tao-te
Spiritual goals,
especially self-realisation
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Enlightenment
Self-realisation
Personal (material)
enrichment
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Doing with enough;
recycling
Consumerism
Non-competitive lifestyle;
voluntary simplicity
Cooperative lifestyle
Competitive lifestyle
Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus
Decentralised/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
Centralised/urban centred/
national focus
Hierarchy without
power structure;
anarchoid
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Power structure
hierarchical
Limited technology
Appropriate technology
High technology
Considerable caution
Precautionary practice
Risking taking (verging
upon adventurism)
Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red
and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations
and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role
model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem
ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.)
Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors'
worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world.
In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather
consciousnesses) have to be changed, not rolled.
2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers
and suggested remedies.
Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are
accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an
exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is
wrong.
TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages.
D. Defective
practice answers
Source
Remedy
Objections
�9
DI.
Ignorance
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2.
Unintended consequences
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2a
Faulty technique,
or technology
Repairs
Repairs already
made
D3
Deviation (from
theory, etc.)
Education (for failure
to limit deviance)
Adherence
a. Deviation
uneliminable, or
b. Adherence
no remedy
D4.
Systemic lock-in
(through poverty,
ensnarement in
market forces, etc.)
Trap removal
a. Explains
only certain
cases, and
b. Due to
paradigmatic
features
D5.
Insensitivity or
insensibility
Problem
apprised
Remedy tried;
background
ideological
blockage
D3a
When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory,
or push it back to paradigmatic features.
Source single paradigm
Remedies proposed (among others)
Pl.
Christianity (mainstream
Catholicism)
Scientific enlightenment, or
alternative (Eastern) religion
Pla.
Protestantism and its ethic
P2.
P2a
Cartesianism
Dualism
Anti-dualism
P2b
Mechanism
Organicism
P. Defective paradigm
answers
Substance metaphysics
P3.
P3a Possessive individualism
P3aa Personalism
Monism
Modified holism
Process metaphysics
Non-reductionism
Transpersonalism
P4.
Capitalism
Socialism
P5.
Industrialism
Pre-industrialism (romanticism)
Post-industrialism
P5a Technocratic bureaucracy
P5aa. Transnational business
P6.
Enlightenment
Anti-enlightenment
Anti-materialism
�10
P6a
Materialism
Spiritualism
P8.
P9
Patriarchy, andocentrism
Human domination
of humans
Feminism
Anti-domination
(anti-hierarchy)
Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies
proposed tend to share defects of sources.
PS. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject
specific or partial) include:
Typical remedy suggested
Source
Platonism
Leibnitzianism
Kantianism
Anglo-American philosophy12
Utilitarianism
Economism (economic imperialism as
New metaphysics
New metaphysics
Consequentialism
Continental philosophy
Alternative ethics
New social science; ethics
contrasted with straight economic roots)
Contractarianism
Consequentialism
Domination transfer
Domination removal
Human nature (esp. aggression)
Adolescencism
Infantilism (from Freudian physchology)
Maturation
Maturation
And so on.
A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in
dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say most—entries in
that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems.
That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e.
reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is
representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other
allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also
be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard’s challenging answer. Although
Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false
cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard,
but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon ‘mental maladaptation’).
12
The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism
in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism.
�11
Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick
—in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological
routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not
physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But
the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide
continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No
doubt there is something to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now
influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive
adolescence.13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable,
even mandatory.
Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put
into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society,
to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of
modem institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth.
3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources.
Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat
perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole
theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a
prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to
partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of
the usually accredited sources:
• Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems,
‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and
specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over
nature’, was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.14
One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows:
Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity
has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological
crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology
developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the
scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the
democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to
produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development,
however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to
nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’,
namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the
animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and
destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress,
13
14
It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as
preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix .
White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian
apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole
area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall,
snowed.
�12
a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action,
not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an
extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation
worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will.
Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it
‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.15
What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was
the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse
the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or
isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some
such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable
development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more
sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer
for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.16 Similar responses are
apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy.
Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should
undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that
philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ...
responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection
today. ... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played
a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in
Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.17
• Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.
Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1)
prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the
aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of
reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not
impossible.18
More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course
accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies.
• Cartesian philosophy.
15
16
17
18
The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes
Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of
Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue
continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent
contribution to the debate see Callicott.
Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask,
not merely what they say, but what they do, and would do. For an outline of just such a telling
criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8.
Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to
preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced
back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help
expose.
Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really,
while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a
much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of
the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with
his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest
beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and
Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands.
�13
denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes,
upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of
the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.19 While Descartes was undoubtedly
extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is
accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such.
Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment,
widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems.
• Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others
(some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is
presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly
exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence:
.
The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For
metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode
(sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the
absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present,
the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability
of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a
“natural resource” —and people become “human resources . The sources of
anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can
all be traced back to metaphysics.
Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no
going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness
overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and
metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering,
exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as
vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native
healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system.
We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the
Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms
of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually
ensconced technocratic rationalism.20
An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining
rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics,
characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions
or mere Western seeds.
Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western
metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or
plenum metaphysics.21
19
20
21
For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising
Drengson’s exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the
environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely
maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in
keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy.
Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘rejecting] in its entirety
mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmcntalj
problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies’ (thus Bellett). This
charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep
Ecology (now included in UTD).
For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic
relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews.
�14
• Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’
(e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those
of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and
theistic scholastic hang-overs).
• Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social
evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were
revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism
for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a
matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the
theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to
subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a
means of production.22
But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the
idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ’Now if nature
makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all
animals for the sake of man’.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species.
The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in
shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility, no doubt a relative of
capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution.
•
Modern industrial society or industrialism. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth
superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme:
‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial
paradigm’.24 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of
modem industrial society’.2526Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found
in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed
The
popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial
technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as,
22
23
24
25
26
It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated metaphysics meant thereby
paradigm or paradigms or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they
tend to lose in confusion.
Grundrisse p.409f.
Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further
Hargrove p.25.
M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature”’, a paper
presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a
managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and
more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip
side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the
evident problem.
Gabriel ibid. Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the
theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modem problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While
seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case.
For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped
generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution.
Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2.
�15
less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes,
what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice.
• Economic growth or economic development. ‘According to a common and currently
influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots’.27 One
widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems.
The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause,
itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy,
such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no
environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately
trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay
for continuing employment). No doubt though, stock economic growth is intimately intricated
with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations).
Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems
is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic
development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that ‘the Western
model of economic development, far from being the solution to’ environmental and social
problems, is ‘actually fuelling’ them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the
problems.28
• Human nature. "... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of
intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature
itself.’29 What such “nature” amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left
obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false
27
28
29
Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: ‘the problem is not just
that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. All
that is true, too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental
despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals’
(p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it
presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm.
Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the
living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis.
Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: ‘Less luxury, less wastage.
Otherwise it will be too late’.
Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in Forest and Bird 273 (August 1994)
pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the
present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that
only economic growth will solve environmental problems.
Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to
overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying
both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are
models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant
paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant
problems.
Callicott and Ames, ‘Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action’ p.282 (see also p.281), in a
desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in
their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much
improved treatment for natural and built environments, with ‘the deplorable environmental
conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia’ (p.280).
�16
hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive
imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a
source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems,
including now environmental ones, is “man’s fallen nature”. That astonishing source also
comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed.
• Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of
women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.30
‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.31 One sample linkage statement runs as
follows:
there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both
historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned
against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly
destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that
consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches
and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless
we simultaneously address our gender issues.32
Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes:
• Human domination and exploitation of humans'. It is an extraordinarily widespread
assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or
creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or
classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the
solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety
of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over
from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or
being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from
Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore,
Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social
ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from
deep-seated social problems’.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a
prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus:
all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an
extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and
Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology.
Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships
30
31
32
33
Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a
more critical assessment see the sequel to GE.
See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3).
John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91.
Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to
transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often
reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along
with unrelational property claims.
Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But
he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination
of nature always results from humans’ domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346).
The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology.
�17
—domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows
that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in
small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a
harmonious man-nature relationship.34
Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of
dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the
dominated.
• A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected
ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.35
• Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems.
Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in
educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for
instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as,
so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.36 Therewith we are
transported full circle back to defective practice answers.
4. A selective commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers
A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the
main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two
stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation.
ad D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in
possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them.
(Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical
theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.)
Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time,
perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed
off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While “consequences” or outputs such
things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying
‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and
unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste
watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of
their industry. That should now be a rotten joke, itself with serious consequences.
Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however
exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may
34
35
36
Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given
humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale
communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments.
Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way,
such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective
paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set
of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a
basic two-oneness duality.
Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE
�18
foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.3738Where they
usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics
before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of
plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do
not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources.
But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard
economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure,
environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries, namely
that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been,
environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and
environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.3^ Differently, enlightenment liberals like
Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in
mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence
to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains
of its wilderness and remarkable diversity.
Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting
(collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be
correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts
like Topsoil and Civilization and Agricultural Origins and Dispersal) of degradation of prime
agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became
visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most
historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that
agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because
practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know
more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia,
concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly
sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend
ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a
sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim
that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their
control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the
need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make
no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place,
and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not
37
38
Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24.
It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The
Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and
transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have their property
confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who
made those points, also observed).
�19
deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm.
ad P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed,
business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad themes:
1.
Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental
impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps
social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example,
substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same
might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently
made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and
so forth).
To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not,
on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link
principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy
operates.
Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of
environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another.
Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect
appropriately with practice.
2.
While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right
circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on39)—none are
necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different
paradigms;
for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms,
Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism.
At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related
virtual histories (concerning what would have happened)—enter decisively. For instance,
Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological
fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently
documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or
collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms.40 An important example (much less
speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of
primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under
Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and
others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious
environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to
39
40
While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly
environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to
the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to
have the means, and so on.
Ponting’s valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is
Hillel’s, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale,
Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep
enough, to paradigmatic roots.
�20
do with basic needs) will suffice.
Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which
some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination,
megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively
outside) the rise of modem Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence.
3.
The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation.
Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources
wrongly. For nonWestem paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the
technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness
again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism
incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese
chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond.
The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of
non-Westem paradigms, including for example:
Other Abrahamic religions
Islam
Judaism
Confucianism
Shintoism
Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island.
What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There
is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their
intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts
are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic.
Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or
encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent.
4.
All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are
less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be
encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms.
While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often
they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often
criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements,
such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines
criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism
though Descartes, for all
his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.)
Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modem rationalism
and much else.
41
Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large
fauna worldwide.
�5.
A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated,
and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the
counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration
concerns patriarchy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial
independence of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as
animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the
actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of
environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards
women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting
human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of
environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but
that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class,
etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of
environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of
environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is
no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist
attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing
factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or
sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human
domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems.
5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation.
Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one
paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious
paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or
sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in
requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite
circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within
that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences
in
calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as
mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life
forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience.
The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even
though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of
these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and of third world
communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally
and regionally.
Nor are major inflators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization
and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees
in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from
�22
rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even
global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin
off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again
push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and
mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own.
Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved
primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could
have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as
state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered
more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run
in less favourable settings.
Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying
problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much
facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to
region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms.
Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into
history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other
enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war,
through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many
unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could
differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be
only temporary respite from environmental crises.
While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary
environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial
society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the
other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by
products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by
agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the
forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery.
An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types
of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant
cultures, Western or non-Westem. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more
Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological “break throughs” were not duly
developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not
enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises.
The pictuie of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears
superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to
achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary
phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not
terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf,
pollution problems and all, with a big price tag).
�23
selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and
industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack
sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of
more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems
and crises conditions, include those now tabulated:
TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms.
Oriental ideologies:
Taoism (classical)
recessive traditions,
now with tiny
followings and little
political influence.
Jainism
Indigenous cultures:
Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda)
Amazonian Indians.
Western philosophies:
under certain
favourable
interpretations
old
Stoicism
new
Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology.
Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and
difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new
paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted
to such enterprise.
One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second
large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class
lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions.
Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional
break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to
environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual,
goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such
friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what
would be done in certain other sorts of situations.
Certainly a culture that manifests
unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various
“primitive” cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or
resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a
culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice.
43
In logical terms neither, perhaps as well as another residue class, both.
�24
It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or
religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse.
Certain family
characteristics, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating:
* Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism.
More
generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to
natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite)
projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely
human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal
the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’44 The outside
world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally,
to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery.
‘The exception is [znznJ, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this
alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a
fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts’”.45 The remaining world, the
natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance.
It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or
project upon it, typically little or none.
Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts,
purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it.
It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.
Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from
Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went
further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were aimed at
making men the masters and possessors of nature’ .46
Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link
principles, reminiscent of “correspondence rules” used in explaining applications of scientific
theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to
practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such
principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives,
such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP.
* Indirect combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction
of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive
impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz’s
fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population
44
45
46
Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with
other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan’s investigations.
Cottingham p. 15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this
divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no
such status divides—-just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain.
See Descartes, Discourse VI.
�25
growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,47 in short, to
precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts
upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz’s metaphysics, his monadology, may have
been—by contrast with Plato’s or Descartes’, both of which explicitly devalued much or all of
the natural world—Leibnitz’s wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to
damaging effects.
Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes,
can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is
nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for
the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray.48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the
move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can
be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways
which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example,
depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent
habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as
intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle
and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of “creation . Such
extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some
sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread,
under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would
afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change.
As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains
depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who
display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests
largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally
friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a
basically neutral world.
All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental
sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic
deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness.
Shallowness will work out satisfactorily
environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of
humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such
familiar features as
47
48
49
For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel.
As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also preferred in deep
ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead
to paradigmatic roots, to Naess’s “total views”.
Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep
ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and
transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification.
�26
* short-term framework.
* devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting
human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation,
* entitlement to domination, dominion ove’r nature;
* appropriation of nature, its conversion to property.
* maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size,
coupled with grand projects.
* technofix approach to environmental problems.
Friendly paradigms will tend to invert these features. An environmentally friendly
paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following
samples:
* an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological
agriculture will come to prevail.
* a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms.
* a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural
environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new
mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep
of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way.
As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to
why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of
the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are
psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include
considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have
always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed;
because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought;
because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on.
A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or
another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go
along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the
rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough.
6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant
philosophy.
It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to
Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms.
Stripped of metaphor, there are
environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an
environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the
humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to
satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy,
has by and large been bad environmental news.
�27
It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental
practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to
such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon
enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly
under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even
govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not
therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy.
Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant
unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be
trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile
features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping
there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be
made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness),
there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive
paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to
rehabilitate.
Richard Sylvan*
APPENDIX. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions.
A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s
intriguing books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the
stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in
earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political
inertia, change to agriculture and settlement, 5<\.. . He would (and should, for his eliminative
argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on.
More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’—
similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human
behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism.
But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feel
no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as
accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended
An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms
Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written
without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in
fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms.
A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed
reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments.
No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic:
that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on
to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and
towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from
factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes.
�28
target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an
ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the
facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of
causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through
an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example
of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation
through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made
and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it
acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here.
Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often
hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making
information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life
together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing
conservation, and so on.
Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question
that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and
solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as
causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps
to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal
explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians,
representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial
societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so
redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots51) that having certain
ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”.
So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of
childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive
attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic
dislocations at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the
centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas
originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15).
Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages,
Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly
arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is
51
52
For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us.
Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing)
piactices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not
leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus,
Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests
rather than masters' (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy.
‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the
third page of the main text.
�29
manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive
adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and
person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There
is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile
culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority
figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and
vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly
satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole
social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.55 A superior explanation to widespread
individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans
are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without
coming to know or properly experience alternatives.
The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound,
resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal
growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.*
54 They are not
exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature
mixed communities.
Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be
decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments
and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health.
Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us,
now, that world no longer exists’ (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no
longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural
surrounding can even now be restored.
In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a
certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading
to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about
for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing
erosion of life-support systems.
55
54
A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological
terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the
following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument:
. ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of
society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the
hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to
domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16).
But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or
between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms.
Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep
ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in
‘taking mothers off to work’ (p. 15)!
�30
REFERENCES
E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics
13(1991) 127-137.
R. Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press,
Athens, 1991.
A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental
Questions Papers, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990.
J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, SUNY Press,
Albany NY., 1989.
J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ ReVision 12(3) (1990) 31-41.
R. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982.
J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.
C. Dale, Topsoil and Civilization, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama
Press, Norman, 1974.
A Dobson (ed.), Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991?
A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10.
R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992.
W. Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology, Shambala, Boston, 1990.
A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993.
C. J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967.
R. Goodin, ‘Selling environmental indulgences’, Kyklos 47(1994) 573-596.
N. R. Hanson, Patterns of discovery: an inquiry into conceptual foundations of science,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
E. C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989.
D Hillel, Out of the Earth: Civilization and the Life of the Soil., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991.
M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991.
K. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy, Harmondsworth,
England 1973.
F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Routledge, London, 1991.
A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology , SUNY Press, Albany
N. Y., 1993.
P. Marshall, Nature’s Web, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993.
A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, Ecology, community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1989.
J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974.
D. Pearce and others, Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989.
D. Pepper, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H.
Croom Helm 1984.
�31
V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993.
C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion
papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982; also,
modified, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland
Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP.
C. O. Sauer, Agricultural Origins and Dispersal, American Geographical Society, New York,
1952.
P. Singer, Practical Ethics, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
P. Shepard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994;
referred to as GE.
R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS
Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.
The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993.
Y.F. Tuan, ‘Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from
Europe and China’, The Canadian Geographer 12(1968) 176-91.
S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982.
L. White Jr., ‘Historic roots of our ecologic crisis’, Science 155(1967) 1203-7.
J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred
to as EP3.
�
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1165
PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental
problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not
be adequately addressed.
Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade,
impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why
the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More
immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep
enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More
thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question
entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread
problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly
recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper
paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers
lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow
band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more
satisfactory answer can be broached.
Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant
paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems,
and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the
problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers,
fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the
important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the
present investigation.
. . .
A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial
answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally
friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to
characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking,
philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental
news.
3.7.95
2
PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
of
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Broaching focal questions, and searching for deeper answers.
Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate
(liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modem times
humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system
degradation.
Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering,
many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption
encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have
developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through
need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave
entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so
on).
Whence arises an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More
explicitly, why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their
environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a
long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps
in jeopardy through human enterprise? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the
unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this: because
too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain
committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigm?, diverse paradigms but all
displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the
earth.
Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental
impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring
through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies,
and so on.
While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in
combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are
nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do
not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or
why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes.
Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to
1
In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such
as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or
impoverish their own environments. Introduced “pest” species, such as rabbits and mynahs in
the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well.
3
pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood
production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”, and market ideology
does economic practice, even so-called “environmental economics”.2
An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating
action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea
systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever.
Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect
termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are
opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an
elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes
of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are
also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social
paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s
routing procedures.
Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding
topography on action space.
Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also
correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new
species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically
engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they
facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may
work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this
even feasible, but of getting right paradigms.
The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures,
creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a
technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of
humans are governed by background ideosystems.
It is in terms of these background
ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments
can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4
That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been
supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned
paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single
2
3
4
For more on this style of explanation, see further RP.
It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as
Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated
that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies.
What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in
this regard.
Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap.
How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or
superficial explanation, of them.
As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which
paradigms are, serve in explanation justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson.
4
role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly
overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic
plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to
seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are
plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are
plural.
As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier
working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of
a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a
fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned,
those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes.
Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as
supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a
multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics.
What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local
pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be
the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for
such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea
structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and
sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are ‘‘A
is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated?
While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or
developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially
buried metaphors of roots and sources . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful
introductory text, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism. Although this text presents itself
specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots
metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of
environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which
environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is
apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it
into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements
(from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of
freedom and authority’ (p. 193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make
an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an
idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite
independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic)
causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: post hoc, propter hoc.
Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to
be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for
5
roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the
metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants
have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above
them, and so on. Both differ from another popular basis-beginning buried metaphor, that of
foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative
permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely
passively support, not sustain supported superstructure).
So foundations, for all their
importance in epistemology and elsewhere if foundationalism is correct, can be set aside.
So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short
listing for the figurature use of ‘root’ runs: ‘the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that
which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc. (Concise English Dictionary).
Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should
substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to
mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum
and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as
more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained.
Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source
book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may
have further sources (hence the search for ’‘deeper”, even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and
source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got
to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from
which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system,
gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix
of buried metaphors.
Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should
they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly
locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will
also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning
environmental problems.
There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaboratedincluding a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions,
and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal
questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are
already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere.
1. Problems and paradigms.
5
Despite a referee’s suggestion that discussion of “roots” ‘could be improved by a contrast of the
“roots” metaphor with the “foundations” metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not
concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see
them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying
interpretations offoundations, an emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm.
6
Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are
different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation.
la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions.
Definitions of ‘environmental problem’, and classifications of such problems, have already
been ventured.6 What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value
framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but
a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such
indicator problems, ones here taken as serious problems, are those of
• sustaining biodiversity and
• maintaining significant wilderness.7
Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee
comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There
would be outstanding problems.
In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are
(at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how
they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive
classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant
impact parameters.
Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very
little spent, despite all the talk.8 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys
us, are not however satisfactory stopping points.
How is it, given so much scientific
information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially
destroying, their habitats.
To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on
offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers
are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to
the questions are however important, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there
is even less prospect of satisfactory action to mm around a difficult and deteriorating situation.
That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing
dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of
habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence)
derive from and are supported by particular ideologies.
lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on.
A paradigm can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.9
6
7
8
9
See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and
proximate solutions.
As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The
Wildlands Project.
See e.g. The cost of past environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24.
See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained.
7
That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a
general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational
structure. Naturally it is required to be faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms,
scientific research programs, or whatever. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific
paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes
and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social
paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part
of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of
formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures;
from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models.
The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a
complex universal10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g.
metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen
that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have
repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures
under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of
consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions
(Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess),
traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies,
programs, .... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-
system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative,
from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated.
Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a
tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example:
TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant
paradigm: an initial capsule formulation -11
Taoism
Deep Ecology
Dominant (Western)
Paradigm
Harmony with nature,
through Tao
Harmony with nature
Domination over nature
Nature valuable in itself;
“humanism” rejected
Natural environment
valued for itself
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
10
11
It resembles a structured universal; compare e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex
ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are
historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual
schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of
paradigmatic sort.
This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly
expanded.
8
Levelling of differences;
wide impartiality
Biocentric egalitarianism
Human supremacy
Supplies ample
Earth supplies limited
Ample resources with
substitutes
Following Tao-te
Spiritual goals,
especially self-realisation
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Enlightenment
Self-realisation
Personal (material)
enrichment
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Doing with enough;
recycling
Consumerism
Non-competitive lifestyle;
voluntary simplicity
Cooperative lifestyle
Competitive lifestyle
Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus
Decentralised/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
Centralised/urban centred/
national focus
Hierarchy without
power structure;
anarchoid
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Power structure
hierarchical
Limited technology
Appropriate technology
High technology
Considerable caution
Precautionary practice
Risking taking (verging
upon adventurism)
Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red
and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations
and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role
model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem
ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.)
Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors'
worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world.
In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather
consciousnesses) have to be changed, not rolled.
2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers
and suggested remedies.
Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are
accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an
exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is
wrong.
TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages.
D. Defective
practice answers
Source
Remedy
Objections
9
DI.
Ignorance
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2.
Unintended consequences
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2a
Faulty technique,
or technology
Repairs
Repairs already
made
D3
Deviation (from
theory, etc.)
Education (for failure
to limit deviance)
Adherence
a. Deviation
uneliminable, or
b. Adherence
no remedy
D4.
Systemic lock-in
(through poverty,
ensnarement in
market forces, etc.)
Trap removal
a. Explains
only certain
cases, and
b. Due to
paradigmatic
features
D5.
Insensitivity or
insensibility
Problem
apprised
Remedy tried;
background
ideological
blockage
D3a
When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory,
or push it back to paradigmatic features.
Source single paradigm
Remedies proposed (among others)
Pl.
Christianity (mainstream
Catholicism)
Scientific enlightenment, or
alternative (Eastern) religion
Pla.
Protestantism and its ethic
P2.
P2a
Cartesianism
Dualism
Anti-dualism
P2b
Mechanism
Organicism
P. Defective paradigm
answers
Substance metaphysics
P3.
P3a Possessive individualism
P3aa Personalism
Monism
Modified holism
Process metaphysics
Non-reductionism
Transpersonalism
P4.
Capitalism
Socialism
P5.
Industrialism
Pre-industrialism (romanticism)
Post-industrialism
P5a Technocratic bureaucracy
P5aa. Transnational business
P6.
Enlightenment
Anti-enlightenment
Anti-materialism
10
P6a
Materialism
Spiritualism
P8.
P9
Patriarchy, andocentrism
Human domination
of humans
Feminism
Anti-domination
(anti-hierarchy)
Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies
proposed tend to share defects of sources.
PS. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject
specific or partial) include:
Typical remedy suggested
Source
Platonism
Leibnitzianism
Kantianism
Anglo-American philosophy12
Utilitarianism
Economism (economic imperialism as
New metaphysics
New metaphysics
Consequentialism
Continental philosophy
Alternative ethics
New social science; ethics
contrasted with straight economic roots)
Contractarianism
Consequentialism
Domination transfer
Domination removal
Human nature (esp. aggression)
Adolescencism
Infantilism (from Freudian physchology)
Maturation
Maturation
And so on.
A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in
dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say most—entries in
that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems.
That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e.
reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is
representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other
allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also
be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard’s challenging answer. Although
Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false
cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard,
but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon ‘mental maladaptation’).
12
The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism
in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism.
11
Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick
—in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological
routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not
physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But
the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide
continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No
doubt there is something to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now
influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive
adolescence.13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable,
even mandatory.
Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put
into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society,
to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of
modem institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth.
3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources.
Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat
perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole
theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a
prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to
partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of
the usually accredited sources:
• Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems,
‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and
specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over
nature’, was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.14
One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows:
Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity
has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological
crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology
developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the
scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the
democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to
produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development,
however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to
nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’,
namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the
animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and
destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress,
13
14
It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as
preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix .
White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian
apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole
area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall,
snowed.
12
a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action,
not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an
extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation
worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will.
Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it
‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.15
What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was
the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse
the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or
isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some
such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable
development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more
sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer
for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.16 Similar responses are
apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy.
Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should
undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that
philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ...
responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection
today. ... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played
a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in
Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.17
• Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.
Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1)
prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the
aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of
reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not
impossible.18
More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course
accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies.
• Cartesian philosophy.
15
16
17
18
The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes
Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of
Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue
continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent
contribution to the debate see Callicott.
Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask,
not merely what they say, but what they do, and would do. For an outline of just such a telling
criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8.
Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to
preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced
back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help
expose.
Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really,
while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a
much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of
the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with
his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest
beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and
Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands.
13
denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes,
upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of
the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.19 While Descartes was undoubtedly
extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is
accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such.
Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment,
widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems.
• Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others
(some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is
presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly
exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence:
.
The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For
metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode
(sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the
absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present,
the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability
of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a
“natural resource” —and people become “human resources . The sources of
anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can
all be traced back to metaphysics.
Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no
going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness
overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and
metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering,
exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as
vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native
healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system.
We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the
Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms
of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually
ensconced technocratic rationalism.20
An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining
rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics,
characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions
or mere Western seeds.
Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western
metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or
plenum metaphysics.21
19
20
21
For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising
Drengson’s exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the
environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely
maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in
keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy.
Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘rejecting] in its entirety
mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmcntalj
problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies’ (thus Bellett). This
charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep
Ecology (now included in UTD).
For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic
relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews.
14
• Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’
(e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those
of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and
theistic scholastic hang-overs).
• Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social
evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were
revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism
for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a
matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the
theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to
subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a
means of production.22
But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the
idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ’Now if nature
makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all
animals for the sake of man’.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species.
The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in
shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility, no doubt a relative of
capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution.
•
Modern industrial society or industrialism. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth
superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme:
‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial
paradigm’.24 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of
modem industrial society’.2526Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found
in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed
The
popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial
technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as,
22
23
24
25
26
It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated metaphysics meant thereby
paradigm or paradigms or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they
tend to lose in confusion.
Grundrisse p.409f.
Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further
Hargrove p.25.
M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature”’, a paper
presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a
managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and
more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip
side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the
evident problem.
Gabriel ibid. Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the
theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modem problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While
seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case.
For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped
generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution.
Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2.
15
less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes,
what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice.
• Economic growth or economic development. ‘According to a common and currently
influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots’.27 One
widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems.
The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause,
itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy,
such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no
environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately
trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay
for continuing employment). No doubt though, stock economic growth is intimately intricated
with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations).
Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems
is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic
development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that ‘the Western
model of economic development, far from being the solution to’ environmental and social
problems, is ‘actually fuelling’ them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the
problems.28
• Human nature. "... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of
intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature
itself.’29 What such “nature” amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left
obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false
27
28
29
Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: ‘the problem is not just
that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. All
that is true, too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental
despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals’
(p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it
presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm.
Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the
living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis.
Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: ‘Less luxury, less wastage.
Otherwise it will be too late’.
Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in Forest and Bird 273 (August 1994)
pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the
present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that
only economic growth will solve environmental problems.
Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to
overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying
both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are
models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant
paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant
problems.
Callicott and Ames, ‘Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action’ p.282 (see also p.281), in a
desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in
their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much
improved treatment for natural and built environments, with ‘the deplorable environmental
conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia’ (p.280).
16
hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive
imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a
source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems,
including now environmental ones, is “man’s fallen nature”. That astonishing source also
comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed.
• Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of
women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.30
‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.31 One sample linkage statement runs as
follows:
there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both
historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned
against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly
destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that
consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches
and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless
we simultaneously address our gender issues.32
Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes:
• Human domination and exploitation of humans'. It is an extraordinarily widespread
assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or
creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or
classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the
solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety
of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over
from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or
being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from
Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore,
Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social
ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from
deep-seated social problems’.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a
prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus:
all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an
extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and
Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology.
Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships
30
31
32
33
Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a
more critical assessment see the sequel to GE.
See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3).
John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91.
Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to
transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often
reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along
with unrelational property claims.
Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But
he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination
of nature always results from humans’ domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346).
The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology.
17
—domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows
that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in
small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a
harmonious man-nature relationship.34
Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of
dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the
dominated.
• A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected
ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.35
• Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems.
Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in
educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for
instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as,
so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.36 Therewith we are
transported full circle back to defective practice answers.
4. A selective commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers
A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the
main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two
stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation.
ad D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in
possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them.
(Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical
theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.)
Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time,
perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed
off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While “consequences” or outputs such
things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying
‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and
unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste
watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of
their industry. That should now be a rotten joke, itself with serious consequences.
Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however
exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may
34
35
36
Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given
humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale
communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments.
Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way,
such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective
paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set
of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a
basic two-oneness duality.
Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE
18
foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.3738Where they
usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics
before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of
plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do
not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources.
But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard
economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure,
environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries, namely
that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been,
environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and
environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.3^ Differently, enlightenment liberals like
Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in
mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence
to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains
of its wilderness and remarkable diversity.
Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting
(collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be
correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts
like Topsoil and Civilization and Agricultural Origins and Dispersal) of degradation of prime
agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became
visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most
historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that
agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because
practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know
more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia,
concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly
sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend
ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a
sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim
that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their
control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the
need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make
no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place,
and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not
37
38
Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24.
It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The
Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and
transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have their property
confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who
made those points, also observed).
19
deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm.
ad P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed,
business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad themes:
1.
Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental
impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps
social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example,
substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same
might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently
made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and
so forth).
To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not,
on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link
principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy
operates.
Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of
environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another.
Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect
appropriately with practice.
2.
While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right
circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on39)—none are
necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different
paradigms;
for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms,
Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism.
At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related
virtual histories (concerning what would have happened)—enter decisively. For instance,
Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological
fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently
documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or
collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms.40 An important example (much less
speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of
primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under
Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and
others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious
environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to
39
40
While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly
environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to
the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to
have the means, and so on.
Ponting’s valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is
Hillel’s, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale,
Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep
enough, to paradigmatic roots.
20
do with basic needs) will suffice.
Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which
some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination,
megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively
outside) the rise of modem Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence.
3.
The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation.
Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources
wrongly. For nonWestem paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the
technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness
again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism
incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese
chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond.
The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of
non-Westem paradigms, including for example:
Other Abrahamic religions
Islam
Judaism
Confucianism
Shintoism
Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island.
What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There
is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their
intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts
are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic.
Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or
encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent.
4.
All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are
less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be
encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms.
While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often
they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often
criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements,
such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines
criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism
though Descartes, for all
his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.)
Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modem rationalism
and much else.
41
Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large
fauna worldwide.
5.
A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated,
and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the
counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration
concerns patriarchy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial
independence of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as
animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the
actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of
environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards
women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting
human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of
environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but
that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class,
etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of
environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of
environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is
no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist
attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing
factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or
sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human
domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems.
5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation.
Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one
paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious
paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or
sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in
requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite
circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within
that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences
in
calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as
mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life
forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience.
The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even
though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of
these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and of third world
communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally
and regionally.
Nor are major inflators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization
and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees
in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from
22
rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even
global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin
off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again
push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and
mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own.
Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved
primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could
have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as
state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered
more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run
in less favourable settings.
Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying
problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much
facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to
region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms.
Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into
history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other
enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war,
through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many
unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could
differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be
only temporary respite from environmental crises.
While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary
environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial
society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the
other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by
products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by
agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the
forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery.
An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types
of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant
cultures, Western or non-Westem. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more
Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological “break throughs” were not duly
developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not
enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises.
The pictuie of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears
superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to
achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary
phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not
terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf,
pollution problems and all, with a big price tag).
23
selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and
industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack
sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of
more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems
and crises conditions, include those now tabulated:
TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms.
Oriental ideologies:
Taoism (classical)
recessive traditions,
now with tiny
followings and little
political influence.
Jainism
Indigenous cultures:
Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda)
Amazonian Indians.
Western philosophies:
under certain
favourable
interpretations
old
Stoicism
new
Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology.
Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and
difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new
paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted
to such enterprise.
One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second
large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class
lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions.
Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional
break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to
environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual,
goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such
friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what
would be done in certain other sorts of situations.
Certainly a culture that manifests
unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various
“primitive” cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or
resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a
culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice.
43
In logical terms neither, perhaps as well as another residue class, both.
24
It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or
religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse.
Certain family
characteristics, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating:
* Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism.
More
generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to
natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite)
projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely
human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal
the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’44 The outside
world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally,
to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery.
‘The exception is [znznJ, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this
alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a
fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts’”.45 The remaining world, the
natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance.
It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or
project upon it, typically little or none.
Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts,
purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it.
It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.
Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from
Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went
further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were aimed at
making men the masters and possessors of nature’ .46
Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link
principles, reminiscent of “correspondence rules” used in explaining applications of scientific
theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to
practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such
principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives,
such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP.
* Indirect combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction
of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive
impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz’s
fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population
44
45
46
Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with
other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan’s investigations.
Cottingham p. 15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this
divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no
such status divides—-just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain.
See Descartes, Discourse VI.
25
growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,47 in short, to
precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts
upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz’s metaphysics, his monadology, may have
been—by contrast with Plato’s or Descartes’, both of which explicitly devalued much or all of
the natural world—Leibnitz’s wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to
damaging effects.
Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes,
can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is
nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for
the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray.48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the
move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can
be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways
which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example,
depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent
habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as
intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle
and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of “creation . Such
extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some
sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread,
under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would
afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change.
As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains
depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who
display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests
largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally
friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a
basically neutral world.
All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental
sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic
deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness.
Shallowness will work out satisfactorily
environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of
humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such
familiar features as
47
48
49
For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel.
As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also preferred in deep
ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead
to paradigmatic roots, to Naess’s “total views”.
Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep
ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and
transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification.
26
* short-term framework.
* devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting
human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation,
* entitlement to domination, dominion ove’r nature;
* appropriation of nature, its conversion to property.
* maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size,
coupled with grand projects.
* technofix approach to environmental problems.
Friendly paradigms will tend to invert these features. An environmentally friendly
paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following
samples:
* an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological
agriculture will come to prevail.
* a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms.
* a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural
environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new
mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep
of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way.
As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to
why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of
the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are
psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include
considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have
always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed;
because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought;
because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on.
A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or
another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go
along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the
rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough.
6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant
philosophy.
It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to
Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms.
Stripped of metaphor, there are
environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an
environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the
humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to
satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy,
has by and large been bad environmental news.
27
It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental
practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to
such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon
enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly
under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even
govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not
therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy.
Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant
unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be
trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile
features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping
there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be
made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness),
there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive
paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to
rehabilitate.
Richard Sylvan*
APPENDIX. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions.
A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s
intriguing books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the
stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in
earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political
inertia, change to agriculture and settlement, 5<\.. . He would (and should, for his eliminative
argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on.
More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’—
similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human
behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism.
But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feel
no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as
accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended
An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms
Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written
without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in
fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms.
A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed
reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments.
No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic:
that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on
to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and
towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from
factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes.
28
target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an
ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the
facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of
causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through
an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example
of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation
through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made
and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it
acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here.
Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often
hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making
information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life
together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing
conservation, and so on.
Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question
that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and
solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as
causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps
to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal
explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians,
representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial
societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so
redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots51) that having certain
ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”.
So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of
childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive
attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic
dislocations at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the
centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas
originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15).
Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages,
Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly
arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is
51
52
For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us.
Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing)
piactices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not
leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus,
Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests
rather than masters' (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy.
‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the
third page of the main text.
29
manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive
adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and
person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There
is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile
culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority
figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and
vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly
satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole
social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.55 A superior explanation to widespread
individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans
are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without
coming to know or properly experience alternatives.
The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound,
resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal
growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.*
54 They are not
exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature
mixed communities.
Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be
decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments
and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health.
Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us,
now, that world no longer exists’ (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no
longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural
surrounding can even now be restored.
In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a
certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading
to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about
for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing
erosion of life-support systems.
55
54
A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological
terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the
following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument:
. ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of
society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the
hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to
domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16).
But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or
between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms.
Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep
ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in
‘taking mothers off to work’ (p. 15)!
30
REFERENCES
E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics
13(1991) 127-137.
R. Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press,
Athens, 1991.
A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental
Questions Papers, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990.
J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, SUNY Press,
Albany NY., 1989.
J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ ReVision 12(3) (1990) 31-41.
R. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982.
J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.
C. Dale, Topsoil and Civilization, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama
Press, Norman, 1974.
A Dobson (ed.), Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991?
A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10.
R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992.
W. Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology, Shambala, Boston, 1990.
A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993.
C. J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967.
R. Goodin, ‘Selling environmental indulgences’, Kyklos 47(1994) 573-596.
N. R. Hanson, Patterns of discovery: an inquiry into conceptual foundations of science,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
E. C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989.
D Hillel, Out of the Earth: Civilization and the Life of the Soil., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991.
M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991.
K. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy, Harmondsworth,
England 1973.
F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Routledge, London, 1991.
A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology , SUNY Press, Albany
N. Y., 1993.
P. Marshall, Nature’s Web, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993.
A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, Ecology, community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1989.
J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974.
D. Pearce and others, Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989.
D. Pepper, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H.
Croom Helm 1984.
31
V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993.
C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion
papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982; also,
modified, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland
Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP.
C. O. Sauer, Agricultural Origins and Dispersal, American Geographical Society, New York,
1952.
P. Singer, Practical Ethics, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
P. Shepard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994;
referred to as GE.
R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS
Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.
The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993.
Y.F. Tuan, ‘Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from
Europe and China’, The Canadian Geographer 12(1968) 176-91.
S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982.
L. White Jr., ‘Historic roots of our ecologic crisis’, Science 155(1967) 1203-7.
J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred
to as EP3.
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�f
Chapter 10
_
CRITICS OF ANARCHISM AND FURTHER CRITICISM.
..
One of the regular obstacles almost any innovative ideology encounters is hardened
dogfpMdwi. Hardened dogmatism characteristically sees little scope for movement from some
established status quo. There are many hardened dogmatists who see no alternative to the
modern state. In this they join company with a huge and motley crew of political "realists":
'There simply is no way an advanced industrial state can cope with technological complexities,
can minimize waste and misery and the danger of revolutions without strong government
controls' (Gardner!, our sample dcifnatist, selected^because he has ranted^at verbose length,on
his anti-anarchist disposition). We can grant that there is no viable state without requisite
government controls, no state without a state. The question is rather whether such objectives as
reduction of waste and misery and control of technology even he accomplished, perhaps
significantly better without the state, which tends to wagnt/y the problems concerned.
A feature of dogmatism is that assertion, reiterated assertion, replaces argument. So it is
with^state dogmatism: 'As things are, there simply is no way a modem industrial society can
flourish without a strong government to enforce the law' (p.123). international industrial
society flourishes, after a fashion ^without such a government. Analogous functional ways in
which regional industrial societies can operate, way implicit in historic anarchism, have been
explained. 'It is not just the necessity of a state to preserve law and order that makes the
anarchist dream so hopeless' (p.124). Order requires only a certain organisation^, for which the
state is quite unnecessary. As for law, the necessity is but analytic on the law being state-law.
But a wide network of conventions and regulations can operate without a state; there are many
examples, beginning with stateless societies, continuing through a range of voluntary
organisations.
Why 'so hopeless'?
,,
Even if small communities [observe the limitation on anarchism
immediately slippst in]... found a way to police themselves, there is no way
they could maintain, let alone establish, an industrial society. Small selfgoverning groups are incapable of building reservoirs to bring them clean
water, or roads to connect cities, or dynamos to supply electricity, or cars,
or printing presses, or modem hospitals, or anything else that is a product of
an advanced technology. Big tasks can be done only by big corporations
that are either state-owned or state-controlled, or that operate as vast
independent oligarches within the state (p.124).
eV
As well as intellectually lazy, this is hopelessly astray: there resides the hopelessness. In some
regions, pioneer societies and industrial society developed more or less regardless of the state.
Even small f^rm communities built themselves reservoirs for stock and household water
supplies, built their local roads, and so on (in Australia, USA, and elsewhere). They still do.
Electricity generates and printing presses can be manufactured in fairly unsophisticated
i
.
Martin Gardner
776-7SS.
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�workshops, where the state need be nowhere in evidence. As for big tasks, international
organisations (for construction, forestry, dam building, oil-well sinking,^ substantially
independent of particular states can, and do, perform the work. They may presently be required
to have a state location, but that is strictly unnecessary for accomplishing the tasks; they are
certainly not state-owned, or state-controlled, nor do they, in any real sense, operate within the
states'. Furthermore, regions investing in large works beyond their capacities can set up their
own specialized structures, to oversee such big tasks, to monitor activities and ensure
accountability, and to exclude cowboy operations. It is simply false that the advancement and
application of science and technology requires the state, as much history reveals. In a similar
way, it is simply misleading that 'if we want to enjoy the benefits of science and technology,
the ideals of an archism are as irrelevant as the ideals of the Sermon on the Mount' (p.124). By
contrast with the ideals of the Sermon, the impact of which are quite indirect, much anarchist
output concerns science and technology, their promotion and qualified benefits, proper place
and appropriateness.
Next our philosophical scrivener turns to pulling down anarchism by a superficial
comparison with and sen^up of the American 'counter culture scene of the sixties' (pp. 1244-5).
As technology is not condemned by one bad result, nor is anarchism shown impracticable by
one presumed form wht^e merit remain a matter of controversy. In any case, m^re accurate
comparisons are available than Gardner's prejudical poQ)ourL These set anarchist elements of
the counterculture substantially witli^th&\merican individual, pro-violence form of anarchism.
Hardened dogmatists are almost invariably crt^ss critics. They do not ever get at close
quaters^et alon^ inside, what they are criticising; so they do not achieve a good view, still less
adequate
sympathetic view, of what they ^/are criticising. Fortunately there are less cr^ss
critics, most of them with heavy commitments to democratic states (Gardner, though he makes
obeisant gestures towards democracy, is underneath it committed to the strong tech,o-cratic
state.) It should be plain that any critic with heavy commit^nts to democracy would have to
take anarchism more seriously as an option; for the demos may chose, or rule, to remove their
state. (Quite constitutional means may, and should, permit this.) The point, though elementary,
has escaped apparently more sympathetic opponents of anarchism such as Dahl, who premisses
his critique of anarchism upon the incompatibility of anarchism with democracy. He appears to
manage this yhnx
by mistakenly equating democracy with the democratic state. Certainly
anarchism is incompatible with the democratic state, as with any state, but it does not follow,
except through a variant of the mistaken equation, that it is incompatible with democracy. And
it should be evident that this latter incompatibility is contested. For the^e have many proposals
for combining anarchism with m^re participatory democracy (ul^minating on enterprises like
Burgheim's quest fortrue democracy^ which arrives at a dilute anarchism).
Dahl begins his criticism of anarchism by asserting that anarchist (and guardianship)
'objections to democracy aare so fundamental that unless they can be satisfactorily met any
further explanations of the democratic idea would be futile' (p.37).
Given the heavy
�commitment of much anarchism to democratic processes, this assertion faces evident
rejoinders. And Dahl himself quickly shifts ground (though a page later he shifts back,
assuming that his archetypal democrat and anarchist are opposed as archist and anarchist):
'Because democracy might well be the most des^be process for governing [anarchist
v^lu^ttpry]
it might also be the prevented form of government in an anarchist society.
But i^ the anarchist view democracy cannot redeem a state
*
(p.37, two paragraphs down).
Since nothing can redeem the state, ergo neither gods nor people nor democracy can. Yet Dahl
begins his cri^tism with this curious twist: since the state^coercism, and coercisaa is
intrinsically bad, can the democratic process somehow make it good?
*
(p.37). This problem for
archism, which Dahl assumes, is no problem at all for anarchism. Instead of addressing the
question posed, Dahl switches focus, by challenging the coherence and consistency of
anarchism. But all his exhibition of divWity/shows is that anarchism is a family-resemblance
notion, like many Wittgenstein pointed outigbwc, warAewatic.?, and so on. It is a family
resemblance notion with certain key features (as being played, is of a game), namely rejection
of archie authority, ^percion and the state; beyond that there is a plurality of forms. Once the
pluralistic conceptualisation is appreciated, there need be no incoherence; it all fits together.
^^Many of the criticisms of anarchism turn on the issue of
especially how
economic activity such asf marketing, distribution, and so on, is to be organised in the absence
of a central state authority. Meeting these criticisms in appropriate detail is no mean feat,
requiring the elaboration of substantially new economic theory (except for excessively
individualistic anarchists like Rothbart, but sketchy details and hints have been offered by
anarchist theorists). While economic criticisms bulk large in recent criticism of anarchism, the
state having assumed the role of grand macro-economic organiser, these by no means exhaust
criticisms. There are serious issues also concerning political and cultural organisation,
concerning the presumed enemies of organisation and order.
In many criticisms it is simply assumed that anarchistic organisation will have to take
over the arrangements of present mega-states and somehow substitute for those, without mega
states. The assumption is astray. Mega-states are mostly recent undesirable constructions,
obtained by conquest or war dealings, and held together coercive means and other devices of
state. These would, would be allowed to, fragment into regional components. Thus the
problem of organisation is a substantially smaller problem than that of organisation of mega
states; namely, that of organisation of regions. The regions would naturally be grouped
together, by principles of federation. (The new Europe provides a partial, suggestive example.)
No strand of anarchism 'has developed an adequate economic theory. The individualists
are stymied by the public goods problem, the communists by the problems of coordination.
[Even more plausible intermediate positions] require the support of the state at a number of
critical points' (M p.172). How the state is presumed to provide its benign supportative role is
well illustrated in the case of more individualistic anarchism, where the familiar problem of
public goods is also taken to manifest itself.
�4
A cynic might well observe that no strand of capitalism or of socialism has developed an
adequate economic theory. But theories there no doubt are, in certain narrow reaches in
abundance.
*
Anarchism assumes the benefits of autonomous
operations, indeed the
individualistic ideal is one of personal sovereignty in the market place', but 'is not the state an
indispensible prerequisite for a successfully functioning economy?' (M p.169). There are two
parts to a response. First, markets functioned before states, and function outside states, for
example internationally. Second, whatever institutions are required for the operation of
markets can be supplied regionally under anarchistic fragmentation of the state.
How much background structure do markets depend upon, which might presuppose
apparatus of state. A market has a place of transactions, which can be common or waste
ground, a supply of goods or services to be exchanged there for other goods or services (barter)
or currency (in a money economy). Buyers and sellers enter the market to effect exchanges.
No doubt presupposed are at least limited entitlements (leasehold or property rights, so a seller
is entitled to dispose of, to a new user, holder or owner, what is offered for sale), contractual
arrangements, and in a money economy, some recognised currency. Also presumed, normally
where markets operate, are certain levels of safety, for instance protection against invasion,
assault and theft. But these are normal expectations for much of social life, for even conducting
a conversation. As for the rest, except perhaps for currency, it is a mere pretence that a state is
required for their assurance: customary or tribal arrangements will ensure both property in
transportable goods and recognition of verbal contracts or undertakings. An appropriate
currency too can develop in the absence of states, as exemplified in the shell currencies of
Melanesia and the bank notes of early America. Bank notes are not fully public goods; for a
bank which can profit from their circulation or issue has an incentive to supply them. (And
banks themselves do not require a sponsoring state, even if sometimes that helps, as in bailing
them out.)
It is worth observing that much of the conventional apparatus presumed for markets is
already presupposed
for the fictional covenant by which the state is supposedly
established. Namely, meeting in relative safety, entering into contractual arrangements (in the
case of the state of a very sophisticated sophistical sort).
* Anarchism has not met the 'intractable ... problem of co-ordinating the activities of many
independent social units without recourse to central authority' (M p.181). But there are many
examples, most notably at an international level again, where such coordination has been
achieved (e.g. IUCO). Examples are increasing with new networking arrangements (e.g.
Pegasus network).
Where substantially self-managing arrangements, such as traditional
markets are allowed to flourish, there are no such intractable problems. Certainly, however,
with anarcho-communist structures which aim to suppress such self-managing arrangements,
there are problems: namely those of
* co-ordinating productive activity, aligning production with the needs of consumers without
�5
markets or central planning.
Key approach: localising production, face-to-face.
How can this work in an advanced industrial economy, where a high degree of specialization
and much division of labour. Suggestion CAN'T!
* motivating people to work.
Pressure, sanctions, rewards. While this is a problem in any setting, it is caAaaccJ since certain
personal rewards removed.
*
a central agency seems necessary to maintain any society-wide distribution of resources'
(p.172). W/nc/i resources? Where markets operate, many resources will be distributed without
any role for a central agency, which would often serve as a serious blockage. WAat
distribution? What was intended was: a
distribution of resources, so the blatant inequalities
now observed in even the wealthist societies are mitigated and the conditions of the worst-off
are alleviated. That is drawing upon experience of capitalism: anarchism would not start out
from such an invidious position. Further, it is assumed that there are only two ways of righting
such (capitalistic) maldistribution: through purely private means or by a centralised state means.
So presented it represents an extremely familiar false dichotomy, private or state, in which
society is either equated with the state or else drops out, and all other public means disappear.
For socially-inclined anarchists there is no disputing that there need to be safety nets in
place for the poor and disadvantaged. What is in question is how those nets are placed and
administered, and whether the state has an essential role or is rather a less efficient more
officious nuisance. One option is an exposed tithing system, where members of society are
offered a choice of schemes to contribute to, and expected to contribute to these, and
encouraged to make their contribution open to public inspection. Those who tried to evade
contribution and closed their books would be subject to a range of social pressures.
It is further claimed that while smaller anarchist communities, especially those of a
collectivistic or communistic bent, may be able to resolve inequitable distribution problems,
'there are major difficulties' in attempting to realise some distributive ideal 'between
communities' (p.173). There may be major difficulties, there are now, but that is scarcely an
argument for a central authority. Some redistribution and a small transfer of wealth occurs
intentionally without a central authority. There is not even decisive evidence that a central
authority helps, so far from making matters worse.
* AaarcA/sw
no
/or /aw.
Anarchism cannot traffic in law - at least in the initial and prominent sense of /aw
(ventured e.g. in the OED), namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by
authority and characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent
counter balancing this prognostication is a second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific
and philosophical uses' from which likewise anarchism is not debarred): namely 'without
reference to an external commanding authority'. Thus as the term gavcrawcar is variably
determinable, so also is /aw. Under the main determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism.
�6
But under a different determinate, there is no incompatibility. Anarchism could operate with
such a derminate (as with appropriate notions of moral law, and similar). Law, however,
deservedly has a tarnished reputation, in anarchism as elsewhere. Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive oligopolistic priesthood. Too often it is an oppressive tool of the
state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatible with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely assented to sorts, and so
on. These can substitute.
The state has other less conspicuous roles than law and order, war and defence, and
managing the economy.
* The state serves as representative of national identity, which people crave. Anarchism does
not cater for this basic human need. This is pretty dubious stuff. Such a need is by no means
ubiquitous, and is, if not manufactured, certainly exaggerated in convenient cases, by state
devices. But let us concede a need hypothesis (there is nothing basic about it). Is it true that
The anarchist does nothing to replace the notion; his ideal society is devoid of any features
which might serve as a focus of identity' (M p.180)? No. The components in terms of which
an anarchistic society is structured — the local community, the local region, the regional
federations,... - offer foci for identification, bases for sporting teams, and so on. But, in any
event, nothing excludes national organisations, fielding cultural groups, artistic troupes,
sporting teams, and so on. The present structure of national sporting bodies, only loosely
affiliated with states, and coordinated in model anarchist fashion, provides in fact a worthwhile
example of anarchism in action (Burnheim again).
Do such concessions to features of nationhood 'naturally lead to a demand for self
government', and thence for a nation-state (p.181)? They may (as with the Basques) or may
not (as with the Cornish), and if so more likely the former than the latter? Further these
demands may come only from a small minority of nationals, or may be ill-founded. A demand
on its own demonstates comparatively
of merit, for all that modem economics would have
us imagine.
A repeated criticism of anarchism is that 'with the state removed, the system has no
ultimate guarantor ...'. So it used to be said in favour of God. But who guarantees the
guarantor? (A state may underwrite a bank, but a state itself can fail, despite support of other
states.) There is no ultimate guarantor. There are other issues also, such as the character of the
guarantor. While it is seen to in theology, as a matter of further (illicit) characterisation, that
God has the right features, nothing guarantees that an "ultimate guarantor" is not, rather like
most states, corrupt, unfair, heavy handed and incompetent.^ Even if an ultimate guarantee was
needed, none could be provided. But lesser assurances can be offered. For example, a bank's
2
If a guarantee cannot be obtained without violence, it is most unlikely that a satisfactory one
will be obtained with it.
�7
books can be open to public scrutiny and assessment, so that it can be seen that it is trading in a
responsible and viable fashion. (It is better that a person's healthy state be assured by
observation that the person is functioning well, than by maintaining the person as a closed
system and relying on the doctor's guarantee of the person's health.)
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�Many of the criticisms of anarchism turn on the issue of orgam.Mric'K, especially how
gconcwHC activity such as: marketing, distribution, and so on, is to be organised in the absence
of a central state authority. Meeting these criticisms in appropriate detail is no mean feat,
requiring the elaboration of substantially new economic theory (except for excessively
individualistic anarchists like Rothbart, but sketchy details and hints have been offered by
anarchist theorists). While economic criticisms bulk large in recent criticism of anarchism, the
state having assumed the role of grand macro-economic organiser, these by no means exhaust
criticisms. There are serious issues also concerning political and cultural organisation,
concerning the presumed enemies of organisation and order.
In many criticisms it is simply assumed that anarchistic organisation will have to take over
�the arrangements of present mega-states and somehow substitute for those, without mega-states.
The assumption is astray. Mega-states are mostly recent undesirable constructions, obtained by
conquest or war dealings, and held together coercive means and other devices of state. These
would, would be allowed to, fragment into regional components. Thus the problem of
organisation is a substantially smaller problem than that of organisation of mega-states; namely,
that of organisation of regions. The regions would naturally be grouped together, by principles
of federation. (The new Europe provides a partial, suggestive example.)
J
*
No strand of anarchism 'has developed an adequate economic theory.
The
individualists are stymied by the public goods problem, the communists by the problems of
coordination. [Even more plausible intermediate positions] require the support of the state at a
number of critical points' (M p.172). How the state is presumed to provide its benign
supportative role is well illustrated in the case of more individualistic anarchism, where the
familiar problem of public goods is also taken to manifest itself.
A cynic might well observe that no strand of capitalism or of socialism has developed an
adequate economic theory. But theories there no doubt are, in certain narrow reaches in
abundance.
* Anarchism assumes the benefits of autonomous market operations, indeed The individualistic
ideal is one of personal sovereignty in the market place', but 'is not the state an indispensible
prerequisite for a successfully functioning economy?' (M p.169). There are two parts to a
response. First, markets functioned before states, and function outside states, for example
internationally. Second, whatever institutions are required for the operation of markets can be
supplied regionally under anarchistic fragmentation of the state.
How much background structure do markets depend upon, which might presuppose
apparatus of state. A market has a place of transactions, which can be common or waste
ground, a supply of goods or services to be exchanged there for other goods or services (barter)
or currency (in a money economy). Buyers and sellers enter the market to effect exchanges.
No doubt presupposed are at least limited entitlement (leasehold or property rights, so a seller is
entitled to dispose of, to a new user, holder or owner, what is offered for sale), contractual
arrangements, and in a money economy, some recognised currency. Also presumed, normally
where markets operate, are certain levels of safety, for instance protection against invasion,
assault and theft. But these are normal expectations for much of social life, for even conducting
a conversation. As for the rest, except perhaps for currency, it is a mere pretence that a state is
required for their assurance: custom^ or tribal arrangements will ensure both property in
transportable goods and recognition of verbal contracts or undertakings. An appropriate
currency too can develop in the absence of states, as exemplified in the shell currencies of
Melanesia and the bank notes of early America. Bank notes are not fully public goods; for a
bank which can profit from their circulation or issue has an incentive to supply them. (And
�32
banks themselves do not require a sponsoring state, even if sometimes that helps, as in bailing
them out.)
It is worth observing that much of the conventional apparatus presumed for markets is
already presupposed prg-sMfe for the fictional covenant by which the state is supposedly
established. Namely, meeting in relative safety, entering into contractual arrangements (in the
case of the state of a very sophisticated sophistical sort).
* Anarchism has not met the 'intractable ... problem of co-ordinating the activities of many
examples, most notably at an international level again, where such coordination has been
achieved (e.g. IUCO). Examples are increasing with new networking arrangements (e.g.
Pegasus network). Where substantially self-managing arrangements, such as traditional
markets are allowed to flourish, there are no such intractable problems. Certainly, however,
with anarcho-communist structures which aim to suppress such self-managing arrangements,
there are problems:
* ^o-ordinating productive activity, aligning production with
*needs
of
consumers without markets <?r central planning.
Key approach: localising production, face-to-face.
How can this work in an advanced industrial economy, where a high degree of specialization
and much division of labour. Suggestion CAN'T!
* motivating people to work.
Pressure, sanctions, rewards.
in any setting, but
rewards removed.
since certain personal
* '... a central agency seems necessary to maintain any society-tide distribution of resources'
(p.172). WTu'cA resources? Where markets operate, many resources will be distributed without
any role for a central agency, which would often serve as a serious blockage.
What
distribution? What was intended was: ayMst distribution of resources, so the blatant inequalities
now observed in even the wealthist societies are mitigated and the conditions of the worst-off
are alleviated. That is drawing upon experience of capitalism: anarchism would not start out
from such an invidious position. Further, it is assumed that there are only two ways of righting
such (capitalistic) maldistribution: through purely private means or by a centralised state means.
So presented it represents an extremely familiar false dichotomy, private or state, in which
society is either equated with the state or else drops out, and all other public means disappear.
For socially-inclined anarchists there is no disputing that there need to be safety nets in
place for the poor and disadvantaged. What is in question is how those nets are placed and
administered, and whether the state has an essential role or is rather a less efficient more
officious nuisance. One option is an exposed tithing system, where members of society are
/v
�33
offered a choice of schemes to contribute to, and expected to contribute to these, and encouraged
to make their contribution open to public inspection. Those who tried to evade contribution and
closed their books would be subject to a range of social pressures.
It is further claimed that while smaller anarchist communities, especially those of a
collectivistic or communistic bent, may be able to resolve inequitable distribution problems,
'there are major difficulties' in attempting to realise some distributive ideal
communities' (p.173). There may be major difficulties, there are now, but that is scarcely an
argument for a central authority. Some redistribution and a small transfer of wealth occurs
intentionally without a central authority. There is not even decisive evidence that a central
authority helps, so far from making matters worse.
The state has other less conspicuous roles than law and order, war and defence, and
managing the economy.
* The state serves as representative of national identity, which people crave. Anarchism does
not cater for this basic human need. This is pretty dubious stuff. Such a need is by no means
ubiquitous, and is, if not manufactured, certainly exaggerated in convenient cases, by state
devices. But let us concede a need hypothesis? Is it true that 'the anarchist does nothing to
replace the notion; his ideal society is devoid of any features which might serve as a focus of
identity' (M p.180)? No. The components in terms of which an anarchistic society is structured
- the local community, the local region, the regional federations, ... — offer foci for
identification, bases for sporting teams, and so on. But, in any event, nothing excludes national
organisations, fielding cultural groups, artistic troupes, sporting teams, and so on. The present
structure of national sporting bodies, only loosely affiliated with states, and coordinated in
model anarchist fashion, provides in fact a worthwhile example of anarchism in action
(Bumheim again).
Do such concessions to features of nationhood 'naturally lead to a demand for self
government', and thence for a nation-state (p.181)? They may (as with the Basques) or may not
(as with the Cornish), and if so more likely the former than the latter? Further these demands
may come only from a small minority of nationals, or may be ill-founded. A demand on its own
demonstates comparatively ZZrr/e of merit, for all that modern economics would have us imagine.
A repeated criticism of anarchism is that 'with the state removed, the system has no
ultimate guarantor ...'. So it used to be said in favour of God. But who guarantees the
guarantor? (A state may underwrite a bank, but a state itself can fail, despite support of other
states.) There is no ultimate guarantor. There are other issues also, such as the character of the
�s
[Jj[government is variably determinable, so also is /ow. Under the mam
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determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism. But under a different determinate, there is no
( incmpatibiHty.
--------------- —----------------- ------------------------------ ------ L_
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Anarchism cannot traffic in law, in the initial and prominent sense of /<2w(offered in the
OEE^, namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by authority and
characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent counter^teducing this
prognostication is a second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific and philosophical
-
uses'): namely 'without reference to an external commanding authority'.
^aw deservedly has a tarnished reputation^ m anarchism. Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive, priesthood. Too often it is an oppression tool of the state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatable with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely assented to Kats, and so
On.
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�guarantor. While it is seen to in theology, as a matter of further (illicit) characterisation, that
God has the right features, nothing guarantees that an "ultimate guarantor" is not, rather like
most states, corrupt, unfair, heavy handed and incompetent? Even if an ultimate guarantee was
needed, none could be provided. But lesser assurances can be offered. For example, a bank's
books can be open to public scrutiny and assessment, so that it can be seen that it is trading in a
responsible and viable fashion. (It is better that a person's healthy state be assured by
observation that the person is functioning well, than by maintaining the person as a closed
system and relying on the doctor's guarantee of the person s health.)
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A DEEP RIFT ON PROPERTY
A main element in the major divide between right and left anarchism, as between left and
right, is property. Other elements in the divide, such as the accumulation of capital essential to
capitalism, depend upon property, because it in it as a transferable commodity that capital is held.
It is unremarkable then that property balks large, as an institution to be defended and even extended
(with new rights to address environmental issues) in right-leaving political theory and, what heavily
overlaps that g^ave. American anarchism. At the opposing end of the right-left tug of war, state,
.social or common ownership of property used to be all the go: but left coalitions are presently
down-playing such ideals and aspirations.
Reflective green theory once again moves off the right-left axis, questioning aspects of the
strong ownership and control relations presumed in the tug-of war. Prope^tarian relations are all
based upon older domination and control ideologies, but diluted in kinder stewardship approaches,
not removed. For, while the idea of land as a mere commodity subject to the $hims of present
owners is softened, the steward normally but manages and controls for some higher master, god or
humanity. Reflect further on what both private owners and state owners may do to the
environments and habitats they "own".
Green reflection le^ds then towards the modification of entrenched institutions of private and
state property.
Green anarchism automatically eliminates certain types of ownership, namely state ownership
which has to depart with the state. The demise of the state should at least suggest that associated
institutions such as property and the law may be in some trouble. So it proves, to an interesting
extent. For, much as arguments to the state are, like those to the Master, Dominus, fatally flawed,
so are those to strong and established systems of property subject to lethal objections. Further,
much as the unwarranted state may be substituted for less dominating justifiable institutions, so
property and its adjuncts may be replaced by alternative less dominating arrangements, such as use
hold, leasehold, and the like.
A central claim, argued^ detail, will be that none of the arguments for property as justified,
as an entitlement as right, succeeds,?!// that the whole run of arguments supports is the need, or
desirability for some lesser arrangements. It is advantageous to have some terminology to cover
both property anJ lesser arrangements, <7aa.n-proper?y so to say, or gua/efty as will be said.
'The concept of property is fundamental to our [U.S.] society, probably to any workable
society' (Friedman p.3). The second claim is soon strengthened, and a third insupportable claim
added: '... property is a central economic institution of any society, and private property is the
central institution of a free society' (p.4). The onus of proof strictly lies with those who claim
property, property rights, etc. For outside certain far from universal social conditions there is no
such property as is claimed. Considering the way the onus falls, the situation is remarkable. 77?ere
are no JecM/ve argawenM, so far as I can ascertain,/or such an institution as property. That
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2
situation, if confirmed, raises important questions, such as how and w/ry the institution is in place?
But first the arguments, such as they are.
The main argument preferred by Friedman in support of his grand claims takes off from the
problem of the distribution of scarce material resources among competing parties who seek access
or use.
The usual solution is for the use of each t/ung to be decided by a person or
some group of persons organised under some
o/
Such t/ungs are
called property. If each thing is controlled by an individual who has the
power to transfer that control to any other individual, we call the institution
private property (p.4).
Firstly, all the distribution of resources problem points to is some allocation of uses, or some
sharing thereof. For such purposes many arrangements far short of property will serve; for
instance, lease, limited use rights, and so on. Secondly, what immediately stands out, an attempt is
made to close the chasm between what is so far delivered and what the claims concerning property
require through an appallingly low redefinition of 'property'. What one gets to use under some set
of rules may not be property at all (e.g. a cove, a sea passage,...). Property requires much more:
ownership in a nonv^cuous sense, coupled with a high level of potential control. Nor, thirdly, is
the characterisation of private property satisfactory, as transferable leasehold will meet the
conditions given. It may be argued that leasehold itself requires owne^h^ip; it will be argued that it
does not. But it certainly does not require private property, nor does proprietorship transfer across
leasehold arrangements.
That is^ it. Friedman proceeds, on the quite unwarranted assumption that all is property, to
argue the respective merits of private property and demerits of what is not private, public property
so it is supposed. 'Under public property, the values of the public as a whole are imposed on the
individuals who require the use of that property to accomplish their ends' (p.7). Something
remotely
that may hold for the example Friedman is discussing, the inordinately dull broadcast
media of the USA; but it certainly does not hold generally given the remainder way in which 'public
property' is characterised, so that no values whatsoever may be imposed.
What subjects hold property rights (if any) or like rights? The standard chauvinistic
assumption is that the class of such subjects comprises humans, or competent humans, or humans
who have competent guardians. But why should other creatures not hold and maintain territories,
as many appear to do? And if incompetent or disqualified humans can hold property managed by
guardians, trustees and the like, and if legal persons such as corporations can do likewise, why
should not a range of nonhumans (for instance, those that are credited with interests) do something
similar?
Given that many nonhumans can (and do) have proprietory rights, there can be a head-on
conflict between human rights and property rights (in opposition to Friedman p.3).
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Anarchistic societies of any complexity will typically consist of a network of decentralised
organisation, or a federation of these (etc.). The organisations will thus be regional, but
beyond that set up according to issue, role or function. Thus they will include what might well
be accounted
Many of the stock features of political functionalism, as
decentralised, will accordingly recur, separation of powers, tailoring of administration to need,
�for instance. The organisations will furthermore be noncoercive; no individual or group will be
forced to join. Typically they will be voluntary arrangements.
A critical question is to how these organisations, substituting for the operation of state,
are to be controlled, regulated, and so on. In such favoured democratic structures control is
usually remarkably indirect. A populace weakly selects a central parliament, which exercises
through other bodies some control of state organisations. A full anarchism is obliged to
dissolve or substitute for central parliaments. It has a obvious option, namely direct democratic
control of state-substituting organisations. A simple way of achieving this is through sortition:
the membership of the governing component of each organisation is chosen randomly from
those of the regional community who volunteer to be on it. In some cases volunteers may
require accessible qualifications, and disqualifications (e.g. by having served before, by some
disqualifying record). Where the community decides that certain categories of people should be
represented, e.g. disable, minorities, then it is a matter of arranging random selection of the
required fraction of group numbers from these categories. This style of statistical democracy
dates back at least to original democracies of Greek city states where public officials were
sometimes selected by lot (it is discussed under democracy in Aristotle's Po/m'cy). Nowadays it
is called dwxirc/ty (a term with an unfortunate prior meaning); here in its anarchistic form it will
be alluded to under the ecologism dewa/tarcAy.
Such demanarchy has the immediate virtue of removing an expensive duplication,
government ministers and their departmental counterparts (e.g. finance ministers and
corresponding appointed treasury officials). Indeed, the whole charade of parliamentary
government, ministers and hordes of minders, governments and replicating opposition teams, is
duly removed - as it has to be under non-centralization. Such parliamentary centres are
eliminated; insofar as anything replaces them, it is the dispersed community, no centre, which is
directly linked to functional organisation.
Gone with the centre, or seriously reduced, are several standard political worries, such as
those of coup or take-over, insurrection or invasion. These usually involve capturing the centre
and its command structure, no longer there to capture.^ Community defence is thereby
rendered much easier. Also considerably reduced is the standard problem of who controls the
controllers: partly because control is so diffused, and prartly because a main controller is the
community (one of the advantages of democracy).
Appropriate institutions take care of the day-to-day running of community affairs; but
what of major issue decisions, changes of direction or structure. These can be accomplished
3
For there is no command or control structure that could be taken by an invador or internal
insurrection.
�from the bottom, through referenda, propositions and the iike (organised through a suitably
independent college), rather than in present top-down inflexible fashion. (These methods, of
which there is worthwhile experience in parts of Europe, are investigated in Wolff.)
A regular early question is how such a stateless structure is to be financed wirAoM? coecive
mechanisms available. Of course if coercive institutions were in place, then the overall structure
could be financed in the sorts of ways that states are presently financed. It should be observed,
in any case, that coercive means are very rarely resorted to (unless the target is persued for
reasons, such as crime) in order to obtain revenue payments from wealthy corporations, firms
or individuals, where in a more equitible community much of the funding would derive from
(by contrast with most present states). There are several parts to a satisfactory answer:* Mt/cA less public revenue would be required because the most expensive, most wasteful, and
least productive components of state have been excised. These include the whole apparatus of
central government and electoral politics, and the associated system of coercion, standard
military forces and defense establishment, espionage framework, and police forces, prison
establishment and expensive courts.
Nonetheless there remain many institutions to finance, include smaller substitutes for
some of the abolished structures (e.g. social defence arrangements).
* Many institutions can be largely or entirely self-financing, because like customs and import
organisation they collect revenue, or through fair user-pays principles. Reasonable returns
taken can be channelled to an independent revenue office with no outside spending or
redistribution powers.
* Much, if not all, further social revenue could be raised through resources taxation (adequate
royalties and the like), rental taxes on property, gift and gains taxes, and through auctions (of
previously inherited goods), how this would work depends upon community arrangements.
Consider however a preferred anarchistic arrangement where that problematic item, private
property, has not been instituted or has been oblished (as with most European anarchism, by
contrast with North American forms). Valuable durables (roughly, any durable with stealing
for sale in present systems) will be rented instead of bought. Learnchold systems can be
operated very like private property (as the land system in A.C.T. reveals) fruit-feting market
operations, but they offer significantly better control, for instance environmentally, they enable
the social component of generated wealth to be reflected, through a rental, and they can be of
finite terms and to a given individual, so inheritance transfer is excluded. In place of the
�customery land titles office a larger durables office with subdivision for types of durables
would be instituted, with each durable now indelibly marked or described.^
4
Here as with rcfcraHs, computing fasiiibiies remove many previous obstacles to each arguments.
Organisation can move with new technology.
��,.
—--
-------------------------
^4^
/
A
����CHAPTER
ROADS TO ANARCHY: OLD ROUTES AND NEW INPUTS
STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION TO ANARCHIST SOCIETIES,
AND AFTER.
As there is a plurality of anarchistic positions and end-states, so, but not in a directly
corresponding way, there is a plurality of routes to anarchism. As the positions vary very
considerably in quality, so do the routes, some of them risky, all of them difficult.
Anarchism, even though theoretical viable, undoubtedly looks /iard to obtain on any scale.
For states are now extremely well entrenched - in furthermore a mutually supportive exclusive
club of states. There is now immense resistance to their removal, deriving from several sources.
In particular, state actors and power-brokers are most unlikely to modify statist arrangements in
ways inadvantageous to themselves, to relinquish any power, still less to step down easily. Such
actors will often take desperate steps to retain institutional power; it is very difficult to persuade
most political human to relinquish power simply and gracefully.
Nonetheless opportunities arise for overthrowing or superseding states (for instance, in most
of Eastern Europe and much of Western Asia in the early 1990s). Periods of crises or "power
vacuum", in particular, afford opportunities, which should be seized as they may not arise often in
more stable states (most recently in 1974 in Australia). A well-prepared anarchist movement will
organise, then, and when the moment arrives, pounce (a partial model is feline hunting practice).
But such opportunistic and risky revolutionary routes are only one way to change, as the following
diagram, designed to survey the possibility field, should reveal.
Diagram 5.7 Ways /a poZiWca/ change.
WAYS
Intra-State:
within State
setting
EVOLUTIONARY
1. typically slow or incremental
REVOLUTIONARY
]
'
operations through received
political channels
2.
t
<
j
typically rapid
operations circuiting
established channels:
coups, insurrections, etc.
)
Extra-State
3. operations establishing
alternative organisations
bypassing or substituting
for statist arrangements, or
functioning within the
interstices of the state
!
*
4. operations comprising
j)
.
'
]
external inference or
intervention: by negotiation,
military means, sanctions,
examples, etc.
�0
2
Pluralistic anarchist practice will pursue each and every one of these ways and means, so far
as resources indicate and permit, subject to constraints. For example, a nonviolent movement will
not adopt violent means (unless it insists upon a strange separation of ends and means). There is
nothing distinctively anarchist about these ways, except for 3; all otherwise are ways of changing
state arrangements, 2 of trading one sort of state for another, 3 of imposing state control and
discipline where it is lapsing from "approved" form or where there may have been none (as with
colonial adventures).
As there have been many attempts to narrowly delimit anarchism, so there have been
repeated attempts to restrict roads and byways to anarchism. Exposing these attempts will at the
same time show what is open.
J, Deploying and making wore
sZads/ po/f/fcaf arrange/ncnis
Use of orthodox political channels is not excluded. Pluralistic anarchism is not obliged to
dismiss political routes to anarchism or to anarchist objectives. Parliamentary and other
constitutional routes (such as through referenda) to an anarchist end-state are perfectly possible, if
difficult because of the tendency of state apparatus to endeavour to perpetuate itself. (As a related
example, a main successful party in the multi-party Australian Capital Territory government was
organised and supported by those opposed to such a government.) A main difficulty confronting
change through conventional political procedure is simply that, w/tere it does occur, it is usually
extraordinarily slow and limited, it is almost invariably small change at the margins.
It may take a little lateral reasoning to see the advantages, or occasionally practical necessity,
of working through or within a system or even strengthening it first in order to demolish it
(strengthening does not imply endorsing forever, but nothing more "counterintuitive" than appears
in a battery of stock psychological tests or clever martial arts). Authentic Marxism, for example,
which is ultimately anarchistic, is committed to very much such a circuitous route: the circuit goes
through a rejuvenated super-productive state, which in old age withers away.
A main reason why it has been imagined that use of established political channels is
excluded, in anarchist practice, is not because of the slow evolutionary nature of the process, but
because of a doctrine of means-ends congruence, which is given too circumscribed a construal.
This over-strong congruence doctrine requires more than what coherence seems to demand,
namely that the means should be compatible with comprehensive ends sought (thus precluding, for
example, violent means to achieve non-violent ends). It further requires that in anarchist action,
particularly the revolution, the end of a stateless society should be "prefigured", not some
intervening non-congruent objective. Even if the geometric metaphor were duly clarified, few
reasons have been advanced for accepting the crippling doctrine, which is not self-evident.
�3
Frankly, anarchism does not need to give itself unnecessary handicaps; it faces enough real-world
obstacles without dubious doctrinaire additions from well-intentioned friends.
An anarchist organisation is plainly not a contradiction in terms; nor therefore is an anarchist
coalition or party, committed for instance to removing coercive institutions. Pursuing this tack, an
anarchist can vote for a party which comes closer to realising immediate anarchist objectives than
other parties, or, very differently, for a party which will assist long-term anarchist objectives (for
instance, by wreaking the national economy and thereby helping green objectives and generating
appropriate political discontent and dissent), without any commitment to the parties concerned, and
without endorsing the political system within which they operate. Strategic voting is not
precluded; strategic anarchist voters may well (unlike totalitarian voters) support (preferential)
democratic procedures.
While the state is to be dis-established, meanwhile there are more benign and less benign
states, in relevant respects, apart from how decently they treat their citizens and noncitizens and
aliens. It is no longer altogether accurate to insist, as anarchists used to a century ago, that 'every
state is an agency whereby a ruling minority exploits and oppresses a majority' (M p.87). Many in
majorities may do very nicely, thank you, while some in the elite minority may be grindstoned.
Moreover, the mass of people is generally not only resistant to change, but highly reluctant to force
changed unless there is very considerable dis-ease, which in most developed states there is not.
These are some of a mix of reasons why a revolution is so remote in comfortable countries; no
longer the incendiary states kindled for the anarchist match that 19th century anarchists imagined.
Despite mass lethargy, dissatisfaction with the state is extensive and comes from right across
the conventional political spectrum. There is widespread popular sentiment to the effect that "the
state has become our master instead of our servant", a reversal of roles that should not surprise
Hegelians. Libertarians interpret this in terms of a much reduced state, a much leaner and
hopefully much less hungry state - a route to anarchism if dismantling went in a right direction and
far enough. Right-thinking socialists interpret it in terms of a much transformed state, a helping
but unobtrusive rather than a commanding busybody state. A familiar view of the state from a
section of Green Movement represents a turn on the old anarcho-socialist view:
The ... state and the corporate sector are in alliance for the sake of "development".... We
try to wean people away from the belief that the state will act in the interest of the cidzens.
So we believe the ... state is best viewed as an oppressor (Orton, Response to Dwandik
Quesdons, p.6).
Orton argues on the basis of this for not trying 'to "use" the state' and 'not seeking government
funds'. But if the funds largely represent social wealth, why not judicious use? And if the state is
1
Social psychology appears to show as much.
�4
the only legal means of requisite change? And so on.. In fact Orton himself proposes to make
changes through the state by mobilizing the people.
A state may also be more benign in other significant respects: for instance, in that it facilitates
minority political representation, including green anarchist groups, and in that it does not
significantly impede anarchist political and practical activity or render paths significantly more
difficult. Overlapping that, more benign less domineering states may leave substantial room for
significant anarchist practice both in lifestyle and in building organisational structures and (as it
were) alternatives to archist arrangements (such as peoples' books, time stores, etc.) What are in
important respects anarchist communities can operate within, as well as be modelled within, less
intrusive states (the limits to this quasi-anarchism, elaborated in Nozick, are explained in UT).
States that better meet anarchist (and green socialist) criteria for benignness can conveniently be
disdnguished as more .sywparico states.
Committed anarchists can quite well also be committed, as an intermediate goal among
others, to achieving more sympatico states, which may involve conventional (as well as
unconventional) political activity. No doubt engagement in conventional political activity carries a
risk of co-option; but there are obvious way of reducing that risk, of avoiding the 'slide into
collaboration with the bourgeoisie [and] ... willingness to play the game of parliamentary
politics'.2 For example, precautionary strategies include: engagement also in unconventional
political activity, anarchist or communal practice, consciousness-raising exercises, and use of time
limits, interruption tactics, rotations of leaders, and so on. Green party activities and procedures
can serve as a useful model here?.
Apart from the real dangers of co-option and state collaboration, there are other intertwined
objections standardly made to attempting political roads to anarchism and socialism. One objection
is that any attempt to use the state 'unavoidably reproduces all the features of that institution', such
as exploitation by a ruling or elite minority, and oppression of the majority. Few, it is continued,
will escape from effective control, or, when if offers, be able to resist using the immense powers
of the state. New people, new power-holders, will be transformed (by the usual devices, such as
being made to feel important, given an exaggerated impression of their own worth). It should be
evident that the objection has drifted from "reproduction of the state" to variants of "power
corrupts". Both are overstated, and there are strategies for overcoming both. Sometimes the state
c/tang&y, perhaps for the better; the British state has altered significantly in the last 300 years,
seemingly for better.
Corresponding the power of certain power-holders has declined
significantly, from monarchs and aristocracy down.
2
3
M p.89, see also Goodin in Green Politics.
See Spretnak and Capra 86 for details.
�5
Another objection is better focussed. It is that use of the state leads the wrong ways,
through organisation by centralization and hierarchy, and action by legislation. As a result state
routes will not lead to decentralization, distribution of power and wealth downwards, and so on.
While state practices are commonly antipathetic to the sort of constructive objectives indicated, they
are not always, and they do not /Mvg to be. States, like large corporations, can reorganise, and
occasionally attempt to (thus reform and restructuring of bureaucracies, or even of whole public
services, etc.). Although unlikely for reasons indirected, state reorganisation can in principle
proceed by decentralization and devolution of power. Nor is there any lethal objection to achieving
action by legislation, so long as that legislation is not enforced by inadmissible coercive methods.
In sum, what the objection reemphasizes is that considerable care has to be exercised in using the
state, as with any major source of power. Further it shows again that transition can only proceed
so far through the state; the state route only leads so far, after which other means of transport need
to be taken or considered.
There are other ways of amending statist political arrangements than political approaches,
notably legal means, through courts. There is little anarchist precedence for such activity; mostly
anarchists have had heavy legal apparatus used against them. However, once again environmental
practice serves as a valuable exemplar, with many worthwhile results achieved (especially in
American courts) through litigation. In principle there is much that could be achieved in this way,
in state and international courts, to reduce the power of states and their instrumentalities. For
example, in Australia there are very many statues and laws which unjustifiably limit freedoms and
restrict individual and group action: examples include not only little activated but appalling
legislation on sedition, assembly, and similar, but a sweeping range of actively used and
opportunistically exploited legislation concerning defamation and freedom of speech, victimless
crimes, paternalism, restrictive trade and banking, sheltered professions, compulsory voting, and
so on, and on.
There is also much room for variation and experimentation within prevailing political and
legal arrangements. For example, applying procedures of statistical democracy to a few greater
range of activities than (adjusted) jury servicing to the organisation of municipal services, public
companies, and so on.
alternative structures and the forest succession model.
A main strategy for transition, emerging from the arguments for the viability of anarchism, is
that of replacement: transition to a new anarchist social order proceeds by replacement or
adaptation of the more satisfactory State organisations and structures by organisations and
structures of a more anarchistic cast, and by removal or phasing out of remaining no longer
necessary or unsatisfactory State arrangements.
Replacement and supersession suggest a biological model, of such change and succession,
as occurs where one forest type succeeds another; and such a model is in turn very suggestive. To
<?,
�6
make the model more definite, and to give it some local colour, consider forest succession where a
sub-tropical rainforest replaces a eucalypt forest, as analogous to the case where anarchism
replaces a Statist society. There is certainly a marked change in structure, typically from a tall
forest with a fairly open canopy to a more compact closed forest with more layers of vegetation,
much more local diversity and a richer variety of life forms, especially floral forms. A forest is not
merely a set of trees, but trees in structural arrangement and interdependence, not merely on one
another but on other life forms such as pollinating insects, seed-carrying birds and animals, and so
on; and the changes in structure include changes in microclimate, in soil moisture levels and humus
and bacterial content.
The change of forest type may be by evolution, by hastened or induced evolution, or by
catastrophe (revolution) as when a eucalypt forest is clearfelled and artificially succeeded by
planted rainforest. (Strictly, there is a spectrum of practices and replacement strategies between
evolutionary and revolutionary and various different revolutionary strategies; and the standard
evolutionary-revolutionary contrast presents a false dichotomy.)
Even reliance on predominantly evolutionary methods, which tend to be very slow by human
time scales, way require some (management) practices, else evolution towards rainforest will not
begin or continue. For example, seeds for rainforest species may not be available if adjoining
areas have been stripped of suitable seed trees, e.g. by clearing or eucalypt conversion, in which
case it will be necessary to introduce seeds (of anarchist ideas, methods, arrangements, etc.). And
rainforest evolution may not be able to continue because the area is burnt occasionally, e.g. by
State officers, in which case protection against fire will be required: for with burning (and the
suppression) regimes rainforest seedlings are killed and eucalypt dominance perpetuated.
Furthermore, evolution can be hastened or induced by introducing seeds, or planting rainforest
trees in poorly seeded areas (i.e. setting up alternative social arrangements) under the eucalypt
overstorey, or even by some careful culling of eucalypts. But even without culling there will be
much for anarchist management to do.
As the rainforest cover begins to grow up through the eucalypt forest, the forest begins to
change structurally. Younger eucalypt poles die, and their replacement by eucalypts is generally
precluded owing to low light intensities near the forest floor (in something the same way
conditions for political entrepreneurs to flourish are excluded in an emerging anarchist society).
Gradually, as the rainforest grows, only scattered giant eucalypts protrude through the canopy,
and in time these fall to the forest floor, to rot and not to be replaced - unless the climax rainforest
is subject to catastrophe, such as fire or cyclone.
Catastrophic methods, such as clearfelling the eucalypt forest, replanting with rainforest,
protecting the new forest, and removing eucalyptus regrowth, are wocA more problematic. To be
applied they require either a large workforce or much mechanical power (so it is with violent
revolutions which need a large support basis not generally available in advanced capitalist and state
�7
socialist countries, or else access to means of perpetrating violence comparable to that of the State).
There are often similar requirements for success; otherwise the area may be choked by rapidly
growing weeds or the rainforest plants may be suppressed by eucalypt seedlings and a pioneer
eucalypt stage recur. Moreover, a eucalypt overstorey can sometimes afford good conditions for
rainforest growth, e.g. plant protection from excessive sun, from occasional frosts, and from
drying winds, better moisture retention conditions, and so on. Similarly anarchist social
organisations may sometimes be able to
the environment afforded by the State to get started.
Thus not all forms of the State are necessarily equally inimical, and some may provide much more
favourable conditions for the development of anarchist social organisation than others.^
The forest model (together with preceding arguments) helps to illustrate why violent and
catastrophic methods are not congruent witty the goals of an anarchist society and why there is an
intimate connection between these goals and a strong preference for nonmilitaristic and non-violent
methods of achieving change. Replacement involves a (normally gradual) process of developing
alternative institutions and forms of social organisation and the growth of the new form of society
within the old, and is not a catastrophic single event conceived of as outside the normal order of
things, and for whose advent all other action for change is held suspended. And just as methods
of change such as clearfelling are likely to perpetuate the eucalypt cycle and are unlikely to favour
the development of the rainforest, so the use of catastrophic and especially militaristic methods is
likely to perpetuate an authoritarian social order and unlikely to favour the development of a co
operative, non-violent and non-coercive one.
* applying the forest succession model.
How to apply the model is not difficult to appreciate at least in broad outline. As well many
of the further details have been filled out by work that can be described as indicating how
allegiance can be shifted in practice from where we mostly are to alternative social arrangements
and lifestyles built on self-management and mutual aid.$ The seeds of anarchism should be
broadcast or planted, anarchist (non-Statist) arrangements instituted or strengthened, and efforts
made to replace or modify vulnerable Statist arrangements, e.g. by democratisation of present
institutions and development of nonstatist and noncapitalist alternatives. Some of the practices are
familiar: anarchist groups, clubs, pamphlets, broadcasts, newsletters, etc.; (anarchist)
cooperatives, exchanges, neighbourhood groups, rural communities, etc. Others are slightly less
familiar: avoidance of State influence by arrangements beyond State reach such as costless (or
alternative currency) interchanges of goods and services, barter, black-green economies, and so
on, action directed at removing decision-making from State departments, such as forest services,
and into citizen hands, and ultimately, to decentralized interested communities. In this sort of way,
4
5
This has an important bearing on strategies for achieving change: see D. Altman, ReAearsaAs ybr CAange,
Fontana, Melbourne. 1980.
As sketched in some of the material already cited, for example, Routley, p.284 ff.,SM.
�8
worthwhile State arrangements can be replaced, and power can be progressively transferred from
the State, and returned to the communities and to people more directly involved.
Formation of networks of anarchistic communities and neighbourhoods, functioning within
the interstices of the state and state bureaucracies, would represent a significant stage in
succession. Something like this is beginning to develop in Australia (by contrast with the USA
where the commune movement appears to have gone into decline).^
3. Types of individual and small group actions
While strategies proceeding through movements are social in character, a variety of
individna/ action can also be highly effective if widely enough separately undertaken. Naturally if
there is some solidarity, some coordination of individuals, such action will be both fostered and
enhanced. Witness the practice of early Christians, which combined individual action and
consciousness change, within a support and solidarity network. But Christianity misleadingly
promised more than anarchism and environmentalism can, not merely future better lives, but after
lives in splendour, a bogus transcendentalism which however was, and still is, widely believed, a
damaging transcendentalism too, in that satisfactory lives in real space-time can be foregone, in
favour of virtual after-lives.
*
fran-y/br/nano/M. There are a range of proposals for comprehensive personal
change, but they all share fundamentals, which are personal improvement and enhanced personal
relationships. It is because of these shared fundamentals that religious change, such as that offered
under new Testament Christianity shades into the quasi-spiritualism of sects linked to Deep
Ecology (such as Council of All-Beings, Homage to Gaia, Earth Empowerment, etc.) which in
tum shades into Californian personal therapy fashions. Proposals for transformation do not
however have to hang^ out on the fringes of religion; hardheads like Passmore (in direct descent^
from 18th century sympathy-based ethics) have emphasized both personal relationships, love for
others, and moral improvement, better adherence to tested moral principles. Put together, these
individual changes would lead us, it is optimistically imagined, out of the environmental morass
and to a socially and environmentally better world. While it is not that simple, while the problems
lie deeper, some thought it was simpler still. Either the Beatles in their famous lines 'All you need
is love', reflecting an extremely popular sentiment, only saw one part of what was recognised, or
they erroneously supposed that part would yield the remainder. Love slobs are one sort of
counterexample; they achieve love and just wallow in that, not seeking any sort of improvement,
moral or other.
Let us not diminish the relevance of these proposals: the more rounded people among the
thin paper-mache economic and political men focussed only upon maximizing their own self-
interested utility in material consumer goods the better, the better for many concerns, including no
6
Refs
�9
doubt prospects for anarchism. But let us not delude ourselves that herein lies the way out or
forward. Many of those proposals have been around for rather long time, and suggested again and
again, with no conspicuous results. A lot of it is to found in Spinoza, whence it has percolated
through both to Deep Ecology and Freudian therapy. The Deep Ecological emphasis on self
realisation goes back at leas a century, to Humboldt and Mill, with Self already expanded in
German and British idealists. German and British industrial development did not lose a beat.
A mental revolution, in some people's minds, is no doubt essential for a properly planned
revolution. But mental transformations have to be translated into action, to practices that make a
material difference. And consciousness transformations may not translate into appropriate action;
many such transformations are politically very conservative, and lead to no relevant action or effort
for structural change.
Much of what is said of consciousness transformation applies also to
*
a route to change recommended by reformers and radicals for at least a century, from
Mill through Bookchin. Education, appropriately undertaken, can amend ideology, change
consciousness. But at its best it is very slow in operation, very partial because it has to compete
against other sources of propaganda (such as media, dominant society, etc.). And it is more likely
to carry dominant messages, and reinforce dominant attitudes. There is a major problem in getting
alternative messages appropriately delivered and action undertaken.
* c^pting oat (so far as this is possible or even now possible).
To be effective, this has to be focussed, not merely a dropping out parasitic on the state system. It
has to be focussed in way^which challenge the state systems, it inevitability, decidability, etc., in
Redirect
*-F
ways which withdraw contributions to it and ^.... activity elsewhere^creating an atwojpaere, of
expectation and of belief (perhaps even if false). .
If you or your group produce the impression that there is going to be a continuing recession
or a revolution, if your spread the conviction that there is widespread dissatisfaction, that society is
sick or rotten to the core and is about to decline further or collapse, then you are taking a
significant step towards such outcomes, towards decline or fall? If these efforts to develop an
atmosphere are widely orchestrated then they are likely to be so much the more effective. It is
appreciated in business and advertising circles how much psychological atmosphere counts; a
Pint
,
*
Al
r
climate of confidence is
important ^for climbing out of a recession. A climate of
revolutionary expectation can set the scene for revolution events.
While it is dishonest to create an impression of imminent decline and disaster knowing full
well that such scenarios are utterly unlikely, informed greens and anarchists are not in any such
compromised situation. Environmental decline, continuing extensive unemployment, persisting
7
To adapt Joll p.222.
v /s
�10
periodic recession, and in due course collapse, are likely futures under present capitalist state
trajectories.
Anarchists can assist in producing an atmosphere of gloom and depression and pessimism
about capitalist economic circumstances and prospects. But they will aim to generate a quite
different impression of the stability of capitalistic arrangements.
4. Widening operations to exceed standard political and legal arrangements.
Unorthodox political ways and means, a prominent part of historical anarchist activity, are
much more extensive than political textbooks would suggest (or have impressionable readers
believe). These have been restored to contemporary prominence through civil disobedience
practices, and peace and environmental actions. Methods have also been modified (for instance to
exclude pointless personal violence) and substantially expanded. Practical tactics include protests,
occupations, blockades, parades demonstrations, theatre, civil disobedience, refusals, boycotts,
tax and financial withholdings, plant disobilizations, monkey wrenching, and so on.8 Such
methods, more accurately active applications of those tactics, are grouped under Jirec? action, a
vague appellation sometimes taken or extended to include forms of guerrilla warfare on the one
side and more indirect pressure group activity (lobbying, petitioning, public meetings, etc) on the
other. (Such tactics substantially improve upon, and rechannel, the often misguided and rather illfated "deeds" and "acts of propaganda" of late 19th C anarchists.) Such tactics can be both shorttermed and sustained. Important among sustained practices are resistance movements and
organised refusals (preferably without conspicuous leaders). While individuals can be selectively
picked off, enough people well organised cannot. Mass social actions and Grand Refusals could
constitute significant political happenings. Such strategies can be pursued both for specific
objectives (to preserve a forest here, a building there) and for much more general objectives, up to
and including dislodging an unpopular governing party, or overturning a state.
For more general and dramatic results to be achieved, there are some important preliminary
desiderata to be satisfied. These include
* establishment of a movement, to carry out actions, and subsequently to participate in the
supersession of the state.
* a certain amount of planning, of how to proceed, to direct limited resources. Subsequently, as
supersession of the state becomes a live issue, much planning of the transition and of post-state
arrangements is important, if a successful outcome, or even a good attempt, is to be achieved.
Proper preparation is critical. Once again, planning and organisation of anarchist activity is
certainly not excluded, in revolutionary movements or elsewhere. The rival spontaneity view, still
fashionable in anarchist circles, is underpinned by a confused picture of freedom;^ is inconsistent
8
9
See Coover et al, B. Martin, Changing t/te %bgs, G Sharp.
Duly criticised in "Hot immigration".
�11
with the coupled congruence doctrine where end-states are prefigured; and issues in poor decision
making, choice deliberately uninformed by available information. But naturally planning is not,
and cannot be, total; and it should not be too inflexible, but allow for contingencies, extraordinary
happenings, even spontaneous redirection (e.g. though a range of flexible ranked options).
Initiating an anarchist movement virtually from a zero base (the present situation in most
developed states), would be a slow difficult and no doubt frustrating task. Fortunately there are
attractive alternatives, such as integration with already effective movements, notably those already
engaged and experienced in direct action.
Declared or self-conscious anarchists are now few in number, and lacking in power.
Contemporary anarchists live like the counterculture did, around the margins or in the interstices of
contemporary dominant statist societies, rarely seen in the boardrooms of top companies or at the
clubs of power brokers. Accordingly, transitions to anarchism are most unlikely to proceed at all
directly, either upwards by democratic or popular procedures or downwards through constitutional
procedures invoked by controlling elites. Anarchist strategies, in order to work, will need to be
indirect and smarter. There is much scope for such strategies.
For direct action along the lines sketched to amount to anything, an anarchist movement with
considerable organisational capabilities is needed. The most promising way of fast-tracking such a
movement is to mobilize already established movements, namely, once again, green and peace and
like movements. The idea, in brief, to form an active anarchist movement within the union of
green and peace movements. It will have to be wif/un these movements. For not all those
affiliated with those loose movements are opposed to statist political arrangements or
anarchistically inclined. Many of the leaders and prominent spokespeople among
environmentalists for instance, have a cosy relationship with state political figures and bureaucrats.
Indeed these days many of these state-intricated people, who may well have genuine environmental
commitments, account themselves green, but they are generally unlikely to consider rocking the
ship of state. Nor do these state people generally participate in extended or vigorous protest
operations, of which there are increasing many. An anarchist movement will link into the
extensive more radical end of green and peace movements. There is already considerable linkage,
and considerable scope for expansion of linkage. Many radical greens are vaguely aware of the
anarchist character of several of their own proposals for change.
More radical greens are mostly already aware of the extent of state involvement in
environmental degradation, and of state connections with, and encouragement of, large
corporations engaged in environmentally destructive enterprises. Nor will they be long bought off
by (what threatens to split the green movement) attempts at reconciliation, most recently under the
ambiguous banner of "sustainable development". It is becoming clear to more radical greens that
this normally means sustaining economic development, that is capitalistic business and
macroeconomic growth largely as usual, not sustaining the already developed environmental
heritage. More radical peace activists are even more keenly aware of the intrication of states in
�12
activities hostile to peace such as military activity, weapons production, support of repressive
states and client army/armies funding of counter-insurgency, terrorist and destabilization operators,
and so on. There is evidently much common ground to build upon, from which to organise.
Correladvely, mobilization through loose green and peace movements effects the character of
the activated anarchism, shaping and limiting its forms. It will be an ecosocial anarchism of pacific
slant: ESP anarchism for short (for ecosociopacific anarchism). There is no similar prospect of
mobilizing most other forms of anarchism, in particular robustly individualistic varieties. For the
natural allies of the latter varieties, economic rationalist and libertarianians are overwhelmingly
committed to a minimalistic state to guarantee, coercively, the fundamentals of market capitalism
(private property, constitu^onal and contract law, etc.).
Until a movement is organised there is little chance of a satisfactory revolution. While a few
people may be able to gain control, briefly, of some states, without a larger movement requisite
restructuring of state functions cannot be carried through.
A viable anarchism further supposes some alternative fairly detailed organisational and social
arrangements. If such a system is to come to pass and to persist, then its prospects are
exceedingly poor if it is a do-nothing set of arrangements spontaneously arising out of a
revolution. But the state as it grows tends to undermine or eliminate such alternative arrangements;
and simultaneously people come more and more to expect the government to do what they might
formerly have done, or banded together to do, themselves. The state again proceeds, like other
persistent systems and ecosystems, to establish conditions for its own survival: to be needed for
social and even individual activities.
Formation q/ movements wMwn movements.
There is presently very little in the way of organised anarchist activity anywhere in the
world, and no real movements. There is, for instance, Liberty Foundation in USA which supports
anarchist productions, but it does not discriminate in what it supports between anarchism and
minimal statism and economic rationalism. There are other organisations that do or could play a
creative role in anarchist movements (such as Black Rose publicadons in Montreal, and the small
Institute of Social Ecology in Vermont). As it takes some time, and much effort, to establish a
viable movement, the situation for anarchistic change may look bleak. But there is no reason why
anarchism need form an independent movement; it can hitch to already established movements.
There are obvious movements, of very sympathetic character, to join (this is no inHitration or
annexation): namely the green movement and the peace movement. In both these overlapping
movements there is wide appreciation that states themselves are major sources of the issues they
are concerned with; for states are the main cause of wars, major participants in nuclear industries,
major sources of the issues they are concerned with; for states are the main cause of wars, major
participants in nuclear industries, major proponents of economic growth and its concomitant
pollution and waste. (Despite the definite descriptions, these "movement" are really loose
A
�13
c
coalitions, often not even organised in one group in individual countries.) Development of
anarchist groundswells within green organisations and among green sympathizers appears
particularly promising. For many greens are beginning to recognise that they are getting nowhere
much, or even going backwards, through state support and state-directed appeals and activity.
Turning enough of these doubtful or disillusional greens in positive anarchist directions looks a
genuine prospect, io
There are very great advantages in mobilizing relevant parts of green and peace movements
(
in anarchistic direcdons. Not only are there substantially concordant ideologies and goods; further
the
to these ends lie available and quite well developed. Readily to be drawn upon is much
knowledge of and experience in direct action methods, nonviolent resistance and sabotage, civil
(and state) disobedience, and similar.n While several of these methods and procedures derive
from earlier anarchist, resistance and civil disobedience practices (and many are common currency
of direct oppositional organisations everywhere), they have been brought to a new level of
refinement. Further, some extremely important restrictions are recognised. By contrast with
methods deployed by "illegal" armies, guerillas, insurgents and the like, paramilitary techniques
are out. Such paramilitary organisations are, in any case, operating within the statist paradigm,
normally aiming to replace some state arrangements by others. Methods applied are expected to be
nonviolent, and to inflict no serious damage upon living creatures.^
What is foreshadowed, then, is formation and development, in each region, of a radical
change movement, a radwienf or
Ideal radments in different regions are in
communication and loosely federated. A radment proceeds to undertake both reformist action and
radical action, marginally political and extra-political action, up to and including revolutionary
action. Much action is undertaken by smaller groups within the radment, vands (to choose a heady
combination of "band" and "van").^ Vands undertake specific projects, of a wide variety of sorts.
So far much of their activity has been directed to halting or redirecting specific vandalistic activities
of governments, governmental authorities or government-licensed corporations, such as logging,
whaling, sealing, polluting, transporting hazardous waste,... The simple proposal is that the range
10
11
12
13
Experiences or processes of change involved do not amount to conversion; for there is no adoption of a
faith. Anarchism resembles atheism, a loss of faith, rather than a religion. Rather there is a comingdown-to-earth, a realisation that institutions in which trust and hope had been placed did not warrant those
investments and were without justificatory clothes.
There is now an array of texts documenting methods, explaining how they are applied, how they can be
taught (e.g. through enactments, drama, practice, etc), and so on. See (as above).
There are some controversial procedures, such as the tree spiking used by Earth-Firsters and MonkeyWrenchers. Those may do minor damage to some trees spiked, and serious damage to loggers and
sawmillers who proceed to mill spiked trees, (a careful formulation of admissible procedures and practices
is required.)
Vands may include wanderers and wanderlebeners, but they are not vandals. Environmental vandalism is
one of the major practices they oppose.
�14
of vand activity should be expanded, to include revolutionary action. Such action would include
counter-option, taking over the administrations of organisations that are being specifically
combated or targeted. Experience could be gained on organisations like universities, though the
ultimate target is naturally the state.
Designing a s/nari revo/afton.'
and revo/MZfonary achion.
If the state were justified, if it had a moral right to be there, the action, revolutionary or
other, by ethically guided anarchists to dislodge or remove it would be excluded. But it is not. So
action, including revolutionary action against it, is not thereby excluded.
Perhaps the richest literature on rapid transformation of society, on revolution, falls within
the orbit of marxism. There is much to be learnt from this literature, and much from it can be
adopted. Some of the elements for textual adaptation are simple. Replace 'the working class' or
'workers' appropriately (unfortunately the replacement is not uniform). For example, substitute
'people's councils' for 'workers councils'; replace 'vanguard class' by 'revolutionary coalition',
etc. Not only does marxism presume a vanguard class; more difficult it presumes violence as an
inevitable component of revolutionary action. Here the direct and other action methods already
alluded to substitute for marxist methods.
But while much can be learnt form Marxist socialists, there are fundamental differences as to
the point and character of revolution. While the Marxist objective is to siege power and use it, the
anarchist objective is not to seize power, and then remove it or relinquish it, a dubious and risky
indirect route, but rather to neutralize and remove power directly.
There are said to be classic problems confronting any revolutionary movement. One of these
is the alleged stability of states, in the West at least. This stability, which does not extend far east,
or even into Central Europe, is considerably exaggerated; belief in this stability, which was shaken
by the events in Paris in 1968, can be undermined, by an appropriate subversive campaign, so that
belief no longer constitutes such an intellectual obstacle to revolutionary activity. Another classic
problem turns upon the issue of revolutionary organisation. Some of these organisation^ problems,
practices in green and peace movements, especially in groups like Greenpeace, have already
effectively solved.[detail].
Z/te ZransMon.
Like stages before the transition, stages q/fer transitions to post-state societies will not be
easy. There is a commonplace anarchist sentiment that removal of the state, its burden and
oppressiveness, a real incubus, will release an enormous amount of energy, with great scope for
spontaneity, fulfilment of human potentialities, and so on. Although this sentiment is widely
reiterated, very little evidence for the sentiment is ever assembled. My own sentiment is that the
commonplace sentiment, and what is taken to ensue from it, is largely moonshine, because, for
one thing, there is a countermodel that is at least as plausible. Those who are released from an
�15
immense burden, or very hard oppressive forced labour, simply stop, relax and do very little, or
little more than is necessary for life and limb.
For similar reasons the common anarchist proposition that productivity will rise enormously
after the state is stripped away is very doubtful. If the state is like some sort of slave-driver, post
state productivity will presumably fall. The flood of goods and the end of scarcity, with the
demise of the state and its well-published appropriation of the surplus, looks unlikely (not to say
environmentally undesirable because the impact of the "goods"). Wishful thinking appears to have
gained control in much anarchist literature. There are other important reasons why parts of post
state productivity will decline considerably. Much too much of present production, fostered by the
state, involves erosion of biological capital, and should be wound down accordingly, and
alternatives sought.
In a similar way, anarchists often look far too optimistic about the rapid regeneration of
supportative societies destroyed by, and through machinations of the state. Some of those
supportative arrangements, developed in ages of suppression are gone, perhaps forever; others
will take much tiwg to repair. Social healing is sometimes very slow.
As with post-war reconstruction, living and social arrangements could be very difficult for
some for some considerable time. There will need to be, for instance,
* intermediate support structures put in place to ease the transition for some;
* much flexibility, and some preparedness to experiment to see what works;
* vigilance to ensure that old forces of state do not remerge on the back of social discontent.
Intelligent anarchist arrangements will have flexible plans, enabling anticipation of main problem
areas and sensitive coping with them.
5. External interference
�Chapter 11
FEASIBLE ANARCHIST CONTRIBUTIONS
TO
GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL PROBLEMS
Heavy criticisms of anarchism, driving in strongly from socialist and marxist quarters,
include these: that anarchism offers no worthwhile practice for and offers no useful
contributions far coping with global problems^ meaning problems in present social and political
conditions (not usually problems concerning world environments). Among the problems
alluded to, which it is alleged anarchism does not and cannot address, are human proverty,
human malnutrition, inequitable distribution of resources, human (over-)population, and so on.
Granted, there are great many problems, many of them getting worse rapidly. Though
anarchist arrangements played little or no part in producing these problems — many of them
o
developing and getting out of control under free-enterprise capitalist and state-socialist
arrangements — it is sometimes outrageously claimed that anarchism should be able to deal
successfully with an array of these problems. To add to the insult, it is said to fail as a theory
because it is unable to do so. Why on earth should anarchism be presumed to do this? One
critic endowed with this level of 'gall' (one A. Wertheimer)
contends that anarchism is unable to successfully deal with four
presently existing world social conditions. These are: 1) that "the
population of the earth is (perhaps) too large, but increasing at a
rapid rate with no prospect for a serious reduction"; 2) that "in much
of the world, basic human needs are not being satisfied"; 3) that "the
world's natural and human resources are not evenly distributed
across the globe"; and finally 4) that "the present level of subsistence
is based on a high level of social and economic interdependence
among various regions of the world and within the regions
themselves". In addition [5)J... anarchism is unable to cope with
conflicts between individual self-interest and social needs,
particularly as relates to ... defense (Clark p.142).
The short response is, So what? Anarchism is not really saddled with the global legacies
of p^archist practice. A longer response begins thus:- Firstly, insofar as these conditions
constitute problems ("condition " 3) is more a "fact" than a "problem"), no political theory is
coping successfully, only an all-conquering ideology would pretend to be able to cope.
Democratic capitalism has had (important isolated pockets excepted) little impact in limiting
India's gross population; Maoist socialism^' has de^ only a little better in China. Part of the
problem in almost all such overpopulated regions lies in getting the problem recognised as a
problem, and making appropriate adjustments; as with education and adjustment concerning the
hazards of pollution and smoking, this is largely because of remiss state practice. Part of the
problem, the present resolutions will have ethically inadmissible outcomes or by-products.
—------------ .------------------ ——___
�2
Only for the future is there some glimmer of hope, but not under present archist arrangements.
Secondly, prospects of success for anarchism are primarily regional, not global. But a region
can hardly be expected to handle, rather than make limited contributions towards, world
problems. Suppose, for instance, Niue became (or reverted to) an anarchist society, a
successful one locally. It would be no detraction from its local success that it made no impact
upon demilitarizing the USA or in halting the world's resource drain te thereto, or that its
success was (through standard US media practice) scarcely known about there.
*
iMMM. As we have already noticed, it is often asserted that anarchism cannot work
in regions of large populations or with high population densities. That anarchy only has
prospects of success in small, and perhaps technologically unsophisticated, communities is a
widely espoused thesis? These kinds of assertion have already been criticised.
What do not work are stock archist procedures, e.g. expanding \m out-of-touch
bureaucracy. Poly-archic arrangements cannot handle tough decisions. By contrast, sortition
allows them to be taken (Burgheim). This is important as wide range of decisions: transport
systems, restructuring urban systems, and so on, as well as population and immigration
policies. As there is a range of lobbies (ethnics, etc.) in favour of population increase: hard for
party systems to ignor these lobbies, because of voting system.
* Deliberate social reorganisation, which undercuts reasons for large families, namely old-age
care, cheap labour in fields, etc. (Seeams as successor (technology here)?
* Scarcity is re/aftw to wants and presumed needs. Similarly abundance: it depends
on extent to which materialism, consumerism, ete, prevail. When wants are large, perhaps
insatiable, there will always be scarcity. Wants are not a given; needs, through culturally
dependent, can be. Whan needs are set high (e.g. to include domestic ref^rgeaati^s), then too
there will be scarcity for the foreseeable future?
No doubt there is a rough band of minimal sustenance and shelter requirement for keeping
humans (why are we back to this) alive, for bare sustenance. Even if they could be met,
satisfactory lives would not result.
* Creation of needs (Marx). Industrial revolution under capitalism aggravated
of scarcity
and toil.
* Anarchists have a bad track-record on scarcity. They have tended to assume abundance. A
vast increase once the shades of the state are removed.
A
Following Kropotkin's proposals they have taken for granted enormous productivity from
labour-intensive garden plots, a sort of anarchist green revolution, neglecting the extensive
*
3
4
Even so, oneway to resolve/is by building up from local and regional solutions. Compare
nuclear freedom, peace, etc.(
Thus both sympathetic and unsympathetic commentators; Taylor, Wertheimer etc.
n frequently claimed that we know more or less how to meet population problems. Only
political structures and vested interests stand in way of doing so. But it is not quite that simple
and easy.
Arguments that wants/needs distinction cannot be drawn.
//'
�3
inputs required to make this feasible, (water, energy, manure, pesticides, etc.). [Thus e.g. Clark
p.148.)
* There are some sharp limits on the extent of growth to cater for human populations and their
"needs". An important limitation can be seen by tracking energy, which is limited, more
abundant production of which encounters other limits (pollution, nasty works production, etc.)
D&triZwHon,
q/T&Kmrcgs.
. 4.
* Necessity is regularly exaggerated. Often this done to enable capitalist routes to be taken,
access to foreign business provided etc.
*
'Necessity
becomes part of imperialistic exploitation. Contrast the equally unsatisfactory
Marxist line: distribution is one with production. What is required is a change in technological
systems and productive relations. Undesirable patterns of production result in maldistribution.
'... the entire problematic of "redistribution" is bared jn the questionable assumption of the
feasibility of seeking a solution to the problem while continuing a technological system
founded ^n dependency and disproperti%s in economic power
*
(Clark p.154).
* The Aid record of present liberal democratic states is dismal.
* As regards more basic provisioning, mutual aid through free federation. Example of
Spanish collective ((^ebal ref 19 pp. 184-5).
Argument that anarchist approach could succeed, from socio-psychological assumption:
'unless humans develop patterns of life and values based on mutual aid at level of small groups
and local communities, one cannot expect them to go very far in the practice of mutual aid at
any other level of social organisation
*
(Clark p.154).
But really heeds the convert: when have no developed, can be suspected to deliver aid.
Present arrangement for human living are not made on the basis of
quality of life for the livers, but all too often to suit the needs of industry J returns to capitalism,
etc. The results are everywhere conspicuous, especially in contemporary cities — which
characteristically dominate whole regions.
Many major local problems derive from the environmental states and living conditions of
cities. An anarchist resolution involves restructuring cities. This would include development
of network cities and restoration of community.
�4. Appendix:
ON SELECTION OF COMMITTEES
For how committees should be comprised, look at what they are supposed to accomplish, what
sorts of decisions deliver, and so on.
For example, the basis of decision for allocating public money has to be: 'attempting to balance
all legitimate claims on the basis of need and public benefit in accordance with recognised
moral values and principles'.^
Evidently such committees should not be composed of
1. members of competing constitutions seeking funds (i.e. anti-model is premiers conference)
2. power traders (i.e. anti-model is /...... or typical bureaucratic committee).
What appears to be required are candidates who are
* impartial (without chauvinistic or other prejudices)
* varied in evolutionary complex claims
* informed of.... moral values and principles, and committed to some such.
H
<3-.
After that try statically for spread of attitudes from conservative to radical.
Such committees according directly violate (Burheim) relevant interests criteria. In general
however for lower level committees relevance criteria obtain.
5. Demanarchoid ecodesigns for Australia
�Chapter 5.1
THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM:
VARIETIES AND OPTIONS
The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the
options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a
stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism - according to which
organisation is unnecessary and social arrangements will arise spontaneously and will be
ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation - is a position which is not
viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which
durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society which these theoretical
arguments delineate will certainly be organised, but the organisation will not be compulsory,
and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition
by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily no doubt on voluntary co
operation and direct democracy.
The society which emerges may be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured
it, or it may not. It may well be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities: for
otherwise such arrangements as community replacements of State welfare arrangements,
control of their environment, removal of Prisoners" Dilemmas, and participatory democracy,
will work less satisfactorily. Communities may well be federated and control will be bottomup, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each
community there will, under such social anarchism, not be great discrepancies in the
distribution of wealth and property, and no highly concentrated economic power. Under social
anarchism, a community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is
communally owned or not owned at all.
While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic
arrangements, they are very far from determining them completely; they offer no detailed
blueprint. Accordingly what emerges is not a particular from of anarchism, for instance
anarchist communism, but a more experimental and
anarchism, such as was broadly
instituted in the Spanish collectives.
There are several recognised varieties of anarchism, among the more common:
individualistic anarchisms, anarcho-capitalisms, anarcho-communisms, mutualisms, anarchosyndicalisms, libertarian socialisms, social anarchisms, and now eco-anarchisms.
These
varieties are not particularly well-characterised. They are by no means at all exclusive. They
certainly do not exhaust the interesting possibilities. So far indeed a satisfactory classification
is lacking. Usually something of a ragbag is offered: textbooks single out a very few varieties,
and look at them. Invariably they leave out important varieties.
�2
But it is not difficult to discern some of the more independent dimensions^ along which
variation occurs, and which accordingly are relevant to an improved multi-dimensional tabular
classification:
Part-w/to/e dimension:
atomism pole O
<—
individual social---------- communal
—O total holism
This is a most important dimension of variation among organisational arrangements (for
analysis see SM). It accounts for a major bifurcation between European anarchisms, which tend
to be socially oriented, and American anarchisms, which are usually highly individualistic
(religious communities and some European transplants excepted). For markedly holistic
arrangements to persist, some strong ideological relational glue appears required, such as an
immersing spiritual ideology.
Property spectrum:
Although this can be compressed into two dimensional form, it is better presented three
dimensionally as follows:
full
O <individualistic ---privatization
communalistic
-> O full public
(tribal) ownership
diminished
ownership
no ownership
This spectrum evidently connects with the preceding holistic dimension, and both contribute to
what was the old right-left political division (a sort of crude super-position), and to what should
be superseding it, three-colour political spectrum:
(old right) blue
<-
red (old left)
green (new environmental)
and electoral spectrum:
Gronp
fully
O <- bottom up
— democratic — oligopolistic — top down
participatory
O fully
dictatorial
Change proceJnre dimensions:
violent
non-constitutional
constitutional <pacific
1
Some of these "dimensions" are not really linear in the way strictly required. That they are not,
and that they are not fully independent, does not impede a much improved classification.
�3
C/tangg wufMfors: vanguard group or class;
<Lumpen-proletariat-workers' syndicates
bottom
"the people"
-----------------business
political
companies
parties
ruling elites
top
greens
alternative
coalitions
And so on. The schema presented are clearly far from exhaustive; nothing has been directly
included concerning distribution methods (market vs command, open vs closed storehouses,
etc.), admissible technology, or work-leisure arrangements, to take three important examples.
More pieces will be picked up as we proceed (the approximate number of dimensions is
computationally small), and some of the rather schematic sketches ventured above, elements of
which should be familiar, will receive some development in what follows.
Once the (n) dimensions are duly elaborated an anarc/tAm can be located and classified
(pigeon-holed in n-space) by placement in each dimension. For instance, the form of anarchism
preferred by me (see SM for an early presentation), is located as follows: it is social (with a
significantly qualified communistic safety net: each according to her or his basic needs), local
market-oriented but non-capitalistic, with diminished ownership, democratic but without
politicians and with alternative electoral arrangements, pacific but not bound by "constitutional"
procedures, utilizing modest safe technologies,.... But it is but one sort never to be instituted
everywhere, from a rich variety of alternatives
There are then MMny anarchisms, a rich variety of different forms, some of them scarcely
investigated or known. That anarchism comprises such a plurality has proved puzzling to those
(for example of one name-one thing persuasion) who assumed it must be a single ideology,
either individual or collective,.... Indeed the pluralist character of anarchism has led even more
apparently sympathetic critics, to 'wonder whether anarchism is really an ideology at all, or
merely a jumble of beliefs ...' (M. p.3). Of course the impression that anarchism 'is amorphous
and full of paradoxes and contradictions' is marvellously assisted by conflating degenarchism
with anarchism, chaos with order, and by combining the variant forms, individualism with
socialism and communism.
By properly regarding anarchism as a sheaf of overlapping
positions assembled around a core characterisation, a standard model for pluralism, the
problematic elements of anarchism as an ideology disappear. No doubt it is not an ideology
like Marxism, but then Marxism is atypical in its set of paradigmatic texts, concentrated in the
works of the master. Other ideologies such as liberalism or environmentalism afford better
comparisons. While anarchism is an ideology (in both good and bad senses), it is not really a
movement. There is not, anywhere really, such a movement, in the way there have been a
succession of liberation movements or there is a green movement and within it a deep ecology
movement.
�4
As anarchisms are plural, so by similar arguments are green, and deep-green, anarchisms.
Certainly green effect a select among their cluse of anarchism; it excludes, for example, the run
of individualistic anarchisms peddial in USA, because these admit much anti-environmental
activity, manifested for instance through "externalities" and market failure (some of these could
be very pale green). But selection does not, even for deep-green tend to a singleton, but still to
a wide pluralism.
These pluralisms are not merely descriptive, but normative. Insofar as any anarchism is
duly based on removal of unacceptable means, it should be
* pluralistic, because for example it cannot impose a single formulation on communities who
want to organise differently than its preferred way.
It should also be
* non-violent. Terrorist forms of anarchism are strictly incompatible with broad-based non
coercion. For terrorism typically involves coercion, stand-over tactics, and the like.2
That is, there is a doublish standard on vio/encg: It is alright to apply violence against state
(and others) while not alright to have coercive state, which applies violence. No doubt this can
be justified through
namely it is OK for me to do violence to you bot not OK for you to
apply violence to me. Accordingly a
conc/MMon is: A moral anarchism will not be a
form committed to violence (except unavoidable forms etc.).
Such pluralism does not enjoy a strong historic track-record, and does not go unopposed.
Standard anarchist positions, sketching of which was mainly a nineteenth century preoccupation
(but extending into twentieth century science fiction and utopian literature), shied away from
pluralism in the direction of monistic forms, towards insistence upon particular structure,
organisation and distributional methods. Such monistic rigidity led to much intense, often
fruitless discussion and friction between anarchists committed to different arrangements.
Certainly there was a doctrine of spontaneity — according to which in a state-overthrowing
revolution (in the very heat of the revolution!) the masses world spontaneously decide upon
new arrangements — which makes it appear that any structures at all were open for
consideration; but it was also assumed that certain arrangements would be selected, towards
which active anarchists would provide guidance.
It is not difficult to indicate some of the broad features of emergent arrangements features
that flow from the character of anarchism. But anarchists, over-attracted like others to monistic
schemes, have regularly attempted to advance their own schemes, introducing many further
postulates, that reach far beyond what flows from the basic characterisation, and that need not
2
There are serious pro&Anw for anarchism that accept coercive methods: why not aiso
accept the state then? Such positions tend to be forced back towards an organised
individualism.
But how then do they stop voluntary organisation arising (legitimately)?
�5
be adopted by genuine anarchistics (some further examples of optional and rejectable extras
from a recent manifesto: ... direct democracy, destruction of all hierarchies, maximization of
freedom, total Revolution, no ends-means distinction, no leaders, optimism about an anarchist
future,...).
Because of the expansive pluralism of anarchism, it overlaps many other ideologies,
indeed virtually all that do not include as a theme unmitigated commitment to a state or like
central authority. Thus while anarchism excludes fascism and is incompatible with state
capitalism, anarchism overlaps liberalism, democracy, and even Marxism, since Marxism
affords a long-term anarchism. There has been much confusion about these interrelations.
Take democracy. Anarchism does not entail democracy, as is sometimes claimed. Advice of a
select minority or of a single sage could regularly be adopted, though the advice did not reflect
the will of the people and its source was not elected or appointed by the people. Nor does
anarchism entail undemocratic procedures. There are, in the plurality, democratic forms, of
various sorts, and undemocratic forms. Democratic forms may have a better prospect of
enabling genuine democracy than life under the state. For as some have argued, 'both the
nation state and electoral democracy are inadequate as vehicles for democracy under modern
conditions' (Bumheim p.218).
Is its goal individual freedom or communal solidarity? Sometimes one, sometimes the
other, sometimes neither, sometimes both (a typical four-valued logical structure). A pluralistic
anarchism offers several different sorts of communities, not just one kind: for instance,
independent individuals, perhaps interrelated and organised through contracts, solidaristic
groups working freely together and sharing according to need, and various attractive
intermediaries, where there may be more individual-oriented market arrangements but there are
also safety nets ensuring distribution according to basic needs.
It is not difficult in theory to devise structures that allow a wide variety of kinds. For
example, in simple cases this can be accomplished through regional patterning, as illustrated in
the following
with 6 varieties.
2
1
5
3
6
4
(Such a modelling for political pluralism is further elaborated in UT.) The brief interlude of
anarchism in Spain afforded a small-scale example of regional patterning at work
The kinds of anarchistic societies are bound to be of very variable quality, both
theoretically and in practice. Some will only work with rather special sorts of people, for
instance certain communes with members with strong religious or ideological commitments;
some will not succeed at all. Some verge on incoherence, for instance those against coercive
organisation that approve group terrorist tactics. But while some kinds of anarchism are
entangled in serious problems, others are not. Anarchists generally have no obligation to
�6
defend defective kinds; yet many criticisms of anarchism are directed at just such defective
forms.
Although there is a rich variety of anarchistic end-states (virtually uninstantiated
possibilities), there are same common or overlapping organisational and structural features.
Such family-resemblance features are what hold the plurality together, and include noncoercive
versions of those arrangements essential to a functioning society: for instance, broad features of
arrangements for production and distribution, for arbitration and reconciliation, and so on, and
on. But although each such anarchist society will have some such organizational features, they
will differ in detail. For example, a main distributional feature of a simple communist society
may comprise a common storehouse from which members take according to need, whereas in
individualist societies distribution will normally proceed through some sort of exchange in
market systems. More generally different types of anarchism will offer different economic
theories. Those with stronger individualistic component will tend to rely upon not merely
market or allied exchange arrangements, but upon capitalistic organisation. The type of
anarchism favoured here strikes an intermediate route: markets without capitalism.
How is such complex organisation to be achieved without a state? Does not such
organisation and government require a state? To remove that familiar assumption and
associated blockages — encouraged by too much life under states and no experience of
alternatives - take a wider look around. Look at how many activities and procedures are
organised without states or essential participation of states. By voluntary arrangements.
Prominent examples are again sporting organisations, labour unions and business corporations
of various sorts. In short, organisation can be accomplished through a range of appropriate
institutions.
Such examples also provide the appropriate key unlocking the door as to how more
extensive organisation can be achieved in the absence of the state, namely through appropriate
institutions. The state dissolves into functioning components, a set of appropriate institutions,
and at bottom into its relevant minimization. It fragments into compartments — in two
interconnected ways: into regional parts and into capacities, functional parts.
There are other valuable clues to stateless reorganisation. What happens within the more
self-regulating state can also happen without it. As Gramsci emphasized,
the ability to govern without overt coercion depends largely on the ability
of those in power to exploit systems of belief that the larger population
shares. The nature of that system of belief is to some extent determinable
by policy makers, since in the modern state they possess a significant
ability to propagandize for their view. Yet.... (p.63).
Recent empirical investigations tend to yield similar results. People tend to follow rules and
obey laws they regard as moral or otherwise satisfactory. There are important messages for
anarchistic organisation here also, for arrangements without coercion, overt or other.
�7
Anarchistic rules will try to go with the prevailing flow, and will only vary (as over vindictive
punishment) where an evidently satisfactory justification can be given. More generally, smarter
anarchistic arrangements will aim to include desirable self-regulating systems, such as small-
scale markets.
Though there are many different strands that can be interwoven through the pluralistic
out-fall from the basic characterisation, there are some broad tendencies of anarchistic
arrangement which include:
* reliance on self-regulatory methods of organisation that require little or no intervention, as
opposed to highly regulated procedures, perhaps tending towards centralism or paternalism.
This is one reason why markets are often favoured, analogues of centralised control and
coercive legal systems are not.
* emphasis on voluntary methods, in place of imposed methods — coercive methods are of
course excluded by virtue of basic characterisation. Certainly de facto power may remain, but it
will be without justification.
* favouring of decentralisation and deconcentration rather than centralised or concentrated
structures.
That does not imply there can be no downward relations. Of course under federal arrangements
there will be, and sideways natural relations as well (a full control system).
* discouragement of empowerment, encouragement of depowerment.
* opposition to oppression is a corollary.
There are too many alternatives in the pluralistic basket to look at all of them. Let us
consider only some of them, with however preferred features. (An example that does not rank
highly and will not be further assessed is Stimer's individualism.) Anarchistic societies of any
complexity will typically consist of a network of decentralised organisations, or a federation of
these (etc.). The organisations will thus be regional, but beyond that set up according to issue,
role or function.
Thus they will include what might well be accounted gcorggiowuZ
/hnctiona/iym. Many of the stock features of political functionalism, as decentralised, will
accordingly recur, separation of powers, tailoring of administration to need, for instance. The
organisations will furthermore be noncoercive; no individual or group will be forced to join.
Typically they will be voluntary arrangements.
A critical question concerns how these organisations, substituting for the operation of
state, are to be controlled, regulated, and so on. In much favoured democratic structures, such
as electoral bureaucracies, control is usually weak and remarkably mJirgct. A populace weakly
selects a central parliament, which exercises through other bureaucratic bodies some control of
state organisations. A full anarchism is obliged to dissolve or substitute for central parliaments.
It has a obvious option, namely direct democratic control of state-substituting organisations. A
simple way of achieving this is through sortition: the membership of the governing component
of each organisation is chosen randomly from those qualified of the regional community who
volunteer to be on it. In some cases volunteers may require accessible qualifications (e.g.
�8
having served before at a lower level), and avoid disqualifications (e.g. having acquired a
disqualifying record).^ Where the community decides that certain categories of people should
be represented, for instance disabled, minorities, and so forth, then it is a matter of arranging
random selection of the required fraction of group numbers from these categories. This style of
statistical democracy dates back at least to original democracies of Greek city states where
public officials were sometimes selected by lot (it is discussed under democracy in Aristotle's
Po/t/fc^). Nowadays it is called Je/narchy (a term with an unfortunate prior meaning); here in
its anarchistic form it will be alluded to under the neologism JewMwiarc/ty.
Such demanarchy has the immediate virtue of removing a most expensive duplication,
government ministers and their departmental counterparts (e.g. finance ministers and
corresponding appointed treasury officials). Indeed, the whole charade of central parliamentary
government, ministers and hordes of minders, governments and replicating opposition teams, is
duly removed - as it has to be under non-centralization. Such parliamentary centres are
eliminated; insofar as anything replaces them, it is the dispersed community, itself no centre,
which is directly linked to functional organisation.
Gone with the centre, or seriously reduced, are several standard political worries, such as
those of coup or take-over, insurrection or invasion. These usually involve capturing the centre
and its command structure, no longer there to capture (for there is no command or control
structure that could be taken by an invader or with internal insurrection). Community defence
is thereby rendered much easier. Also considerably reduced is the standard problem of who
controls the controllers: partly because control is so diffused, partly because also gone are
legions of soldiers and security forces, and partly because a main controller is the community
(one of the advantages of more direct democracy).
Appropriate institutions take care then of the day-to-day running of community affairs.
But what of major issue decisions, changes of direction or structure?
These can be
accomplished from the bottom, through referenda, propositions and the like (with public
assessment organised through a suitably independent college), rather than in present top-down
inflexible fashion. (Some of these methods, of which there is worthwhile experience in parts of
Europe, are investigated in Wolff.)
A regular early question is how such a stateless structure is to be financed
coercive mechanisms available. Of course if coercive institutions were in place, then the
overall structure could be financed in the sorts of ways that states are presently financed. It
3
People can serve their administrative apprenticeship at iocal or group levels. One when they are
adjudged to have exhibited sufficient competence here are they entitled to nominate for selection
at grander levels. That is, there is a tiered structure for administralive careers, which would no
longer be full-time or working life long. This is one reasonable way of obtained some quality
control in selection of administrators. (Note these/evefy do not provide a vicious hierarchy.)
�9
should be observed, in any case, that coercive means are very rarely resorted to (unless the
target is pursued for
reasons, such as crime) in order to obtain revenue payments from
wealthy corporations, firms or individuals, from where in a more equitable community much of
the funding would derive (by contrast with most present states). There are several parts to a
satisfactory answer:* Muc/t less public revenue would be required because the most expensive, most wasteful, and
least productive components of state have been excised. These include the whole apparatus of
central government and electoral politics, and the associated system of coercion, standard
military forces and defence establishment, espionage framework, and police forces, prison
establishment and expensive courts.
*
Nonetheless there remain many institutions to finance,
include smaller substitutes for some of the abolished structures (e.g. social defence
arrangements).
* Many institutions can be largely or entirely self-financing, because like customs and import
organisations they collect revenue, or through fair user-pays principles. Reasonable returns
taken can be channelled to an independent revenue office with no outside spending or
redistribution powers.
* Much, if not all, further social revenue could be raised through resources taxation (adequate
royalties and the like), rental taxes on property or leases, gift and gains taxes, and through
auctions (of previously inherited goods). How this would work depends upon community
arrangements.
Consider for instance anarchistic arrangements where that problematic item, private
property, has not been instituted or has been abolished (as under main examples of European
anarchism, by contrast with North American forms). Valuable durables (roughly, any durable
worth stealing for sale in present systems) will be
instead of bought. Leasehold systems
can be operated very like private property (as the land system in the Australian Capital Territory
reveals) thus facilitating market operations, but they offer significantly better control, for
instance environmentally, they enable the social component of generated wealth to be reflected,
through a rental, and they can be of finite term and to a given individual, so inheritance transfer
is excluded.
In place of the customary land titles office a larger durables office with
subdivision for types of durables would be instituted, with each durable now indelibly marked
or described. Here, as with referenda, computing facilities remove many previous obstacles to
such developments. Organisation can move with newer technologies.
Leasehold arrangements are readily applied to prevent the accumulation ol scarce
property resources, such as urban land, which is a major feature of capitalism. For leases of
scarce commodities can be allocated according to need and ability to use, not merely through a
4
The costs are enormous. A minute component, a singie federai election in Australia, now costs
about $54 million to arrange.
�10
historically rooted market distribution as with private property. It is private property, not a
market system of distribution, that is really distinctive of capitalism, since it not only provides a
place to park and increase capital, but it enables transmission of accumulated wealth (e.g.
within a family or dynasty) and control of the means of production.
Where can anarchism work — satisfactively: on stock presumptions of community and
smallness.
Even proponents of the state have allowed that anarchy can work, indeed their position
often depends upon it. The horrible alternative to their, or their friends' or patrons', splendid
state and statecraft, is that a region should lapse into anarchy (a regular fear of the US
administration). Anarchism, that is, works, but works very nastily, like that presumed in "states
of nature", like that many in fact encounter in the encampments, slums or ghettos of terrorist or
other states.
But it now fairly widely appreciated, outside those intellectually incarcerated in the allencompassing realm of states, that anarchism can work rather satisfactorily, and did in may pre
state societies.
Concurrent anthropological findings concerning small communities and collective action
results concerning small collective have demolished the assumption that anarchy is impossible,
either in practice or techno-logically. Since then it has become fashionable to concede that
anarchy is possible but on/y where there is a suitable small community. This sort of anarchimin-the-small is commonly conceded by socialists, but dismissively. While anarchism may, it is
allowed, work well enough in small, isolated or primitive communities, it cannot work in large
industrial or urban societies such as now predominate globally. Anarchism is accordingly but a
marginal possibility, unworthly any longer of much serious political concern. Such dismissals
tend to be strong on claims and unfavourable judgements but excessingly weak on supporting
argument, where socialist handwaving takes over (obviously this widespread phenomenon is
not confined to socialism, or even to political debate). Confidence that anarchism cannot
succeed seems to be largely founded on the erroneous assumption that anarchism cannot supply
any but a primitive organisational structure.
By contrast, a sort of anarchism-in-the-small has been forcefully pursued, with due
argument, by Taylor, who contends that 'anarchy is viable to the extent that the relations
between people are those which are characteristic of community', a small community (-.166).
That is: '... community is nec&wary — if people are to live without the state' (p.3).
The argument to community that Taylor offers reduces a modified Hobbesianism; social
order can only be maintained, without the state and in the small, if the relations between
individuals are those of community (cf. p.2). Insofar as it is detailed, it is a remarkably broken-
down argument. As Taylor himself helps to show, 'the liberal justification of the state' — from
the failure of individuals in a large public to voluntarily cooperated to provide themselves
without requisite collective goods — breaks down at every critical point, in its premisses, in its
�1
11
argument, and in its concluding inference to the state was the on/y means of ensuring the supply
of such goods (p.59).
It is this final lacuna onto which Taylor latches. Granting the rest, 'all that can be inferred
is that, if public goods are to be provided,
means must be found of getting people to do
their part in providing them' (p.59). There are, Taylor swiftly finds, three pure methods of
ensuring provision of the goods in question: the state, the market, and the community. The
argument then proceeds by elimination, of the market. Taylor 'contends that social order
cannot satisfactorily be put on the market' (p.2), though his arguments to this contention are
unfortunately far from decisive. That leaves the state for public larger than communities, and
communitarian anarchism as an extra-terrestrial possibility for small communities (because
communities in the vicinity of states do not, it is claimed, survive). For all the talk about
anarchism, it looks like another triumph for the state.
But the argument is unsound, because there are
methods than those Taylor locates.
Non-statist organisation, which comes in a range of forms — functional, regional and others —
is not a combination of the pure methods considered. As a broad type of method it is hardly
"unproposed", or without precedents or examples (e.g. medieval orders and present
international order).
While there is no need to dispute that prospects for anarchism tend to be enhanced in
smaller communities, or in conglomerates that can be arranged in networks of smaller
communities, anarchism can work, if less satisfactorily, in modem mass society. Such is one of
the large themes being advanced.
�777E EA7FFG//VG
OF
/LV1/?C77/.SM: ^/<^r
cipy?^s
,
i
The
arguments
outlined,
predominancy theoretical, inform the
practical, revealing the options open for
anarchism, courses of action in superan
nuating the State and for transition to a
stateless Society, and so on. For exam
ple, spontaneous anarchism — accor
ding to which organisation is un
necessary and social arrangements will
arise spontaneously and will be ushered
in during the revolution without any
prior organisation — is a position which
is not viable and could not endure,
because it makes none of the requisite
replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of
anarchist society which these theoretical
arguments delineate will certainly be
organised, but the organisation will not
be compulsory, and will eschew
authoritarian measures (and, by the
overshoot argument, will reject transi
tion by any strengthening oj^he cen
tralised State), relying heavil\^on volun
tary co-operation and direct democracy.
^ The society which emerges mciy be much
. ..as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes
piAuredH^lt /9^be based on smallerscale decentralised communities? for
otherwise such arrangements as com
munity replacement of State welfare ar
rangements, control of their environ
ment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas,
and participatory democracy, will w(?rk
less satisfactorily. Communities
.be
federated and control will be bottom-up,
not merely by representation and subject
to a downward system of command.__
Within each community there will hot be
great discrepancies in the distribution of
weakh and property, ar^p hi^^ycom
centrated economic powercommum
ty win be a rather equaiitarian group,
sharing in much that is communally
owned or not owned at a!i.
White theoretical arguments heip
outtine the generat shape of social, ami
aiso economic arrangements,they
determine^them compietety; they offer
no detaited btueprint. Accordingty what
emerges is not a particular form of anar
chism, for instance anarchist com
munism, but a more experinienta^an.^
p/ura/bhc anarchism, such as was^tnstituted in the Spanish cokectives.
traced/
\^^There are several recognised varieties of anarchism among the more common:
individualistic anarchisms, anarcho-capitalisms, anarcho-communisms, mutualisms, anarcho-
syndicalisms, libertarian socialisms, social anarchisms, and now eco-anarchisms. These
varieties are not particularly well-characterised, /hey are by no means at all exclusive. So far
indeed a satisfactory classification is lacking. Usually something of a ragbag is offered:
textbooks single out a very few varieties, and look at them. Invariably they leave out important
varieties.
��But it is not difficult to discern some of the more independent dimensions^ along which
variation occurs, and which accordingly are relevant to an improved multi-dimensional tabular
classification:
Parf-w/zo/g/ dimension:
atomism pole O <— individual ----
social
----
communal
—> O total holism
This is a most important dimension of variation among organisational arrangements (for
analysis see SM). It accounts for a major bifpriation between European anarchisms, which tend
...
.
1
'S^
to be socially oriented, and American anarchism^ which are usually highly individual (religious
communities^ some European transplants/ excepted). For markedly holistic arrangements to
persist, some strong ideological relational glue appears required, such as an immersing spiritual
ideology.
Properly spectrum:
Although this can be compressed into two dimensional form, it is better presented three
dimensionally as follows:
full
privatization
—> O full public
(tribal) ownership
no ownership
This spectrum evidently connects with the preceding holistic dimension, and both contribute to
what was the old right-left political division (a sort of crude super-position), and to what should
be superseding it, three-colour political spectrum:
(old right) blue
<------------------------ .--------------------------- >
red (old left)
green (new environmental)
Group Jectwon and electoral spectrum:
fully
O <- bottom up — democratic —y oligopolistic — top down
participatory
C/umge procedure dimensions:
^violent
-*
O fully
dictatorial
constitutional <------------------------- —---------------------------------- > non-constitutional
pacific
5
Some of these "dimensions" are not really h'wear in the way strictly required. That they are not, and that
they are not fully independent, does not impede a much improved classification.
�22
CTtangc mmai/ors': vanguard group or class;
<—
Lumpen-proletariat—workers
*
syndicates
bottom
"the people"
political
parties
business ---companies
top
alternative
ccylitions
a/
And so on. The schema presented are clearly far from exhaustive; nothing has been directly
included concerning distribution methods (market vs command, open vs closed storehouses,
etc.), admissible technology, or work-leisure arrangements, to take three important examples.
More pieces will be picked up as we proceed (the approximate number of dimensions is
computationally small), and some of the rather schematic sketches ventured above, elements of
which should be familiar, will receive some development in what follows^ Once the (n)
dimensions are duly elaborated an anarchism can be located and classified (pidgeon-holed in n-
space) by placement in sach dimension. For instance, the form of anarchism preferred by me
(s<$SM for an early presentation),[But one sort never to be^instituted everywhere/rom a riciT'
<L. variety of altematie^s located as follows: it is social (with a significantly qualified communistic
safety net: each according to her or his basic needs),' market-oriented but non-capitalistic, with
diminished ownership, democratic but without politicians and with alternative electoral
arrangements, pacific but not bound by "constitutional" procedures, utilizing modest safe
technologies, ....
There are then many anarchisms, a rich variety of different forms, some of them scarcely
investigated or known. That anarchism comprises such a plurality has proved puzzling to those
(for example of one name-one thing persuasion) who assumed it must be a single ideology,
either individual or collective,.... Indeed the pluralist character of anarchism has led even more
apparently sympathetic critics, to 'wonder whether anarchism is really an ideology at all, or
merely a jumble of beliefs
(M, p.3). Of course the impression that anarchism 'is amorphous
and full of paradoxes and contradictions' is marvellously assisted by conflating degenarchism
with anarchism, chaos with order, and by combining the variant forms, individualism with
socialism and communism. By properly regarding anarchism as a sheaf of overlapping
positions assembled around a core characterisation, a standard model for pluralism, the
problematic elements of anarchism as an ideology disappear. No doubt it is not an ideology like
Marxism, but then Marxism is atypical in its set of paradigmatic texts, concentrated in the works
of the master. Other ideologies such as liberalism or environmentalism afford better
comparisons. While anarchism is an ideology (in both good and bad senses), it is not really a
movement. There is not, anywhere really, such a movement, in the way there have been a
succession of liberation movements or there is a green ^deep ecology^movement.
9
2 : . /
A
/f
7
�z^4-v^-
/i
cY&v-e, Insofar a^ anarchism is duly based on removal of unacceptable means, it
should be
* pluralistic, because for example it cannot impose a single formulation on communities who
want to organise differently thatiits preferred way.
* non-violent. Terrorist forms of anarchism are strictly incompatible with broad-based non
coercion. For terrorism typically involves coercion, stand-over tactics, and the like/
That is, there is a doublish standard on violence: It is alright to apply violence against
state (and others) while not alright to have coercive state, which applies violence. No doubt
this can be justified through cgoLwr namely OK for me to do violence to you but not OK for
you to apply violence to me. Accordingly tentative conc/MMon is: A moral anarchism will not
be a form committed to violence Except unavoidable forms etc.
Such pluralism does not enjoy a strong historic track-record, and does not go
unopposed. Standard anarchist positions, sketching of which was mainly a nineteenth
century preoccupation (but extending into twentieth century science fiction and utopian
literature), shied away from pluralism in the direction of monistic forms, towards
insistence upon particular structure, organisation and distributional methods. Such
monistic rigidity led to much intense, often fruitless discussion and friction between
anarchists committed to different arrangements. Certainly there was a doctrine of
spontaneity — according to which in a state-overthrowing revolution (in the very heat of
the revolution!) the masses world spontaneously decide upon new arrangements — which
makes it appear that any structures at all were open for consideration; but it was also
assumed that certain arrangements would be selected, towards which active anarchists
would provide guidance.
It is not difficult to indicate some of the broad features of emergent arrangemens
features that flow from the character of anarchism. But anarchists, over-attracted like
others to monistic schemes, have regularly attempted to advance their own schemes,
introducing many further postulates, that reach far beyond what flows from the basic
characterisation, and that need not be adopted by genuine anarchistics (some further
examples of optional and rejectable extras from a recent manifesto:... direct democracy,
destruction of all hierarchies, maximization of freedom, total Revolution, no ends-means
distinction, no leaders, optimism about an anarchist future,...).
�23
Because of the expansive pluralism of anarchism, it overlaps many other ideologies,
indeed all that do not include as a theme unmitigated commitment to a state or like central
authority. Thus while anarchism excludes fascism and is incompatible with state capitalism,
anarchism overlaps liberalism, democracy, and even Marxism, since Marxism affords a long
term anarchism. There has been much confusion about these interrelations. Take democracy.
Anarchism does not entail democracy, as is sometimes claimed. Advice of a select minority or
of a^sage could regularly be adopted, though the advice did not reflect the will of the people and
its source was not elected or appointed by the people. Nor does anarchism entail undemocratic
procedures. There are, in the plurality, democratic forms, of various sorts, and undemocratic
forms. Democratic forms may have a better prospect of enabling genuine democracy than life
under the state. For as some have argued, 'both the nation state and electoral democracy are
inadequate as vehicles for democracy under modem conditions' (Bumheim p.218).
Is its goal individual freedom or communal solidarity? Sometimes one, sometimes the
other, sometimes neither, sometimes both (a typical four-valued logical structure). A pluralistic
anarchism offers several different sorts of communities, not just one kind: for instance,
independent individuals, perhaps interrelated and organised through contracts, solidaristic
groups working freely together and sharing according to need, and various attractive
intermediaries, where there may be more individual-oriented market arrangements but there are
also safety nets ensuring distribution according to basic needs.
It is not difficult in theory to devise structures that allow a wide variety of kinds. For
example, in simple cases this can be accomplished through regional patterning, as illustrated
with 6 varieties.
(Such a modelling for political pluralism is further elaborated in UT.) The brief interlude of
anarchism in Spain afforded a small-scale example of regional patterning at work
The kinds of anarchistic societies are bound to be of very variable quality, both
theoretically and in practice. Some will only work with rather special sorts of people, for
instance certain Answers with members with strong religious or ideological commitments; some
will not succeed at all. Some verge on incoherence, for instance those against coercive
organistions that approve group terrqist tactics. But while some kinds of anarchism are
entangled in serious problems, others are not. Anarchists generally have no obligation to
defend defective kinds; yet many criticisms of anarchism are directed at just such defective
forms.
Although there is a rich variety of anarchistic end-states (virtually uninstantiated
) f
/-I'y e
�24
or
1^-
*rc!
n
possibilities), there are^ common organisational and structural features. Such cluster features are
A
J
what hold the plurality together, and include noncoercive versions of those arrangements
essential to a functioning society: for instance, broad features of arrangements for production
and distribution, for arbitration and reconciliation, and so on, and on. But although each such
anarchist society will have such organizational features, they will differ in detail. For example,
a main distributional feature of a simple communist society may comprise a common
storehouse from which members take according to need, whereas in individualist societies
distribution will normally proceed through some sort of exchange in market systems. MoK
(
generally different types of anarchism will offer different economic theories. Those with
stronger individualistic component will tend to rely upon not merely market or allied exchange
arrangements, but upon capitalistic organisation. The type of anarchism favoured here strikes
an intermediate route: markets without capitalism.
How is such complex organisation to be achieved without a state? Does not such
organisation and government require a state? To remove that familiar assumption and
associated blockages - encouraged by too much life under states and no experience of
alternatives - take a wider look around. Look at how many activities and procedures are
organised without states or essential participation of states. By voluntary arrangements.
Prominent examples are again sporting organisations, labour unions and business corporations
of various sorts. In short, organisation can be accomplished through a range of appropriate
institutions.
Such examples also provide the appropriate key unlocking the door as to how more
extensive organisation can be achieved in the absence of the state, namely through appropriate
institutions. The state dissolves into functioning components, a set of appropriate institutions,
and at bottom into its relevant minimization. It fragments into compartments - in two
interconnected ways: into regional parts and into capacities, functional parts.
There are other valuable clues to stateless reorganisation. What happens within the more
self-regulating state can also happen without it. As Gramsci emphasized,
the ability to govern without overt coercion depends largely on the ability of
those in power to exploit systems of belief that the larger population shares.
The nature of that system of belief is to some extent determinable by policy
makers, since in the modern state they possess a significant ability to
propagandize for their view. Yet.... (p.63).
Recent empirical investigations tend to yield similar results. People tend to follow rules and
obey laws they regard as moral or otherwise satisfactory. There are important messages for
anarchistic organisation here also, for arrangements without coercion, overt or other.
Anarchistic rules will try to go with the prevailing flow, and will only vary (as over vindictive
punishment) where an evidently satisfactory justification can be given. More generally, smarter
anarchistic arrangements will aim to include desirable self-regulating systems, such as small-
/<?
�25
scale markets.
t
There are too many alternatives in the pluralistic basket to look at all of them. Let us
consider only some of them, with however preferred features. (An example that does not rank
highly and will not be further assessed is Stirner's individualism.) Anarchistic societies of any
complexity will typically consist of a network of decentralised organisations, or a federation of
these (etc.). The organisations will thus be regional, but beyond that set up according to issue,
role or function.
Thus they will include what might well be accounted ecoregiona/
Many of the stock features of political functionalism, as decentralised, will
accordingly recur, separation of powers, tailoring of administration to need, for instance. The
organisations will furthermore be noncoercive; no individual or group will be forced to join.
Typically they will be voluntary arrangements.
A critical question is-to how these organisations, substitudng for the operation of state, are
to be controlled, regulated, and so on. In much favoured democratic structures, such as
electoral bureaucracies, control is usually weak and remarkably tnJtrecf. A populace weakly
selects a central parliament, which exercises through other bureaucratic bodies some control of
state organisations. A full anarchism is obliged to dissolve or substitute for central parliaments.
It has a obvious option, namely direct democratic control of state-substituting organisations. A
simple way of achieving this is through sortition: the membership of the governing component
of each organisation is chosen randomly from those qualified of the regional community who
volunteer to be on it. In some cases volunteers may require accessible qualifications (e.g.
having served before at a lower level), and avoid disqualifications (e.g. having acquired a
disqualifying record).6 Where the community decides that certain categories of people should be
represented, for instance disabled, minorities, and so forth, then it is a matter of arranging
random selection of the required fraction of group numbers from these categories. This style of
statistical democracy dates back at least to original democracies of Greek city states where public
officials were sometimes selected by lot (it is discussed under democracy in Aristotle's P<?/iric.y).
Nowadays it is called t/gwarcAy (a term with an unfortunate prior meaning); here in its
anarchistic form it will be alluded to under the neologism dewanarcAy.
Such demanarchy has the immediate virtue of removing a most expensive duplication,
government ministers and their departmental counterparts (e.g. finance ministers and
corresponding appointed treasury officials). Indeed, the whole charade of central parliamentary
6
People can serve their administrative apprenticeship at local or group levels. One when they are adjudged
to have exhibited sufficient competence here are they entitled to nominate for selection at grander levels.
This is one reasonable way of obtained some quality control in selection of administrators. (Note /gve/^ do
not provide a vicious hierarchy.)
A""
�—H
Though there are many different strands that can be interwoven through the
pluralistic out-fall from the basic characterisation, there are some broad tendencies of
anarchistic arrangement which include:
*
reliance on self-regulatory methods of organisation that require little or no
intervention, as opposed to highly regulated procedures, perhaps tending towards
centralism
or
paternalism.
This is one reason why markets are favoured, analogues of centralised control and
coercive legal systems are not.
* emphasis on voluntary methods, in place of imposed methods - coercive methods are
of course excluded by virtue of basic characterisation. Certainly de facto power may
remain, but it will be without justification.
* favouring of decentralisation and deconcentration rather than centralised or
concentrated structures.
That does not imply there can be no downward relations. Of course under federal
arrangements there will be, and sideways natural relations as well (a full control
system).
* discouragement of empowerment, encouragement of depowerment.
* opposition to oppression is a corollary.
�26
government, ministers and hordes of minders, governments and replicating opposition teams, is
duly removed — as it has to be under non-centralization. Such parliamentary centres are
.
....
eliminated; insofar as anything replaces them, it is the dispersed community, no centre, which is
directly linked to functional organisation.
Gone with the centre, or seriously reduced, are several standard political worries, such as
those of coup or take-over, insurrection or invasion. These usually involve capturing the centre
and its command structure, no longer there to capture (for there is no command or control
structure that could be taken by an invador or with internal insurrection). Community defence is
thereby rendered much easier. Also considerably reduced is the standard problem of who
controller is the community (one of the advantages of more direct democracy).
Appropriate institutions take care then of the day-to-day running of community affairs.
But what of major issue decisions, changes of direction or structure? These can be
accomplished from the bottom, through referenda, propositions and the like (with public
assessment organised through a suitably independent college), rather than in present top-down
inflexible fashion. (Some of these methods, of which there is worthwhile experience in parts of
Europe, are investigated in Wolff.)
A regular early question is how such a stateless structure is to be financed
coecive
mechanisms available. Of course if coercive institutions were in place, then the overall structure
could be financed in the sorts of ways that states are presently financed. It should be observed,
in any case, that coercive means are very rarely resorted to (unless the target is pursued for otAgr
reasons, such as crime) in order to obtain revenue payments from wealthy corporations, firms or
individuals, from where in a more equitable community much of the funding would derive (by
contrast with most present states). There are several parts to a satisfactory answer:* AfMcA less public revenue would be required because the most expensive, most wasteful, and
least productive components of state have been excised. These include the whole apparatus of
central government and electoral politics, and the associated system of coercion, standard
military forces and defense establishment, espionage framework, and police forces, prison
establishment and expensive courts. -—
Nonetheless there remain many institutions to finance, include smaller substitutes for some of
the abolished structures (e.g. social defence arrangements).
* Many institutions can be largely or entirely self-financing, because like customs and import
organisation^ they collect revenue, or through fair user-pays principles. Reasonable returns
taken can be channelled to an independent revenue office with no outside spending or
redistribution powers.
* Much, if not all, further social revenue could be raised through resources taxation (adequate
�royalties and the like), rental taxes on property or leases, gift and gains taxes, and through
auctions (of previously inherited goods). How this would work depends upon community
arrangements.
Consider for instance anarchistic arrangements where that problematic item, private
property, has not been instituted or has been abolished (as under main examples of European
anarchism, by contrast with North American forms). Valuable durables (roughly, any durable
worth stealing for sale in present systems) will be renfed instead of bought. Leasehold systems
can be operated very like private property (as the land system in the Australian Capital Territory
reveals)^facilitating market operations, but they offer significantly better control, for instance
environmentally, they enable the social component of generated wealth to be reflected, through a
rental, and they can be of finite term and to a given individual, so inheritance transfer is
excluded. In place of the customary land titles office a larger durables office with subdivision
for types of durables would be instituted, with each durable now indelibly marked or described.
(Here, as with referenda, computing facililies remove many previous obstacles to such
developments. Organisation can move with newer technologies.
Leasehold arrangements are readily applied to prevent the accumulation of scarce property
resources, such as urban land, which is a major feature of capitalism. For leases of scarce
commodities can be allocated according to need and ability to use, not merely through a
historically rooted market distribution as with private property. It is private property, not a
market system of distribution, that is really distinctive of capitalism, since it not only provides a
place to park and increase capital, but it enables transmission of accumulated wealth (e.g. within
a family or dynasty) and control of the means of production.
CZ
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�has become fashionable/^ince th^oncurrent anthropological findings concerning
small communities and the collective action results concerning small collectives demolished the
assumption that anarchy
impossible, t& concede that anarchy is possible but only where
there is a suitable small community.
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- sort of anarchism in-the-small has been forcefully
pursued by Taylor, who contends that 'anarchy is viable to the extent that the relations between
people are those which are characteristic of community', a small community (p.166). That is:
... community is necawa/y — if people are to live without the state' (p.3).
The argument to community that Taylor offers reduces a modified Hobbesipnism; social
order can oly be maintained, without the state and in the small, if the relations between
individuals are those of community (cf p.2). Insofar as it is detailed, it is a remarkably brokeddown argument. As Taylor himself helps to show, 'the liberal justification of the state' - from
the failure of individuals in a large public to voluntarily cooperate to provide themselves without
requisite collective goods - breaks down at every critical point, in its premisses, in its
argument, and in its concluding inference to the state was the on/y means of ensuring the
supply of such goods (p.59).
It is this final lacuna onto which Taylor latches. Granting the rest, 'all that can be inferred
is that, if public goods are to be provided, jowc means must be found of getting people to do
their part in providing them' (p.59). There are, Taylor swiftly finds, three pure methods of
ensuring provision of the goods in question: the state, the market, and the community. The
argument then proceeds by elimination, of the market. Taylor 'contends that social order
cannot satisfactorily be put on the market' (p.2), though his arguments to this contention are far
from decisive. That leaves the state for public larger than communities, and communitarian
anarchism as an extra-terrestial possibility for small communities (because communities in the
vicinity of states do not, it is claimed, survive). For all the talk about anarchism^it looks like
another triumph for the state.
&t the argument is unsound, because there are other methods than those Taylor locates.
Non-statist organisation, which comes in a range of forms^ is not a combination of the pure
methods considered. As a broad type of method it is hardly "unproposed", or without
precedents or examples (e.g. medieval orders and present international order).
7^
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[1] p.3O Important among these practices are resistance movements and organised
refusals (preferably without conspicuous leaders). While individuals can be selectively picked
off, enough people well organsed cannot. As a result grand refusals could be significant
political happenings.
[3] p.4? The practice of anarchism, generously construed, naturally includes the state of
being in anarchist conditions, of living under anarchism (though perhaps unaware). There is
cope for anarchism without doctrine. Many primitive societies thus qualify on anarchistic; they
practice, or practiced, anarchism though unaware (somewhat as wild animals practice hygine).
Further, no doubt now stretching 'practice' beyond its assumed anthropic context, many animal
communities practice anarchism. Many attracted ^anarchism, an anarchism without name
even, long for analogous pure practice.^ Th^ hope that whatever it is ill operate, perhps even
materilize, without any heave-
ithouteness or e
any intellectualizing, perhaps
without even thought or much ef
on their part. In contemporary circumstances they would
thave to be extrordinary lucky (a paternal state with caring elements, such as safe jobs and
spoon-fed indoctrinal education for all citizens, does not relinquish its control voluntarily).
[4] #awan Harare. This is a theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious
/refprious, social and political purposes. Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort to
force various restrictive types of social arrangements, archie ones (including defence focus,
standing armies, survellience etc.)
[5] about p.20 (connector^
Present minolithic governments have assumed far too many roles, for many of which
they are not competent, ffom some of wlpdrihey are disqualified by other roles (e.g. as
impartial referees by ^h^r/businessjsofnmitments). Because the centre tries to do and control
too much, as a consequenc$4tdoes very much unsatisifactorily. Improved arrangements would
separate these roles, deconcentrating and decentralizing power.
[6] p.30. As^?ovemmenr is variably determinable, so also is /aw. Under the main
determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism. But under a different determinate, there is no
incompatibility.
Anarchism cannot traffic in law, in the initial and prominent sense of /aw offered in the
OED, namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by authority and
characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent counter reducing this
prognastication is a'second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific and philosophical
uses'): namely 'without reference to an external commanding authority'.
�Law deservedly has a tarnished reputation in anarchism.
Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive priesthood. Too often it is an oppression tool of the state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatable with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely asserted to lists, and so
on.
[7] Democracy within ANARCHY, and DEMANARCHY
Present electoral arrangements offer what? What presently have is a competative game
between competating blocks of the ruling elite (with professional power-brokers who trade with
each other their patronage and cites/br the acclaimed right to govern.
Thus elections hardly represent a genuine expression of agreement by the populace to be
governed; rather they are occasions when the populace is duped into supporting one or other
elite team.
For the most part power is concentrated in organisations which are not elected, not
controlled by the people effected by their contractions and not representative.
By and large, satisfactory democratic arrangements will not be participatory (see
Burnheim).
are valuable for limited purposes, viz. as /a// bacty. B argues that they are not
satisfactory in general (p.91). There is no need to dissent.
Mows 1. Encourage those without interest in, or not genuinely affected by issue not to vote.
2. only structural, not material issues to refs. Certainly not material moral issues, for
instance, not capital punishment, not abortion.
Dgwarc/ty has the wrong etymology and the wrong meaning for anarchist purposes. It
means 'the office of a demarch [a president, chief magistrate, major or governnorj; a popular
government. The municipal body of a modern Greek commune' (OED). Anarchism recognises
no chiefs or leaders, even democratic ones or demogogues. What can be done very simply,
however, is to enlarge the word by a simple important syllable 'an', giving Jcwa/MrAy.
[8] [after authority, coercion.
To coerce is maintain or change state, normaliy of another creature, by force.
�Re Chap 4) Insofar as anarchism is duly based on removal of unacceptable means, it
should be
* pluralistic, because for example it cannot impose a single formulation on communities who
want to organise differently that its preferred way.
* non-violent. Terrorist forms of anarchism are strictly incompatibile with broad-based non
coercion. For terrorism typically involves coercion, stand-over tactics, and the like.
That is, there is a doublish standard on vio/ence: It is alright to apply violence against
state (and others) while not alright to have coercive state, which applies violence. No doubt this
can be justified through ggoi-sw: namely OK for me to do violence to you but not OK for you to
apply violence to me. Accordingly afentadve
is: A moral anarchism will not be a
form committed to violence - except unavoidable forms etc.
[9]
anJ Smallness
It has become fashionable, since the concurrent anthropological finalings concerning
small communities and the collective action results concerning small collectiyes demolisted the
assumption that anarchy was impossible, to concede that anarchy is possible but only where
there is a suitable small community. This sort of anarchism in-the-small has been forcefully
pursued by Taylor, who contends that 'anarchy is viable to the extent that the relations between
people are those which are characteristic of community', a small community (p.166). That is:
... community is necessary - if people are to live without the state' (p.3).
The argument to community that Taylor offeysreduces a modified Hobbesionism; social
order can oly be maintained, without the st^te and in the small, if the relations between
individuals are those of community (cf p.2L lnsofar as it is detailed, it is a remarkably brokeddown argument. As Taylor himself helps to show, 'the liberal jusdfication of the state' - from
the failure of individuals in a large public to voluntarily cooperate to provide themselves without
requisite collective goods - brdaks down at every critical point, in its premisses, in its
argument, and in its concluding inference to the state was the on/y means of ensuring the supply
of such goods (p.59).
It is this final lacuna onto which Taylor latches. Granting the rest, 'all that can be inferred
is that, if public goods are to be provided, some means must be found of getting people to do
their part in providing them' (p.59). There are, Taylor swiftly finds, three pure methods of
ensuring provision of the goods in question: the state, the market, and the community. The
argument then proceeds by elimination, of the market. Taylor 'contends that social order cannot
satisfactorily be put on the market' (p.2), though his arguments to this contention are far from
�14
e
OF
/
7
One
appalling
mes from a Russi
icrionary
that is hostile to all
-bourgeours socio-political tr
authority a
e, and counterpasses ' intere^s of petty private
ownersbib and small
ant economy to
progress of^ociety based on
large-scale production
v, 2nd revision
s, Progress,
bsever, 1989).
^nether-dismal-eharaeterisati
[4]
scientistIfApter).
narurg. This is a theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious
reforious, social and political purposes. Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort to
.v(0
force various restrictive types of social arrangements, archie ones [including defence focus,
standing armies, survellience etc.)
*[5FabouFpT2O-(G0miect0f)
Present\p^nolithic governments have assumed far too many roles, for many of which
they are not co
etent, from some of which they are disqualified by other roles (e.g. as
KHLI Ut
impartial referees by\[ieir business commitments). Because the centre tries to do and epntro
too much, as a conseque
it does very much unsatisifactofily. Improve
tents wouldl
.separate these roles, deconcen^ating and decentralizing power.
[7] Democracy within ANARCHY, and DEMANARCHY
Present electoral arrangements offer what? What presently have is a competative game
between competating blocks of the ruling elite (with professional power-brokers who trade with
each other their patronage and citesybr the acclaimed right to govern.
Thus elections hardly represent a genuine expression of agreement by the populace to be
governed; rather they are occasions when the populace is duped into supporting one or other
elite team.
For the most part power is concentrated in organisations which are not elected, not
controlled by the people effected by their contractions and not representative.
By and large, satisfactory democratic arrangements will not be participatory (see
Burnheim).
o
�— /^W/
6'J
n /
/I
15
7?^/<?rc/!^Az are valuable for limited purposes, viz. as /<
*/// /?ocA.s'. B argues that they are not
satisfactory in general (p.91). There is no need to dissent.
Moray 1. Encourage those without interest in, or not genuinely affected by issue not to vote.
2. only structural, not material issues to refs. Certainly not material moral issues, for
instance, not capital punishment, not abortion.
Z)^marc/ty has the wrong etymology and the wrong meaning for anarchist purposes. It
means the office of a demarch [a president, chief magistrate, major or govemnor]; a popular
government. The municipal body of a modem Greek commune' (OED). Anarchism recognises
no chiefs or leaders, even democratic ones or demogogues. What can be done very simply,
however, is to enlarge the word by a simple important syllable 'an', giving
IM) A
�*
*
��Chapter 8A
ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
AND OF A PREFERRED THEORY
There are many preliminaries. One, like preparing a badly used building site, consists in
removing the rubbish. That of course is but the beginning of philosophy, not the sole content
and end, as some zealous followers of Lockejhave supposed.
1. Issues in appalling methodology.
Many of the prevailing sins of philosophy are writ large in political philosophy, i Bad
practices abound; anarchism has suffered particularly as a result.
Redefinitions, and
redefinitional stratagems to try to close gappy arguments, abound. Large assumptions are
imported and regularly used, without due notice, or too often any awareness: particularly
pernicious are those of individualism and atomism, and of thoroughgoing egoism. It hardly
needs stressing that such assumptions are environmentally unfriendly, at best.
False
dichotomies abound. And so on. Among the deleterious practices, several deserve special
mention:
* 7%#/
o/
There is a deeply embedded in modern
mainstream intellectual activity and strikingly manifest in political theory. A general feature of
contemporary thought, as of much contemporary technology and practice, is that of over
powering or of excessive strength. The phenomenon, as exhibited in contemporary mainstream
logic, where it shows up in excessive assumptions, and principles more powerful than reason
can justify, is dis-assessed elsewhere (from the perspective of relevant logic, in RLR). Some of
the same unwarranted assumptions, notably those of invariant consistency and maximization,
reach far beyond stock logical theory to apply, so it is regularly claimed, to all rational practice,
including political decision-making and institutional arrangements (see MR).
Analogous features are incorporated in many of the arguments against anarchism. For
example, it is argued that anarchism cannot realise optimal delivery of public goods, ideal
conditions for this or that (e.g. free market functioning, capital formation and flow), and so on.
Not only do other alternatives not measure up to these standards (certainly prevailing
arrangements fall very far short), the standards themselves are quite excessive. Instead it is
enough that certain sorts of adequacy standards are met, that reasonable thresholds are
1
One reason is that much of it is done by political
thinking.
with no adequate grounding tn logic or
�/'
m we/Ttoi/o/ogy. Many of the prevailing sins of philosophy are writ large in political
*
philosophy.
Redefinitions, and redefinitional otologies to try to close gappy arguments,
abound. Large assumptions are imported and regularly used, without due notice, or too often
any awareness: particularly pernicious are those of individualism and atomism, and of
thoroughgoing egoism. It hardly needs stressing that such assumptions are environmentally
unfriendly, at best.
P/tcno/ncnon o/
* excessive strength. There is a deeply embedded in modern mainstream
intellectual activity and strikingly manifest in political theory.
A general feature of contemporary thought, as of much contemporary technology and
practice, is that of over-powering or of excessive strength. The phenomenon, as exhibited in
contemporary mainstream logic, where it shows up in excessive assumptions, and principles
more powerful than reason can justify, is disassesed elsewhere (from the perspective of relevant
logic, in RLR). Some of the same unwarranted assumptions, notably those of invariant
consistency and maximization, reach far beyond stock logical theory to apply, so it is regularly
claimed, to all rational practice, including political decision making and obstitutional
arrangements (see MR).
Analogous features are incorporated in many of the arguments against anarchism. For
example, it is argued that anarchism cannot realise optimal delivery of public goods, ideal
conditions for this or that (e.g. free market functioning, capital formation and flow), and so on.
Not only do other alternatives not measure up to these standards (certainly prevailing
arrangements fall very far short), the standards themselves are quite excessive. Instead it is
enough that certain sorts of adequacy standards are met, that reasonable thresholds are
achieved. There is a most important corollary: that arguments against anarchism or anarchistic
institutional arrangement which assume maximizing principles or the like (as are presumed in
Prisimers Dilemma arguments, game theory, mainstream economics, etc.) are flowed from the
very outset, and should be set aside.
A central time in anarchism offers a somewhat different display of the excess
phenomenon. The issue concerns alleged justifications of the state, or state-like institutions.
Here all that reason and argument appear to warrant are much less powerful institutions, not
arrangements with the excessive powers of the state. To close the gap between what argument
and practice appear,to justify and what the state claims, some opportunistic intellectuals have
1
One reason is that much of it is done by poiiticai szds with no adequate grounding in logic or critical
thinking.
�tried, rather......... to redefine the state. But such low redefinitions, while imposing states on
societies that operated without them, leaves the contemporary state besereft of adequate
justification. In brief, such intellectual strategies lead from the frying pan to the fire.
So it is similarly with institutions within the state, such as property and law. Reason and
argument do not justify state property arrangements, only an opportunistically redefined
"property" which does not fulfil the same state and capitalistic role. Similarly with law and state
legal systems.
ON DEFINING ANARCHISM DEFINITIONS OF ANARCHISM
One characterisation that is utterly appalling comes from a Russian Dictionary of
PAi/<9^o/?Ay:
'Anarc&i.wn, a petty-bourgeours socio-political trend that is hostile to all
authority and the state, and counterpasses the interests of petty private
ownership and small peasant economy to the progress of society based on
large-scale production' (ed I. Frolov, 2nd revision eds, Progress,
Plosever, 1989).
Another dismal characterisation comes from an American political scientist (Apter).
Defective definitions of anarchism abound, many supplied by high profile anarchists
(whereupon they assume a certain air of authority, a bogus air). A few examples will be
considered, mostly drawn from a large list of similarly defective definitions included in Clark,
p.ll8ff., who is out to show that any definition which attempts to do justice to anarchism
through an assentialistic definition deploying one simple idea is bound to fail, abysmally.
AnarcAy does not "mean literally "without government'" contrary to Caster p.14. It does
however imply without governments of prevailing cuts which is what the immediately proceeds
to: 'and the lowerst common demominstor of anarchist thought is the conviction that existing
forms of government are productive of wars, internal violence, repression and misery' (p.14).
Right on!
The very short characterisation of anarc/iAy/?? (and redition of anarc/taj) as 'no *
government'is defective because of the elosticity, and slippiness of 'government'. For
example, according to one dictionary (Dniverya/ E/tg/Bh) govern/ytenr means '... system of
polity in a state; territory ruled by a governor ...' in which case it fy incompatible with
Thus, e.g. Carter, Websters (?).
�2
achieved. There is a most important corollary: that arguments against anarchism or anarchistic
institutional arrangement which assume maximizing principles or the like (as are presumed in
Prisoners Dilemma arguments, game theory, mainstream economics, etc.) are flawed from the
very outset, and should be set aside.
A central issue in anarchism offers a somewhat different display of the excess
phenomenon. The issue concerns alleged justifications of the state, or state-like institutions.
Here all that reason and argument appear to warrant are much less powerful institutions, not
arrangements with the excessive powers of the state. To close the gap between what argument
and practice appear to justify and what the state claims, some opportunistic intellectuals have
tried, rather deviously, to redefine the state. But such low redefinitions, while imposing states
on societies that operated without them, leaves the contemporary state bereft of adequate
justification. In brief, such intellectual strategies lead from the frying pan to the fire.
So it is similarly with institutions within the state, such as property and law. Reason and
argument do not justify state property arrangements, only an opportunistically redefined
"property" which does not fulfil the same state and capitalistic role. Similarly with law and state
legal systems.
* Htg/t anJ low
Wolffs little book, billed as "a defence of anarchism" is a
small treasury of these. Virtually all the characterisations proposed at the beginning of this
book, of state, sovereignty, authority, power, actomomy, are defective, often by virtue of
definitional features. Consider Wolffs opening:
'Politics is the exercise of the power of the state, or the attempt to influence that exercise.
Political philosophy is therefore ... the philosophy of the state' (p.3 also p.ll). Politics went
on before the rise of the state, and with some good fortune, will persist often its demise.
Again, consider: 'the state is a group of persons who have or exercise suppose authority within
a given territory' (p3; repeated p.5). This shows the fallacy of redirectionism. For a state
normally does not change when those who exercise power do. On the de facto state Wolff is
also astray: 'a & Jacio state is simply a state whose subjects believe it to be ligitimate (i.e. really
to have the authority it claims for itself)' (p.10). Many subjects may nor believe that, but be
intimidated through state power. Very fashionable in removing anarchism are low redefinitions
of Ftare, where there is a state given any positional components in society, such as political
specialisation or division of labour (see Taylor on anthopoligical efforts on societies without
states). As a result there can be effortessly be both anarchy and "state"; any complex anarchist
society is a state!
Another rich source of redefinitions is founded by Taylor's books on anarchism.
Examples include: a fairly hopeless definition of gooJ.' it is desired (p.45). Most interesting is a
�3
disgustingly low redefinition of property.- 'Property' is here a shorthand for a variety of
entilements or use rights (Taylor 82 p.44). So as I am entitled to use the byway or to bathe in
the stream, they are my property, so I run them? Another example concerns coercion: In the
claim that to avoid the Hobbesian prisoners' dilemma 'every man must be coerced', Taylor
continues (87 p. 145), 'by which I mean simply that he must be made to behave differently than
he otherwise would (... (i.e.) would "ovlantarily" in the state of nature).' But such a difference
may be effectively achieved, depending on the subject, by noncoercive means, such as
persassion, sanctions, and so forth. Furthermore it would not guarantee what Taylor and
Hobbes appear to expect, authority and sovereignty.
Among the most pernicious of redefinitions, constraints, and elides are those concerning
interests and preferences - often reduction bases for gooJ and other value qualities, often
quickly converted from interest to self-interest (thus Taylor)^ Examples from within this circle
include harmony and cooperation.
For instance.'Harmony requires complete identity of
interests' (in Ope, p.226). It hardly requires comment. Again '...cooperation occurs when
actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others (in Ope p.226).
But suppose creatures simply work or act together (what 'cooperation' means).
psychological accounts are seriously astray.
* ZHc%#%MnoMS
or ctf^cr-or-M/n.
Such
Humans are extraordinarily addicted to
flawed dichotomous reasoning, again powerfully exhibited with regard to anarchism and the
state? For example, the alternative to the state is presumed to be anarchism which is equated
with disorder; so it is either the state or disorder. Again, the only alternative to a market system
of government is central control - market or control - and the market has won out decisively
now (one of the presumed reasons for the prematurely announced "end to ideology").
Other objectionable methodological assumptions include
'..Po.w&Mh'g mJzvo/aa/LSW (after McP p.3)
'Its possessive quality is its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own
person or capacities, owning nothing to society for them. The individual (is not)... part of a
larger..... whole, but... surer of himself.'
As a result:
'Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political socieity becomes a
celebrated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly
relation of exchange.'
2
3
The fallacious shifts are dealt with in 'Aquinst,
A famous Australian example is the truculent stance of its richest mum, Packer, in a parliamentary
inquiry: Either you believe me or call be a liar. Reflect on how far "call me a liar" goes beyond "you
do not believe me".
,
„
There should be some eodness^ that we are now trying to build machines in our own inadequate
image. (Many examples in SM).
�4
(a prime example in economics: the data of extremality).
* /tM/nan
* g/fwn o/va/ne, or reduction of value to preference.
All of these have been crically assessed elsewhere. But some features deserve further
elaboration:
* f/tg
tAgo/y
With rule and compass techniques it is wn/MM.n&Zg to trirect angle. Of course by measuring it is
rather easy.
Similarly with rationality: wider means can do what state was supposed to be necessary for.
Put differently, the theoretical state is an artifact on a certain ultra-thin theory of rationality.
The thin theory of rationality is an extraordinarily widespread ideological....... among
Anglo-American social theorists (many of whom feel obliged to make public dealeraatous of
faith). But that it is 'almost universally taken for granted by economists' does nothing to show
its correctness, unless an argument from expectise has required a new validity. What it reveals
rather is something about the ideological commitments,...........of economists.
The thing theory of rationality is almost invariably coupled with individualism,
methodological individualism as it is usually cleverly called (after Popper's theorizing).^
Many of these objectionabl assumption are melted together in theories of /mman nafnrg.
Mafnrg, CM/tMrg anJconfro/.
Part of the intellectual aim of a theory of human nature is to achieve an account of hum^n
/motivation. But a uniform story of motivation is scarcely more likely drawn as uniform account
of human nature.^ Motivations are no doubt important; but they are many and various.
It is still fashionable to assert, as if it was a truism, that 'all political philosophies ... base
themselves upon a conception of human nature' (Wolff Povgrty p. 140, pluralised). That is no
longer so (certainly, since Foucault) is that the notion of //n/nnn nnturg is not well defined, and
never was except under high redefinitions.
Work in decqtralized artificial intelligence readily suggests that communities of robots
could operate without statist arrangements (nor need outiside imput be state bound). That
suggests in tum that it is something about humans, as many humans, that leads to development
or imposition of states. That something has been ascribed, rather too quickly, to human nature,
or to human culture, or to some mix of human genetypic and phenotypic features, features that
other creatures or artificial intelligences do not share. It is something peculiarly pertaining to
and special to humans, their nature or culture, that amends institutional control. But has never
been satisfactorily explained what these special features are or how they operate. There is much
space for total scepticism about such justificatory or apologetic approaches.
4
5
Taylor has a dreadful argumejpj (892 p.57) that people are agents, because otherewise default to
understand why so many goods and supplied (also 87 p.109).
The usual uniform story depends upon self inferey/, which is widened into mteresM under pressure.
�5
2. Aa/Mrc, CM/tMro, awJ contra/.
A major function of culture is to regulate and control changed Political change in the
South Pacific, and political divergence from the industrial North, can, in principle then, be
grounded in and powered by features of local and regional culture. One organising theme, a
corollary of the argument, facilitates the transition from principle to practice:- It is that the
requisite elements are present in regional cultures, the potentiality is there, for the South Pacific
region (and Australia in particular) to proceed in a very different social political direction from
the North (and from the USA in particular). Given the radical unsatisfactoriness of the
American arrangements, in many frequently exposed respects,7 such a different direction is
worth taking — if it can be.
But a serious problem in the way of change is imposition of political arrangements, from
outside or from above. And, since imposition shades into political pressure, this is only one of
the obstacles impeding change in the South Pacific and elsewhere. Another forcing more and
more peoples, no longer sheltered by geographical isolation, into the same type of socio
political arrangements is supposed to derive from human nature itself. Free people are
economic people, in pretty much the American mould, so it is claimed. By this route, economic
imperialism can replace political imperialism.
A key question in political theory — one to which we are said to have no satisfactory
answer in the absence of a worthwhile theory of human nature (or human natures) — is
supposedly this:To what extent does human nature allow for alternative political and social arrangements? Or,
to tum the question around:- What restrictions are imposed in virtue of the nature of humans on
the broad range of political possibilities? How does that "nature" reduce the organisational
options?
A much-promoted Anglo-American answer, directly descended from the
Enlightenment, is that once /rcc/Y from systems of myths, taboos and tribal controls, from
superstition, people are essentially (and will generally become) self-centred individuals,
(properly) concerned with maximising their own gain or interests; that is, but for their shortage
of information (including technical know-how), free people are basically economic peopled
As ought now to be evident, that is to replace one ideology by another. But the Enlightenment
ideology is no longer so evident^: what recommends it? Under pressure of this sort, the AngloAmerican answer gets transformed to the theme that the economic picture of human nature is
superior, and fitting of rational creatures. That 'self-appointed West European superiority' has
6
7
8
9
Thus Abraham p.29ff.; Awa p.30. These sections are drawn from Cu/turc onJ rAc RooM of Political
Divergence.' a SowtA Pacific perspective.
For a recent trenchant expose, see Cohen and Rogers.
These people are also picked out under various alternative (but not strictly equivalent) descriptions,
e g. as acquisitive individuals, possessive individuals.
See e g. DP, chapter 10.
�6
in turn been disputed, since the time of Herder and the Romantics.^ Fortunately, however,
the extensive ensuing dialectic can be substantially avoided.
For all these questions and answers presuppose, to begin with, a certain misplaced
essentialism, that there is such an invariant nature common to human beings, which exactly
separates humans from other creatures. Attempts to specify such an essence, suitably constant
and invariant and given by necessary and sufficient conditions,^ are legion. They are
a frequent feature of Enlightenment thought. All ment are the same
because of universal drives [such as to pleasure and avoidance of pain].
These drives will operate independently of any location.
Chief among those drives was that towards self-preservation — Holbach,
for instance, stipulates:
we shall call nafare in man the collection of properties and qualities
which constitute him what he is, which are inherent to his species, which
distinguish him from other animal species or which he as in common with
them ... every man feels, things, acts and seeks his own well-being at all
times; these are the qualities and properties that constitute human nature
12
But this attempt at essentialist definition of /mman naA/re fails, in a quite characteristic way. As
it stands, the definition is inadequate; for not all humans seek just their own well-being always;
some are "stupid", some are altruistic, some have other commitments. However, suppose we
avoid such familiar counter-instances to egoism, by replacing 'well-being' by say 'broad well-
being', thus rendering such internal egoism analytic. And suppose to avoid other counter
expales (such as human vegetables, morons and the like), we normalise the definition, replacing
'every man' by 'every normal human'. But then the definition is again inadequate; for it fails to
distinguish humans from, for example, dolphins. It applies equally to Jo/p/un natMrg or, for
that matter, to gon/Z# natMrg.
10
11
12
See Berry, p.30ff., from whom the quote is taken. It is worth spelling out a little the extent of
agreement and disagreement with Herder. What is applauded is
1. 'Herder's dismissal of the Enlightenment's conception of human nature as static, acultural and
ahistorical' (Berry, p.32), but nor
*1. Herder's cultural relativism, that 'each culture ... should be treated on its own merits and not
judged by some faulty perspective such as Io bel/e nature' (p.30), or from any other perspective. In
the pluralistic framework of the text (which presuppoes PPP), a good many cross-cultural judgements
ate made and defended.
*2. Herder's relativisation of human nature to culture, and embodiment of it in culture; for example,
'it is through language that human nature can be seen to be .spect/iicaPy embodied in culture' (p.32).
With relativisation the notion loses its original theoretical point; but while failing in this role,
cultural nature is open to many of the same sorts of objections as human nature. Nor can language
bear the weight Herder loads upon it.
*3. Herder's human chauvinism: '... it is speech and with that reason and freedom, that differentiates
man. Man can choose, man is king' (p.36). Wild animals are free, can choose, communicate, solve
puzzles, and carry out elementary reasoning; in these respects they surpass children and many other
humans. Furthermore, *
*3 gets Herder into serious trouble, not to say inconsistency, with 1.
Abraham, drawing on Wittgenstein, presents just these conditions for an essence, p.23ff.
Berry p.17. Berry supplies several other similar examples.
�7
Of course the definition can again be patched, by appealing to the anatomical cluster of
features that separate humans from other mammals or to the biological specification of /tomo
But the resulting normalised definition, with its analytical egoism, does little more
than such biological definitions of An/nan: it does not supply a natnrg, it does not deliver
-ynp^rbiological features of political relevance. The notion of human nature thus fragments: into
the satisfactory enough biological notion of human, and an unsatisfactory superbiological (or
sociobiological) addition: that of human nature or essence. What is this further, problematic
nature? The Romantics can be read as arguing that there is none, no nature as distinct from
culture, only /oca/ nature (Herder's term) which coincides with culture. Peeling off cultural
excretions and variations in order to reach an essence leaves, like Wittgenstein's artichoke,
nothing. Just nothing.
The notion of human nature is a theoretical item, introduced to provide stability amid
cultural variability, a constant bulwark against relativism, but designed as well to justify — as
natural or, failing that as superior — a porr/cn/or type of political economy, state and legislature,
and its imposition everywhere else. 13 But its application is even grander: Human nature is a
theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious nefarious, social and political purposes.
Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort to justify or enforce various restrictive types
of social arrangements, statist ones (including defence forces, standing armies, survellience —
arrangements, and so on). Human nature is a highly resilient notion which has been widely
applied in such fashions; it is not so easily dissolved, certainly not through one illustration.
However the fact that the notion is written large in much political theory, and is received, does
not show that it or the embedding theory is sound. And it is not, but is defective, and in its
socio-political selectivity it is, as the illustration reveals, virtually of a piece with human
chauvinism (which would assign an unduly privileged position to human beings in the
ecological scheme of things).
Most conveniently, the superbiological notion of human nature begins to dissolve under
any attempt to set it down, in mmuch the way that attempts supporting human chauvinism to set
down something ethically special about humans disintegrate.
*^
13
14
The notion of human nature —
Hence the Enlightenment program of imposing enlightened Western culture everywhere, later
emphasised by Bentham. 'The Legislator, Knowing that human nature is ever the same [different
countries do not have different catalogues of pleasure and pain], can reform the laws and even
transplant them from one society to another' (Berry, p.18).
This claim concerning human chauvinism is argued in detail in EE. But the claim concerning human
nature is only sketchily defended in the text. For the alleged social-arrangement-dictating features of
human nature, like similar alleged features of economic or technological determinism, are rather
major obstacles to be removed — especially insofar as they supposedly severely and inevitably
restrict the character of future societies — than the main business of the present enterprise.
Fortunately then the claim, that the superbiological notion of human nature is a defective theoretical
one which dissolves, is defended elsewhere: not only, in effect, in work of Romantics from Herder
�8
a nature or essence for a// and on/y humans (some special classes of humans excepted perhaps)
— presuppoes that there are some stable or constant social features holding for all peoples,
across different cultures, which are furthermore distinctively human features.
The
presupposition fails, because once cultural variation between peoples is fully taken into account,
only some rather trivial shared characteristics remain, which furthermore are shared by various
animal cultures, such as those of primates.
Consider, first, such products or tools of more literary cultures as books, or of
contemporary cultures as telephones and computers. Since most historical cultures lacked such
items, their possession or distribution obviously cannot figure as part of what marks out human
nature. Consider next, then, what are commonly taken to be key components of (human)
nature, certain basic human needs, such as food and shelter. These requirements are far from
free of cultural and environmental determinants. For look at what is regarded as required in the
way of shelter, and how it varies from culture to culture, place to place. (And even what is
taken as basic can often be met in a myriad of ways, though acceptably in some cultures only in
a few fixed ways.) The common denominator is the rather trivial requirement of some sort of
shelter under more extreme conditions — a requirement also of wombats. The situation with
food, sex, and so on, is hardly better. Dietary requirements vary considerably from race to
race, Europeans for example being very inefficient by many tribal standards and unable to
survive satisfactorily where tribal people flourish. 1$ Again the somewhat trivial lowest
common denominator applies also to various groups of animals. Nor are attempts to mark out
the human nature by some more complex list of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions, or
more loosely by a cluster of natural features, much more successful, or of direct political
application without the importation of what is culturally at issue — values. In any case, such
vague and general lists as emerge^ impose little constraint at all on a political direction, since a
variety of political arrangements is compatible with such listings.
15
16
on, but also in significant recent literature. Foucault, for example, can be read as saying that human
nature is an invention of the Enlightenment which dissolves: 'his much discussed ... di&MdMhon of
mon is nothing more, or less, than the claim that the attempt to establish order upon a scientific
understanding of human nature is both profoundly mistaken and profoundly unstable' (Philp, p.15,
italics added).
The converse is seen in the extent to which tribal peoples gain weight on European diets. At another
level, consider the Maori attitude to, and underlying revulsion by, cooked food: see Alpers, p.7-9.
For one such list, which however requires pruning and adjustment, see Wilson, p.22. As it happens,
Wilson does not make anything much of this list (which does not supply necessary conditions),
immediately presents a parallel list for insect societies — a list which does considerable damage to
more traditional claims about human nature — and then proceeds in effect to demolish main criteria
that have been used to separate humans from animals and to restrict cultures to human societies (e.g.
p.39).
�9
Accordingly, human nature as such is not an important constraint on political theory, or a
theory of human nature a key ingredient in endeavours to work out a political philosophy or
political directions. *7 The reason is like the reason that determining the conditions for the good
life would not impose a satisfactory constraint on a political theory, namely presupposition
failure. Like the meaning of life
*s,
the good life fails to demarcate a single thing; there are
many styles of good lives. So too there is human nature and human nature, depending on the
culture or social paradigm and on the setting. Nature, both human and not, varies with culture
and environment. Because of this two-way dependence, there is no unique stable
superbiological human nature.
A corollary of the dissolution of the notion of human nature is the rejection also, as
misleading, of the usual picture of nature as given, as a stable notion across races and tribes,
with culture as a variable on top. There is no such culturally invariant division: culture affects
local nature. The picture is flawed in much the same way, then, as the familiar picture of
perception, as consisting of given uninterpreted sense data, stable across (normal) perceivers,
with interpretation imposed on the neutral data.
Nor therefore is culture something that can be creamed off the top, so to speak, to find
real human features or basic nature underneath. Certainly, cultures can be destroyed; however
what results from removal by destruction of a culture is not something closer to real people, but
people with a destroyed culture. So it is also with attempts like Hobbes or Rawls to peel
political organisation off the the top, in order to locate in a quasi-analytical or quasi-historical
way, a state of nature underneath or preceding some organised state or other. A flawed picture,
derived from mistaken or questionable presuppositions, is assumed.
What will be found underneath, or in the original (natural) state, is, it is usually
conveniently assumed, a nature that fits the view to be developed — with the right values very
fortunately in-built. Given that what is to be explained or justified is something like present
socio-political arrangements and the privileged position of some status quo — as well as a
dominant culture's image of itself, and elements of the dominant Northern social paradigm —
underlying human nature turns out to be, hardly surprisingly, that of fully competitive
possessive individualism (much the same model, that is, which serves for economic man, for
Enlightenment man, for the "rational person", etc.) The myth of unique human nature
17
18
For more on contemporary "scientific" efforts to deploy a theory of human nature for social and
political ends, see Appendix 2.
Which is perhaps as well, since we still have so little reliable and unprejudiced information as to
what "human nature" amounts to, what its variational possibilities, in different environments, might
be, or of the possibilities beyond past terrestrial selections of cultures.
On which see Routley and Griffin.
�10
functions, like many other myths, to perpetuate or instil particular social arrangements and
special privilege.
Thus too the myth of human nature is linked to other culture-based myths, the myths of
all (normal) humans as aggressive individuals and as predominantly self-interested maximizers
(at least insofar as they are rational) — to bring in some of the myths bound up with the image
of contemporary urban-industrial humans. As there is no underlying hard ground, no firm
starting point in human nature, so there is none in these associated myths. The South Pacific
was, and remains, rich in cultures which upset these associated myths. Non of the
Melanesians, Polynesians or Australian aboriginal peoples comprised societies of individuallyoriented maximizers; indeed their strongly communal lifestyles and preparedness to stop, work
especially, after a low sufficiency threshold had been reached, was a major and repeated source
of criticism from the European cultures that came to dominate the region.
Even forms and types of aggressiveness, and approaches to war, often taken to be solid
ground, are culture and environment dependent, and vary with both parameters. 19
Aggressiveness is often supposed to impose hugh constraints on political arrangements. But
there is little substance to the claim that humans are naturally aggressive independently of social
or cultural setting. The most that appears clear is that circumstances can be arranged, for
instance through crowding or provocation or cultural relocation, where peoples of more familiar
cultures will become aggressive^ — and perhaps people of other cultures will not, but will just
give up, as people often do in the face of immense brutality. Certainly some arrangements are
required to cope with or suitably isolate aggression, but these can be of a wide range of
alternative types. Once again, what is normally accounted human nature depends upon and
varies with culture and environment, which people often shortsightedly see as fixed: certainly,
such components as selfishness, cooperativeness, individuality do.
What is often much more important than either culture or nature in determining social
arrangements is another factor: namely, outside control or imposition. Whatever social
arrangements have evolved in a region (through local "nature and culture") can be overridden,
A striking illustration of environmental variation is afforded by the differences between savannah
dwelling and forest dwelling tribes of baboons. For a local illustration, consider Maori approaches to
war (like war conventions, a social phenomenon), before European corruption. Thus Best reports
that 'an individual, or a whole clan, might decline to take part in an engagement on account of some
evil omen, and such an action would be approved of (p.15). There are several, apparently reliable,
stories of Maoris engaged in war supplying the opposition with equipment or ammunition, or
temporarily abandoning their fighting effort to help out the other (British) side, so the battle could
proceed properly.
20Wilson's argument that humans are innately aggressive involves such an invalid move: he looks at the
behaviour of Semai men when 'taken out of their nonviolent society' by recruitment in a British
colonial army (p.100)! As well, Wilson's case rests on a dubious redefinition of innateness, and a
low redefinition of aggressiveness to take in form of mere (nonaggressive) conflict (pp.99-100).
19
�11
and new arrangements imposed, in one way or another. With long-standing arrangements,
imposition is almost invariably from without, and the changes in arrangements typically involve
either violence in their adaption or mass migration of people or both. In the last two hundred
years, especially, the South Pacific has, like much of the newer world, been drastically so
affected, in a complex way. And the changes, still flowing strongly from the North, continue.
We are in the last days of the destruction of old cultures, and the destruction is now to a
considerable extend by more subtle cultural, economic and technological means than the cruder
methods of slightly earlier times. Outside control can be exercised, or occur, in many ways less
blatant than direct intervention of one sort or another, such as through introduction of new
technologies, economic sanctions, monetary and loan policies, etc., as well as through
exchange and training programs, textbooks, advertising and magazines, film and television (i.e.
through physical exemplifications of culture). European peoples in the South pacific are often
unwittingly, part of this quieter process of cultural conversion and erosion; but many of us are
now victimes as well as, or rather than, perpetrators (cf. Crough and Wheelwright).
Human communities have been — and many still are — as insensitive to other human
cultures as they are to the natural environment (witness American and their allies in Vietnam).
Like an ecosystem, a culture can be destroyed, or pushed beyond redemption. This is
sufficiently well-known. Yet the creation of political disaster areas proceeds apace — in blatant
cases typically by disruption of culture and lifestyle using violence^ There is furthermore,
where recovery is possible at all, a long recovery period, perhaps sometimes of the order of
human generations. Yet there is increasing production of these politically contaminated regions,
especially through imperialism, e.g. USA in Central America, Israel in Lebanon, Russia in
Afghanistan, Indonesia in East Timor and West papua, etc.
In the south Pacific, there are many quieter Northern influences at work, but the strongest
now is unquestionably the American. American companies, businessmen, academics, tourists
and warships, their technology and patents, films and television programs, are the most evident
and influential. There can be various motives and aims (and assumptions) behind the newer
cultural and economic imperialism, behind endeavours such as the American to install their "free
enterprise" philosophy and practice everywhere. 22 Granted it mostly contributes to American
economic supremacy, to American business23 and to the transfer of substantial regional wealth
and surplus value to the USA. But national economic reasons are not the only sort of reasons
21
22
23
These disaster areas should perhaps be cordoned off like those infected by communicable disease, but
from continuing disruptive, outside interference.
What is said about American cultural and political imperialism applies, with adaption, in a lesser
way, to imperialism and colonialism by other nation-states such as USSR, Britian, France and
Indonesia. USA has no monopoly on imperialism. US imerialism in the third world is in part
documented and analysed in Chomsky and Herman.
Though not invariably as the experience with the Japanese motor industry has indicated.
�12
such policies are pursued; apart from the side-issue of integrity, that many Americans really do
believe in the optimality of their local ideals to the exclusion of other arrangements, there are
deeper and somewhat more respectable ideological reasons as well.
The imperialistic endeavours can be underpinned by a J^cripftve assumption that all
human nature is at bottom really like American human nature, for instance highly economically
oriented. Thus, but for political distortions (a political analogue of economic externalities) and
lack of technological means, other peoples would choose the American (political and economic)
way: they simply have not really been given the opportunity or means. For many peoples this
is simply not true; for most other cultures let us hope, or pray, that this is not the case.
Alternatively, or as well, a more arrogant prescriptive assumption may be at work, that all
human nature ought to be like American nature at its best, because America not only has the best
way of life in the world and mostly the best ways of doing things^, but has a special hold on
rationality. The free-enterprise system (perhaps with representative democracy American-style
tackedon) is the rational enterprise embodied. Certainly the system is sometimes peddled, by
genuine believers in the American way, with the same evangelism as Christianity, which was
often seen and presented as the rational religion, at least before science got at it. Well, science
hasn't got at the free-enterprise religion yet, but on the contrary now has a social division
heavily devoted to its justification and furtherance.^ However some philosophy has got at the
system, sufficiently to reveal that it is no unique embodiment of rationality — there is none such
— but is a decidedly irrational practice in many circumstances. Thus, it is especially irrational if
local goals are to preserve local environments and cultures, as much experience helps attest.
It is aspects of the false descriptive assumption, and what can emerge with its rejection,
that are a main focus in what follows (though various of the reasons for rejecting the
prescriptive assumption will also emerge or get recorded). An important underlying theme will
24
25
Thus, for example, American agricultural textbooks and agricultural spokespeople are fond of
announcing that American agriculture is the best in the world; similarly for environmental
protection, forestry, technology, university education, and so on. But since they are the best, it is
evident that these American ways should be exported, isn't it? Even granting the large assumptions,
No, firstly, because that is to neglect important regional and local variations and differences, and
secondly because these ways may interfere with other significant features of reginal life or culture.
It has not passed unremarked that the high standard of material life in USA depends in part on a very
fortunate inheritance (e g. some of the best and deepest soils) and in part, as in Europe, on a lower
standard of life and conditions elsewhere, upon siphoning off wealth and especially resources (US
currently uses about one-fifth of world resources and 30% of world energy) from other regions. To be
sure, economic apologetics proffer other explanations of American transcendence, e.g. ingenious
constuctions like that of Olson, built on a sandy logic of economic actors collectively locked into
economically determined arrangements, substantially independent of the resource base.
In elaborating on how modem societies control their citizens, Foucaul has explained various
extensive types of social control exercised and licensed through received social sciences, by way of
approved standards of normality, health, stability, adequacy, rationality, etc.: See Phil p.15.
�13
continue to be that neither broader nor basic human nature is a single stable thing, but varies
substantially in ways that are highly political relevant — relevant to the sort of political
framework a society adopts. In freer societies, less imposed upon from outside or above, the
variation can be largely accounted for through cultural variation (which in tum depends on
environment, etc.). The alternative assumptions, are then, those of cultural pluralism, that
culture is part of "nature", shaping in particular local human nature. Of course once again
"human nature" can be pared back and back to try to remove cultural variations; but in this way
what are taken to be important superbiological features of human nature for political theory are
also excised (e.g. features that make prisoners' dilemmas and commons' tragedies come out
one way rather than another).
Just as different cultures can mean different social arrangements, so in a larger setting
they can imply different political organisation and different political directions. Where requisite
differences do not occur, because incongrous arrangements have been imposed, ca/tMra/
can
a powcr/hZ /brcc ybr change. Likewise developing elements of cultural
difference can be a potent base for social change — or resistance to imposed change —
(especially, in communities where other more orthodox bases for change, such as economic
incentives or penalties, have become inoperative or failed, or are not available.
Culture is however a double-edged instrument, not only to be used, but resisted. For
example, though leading [valuable] features of indigenous Pacific cultures are to be reactivated,
as forces for change, some features of these cultures are to be resisted (such as male
domination), along with many features of modern Western cultures. Features of culture are
thus used to resist and confront undesirable (implanted or imported) sorces of culture; such as,
inequitable political arrangements, excessive consumerism, persuasive advertising media and
loaded news systems, hollow suburbia, alienating job structures, etc. It is important not only to
build and design alternatives — for which elements of local culture afford a solid foundation —
but also to dismantle, and build up resistance against, prime sources of antagonistic culture.
This is as true for American culture as Antipodean. One of the chief reasons why mainstream
American culture is so individualistic, so competitive, so violent, and so forth, is that
movements offering or encouraging alternatives have been repressed by the dominant
corporations and the state apparatus (see especially Goldstein).
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political philosophy.; Redefinitions, and redefinitional -otolJgies to try to close gappy
arguments, abound. Large assumptions are imported and regularly used, without due notice,
or too often any awareness: particularly pernicious are those of individualism and atomism, and
of thoroughgoing egoism. It hardly needs stressing that such assumptions are environmentally
unfriendly, at best,
w,
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intellectual aedvity and strikingly manifest in polidcal theory.
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One reason is that much of it is done by poiitical 6,..Is with no adequate grounding in logic or critical
thinking.
�A general feature of contemporary thought, as of much contemporary technology and
practice, is that of over-powering or of excessive strength. The phenomenon, as exhibited in
contemporary mainstream logic, where it shows up in excessive assumptions, and principles
more powerful than reason can justify, is dis^assesed elsewhere (from the perspective of
relevant logic, in RLR). Some of the same unwarranted assumptions, notably those of invariant
consistency and maximization, reach far beyond stock logical theory to apply, so it is regularly
claimed, to all rational practice, including political decision-making and obstitutional
arrangements (see MR).
Analogous features are incorporated in many of the arguments against anarchism. For
example, it is argued that anarchism cannot realise optimal delivery of public goods, ideal
conditions for this or that (e.g. free market functioning, capital formation and flow), and so on.
Not only do other alternatives not measure up to these standards (certainly prevailing
arrangements fall very far short), the standards themselves are quite excessive. Instead it is
enough that certain sorts of adequacy standards are met, that reasonable thresholds are
achieved. There is a most important corollary: that arguments against anarchism or anarchistic
institutional arrangement which assume maximizing principles or the like (as are presumed in
Prisoners Dilemma arguments, game theory, mainstream economics, etc.) are flowed from the
very outset, and should be set aside.
A central time in anarchism offers a somewhat different display of the excess
phenomenon. The issue concerns alleged justifications of the state, or state-like institutions.
Here all that reason and argument appear to warrant are much less powerful institutions, not
arrangements with the excessive powers of the state. To close the gap between what argument
and practice appear to justify and what the state claims, some opportunistic intellectuals have
tried, rather ^".^..^to redefine the state. But such low redefinitions, while imposing states on
societies that operated without them, leaves the contemporary state be^ereft of adequate
justification. In brief, such intellectual strategies lead from the frying pan to the fire.
So it is similarly with institutions within the state, such as property and law. Reason and
argument do not justify state property arrangements, only an opportunistically redefined
"property" which does not fulfil the same state and capitalistic role. Similarly with law and
state legal systems.
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�NQRK4-N&-5RAFT
CULTURE AND THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL DIVERGENCE:
a South Pacific perspective
the Austral ian/American contrast
major
A
Political
change
industrial
of
-Function
in
in
regulate
and
control
and political divergence
principle then,
features of local and regional culture.
the
to
is
the South Pacific,
can,
North,
culture
be grounded in and
change. 1
from
the
powered
by
One organising theme, a corollary of
facilitates the transition from principle to practice:- It
argument,
is
that the requisite elements are present in regional cultures, the potentiality
is
for
there,
South Pacific region (and Australia
the
particular)
in
to
proceed in a very different social and political direction from the North (and
from
USA in particular).
the
American arrangements,
unsatisfactoriness of
the
2
in many frequently exposed respects , such a different
Given the radical
direction is worth taking - if it can be.
serious problem in the nay of
a
But
arrangements,
from outside or from above.
change is imposition of
And,
political
since imposition shades into
this is
only one of the obstacles impeding change in the
South Pacific and elsewhere.
Another forcing more and more peoples, no longer
political pressure,
sheltered
by geographical isolation,
arrangements
of
socio-political
is supposed to derive from human nature itself.
Free people are
economic people,
into the same type
in pretty much the American mould,
this route, economic imperialism can replace political
1.
Nature,
theory
- one
culture,
to
which
and control.
so it
is
By
claimed.
imperialism.
A supposedly,key question in political
we are said to have no satisfactory'' answer
in
the
absence of a worthwhile theory of human nature (or human natures) - is .his:
1.
Thus Abraham p.29ff.; Awa p.30.
2.
For a recent trenchant expose, see Cohen and Rogers.
1
*
7%-
�To
extent does human nature allow tor alternative political and
what
arrangements? Or, to turn the question around:-
in
virtue
of
the
nature
of
possibilities?
How does that
much-promoted
Anglo-American
Enlightenment,
is
controls,
become)
from
or
superstition,
answer,
people
broad
range
directly
taboos and
(and
6
from
descended
are essentially
but for their
will
the
tribal
generally
shortage
information
of
free people are basically economic
people.
that is to replace one ideology by another.
ideology is no longer so
Enlightenment
political
of
(properly) concerned with maximising their
that is,
interests;
As ought now to be evident,
the
the
that once freed from systems of myths,
technical know-how),
(including
on
What restrictions are imposed
"nature" reduce the organisational options?
self-centred individuals,
gain
own
humans
social
evident:
what
But
recommends
it?
Under pressure of this sort, the Anglo-American answer gets transformed to the
that the economic picture of human nature is superior,
theme
rational
creatures.
and fitting
That 'self-appointed West European superiority
*
turn been disputed, since the time of Herder and the Romantics.
has
of
in
Fortunately,
however, the extensive ensuing dialectic can be substantially avoided
For all
these questions and answers presuppose, to begin
with, a certain
misplaced essential ism, that there is such an invariant nature common to human
beings,
which
such
exactly
separates humans from other
creatures.
suitably constant and invariant
5
necessary and sufficient conditions , are legion. They are
specify
an
essence,
Attempts
and
given
to
by
a frequent feature of Enlightenment thought. All men are the same
because of universal drives [such as to pleasure and the avoidance of
pain). These drives will operate independently of any location.
Chief among those drives was that towards self-preservation - Holbach,
for instance, stipulates:
we .shall
call
nature in man the collection of properties and
qualities which constitute him what he is, which are inherent
.o
his species, which distinguish him from other animal
species ur
which he has in common with them ... every man feels,
thinks,
3.
These people are also picked out under various alternative (but
strictly equivalent)
descriptions, e.g. as acquisitive m i?i ua s,
possessive individuals.
�acts and seeks his own well-being at all times,
these are^
kilties and property thet constitute human nature ... o.
But th,, attempt at essenti.list defin.ti.n of human nature fail,,
in a quite
A, -t stands, th. d.dtniti.n is inadequate; tor net a!)
*c
yo<
/
humans seek just their o<an ujeii-being always; .ssome ar. altruistic, s<xne have
characterrst-c ^y.
other commitment,.
to
ego-sm,
by
replacing
rendering such internal
examples
suppose
Hoover,
uell-being-
egoism analytic.
(such a, human vegetables,
definition,
replacing
every
definition 1, again inadequate;
example,
avoid such tamtl.ar counter.ostance,
by
say
broad
m.ll-being',
And suppose to avoid other counter
morons and th. like),
man' by
thus
every normal human'.
^normalise
the
then
the
But
tor it fails to distinguish humans from, for
It applies equally to dolphin nature or, for that matter,
dolphins.
to aori11 a nature.
Of
4.
course
the
definition can again be patched,
by
appealing
to
the
(From previous page)
See Berry, p.30ff., from whom the quote is taken,
It
is worth spelling out a little the extent of agreement and
disagreement with Herder. Nhat is applauded is
1.
'Herder's dismissal
dismissal of
of the
the Enlightenment's
Enlightenment's conception
conception of human nature
as static, acultural and ahistorical' (Berry, p.32), but no^
that 'each culture
... should be
31.
Herder's cultural relativism,
t judged by some faulty perspective such
treated on its own merits and no! .
"nature' (p.30), or from any other perspective.
In the
as
la belle
p.u,77^^k
of th. text ("huh presupposes PPP),
a good many
pluralistic cross-cultural judgements are made and defended.
Order's relativisation of human nature to culture,
and embodiment
32.
Herder s relafivisatio
through language that human nature
of it in culture; for example,
it is
Mi th
* 32).
(p
can be seen to be specifically embodied in culture'
but
theoretical
point;
relativisation the notion loses its original
same
cultural nature is open to many of the
ojhile failing in this role,
Nor can language bear the weight
sorts of objections as human nature.
Herder loads upon it.
A
it is speech and with that reason
Herder's human chauvinism:
33.
Man can choose, man
is king'
that differentiates man.
and freedom,
can choose, communicate, solve puzzles,
<
<=Hrn^^s
(p.36).
1Wild animals are free, ---- -----) out elementary reasoning;
m these ^^=-7
;
and carryand many other humans. Furthermore, 33 gets Herder into serious
chi 1dren
trouble, not to say inconsistency, with 1.
5.
6.
drying on Nittg.nste.n,
Abraham,
essence, p.23ff.
Berry p.17.
Berry supplies severa
pre^nt, Just these condition, for an
1 other similar examples.
�cluster of -features that separate humans from other mammals or
anatomical
the
biological specification of homo sapiens.
But the resulting
to
normalised
definition,
with its analytical egoism, does little more than such biological
definitions
of
human:
it does not supply a nature,
deliver
not
does
it
The notion of human
superbiological
features of political relevance.
thus fragments:
into the satisfactory enough biological notion of human,
an
unsatisfactory
superbiological (or sociobiological)
and
of
that
addition^
The Romantics
What is this further, problematic, nature?
nature or essence.
nature
can be read as arguing that there is none, no nature as distinct from culture,
cultural
off
Peeling
only local nature (Herder's term) which coincides with culture.
excretions and variations in order to reach an essence leaves,
liKe
Wittgenstein's artichoke, nothing.
of human nature is a theoretical item,
The notion
cultural variability,
amid
stabi1i ty
but designed as wel 1
particular
type
everywhere
else.
of
7
fashionj;
fact
and
that
received,
not,
the
introduced to
a constant bulwark against
to justify ^as natural or, failing that,
political
economy and legislature, and
provide
relativism,
as superior^
its
imposi t i on
such
Tlsf?s resilient notion has been widely applied in
i
is not so easily dissolved,
notion
by one illustration.
is wri tten large in much
political
but is defective,
3
However the
theory,
the embedding theory is sound.
does not show that it or
a
and
is
Hnd it is
and in its socio-political selectivity it is,
as the
a piece with human chauvinism (which would
assign an unduly privileged position to human beings in the ecological
scheme
of things).
under
7.
. the superbiological notion of human nature begins to dissol\
*
A
any attempt to set it down,
in much the way that attempts supporting
Hence the Enlightenment program of imposing enlightened Western cultur^
everywhere,
later emphasised by Bentham. 'The Legislator, lowing t
human nature is ever the same [different countries do not have
catalogues of pleasure and pain], can reform the laws and even transplan
them from one society to another' (Berry, p.18).
namrg. This is a theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious
reforious, social and political purposes. Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort toy
i
.7"& $ 11T
A
enforce various restrictive types of social arrangements, archie ones (including defence foc^s,
�to
chauvinism
human
humans
that
there
ethically
something
about
special
humans
The notion of human nature - a nature or essence for alj_
disintegrate.
only
down
set
(some special classes of humans excepted perhaps)
are
stable or constant social
some
- presupposes
holding
features
and
for
all
across different cultures, which are furthermore distinctively human
peoples,
features.
peoples
The
is
presupposition fails,
fully
characteristics
taken
remain,
because once cultural variation between
into account,
which
some
only
furthermore
are
rather
shared
by
trivial
shared
various
animal
cultures, such as those of primates.
Consider,
books,
or
historical
first,
such
products or tools of more literary cultures as
of contemporary cultures as telephones and computers.
cultures
lacked
such items,
their
possession
or
Since
most
distribution
obviously cannot figure as part of what marks out human nature. Consider next,
what are commonly taken to be key components of (human) nature, certain
then,
basic human needs,
such as food and shelter.
free of cultural and environmental
as required in the way of shelter,
place to place.
of
ways,
common
under
8.
These requirements are far from
determinants.
For look at what is regarded
and how it varies from culture to culture,
(And even what is taken as basic can often be met in a myriad
though acceptably in some cultures only in a few fixed
ways.)
denominator is the rather trivial requirement of some sort of
more extreme conditions - a requirement also of wombats.
The
shelter
The situation
This claim concerning human chauvinism is argued in detail in EE. But the
claim concerning human nature is only sketchily defended in the ex -or
the alleged social-arrangement-dictating features of human nature,
like
similar alleged features of economic or technological
determinism, are
rather major obstacles to be removed - especially insofar as they
supposedly severely and inevitably restrict the character of
u ure
societies - than the main business of the present enterprise.
Fortunately then the claim,
that the superbiological notion of human
nature is a defective theoretical one which dissolves,
is defende
elsewhere: not only, in effect, in work of Romantics from Herder on, but
also in significant recent literature. Foucault, for example, can be read
as saying
*
that human nature is an invention of the Enlightenment which
dissolves: "his much discussed ... dissolution of man is nothing more, or
less,
than the claim that
the attempt to establish order upon a
scientific understanding of human nature is both profoundly mistaken an
profoundly unstable" (Philp, p.15, italics added).
5
�with
1-ood,
sex,
and
so on,
considerably from race to race,
by
many
people
is hardly better.
vary
Europeans for example being very inefficient
tribal standards and unable to survive satisfactorily where tribal
9
flourish.
figain the somewhat
trivial
lowest common denominator
applies also to various groups of animals.
human
requirements
Dietary
by some more complex list of jointly necessary
nature
conditions,
Nor are attempts to mark out
more
or
loosely
by a cluster of natural
and
features,
the
sufficient
more
much
successful, or of direct political application without the importation of what
is culturally at issue - values.
In any case, such vague and general
impose little constraint at all on apolitical
emerge
direction,
lists as
since
a
variety of political arrangements is compatible with such listings.
Accordingly,
political
theory,
human
nature
as such is not an
important
constraint
on
or a theory of human nature a key ingredient in endeavours
11
work out a political philosophy or political directions
to
.
The reason is
the reason that determining the conditions for the good life would
like
not
impose a satisfactory constraint on a political theory, namely presupposition
12
failure.
Like the meaning of life ,
the good life fails to demarcate a
single
'?.
thing;
there
are many styles of good lives.
So too there
is
human
The
converse is seen in the extent to which tribal peoples gain weight
on European diets. At another level, consider the Maori attitude to, and
underlying revulsion by, cooked food: see Alpers, p.7-9.
10. For one such list, which however requires pruning and adjustment, see
Nilson, p.22. As it happens, Wilson does not make anything much of this
list (which does not supply necessary conditions), immediately presents a
parallel
list for insect societies - a list which does considerable
damage to more traditional claims about human nature - and then proceeds
in effect
to demolish main criteria that have been used to separate
humans from animals and to restrict cultures to human societies <e.a.
p. 39) .
For more on contemporary "scientific" efforts to deploy a theory of human
nature for social and political ends, see Appendix 2.
11.
Which is perhaps as well, since we still have so little reliable and
unprejudiced information as to what "human nature" amounts to, what its
variational possibilities, in different environments, might be, or of the
possibilities beyond past terrestrial selections of cultures.
12.
On which see Routley and Griffin.
�and human nature,
nature
depending on the culture or social paradigm and
on
Nature, both human and not, varies with culture and environment.
the setting.
there is no unique stable superbiological
Because of this two-way dependence,
human nature.
of
corollary
6
rejection also,
across races and tribes,
The picture is flawed in much the same way,
the
on
top.
culture affects local nature.
as the familiar picture of
then,
consisting of given uninterpreted sense data,
as
is
with culture as a variable
There is no such culturally invariant division:
perception,
nature
of the usual picture of nature as given, as a
as misleading,
notion
stable
the dissolution of the notion of human
stable
across
(normal) perceivers, with interpretation imposed on the neutral data.
Nor therefore is culture something that can be creamed off the top, so to
find real human features or basic nature
to
speak,
Certainly,
underneath.
cultures can be destroyed; however what results from removal by destruction of
a culture is not something closer to real people,
culture.
So
organisation
but people with a destroyed
it is also with attempts like Hobbes or Rawls to peel
off
in order to locate in a
the the top,
political
quasi-analytical
or
quasi-historical way, a state of nature underneath or preceding some organised
state
or
other.
A
flawed picture,
derived from mistaken
or
questionable
presuppositions, is assumed.
Nhat will be found underneath, or in the original
(natural) state, is, it
is usually conveniently assumed, a nature that fits the view to be developed
with the
explained
the
and
culture's
right values very fortunately in-built.
is
privileged
image
position of some
of itself,
and
status quo -
elements of the
as well
dominant
as
a
Northern
be
serves
for
economic man,
7
dominant
social
hardly surprisingly, that
fully competitive possessive individualism (much the same model,
which
to
or justified is something like present socio-political arrangements
paradigm - underlying human nature turns out to be,
of
Given that what
for Enlightenment man,
for
the
that is,
rational
�myths,
The myth of unique human nature functions,
etc.)
person",
perpetuate
to
other
tike many
or instit particular social arrangements
special
and
pr ivi1ege.
Thus too the myth of human nature is linked to other culture-based myths,
myths
the
predominantly
rational)
all
of
humans
(normal)
self-interested
- to
bring
maximizers
no firm starting point in human nature,
myths.
aggressive
(at
least
some of the myths bound
in
urban-industrial humans.
contemporary
as
individuals
as
they
are
Mi th
the
image
of
up
As there is no underlying hard ground,
associated
so there is none in these
The South Pacific Mas, and remains, rich in cultures Mhich upset these
of
the
Melanesians,
Polynesians
None
aboriginal
peoples
comprised societies of individually-oriented
after
especially,
lifestyles and
strongly communal
their
to
a loM sufficiency threshold had been reached,
source of criticism from the
repeated
preparedness
European cultures
Australian
or
myths.
and
as
insofar
associated
indeed
and
maximizers;
Mork
stop,
Mas a major
that
came
to
dominate the region.
forms and types of
Even
aggressiveness,
and approaches to
Mar,
often
taken to be solid ground, are culture and environment dependent, and vary Mi th
13
both
parameters .
Aggressiveness is often supposed to impose
huge
constraints
on political
arrangements.
But there is little substance to the
claim that humans are naturally aggressive independently of social or cultural
setting.
for
13.
The most that appears
instance
clear is that circumstances can be
through croMding or provocation or cultural
arranged,
relocation,
Mhere
A striking illustration of environmental variation is afforded by the
differences betMeen savannah dMelling and forest dMelling tribes of
baboons.
For a local illustration, consider Maori approaches to Mar
(like Mar conventions, a social phenomenon), before European corruption.
Thus Best reports that 'an individual, or a Mhole clan, might decline to
take part in an engagement on account of some evil omen,
and such an
action Mould be approved of' (p.15).
There are several, apparently
reliable, stories of Maoris engaged in Mar supplying the opposition Mith
equipment or ammunition, or temporarily abandoning their fighting effort
to help out the other (British) side, so the battle could proceed
properly.
8
�14
of
peoples
cultures will become aggressive
familiar
more
but Mill just give up,
people of other cultures Mill not,
in the face of immense brutality.
types.
depends
upbn
Once
shortsightedly
again,
as fixed:
see
as people often do
but these can be of a Mide range of
Mhat is normally
accounted
varies Mi th culture and environment,
and
perhaps
Certainly some arrangements are required to
cope Mi th or suitably isolate aggression,
alternative
- and
certainly,
such
nature
people
Mhich
components
human
as
often
selfishness,
cooperativeness, individuality do.
What
much more important than either culture or nature
is
determining social arrangements is another factor:
social
Whatever
imposition.
one
May or another.
from
invariably
namely, outside control or
arrangements have evolved in a
local^nature and cultureican be overridden,
through
region
and neM arrangements imposed,
With long-standing arrangements,
Mithout,
imposition
is
and the changes in arrangements typically
the South Pacific has,
especially,
in
almost
involve
either violence in their adaption or mass migration of people or both.
last tMO hundred years,
in
In the
like much of the
been drastically so affected, in a complex May. And the changes,
neMer world,
still flowing strongly from the North, continue.
We
are
in the last days of the destruction of
old
and
cultures,
destruction is now to a considerable extent by more subtle cultural,
and
technological
Outside
direct
control can be exercised,
economic sanctions,
film
and
television (i.e.
economic
earlier
times.
in many ways less blatant
such as through introduction
monetary and loan policies,
as through exchange and training programs,
magazines,
14.
or occur,
intervention of one sort or another,
new technologies,
well
means than the cruder methods of slightly
textbooks,
through physical
the
etc.,
advertising
than
of
as
and
exemplifications of
Wilson's argument that humans are innately aggressive involves such an
invalid move: he looks at the behaviour of Semai men when taken out of
their nonviolent society'' by recruitment in a British colonial
army
(p.100)!
As well, Wilson's case rests on a dubious redefinition of
innateness, and a low redefinition of aggressiveness to take in forms of
mere (nonaggressive) conflict (pp.99-100).
9
�process of cultural conversion and erosion;
this quieter
are
unwittingly, part
European peoples in the South Pacific are often
culture).
or rather than,
victims as well as,
now
but many of
perpetrators (cf.
US
and
Crough
Wheelwright).
Human
communities
have been
and many still are
as
to
insensiti
other human cultures as they are to the natural environment (witness Americans
Like an ecosystem, a culture can be destroyed,
and their allies in Vietnam).
pushed
creation
political
of
typically
This is
beyond redemption.
disaster
sufficiently
apace
areas proceeds
where
is possible at all,
recovery
a
sometimes of the order of human generations.
production
of
imperial ism,
- in
these politically
e.g.
USA
in
contaminated
Central America,
long
blatant
cases
There
recovery
is
period,
Yet there is increasing
regions,
Israel
the
Yet
disruption of cultu-e and lifestyle using violence.
by
-fur thermore,
perhaps
well-known.
in
especially
Lebanon,
through
Russia
in
Afghanistan, Indonesia in East Timor and West Papua, etc.
In the South Pacific, there are
but
the
strongest now is unquestionably the
businessmen,
films
can
many quieter Northern influences at work,
academics,
American.
American
companies,
tourists and warships, their technology and patents,
are the most evident and influential.
and television programs,
be various motives and aims (and assumptions) behind the
newer
There
cultural
behind endeavours such as the American
16
Granted it
everywhere
.
their "free enterprise
*
philosophy and practice
17
to American business
and
mostly contributes to American economic supremacy,
and
economic imperialism,
These disaster areas should perhaps be cordoned off li.e
by communicable disease,
but from continuing disruptive,
infec ted
outside
in ter-ference.
What is said about American cultural and political imperialism applies,
with adaption,
in a lesser way,
to imperialism and colonialism by other
nation-states such as USSR, Britain, France and Indonesia.. USA
L.. has no
in
the
third
world
is in part
monopoly on imperialism. US imperialism i......... documented and analysed in Chomsky and Herman.
Though
not md.riaMy a. th. experience "ith the Japanese ctor industry
has indicated.
10
�to
the transfer of substantia! regional wealth and surplus value to the
But
national economic reasons &re not the only sort of reasons such
are
pursued;
apart
from the side-issue of integrity,
really do believe in the optimality of their local
USA.
policies
Americans
that many
ideals to the exclusion
of
other arrangements, there are deeper and somewhat more respectable ideological
reasons as Mel 1.
imperialistic
The
assumption
that
(a
distortions
technological
economic)
means.
can
be
underpinned
all human nature is at bottom really
instance highly economically oriented.
for
nature,
endeavours
political
means,
May:
they
by
American
like
Thus,
descr i pt ive
a
human
but for political
analogue of economic externalities)
and
lack
other peoples Mould choose the American (political
simply have not really been given the
For many peoples this is simply not true;
of
and
opportunity
or
for most other cultures let
us hope, or pray, that this is not the case. Alternatively, or as Mell, a more
arrogant
prescriptive assumption may be at Mork,
that all human nature ought
to be like American nature at its
best, because America not only has the best
18
May of life in the Morld and mostly the best Mays of doing things
, but has
a
special
hold
on rationality.
The free-enterprise
representative democracy American-style tacked on)
18.
system
(perhaps
is the rational
Mith
enterprise
Thus, for example, American agricultural textbooks and agricultural
spokespeople are fond of announcing that American agriculture is the best
in the Morld;
similarly for environmental
protection,
forestry,
technology, university education, and so on.
But since they are the
best,
it is evident that these American Mays should be exported,
isn't
it? Even granting the large assumptions, No, firstly, because that is to
neglect important regional and local variations and differences,
and
secondly because these Mays may interfere Mith other significant features
of regional life or culture.
It has not passed unremarked that the high standard of material life in
USA depends in part on a very fortunate inheritance (e.g. some of
the
best and deepest soils) and in part, as in Europe, on a loMer standard of
life and conditions elseMhere, upon siphoning off Meal th and especially
resources (US currently uses about one-fifth of Morld resources and 30 X
of Morld energy) from other regions.
To be sure, economic apologetics
proffer other explanations of American transcendence, e.g.
ingenious
constructions like that of Olson, built on a sandy logic of economic
actors collectively
locked into economically determined arrangements,
substantially independent of the resource base.
�by genuine believers in
bridled
Certainly the system is sometimes peddl
,
embodied.
which Mas often
with the same evangelism as Christianity,
American way,
the
at least before science got at
rational
religion,
as the
seen and presented
yet, but on the
got at the free-enterprise religion
hasn't
i t. MeH, science
justification and
division heavily devoted to its
contrary now has a social
sufficiently to
19
philosophy has got at the system,
furtherance.
However some
_
tp,t it is no unique embodiment of rationality - there -s none sue
reveal
decidedly irrational practice in many circumstances.
is
but
a
preserve local
environments
end
if local goals are to
irrational
especial ly
Thus,
cultures, as much experience helps attest.
is aspects of
tt
with
false descriptive
and what can
assumption,
.what follows (though various of
are a main focus in
rejection,that
th. prescripts, assumption Mill .'so -.rg. °r 9^
its
the reasons for rejecting
underlying theme Mil! continue to be
An
recorded).
nor
broader
emerge
basic
human
.
nature
is
a
single
in
substantially
sort of political framework a society adopts. In
outside
cultural
nei ther
important
ways that are highly political
upon *from
that
or above, the variation can be
variation
<Mhich
turn
in
depends
stable
thing,
varies
but
the
to
relevant - relevant
freer societies, less imposed
largely accounted for through
The
environment,etc).
on
those of cuitura! pluralism, that culture
alternative
assumptions,
are then,
..cal human nature. Of course once
is part of "nature",
"human nature"
again
^nations-,
but
shaping in particular
can be pared back and back to try to
m this way what are taken to be
remove
important
superbi ologi c a
*
matures of human nature for political theory are also excised (e.g
that
make prisoners' dilemmas and commons' tragedies
cu1tura'
feature
one way
rathe
than another).
1?.
in
elaborating on h.M
has
explained
^"soc'ial"control
various extensile typ
p. 15.
12
exercised
py^.y of approved
�Just as dttterent cultures can.mean different social arrangements,
so tn
, larger setting they can imply different political organisation and different
directions.
political
incongrous
Where
requisite differences
had.
arrangements
been imposed,
do
not
occur,
because
cultural differences can
b.^.
nnuerful force for change. Lihemse d^.loping elements of cultural difference
can
a potent base for social change - or resistance to imposed
be
in communities inhere other more orthodox
(especially)
a, economic mcertioes or penalties,
have
bases for change,
become inoperative or
-
change
such
tailed,
or
used,
but
are not avaitable.
Culture is hotter a double-edged instrument,
For
resisted.
though
example,
leading
not only to be
of
[valuable] features
indigenous
Pacific cultures are to be reactivated, as forces for change, some features of
these cultures are to be resisted (such as male domination),
features
modern Western cultures.
of
along mth
used
Features of culture are thus
and confront undesirable (implanted or imported) sources
resist
many
to
culture;
of
such as, inequitable political arrangements, excessive consumerism, persuasive
advertising
media and loaded news systems,
structures,
etc.
for
culture.
chief
build
and
competi tive
encouraging
culture afford a solid foundation - but also
prime sources of
up resistance against,
is as true for American culture as Antipodean.
This
reasons
alienating
^hy
so
job
build and design alternatives
It is important not only to
which elements of local
dismantle,
holloa suburbia,
mainstream American culture
violent,
and
so
forth,
is
is
that
so
to
antagonistic
One
of
the
ndividualistlc,
so
offering
or
movements
alternatives have been repressed by the dominant corporations and
the state apparatus (see especially Goldstein).
2.
The
Why work with such an unfavourable contrast case as Australian—^iety^
regional and environmental orientation.
cultural variation and their force for change,
contrast
than
US
In defence of theme.
for instance Melanesian culture.
13
g
it Mould no doubt be easier to
culture with some other culture which diverges
Australian culture,
<_on-_
more
Or,
strikingly
differe
y,
�ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL PLURALLISM
*
Let us begin by sketching, in summary form, what political pluralism was, and then
explaining what it becomes under contemporary plurallism, ecopluralism in particular. These
new pluralisms, while they differ markedly from former political pluralsm, undoubtedly can
build upon it
Political pluralism used to be a theory viewing social life in terms of groups, which were
said to be the priwMry .s*oc/o/
On this theory, an individual's primary allegiance is not to
any abstract government but to groups, unions, clubs, churches. Thus there is no absolute
necessity for a highly unified political or legal order - whence developed a critical stance
towards the state and towards sovereignty among somg pluralists and so elements of anarchistic
pluralism.
There was, however, no systematic theory of political pluralism (a further anarchistic
feature). The position (and both British and American pluralism, however different) were
unified not by any doctrine but by crinco/ response to growth of the state.
A major theme was, and remains, moderate
(as further explained in EP). Humans
are neither isolated atoms, nor components of centralised states, but social creatures who
function in crisscrossing groups of their own choice. Moreover, groups are genuine objects
with choices, capacities, purposes, etc.
Pluralist society respects and tries to reconcile diverse interests of humans without
thwarting them. Groups communicate via negotiation and the like; their operations are not
delegative from some higher authority.
Contemporary ecological pluralism takes over most of these scene setting features, but
emphasizes the communitarian bases, and expands the scope of communities and groups to
include
communities, which include creatures and systems other than humans. Perhaps
the best known example of such a mixed community is that, introduced by Naess and
elaborated by Devall (in 89) of a Norwegian community of bears and wolves, sheep and
humans (but earlier Leopold and other had offered examples of expanded communities). A
problem which group theory hides, perhaps deliberately, but which such communities at once
expose, is that of internal conflict. Conflict cannot be avoided even by going right down to
families or individuals; for as much conflict may be bottled up in a family or even in one
*
Early versions of the first section of these notes drew heavily on Vincent, TAeonej of
ytote. The text takes up the working draft of 'Philosophy, politics and pluralism: II.
Anarchistic pluralism'.
�2
individual as in a small group. That is, there are no pure conflict-free atoms from which to
build up group or community structure.
Conflict within individuals is strikingly exhibited in certain sorts of schizopherenia. But
it happens also in many humans. On conflict issues, in dilemmatic situations, and similar, one
part of a person pulls in one direction, another part in another. Or, more accurately, because
often no such neat separation into directional components can be affected, there are inconsistent
allegiances, derives, drives. Under orthodox theory, it is presumed that such conflicts,
personal inconsistency, can be removed by artificial fragmentation. What happens in orthodox
social theory is that individuals are effectively broken down and whittled down, not without
significant.... . into iJca/ components — classical individuals — with properly organised
(duly transitive, etc.) preferences and coherent desires. While such idealization is alright for
limited theoretical purposes, let us not falsey imagine that it is adequate for a satisfactory social
theory. Let us not pretend that such thin classical individuals offer a saatisfactory model for
rich actual individuals.
Ecopluralism not only extends the group basis; like gontc contemporary pluralism, the
variety of positions and practices is also much expanded. Early political pluralism (so-called)
was far from advocating a plural variety. (Figgin, an early British pluralist, would have been
shocked at such a supposition: Vincent p.182.) A fairly narrow normative consensus was
assumed, e.g. Christian morality in British "pluralism", American political arrangements in
American "pluralism". Indeed several American "pluralists", political scientists from Bentley
on, erroneously "saw pluralism as a description of the American political system. In this usage,
pluralism moves into the area of interest group and pressure group theory' (Vincent p.183).
Herein lies the route to
p/ura/hwn: While the state may remain discredited as a unitary
order, it is now seen a complex multiple entity, which tried to incorporate and theorize diversity
of group life. In the American version, groups are seen as interested in reaching some kind of
bargain. Government policy is the outcome of group pressures. Government is alleged to seek
out some abstract national interest.
Public police is ...' the equilibrium reached in this struggle at any given
moment' .... Today's loser, it is blithely assumed, will be tomorrow's
winner.
Most American pluralists of this ilk assume that the contest between
groups will be fair and that there is some kind of lurking normative
consensus in the background. Certain types of behaviour are
presumably un-American. Practical politics, therefore, for the American
pluralist is about bargaining, compromise and trade-offs. There is no
normative appraisal of the State, but rather an gjtp/anation anJ partial/y %
yn^ti/icarion o/ wAat t/tgy ta%g to
actaa//y tAg ca^g in tAg qo/irica/
qrocc.y^g.y of the USA. Government is not an impartial umpire. It
reflects the dominant coalition on a particular policy — although it will
try to maintain some balance. ... In American pluralism a group is
simply a collection or aggregation of individuals acting in specific roles.
�3
Most significantly the American pluralists were not concerned with any
normative account of the State as an institution or practice. They were
far more interested in examing, empirically, the effects of group
pressures on the actual activity of government (Vincent p.190 emphasis
added).
In even more degenerate Eastern European forms, pluralism comes down to some sort of
multi-party electoral arrangements;
plurality just amounts to many parties. Political
arrangements can however remain highly paternalistic and authoritarian. Because we are
interested in genuine free pluralisms, we shall leave these desperate terms behind.
EXTRA SPACE
Now consider the organisational possibilities for the Earth, i The Earth divides variously
into (geographical) regions; under ecological organisation the decomposition will be into
ecoregions. Those regions that are occupied will be occupied by structures of (mixed)
communities. The assumption that each occupied region is occupied by a single community is
too simple to account even for the present impoverished arrangements offering on Earth. Some
regions are occupied by communities of communities,
community structure so to
say.2 It seems unlikely that on Earth, given a suitable choice of regions, it is necessary to
ascend beyond communities of communities to third-order community structures. Thus for
each region it is appropriate to begin with the ancient ideal of a community of communities.
But of course there will be higher-order structure involved, such as regional federations of
regions, and federations of these federations, and so on and up. Call this organisational
structure, the Earth frame. This frame is not of course unique; there are many other ways, of
varying levels of adequacy, of unscrambling an organisational grid.
1
Off the Earth, in free logical space, case arrangements are wry much greater. Not only
can many terrestrial limitations be transcended, for instance with wiser creatures than
humans, and many fairer regions, but the interaction of regions can be avoided, so that,
for example, an intense dense industrial society need not transmit its pollution outside
its own borders, indeed in the right circumstances it need not be polluting at all. A
beginning is made in investigating this richer structure by Nozick, but even his useful
beginnings leave much to be desired, as brought out in UT.
2
Whether communities of communities amount just to communities will depend upon
the final characterisation of community, or what sort of members they can have and
the extent and character of the interrelations of their members. If communities were
mere set-like objects, it would be a matter of the transitivity of membership; but
obviously communities are more than mere sets, internal relations counting for much.
�4
The frame selected is in fact intimately tied to real mundane arrangements. For the short
time that they survived state interference, the Spanish anarchistic communities coexisted and
coevolved in genuine pluralistic fashion (as Dolgoffs sympathetic description has revealed).
That is by no means the only occasion on which the old ideal of a community of communities
(communitas communitatorum) has achieved partial realisation, but is one of the better known
recent examples involving anarchistic communities in a limited geographic region - at a time in
world history when state domination of social life continues to break up communities and
impose a grey uniformity across former community diversity. But the concern here is not with
what is, with present depressing (but temporary) political realities, but with how things might
well be, with different and - no difficult feat - superior political arrangements, in particular
pluralist arrangements.
A recent picture of pluralistic political arrangements by Nozick supposedly allows for
virtually anarchistic communities within an overarching minarchic framework. It would seem a
simple matter to vary this picture, in particular, to weaken or strengthen the overarching
framework; and that indeed the system of Spanish communities (which of course did not
persist) weakened the minimum state arrangements in true anarchistic fashion to zero. Nozick
has however a complex (and also seriously flawed) argument that variations are without
justification, that political possibilities which can be justified are omc/t tighter than the wide
range of the logical possibilities would suggest.
A crucial early question once an Earth frame is untangled is, for each structural level:
what are the broad organising principles? Consider a more important case, the regional level.
Will the same broad principles reappear for each region? Only in a very tenuous fashion, if
such desiderata as regional diversity are to be given appropriate play. Naturally these had better
be included some procedure or other for conflict resolution where conflict is severe, but there is
a wide variety of procedures of very varying merit; some procedures or other for the numerous
issues that have to be dealt with to keep communities functioning, such as to take a sample of
issues, burying the dead, taking care of the indigent.
*
A crucial question, for each structural level,is: what are the broad organisational
principles? One working idea is that in the sort of organisational framework sought will enable
a mix of desiderata to be pushed over some far out natural thresholds. The comy desiderata
include liberal and environmental objectives, such as those of freedom, liberation. Life, liberty,
pursuit of happiness, etc.
3
Levels of organisation, by geographical region (functional with a that), local, small
ecoregion, large ecoregion, ... (old large state), continent - federations, world federation.
�Direction of world reorganisation: to a plurality of possibilities, with different possibilities
in different regions. Cities for those who like them in the substantially ecologically destroyed
urban land recipes of the North. Etc.
Diversity is a prime desideratum. We should rgjoicc in Jhw-yity where it recurs, and
encourage ir where it does not, subject as always to certain constraints. In particular, then,
attempt to impose fashionable ideologies everywhere should be strongly resisted; this includes
religious faith and other gospels such as those of market capitalism and state socialism. Such
drives to unity and conformity, and intellectual monoculture, should be derailed. Evidently in
an interlinked system such as the Earth form, federal organisation should include arrangements
to block imposition of ideologies by expansive neighbours on other regions. (Included herein
are states; here is yet another reason for the abolition of states.)
Not to be encouraged, but opposed, are mc.MMnic ging/c-way movements, such as
messianic catholism, messianic communism, and messianic capitalism. These come with a
amvcrya/Mtic perspectic, and a single, allegedly universal set of values: they do not, unless
severely cut down in size, fit into a generous plurallism. Needless to say, these universalistic
(one-tuming) movements cannot rationally justify their practices. It can no more be established
that there is only one god with such and such properties (e.g. those ascribed to Allah under
Islam) than it can be established that there is only one logic; indeed the justificatory situation is
considerably worse (imagine the faithful chanting each day, facing one Cambridge or other,
"There is no logic but classical logic ..."; of course most Anglo-American philosophers are
committed to something like this in their philosophical practice, but they rarely recognise the
character of the commitment).
Note: Many of the economic objectives presented as absolute, are not merely dubious. They
are not intrinsic values, but merely instrumental, and instrumental to goals that a community
may not have. Leading examples of such objectives are efficiency, production.
Out of the same stable as broad monoculturalism, with its uniform urban systems,
universities, etc., is the method of consensus (or
one opinion, as it might as well
have been called). Consensus — unless severely limited, as for instance to argument on a
pluralistic structure — is anti-pluralistic. Nonetheless there can be consensus of a sort at one
remove, metaconsensus on one story, "agreement" to differ.
Limited agreement does however have its virtues in conflict resolution.
* To be sure, cases where have to resolve what is to be done, how to act. Many ways to go:
single uniform recipe approach too absolutist. On the other hand, it is not entirely situational.
Set of recognised decent procedures.
�6
The problematicness of conflict, and need for its removal, is much exaggerated. The
drive for conflict-free conditions is like, and linked to, the drive for consistency. But conflict is
not always undesirable, but often advantageous (and perhaps, as Heracleitus claimed,
necessary). Often conflict should just be allowed to stand; it does not require resolution.
Political and social arrangements should allow for it and be able to absorb it. Where removal is
required, it is often by achieved by distancing, regionalisations etc.
APPENDICES
1. On Walzer's p/ara/Mm there is a plurality of distributive systems. From Plato onwards it is
suggested that only one distributive arrangement that can be justified, (p.5). Walzer suggests
the Rawlsian picture of reeled strand choosers provides
modern arrangements. But
'Justice is a human construction, and it is doubtful that it can be made in only one way' (p.5).
Thus there is a plurality also of distributive justice. While the argument is plausible, its
construction prescription is not. Walzers' 7%Mt'.? (p.6) is: 'the principles of justice are
themselves pluralistic in form [whatever that means); that different social goods ought to be
distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents;
and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods
themselves — the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism'.
There is also a theory of goods, and f/teir distribution. In the usual form, people
distribute goods to people. The basic relation is a proc^Jarg. In fact there are many
procedures: given, allocating, exchanging, selling, etc. Walzer wants to claim: People
conceived create goods, which they then distribute among themselves. This is really a
Concatenation of two procedures. His iJea is to split goods into quaser sphere, and to have
different dibtributive criteria for different spheres. This is said to be complex e^aa/ity (p. 18)!
According to Walzer, there are sp/tereg/ or regions of competition, etc. For example, in
Pascal: strength, beauty, intelligence, devoteness;
but it could be: rugby, soccer, rules, horse racing, mountain climbing, etc.
However there are divisions, barriers between these — but they compete for key items e.g.
money, fields, etc. [so population growth is a total menance for a easily pluralistic society.)
1] 'Personal qualities and social goods have their own spheres of operation, where they work
their effects freely, spontaneously legitimately' (p.19) wAat does this seem: work? by
legitimally? etc.
2] Disregard of those sepaate spheres is tyranny; Attempting to convert one good in one place
to another in another is ruled out.
Meaning of "complex equality" (nothing much of equality about it): 'no citizens' standing in
one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other
�sphere, with regard to one other good' (p.19). Thus political advantage does not confer
advantage in other spheres, e.g. health care, advoting, etc.
W 'open-ended distributive principle' (p.20): 'no social good x should be distributed to nea
.... who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to the
meaning of x'.
�*^-V
^T)/ ^/'
y-a-y^,
C-V
?^^-<-
,
ece/."*
y4^^y
Z—r
'^/?^'
A// g)Z
y
ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL PLURALLISM^
Political pluralism was a theory viewing social life in terms of groups, which were
said to be the primary social objects. Further an individual's primary allegiance is not to
any abstract government but to groups, unions, clubs, churches. Thus there is no absolute
necessity for a highly unified political or legal order - whence developed a critical stance
towards the state and towards sovereignty among yomg pluralist^and so elements of
anarchistic pluralism.
There was, however, no systematic theory of political pluralism (a further anarchistic
feature.) The position (and both British and American pluralism, however different) were
unified not by any doctrine but by crit/ca/ response to growth of the state.
A major theme wa^aadd^a^ay&M^ one (as/in EP)t humans are neither isolated atoms,
nor components of centralised states, but social creatures who^werkedin crisscrossing
groups of their own choice. Moreover, groups are genuine objects with choices, capacities,
purposes, etc.
Pluralist society respects and tries to reconcile diverse interests of humans without
,
.
,
—
.
.
.
thwarting them. Groups communicate via negotiation etc.; their operations are not
delegadve from some higher authority.
Contemporary ecological pluralism takes over most of these scene setting features, but
emphasizes the communitarian bases, and expands the scope of communities and groups to
include
communities, which include creatures and systems other than humans.
Perhaps the best known example of such a mixed community is the exampley-^givaa by
Naess and elaborated by Devall (89^dhapter-^3)^of a Norwegian community of bears and
wolves, sheep and humans'. A problem which group theory hides, perhaps deliberately, but
which such communities at once expose, is that of internal conflict. Conflict cannot be
avoided even by going right down to familiar or individuals; for as much conflict may be
Early versions of the first section of these notes drew heavily on Vincent, TAcorier <?f
The text takes up the working drift of 'Philosophy, politics and pluralism: II.
Anarchistic pluralism',, and thus completes (so far as it can presently be taken) a series
on this generous topic
*.
; TW J
�^4?
^c
A
/^T
%T
j
f iSj
!^3
Ph..
r
t>
", ',
P
*
<r
'*^
c
e \y—Z
,
")"WMnm reached In d.i, Hn<wk at aav'tiv'en
m..n<„, <l<AS,p. 31,). Today', loser, i, I, bh.hol, a,,u,„ed. wdl ho
tomorrow s wmner.
Most American pluralists of this ilk assume that the contest
tween groups wtll be fhir and that there is some kind of lurking
normative consensus in the background. Certain types of behaviour
are presumably un-American. Practical politics, therefore, fbr the
mertcan p urahst is about bargaining, compromise and trade-ofls
lore is no normative appraisal of the State, but rather an
of what they take to be
acm^
processesTnhXUSA
Gov
*
. dm^c^updTe^J^a
"——------ -R—-±A1 1 PLl^uSses^oi
the USA. Government
is
not an impartial umpire. It reflects
reflects the
the domii.^
dominant coalition on a
particular policy - although it will try to maintain some balance
*
I'.--D.
D. Roosevelt remarked, 'The
'
science of politics, indeed, mav
properly be said to be m large part the science of the adjustment of
conflicting group interests' (quoted in Nicholls, 1974, p. 2). This aim
is contrary to that of the English pluralists, who would have been
deeply critical of the idea that the State becomes a focal point for
group pressure, also that policy should emanate from dominant
coalitions of groups via the State apparatus. Individuals, in English
pluralism, pursue their goals within groups. The State should not be
inked to any such partial interests. Each of theSe groups is
recognized as a moral person with a legal status. In American
pluralism a group is simply a collection or aggregation of individuals
acting m specific roles. Most significantly the American pluralists
were not concerned with any normative account of the State as an
institution or practice. They were fhr more interested in examining
empirically, the effects of group pressures on the actual activity of
government,
th^y ^in not
cltscnsswn.
�7bottled up in a family or even in one individual as in a small group. That is, there are no
<*/o
pure conflict-free it^ms from which to build up group or community structure.
'
@
Ecopluralism not only extends the group basis; like
contemporary pluralism, the
variety of positions and practices is much expanded. Early political pluralism (so-called)
was far from advocating a plural variety. (Figgin, an early British pluralist, would have
been shocked at such a supposition: Vincent p.182.) A fairly narrow normative consensus
was assumed, e.g. Christian morality in British "pluralism", American political
arrangements in American "pluralism". Indeed several American "pluralists", political
scientists from Bentley Erroneously on^'saw pluralism as a description of the American
political system. In this usage, pluralism moves into the area of interest group and pressure
group theory" (Vincent p.183). Herein lies the route to
While the state jLSxiiscredited as a unitary ordef} it is now seen a complex
multiple entity, which tried to incorporate and theorize diversity of group life. In the
American version, groups are seen as interested in reaching some kind of bargain.
Government policy is the outcome of group pressures. Government is alleged to seek out
some abstract national interest^In even more degenerate Eastern European forms, pluralism
comes down to some sort of multiparty electoral arrangements; plurality just amounts to
many parties. Political arrangements can however remain highly paternalistic and
. Because we are interested in genuine free pluralisms, we shall leave these
desperate ^rms behind.
/^copyV^ncent-l$0, on US pluraKstsof this sort]
/)^onsider the organisational possibilities for the Earth.i The Earth divides variously
into (geographical) rggto/ts; under ecological organisation the decomposition will be into
jporegions. Those regions that are occupied will be occupied by structures of (mixed)
communities. The assumption that each occupied region is occupied by a single community
is too simple to account even for the present impoverished arrangements offering on Earth.
Some regions are occupied by communities of communities,
community
structure so to say.z It seems unlikely that Earth, given a suitable choice of regions, it is
_
.
cm
1
Off the Earth, in free logicat space, case arrangements are very much greater. Not only
can many terrestrial iimiations be transcended, (widi for instance wiscr creatures than
humans, and many fairer regions, but the interaction of regions can be avoided, so that,
for example, an intense dense industrial society need not transmit its pollution outside
its own borders, indeed in the right circumstances it need not be polluting at all. A
beginning is made in investigating this richer structure by Nozick, but even his
beginnings leave much to be desired?
*.
4/7
2
Whether communities of communities amount just to communities will depend upon
the final characterisation of comwMnhy, or what sort of members they can have and
c?
/-
�3
necessary to ascend beyond communities of communities to third-order community
structures. Thus for each region it is appropriate to begin with the ancient ideal of a
community of communities. But of course there will be higher-order structure involved,
such as regional federations of regions, and federations of these federations, and so on and
up. Call this organisational structure, the Earth frame. This frame is not of course unique;
there are many other ways, of varying levels of adequacy, of unscrambling an
organisational grid.
The frame selected is in fact intimately tied to real mundane arrangements. For the
short time that they survived state interference, the Spanish anarchistic communities
coexisted and coevolved in genuine pluralistic fashion (as Dolgoff s sympathetic description
has revealed). That is by no means the only occasion on which the old ideal of a
community of communities (communitas communitatorum) has achieved partial realisation,
but is one of the better known recent examples involving anarchistic communities in a
limited geographic region - at a time in world history when state domination of social life
continues to break up communities and impose a grey uniformity across former community
diversity. But the concern here is not with what is, with present depressing (but temporary)
political realities, but with how things might well be, with different and - no difficult feat superior political arrangements, in particular pluralist arrangements.
A recent picture of pluralistic political arrangements by Nozick supposedly allows for
virtually anarchistic communities within an overarching minarchic framework. It would
seem a simple matter to vary this picture, in particular, to weaken or strengthen the
overarching framework; and that indeed the system of Spanish communities (which of
course did not persist) weakened the minimum state arrangements in true anarchisdc fashion
to zero. Nozick has however a complex (and also seriously flawed) argument that
variations are without justification, that political possibilities which can be justified are mMc/z
tighter than the wide range of the logical possibilities would suggest.
A crucial early question once an Earth frame is untangled is, for each structural level:
what are the broad organising principles? Consider a more important case, the regional
level. Will the same broad principles reappear for each region? Only in a very tenu/ous
fashion, if such desiderate as regional diversity are to be given appropriate play. Naturally
the extent and character of the interrelations of their members. If communities were
mere set-like objects, it would be a matter of the transitivity of membership; but
obviously communities are more than mere sets, internal relations counting for much.
*j
�these had better be some procedure or other for conflict resolution where conflict is severe,
but there is a wide variety of procedures of very varying merit; some procedures or other for
the numerous issues that have to be dealt with to keep communities functioning, such as to
take a sample of issues, burying the dead, taking care of the indigent.
A crucial question, for each structural level, is: what are the broad organisational
principles?
.
The working idea is that in the sort of organisational framework sought will enable a
mix of desiderata to be pushed over some far out natural thresholds. The, desiderata include
liberal and environmental objectives, each as those of freedom, liberation. Life liberty,
pursuit of happiness^etc.
Direction of world reorganisation: to a plurality of possibilities, with different
possibilities in different regions. Cities for those who like them in the substantially
ecologically destroyed urban land recipes of the North. Etc.
Diversity is a prime desideratum. We should re/'ozce in JivgrHfy where it recurs, and
if where it does not, subject as always to certain constraints. In particular, then,
attempts to impose fashionable ideologies everywhere should be strongly resisted; this
includes religious faith and other gospels such as those of market capitalism and state
socialism. Such drives to unity and conformity, and intellectualm^njt culture, should be
derailed. Evidently in an interlinked system such as the Earth form; federal organisation
should include arrangements to block imposition of ideologies by expansive neighbours on
other regions. (Included herein are states; here is yet another reason for the ahabition of
states.)
Not to be encouraged, but opposed, are
sing/c-way movements, such as
messianic catholism, messianic communism, and messianic capitalism. These come with a
M/uvcrM/Af/c perspectic, and a single, allegedly universal set of values: they do not, unless
severely cut down in size, fit into a generous plurallism. Needless to say, these
universalistic (one-turning) movements cannot rationally justify their practices. It can no
more be established that there is only one god with such and such properties (e.g. thvse
ascribed to Allah under Islam) than it can be established that there is only one logic; indeed
the justificatory situation is considerably worse (imagine the faithful chanting each day,
facing one Cambridge or other, "There is no logic but classical logic
of course most
Anglo-American philosophers are committed to something like this in their philosophical
practice, but they rarely recognise the character of the commitment).
�Note: Many of the economic objectives presented as absolute, are not merely dubious.
They are not intrinsic values, but merely instrumental, and instrumental to %^that a
community may not have. Leading examples of such objectives are efficiency, production.
Out of the same stable as broad monoculturalism, with its uniform urban systems,
universities, etc., is the method of consensus (or
one opinion, as it might as well
have been called). Consensus - unless severely limited, as for instance to argument on a
pluralistic structure - is anti-pluralistic. Nonetheless there can be consensus of a sort at one
remove, metacon^ensus on^ one story, "agreement" to differ.
Limited agreement does however have its virtues in conflict resolution.
* To be sure, cases where have to resolve what is to be down, how to act. Many ways to
go: -si^i uniform recipe approach too absolutist. On the other hand act entirely situational.
Last of recognised decent procedures.
The problematicness of conflict, and need for its removal, is much exaggerated. The
drive for conflict-free conditions is like, and linked to, the drive for consistency. But
conflict is not always undesirable, but often advantageous (read perhaps, as Heracleitus
claimed, necessary). Often conflict should just be allowed to stand; it does not require
resolution. Political and social arrangements should allow for it and be able to absorb it.
��C**------ -
�
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f
Chapter 10
_
CRITICS OF ANARCHISM AND FURTHER CRITICISM.
..
One of the regular obstacles almost any innovative ideology encounters is hardened
dogfpMdwi. Hardened dogmatism characteristically sees little scope for movement from some
established status quo. There are many hardened dogmatists who see no alternative to the
modern state. In this they join company with a huge and motley crew of political "realists":
'There simply is no way an advanced industrial state can cope with technological complexities,
can minimize waste and misery and the danger of revolutions without strong government
controls' (Gardner!, our sample dcifnatist, selected^because he has ranted^at verbose length,on
his anti-anarchist disposition). We can grant that there is no viable state without requisite
government controls, no state without a state. The question is rather whether such objectives as
reduction of waste and misery and control of technology even he accomplished, perhaps
significantly better without the state, which tends to wagnt/y the problems concerned.
A feature of dogmatism is that assertion, reiterated assertion, replaces argument. So it is
with^state dogmatism: 'As things are, there simply is no way a modem industrial society can
flourish without a strong government to enforce the law' (p.123). international industrial
society flourishes, after a fashion ^without such a government. Analogous functional ways in
which regional industrial societies can operate, way implicit in historic anarchism, have been
explained. 'It is not just the necessity of a state to preserve law and order that makes the
anarchist dream so hopeless' (p.124). Order requires only a certain organisation^, for which the
state is quite unnecessary. As for law, the necessity is but analytic on the law being state-law.
But a wide network of conventions and regulations can operate without a state; there are many
examples, beginning with stateless societies, continuing through a range of voluntary
organisations.
Why 'so hopeless'?
,,
Even if small communities [observe the limitation on anarchism
immediately slippst in]... found a way to police themselves, there is no way
they could maintain, let alone establish, an industrial society. Small selfgoverning groups are incapable of building reservoirs to bring them clean
water, or roads to connect cities, or dynamos to supply electricity, or cars,
or printing presses, or modem hospitals, or anything else that is a product of
an advanced technology. Big tasks can be done only by big corporations
that are either state-owned or state-controlled, or that operate as vast
independent oligarches within the state (p.124).
eV
As well as intellectually lazy, this is hopelessly astray: there resides the hopelessness. In some
regions, pioneer societies and industrial society developed more or less regardless of the state.
Even small f^rm communities built themselves reservoirs for stock and household water
supplies, built their local roads, and so on (in Australia, USA, and elsewhere). They still do.
Electricity generates and printing presses can be manufactured in fairly unsophisticated
i
.
Martin Gardner
776-7SS.
e
W7ry.y i?/
*#
/
ch.7
Aafe.- WTry 7 owi
an
'
workshops, where the state need be nowhere in evidence. As for big tasks, international
organisations (for construction, forestry, dam building, oil-well sinking,^ substantially
independent of particular states can, and do, perform the work. They may presently be required
to have a state location, but that is strictly unnecessary for accomplishing the tasks; they are
certainly not state-owned, or state-controlled, nor do they, in any real sense, operate within the
states'. Furthermore, regions investing in large works beyond their capacities can set up their
own specialized structures, to oversee such big tasks, to monitor activities and ensure
accountability, and to exclude cowboy operations. It is simply false that the advancement and
application of science and technology requires the state, as much history reveals. In a similar
way, it is simply misleading that 'if we want to enjoy the benefits of science and technology,
the ideals of an archism are as irrelevant as the ideals of the Sermon on the Mount' (p.124). By
contrast with the ideals of the Sermon, the impact of which are quite indirect, much anarchist
output concerns science and technology, their promotion and qualified benefits, proper place
and appropriateness.
Next our philosophical scrivener turns to pulling down anarchism by a superficial
comparison with and sen^up of the American 'counter culture scene of the sixties' (pp. 1244-5).
As technology is not condemned by one bad result, nor is anarchism shown impracticable by
one presumed form wht^e merit remain a matter of controversy. In any case, m^re accurate
comparisons are available than Gardner's prejudical poQ)ourL These set anarchist elements of
the counterculture substantially witli^th&\merican individual, pro-violence form of anarchism.
Hardened dogmatists are almost invariably crt^ss critics. They do not ever get at close
quaters^et alon^ inside, what they are criticising; so they do not achieve a good view, still less
adequate
sympathetic view, of what they ^/are criticising. Fortunately there are less cr^ss
critics, most of them with heavy commitments to democratic states (Gardner, though he makes
obeisant gestures towards democracy, is underneath it committed to the strong tech,o-cratic
state.) It should be plain that any critic with heavy commit^nts to democracy would have to
take anarchism more seriously as an option; for the demos may chose, or rule, to remove their
state. (Quite constitutional means may, and should, permit this.) The point, though elementary,
has escaped apparently more sympathetic opponents of anarchism such as Dahl, who premisses
his critique of anarchism upon the incompatibility of anarchism with democracy. He appears to
manage this yhnx
by mistakenly equating democracy with the democratic state. Certainly
anarchism is incompatible with the democratic state, as with any state, but it does not follow,
except through a variant of the mistaken equation, that it is incompatible with democracy. And
it should be evident that this latter incompatibility is contested. For the^e have many proposals
for combining anarchism with m^re participatory democracy (ul^minating on enterprises like
Burgheim's quest fortrue democracy^ which arrives at a dilute anarchism).
Dahl begins his criticism of anarchism by asserting that anarchist (and guardianship)
'objections to democracy aare so fundamental that unless they can be satisfactorily met any
further explanations of the democratic idea would be futile' (p.37).
Given the heavy
commitment of much anarchism to democratic processes, this assertion faces evident
rejoinders. And Dahl himself quickly shifts ground (though a page later he shifts back,
assuming that his archetypal democrat and anarchist are opposed as archist and anarchist):
'Because democracy might well be the most des^be process for governing [anarchist
v^lu^ttpry]
it might also be the prevented form of government in an anarchist society.
But i^ the anarchist view democracy cannot redeem a state
*
(p.37, two paragraphs down).
Since nothing can redeem the state, ergo neither gods nor people nor democracy can. Yet Dahl
begins his cri^tism with this curious twist: since the state^coercism, and coercisaa is
intrinsically bad, can the democratic process somehow make it good?
*
(p.37). This problem for
archism, which Dahl assumes, is no problem at all for anarchism. Instead of addressing the
question posed, Dahl switches focus, by challenging the coherence and consistency of
anarchism. But all his exhibition of divWity/shows is that anarchism is a family-resemblance
notion, like many Wittgenstein pointed outigbwc, warAewatic.?, and so on. It is a family
resemblance notion with certain key features (as being played, is of a game), namely rejection
of archie authority, ^percion and the state; beyond that there is a plurality of forms. Once the
pluralistic conceptualisation is appreciated, there need be no incoherence; it all fits together.
^^Many of the criticisms of anarchism turn on the issue of
especially how
economic activity such asf marketing, distribution, and so on, is to be organised in the absence
of a central state authority. Meeting these criticisms in appropriate detail is no mean feat,
requiring the elaboration of substantially new economic theory (except for excessively
individualistic anarchists like Rothbart, but sketchy details and hints have been offered by
anarchist theorists). While economic criticisms bulk large in recent criticism of anarchism, the
state having assumed the role of grand macro-economic organiser, these by no means exhaust
criticisms. There are serious issues also concerning political and cultural organisation,
concerning the presumed enemies of organisation and order.
In many criticisms it is simply assumed that anarchistic organisation will have to take
over the arrangements of present mega-states and somehow substitute for those, without mega
states. The assumption is astray. Mega-states are mostly recent undesirable constructions,
obtained by conquest or war dealings, and held together coercive means and other devices of
state. These would, would be allowed to, fragment into regional components. Thus the
problem of organisation is a substantially smaller problem than that of organisation of mega
states; namely, that of organisation of regions. The regions would naturally be grouped
together, by principles of federation. (The new Europe provides a partial, suggestive example.)
No strand of anarchism 'has developed an adequate economic theory. The individualists
are stymied by the public goods problem, the communists by the problems of coordination.
[Even more plausible intermediate positions] require the support of the state at a number of
critical points' (M p.172). How the state is presumed to provide its benign supportative role is
well illustrated in the case of more individualistic anarchism, where the familiar problem of
public goods is also taken to manifest itself.
4
A cynic might well observe that no strand of capitalism or of socialism has developed an
adequate economic theory. But theories there no doubt are, in certain narrow reaches in
abundance.
*
Anarchism assumes the benefits of autonomous
operations, indeed the
individualistic ideal is one of personal sovereignty in the market place', but 'is not the state an
indispensible prerequisite for a successfully functioning economy?' (M p.169). There are two
parts to a response. First, markets functioned before states, and function outside states, for
example internationally. Second, whatever institutions are required for the operation of
markets can be supplied regionally under anarchistic fragmentation of the state.
How much background structure do markets depend upon, which might presuppose
apparatus of state. A market has a place of transactions, which can be common or waste
ground, a supply of goods or services to be exchanged there for other goods or services (barter)
or currency (in a money economy). Buyers and sellers enter the market to effect exchanges.
No doubt presupposed are at least limited entitlements (leasehold or property rights, so a seller
is entitled to dispose of, to a new user, holder or owner, what is offered for sale), contractual
arrangements, and in a money economy, some recognised currency. Also presumed, normally
where markets operate, are certain levels of safety, for instance protection against invasion,
assault and theft. But these are normal expectations for much of social life, for even conducting
a conversation. As for the rest, except perhaps for currency, it is a mere pretence that a state is
required for their assurance: customary or tribal arrangements will ensure both property in
transportable goods and recognition of verbal contracts or undertakings. An appropriate
currency too can develop in the absence of states, as exemplified in the shell currencies of
Melanesia and the bank notes of early America. Bank notes are not fully public goods; for a
bank which can profit from their circulation or issue has an incentive to supply them. (And
banks themselves do not require a sponsoring state, even if sometimes that helps, as in bailing
them out.)
It is worth observing that much of the conventional apparatus presumed for markets is
already presupposed
for the fictional covenant by which the state is supposedly
established. Namely, meeting in relative safety, entering into contractual arrangements (in the
case of the state of a very sophisticated sophistical sort).
* Anarchism has not met the 'intractable ... problem of co-ordinating the activities of many
independent social units without recourse to central authority' (M p.181). But there are many
examples, most notably at an international level again, where such coordination has been
achieved (e.g. IUCO). Examples are increasing with new networking arrangements (e.g.
Pegasus network).
Where substantially self-managing arrangements, such as traditional
markets are allowed to flourish, there are no such intractable problems. Certainly, however,
with anarcho-communist structures which aim to suppress such self-managing arrangements,
there are problems: namely those of
* co-ordinating productive activity, aligning production with the needs of consumers without
5
markets or central planning.
Key approach: localising production, face-to-face.
How can this work in an advanced industrial economy, where a high degree of specialization
and much division of labour. Suggestion CAN'T!
* motivating people to work.
Pressure, sanctions, rewards. While this is a problem in any setting, it is caAaaccJ since certain
personal rewards removed.
*
a central agency seems necessary to maintain any society-wide distribution of resources'
(p.172). W/nc/i resources? Where markets operate, many resources will be distributed without
any role for a central agency, which would often serve as a serious blockage. WAat
distribution? What was intended was: a
distribution of resources, so the blatant inequalities
now observed in even the wealthist societies are mitigated and the conditions of the worst-off
are alleviated. That is drawing upon experience of capitalism: anarchism would not start out
from such an invidious position. Further, it is assumed that there are only two ways of righting
such (capitalistic) maldistribution: through purely private means or by a centralised state means.
So presented it represents an extremely familiar false dichotomy, private or state, in which
society is either equated with the state or else drops out, and all other public means disappear.
For socially-inclined anarchists there is no disputing that there need to be safety nets in
place for the poor and disadvantaged. What is in question is how those nets are placed and
administered, and whether the state has an essential role or is rather a less efficient more
officious nuisance. One option is an exposed tithing system, where members of society are
offered a choice of schemes to contribute to, and expected to contribute to these, and
encouraged to make their contribution open to public inspection. Those who tried to evade
contribution and closed their books would be subject to a range of social pressures.
It is further claimed that while smaller anarchist communities, especially those of a
collectivistic or communistic bent, may be able to resolve inequitable distribution problems,
'there are major difficulties' in attempting to realise some distributive ideal 'between
communities' (p.173). There may be major difficulties, there are now, but that is scarcely an
argument for a central authority. Some redistribution and a small transfer of wealth occurs
intentionally without a central authority. There is not even decisive evidence that a central
authority helps, so far from making matters worse.
* AaarcA/sw
no
/or /aw.
Anarchism cannot traffic in law - at least in the initial and prominent sense of /aw
(ventured e.g. in the OED), namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by
authority and characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent
counter balancing this prognostication is a second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific
and philosophical uses' from which likewise anarchism is not debarred): namely 'without
reference to an external commanding authority'. Thus as the term gavcrawcar is variably
determinable, so also is /aw. Under the main determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism.
6
But under a different determinate, there is no incompatibility. Anarchism could operate with
such a derminate (as with appropriate notions of moral law, and similar). Law, however,
deservedly has a tarnished reputation, in anarchism as elsewhere. Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive oligopolistic priesthood. Too often it is an oppressive tool of the
state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatible with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely assented to sorts, and so
on. These can substitute.
The state has other less conspicuous roles than law and order, war and defence, and
managing the economy.
* The state serves as representative of national identity, which people crave. Anarchism does
not cater for this basic human need. This is pretty dubious stuff. Such a need is by no means
ubiquitous, and is, if not manufactured, certainly exaggerated in convenient cases, by state
devices. But let us concede a need hypothesis (there is nothing basic about it). Is it true that
The anarchist does nothing to replace the notion; his ideal society is devoid of any features
which might serve as a focus of identity' (M p.180)? No. The components in terms of which
an anarchistic society is structured — the local community, the local region, the regional
federations,... - offer foci for identification, bases for sporting teams, and so on. But, in any
event, nothing excludes national organisations, fielding cultural groups, artistic troupes,
sporting teams, and so on. The present structure of national sporting bodies, only loosely
affiliated with states, and coordinated in model anarchist fashion, provides in fact a worthwhile
example of anarchism in action (Burnheim again).
Do such concessions to features of nationhood 'naturally lead to a demand for self
government', and thence for a nation-state (p.181)? They may (as with the Basques) or may
not (as with the Cornish), and if so more likely the former than the latter? Further these
demands may come only from a small minority of nationals, or may be ill-founded. A demand
on its own demonstates comparatively
of merit, for all that modem economics would have
us imagine.
A repeated criticism of anarchism is that 'with the state removed, the system has no
ultimate guarantor ...'. So it used to be said in favour of God. But who guarantees the
guarantor? (A state may underwrite a bank, but a state itself can fail, despite support of other
states.) There is no ultimate guarantor. There are other issues also, such as the character of the
guarantor. While it is seen to in theology, as a matter of further (illicit) characterisation, that
God has the right features, nothing guarantees that an "ultimate guarantor" is not, rather like
most states, corrupt, unfair, heavy handed and incompetent.^ Even if an ultimate guarantee was
needed, none could be provided. But lesser assurances can be offered. For example, a bank's
2
If a guarantee cannot be obtained without violence, it is most unlikely that a satisfactory one
will be obtained with it.
7
books can be open to public scrutiny and assessment, so that it can be seen that it is trading in a
responsible and viable fashion. (It is better that a person's healthy state be assured by
observation that the person is functioning well, than by maintaining the person as a closed
system and relying on the doctor's guarantee of the person's health.)
^/^ w:
C^^cj
/#
o^=
C/f'77C/J'^
J*
yy"
"7
%?
'4%y /<^ 4^7^
z%^-/^3
c/jevve,
L__ found a way to police themselves,
f
there is no way they could maintain, let alone establish, an industrial
\
society. Small self-governing groups are incapable of building reser1
voirs to bring them clean water, or roads to connect cities, or dynamos
S
to supply electricity, or cars, or printing presses, or modern hospitals, '
product of
ofan
an advanced
advanced technology.
technology. Btg
Big tasks
tasks i,
1
or anything else that is a product
can be done only by big corporations tha^are either state-owned or
state-controlled, or that operate as vast independent oligarchies wtthm
;
the stated/2^-),
^..
rcT/
T. —.
,^y
T^,
TA
7./^
/c-
'
4^<!-
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^7'7
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cv<^A^7
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7'^-
!
Many of the criticisms of anarchism turn on the issue of orgam.Mric'K, especially how
gconcwHC activity such as: marketing, distribution, and so on, is to be organised in the absence
of a central state authority. Meeting these criticisms in appropriate detail is no mean feat,
requiring the elaboration of substantially new economic theory (except for excessively
individualistic anarchists like Rothbart, but sketchy details and hints have been offered by
anarchist theorists). While economic criticisms bulk large in recent criticism of anarchism, the
state having assumed the role of grand macro-economic organiser, these by no means exhaust
criticisms. There are serious issues also concerning political and cultural organisation,
concerning the presumed enemies of organisation and order.
In many criticisms it is simply assumed that anarchistic organisation will have to take over
the arrangements of present mega-states and somehow substitute for those, without mega-states.
The assumption is astray. Mega-states are mostly recent undesirable constructions, obtained by
conquest or war dealings, and held together coercive means and other devices of state. These
would, would be allowed to, fragment into regional components. Thus the problem of
organisation is a substantially smaller problem than that of organisation of mega-states; namely,
that of organisation of regions. The regions would naturally be grouped together, by principles
of federation. (The new Europe provides a partial, suggestive example.)
J
*
No strand of anarchism 'has developed an adequate economic theory.
The
individualists are stymied by the public goods problem, the communists by the problems of
coordination. [Even more plausible intermediate positions] require the support of the state at a
number of critical points' (M p.172). How the state is presumed to provide its benign
supportative role is well illustrated in the case of more individualistic anarchism, where the
familiar problem of public goods is also taken to manifest itself.
A cynic might well observe that no strand of capitalism or of socialism has developed an
adequate economic theory. But theories there no doubt are, in certain narrow reaches in
abundance.
* Anarchism assumes the benefits of autonomous market operations, indeed The individualistic
ideal is one of personal sovereignty in the market place', but 'is not the state an indispensible
prerequisite for a successfully functioning economy?' (M p.169). There are two parts to a
response. First, markets functioned before states, and function outside states, for example
internationally. Second, whatever institutions are required for the operation of markets can be
supplied regionally under anarchistic fragmentation of the state.
How much background structure do markets depend upon, which might presuppose
apparatus of state. A market has a place of transactions, which can be common or waste
ground, a supply of goods or services to be exchanged there for other goods or services (barter)
or currency (in a money economy). Buyers and sellers enter the market to effect exchanges.
No doubt presupposed are at least limited entitlement (leasehold or property rights, so a seller is
entitled to dispose of, to a new user, holder or owner, what is offered for sale), contractual
arrangements, and in a money economy, some recognised currency. Also presumed, normally
where markets operate, are certain levels of safety, for instance protection against invasion,
assault and theft. But these are normal expectations for much of social life, for even conducting
a conversation. As for the rest, except perhaps for currency, it is a mere pretence that a state is
required for their assurance: custom^ or tribal arrangements will ensure both property in
transportable goods and recognition of verbal contracts or undertakings. An appropriate
currency too can develop in the absence of states, as exemplified in the shell currencies of
Melanesia and the bank notes of early America. Bank notes are not fully public goods; for a
bank which can profit from their circulation or issue has an incentive to supply them. (And
32
banks themselves do not require a sponsoring state, even if sometimes that helps, as in bailing
them out.)
It is worth observing that much of the conventional apparatus presumed for markets is
already presupposed prg-sMfe for the fictional covenant by which the state is supposedly
established. Namely, meeting in relative safety, entering into contractual arrangements (in the
case of the state of a very sophisticated sophistical sort).
* Anarchism has not met the 'intractable ... problem of co-ordinating the activities of many
examples, most notably at an international level again, where such coordination has been
achieved (e.g. IUCO). Examples are increasing with new networking arrangements (e.g.
Pegasus network). Where substantially self-managing arrangements, such as traditional
markets are allowed to flourish, there are no such intractable problems. Certainly, however,
with anarcho-communist structures which aim to suppress such self-managing arrangements,
there are problems:
* ^o-ordinating productive activity, aligning production with
*needs
of
consumers without markets <?r central planning.
Key approach: localising production, face-to-face.
How can this work in an advanced industrial economy, where a high degree of specialization
and much division of labour. Suggestion CAN'T!
* motivating people to work.
Pressure, sanctions, rewards.
in any setting, but
rewards removed.
since certain personal
* '... a central agency seems necessary to maintain any society-tide distribution of resources'
(p.172). WTu'cA resources? Where markets operate, many resources will be distributed without
any role for a central agency, which would often serve as a serious blockage.
What
distribution? What was intended was: ayMst distribution of resources, so the blatant inequalities
now observed in even the wealthist societies are mitigated and the conditions of the worst-off
are alleviated. That is drawing upon experience of capitalism: anarchism would not start out
from such an invidious position. Further, it is assumed that there are only two ways of righting
such (capitalistic) maldistribution: through purely private means or by a centralised state means.
So presented it represents an extremely familiar false dichotomy, private or state, in which
society is either equated with the state or else drops out, and all other public means disappear.
For socially-inclined anarchists there is no disputing that there need to be safety nets in
place for the poor and disadvantaged. What is in question is how those nets are placed and
administered, and whether the state has an essential role or is rather a less efficient more
officious nuisance. One option is an exposed tithing system, where members of society are
/v
33
offered a choice of schemes to contribute to, and expected to contribute to these, and encouraged
to make their contribution open to public inspection. Those who tried to evade contribution and
closed their books would be subject to a range of social pressures.
It is further claimed that while smaller anarchist communities, especially those of a
collectivistic or communistic bent, may be able to resolve inequitable distribution problems,
'there are major difficulties' in attempting to realise some distributive ideal
communities' (p.173). There may be major difficulties, there are now, but that is scarcely an
argument for a central authority. Some redistribution and a small transfer of wealth occurs
intentionally without a central authority. There is not even decisive evidence that a central
authority helps, so far from making matters worse.
The state has other less conspicuous roles than law and order, war and defence, and
managing the economy.
* The state serves as representative of national identity, which people crave. Anarchism does
not cater for this basic human need. This is pretty dubious stuff. Such a need is by no means
ubiquitous, and is, if not manufactured, certainly exaggerated in convenient cases, by state
devices. But let us concede a need hypothesis? Is it true that 'the anarchist does nothing to
replace the notion; his ideal society is devoid of any features which might serve as a focus of
identity' (M p.180)? No. The components in terms of which an anarchistic society is structured
- the local community, the local region, the regional federations, ... — offer foci for
identification, bases for sporting teams, and so on. But, in any event, nothing excludes national
organisations, fielding cultural groups, artistic troupes, sporting teams, and so on. The present
structure of national sporting bodies, only loosely affiliated with states, and coordinated in
model anarchist fashion, provides in fact a worthwhile example of anarchism in action
(Bumheim again).
Do such concessions to features of nationhood 'naturally lead to a demand for self
government', and thence for a nation-state (p.181)? They may (as with the Basques) or may not
(as with the Cornish), and if so more likely the former than the latter? Further these demands
may come only from a small minority of nationals, or may be ill-founded. A demand on its own
demonstates comparatively ZZrr/e of merit, for all that modern economics would have us imagine.
A repeated criticism of anarchism is that 'with the state removed, the system has no
ultimate guarantor ...'. So it used to be said in favour of God. But who guarantees the
guarantor? (A state may underwrite a bank, but a state itself can fail, despite support of other
states.) There is no ultimate guarantor. There are other issues also, such as the character of the
s
[Jj[government is variably determinable, so also is /ow. Under the mam
a JS/'
/A%>
determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism. But under a different determinate, there is no
( incmpatibiHty.
--------------- —----------------- ------------------------------ ------ L_
--- Cjy.
Anarchism cannot traffic in law, in the initial and prominent sense of /<2w(offered in the
OEE^, namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by authority and
characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent counter^teducing this
prognostication is a second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific and philosophical
-
uses'): namely 'without reference to an external commanding authority'.
^aw deservedly has a tarnished reputation^ m anarchism. Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive, priesthood. Too often it is an oppression tool of the state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatable with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely assented to Kats, and so
On.
can
t
?
guarantor. While it is seen to in theology, as a matter of further (illicit) characterisation, that
God has the right features, nothing guarantees that an "ultimate guarantor" is not, rather like
most states, corrupt, unfair, heavy handed and incompetent? Even if an ultimate guarantee was
needed, none could be provided. But lesser assurances can be offered. For example, a bank's
books can be open to public scrutiny and assessment, so that it can be seen that it is trading in a
responsible and viable fashion. (It is better that a person's healthy state be assured by
observation that the person is functioning well, than by maintaining the person as a closed
system and relying on the doctor's guarantee of the person s health.)
6^/77///^ ,^7c-.
_ y
^L
/^/
"
A-^-'
<)
/
4<cc^<
/
8(^
'"-^ T=^r
V
z^_,
/c
rc
/rrA^
r*
r^.
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/^^c
*L^4?
7^
/t
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c
"*e- *
/(^? /^l
.
(
1
A DEEP RIFT ON PROPERTY
A main element in the major divide between right and left anarchism, as between left and
right, is property. Other elements in the divide, such as the accumulation of capital essential to
capitalism, depend upon property, because it in it as a transferable commodity that capital is held.
It is unremarkable then that property balks large, as an institution to be defended and even extended
(with new rights to address environmental issues) in right-leaving political theory and, what heavily
overlaps that g^ave. American anarchism. At the opposing end of the right-left tug of war, state,
.social or common ownership of property used to be all the go: but left coalitions are presently
down-playing such ideals and aspirations.
Reflective green theory once again moves off the right-left axis, questioning aspects of the
strong ownership and control relations presumed in the tug-of war. Prope^tarian relations are all
based upon older domination and control ideologies, but diluted in kinder stewardship approaches,
not removed. For, while the idea of land as a mere commodity subject to the $hims of present
owners is softened, the steward normally but manages and controls for some higher master, god or
humanity. Reflect further on what both private owners and state owners may do to the
environments and habitats they "own".
Green reflection le^ds then towards the modification of entrenched institutions of private and
state property.
Green anarchism automatically eliminates certain types of ownership, namely state ownership
which has to depart with the state. The demise of the state should at least suggest that associated
institutions such as property and the law may be in some trouble. So it proves, to an interesting
extent. For, much as arguments to the state are, like those to the Master, Dominus, fatally flawed,
so are those to strong and established systems of property subject to lethal objections. Further,
much as the unwarranted state may be substituted for less dominating justifiable institutions, so
property and its adjuncts may be replaced by alternative less dominating arrangements, such as use
hold, leasehold, and the like.
A central claim, argued^ detail, will be that none of the arguments for property as justified,
as an entitlement as right, succeeds,?!// that the whole run of arguments supports is the need, or
desirability for some lesser arrangements. It is advantageous to have some terminology to cover
both property anJ lesser arrangements, <7aa.n-proper?y so to say, or gua/efty as will be said.
'The concept of property is fundamental to our [U.S.] society, probably to any workable
society' (Friedman p.3). The second claim is soon strengthened, and a third insupportable claim
added: '... property is a central economic institution of any society, and private property is the
central institution of a free society' (p.4). The onus of proof strictly lies with those who claim
property, property rights, etc. For outside certain far from universal social conditions there is no
such property as is claimed. Considering the way the onus falls, the situation is remarkable. 77?ere
are no JecM/ve argawenM, so far as I can ascertain,/or such an institution as property. That
/r
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2
situation, if confirmed, raises important questions, such as how and w/ry the institution is in place?
But first the arguments, such as they are.
The main argument preferred by Friedman in support of his grand claims takes off from the
problem of the distribution of scarce material resources among competing parties who seek access
or use.
The usual solution is for the use of each t/ung to be decided by a person or
some group of persons organised under some
o/
Such t/ungs are
called property. If each thing is controlled by an individual who has the
power to transfer that control to any other individual, we call the institution
private property (p.4).
Firstly, all the distribution of resources problem points to is some allocation of uses, or some
sharing thereof. For such purposes many arrangements far short of property will serve; for
instance, lease, limited use rights, and so on. Secondly, what immediately stands out, an attempt is
made to close the chasm between what is so far delivered and what the claims concerning property
require through an appallingly low redefinition of 'property'. What one gets to use under some set
of rules may not be property at all (e.g. a cove, a sea passage,...). Property requires much more:
ownership in a nonv^cuous sense, coupled with a high level of potential control. Nor, thirdly, is
the characterisation of private property satisfactory, as transferable leasehold will meet the
conditions given. It may be argued that leasehold itself requires owne^h^ip; it will be argued that it
does not. But it certainly does not require private property, nor does proprietorship transfer across
leasehold arrangements.
That is^ it. Friedman proceeds, on the quite unwarranted assumption that all is property, to
argue the respective merits of private property and demerits of what is not private, public property
so it is supposed. 'Under public property, the values of the public as a whole are imposed on the
individuals who require the use of that property to accomplish their ends' (p.7). Something
remotely
that may hold for the example Friedman is discussing, the inordinately dull broadcast
media of the USA; but it certainly does not hold generally given the remainder way in which 'public
property' is characterised, so that no values whatsoever may be imposed.
What subjects hold property rights (if any) or like rights? The standard chauvinistic
assumption is that the class of such subjects comprises humans, or competent humans, or humans
who have competent guardians. But why should other creatures not hold and maintain territories,
as many appear to do? And if incompetent or disqualified humans can hold property managed by
guardians, trustees and the like, and if legal persons such as corporations can do likewise, why
should not a range of nonhumans (for instance, those that are credited with interests) do something
similar?
Given that many nonhumans can (and do) have proprietory rights, there can be a head-on
conflict between human rights and property rights (in opposition to Friedman p.3).
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Anarchistic societies of any complexity will typically consist of a network of decentralised
organisation, or a federation of these (etc.). The organisations will thus be regional, but
beyond that set up according to issue, role or function. Thus they will include what might well
be accounted
Many of the stock features of political functionalism, as
decentralised, will accordingly recur, separation of powers, tailoring of administration to need,
for instance. The organisations will furthermore be noncoercive; no individual or group will be
forced to join. Typically they will be voluntary arrangements.
A critical question is to how these organisations, substituting for the operation of state,
are to be controlled, regulated, and so on. In such favoured democratic structures control is
usually remarkably indirect. A populace weakly selects a central parliament, which exercises
through other bodies some control of state organisations. A full anarchism is obliged to
dissolve or substitute for central parliaments. It has a obvious option, namely direct democratic
control of state-substituting organisations. A simple way of achieving this is through sortition:
the membership of the governing component of each organisation is chosen randomly from
those of the regional community who volunteer to be on it. In some cases volunteers may
require accessible qualifications, and disqualifications (e.g. by having served before, by some
disqualifying record). Where the community decides that certain categories of people should be
represented, e.g. disable, minorities, then it is a matter of arranging random selection of the
required fraction of group numbers from these categories. This style of statistical democracy
dates back at least to original democracies of Greek city states where public officials were
sometimes selected by lot (it is discussed under democracy in Aristotle's Po/m'cy). Nowadays it
is called dwxirc/ty (a term with an unfortunate prior meaning); here in its anarchistic form it will
be alluded to under the ecologism dewa/tarcAy.
Such demanarchy has the immediate virtue of removing an expensive duplication,
government ministers and their departmental counterparts (e.g. finance ministers and
corresponding appointed treasury officials). Indeed, the whole charade of parliamentary
government, ministers and hordes of minders, governments and replicating opposition teams, is
duly removed - as it has to be under non-centralization. Such parliamentary centres are
eliminated; insofar as anything replaces them, it is the dispersed community, no centre, which is
directly linked to functional organisation.
Gone with the centre, or seriously reduced, are several standard political worries, such as
those of coup or take-over, insurrection or invasion. These usually involve capturing the centre
and its command structure, no longer there to capture.^ Community defence is thereby
rendered much easier. Also considerably reduced is the standard problem of who controls the
controllers: partly because control is so diffused, and prartly because a main controller is the
community (one of the advantages of democracy).
Appropriate institutions take care of the day-to-day running of community affairs; but
what of major issue decisions, changes of direction or structure. These can be accomplished
3
For there is no command or control structure that could be taken by an invador or internal
insurrection.
from the bottom, through referenda, propositions and the iike (organised through a suitably
independent college), rather than in present top-down inflexible fashion. (These methods, of
which there is worthwhile experience in parts of Europe, are investigated in Wolff.)
A regular early question is how such a stateless structure is to be financed wirAoM? coecive
mechanisms available. Of course if coercive institutions were in place, then the overall structure
could be financed in the sorts of ways that states are presently financed. It should be observed,
in any case, that coercive means are very rarely resorted to (unless the target is persued for
reasons, such as crime) in order to obtain revenue payments from wealthy corporations, firms
or individuals, where in a more equitible community much of the funding would derive from
(by contrast with most present states). There are several parts to a satisfactory answer:* Mt/cA less public revenue would be required because the most expensive, most wasteful, and
least productive components of state have been excised. These include the whole apparatus of
central government and electoral politics, and the associated system of coercion, standard
military forces and defense establishment, espionage framework, and police forces, prison
establishment and expensive courts.
Nonetheless there remain many institutions to finance, include smaller substitutes for
some of the abolished structures (e.g. social defence arrangements).
* Many institutions can be largely or entirely self-financing, because like customs and import
organisation they collect revenue, or through fair user-pays principles. Reasonable returns
taken can be channelled to an independent revenue office with no outside spending or
redistribution powers.
* Much, if not all, further social revenue could be raised through resources taxation (adequate
royalties and the like), rental taxes on property, gift and gains taxes, and through auctions (of
previously inherited goods), how this would work depends upon community arrangements.
Consider however a preferred anarchistic arrangement where that problematic item, private
property, has not been instituted or has been oblished (as with most European anarchism, by
contrast with North American forms). Valuable durables (roughly, any durable with stealing
for sale in present systems) will be rented instead of bought. Learnchold systems can be
operated very like private property (as the land system in A.C.T. reveals) fruit-feting market
operations, but they offer significantly better control, for instance environmentally, they enable
the social component of generated wealth to be reflected, through a rental, and they can be of
finite terms and to a given individual, so inheritance transfer is excluded. In place of the
customery land titles office a larger durables office with subdivision for types of durables
would be instituted, with each durable now indelibly marked or described.^
4
Here as with rcfcraHs, computing fasiiibiies remove many previous obstacles to each arguments.
Organisation can move with new technology.
,.
—--
-------------------------
^4^
/
A
CHAPTER
ROADS TO ANARCHY: OLD ROUTES AND NEW INPUTS
STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION TO ANARCHIST SOCIETIES,
AND AFTER.
As there is a plurality of anarchistic positions and end-states, so, but not in a directly
corresponding way, there is a plurality of routes to anarchism. As the positions vary very
considerably in quality, so do the routes, some of them risky, all of them difficult.
Anarchism, even though theoretical viable, undoubtedly looks /iard to obtain on any scale.
For states are now extremely well entrenched - in furthermore a mutually supportive exclusive
club of states. There is now immense resistance to their removal, deriving from several sources.
In particular, state actors and power-brokers are most unlikely to modify statist arrangements in
ways inadvantageous to themselves, to relinquish any power, still less to step down easily. Such
actors will often take desperate steps to retain institutional power; it is very difficult to persuade
most political human to relinquish power simply and gracefully.
Nonetheless opportunities arise for overthrowing or superseding states (for instance, in most
of Eastern Europe and much of Western Asia in the early 1990s). Periods of crises or "power
vacuum", in particular, afford opportunities, which should be seized as they may not arise often in
more stable states (most recently in 1974 in Australia). A well-prepared anarchist movement will
organise, then, and when the moment arrives, pounce (a partial model is feline hunting practice).
But such opportunistic and risky revolutionary routes are only one way to change, as the following
diagram, designed to survey the possibility field, should reveal.
Diagram 5.7 Ways /a poZiWca/ change.
WAYS
Intra-State:
within State
setting
EVOLUTIONARY
1. typically slow or incremental
REVOLUTIONARY
]
'
operations through received
political channels
2.
t
<
j
typically rapid
operations circuiting
established channels:
coups, insurrections, etc.
)
Extra-State
3. operations establishing
alternative organisations
bypassing or substituting
for statist arrangements, or
functioning within the
interstices of the state
!
*
4. operations comprising
j)
.
'
]
external inference or
intervention: by negotiation,
military means, sanctions,
examples, etc.
0
2
Pluralistic anarchist practice will pursue each and every one of these ways and means, so far
as resources indicate and permit, subject to constraints. For example, a nonviolent movement will
not adopt violent means (unless it insists upon a strange separation of ends and means). There is
nothing distinctively anarchist about these ways, except for 3; all otherwise are ways of changing
state arrangements, 2 of trading one sort of state for another, 3 of imposing state control and
discipline where it is lapsing from "approved" form or where there may have been none (as with
colonial adventures).
As there have been many attempts to narrowly delimit anarchism, so there have been
repeated attempts to restrict roads and byways to anarchism. Exposing these attempts will at the
same time show what is open.
J, Deploying and making wore
sZads/ po/f/fcaf arrange/ncnis
Use of orthodox political channels is not excluded. Pluralistic anarchism is not obliged to
dismiss political routes to anarchism or to anarchist objectives. Parliamentary and other
constitutional routes (such as through referenda) to an anarchist end-state are perfectly possible, if
difficult because of the tendency of state apparatus to endeavour to perpetuate itself. (As a related
example, a main successful party in the multi-party Australian Capital Territory government was
organised and supported by those opposed to such a government.) A main difficulty confronting
change through conventional political procedure is simply that, w/tere it does occur, it is usually
extraordinarily slow and limited, it is almost invariably small change at the margins.
It may take a little lateral reasoning to see the advantages, or occasionally practical necessity,
of working through or within a system or even strengthening it first in order to demolish it
(strengthening does not imply endorsing forever, but nothing more "counterintuitive" than appears
in a battery of stock psychological tests or clever martial arts). Authentic Marxism, for example,
which is ultimately anarchistic, is committed to very much such a circuitous route: the circuit goes
through a rejuvenated super-productive state, which in old age withers away.
A main reason why it has been imagined that use of established political channels is
excluded, in anarchist practice, is not because of the slow evolutionary nature of the process, but
because of a doctrine of means-ends congruence, which is given too circumscribed a construal.
This over-strong congruence doctrine requires more than what coherence seems to demand,
namely that the means should be compatible with comprehensive ends sought (thus precluding, for
example, violent means to achieve non-violent ends). It further requires that in anarchist action,
particularly the revolution, the end of a stateless society should be "prefigured", not some
intervening non-congruent objective. Even if the geometric metaphor were duly clarified, few
reasons have been advanced for accepting the crippling doctrine, which is not self-evident.
3
Frankly, anarchism does not need to give itself unnecessary handicaps; it faces enough real-world
obstacles without dubious doctrinaire additions from well-intentioned friends.
An anarchist organisation is plainly not a contradiction in terms; nor therefore is an anarchist
coalition or party, committed for instance to removing coercive institutions. Pursuing this tack, an
anarchist can vote for a party which comes closer to realising immediate anarchist objectives than
other parties, or, very differently, for a party which will assist long-term anarchist objectives (for
instance, by wreaking the national economy and thereby helping green objectives and generating
appropriate political discontent and dissent), without any commitment to the parties concerned, and
without endorsing the political system within which they operate. Strategic voting is not
precluded; strategic anarchist voters may well (unlike totalitarian voters) support (preferential)
democratic procedures.
While the state is to be dis-established, meanwhile there are more benign and less benign
states, in relevant respects, apart from how decently they treat their citizens and noncitizens and
aliens. It is no longer altogether accurate to insist, as anarchists used to a century ago, that 'every
state is an agency whereby a ruling minority exploits and oppresses a majority' (M p.87). Many in
majorities may do very nicely, thank you, while some in the elite minority may be grindstoned.
Moreover, the mass of people is generally not only resistant to change, but highly reluctant to force
changed unless there is very considerable dis-ease, which in most developed states there is not.
These are some of a mix of reasons why a revolution is so remote in comfortable countries; no
longer the incendiary states kindled for the anarchist match that 19th century anarchists imagined.
Despite mass lethargy, dissatisfaction with the state is extensive and comes from right across
the conventional political spectrum. There is widespread popular sentiment to the effect that "the
state has become our master instead of our servant", a reversal of roles that should not surprise
Hegelians. Libertarians interpret this in terms of a much reduced state, a much leaner and
hopefully much less hungry state - a route to anarchism if dismantling went in a right direction and
far enough. Right-thinking socialists interpret it in terms of a much transformed state, a helping
but unobtrusive rather than a commanding busybody state. A familiar view of the state from a
section of Green Movement represents a turn on the old anarcho-socialist view:
The ... state and the corporate sector are in alliance for the sake of "development".... We
try to wean people away from the belief that the state will act in the interest of the cidzens.
So we believe the ... state is best viewed as an oppressor (Orton, Response to Dwandik
Quesdons, p.6).
Orton argues on the basis of this for not trying 'to "use" the state' and 'not seeking government
funds'. But if the funds largely represent social wealth, why not judicious use? And if the state is
1
Social psychology appears to show as much.
4
the only legal means of requisite change? And so on.. In fact Orton himself proposes to make
changes through the state by mobilizing the people.
A state may also be more benign in other significant respects: for instance, in that it facilitates
minority political representation, including green anarchist groups, and in that it does not
significantly impede anarchist political and practical activity or render paths significantly more
difficult. Overlapping that, more benign less domineering states may leave substantial room for
significant anarchist practice both in lifestyle and in building organisational structures and (as it
were) alternatives to archist arrangements (such as peoples' books, time stores, etc.) What are in
important respects anarchist communities can operate within, as well as be modelled within, less
intrusive states (the limits to this quasi-anarchism, elaborated in Nozick, are explained in UT).
States that better meet anarchist (and green socialist) criteria for benignness can conveniently be
disdnguished as more .sywparico states.
Committed anarchists can quite well also be committed, as an intermediate goal among
others, to achieving more sympatico states, which may involve conventional (as well as
unconventional) political activity. No doubt engagement in conventional political activity carries a
risk of co-option; but there are obvious way of reducing that risk, of avoiding the 'slide into
collaboration with the bourgeoisie [and] ... willingness to play the game of parliamentary
politics'.2 For example, precautionary strategies include: engagement also in unconventional
political activity, anarchist or communal practice, consciousness-raising exercises, and use of time
limits, interruption tactics, rotations of leaders, and so on. Green party activities and procedures
can serve as a useful model here?.
Apart from the real dangers of co-option and state collaboration, there are other intertwined
objections standardly made to attempting political roads to anarchism and socialism. One objection
is that any attempt to use the state 'unavoidably reproduces all the features of that institution', such
as exploitation by a ruling or elite minority, and oppression of the majority. Few, it is continued,
will escape from effective control, or, when if offers, be able to resist using the immense powers
of the state. New people, new power-holders, will be transformed (by the usual devices, such as
being made to feel important, given an exaggerated impression of their own worth). It should be
evident that the objection has drifted from "reproduction of the state" to variants of "power
corrupts". Both are overstated, and there are strategies for overcoming both. Sometimes the state
c/tang&y, perhaps for the better; the British state has altered significantly in the last 300 years,
seemingly for better.
Corresponding the power of certain power-holders has declined
significantly, from monarchs and aristocracy down.
2
3
M p.89, see also Goodin in Green Politics.
See Spretnak and Capra 86 for details.
5
Another objection is better focussed. It is that use of the state leads the wrong ways,
through organisation by centralization and hierarchy, and action by legislation. As a result state
routes will not lead to decentralization, distribution of power and wealth downwards, and so on.
While state practices are commonly antipathetic to the sort of constructive objectives indicated, they
are not always, and they do not /Mvg to be. States, like large corporations, can reorganise, and
occasionally attempt to (thus reform and restructuring of bureaucracies, or even of whole public
services, etc.). Although unlikely for reasons indirected, state reorganisation can in principle
proceed by decentralization and devolution of power. Nor is there any lethal objection to achieving
action by legislation, so long as that legislation is not enforced by inadmissible coercive methods.
In sum, what the objection reemphasizes is that considerable care has to be exercised in using the
state, as with any major source of power. Further it shows again that transition can only proceed
so far through the state; the state route only leads so far, after which other means of transport need
to be taken or considered.
There are other ways of amending statist political arrangements than political approaches,
notably legal means, through courts. There is little anarchist precedence for such activity; mostly
anarchists have had heavy legal apparatus used against them. However, once again environmental
practice serves as a valuable exemplar, with many worthwhile results achieved (especially in
American courts) through litigation. In principle there is much that could be achieved in this way,
in state and international courts, to reduce the power of states and their instrumentalities. For
example, in Australia there are very many statues and laws which unjustifiably limit freedoms and
restrict individual and group action: examples include not only little activated but appalling
legislation on sedition, assembly, and similar, but a sweeping range of actively used and
opportunistically exploited legislation concerning defamation and freedom of speech, victimless
crimes, paternalism, restrictive trade and banking, sheltered professions, compulsory voting, and
so on, and on.
There is also much room for variation and experimentation within prevailing political and
legal arrangements. For example, applying procedures of statistical democracy to a few greater
range of activities than (adjusted) jury servicing to the organisation of municipal services, public
companies, and so on.
alternative structures and the forest succession model.
A main strategy for transition, emerging from the arguments for the viability of anarchism, is
that of replacement: transition to a new anarchist social order proceeds by replacement or
adaptation of the more satisfactory State organisations and structures by organisations and
structures of a more anarchistic cast, and by removal or phasing out of remaining no longer
necessary or unsatisfactory State arrangements.
Replacement and supersession suggest a biological model, of such change and succession,
as occurs where one forest type succeeds another; and such a model is in turn very suggestive. To
<?,
6
make the model more definite, and to give it some local colour, consider forest succession where a
sub-tropical rainforest replaces a eucalypt forest, as analogous to the case where anarchism
replaces a Statist society. There is certainly a marked change in structure, typically from a tall
forest with a fairly open canopy to a more compact closed forest with more layers of vegetation,
much more local diversity and a richer variety of life forms, especially floral forms. A forest is not
merely a set of trees, but trees in structural arrangement and interdependence, not merely on one
another but on other life forms such as pollinating insects, seed-carrying birds and animals, and so
on; and the changes in structure include changes in microclimate, in soil moisture levels and humus
and bacterial content.
The change of forest type may be by evolution, by hastened or induced evolution, or by
catastrophe (revolution) as when a eucalypt forest is clearfelled and artificially succeeded by
planted rainforest. (Strictly, there is a spectrum of practices and replacement strategies between
evolutionary and revolutionary and various different revolutionary strategies; and the standard
evolutionary-revolutionary contrast presents a false dichotomy.)
Even reliance on predominantly evolutionary methods, which tend to be very slow by human
time scales, way require some (management) practices, else evolution towards rainforest will not
begin or continue. For example, seeds for rainforest species may not be available if adjoining
areas have been stripped of suitable seed trees, e.g. by clearing or eucalypt conversion, in which
case it will be necessary to introduce seeds (of anarchist ideas, methods, arrangements, etc.). And
rainforest evolution may not be able to continue because the area is burnt occasionally, e.g. by
State officers, in which case protection against fire will be required: for with burning (and the
suppression) regimes rainforest seedlings are killed and eucalypt dominance perpetuated.
Furthermore, evolution can be hastened or induced by introducing seeds, or planting rainforest
trees in poorly seeded areas (i.e. setting up alternative social arrangements) under the eucalypt
overstorey, or even by some careful culling of eucalypts. But even without culling there will be
much for anarchist management to do.
As the rainforest cover begins to grow up through the eucalypt forest, the forest begins to
change structurally. Younger eucalypt poles die, and their replacement by eucalypts is generally
precluded owing to low light intensities near the forest floor (in something the same way
conditions for political entrepreneurs to flourish are excluded in an emerging anarchist society).
Gradually, as the rainforest grows, only scattered giant eucalypts protrude through the canopy,
and in time these fall to the forest floor, to rot and not to be replaced - unless the climax rainforest
is subject to catastrophe, such as fire or cyclone.
Catastrophic methods, such as clearfelling the eucalypt forest, replanting with rainforest,
protecting the new forest, and removing eucalyptus regrowth, are wocA more problematic. To be
applied they require either a large workforce or much mechanical power (so it is with violent
revolutions which need a large support basis not generally available in advanced capitalist and state
7
socialist countries, or else access to means of perpetrating violence comparable to that of the State).
There are often similar requirements for success; otherwise the area may be choked by rapidly
growing weeds or the rainforest plants may be suppressed by eucalypt seedlings and a pioneer
eucalypt stage recur. Moreover, a eucalypt overstorey can sometimes afford good conditions for
rainforest growth, e.g. plant protection from excessive sun, from occasional frosts, and from
drying winds, better moisture retention conditions, and so on. Similarly anarchist social
organisations may sometimes be able to
the environment afforded by the State to get started.
Thus not all forms of the State are necessarily equally inimical, and some may provide much more
favourable conditions for the development of anarchist social organisation than others.^
The forest model (together with preceding arguments) helps to illustrate why violent and
catastrophic methods are not congruent witty the goals of an anarchist society and why there is an
intimate connection between these goals and a strong preference for nonmilitaristic and non-violent
methods of achieving change. Replacement involves a (normally gradual) process of developing
alternative institutions and forms of social organisation and the growth of the new form of society
within the old, and is not a catastrophic single event conceived of as outside the normal order of
things, and for whose advent all other action for change is held suspended. And just as methods
of change such as clearfelling are likely to perpetuate the eucalypt cycle and are unlikely to favour
the development of the rainforest, so the use of catastrophic and especially militaristic methods is
likely to perpetuate an authoritarian social order and unlikely to favour the development of a co
operative, non-violent and non-coercive one.
* applying the forest succession model.
How to apply the model is not difficult to appreciate at least in broad outline. As well many
of the further details have been filled out by work that can be described as indicating how
allegiance can be shifted in practice from where we mostly are to alternative social arrangements
and lifestyles built on self-management and mutual aid.$ The seeds of anarchism should be
broadcast or planted, anarchist (non-Statist) arrangements instituted or strengthened, and efforts
made to replace or modify vulnerable Statist arrangements, e.g. by democratisation of present
institutions and development of nonstatist and noncapitalist alternatives. Some of the practices are
familiar: anarchist groups, clubs, pamphlets, broadcasts, newsletters, etc.; (anarchist)
cooperatives, exchanges, neighbourhood groups, rural communities, etc. Others are slightly less
familiar: avoidance of State influence by arrangements beyond State reach such as costless (or
alternative currency) interchanges of goods and services, barter, black-green economies, and so
on, action directed at removing decision-making from State departments, such as forest services,
and into citizen hands, and ultimately, to decentralized interested communities. In this sort of way,
4
5
This has an important bearing on strategies for achieving change: see D. Altman, ReAearsaAs ybr CAange,
Fontana, Melbourne. 1980.
As sketched in some of the material already cited, for example, Routley, p.284 ff.,SM.
8
worthwhile State arrangements can be replaced, and power can be progressively transferred from
the State, and returned to the communities and to people more directly involved.
Formation of networks of anarchistic communities and neighbourhoods, functioning within
the interstices of the state and state bureaucracies, would represent a significant stage in
succession. Something like this is beginning to develop in Australia (by contrast with the USA
where the commune movement appears to have gone into decline).^
3. Types of individual and small group actions
While strategies proceeding through movements are social in character, a variety of
individna/ action can also be highly effective if widely enough separately undertaken. Naturally if
there is some solidarity, some coordination of individuals, such action will be both fostered and
enhanced. Witness the practice of early Christians, which combined individual action and
consciousness change, within a support and solidarity network. But Christianity misleadingly
promised more than anarchism and environmentalism can, not merely future better lives, but after
lives in splendour, a bogus transcendentalism which however was, and still is, widely believed, a
damaging transcendentalism too, in that satisfactory lives in real space-time can be foregone, in
favour of virtual after-lives.
*
fran-y/br/nano/M. There are a range of proposals for comprehensive personal
change, but they all share fundamentals, which are personal improvement and enhanced personal
relationships. It is because of these shared fundamentals that religious change, such as that offered
under new Testament Christianity shades into the quasi-spiritualism of sects linked to Deep
Ecology (such as Council of All-Beings, Homage to Gaia, Earth Empowerment, etc.) which in
tum shades into Californian personal therapy fashions. Proposals for transformation do not
however have to hang^ out on the fringes of religion; hardheads like Passmore (in direct descent^
from 18th century sympathy-based ethics) have emphasized both personal relationships, love for
others, and moral improvement, better adherence to tested moral principles. Put together, these
individual changes would lead us, it is optimistically imagined, out of the environmental morass
and to a socially and environmentally better world. While it is not that simple, while the problems
lie deeper, some thought it was simpler still. Either the Beatles in their famous lines 'All you need
is love', reflecting an extremely popular sentiment, only saw one part of what was recognised, or
they erroneously supposed that part would yield the remainder. Love slobs are one sort of
counterexample; they achieve love and just wallow in that, not seeking any sort of improvement,
moral or other.
Let us not diminish the relevance of these proposals: the more rounded people among the
thin paper-mache economic and political men focussed only upon maximizing their own self-
interested utility in material consumer goods the better, the better for many concerns, including no
6
Refs
9
doubt prospects for anarchism. But let us not delude ourselves that herein lies the way out or
forward. Many of those proposals have been around for rather long time, and suggested again and
again, with no conspicuous results. A lot of it is to found in Spinoza, whence it has percolated
through both to Deep Ecology and Freudian therapy. The Deep Ecological emphasis on self
realisation goes back at leas a century, to Humboldt and Mill, with Self already expanded in
German and British idealists. German and British industrial development did not lose a beat.
A mental revolution, in some people's minds, is no doubt essential for a properly planned
revolution. But mental transformations have to be translated into action, to practices that make a
material difference. And consciousness transformations may not translate into appropriate action;
many such transformations are politically very conservative, and lead to no relevant action or effort
for structural change.
Much of what is said of consciousness transformation applies also to
*
a route to change recommended by reformers and radicals for at least a century, from
Mill through Bookchin. Education, appropriately undertaken, can amend ideology, change
consciousness. But at its best it is very slow in operation, very partial because it has to compete
against other sources of propaganda (such as media, dominant society, etc.). And it is more likely
to carry dominant messages, and reinforce dominant attitudes. There is a major problem in getting
alternative messages appropriately delivered and action undertaken.
* c^pting oat (so far as this is possible or even now possible).
To be effective, this has to be focussed, not merely a dropping out parasitic on the state system. It
has to be focussed in way^which challenge the state systems, it inevitability, decidability, etc., in
Redirect
*-F
ways which withdraw contributions to it and ^.... activity elsewhere^creating an atwojpaere, of
expectation and of belief (perhaps even if false). .
If you or your group produce the impression that there is going to be a continuing recession
or a revolution, if your spread the conviction that there is widespread dissatisfaction, that society is
sick or rotten to the core and is about to decline further or collapse, then you are taking a
significant step towards such outcomes, towards decline or fall? If these efforts to develop an
atmosphere are widely orchestrated then they are likely to be so much the more effective. It is
appreciated in business and advertising circles how much psychological atmosphere counts; a
Pint
,
*
Al
r
climate of confidence is
important ^for climbing out of a recession. A climate of
revolutionary expectation can set the scene for revolution events.
While it is dishonest to create an impression of imminent decline and disaster knowing full
well that such scenarios are utterly unlikely, informed greens and anarchists are not in any such
compromised situation. Environmental decline, continuing extensive unemployment, persisting
7
To adapt Joll p.222.
v /s
10
periodic recession, and in due course collapse, are likely futures under present capitalist state
trajectories.
Anarchists can assist in producing an atmosphere of gloom and depression and pessimism
about capitalist economic circumstances and prospects. But they will aim to generate a quite
different impression of the stability of capitalistic arrangements.
4. Widening operations to exceed standard political and legal arrangements.
Unorthodox political ways and means, a prominent part of historical anarchist activity, are
much more extensive than political textbooks would suggest (or have impressionable readers
believe). These have been restored to contemporary prominence through civil disobedience
practices, and peace and environmental actions. Methods have also been modified (for instance to
exclude pointless personal violence) and substantially expanded. Practical tactics include protests,
occupations, blockades, parades demonstrations, theatre, civil disobedience, refusals, boycotts,
tax and financial withholdings, plant disobilizations, monkey wrenching, and so on.8 Such
methods, more accurately active applications of those tactics, are grouped under Jirec? action, a
vague appellation sometimes taken or extended to include forms of guerrilla warfare on the one
side and more indirect pressure group activity (lobbying, petitioning, public meetings, etc) on the
other. (Such tactics substantially improve upon, and rechannel, the often misguided and rather illfated "deeds" and "acts of propaganda" of late 19th C anarchists.) Such tactics can be both shorttermed and sustained. Important among sustained practices are resistance movements and
organised refusals (preferably without conspicuous leaders). While individuals can be selectively
picked off, enough people well organised cannot. Mass social actions and Grand Refusals could
constitute significant political happenings. Such strategies can be pursued both for specific
objectives (to preserve a forest here, a building there) and for much more general objectives, up to
and including dislodging an unpopular governing party, or overturning a state.
For more general and dramatic results to be achieved, there are some important preliminary
desiderata to be satisfied. These include
* establishment of a movement, to carry out actions, and subsequently to participate in the
supersession of the state.
* a certain amount of planning, of how to proceed, to direct limited resources. Subsequently, as
supersession of the state becomes a live issue, much planning of the transition and of post-state
arrangements is important, if a successful outcome, or even a good attempt, is to be achieved.
Proper preparation is critical. Once again, planning and organisation of anarchist activity is
certainly not excluded, in revolutionary movements or elsewhere. The rival spontaneity view, still
fashionable in anarchist circles, is underpinned by a confused picture of freedom;^ is inconsistent
8
9
See Coover et al, B. Martin, Changing t/te %bgs, G Sharp.
Duly criticised in "Hot immigration".
11
with the coupled congruence doctrine where end-states are prefigured; and issues in poor decision
making, choice deliberately uninformed by available information. But naturally planning is not,
and cannot be, total; and it should not be too inflexible, but allow for contingencies, extraordinary
happenings, even spontaneous redirection (e.g. though a range of flexible ranked options).
Initiating an anarchist movement virtually from a zero base (the present situation in most
developed states), would be a slow difficult and no doubt frustrating task. Fortunately there are
attractive alternatives, such as integration with already effective movements, notably those already
engaged and experienced in direct action.
Declared or self-conscious anarchists are now few in number, and lacking in power.
Contemporary anarchists live like the counterculture did, around the margins or in the interstices of
contemporary dominant statist societies, rarely seen in the boardrooms of top companies or at the
clubs of power brokers. Accordingly, transitions to anarchism are most unlikely to proceed at all
directly, either upwards by democratic or popular procedures or downwards through constitutional
procedures invoked by controlling elites. Anarchist strategies, in order to work, will need to be
indirect and smarter. There is much scope for such strategies.
For direct action along the lines sketched to amount to anything, an anarchist movement with
considerable organisational capabilities is needed. The most promising way of fast-tracking such a
movement is to mobilize already established movements, namely, once again, green and peace and
like movements. The idea, in brief, to form an active anarchist movement within the union of
green and peace movements. It will have to be wif/un these movements. For not all those
affiliated with those loose movements are opposed to statist political arrangements or
anarchistically inclined. Many of the leaders and prominent spokespeople among
environmentalists for instance, have a cosy relationship with state political figures and bureaucrats.
Indeed these days many of these state-intricated people, who may well have genuine environmental
commitments, account themselves green, but they are generally unlikely to consider rocking the
ship of state. Nor do these state people generally participate in extended or vigorous protest
operations, of which there are increasing many. An anarchist movement will link into the
extensive more radical end of green and peace movements. There is already considerable linkage,
and considerable scope for expansion of linkage. Many radical greens are vaguely aware of the
anarchist character of several of their own proposals for change.
More radical greens are mostly already aware of the extent of state involvement in
environmental degradation, and of state connections with, and encouragement of, large
corporations engaged in environmentally destructive enterprises. Nor will they be long bought off
by (what threatens to split the green movement) attempts at reconciliation, most recently under the
ambiguous banner of "sustainable development". It is becoming clear to more radical greens that
this normally means sustaining economic development, that is capitalistic business and
macroeconomic growth largely as usual, not sustaining the already developed environmental
heritage. More radical peace activists are even more keenly aware of the intrication of states in
12
activities hostile to peace such as military activity, weapons production, support of repressive
states and client army/armies funding of counter-insurgency, terrorist and destabilization operators,
and so on. There is evidently much common ground to build upon, from which to organise.
Correladvely, mobilization through loose green and peace movements effects the character of
the activated anarchism, shaping and limiting its forms. It will be an ecosocial anarchism of pacific
slant: ESP anarchism for short (for ecosociopacific anarchism). There is no similar prospect of
mobilizing most other forms of anarchism, in particular robustly individualistic varieties. For the
natural allies of the latter varieties, economic rationalist and libertarianians are overwhelmingly
committed to a minimalistic state to guarantee, coercively, the fundamentals of market capitalism
(private property, constitu^onal and contract law, etc.).
Until a movement is organised there is little chance of a satisfactory revolution. While a few
people may be able to gain control, briefly, of some states, without a larger movement requisite
restructuring of state functions cannot be carried through.
A viable anarchism further supposes some alternative fairly detailed organisational and social
arrangements. If such a system is to come to pass and to persist, then its prospects are
exceedingly poor if it is a do-nothing set of arrangements spontaneously arising out of a
revolution. But the state as it grows tends to undermine or eliminate such alternative arrangements;
and simultaneously people come more and more to expect the government to do what they might
formerly have done, or banded together to do, themselves. The state again proceeds, like other
persistent systems and ecosystems, to establish conditions for its own survival: to be needed for
social and even individual activities.
Formation q/ movements wMwn movements.
There is presently very little in the way of organised anarchist activity anywhere in the
world, and no real movements. There is, for instance, Liberty Foundation in USA which supports
anarchist productions, but it does not discriminate in what it supports between anarchism and
minimal statism and economic rationalism. There are other organisations that do or could play a
creative role in anarchist movements (such as Black Rose publicadons in Montreal, and the small
Institute of Social Ecology in Vermont). As it takes some time, and much effort, to establish a
viable movement, the situation for anarchistic change may look bleak. But there is no reason why
anarchism need form an independent movement; it can hitch to already established movements.
There are obvious movements, of very sympathetic character, to join (this is no inHitration or
annexation): namely the green movement and the peace movement. In both these overlapping
movements there is wide appreciation that states themselves are major sources of the issues they
are concerned with; for states are the main cause of wars, major participants in nuclear industries,
major sources of the issues they are concerned with; for states are the main cause of wars, major
participants in nuclear industries, major proponents of economic growth and its concomitant
pollution and waste. (Despite the definite descriptions, these "movement" are really loose
A
13
c
coalitions, often not even organised in one group in individual countries.) Development of
anarchist groundswells within green organisations and among green sympathizers appears
particularly promising. For many greens are beginning to recognise that they are getting nowhere
much, or even going backwards, through state support and state-directed appeals and activity.
Turning enough of these doubtful or disillusional greens in positive anarchist directions looks a
genuine prospect, io
There are very great advantages in mobilizing relevant parts of green and peace movements
(
in anarchistic direcdons. Not only are there substantially concordant ideologies and goods; further
the
to these ends lie available and quite well developed. Readily to be drawn upon is much
knowledge of and experience in direct action methods, nonviolent resistance and sabotage, civil
(and state) disobedience, and similar.n While several of these methods and procedures derive
from earlier anarchist, resistance and civil disobedience practices (and many are common currency
of direct oppositional organisations everywhere), they have been brought to a new level of
refinement. Further, some extremely important restrictions are recognised. By contrast with
methods deployed by "illegal" armies, guerillas, insurgents and the like, paramilitary techniques
are out. Such paramilitary organisations are, in any case, operating within the statist paradigm,
normally aiming to replace some state arrangements by others. Methods applied are expected to be
nonviolent, and to inflict no serious damage upon living creatures.^
What is foreshadowed, then, is formation and development, in each region, of a radical
change movement, a radwienf or
Ideal radments in different regions are in
communication and loosely federated. A radment proceeds to undertake both reformist action and
radical action, marginally political and extra-political action, up to and including revolutionary
action. Much action is undertaken by smaller groups within the radment, vands (to choose a heady
combination of "band" and "van").^ Vands undertake specific projects, of a wide variety of sorts.
So far much of their activity has been directed to halting or redirecting specific vandalistic activities
of governments, governmental authorities or government-licensed corporations, such as logging,
whaling, sealing, polluting, transporting hazardous waste,... The simple proposal is that the range
10
11
12
13
Experiences or processes of change involved do not amount to conversion; for there is no adoption of a
faith. Anarchism resembles atheism, a loss of faith, rather than a religion. Rather there is a comingdown-to-earth, a realisation that institutions in which trust and hope had been placed did not warrant those
investments and were without justificatory clothes.
There is now an array of texts documenting methods, explaining how they are applied, how they can be
taught (e.g. through enactments, drama, practice, etc), and so on. See (as above).
There are some controversial procedures, such as the tree spiking used by Earth-Firsters and MonkeyWrenchers. Those may do minor damage to some trees spiked, and serious damage to loggers and
sawmillers who proceed to mill spiked trees, (a careful formulation of admissible procedures and practices
is required.)
Vands may include wanderers and wanderlebeners, but they are not vandals. Environmental vandalism is
one of the major practices they oppose.
14
of vand activity should be expanded, to include revolutionary action. Such action would include
counter-option, taking over the administrations of organisations that are being specifically
combated or targeted. Experience could be gained on organisations like universities, though the
ultimate target is naturally the state.
Designing a s/nari revo/afton.'
and revo/MZfonary achion.
If the state were justified, if it had a moral right to be there, the action, revolutionary or
other, by ethically guided anarchists to dislodge or remove it would be excluded. But it is not. So
action, including revolutionary action against it, is not thereby excluded.
Perhaps the richest literature on rapid transformation of society, on revolution, falls within
the orbit of marxism. There is much to be learnt from this literature, and much from it can be
adopted. Some of the elements for textual adaptation are simple. Replace 'the working class' or
'workers' appropriately (unfortunately the replacement is not uniform). For example, substitute
'people's councils' for 'workers councils'; replace 'vanguard class' by 'revolutionary coalition',
etc. Not only does marxism presume a vanguard class; more difficult it presumes violence as an
inevitable component of revolutionary action. Here the direct and other action methods already
alluded to substitute for marxist methods.
But while much can be learnt form Marxist socialists, there are fundamental differences as to
the point and character of revolution. While the Marxist objective is to siege power and use it, the
anarchist objective is not to seize power, and then remove it or relinquish it, a dubious and risky
indirect route, but rather to neutralize and remove power directly.
There are said to be classic problems confronting any revolutionary movement. One of these
is the alleged stability of states, in the West at least. This stability, which does not extend far east,
or even into Central Europe, is considerably exaggerated; belief in this stability, which was shaken
by the events in Paris in 1968, can be undermined, by an appropriate subversive campaign, so that
belief no longer constitutes such an intellectual obstacle to revolutionary activity. Another classic
problem turns upon the issue of revolutionary organisation. Some of these organisation^ problems,
practices in green and peace movements, especially in groups like Greenpeace, have already
effectively solved.[detail].
Z/te ZransMon.
Like stages before the transition, stages q/fer transitions to post-state societies will not be
easy. There is a commonplace anarchist sentiment that removal of the state, its burden and
oppressiveness, a real incubus, will release an enormous amount of energy, with great scope for
spontaneity, fulfilment of human potentialities, and so on. Although this sentiment is widely
reiterated, very little evidence for the sentiment is ever assembled. My own sentiment is that the
commonplace sentiment, and what is taken to ensue from it, is largely moonshine, because, for
one thing, there is a countermodel that is at least as plausible. Those who are released from an
15
immense burden, or very hard oppressive forced labour, simply stop, relax and do very little, or
little more than is necessary for life and limb.
For similar reasons the common anarchist proposition that productivity will rise enormously
after the state is stripped away is very doubtful. If the state is like some sort of slave-driver, post
state productivity will presumably fall. The flood of goods and the end of scarcity, with the
demise of the state and its well-published appropriation of the surplus, looks unlikely (not to say
environmentally undesirable because the impact of the "goods"). Wishful thinking appears to have
gained control in much anarchist literature. There are other important reasons why parts of post
state productivity will decline considerably. Much too much of present production, fostered by the
state, involves erosion of biological capital, and should be wound down accordingly, and
alternatives sought.
In a similar way, anarchists often look far too optimistic about the rapid regeneration of
supportative societies destroyed by, and through machinations of the state. Some of those
supportative arrangements, developed in ages of suppression are gone, perhaps forever; others
will take much tiwg to repair. Social healing is sometimes very slow.
As with post-war reconstruction, living and social arrangements could be very difficult for
some for some considerable time. There will need to be, for instance,
* intermediate support structures put in place to ease the transition for some;
* much flexibility, and some preparedness to experiment to see what works;
* vigilance to ensure that old forces of state do not remerge on the back of social discontent.
Intelligent anarchist arrangements will have flexible plans, enabling anticipation of main problem
areas and sensitive coping with them.
5. External interference
Chapter 11
FEASIBLE ANARCHIST CONTRIBUTIONS
TO
GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL PROBLEMS
Heavy criticisms of anarchism, driving in strongly from socialist and marxist quarters,
include these: that anarchism offers no worthwhile practice for and offers no useful
contributions far coping with global problems^ meaning problems in present social and political
conditions (not usually problems concerning world environments). Among the problems
alluded to, which it is alleged anarchism does not and cannot address, are human proverty,
human malnutrition, inequitable distribution of resources, human (over-)population, and so on.
Granted, there are great many problems, many of them getting worse rapidly. Though
anarchist arrangements played little or no part in producing these problems — many of them
o
developing and getting out of control under free-enterprise capitalist and state-socialist
arrangements — it is sometimes outrageously claimed that anarchism should be able to deal
successfully with an array of these problems. To add to the insult, it is said to fail as a theory
because it is unable to do so. Why on earth should anarchism be presumed to do this? One
critic endowed with this level of 'gall' (one A. Wertheimer)
contends that anarchism is unable to successfully deal with four
presently existing world social conditions. These are: 1) that "the
population of the earth is (perhaps) too large, but increasing at a
rapid rate with no prospect for a serious reduction"; 2) that "in much
of the world, basic human needs are not being satisfied"; 3) that "the
world's natural and human resources are not evenly distributed
across the globe"; and finally 4) that "the present level of subsistence
is based on a high level of social and economic interdependence
among various regions of the world and within the regions
themselves". In addition [5)J... anarchism is unable to cope with
conflicts between individual self-interest and social needs,
particularly as relates to ... defense (Clark p.142).
The short response is, So what? Anarchism is not really saddled with the global legacies
of p^archist practice. A longer response begins thus:- Firstly, insofar as these conditions
constitute problems ("condition " 3) is more a "fact" than a "problem"), no political theory is
coping successfully, only an all-conquering ideology would pretend to be able to cope.
Democratic capitalism has had (important isolated pockets excepted) little impact in limiting
India's gross population; Maoist socialism^' has de^ only a little better in China. Part of the
problem in almost all such overpopulated regions lies in getting the problem recognised as a
problem, and making appropriate adjustments; as with education and adjustment concerning the
hazards of pollution and smoking, this is largely because of remiss state practice. Part of the
problem, the present resolutions will have ethically inadmissible outcomes or by-products.
—------------ .------------------ ——___
2
Only for the future is there some glimmer of hope, but not under present archist arrangements.
Secondly, prospects of success for anarchism are primarily regional, not global. But a region
can hardly be expected to handle, rather than make limited contributions towards, world
problems. Suppose, for instance, Niue became (or reverted to) an anarchist society, a
successful one locally. It would be no detraction from its local success that it made no impact
upon demilitarizing the USA or in halting the world's resource drain te thereto, or that its
success was (through standard US media practice) scarcely known about there.
*
iMMM. As we have already noticed, it is often asserted that anarchism cannot work
in regions of large populations or with high population densities. That anarchy only has
prospects of success in small, and perhaps technologically unsophisticated, communities is a
widely espoused thesis? These kinds of assertion have already been criticised.
What do not work are stock archist procedures, e.g. expanding \m out-of-touch
bureaucracy. Poly-archic arrangements cannot handle tough decisions. By contrast, sortition
allows them to be taken (Burgheim). This is important as wide range of decisions: transport
systems, restructuring urban systems, and so on, as well as population and immigration
policies. As there is a range of lobbies (ethnics, etc.) in favour of population increase: hard for
party systems to ignor these lobbies, because of voting system.
* Deliberate social reorganisation, which undercuts reasons for large families, namely old-age
care, cheap labour in fields, etc. (Seeams as successor (technology here)?
* Scarcity is re/aftw to wants and presumed needs. Similarly abundance: it depends
on extent to which materialism, consumerism, ete, prevail. When wants are large, perhaps
insatiable, there will always be scarcity. Wants are not a given; needs, through culturally
dependent, can be. Whan needs are set high (e.g. to include domestic ref^rgeaati^s), then too
there will be scarcity for the foreseeable future?
No doubt there is a rough band of minimal sustenance and shelter requirement for keeping
humans (why are we back to this) alive, for bare sustenance. Even if they could be met,
satisfactory lives would not result.
* Creation of needs (Marx). Industrial revolution under capitalism aggravated
of scarcity
and toil.
* Anarchists have a bad track-record on scarcity. They have tended to assume abundance. A
vast increase once the shades of the state are removed.
A
Following Kropotkin's proposals they have taken for granted enormous productivity from
labour-intensive garden plots, a sort of anarchist green revolution, neglecting the extensive
*
3
4
Even so, oneway to resolve/is by building up from local and regional solutions. Compare
nuclear freedom, peace, etc.(
Thus both sympathetic and unsympathetic commentators; Taylor, Wertheimer etc.
n frequently claimed that we know more or less how to meet population problems. Only
political structures and vested interests stand in way of doing so. But it is not quite that simple
and easy.
Arguments that wants/needs distinction cannot be drawn.
//'
3
inputs required to make this feasible, (water, energy, manure, pesticides, etc.). [Thus e.g. Clark
p.148.)
* There are some sharp limits on the extent of growth to cater for human populations and their
"needs". An important limitation can be seen by tracking energy, which is limited, more
abundant production of which encounters other limits (pollution, nasty works production, etc.)
D&triZwHon,
q/T&Kmrcgs.
. 4.
* Necessity is regularly exaggerated. Often this done to enable capitalist routes to be taken,
access to foreign business provided etc.
*
'Necessity
becomes part of imperialistic exploitation. Contrast the equally unsatisfactory
Marxist line: distribution is one with production. What is required is a change in technological
systems and productive relations. Undesirable patterns of production result in maldistribution.
'... the entire problematic of "redistribution" is bared jn the questionable assumption of the
feasibility of seeking a solution to the problem while continuing a technological system
founded ^n dependency and disproperti%s in economic power
*
(Clark p.154).
* The Aid record of present liberal democratic states is dismal.
* As regards more basic provisioning, mutual aid through free federation. Example of
Spanish collective ((^ebal ref 19 pp. 184-5).
Argument that anarchist approach could succeed, from socio-psychological assumption:
'unless humans develop patterns of life and values based on mutual aid at level of small groups
and local communities, one cannot expect them to go very far in the practice of mutual aid at
any other level of social organisation
*
(Clark p.154).
But really heeds the convert: when have no developed, can be suspected to deliver aid.
Present arrangement for human living are not made on the basis of
quality of life for the livers, but all too often to suit the needs of industry J returns to capitalism,
etc. The results are everywhere conspicuous, especially in contemporary cities — which
characteristically dominate whole regions.
Many major local problems derive from the environmental states and living conditions of
cities. An anarchist resolution involves restructuring cities. This would include development
of network cities and restoration of community.
4. Appendix:
ON SELECTION OF COMMITTEES
For how committees should be comprised, look at what they are supposed to accomplish, what
sorts of decisions deliver, and so on.
For example, the basis of decision for allocating public money has to be: 'attempting to balance
all legitimate claims on the basis of need and public benefit in accordance with recognised
moral values and principles'.^
Evidently such committees should not be composed of
1. members of competing constitutions seeking funds (i.e. anti-model is premiers conference)
2. power traders (i.e. anti-model is /...... or typical bureaucratic committee).
What appears to be required are candidates who are
* impartial (without chauvinistic or other prejudices)
* varied in evolutionary complex claims
* informed of.... moral values and principles, and committed to some such.
H
<3-.
After that try statically for spread of attitudes from conservative to radical.
Such committees according directly violate (Burheim) relevant interests criteria. In general
however for lower level committees relevance criteria obtain.
5. Demanarchoid ecodesigns for Australia
Chapter 5.1
THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM:
VARIETIES AND OPTIONS
The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the
options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a
stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism - according to which
organisation is unnecessary and social arrangements will arise spontaneously and will be
ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation - is a position which is not
viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which
durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society which these theoretical
arguments delineate will certainly be organised, but the organisation will not be compulsory,
and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition
by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily no doubt on voluntary co
operation and direct democracy.
The society which emerges may be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured
it, or it may not. It may well be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities: for
otherwise such arrangements as community replacements of State welfare arrangements,
control of their environment, removal of Prisoners" Dilemmas, and participatory democracy,
will work less satisfactorily. Communities may well be federated and control will be bottomup, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each
community there will, under such social anarchism, not be great discrepancies in the
distribution of wealth and property, and no highly concentrated economic power. Under social
anarchism, a community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is
communally owned or not owned at all.
While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic
arrangements, they are very far from determining them completely; they offer no detailed
blueprint. Accordingly what emerges is not a particular from of anarchism, for instance
anarchist communism, but a more experimental and
anarchism, such as was broadly
instituted in the Spanish collectives.
There are several recognised varieties of anarchism, among the more common:
individualistic anarchisms, anarcho-capitalisms, anarcho-communisms, mutualisms, anarchosyndicalisms, libertarian socialisms, social anarchisms, and now eco-anarchisms.
These
varieties are not particularly well-characterised. They are by no means at all exclusive. They
certainly do not exhaust the interesting possibilities. So far indeed a satisfactory classification
is lacking. Usually something of a ragbag is offered: textbooks single out a very few varieties,
and look at them. Invariably they leave out important varieties.
2
But it is not difficult to discern some of the more independent dimensions^ along which
variation occurs, and which accordingly are relevant to an improved multi-dimensional tabular
classification:
Part-w/to/e dimension:
atomism pole O
<—
individual social---------- communal
—O total holism
This is a most important dimension of variation among organisational arrangements (for
analysis see SM). It accounts for a major bifurcation between European anarchisms, which tend
to be socially oriented, and American anarchisms, which are usually highly individualistic
(religious communities and some European transplants excepted). For markedly holistic
arrangements to persist, some strong ideological relational glue appears required, such as an
immersing spiritual ideology.
Property spectrum:
Although this can be compressed into two dimensional form, it is better presented three
dimensionally as follows:
full
O <individualistic ---privatization
communalistic
-> O full public
(tribal) ownership
diminished
ownership
no ownership
This spectrum evidently connects with the preceding holistic dimension, and both contribute to
what was the old right-left political division (a sort of crude super-position), and to what should
be superseding it, three-colour political spectrum:
(old right) blue
<-
red (old left)
green (new environmental)
and electoral spectrum:
Gronp
fully
O <- bottom up
— democratic — oligopolistic — top down
participatory
O fully
dictatorial
Change proceJnre dimensions:
violent
non-constitutional
constitutional <pacific
1
Some of these "dimensions" are not really linear in the way strictly required. That they are not,
and that they are not fully independent, does not impede a much improved classification.
3
C/tangg wufMfors: vanguard group or class;
<Lumpen-proletariat-workers' syndicates
bottom
"the people"
-----------------business
political
companies
parties
ruling elites
top
greens
alternative
coalitions
And so on. The schema presented are clearly far from exhaustive; nothing has been directly
included concerning distribution methods (market vs command, open vs closed storehouses,
etc.), admissible technology, or work-leisure arrangements, to take three important examples.
More pieces will be picked up as we proceed (the approximate number of dimensions is
computationally small), and some of the rather schematic sketches ventured above, elements of
which should be familiar, will receive some development in what follows.
Once the (n) dimensions are duly elaborated an anarc/tAm can be located and classified
(pigeon-holed in n-space) by placement in each dimension. For instance, the form of anarchism
preferred by me (see SM for an early presentation), is located as follows: it is social (with a
significantly qualified communistic safety net: each according to her or his basic needs), local
market-oriented but non-capitalistic, with diminished ownership, democratic but without
politicians and with alternative electoral arrangements, pacific but not bound by "constitutional"
procedures, utilizing modest safe technologies,.... But it is but one sort never to be instituted
everywhere, from a rich variety of alternatives
There are then MMny anarchisms, a rich variety of different forms, some of them scarcely
investigated or known. That anarchism comprises such a plurality has proved puzzling to those
(for example of one name-one thing persuasion) who assumed it must be a single ideology,
either individual or collective,.... Indeed the pluralist character of anarchism has led even more
apparently sympathetic critics, to 'wonder whether anarchism is really an ideology at all, or
merely a jumble of beliefs ...' (M. p.3). Of course the impression that anarchism 'is amorphous
and full of paradoxes and contradictions' is marvellously assisted by conflating degenarchism
with anarchism, chaos with order, and by combining the variant forms, individualism with
socialism and communism.
By properly regarding anarchism as a sheaf of overlapping
positions assembled around a core characterisation, a standard model for pluralism, the
problematic elements of anarchism as an ideology disappear. No doubt it is not an ideology
like Marxism, but then Marxism is atypical in its set of paradigmatic texts, concentrated in the
works of the master. Other ideologies such as liberalism or environmentalism afford better
comparisons. While anarchism is an ideology (in both good and bad senses), it is not really a
movement. There is not, anywhere really, such a movement, in the way there have been a
succession of liberation movements or there is a green movement and within it a deep ecology
movement.
4
As anarchisms are plural, so by similar arguments are green, and deep-green, anarchisms.
Certainly green effect a select among their cluse of anarchism; it excludes, for example, the run
of individualistic anarchisms peddial in USA, because these admit much anti-environmental
activity, manifested for instance through "externalities" and market failure (some of these could
be very pale green). But selection does not, even for deep-green tend to a singleton, but still to
a wide pluralism.
These pluralisms are not merely descriptive, but normative. Insofar as any anarchism is
duly based on removal of unacceptable means, it should be
* pluralistic, because for example it cannot impose a single formulation on communities who
want to organise differently than its preferred way.
It should also be
* non-violent. Terrorist forms of anarchism are strictly incompatible with broad-based non
coercion. For terrorism typically involves coercion, stand-over tactics, and the like.2
That is, there is a doublish standard on vio/encg: It is alright to apply violence against state
(and others) while not alright to have coercive state, which applies violence. No doubt this can
be justified through
namely it is OK for me to do violence to you bot not OK for you to
apply violence to me. Accordingly a
conc/MMon is: A moral anarchism will not be a
form committed to violence (except unavoidable forms etc.).
Such pluralism does not enjoy a strong historic track-record, and does not go unopposed.
Standard anarchist positions, sketching of which was mainly a nineteenth century preoccupation
(but extending into twentieth century science fiction and utopian literature), shied away from
pluralism in the direction of monistic forms, towards insistence upon particular structure,
organisation and distributional methods. Such monistic rigidity led to much intense, often
fruitless discussion and friction between anarchists committed to different arrangements.
Certainly there was a doctrine of spontaneity — according to which in a state-overthrowing
revolution (in the very heat of the revolution!) the masses world spontaneously decide upon
new arrangements — which makes it appear that any structures at all were open for
consideration; but it was also assumed that certain arrangements would be selected, towards
which active anarchists would provide guidance.
It is not difficult to indicate some of the broad features of emergent arrangements features
that flow from the character of anarchism. But anarchists, over-attracted like others to monistic
schemes, have regularly attempted to advance their own schemes, introducing many further
postulates, that reach far beyond what flows from the basic characterisation, and that need not
2
There are serious pro&Anw for anarchism that accept coercive methods: why not aiso
accept the state then? Such positions tend to be forced back towards an organised
individualism.
But how then do they stop voluntary organisation arising (legitimately)?
5
be adopted by genuine anarchistics (some further examples of optional and rejectable extras
from a recent manifesto: ... direct democracy, destruction of all hierarchies, maximization of
freedom, total Revolution, no ends-means distinction, no leaders, optimism about an anarchist
future,...).
Because of the expansive pluralism of anarchism, it overlaps many other ideologies,
indeed virtually all that do not include as a theme unmitigated commitment to a state or like
central authority. Thus while anarchism excludes fascism and is incompatible with state
capitalism, anarchism overlaps liberalism, democracy, and even Marxism, since Marxism
affords a long-term anarchism. There has been much confusion about these interrelations.
Take democracy. Anarchism does not entail democracy, as is sometimes claimed. Advice of a
select minority or of a single sage could regularly be adopted, though the advice did not reflect
the will of the people and its source was not elected or appointed by the people. Nor does
anarchism entail undemocratic procedures. There are, in the plurality, democratic forms, of
various sorts, and undemocratic forms. Democratic forms may have a better prospect of
enabling genuine democracy than life under the state. For as some have argued, 'both the
nation state and electoral democracy are inadequate as vehicles for democracy under modern
conditions' (Bumheim p.218).
Is its goal individual freedom or communal solidarity? Sometimes one, sometimes the
other, sometimes neither, sometimes both (a typical four-valued logical structure). A pluralistic
anarchism offers several different sorts of communities, not just one kind: for instance,
independent individuals, perhaps interrelated and organised through contracts, solidaristic
groups working freely together and sharing according to need, and various attractive
intermediaries, where there may be more individual-oriented market arrangements but there are
also safety nets ensuring distribution according to basic needs.
It is not difficult in theory to devise structures that allow a wide variety of kinds. For
example, in simple cases this can be accomplished through regional patterning, as illustrated in
the following
with 6 varieties.
2
1
5
3
6
4
(Such a modelling for political pluralism is further elaborated in UT.) The brief interlude of
anarchism in Spain afforded a small-scale example of regional patterning at work
The kinds of anarchistic societies are bound to be of very variable quality, both
theoretically and in practice. Some will only work with rather special sorts of people, for
instance certain communes with members with strong religious or ideological commitments;
some will not succeed at all. Some verge on incoherence, for instance those against coercive
organisation that approve group terrorist tactics. But while some kinds of anarchism are
entangled in serious problems, others are not. Anarchists generally have no obligation to
6
defend defective kinds; yet many criticisms of anarchism are directed at just such defective
forms.
Although there is a rich variety of anarchistic end-states (virtually uninstantiated
possibilities), there are same common or overlapping organisational and structural features.
Such family-resemblance features are what hold the plurality together, and include noncoercive
versions of those arrangements essential to a functioning society: for instance, broad features of
arrangements for production and distribution, for arbitration and reconciliation, and so on, and
on. But although each such anarchist society will have some such organizational features, they
will differ in detail. For example, a main distributional feature of a simple communist society
may comprise a common storehouse from which members take according to need, whereas in
individualist societies distribution will normally proceed through some sort of exchange in
market systems. More generally different types of anarchism will offer different economic
theories. Those with stronger individualistic component will tend to rely upon not merely
market or allied exchange arrangements, but upon capitalistic organisation. The type of
anarchism favoured here strikes an intermediate route: markets without capitalism.
How is such complex organisation to be achieved without a state? Does not such
organisation and government require a state? To remove that familiar assumption and
associated blockages — encouraged by too much life under states and no experience of
alternatives - take a wider look around. Look at how many activities and procedures are
organised without states or essential participation of states. By voluntary arrangements.
Prominent examples are again sporting organisations, labour unions and business corporations
of various sorts. In short, organisation can be accomplished through a range of appropriate
institutions.
Such examples also provide the appropriate key unlocking the door as to how more
extensive organisation can be achieved in the absence of the state, namely through appropriate
institutions. The state dissolves into functioning components, a set of appropriate institutions,
and at bottom into its relevant minimization. It fragments into compartments — in two
interconnected ways: into regional parts and into capacities, functional parts.
There are other valuable clues to stateless reorganisation. What happens within the more
self-regulating state can also happen without it. As Gramsci emphasized,
the ability to govern without overt coercion depends largely on the ability
of those in power to exploit systems of belief that the larger population
shares. The nature of that system of belief is to some extent determinable
by policy makers, since in the modern state they possess a significant
ability to propagandize for their view. Yet.... (p.63).
Recent empirical investigations tend to yield similar results. People tend to follow rules and
obey laws they regard as moral or otherwise satisfactory. There are important messages for
anarchistic organisation here also, for arrangements without coercion, overt or other.
7
Anarchistic rules will try to go with the prevailing flow, and will only vary (as over vindictive
punishment) where an evidently satisfactory justification can be given. More generally, smarter
anarchistic arrangements will aim to include desirable self-regulating systems, such as small-
scale markets.
Though there are many different strands that can be interwoven through the pluralistic
out-fall from the basic characterisation, there are some broad tendencies of anarchistic
arrangement which include:
* reliance on self-regulatory methods of organisation that require little or no intervention, as
opposed to highly regulated procedures, perhaps tending towards centralism or paternalism.
This is one reason why markets are often favoured, analogues of centralised control and
coercive legal systems are not.
* emphasis on voluntary methods, in place of imposed methods — coercive methods are of
course excluded by virtue of basic characterisation. Certainly de facto power may remain, but it
will be without justification.
* favouring of decentralisation and deconcentration rather than centralised or concentrated
structures.
That does not imply there can be no downward relations. Of course under federal arrangements
there will be, and sideways natural relations as well (a full control system).
* discouragement of empowerment, encouragement of depowerment.
* opposition to oppression is a corollary.
There are too many alternatives in the pluralistic basket to look at all of them. Let us
consider only some of them, with however preferred features. (An example that does not rank
highly and will not be further assessed is Stimer's individualism.) Anarchistic societies of any
complexity will typically consist of a network of decentralised organisations, or a federation of
these (etc.). The organisations will thus be regional, but beyond that set up according to issue,
role or function.
Thus they will include what might well be accounted gcorggiowuZ
/hnctiona/iym. Many of the stock features of political functionalism, as decentralised, will
accordingly recur, separation of powers, tailoring of administration to need, for instance. The
organisations will furthermore be noncoercive; no individual or group will be forced to join.
Typically they will be voluntary arrangements.
A critical question concerns how these organisations, substituting for the operation of
state, are to be controlled, regulated, and so on. In much favoured democratic structures, such
as electoral bureaucracies, control is usually weak and remarkably mJirgct. A populace weakly
selects a central parliament, which exercises through other bureaucratic bodies some control of
state organisations. A full anarchism is obliged to dissolve or substitute for central parliaments.
It has a obvious option, namely direct democratic control of state-substituting organisations. A
simple way of achieving this is through sortition: the membership of the governing component
of each organisation is chosen randomly from those qualified of the regional community who
volunteer to be on it. In some cases volunteers may require accessible qualifications (e.g.
8
having served before at a lower level), and avoid disqualifications (e.g. having acquired a
disqualifying record).^ Where the community decides that certain categories of people should
be represented, for instance disabled, minorities, and so forth, then it is a matter of arranging
random selection of the required fraction of group numbers from these categories. This style of
statistical democracy dates back at least to original democracies of Greek city states where
public officials were sometimes selected by lot (it is discussed under democracy in Aristotle's
Po/t/fc^). Nowadays it is called Je/narchy (a term with an unfortunate prior meaning); here in
its anarchistic form it will be alluded to under the neologism JewMwiarc/ty.
Such demanarchy has the immediate virtue of removing a most expensive duplication,
government ministers and their departmental counterparts (e.g. finance ministers and
corresponding appointed treasury officials). Indeed, the whole charade of central parliamentary
government, ministers and hordes of minders, governments and replicating opposition teams, is
duly removed - as it has to be under non-centralization. Such parliamentary centres are
eliminated; insofar as anything replaces them, it is the dispersed community, itself no centre,
which is directly linked to functional organisation.
Gone with the centre, or seriously reduced, are several standard political worries, such as
those of coup or take-over, insurrection or invasion. These usually involve capturing the centre
and its command structure, no longer there to capture (for there is no command or control
structure that could be taken by an invader or with internal insurrection). Community defence
is thereby rendered much easier. Also considerably reduced is the standard problem of who
controls the controllers: partly because control is so diffused, partly because also gone are
legions of soldiers and security forces, and partly because a main controller is the community
(one of the advantages of more direct democracy).
Appropriate institutions take care then of the day-to-day running of community affairs.
But what of major issue decisions, changes of direction or structure?
These can be
accomplished from the bottom, through referenda, propositions and the like (with public
assessment organised through a suitably independent college), rather than in present top-down
inflexible fashion. (Some of these methods, of which there is worthwhile experience in parts of
Europe, are investigated in Wolff.)
A regular early question is how such a stateless structure is to be financed
coercive mechanisms available. Of course if coercive institutions were in place, then the
overall structure could be financed in the sorts of ways that states are presently financed. It
3
People can serve their administrative apprenticeship at iocal or group levels. One when they are
adjudged to have exhibited sufficient competence here are they entitled to nominate for selection
at grander levels. That is, there is a tiered structure for administralive careers, which would no
longer be full-time or working life long. This is one reasonable way of obtained some quality
control in selection of administrators. (Note these/evefy do not provide a vicious hierarchy.)
9
should be observed, in any case, that coercive means are very rarely resorted to (unless the
target is pursued for
reasons, such as crime) in order to obtain revenue payments from
wealthy corporations, firms or individuals, from where in a more equitable community much of
the funding would derive (by contrast with most present states). There are several parts to a
satisfactory answer:* Muc/t less public revenue would be required because the most expensive, most wasteful, and
least productive components of state have been excised. These include the whole apparatus of
central government and electoral politics, and the associated system of coercion, standard
military forces and defence establishment, espionage framework, and police forces, prison
establishment and expensive courts.
*
Nonetheless there remain many institutions to finance,
include smaller substitutes for some of the abolished structures (e.g. social defence
arrangements).
* Many institutions can be largely or entirely self-financing, because like customs and import
organisations they collect revenue, or through fair user-pays principles. Reasonable returns
taken can be channelled to an independent revenue office with no outside spending or
redistribution powers.
* Much, if not all, further social revenue could be raised through resources taxation (adequate
royalties and the like), rental taxes on property or leases, gift and gains taxes, and through
auctions (of previously inherited goods). How this would work depends upon community
arrangements.
Consider for instance anarchistic arrangements where that problematic item, private
property, has not been instituted or has been abolished (as under main examples of European
anarchism, by contrast with North American forms). Valuable durables (roughly, any durable
worth stealing for sale in present systems) will be
instead of bought. Leasehold systems
can be operated very like private property (as the land system in the Australian Capital Territory
reveals) thus facilitating market operations, but they offer significantly better control, for
instance environmentally, they enable the social component of generated wealth to be reflected,
through a rental, and they can be of finite term and to a given individual, so inheritance transfer
is excluded.
In place of the customary land titles office a larger durables office with
subdivision for types of durables would be instituted, with each durable now indelibly marked
or described. Here, as with referenda, computing facilities remove many previous obstacles to
such developments. Organisation can move with newer technologies.
Leasehold arrangements are readily applied to prevent the accumulation ol scarce
property resources, such as urban land, which is a major feature of capitalism. For leases of
scarce commodities can be allocated according to need and ability to use, not merely through a
4
The costs are enormous. A minute component, a singie federai election in Australia, now costs
about $54 million to arrange.
10
historically rooted market distribution as with private property. It is private property, not a
market system of distribution, that is really distinctive of capitalism, since it not only provides a
place to park and increase capital, but it enables transmission of accumulated wealth (e.g.
within a family or dynasty) and control of the means of production.
Where can anarchism work — satisfactively: on stock presumptions of community and
smallness.
Even proponents of the state have allowed that anarchy can work, indeed their position
often depends upon it. The horrible alternative to their, or their friends' or patrons', splendid
state and statecraft, is that a region should lapse into anarchy (a regular fear of the US
administration). Anarchism, that is, works, but works very nastily, like that presumed in "states
of nature", like that many in fact encounter in the encampments, slums or ghettos of terrorist or
other states.
But it now fairly widely appreciated, outside those intellectually incarcerated in the allencompassing realm of states, that anarchism can work rather satisfactorily, and did in may pre
state societies.
Concurrent anthropological findings concerning small communities and collective action
results concerning small collective have demolished the assumption that anarchy is impossible,
either in practice or techno-logically. Since then it has become fashionable to concede that
anarchy is possible but on/y where there is a suitable small community. This sort of anarchimin-the-small is commonly conceded by socialists, but dismissively. While anarchism may, it is
allowed, work well enough in small, isolated or primitive communities, it cannot work in large
industrial or urban societies such as now predominate globally. Anarchism is accordingly but a
marginal possibility, unworthly any longer of much serious political concern. Such dismissals
tend to be strong on claims and unfavourable judgements but excessingly weak on supporting
argument, where socialist handwaving takes over (obviously this widespread phenomenon is
not confined to socialism, or even to political debate). Confidence that anarchism cannot
succeed seems to be largely founded on the erroneous assumption that anarchism cannot supply
any but a primitive organisational structure.
By contrast, a sort of anarchism-in-the-small has been forcefully pursued, with due
argument, by Taylor, who contends that 'anarchy is viable to the extent that the relations
between people are those which are characteristic of community', a small community (-.166).
That is: '... community is nec&wary — if people are to live without the state' (p.3).
The argument to community that Taylor offers reduces a modified Hobbesianism; social
order can only be maintained, without the state and in the small, if the relations between
individuals are those of community (cf. p.2). Insofar as it is detailed, it is a remarkably broken-
down argument. As Taylor himself helps to show, 'the liberal justification of the state' — from
the failure of individuals in a large public to voluntarily cooperated to provide themselves
without requisite collective goods — breaks down at every critical point, in its premisses, in its
1
11
argument, and in its concluding inference to the state was the on/y means of ensuring the supply
of such goods (p.59).
It is this final lacuna onto which Taylor latches. Granting the rest, 'all that can be inferred
is that, if public goods are to be provided,
means must be found of getting people to do
their part in providing them' (p.59). There are, Taylor swiftly finds, three pure methods of
ensuring provision of the goods in question: the state, the market, and the community. The
argument then proceeds by elimination, of the market. Taylor 'contends that social order
cannot satisfactorily be put on the market' (p.2), though his arguments to this contention are
unfortunately far from decisive. That leaves the state for public larger than communities, and
communitarian anarchism as an extra-terrestrial possibility for small communities (because
communities in the vicinity of states do not, it is claimed, survive). For all the talk about
anarchism, it looks like another triumph for the state.
But the argument is unsound, because there are
methods than those Taylor locates.
Non-statist organisation, which comes in a range of forms — functional, regional and others —
is not a combination of the pure methods considered. As a broad type of method it is hardly
"unproposed", or without precedents or examples (e.g. medieval orders and present
international order).
While there is no need to dispute that prospects for anarchism tend to be enhanced in
smaller communities, or in conglomerates that can be arranged in networks of smaller
communities, anarchism can work, if less satisfactorily, in modem mass society. Such is one of
the large themes being advanced.
777E EA7FFG//VG
OF
/LV1/?C77/.SM: ^/<^r
cipy?^s
,
i
The
arguments
outlined,
predominancy theoretical, inform the
practical, revealing the options open for
anarchism, courses of action in superan
nuating the State and for transition to a
stateless Society, and so on. For exam
ple, spontaneous anarchism — accor
ding to which organisation is un
necessary and social arrangements will
arise spontaneously and will be ushered
in during the revolution without any
prior organisation — is a position which
is not viable and could not endure,
because it makes none of the requisite
replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of
anarchist society which these theoretical
arguments delineate will certainly be
organised, but the organisation will not
be compulsory, and will eschew
authoritarian measures (and, by the
overshoot argument, will reject transi
tion by any strengthening oj^he cen
tralised State), relying heavil\^on volun
tary co-operation and direct democracy.
^ The society which emerges mciy be much
. ..as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes
piAuredH^lt /9^be based on smallerscale decentralised communities? for
otherwise such arrangements as com
munity replacement of State welfare ar
rangements, control of their environ
ment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas,
and participatory democracy, will w(?rk
less satisfactorily. Communities
.be
federated and control will be bottom-up,
not merely by representation and subject
to a downward system of command.__
Within each community there will hot be
great discrepancies in the distribution of
weakh and property, ar^p hi^^ycom
centrated economic powercommum
ty win be a rather equaiitarian group,
sharing in much that is communally
owned or not owned at a!i.
White theoretical arguments heip
outtine the generat shape of social, ami
aiso economic arrangements,they
determine^them compietety; they offer
no detaited btueprint. Accordingty what
emerges is not a particular form of anar
chism, for instance anarchist com
munism, but a more experinienta^an.^
p/ura/bhc anarchism, such as was^tnstituted in the Spanish cokectives.
traced/
\^^There are several recognised varieties of anarchism among the more common:
individualistic anarchisms, anarcho-capitalisms, anarcho-communisms, mutualisms, anarcho-
syndicalisms, libertarian socialisms, social anarchisms, and now eco-anarchisms. These
varieties are not particularly well-characterised, /hey are by no means at all exclusive. So far
indeed a satisfactory classification is lacking. Usually something of a ragbag is offered:
textbooks single out a very few varieties, and look at them. Invariably they leave out important
varieties.
But it is not difficult to discern some of the more independent dimensions^ along which
variation occurs, and which accordingly are relevant to an improved multi-dimensional tabular
classification:
Parf-w/zo/g/ dimension:
atomism pole O <— individual ----
social
----
communal
—> O total holism
This is a most important dimension of variation among organisational arrangements (for
analysis see SM). It accounts for a major bifpriation between European anarchisms, which tend
...
.
1
'S^
to be socially oriented, and American anarchism^ which are usually highly individual (religious
communities^ some European transplants/ excepted). For markedly holistic arrangements to
persist, some strong ideological relational glue appears required, such as an immersing spiritual
ideology.
Properly spectrum:
Although this can be compressed into two dimensional form, it is better presented three
dimensionally as follows:
full
privatization
—> O full public
(tribal) ownership
no ownership
This spectrum evidently connects with the preceding holistic dimension, and both contribute to
what was the old right-left political division (a sort of crude super-position), and to what should
be superseding it, three-colour political spectrum:
(old right) blue
<------------------------ .--------------------------- >
red (old left)
green (new environmental)
Group Jectwon and electoral spectrum:
fully
O <- bottom up — democratic —y oligopolistic — top down
participatory
C/umge procedure dimensions:
^violent
-*
O fully
dictatorial
constitutional <------------------------- —---------------------------------- > non-constitutional
pacific
5
Some of these "dimensions" are not really h'wear in the way strictly required. That they are not, and that
they are not fully independent, does not impede a much improved classification.
22
CTtangc mmai/ors': vanguard group or class;
<—
Lumpen-proletariat—workers
*
syndicates
bottom
"the people"
political
parties
business ---companies
top
alternative
ccylitions
a/
And so on. The schema presented are clearly far from exhaustive; nothing has been directly
included concerning distribution methods (market vs command, open vs closed storehouses,
etc.), admissible technology, or work-leisure arrangements, to take three important examples.
More pieces will be picked up as we proceed (the approximate number of dimensions is
computationally small), and some of the rather schematic sketches ventured above, elements of
which should be familiar, will receive some development in what follows^ Once the (n)
dimensions are duly elaborated an anarchism can be located and classified (pidgeon-holed in n-
space) by placement in sach dimension. For instance, the form of anarchism preferred by me
(s<$SM for an early presentation),[But one sort never to be^instituted everywhere/rom a riciT'
<L. variety of altematie^s located as follows: it is social (with a significantly qualified communistic
safety net: each according to her or his basic needs),' market-oriented but non-capitalistic, with
diminished ownership, democratic but without politicians and with alternative electoral
arrangements, pacific but not bound by "constitutional" procedures, utilizing modest safe
technologies, ....
There are then many anarchisms, a rich variety of different forms, some of them scarcely
investigated or known. That anarchism comprises such a plurality has proved puzzling to those
(for example of one name-one thing persuasion) who assumed it must be a single ideology,
either individual or collective,.... Indeed the pluralist character of anarchism has led even more
apparently sympathetic critics, to 'wonder whether anarchism is really an ideology at all, or
merely a jumble of beliefs
(M, p.3). Of course the impression that anarchism 'is amorphous
and full of paradoxes and contradictions' is marvellously assisted by conflating degenarchism
with anarchism, chaos with order, and by combining the variant forms, individualism with
socialism and communism. By properly regarding anarchism as a sheaf of overlapping
positions assembled around a core characterisation, a standard model for pluralism, the
problematic elements of anarchism as an ideology disappear. No doubt it is not an ideology like
Marxism, but then Marxism is atypical in its set of paradigmatic texts, concentrated in the works
of the master. Other ideologies such as liberalism or environmentalism afford better
comparisons. While anarchism is an ideology (in both good and bad senses), it is not really a
movement. There is not, anywhere really, such a movement, in the way there have been a
succession of liberation movements or there is a green ^deep ecology^movement.
9
2 : . /
A
/f
7
z^4-v^-
/i
cY&v-e, Insofar a^ anarchism is duly based on removal of unacceptable means, it
should be
* pluralistic, because for example it cannot impose a single formulation on communities who
want to organise differently thatiits preferred way.
* non-violent. Terrorist forms of anarchism are strictly incompatible with broad-based non
coercion. For terrorism typically involves coercion, stand-over tactics, and the like/
That is, there is a doublish standard on violence: It is alright to apply violence against
state (and others) while not alright to have coercive state, which applies violence. No doubt
this can be justified through cgoLwr namely OK for me to do violence to you but not OK for
you to apply violence to me. Accordingly tentative conc/MMon is: A moral anarchism will not
be a form committed to violence Except unavoidable forms etc.
Such pluralism does not enjoy a strong historic track-record, and does not go
unopposed. Standard anarchist positions, sketching of which was mainly a nineteenth
century preoccupation (but extending into twentieth century science fiction and utopian
literature), shied away from pluralism in the direction of monistic forms, towards
insistence upon particular structure, organisation and distributional methods. Such
monistic rigidity led to much intense, often fruitless discussion and friction between
anarchists committed to different arrangements. Certainly there was a doctrine of
spontaneity — according to which in a state-overthrowing revolution (in the very heat of
the revolution!) the masses world spontaneously decide upon new arrangements — which
makes it appear that any structures at all were open for consideration; but it was also
assumed that certain arrangements would be selected, towards which active anarchists
would provide guidance.
It is not difficult to indicate some of the broad features of emergent arrangemens
features that flow from the character of anarchism. But anarchists, over-attracted like
others to monistic schemes, have regularly attempted to advance their own schemes,
introducing many further postulates, that reach far beyond what flows from the basic
characterisation, and that need not be adopted by genuine anarchistics (some further
examples of optional and rejectable extras from a recent manifesto:... direct democracy,
destruction of all hierarchies, maximization of freedom, total Revolution, no ends-means
distinction, no leaders, optimism about an anarchist future,...).
23
Because of the expansive pluralism of anarchism, it overlaps many other ideologies,
indeed all that do not include as a theme unmitigated commitment to a state or like central
authority. Thus while anarchism excludes fascism and is incompatible with state capitalism,
anarchism overlaps liberalism, democracy, and even Marxism, since Marxism affords a long
term anarchism. There has been much confusion about these interrelations. Take democracy.
Anarchism does not entail democracy, as is sometimes claimed. Advice of a select minority or
of a^sage could regularly be adopted, though the advice did not reflect the will of the people and
its source was not elected or appointed by the people. Nor does anarchism entail undemocratic
procedures. There are, in the plurality, democratic forms, of various sorts, and undemocratic
forms. Democratic forms may have a better prospect of enabling genuine democracy than life
under the state. For as some have argued, 'both the nation state and electoral democracy are
inadequate as vehicles for democracy under modem conditions' (Bumheim p.218).
Is its goal individual freedom or communal solidarity? Sometimes one, sometimes the
other, sometimes neither, sometimes both (a typical four-valued logical structure). A pluralistic
anarchism offers several different sorts of communities, not just one kind: for instance,
independent individuals, perhaps interrelated and organised through contracts, solidaristic
groups working freely together and sharing according to need, and various attractive
intermediaries, where there may be more individual-oriented market arrangements but there are
also safety nets ensuring distribution according to basic needs.
It is not difficult in theory to devise structures that allow a wide variety of kinds. For
example, in simple cases this can be accomplished through regional patterning, as illustrated
with 6 varieties.
(Such a modelling for political pluralism is further elaborated in UT.) The brief interlude of
anarchism in Spain afforded a small-scale example of regional patterning at work
The kinds of anarchistic societies are bound to be of very variable quality, both
theoretically and in practice. Some will only work with rather special sorts of people, for
instance certain Answers with members with strong religious or ideological commitments; some
will not succeed at all. Some verge on incoherence, for instance those against coercive
organistions that approve group terrqist tactics. But while some kinds of anarchism are
entangled in serious problems, others are not. Anarchists generally have no obligation to
defend defective kinds; yet many criticisms of anarchism are directed at just such defective
forms.
Although there is a rich variety of anarchistic end-states (virtually uninstantiated
) f
/-I'y e
24
or
1^-
*rc!
n
possibilities), there are^ common organisational and structural features. Such cluster features are
A
J
what hold the plurality together, and include noncoercive versions of those arrangements
essential to a functioning society: for instance, broad features of arrangements for production
and distribution, for arbitration and reconciliation, and so on, and on. But although each such
anarchist society will have such organizational features, they will differ in detail. For example,
a main distributional feature of a simple communist society may comprise a common
storehouse from which members take according to need, whereas in individualist societies
distribution will normally proceed through some sort of exchange in market systems. MoK
(
generally different types of anarchism will offer different economic theories. Those with
stronger individualistic component will tend to rely upon not merely market or allied exchange
arrangements, but upon capitalistic organisation. The type of anarchism favoured here strikes
an intermediate route: markets without capitalism.
How is such complex organisation to be achieved without a state? Does not such
organisation and government require a state? To remove that familiar assumption and
associated blockages - encouraged by too much life under states and no experience of
alternatives - take a wider look around. Look at how many activities and procedures are
organised without states or essential participation of states. By voluntary arrangements.
Prominent examples are again sporting organisations, labour unions and business corporations
of various sorts. In short, organisation can be accomplished through a range of appropriate
institutions.
Such examples also provide the appropriate key unlocking the door as to how more
extensive organisation can be achieved in the absence of the state, namely through appropriate
institutions. The state dissolves into functioning components, a set of appropriate institutions,
and at bottom into its relevant minimization. It fragments into compartments - in two
interconnected ways: into regional parts and into capacities, functional parts.
There are other valuable clues to stateless reorganisation. What happens within the more
self-regulating state can also happen without it. As Gramsci emphasized,
the ability to govern without overt coercion depends largely on the ability of
those in power to exploit systems of belief that the larger population shares.
The nature of that system of belief is to some extent determinable by policy
makers, since in the modern state they possess a significant ability to
propagandize for their view. Yet.... (p.63).
Recent empirical investigations tend to yield similar results. People tend to follow rules and
obey laws they regard as moral or otherwise satisfactory. There are important messages for
anarchistic organisation here also, for arrangements without coercion, overt or other.
Anarchistic rules will try to go with the prevailing flow, and will only vary (as over vindictive
punishment) where an evidently satisfactory justification can be given. More generally, smarter
anarchistic arrangements will aim to include desirable self-regulating systems, such as small-
/<?
25
scale markets.
t
There are too many alternatives in the pluralistic basket to look at all of them. Let us
consider only some of them, with however preferred features. (An example that does not rank
highly and will not be further assessed is Stirner's individualism.) Anarchistic societies of any
complexity will typically consist of a network of decentralised organisations, or a federation of
these (etc.). The organisations will thus be regional, but beyond that set up according to issue,
role or function.
Thus they will include what might well be accounted ecoregiona/
Many of the stock features of political functionalism, as decentralised, will
accordingly recur, separation of powers, tailoring of administration to need, for instance. The
organisations will furthermore be noncoercive; no individual or group will be forced to join.
Typically they will be voluntary arrangements.
A critical question is-to how these organisations, substitudng for the operation of state, are
to be controlled, regulated, and so on. In much favoured democratic structures, such as
electoral bureaucracies, control is usually weak and remarkably tnJtrecf. A populace weakly
selects a central parliament, which exercises through other bureaucratic bodies some control of
state organisations. A full anarchism is obliged to dissolve or substitute for central parliaments.
It has a obvious option, namely direct democratic control of state-substituting organisations. A
simple way of achieving this is through sortition: the membership of the governing component
of each organisation is chosen randomly from those qualified of the regional community who
volunteer to be on it. In some cases volunteers may require accessible qualifications (e.g.
having served before at a lower level), and avoid disqualifications (e.g. having acquired a
disqualifying record).6 Where the community decides that certain categories of people should be
represented, for instance disabled, minorities, and so forth, then it is a matter of arranging
random selection of the required fraction of group numbers from these categories. This style of
statistical democracy dates back at least to original democracies of Greek city states where public
officials were sometimes selected by lot (it is discussed under democracy in Aristotle's P<?/iric.y).
Nowadays it is called t/gwarcAy (a term with an unfortunate prior meaning); here in its
anarchistic form it will be alluded to under the neologism dewanarcAy.
Such demanarchy has the immediate virtue of removing a most expensive duplication,
government ministers and their departmental counterparts (e.g. finance ministers and
corresponding appointed treasury officials). Indeed, the whole charade of central parliamentary
6
People can serve their administrative apprenticeship at local or group levels. One when they are adjudged
to have exhibited sufficient competence here are they entitled to nominate for selection at grander levels.
This is one reasonable way of obtained some quality control in selection of administrators. (Note /gve/^ do
not provide a vicious hierarchy.)
A""
—H
Though there are many different strands that can be interwoven through the
pluralistic out-fall from the basic characterisation, there are some broad tendencies of
anarchistic arrangement which include:
*
reliance on self-regulatory methods of organisation that require little or no
intervention, as opposed to highly regulated procedures, perhaps tending towards
centralism
or
paternalism.
This is one reason why markets are favoured, analogues of centralised control and
coercive legal systems are not.
* emphasis on voluntary methods, in place of imposed methods - coercive methods are
of course excluded by virtue of basic characterisation. Certainly de facto power may
remain, but it will be without justification.
* favouring of decentralisation and deconcentration rather than centralised or
concentrated structures.
That does not imply there can be no downward relations. Of course under federal
arrangements there will be, and sideways natural relations as well (a full control
system).
* discouragement of empowerment, encouragement of depowerment.
* opposition to oppression is a corollary.
26
government, ministers and hordes of minders, governments and replicating opposition teams, is
duly removed — as it has to be under non-centralization. Such parliamentary centres are
.
....
eliminated; insofar as anything replaces them, it is the dispersed community, no centre, which is
directly linked to functional organisation.
Gone with the centre, or seriously reduced, are several standard political worries, such as
those of coup or take-over, insurrection or invasion. These usually involve capturing the centre
and its command structure, no longer there to capture (for there is no command or control
structure that could be taken by an invador or with internal insurrection). Community defence is
thereby rendered much easier. Also considerably reduced is the standard problem of who
controller is the community (one of the advantages of more direct democracy).
Appropriate institutions take care then of the day-to-day running of community affairs.
But what of major issue decisions, changes of direction or structure? These can be
accomplished from the bottom, through referenda, propositions and the like (with public
assessment organised through a suitably independent college), rather than in present top-down
inflexible fashion. (Some of these methods, of which there is worthwhile experience in parts of
Europe, are investigated in Wolff.)
A regular early question is how such a stateless structure is to be financed
coecive
mechanisms available. Of course if coercive institutions were in place, then the overall structure
could be financed in the sorts of ways that states are presently financed. It should be observed,
in any case, that coercive means are very rarely resorted to (unless the target is pursued for otAgr
reasons, such as crime) in order to obtain revenue payments from wealthy corporations, firms or
individuals, from where in a more equitable community much of the funding would derive (by
contrast with most present states). There are several parts to a satisfactory answer:* AfMcA less public revenue would be required because the most expensive, most wasteful, and
least productive components of state have been excised. These include the whole apparatus of
central government and electoral politics, and the associated system of coercion, standard
military forces and defense establishment, espionage framework, and police forces, prison
establishment and expensive courts. -—
Nonetheless there remain many institutions to finance, include smaller substitutes for some of
the abolished structures (e.g. social defence arrangements).
* Many institutions can be largely or entirely self-financing, because like customs and import
organisation^ they collect revenue, or through fair user-pays principles. Reasonable returns
taken can be channelled to an independent revenue office with no outside spending or
redistribution powers.
* Much, if not all, further social revenue could be raised through resources taxation (adequate
royalties and the like), rental taxes on property or leases, gift and gains taxes, and through
auctions (of previously inherited goods). How this would work depends upon community
arrangements.
Consider for instance anarchistic arrangements where that problematic item, private
property, has not been instituted or has been abolished (as under main examples of European
anarchism, by contrast with North American forms). Valuable durables (roughly, any durable
worth stealing for sale in present systems) will be renfed instead of bought. Leasehold systems
can be operated very like private property (as the land system in the Australian Capital Territory
reveals)^facilitating market operations, but they offer significantly better control, for instance
environmentally, they enable the social component of generated wealth to be reflected, through a
rental, and they can be of finite term and to a given individual, so inheritance transfer is
excluded. In place of the customary land titles office a larger durables office with subdivision
for types of durables would be instituted, with each durable now indelibly marked or described.
(Here, as with referenda, computing facililies remove many previous obstacles to such
developments. Organisation can move with newer technologies.
Leasehold arrangements are readily applied to prevent the accumulation of scarce property
resources, such as urban land, which is a major feature of capitalism. For leases of scarce
commodities can be allocated according to need and ability to use, not merely through a
historically rooted market distribution as with private property. It is private property, not a
market system of distribution, that is really distinctive of capitalism, since it not only provides a
place to park and increase capital, but it enables transmission of accumulated wealth (e.g. within
a family or dynasty) and control of the means of production.
CZ
4^? y
and SwiaMness
7^4
,^.
y?e
A^.V<
c. 4^^
*
^AAv^A
A^
r4A
7^?/-
/
z-
yy^fA,
^Tz- A y
. yy
r/At- Ac
x' 4- z A^.
A^
^-A.
AzA
/A^'A
xA.A^
z^^-^-xxAA/
Aa A ^//x/---?
-—
/^c
has become fashionable/^ince th^oncurrent anthropological findings concerning
small communities and the collective action results concerning small collectives demolished the
assumption that anarchy
impossible, t& concede that anarchy is possible but only where
there is a suitable small community.
/Az'
-
A
//
/X
<_y
'
y
'A,,'
'
/
//
^
y
/
.
/
,y,
.. .
^_
—y/-
Zf
..J.
/
/z,
y
y-
7
/
a—
- sort of anarchism in-the-small has been forcefully
pursued by Taylor, who contends that 'anarchy is viable to the extent that the relations between
people are those which are characteristic of community', a small community (p.166). That is:
... community is necawa/y — if people are to live without the state' (p.3).
The argument to community that Taylor offers reduces a modified Hobbesipnism; social
order can oly be maintained, without the state and in the small, if the relations between
individuals are those of community (cf p.2). Insofar as it is detailed, it is a remarkably brokeddown argument. As Taylor himself helps to show, 'the liberal justification of the state' - from
the failure of individuals in a large public to voluntarily cooperate to provide themselves without
requisite collective goods - breaks down at every critical point, in its premisses, in its
argument, and in its concluding inference to the state was the on/y means of ensuring the
supply of such goods (p.59).
It is this final lacuna onto which Taylor latches. Granting the rest, 'all that can be inferred
is that, if public goods are to be provided, jowc means must be found of getting people to do
their part in providing them' (p.59). There are, Taylor swiftly finds, three pure methods of
ensuring provision of the goods in question: the state, the market, and the community. The
argument then proceeds by elimination, of the market. Taylor 'contends that social order
cannot satisfactorily be put on the market' (p.2), though his arguments to this contention are far
from decisive. That leaves the state for public larger than communities, and communitarian
anarchism as an extra-terrestial possibility for small communities (because communities in the
vicinity of states do not, it is claimed, survive). For all the talk about anarchism^it looks like
another triumph for the state.
&t the argument is unsound, because there are other methods than those Taylor locates.
Non-statist organisation, which comes in a range of forms^ is not a combination of the pure
methods considered. As a broad type of method it is hardly "unproposed", or without
precedents or examples (e.g. medieval orders and present international order).
7^
A
er
C
4
!/V
[1] p.3O Important among these practices are resistance movements and organised
refusals (preferably without conspicuous leaders). While individuals can be selectively picked
off, enough people well organsed cannot. As a result grand refusals could be significant
political happenings.
[3] p.4? The practice of anarchism, generously construed, naturally includes the state of
being in anarchist conditions, of living under anarchism (though perhaps unaware). There is
cope for anarchism without doctrine. Many primitive societies thus qualify on anarchistic; they
practice, or practiced, anarchism though unaware (somewhat as wild animals practice hygine).
Further, no doubt now stretching 'practice' beyond its assumed anthropic context, many animal
communities practice anarchism. Many attracted ^anarchism, an anarchism without name
even, long for analogous pure practice.^ Th^ hope that whatever it is ill operate, perhps even
materilize, without any heave-
ithouteness or e
any intellectualizing, perhaps
without even thought or much ef
on their part. In contemporary circumstances they would
thave to be extrordinary lucky (a paternal state with caring elements, such as safe jobs and
spoon-fed indoctrinal education for all citizens, does not relinquish its control voluntarily).
[4] #awan Harare. This is a theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious
/refprious, social and political purposes. Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort to
force various restrictive types of social arrangements, archie ones (including defence focus,
standing armies, survellience etc.)
[5] about p.20 (connector^
Present minolithic governments have assumed far too many roles, for many of which
they are not competent, ffom some of wlpdrihey are disqualified by other roles (e.g. as
impartial referees by ^h^r/businessjsofnmitments). Because the centre tries to do and control
too much, as a consequenc$4tdoes very much unsatisifactorily. Improved arrangements would
separate these roles, deconcentrating and decentralizing power.
[6] p.30. As^?ovemmenr is variably determinable, so also is /aw. Under the main
determinate, law is incompatible with anarchism. But under a different determinate, there is no
incompatibility.
Anarchism cannot traffic in law, in the initial and prominent sense of /aw offered in the
OED, namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority', imposed by authority and
characteristically backed up by coercion, it may be added. To some extent counter reducing this
prognastication is a'second sense of 'law' (the third comprises 'scientific and philosophical
uses'): namely 'without reference to an external commanding authority'.
Law deservedly has a tarnished reputation in anarchism.
Most of it is arcane,
administered by an expensive priesthood. Too often it is an oppression tool of the state.
While anarchism is hostile to such law, and incompatable with heavy authoritarian law, it
is in no way opposed to rules, to regulations, to conventions of freely asserted to lists, and so
on.
[7] Democracy within ANARCHY, and DEMANARCHY
Present electoral arrangements offer what? What presently have is a competative game
between competating blocks of the ruling elite (with professional power-brokers who trade with
each other their patronage and cites/br the acclaimed right to govern.
Thus elections hardly represent a genuine expression of agreement by the populace to be
governed; rather they are occasions when the populace is duped into supporting one or other
elite team.
For the most part power is concentrated in organisations which are not elected, not
controlled by the people effected by their contractions and not representative.
By and large, satisfactory democratic arrangements will not be participatory (see
Burnheim).
are valuable for limited purposes, viz. as /a// bacty. B argues that they are not
satisfactory in general (p.91). There is no need to dissent.
Mows 1. Encourage those without interest in, or not genuinely affected by issue not to vote.
2. only structural, not material issues to refs. Certainly not material moral issues, for
instance, not capital punishment, not abortion.
Dgwarc/ty has the wrong etymology and the wrong meaning for anarchist purposes. It
means 'the office of a demarch [a president, chief magistrate, major or governnorj; a popular
government. The municipal body of a modern Greek commune' (OED). Anarchism recognises
no chiefs or leaders, even democratic ones or demogogues. What can be done very simply,
however, is to enlarge the word by a simple important syllable 'an', giving Jcwa/MrAy.
[8] [after authority, coercion.
To coerce is maintain or change state, normaliy of another creature, by force.
Re Chap 4) Insofar as anarchism is duly based on removal of unacceptable means, it
should be
* pluralistic, because for example it cannot impose a single formulation on communities who
want to organise differently that its preferred way.
* non-violent. Terrorist forms of anarchism are strictly incompatibile with broad-based non
coercion. For terrorism typically involves coercion, stand-over tactics, and the like.
That is, there is a doublish standard on vio/ence: It is alright to apply violence against
state (and others) while not alright to have coercive state, which applies violence. No doubt this
can be justified through ggoi-sw: namely OK for me to do violence to you but not OK for you to
apply violence to me. Accordingly afentadve
is: A moral anarchism will not be a
form committed to violence - except unavoidable forms etc.
[9]
anJ Smallness
It has become fashionable, since the concurrent anthropological finalings concerning
small communities and the collective action results concerning small collectiyes demolisted the
assumption that anarchy was impossible, to concede that anarchy is possible but only where
there is a suitable small community. This sort of anarchism in-the-small has been forcefully
pursued by Taylor, who contends that 'anarchy is viable to the extent that the relations between
people are those which are characteristic of community', a small community (p.166). That is:
... community is necessary - if people are to live without the state' (p.3).
The argument to community that Taylor offeysreduces a modified Hobbesionism; social
order can oly be maintained, without the st^te and in the small, if the relations between
individuals are those of community (cf p.2L lnsofar as it is detailed, it is a remarkably brokeddown argument. As Taylor himself helps to show, 'the liberal jusdfication of the state' - from
the failure of individuals in a large public to voluntarily cooperate to provide themselves without
requisite collective goods - brdaks down at every critical point, in its premisses, in its
argument, and in its concluding inference to the state was the on/y means of ensuring the supply
of such goods (p.59).
It is this final lacuna onto which Taylor latches. Granting the rest, 'all that can be inferred
is that, if public goods are to be provided, some means must be found of getting people to do
their part in providing them' (p.59). There are, Taylor swiftly finds, three pure methods of
ensuring provision of the goods in question: the state, the market, and the community. The
argument then proceeds by elimination, of the market. Taylor 'contends that social order cannot
satisfactorily be put on the market' (p.2), though his arguments to this contention are far from
14
e
OF
/
7
One
appalling
mes from a Russi
icrionary
that is hostile to all
-bourgeours socio-political tr
authority a
e, and counterpasses ' intere^s of petty private
ownersbib and small
ant economy to
progress of^ociety based on
large-scale production
v, 2nd revision
s, Progress,
bsever, 1989).
^nether-dismal-eharaeterisati
[4]
scientistIfApter).
narurg. This is a theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious
reforious, social and political purposes. Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort to
.v(0
force various restrictive types of social arrangements, archie ones [including defence focus,
standing armies, survellience etc.)
*[5FabouFpT2O-(G0miect0f)
Present\p^nolithic governments have assumed far too many roles, for many of which
they are not co
etent, from some of which they are disqualified by other roles (e.g. as
KHLI Ut
impartial referees by\[ieir business commitments). Because the centre tries to do and epntro
too much, as a conseque
it does very much unsatisifactofily. Improve
tents wouldl
.separate these roles, deconcen^ating and decentralizing power.
[7] Democracy within ANARCHY, and DEMANARCHY
Present electoral arrangements offer what? What presently have is a competative game
between competating blocks of the ruling elite (with professional power-brokers who trade with
each other their patronage and citesybr the acclaimed right to govern.
Thus elections hardly represent a genuine expression of agreement by the populace to be
governed; rather they are occasions when the populace is duped into supporting one or other
elite team.
For the most part power is concentrated in organisations which are not elected, not
controlled by the people effected by their contractions and not representative.
By and large, satisfactory democratic arrangements will not be participatory (see
Burnheim).
o
— /^W/
6'J
n /
/I
15
7?^/<?rc/!^Az are valuable for limited purposes, viz. as /<
*/// /?ocA.s'. B argues that they are not
satisfactory in general (p.91). There is no need to dissent.
Moray 1. Encourage those without interest in, or not genuinely affected by issue not to vote.
2. only structural, not material issues to refs. Certainly not material moral issues, for
instance, not capital punishment, not abortion.
Z)^marc/ty has the wrong etymology and the wrong meaning for anarchist purposes. It
means the office of a demarch [a president, chief magistrate, major or govemnor]; a popular
government. The municipal body of a modem Greek commune' (OED). Anarchism recognises
no chiefs or leaders, even democratic ones or demogogues. What can be done very simply,
however, is to enlarge the word by a simple important syllable 'an', giving
IM) A
*
*
Chapter 8A
ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
AND OF A PREFERRED THEORY
There are many preliminaries. One, like preparing a badly used building site, consists in
removing the rubbish. That of course is but the beginning of philosophy, not the sole content
and end, as some zealous followers of Lockejhave supposed.
1. Issues in appalling methodology.
Many of the prevailing sins of philosophy are writ large in political philosophy, i Bad
practices abound; anarchism has suffered particularly as a result.
Redefinitions, and
redefinitional stratagems to try to close gappy arguments, abound. Large assumptions are
imported and regularly used, without due notice, or too often any awareness: particularly
pernicious are those of individualism and atomism, and of thoroughgoing egoism. It hardly
needs stressing that such assumptions are environmentally unfriendly, at best.
False
dichotomies abound. And so on. Among the deleterious practices, several deserve special
mention:
* 7%#/
o/
There is a deeply embedded in modern
mainstream intellectual activity and strikingly manifest in political theory. A general feature of
contemporary thought, as of much contemporary technology and practice, is that of over
powering or of excessive strength. The phenomenon, as exhibited in contemporary mainstream
logic, where it shows up in excessive assumptions, and principles more powerful than reason
can justify, is dis-assessed elsewhere (from the perspective of relevant logic, in RLR). Some of
the same unwarranted assumptions, notably those of invariant consistency and maximization,
reach far beyond stock logical theory to apply, so it is regularly claimed, to all rational practice,
including political decision-making and institutional arrangements (see MR).
Analogous features are incorporated in many of the arguments against anarchism. For
example, it is argued that anarchism cannot realise optimal delivery of public goods, ideal
conditions for this or that (e.g. free market functioning, capital formation and flow), and so on.
Not only do other alternatives not measure up to these standards (certainly prevailing
arrangements fall very far short), the standards themselves are quite excessive. Instead it is
enough that certain sorts of adequacy standards are met, that reasonable thresholds are
1
One reason is that much of it is done by political
thinking.
with no adequate grounding tn logic or
/'
m we/Ttoi/o/ogy. Many of the prevailing sins of philosophy are writ large in political
*
philosophy.
Redefinitions, and redefinitional otologies to try to close gappy arguments,
abound. Large assumptions are imported and regularly used, without due notice, or too often
any awareness: particularly pernicious are those of individualism and atomism, and of
thoroughgoing egoism. It hardly needs stressing that such assumptions are environmentally
unfriendly, at best.
P/tcno/ncnon o/
* excessive strength. There is a deeply embedded in modern mainstream
intellectual activity and strikingly manifest in political theory.
A general feature of contemporary thought, as of much contemporary technology and
practice, is that of over-powering or of excessive strength. The phenomenon, as exhibited in
contemporary mainstream logic, where it shows up in excessive assumptions, and principles
more powerful than reason can justify, is disassesed elsewhere (from the perspective of relevant
logic, in RLR). Some of the same unwarranted assumptions, notably those of invariant
consistency and maximization, reach far beyond stock logical theory to apply, so it is regularly
claimed, to all rational practice, including political decision making and obstitutional
arrangements (see MR).
Analogous features are incorporated in many of the arguments against anarchism. For
example, it is argued that anarchism cannot realise optimal delivery of public goods, ideal
conditions for this or that (e.g. free market functioning, capital formation and flow), and so on.
Not only do other alternatives not measure up to these standards (certainly prevailing
arrangements fall very far short), the standards themselves are quite excessive. Instead it is
enough that certain sorts of adequacy standards are met, that reasonable thresholds are
achieved. There is a most important corollary: that arguments against anarchism or anarchistic
institutional arrangement which assume maximizing principles or the like (as are presumed in
Prisimers Dilemma arguments, game theory, mainstream economics, etc.) are flowed from the
very outset, and should be set aside.
A central time in anarchism offers a somewhat different display of the excess
phenomenon. The issue concerns alleged justifications of the state, or state-like institutions.
Here all that reason and argument appear to warrant are much less powerful institutions, not
arrangements with the excessive powers of the state. To close the gap between what argument
and practice appear,to justify and what the state claims, some opportunistic intellectuals have
1
One reason is that much of it is done by poiiticai szds with no adequate grounding in logic or critical
thinking.
tried, rather......... to redefine the state. But such low redefinitions, while imposing states on
societies that operated without them, leaves the contemporary state besereft of adequate
justification. In brief, such intellectual strategies lead from the frying pan to the fire.
So it is similarly with institutions within the state, such as property and law. Reason and
argument do not justify state property arrangements, only an opportunistically redefined
"property" which does not fulfil the same state and capitalistic role. Similarly with law and state
legal systems.
ON DEFINING ANARCHISM DEFINITIONS OF ANARCHISM
One characterisation that is utterly appalling comes from a Russian Dictionary of
PAi/<9^o/?Ay:
'Anarc&i.wn, a petty-bourgeours socio-political trend that is hostile to all
authority and the state, and counterpasses the interests of petty private
ownership and small peasant economy to the progress of society based on
large-scale production' (ed I. Frolov, 2nd revision eds, Progress,
Plosever, 1989).
Another dismal characterisation comes from an American political scientist (Apter).
Defective definitions of anarchism abound, many supplied by high profile anarchists
(whereupon they assume a certain air of authority, a bogus air). A few examples will be
considered, mostly drawn from a large list of similarly defective definitions included in Clark,
p.ll8ff., who is out to show that any definition which attempts to do justice to anarchism
through an assentialistic definition deploying one simple idea is bound to fail, abysmally.
AnarcAy does not "mean literally "without government'" contrary to Caster p.14. It does
however imply without governments of prevailing cuts which is what the immediately proceeds
to: 'and the lowerst common demominstor of anarchist thought is the conviction that existing
forms of government are productive of wars, internal violence, repression and misery' (p.14).
Right on!
The very short characterisation of anarc/iAy/?? (and redition of anarc/taj) as 'no *
government'is defective because of the elosticity, and slippiness of 'government'. For
example, according to one dictionary (Dniverya/ E/tg/Bh) govern/ytenr means '... system of
polity in a state; territory ruled by a governor ...' in which case it fy incompatible with
Thus, e.g. Carter, Websters (?).
2
achieved. There is a most important corollary: that arguments against anarchism or anarchistic
institutional arrangement which assume maximizing principles or the like (as are presumed in
Prisoners Dilemma arguments, game theory, mainstream economics, etc.) are flawed from the
very outset, and should be set aside.
A central issue in anarchism offers a somewhat different display of the excess
phenomenon. The issue concerns alleged justifications of the state, or state-like institutions.
Here all that reason and argument appear to warrant are much less powerful institutions, not
arrangements with the excessive powers of the state. To close the gap between what argument
and practice appear to justify and what the state claims, some opportunistic intellectuals have
tried, rather deviously, to redefine the state. But such low redefinitions, while imposing states
on societies that operated without them, leaves the contemporary state bereft of adequate
justification. In brief, such intellectual strategies lead from the frying pan to the fire.
So it is similarly with institutions within the state, such as property and law. Reason and
argument do not justify state property arrangements, only an opportunistically redefined
"property" which does not fulfil the same state and capitalistic role. Similarly with law and state
legal systems.
* Htg/t anJ low
Wolffs little book, billed as "a defence of anarchism" is a
small treasury of these. Virtually all the characterisations proposed at the beginning of this
book, of state, sovereignty, authority, power, actomomy, are defective, often by virtue of
definitional features. Consider Wolffs opening:
'Politics is the exercise of the power of the state, or the attempt to influence that exercise.
Political philosophy is therefore ... the philosophy of the state' (p.3 also p.ll). Politics went
on before the rise of the state, and with some good fortune, will persist often its demise.
Again, consider: 'the state is a group of persons who have or exercise suppose authority within
a given territory' (p3; repeated p.5). This shows the fallacy of redirectionism. For a state
normally does not change when those who exercise power do. On the de facto state Wolff is
also astray: 'a & Jacio state is simply a state whose subjects believe it to be ligitimate (i.e. really
to have the authority it claims for itself)' (p.10). Many subjects may nor believe that, but be
intimidated through state power. Very fashionable in removing anarchism are low redefinitions
of Ftare, where there is a state given any positional components in society, such as political
specialisation or division of labour (see Taylor on anthopoligical efforts on societies without
states). As a result there can be effortessly be both anarchy and "state"; any complex anarchist
society is a state!
Another rich source of redefinitions is founded by Taylor's books on anarchism.
Examples include: a fairly hopeless definition of gooJ.' it is desired (p.45). Most interesting is a
3
disgustingly low redefinition of property.- 'Property' is here a shorthand for a variety of
entilements or use rights (Taylor 82 p.44). So as I am entitled to use the byway or to bathe in
the stream, they are my property, so I run them? Another example concerns coercion: In the
claim that to avoid the Hobbesian prisoners' dilemma 'every man must be coerced', Taylor
continues (87 p. 145), 'by which I mean simply that he must be made to behave differently than
he otherwise would (... (i.e.) would "ovlantarily" in the state of nature).' But such a difference
may be effectively achieved, depending on the subject, by noncoercive means, such as
persassion, sanctions, and so forth. Furthermore it would not guarantee what Taylor and
Hobbes appear to expect, authority and sovereignty.
Among the most pernicious of redefinitions, constraints, and elides are those concerning
interests and preferences - often reduction bases for gooJ and other value qualities, often
quickly converted from interest to self-interest (thus Taylor)^ Examples from within this circle
include harmony and cooperation.
For instance.'Harmony requires complete identity of
interests' (in Ope, p.226). It hardly requires comment. Again '...cooperation occurs when
actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others (in Ope p.226).
But suppose creatures simply work or act together (what 'cooperation' means).
psychological accounts are seriously astray.
* ZHc%#%MnoMS
or ctf^cr-or-M/n.
Such
Humans are extraordinarily addicted to
flawed dichotomous reasoning, again powerfully exhibited with regard to anarchism and the
state? For example, the alternative to the state is presumed to be anarchism which is equated
with disorder; so it is either the state or disorder. Again, the only alternative to a market system
of government is central control - market or control - and the market has won out decisively
now (one of the presumed reasons for the prematurely announced "end to ideology").
Other objectionable methodological assumptions include
'..Po.w&Mh'g mJzvo/aa/LSW (after McP p.3)
'Its possessive quality is its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own
person or capacities, owning nothing to society for them. The individual (is not)... part of a
larger..... whole, but... surer of himself.'
As a result:
'Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political socieity becomes a
celebrated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly
relation of exchange.'
2
3
The fallacious shifts are dealt with in 'Aquinst,
A famous Australian example is the truculent stance of its richest mum, Packer, in a parliamentary
inquiry: Either you believe me or call be a liar. Reflect on how far "call me a liar" goes beyond "you
do not believe me".
,
„
There should be some eodness^ that we are now trying to build machines in our own inadequate
image. (Many examples in SM).
4
(a prime example in economics: the data of extremality).
* /tM/nan
* g/fwn o/va/ne, or reduction of value to preference.
All of these have been crically assessed elsewhere. But some features deserve further
elaboration:
* f/tg
tAgo/y
With rule and compass techniques it is wn/MM.n&Zg to trirect angle. Of course by measuring it is
rather easy.
Similarly with rationality: wider means can do what state was supposed to be necessary for.
Put differently, the theoretical state is an artifact on a certain ultra-thin theory of rationality.
The thin theory of rationality is an extraordinarily widespread ideological....... among
Anglo-American social theorists (many of whom feel obliged to make public dealeraatous of
faith). But that it is 'almost universally taken for granted by economists' does nothing to show
its correctness, unless an argument from expectise has required a new validity. What it reveals
rather is something about the ideological commitments,...........of economists.
The thing theory of rationality is almost invariably coupled with individualism,
methodological individualism as it is usually cleverly called (after Popper's theorizing).^
Many of these objectionabl assumption are melted together in theories of /mman nafnrg.
Mafnrg, CM/tMrg anJconfro/.
Part of the intellectual aim of a theory of human nature is to achieve an account of hum^n
/motivation. But a uniform story of motivation is scarcely more likely drawn as uniform account
of human nature.^ Motivations are no doubt important; but they are many and various.
It is still fashionable to assert, as if it was a truism, that 'all political philosophies ... base
themselves upon a conception of human nature' (Wolff Povgrty p. 140, pluralised). That is no
longer so (certainly, since Foucault) is that the notion of //n/nnn nnturg is not well defined, and
never was except under high redefinitions.
Work in decqtralized artificial intelligence readily suggests that communities of robots
could operate without statist arrangements (nor need outiside imput be state bound). That
suggests in tum that it is something about humans, as many humans, that leads to development
or imposition of states. That something has been ascribed, rather too quickly, to human nature,
or to human culture, or to some mix of human genetypic and phenotypic features, features that
other creatures or artificial intelligences do not share. It is something peculiarly pertaining to
and special to humans, their nature or culture, that amends institutional control. But has never
been satisfactorily explained what these special features are or how they operate. There is much
space for total scepticism about such justificatory or apologetic approaches.
4
5
Taylor has a dreadful argumejpj (892 p.57) that people are agents, because otherewise default to
understand why so many goods and supplied (also 87 p.109).
The usual uniform story depends upon self inferey/, which is widened into mteresM under pressure.
5
2. Aa/Mrc, CM/tMro, awJ contra/.
A major function of culture is to regulate and control changed Political change in the
South Pacific, and political divergence from the industrial North, can, in principle then, be
grounded in and powered by features of local and regional culture. One organising theme, a
corollary of the argument, facilitates the transition from principle to practice:- It is that the
requisite elements are present in regional cultures, the potentiality is there, for the South Pacific
region (and Australia in particular) to proceed in a very different social political direction from
the North (and from the USA in particular). Given the radical unsatisfactoriness of the
American arrangements, in many frequently exposed respects,7 such a different direction is
worth taking — if it can be.
But a serious problem in the way of change is imposition of political arrangements, from
outside or from above. And, since imposition shades into political pressure, this is only one of
the obstacles impeding change in the South Pacific and elsewhere. Another forcing more and
more peoples, no longer sheltered by geographical isolation, into the same type of socio
political arrangements is supposed to derive from human nature itself. Free people are
economic people, in pretty much the American mould, so it is claimed. By this route, economic
imperialism can replace political imperialism.
A key question in political theory — one to which we are said to have no satisfactory
answer in the absence of a worthwhile theory of human nature (or human natures) — is
supposedly this:To what extent does human nature allow for alternative political and social arrangements? Or,
to tum the question around:- What restrictions are imposed in virtue of the nature of humans on
the broad range of political possibilities? How does that "nature" reduce the organisational
options?
A much-promoted Anglo-American answer, directly descended from the
Enlightenment, is that once /rcc/Y from systems of myths, taboos and tribal controls, from
superstition, people are essentially (and will generally become) self-centred individuals,
(properly) concerned with maximising their own gain or interests; that is, but for their shortage
of information (including technical know-how), free people are basically economic peopled
As ought now to be evident, that is to replace one ideology by another. But the Enlightenment
ideology is no longer so evident^: what recommends it? Under pressure of this sort, the AngloAmerican answer gets transformed to the theme that the economic picture of human nature is
superior, and fitting of rational creatures. That 'self-appointed West European superiority' has
6
7
8
9
Thus Abraham p.29ff.; Awa p.30. These sections are drawn from Cu/turc onJ rAc RooM of Political
Divergence.' a SowtA Pacific perspective.
For a recent trenchant expose, see Cohen and Rogers.
These people are also picked out under various alternative (but not strictly equivalent) descriptions,
e g. as acquisitive individuals, possessive individuals.
See e g. DP, chapter 10.
6
in turn been disputed, since the time of Herder and the Romantics.^ Fortunately, however,
the extensive ensuing dialectic can be substantially avoided.
For all these questions and answers presuppose, to begin with, a certain misplaced
essentialism, that there is such an invariant nature common to human beings, which exactly
separates humans from other creatures. Attempts to specify such an essence, suitably constant
and invariant and given by necessary and sufficient conditions,^ are legion. They are
a frequent feature of Enlightenment thought. All ment are the same
because of universal drives [such as to pleasure and avoidance of pain].
These drives will operate independently of any location.
Chief among those drives was that towards self-preservation — Holbach,
for instance, stipulates:
we shall call nafare in man the collection of properties and qualities
which constitute him what he is, which are inherent to his species, which
distinguish him from other animal species or which he as in common with
them ... every man feels, things, acts and seeks his own well-being at all
times; these are the qualities and properties that constitute human nature
12
But this attempt at essentialist definition of /mman naA/re fails, in a quite characteristic way. As
it stands, the definition is inadequate; for not all humans seek just their own well-being always;
some are "stupid", some are altruistic, some have other commitments. However, suppose we
avoid such familiar counter-instances to egoism, by replacing 'well-being' by say 'broad well-
being', thus rendering such internal egoism analytic. And suppose to avoid other counter
expales (such as human vegetables, morons and the like), we normalise the definition, replacing
'every man' by 'every normal human'. But then the definition is again inadequate; for it fails to
distinguish humans from, for example, dolphins. It applies equally to Jo/p/un natMrg or, for
that matter, to gon/Z# natMrg.
10
11
12
See Berry, p.30ff., from whom the quote is taken. It is worth spelling out a little the extent of
agreement and disagreement with Herder. What is applauded is
1. 'Herder's dismissal of the Enlightenment's conception of human nature as static, acultural and
ahistorical' (Berry, p.32), but nor
*1. Herder's cultural relativism, that 'each culture ... should be treated on its own merits and not
judged by some faulty perspective such as Io bel/e nature' (p.30), or from any other perspective. In
the pluralistic framework of the text (which presuppoes PPP), a good many cross-cultural judgements
ate made and defended.
*2. Herder's relativisation of human nature to culture, and embodiment of it in culture; for example,
'it is through language that human nature can be seen to be .spect/iicaPy embodied in culture' (p.32).
With relativisation the notion loses its original theoretical point; but while failing in this role,
cultural nature is open to many of the same sorts of objections as human nature. Nor can language
bear the weight Herder loads upon it.
*3. Herder's human chauvinism: '... it is speech and with that reason and freedom, that differentiates
man. Man can choose, man is king' (p.36). Wild animals are free, can choose, communicate, solve
puzzles, and carry out elementary reasoning; in these respects they surpass children and many other
humans. Furthermore, *
*3 gets Herder into serious trouble, not to say inconsistency, with 1.
Abraham, drawing on Wittgenstein, presents just these conditions for an essence, p.23ff.
Berry p.17. Berry supplies several other similar examples.
7
Of course the definition can again be patched, by appealing to the anatomical cluster of
features that separate humans from other mammals or to the biological specification of /tomo
But the resulting normalised definition, with its analytical egoism, does little more
than such biological definitions of An/nan: it does not supply a natnrg, it does not deliver
-ynp^rbiological features of political relevance. The notion of human nature thus fragments: into
the satisfactory enough biological notion of human, and an unsatisfactory superbiological (or
sociobiological) addition: that of human nature or essence. What is this further, problematic
nature? The Romantics can be read as arguing that there is none, no nature as distinct from
culture, only /oca/ nature (Herder's term) which coincides with culture. Peeling off cultural
excretions and variations in order to reach an essence leaves, like Wittgenstein's artichoke,
nothing. Just nothing.
The notion of human nature is a theoretical item, introduced to provide stability amid
cultural variability, a constant bulwark against relativism, but designed as well to justify — as
natural or, failing that as superior — a porr/cn/or type of political economy, state and legislature,
and its imposition everywhere else. 13 But its application is even grander: Human nature is a
theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious nefarious, social and political purposes.
Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort to justify or enforce various restrictive types
of social arrangements, statist ones (including defence forces, standing armies, survellience —
arrangements, and so on). Human nature is a highly resilient notion which has been widely
applied in such fashions; it is not so easily dissolved, certainly not through one illustration.
However the fact that the notion is written large in much political theory, and is received, does
not show that it or the embedding theory is sound. And it is not, but is defective, and in its
socio-political selectivity it is, as the illustration reveals, virtually of a piece with human
chauvinism (which would assign an unduly privileged position to human beings in the
ecological scheme of things).
Most conveniently, the superbiological notion of human nature begins to dissolve under
any attempt to set it down, in mmuch the way that attempts supporting human chauvinism to set
down something ethically special about humans disintegrate.
*^
13
14
The notion of human nature —
Hence the Enlightenment program of imposing enlightened Western culture everywhere, later
emphasised by Bentham. 'The Legislator, Knowing that human nature is ever the same [different
countries do not have different catalogues of pleasure and pain], can reform the laws and even
transplant them from one society to another' (Berry, p.18).
This claim concerning human chauvinism is argued in detail in EE. But the claim concerning human
nature is only sketchily defended in the text. For the alleged social-arrangement-dictating features of
human nature, like similar alleged features of economic or technological determinism, are rather
major obstacles to be removed — especially insofar as they supposedly severely and inevitably
restrict the character of future societies — than the main business of the present enterprise.
Fortunately then the claim, that the superbiological notion of human nature is a defective theoretical
one which dissolves, is defended elsewhere: not only, in effect, in work of Romantics from Herder
8
a nature or essence for a// and on/y humans (some special classes of humans excepted perhaps)
— presuppoes that there are some stable or constant social features holding for all peoples,
across different cultures, which are furthermore distinctively human features.
The
presupposition fails, because once cultural variation between peoples is fully taken into account,
only some rather trivial shared characteristics remain, which furthermore are shared by various
animal cultures, such as those of primates.
Consider, first, such products or tools of more literary cultures as books, or of
contemporary cultures as telephones and computers. Since most historical cultures lacked such
items, their possession or distribution obviously cannot figure as part of what marks out human
nature. Consider next, then, what are commonly taken to be key components of (human)
nature, certain basic human needs, such as food and shelter. These requirements are far from
free of cultural and environmental determinants. For look at what is regarded as required in the
way of shelter, and how it varies from culture to culture, place to place. (And even what is
taken as basic can often be met in a myriad of ways, though acceptably in some cultures only in
a few fixed ways.) The common denominator is the rather trivial requirement of some sort of
shelter under more extreme conditions — a requirement also of wombats. The situation with
food, sex, and so on, is hardly better. Dietary requirements vary considerably from race to
race, Europeans for example being very inefficient by many tribal standards and unable to
survive satisfactorily where tribal people flourish. 1$ Again the somewhat trivial lowest
common denominator applies also to various groups of animals. Nor are attempts to mark out
the human nature by some more complex list of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions, or
more loosely by a cluster of natural features, much more successful, or of direct political
application without the importation of what is culturally at issue — values. In any case, such
vague and general lists as emerge^ impose little constraint at all on a political direction, since a
variety of political arrangements is compatible with such listings.
15
16
on, but also in significant recent literature. Foucault, for example, can be read as saying that human
nature is an invention of the Enlightenment which dissolves: 'his much discussed ... di&MdMhon of
mon is nothing more, or less, than the claim that the attempt to establish order upon a scientific
understanding of human nature is both profoundly mistaken and profoundly unstable' (Philp, p.15,
italics added).
The converse is seen in the extent to which tribal peoples gain weight on European diets. At another
level, consider the Maori attitude to, and underlying revulsion by, cooked food: see Alpers, p.7-9.
For one such list, which however requires pruning and adjustment, see Wilson, p.22. As it happens,
Wilson does not make anything much of this list (which does not supply necessary conditions),
immediately presents a parallel list for insect societies — a list which does considerable damage to
more traditional claims about human nature — and then proceeds in effect to demolish main criteria
that have been used to separate humans from animals and to restrict cultures to human societies (e.g.
p.39).
9
Accordingly, human nature as such is not an important constraint on political theory, or a
theory of human nature a key ingredient in endeavours to work out a political philosophy or
political directions. *7 The reason is like the reason that determining the conditions for the good
life would not impose a satisfactory constraint on a political theory, namely presupposition
failure. Like the meaning of life
*s,
the good life fails to demarcate a single thing; there are
many styles of good lives. So too there is human nature and human nature, depending on the
culture or social paradigm and on the setting. Nature, both human and not, varies with culture
and environment. Because of this two-way dependence, there is no unique stable
superbiological human nature.
A corollary of the dissolution of the notion of human nature is the rejection also, as
misleading, of the usual picture of nature as given, as a stable notion across races and tribes,
with culture as a variable on top. There is no such culturally invariant division: culture affects
local nature. The picture is flawed in much the same way, then, as the familiar picture of
perception, as consisting of given uninterpreted sense data, stable across (normal) perceivers,
with interpretation imposed on the neutral data.
Nor therefore is culture something that can be creamed off the top, so to speak, to find
real human features or basic nature underneath. Certainly, cultures can be destroyed; however
what results from removal by destruction of a culture is not something closer to real people, but
people with a destroyed culture. So it is also with attempts like Hobbes or Rawls to peel
political organisation off the the top, in order to locate in a quasi-analytical or quasi-historical
way, a state of nature underneath or preceding some organised state or other. A flawed picture,
derived from mistaken or questionable presuppositions, is assumed.
What will be found underneath, or in the original (natural) state, is, it is usually
conveniently assumed, a nature that fits the view to be developed — with the right values very
fortunately in-built. Given that what is to be explained or justified is something like present
socio-political arrangements and the privileged position of some status quo — as well as a
dominant culture's image of itself, and elements of the dominant Northern social paradigm —
underlying human nature turns out to be, hardly surprisingly, that of fully competitive
possessive individualism (much the same model, that is, which serves for economic man, for
Enlightenment man, for the "rational person", etc.) The myth of unique human nature
17
18
For more on contemporary "scientific" efforts to deploy a theory of human nature for social and
political ends, see Appendix 2.
Which is perhaps as well, since we still have so little reliable and unprejudiced information as to
what "human nature" amounts to, what its variational possibilities, in different environments, might
be, or of the possibilities beyond past terrestrial selections of cultures.
On which see Routley and Griffin.
10
functions, like many other myths, to perpetuate or instil particular social arrangements and
special privilege.
Thus too the myth of human nature is linked to other culture-based myths, the myths of
all (normal) humans as aggressive individuals and as predominantly self-interested maximizers
(at least insofar as they are rational) — to bring in some of the myths bound up with the image
of contemporary urban-industrial humans. As there is no underlying hard ground, no firm
starting point in human nature, so there is none in these associated myths. The South Pacific
was, and remains, rich in cultures which upset these associated myths. Non of the
Melanesians, Polynesians or Australian aboriginal peoples comprised societies of individuallyoriented maximizers; indeed their strongly communal lifestyles and preparedness to stop, work
especially, after a low sufficiency threshold had been reached, was a major and repeated source
of criticism from the European cultures that came to dominate the region.
Even forms and types of aggressiveness, and approaches to war, often taken to be solid
ground, are culture and environment dependent, and vary with both parameters. 19
Aggressiveness is often supposed to impose hugh constraints on political arrangements. But
there is little substance to the claim that humans are naturally aggressive independently of social
or cultural setting. The most that appears clear is that circumstances can be arranged, for
instance through crowding or provocation or cultural relocation, where peoples of more familiar
cultures will become aggressive^ — and perhaps people of other cultures will not, but will just
give up, as people often do in the face of immense brutality. Certainly some arrangements are
required to cope with or suitably isolate aggression, but these can be of a wide range of
alternative types. Once again, what is normally accounted human nature depends upon and
varies with culture and environment, which people often shortsightedly see as fixed: certainly,
such components as selfishness, cooperativeness, individuality do.
What is often much more important than either culture or nature in determining social
arrangements is another factor: namely, outside control or imposition. Whatever social
arrangements have evolved in a region (through local "nature and culture") can be overridden,
A striking illustration of environmental variation is afforded by the differences between savannah
dwelling and forest dwelling tribes of baboons. For a local illustration, consider Maori approaches to
war (like war conventions, a social phenomenon), before European corruption. Thus Best reports
that 'an individual, or a whole clan, might decline to take part in an engagement on account of some
evil omen, and such an action would be approved of (p.15). There are several, apparently reliable,
stories of Maoris engaged in war supplying the opposition with equipment or ammunition, or
temporarily abandoning their fighting effort to help out the other (British) side, so the battle could
proceed properly.
20Wilson's argument that humans are innately aggressive involves such an invalid move: he looks at the
behaviour of Semai men when 'taken out of their nonviolent society' by recruitment in a British
colonial army (p.100)! As well, Wilson's case rests on a dubious redefinition of innateness, and a
low redefinition of aggressiveness to take in form of mere (nonaggressive) conflict (pp.99-100).
19
11
and new arrangements imposed, in one way or another. With long-standing arrangements,
imposition is almost invariably from without, and the changes in arrangements typically involve
either violence in their adaption or mass migration of people or both. In the last two hundred
years, especially, the South Pacific has, like much of the newer world, been drastically so
affected, in a complex way. And the changes, still flowing strongly from the North, continue.
We are in the last days of the destruction of old cultures, and the destruction is now to a
considerable extend by more subtle cultural, economic and technological means than the cruder
methods of slightly earlier times. Outside control can be exercised, or occur, in many ways less
blatant than direct intervention of one sort or another, such as through introduction of new
technologies, economic sanctions, monetary and loan policies, etc., as well as through
exchange and training programs, textbooks, advertising and magazines, film and television (i.e.
through physical exemplifications of culture). European peoples in the South pacific are often
unwittingly, part of this quieter process of cultural conversion and erosion; but many of us are
now victimes as well as, or rather than, perpetrators (cf. Crough and Wheelwright).
Human communities have been — and many still are — as insensitive to other human
cultures as they are to the natural environment (witness American and their allies in Vietnam).
Like an ecosystem, a culture can be destroyed, or pushed beyond redemption. This is
sufficiently well-known. Yet the creation of political disaster areas proceeds apace — in blatant
cases typically by disruption of culture and lifestyle using violence^ There is furthermore,
where recovery is possible at all, a long recovery period, perhaps sometimes of the order of
human generations. Yet there is increasing production of these politically contaminated regions,
especially through imperialism, e.g. USA in Central America, Israel in Lebanon, Russia in
Afghanistan, Indonesia in East Timor and West papua, etc.
In the south Pacific, there are many quieter Northern influences at work, but the strongest
now is unquestionably the American. American companies, businessmen, academics, tourists
and warships, their technology and patents, films and television programs, are the most evident
and influential. There can be various motives and aims (and assumptions) behind the newer
cultural and economic imperialism, behind endeavours such as the American to install their "free
enterprise" philosophy and practice everywhere. 22 Granted it mostly contributes to American
economic supremacy, to American business23 and to the transfer of substantial regional wealth
and surplus value to the USA. But national economic reasons are not the only sort of reasons
21
22
23
These disaster areas should perhaps be cordoned off like those infected by communicable disease, but
from continuing disruptive, outside interference.
What is said about American cultural and political imperialism applies, with adaption, in a lesser
way, to imperialism and colonialism by other nation-states such as USSR, Britian, France and
Indonesia. USA has no monopoly on imperialism. US imerialism in the third world is in part
documented and analysed in Chomsky and Herman.
Though not invariably as the experience with the Japanese motor industry has indicated.
12
such policies are pursued; apart from the side-issue of integrity, that many Americans really do
believe in the optimality of their local ideals to the exclusion of other arrangements, there are
deeper and somewhat more respectable ideological reasons as well.
The imperialistic endeavours can be underpinned by a J^cripftve assumption that all
human nature is at bottom really like American human nature, for instance highly economically
oriented. Thus, but for political distortions (a political analogue of economic externalities) and
lack of technological means, other peoples would choose the American (political and economic)
way: they simply have not really been given the opportunity or means. For many peoples this
is simply not true; for most other cultures let us hope, or pray, that this is not the case.
Alternatively, or as well, a more arrogant prescriptive assumption may be at work, that all
human nature ought to be like American nature at its best, because America not only has the best
way of life in the world and mostly the best ways of doing things^, but has a special hold on
rationality. The free-enterprise system (perhaps with representative democracy American-style
tackedon) is the rational enterprise embodied. Certainly the system is sometimes peddled, by
genuine believers in the American way, with the same evangelism as Christianity, which was
often seen and presented as the rational religion, at least before science got at it. Well, science
hasn't got at the free-enterprise religion yet, but on the contrary now has a social division
heavily devoted to its justification and furtherance.^ However some philosophy has got at the
system, sufficiently to reveal that it is no unique embodiment of rationality — there is none such
— but is a decidedly irrational practice in many circumstances. Thus, it is especially irrational if
local goals are to preserve local environments and cultures, as much experience helps attest.
It is aspects of the false descriptive assumption, and what can emerge with its rejection,
that are a main focus in what follows (though various of the reasons for rejecting the
prescriptive assumption will also emerge or get recorded). An important underlying theme will
24
25
Thus, for example, American agricultural textbooks and agricultural spokespeople are fond of
announcing that American agriculture is the best in the world; similarly for environmental
protection, forestry, technology, university education, and so on. But since they are the best, it is
evident that these American ways should be exported, isn't it? Even granting the large assumptions,
No, firstly, because that is to neglect important regional and local variations and differences, and
secondly because these ways may interfere with other significant features of reginal life or culture.
It has not passed unremarked that the high standard of material life in USA depends in part on a very
fortunate inheritance (e g. some of the best and deepest soils) and in part, as in Europe, on a lower
standard of life and conditions elsewhere, upon siphoning off wealth and especially resources (US
currently uses about one-fifth of world resources and 30% of world energy) from other regions. To be
sure, economic apologetics proffer other explanations of American transcendence, e.g. ingenious
constuctions like that of Olson, built on a sandy logic of economic actors collectively locked into
economically determined arrangements, substantially independent of the resource base.
In elaborating on how modem societies control their citizens, Foucaul has explained various
extensive types of social control exercised and licensed through received social sciences, by way of
approved standards of normality, health, stability, adequacy, rationality, etc.: See Phil p.15.
13
continue to be that neither broader nor basic human nature is a single stable thing, but varies
substantially in ways that are highly political relevant — relevant to the sort of political
framework a society adopts. In freer societies, less imposed upon from outside or above, the
variation can be largely accounted for through cultural variation (which in tum depends on
environment, etc.). The alternative assumptions, are then, those of cultural pluralism, that
culture is part of "nature", shaping in particular local human nature. Of course once again
"human nature" can be pared back and back to try to remove cultural variations; but in this way
what are taken to be important superbiological features of human nature for political theory are
also excised (e.g. features that make prisoners' dilemmas and commons' tragedies come out
one way rather than another).
Just as different cultures can mean different social arrangements, so in a larger setting
they can imply different political organisation and different political directions. Where requisite
differences do not occur, because incongrous arrangements have been imposed, ca/tMra/
can
a powcr/hZ /brcc ybr change. Likewise developing elements of cultural
difference can be a potent base for social change — or resistance to imposed change —
(especially, in communities where other more orthodox bases for change, such as economic
incentives or penalties, have become inoperative or failed, or are not available.
Culture is however a double-edged instrument, not only to be used, but resisted. For
example, though leading [valuable] features of indigenous Pacific cultures are to be reactivated,
as forces for change, some features of these cultures are to be resisted (such as male
domination), along with many features of modern Western cultures. Features of culture are
thus used to resist and confront undesirable (implanted or imported) sorces of culture; such as,
inequitable political arrangements, excessive consumerism, persuasive advertising media and
loaded news systems, hollow suburbia, alienating job structures, etc. It is important not only to
build and design alternatives — for which elements of local culture afford a solid foundation —
but also to dismantle, and build up resistance against, prime sources of antagonistic culture.
This is as true for American culture as Antipodean. One of the chief reasons why mainstream
American culture is so individualistic, so competitive, so violent, and so forth, is that
movements offering or encouraging alternatives have been repressed by the dominant
corporations and the state apparatus (see especially Goldstein).
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/ssues fa wef/todo/ogy. Many of the prevailing sins of philosophy are writ large in
political philosophy.; Redefinitions, and redefinitional -otolJgies to try to close gappy
arguments, abound. Large assumptions are imported and regularly used, without due notice,
or too often any awareness: particularly pernicious are those of individualism and atomism, and
of thoroughgoing egoism. It hardly needs stressing that such assumptions are environmentally
unfriendly, at best,
w,
—-— —
* /%&1L ^p&enoMienon o/ excessive sfrengt/i. There is a deeply embedded in modern mainstream
intellectual aedvity and strikingly manifest in polidcal theory.
2
y"
;
''r&c-r/KA *
One reason is that much of it is done by poiitical 6,..Is with no adequate grounding in logic or critical
thinking.
A general feature of contemporary thought, as of much contemporary technology and
practice, is that of over-powering or of excessive strength. The phenomenon, as exhibited in
contemporary mainstream logic, where it shows up in excessive assumptions, and principles
more powerful than reason can justify, is dis^assesed elsewhere (from the perspective of
relevant logic, in RLR). Some of the same unwarranted assumptions, notably those of invariant
consistency and maximization, reach far beyond stock logical theory to apply, so it is regularly
claimed, to all rational practice, including political decision-making and obstitutional
arrangements (see MR).
Analogous features are incorporated in many of the arguments against anarchism. For
example, it is argued that anarchism cannot realise optimal delivery of public goods, ideal
conditions for this or that (e.g. free market functioning, capital formation and flow), and so on.
Not only do other alternatives not measure up to these standards (certainly prevailing
arrangements fall very far short), the standards themselves are quite excessive. Instead it is
enough that certain sorts of adequacy standards are met, that reasonable thresholds are
achieved. There is a most important corollary: that arguments against anarchism or anarchistic
institutional arrangement which assume maximizing principles or the like (as are presumed in
Prisoners Dilemma arguments, game theory, mainstream economics, etc.) are flowed from the
very outset, and should be set aside.
A central time in anarchism offers a somewhat different display of the excess
phenomenon. The issue concerns alleged justifications of the state, or state-like institutions.
Here all that reason and argument appear to warrant are much less powerful institutions, not
arrangements with the excessive powers of the state. To close the gap between what argument
and practice appear to justify and what the state claims, some opportunistic intellectuals have
tried, rather ^".^..^to redefine the state. But such low redefinitions, while imposing states on
societies that operated without them, leaves the contemporary state be^ereft of adequate
justification. In brief, such intellectual strategies lead from the frying pan to the fire.
So it is similarly with institutions within the state, such as property and law. Reason and
argument do not justify state property arrangements, only an opportunistically redefined
"property" which does not fulfil the same state and capitalistic role. Similarly with law and
state legal systems.
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NQRK4-N&-5RAFT
CULTURE AND THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL DIVERGENCE:
a South Pacific perspective
the Austral ian/American contrast
major
A
Political
change
industrial
of
-Function
in
in
regulate
and
control
and political divergence
principle then,
features of local and regional culture.
the
to
is
the South Pacific,
can,
North,
culture
be grounded in and
change. 1
from
the
powered
by
One organising theme, a corollary of
facilitates the transition from principle to practice:- It
argument,
is
that the requisite elements are present in regional cultures, the potentiality
is
for
there,
South Pacific region (and Australia
the
particular)
in
to
proceed in a very different social and political direction from the North (and
from
USA in particular).
the
American arrangements,
unsatisfactoriness of
the
2
in many frequently exposed respects , such a different
Given the radical
direction is worth taking - if it can be.
serious problem in the nay of
a
But
arrangements,
from outside or from above.
change is imposition of
And,
political
since imposition shades into
this is
only one of the obstacles impeding change in the
South Pacific and elsewhere.
Another forcing more and more peoples, no longer
political pressure,
sheltered
by geographical isolation,
arrangements
of
socio-political
is supposed to derive from human nature itself.
Free people are
economic people,
into the same type
in pretty much the American mould,
this route, economic imperialism can replace political
1.
Nature,
theory
- one
culture,
to
which
and control.
so it
is
By
claimed.
imperialism.
A supposedly,key question in political
we are said to have no satisfactory'' answer
in
the
absence of a worthwhile theory of human nature (or human natures) - is .his:
1.
Thus Abraham p.29ff.; Awa p.30.
2.
For a recent trenchant expose, see Cohen and Rogers.
1
*
7%-
To
extent does human nature allow tor alternative political and
what
arrangements? Or, to turn the question around:-
in
virtue
of
the
nature
of
possibilities?
How does that
much-promoted
Anglo-American
Enlightenment,
is
controls,
become)
from
or
superstition,
answer,
people
broad
range
directly
taboos and
(and
6
from
descended
are essentially
but for their
will
the
tribal
generally
shortage
information
of
free people are basically economic
people.
that is to replace one ideology by another.
ideology is no longer so
Enlightenment
political
of
(properly) concerned with maximising their
that is,
interests;
As ought now to be evident,
the
the
that once freed from systems of myths,
technical know-how),
(including
on
What restrictions are imposed
"nature" reduce the organisational options?
self-centred individuals,
gain
own
humans
social
evident:
what
But
recommends
it?
Under pressure of this sort, the Anglo-American answer gets transformed to the
that the economic picture of human nature is superior,
theme
rational
creatures.
and fitting
That 'self-appointed West European superiority
*
turn been disputed, since the time of Herder and the Romantics.
has
of
in
Fortunately,
however, the extensive ensuing dialectic can be substantially avoided
For all
these questions and answers presuppose, to begin
with, a certain
misplaced essential ism, that there is such an invariant nature common to human
beings,
which
such
exactly
separates humans from other
creatures.
suitably constant and invariant
5
necessary and sufficient conditions , are legion. They are
specify
an
essence,
Attempts
and
given
to
by
a frequent feature of Enlightenment thought. All men are the same
because of universal drives [such as to pleasure and the avoidance of
pain). These drives will operate independently of any location.
Chief among those drives was that towards self-preservation - Holbach,
for instance, stipulates:
we .shall
call
nature in man the collection of properties and
qualities which constitute him what he is, which are inherent
.o
his species, which distinguish him from other animal
species ur
which he has in common with them ... every man feels,
thinks,
3.
These people are also picked out under various alternative (but
strictly equivalent)
descriptions, e.g. as acquisitive m i?i ua s,
possessive individuals.
acts and seeks his own well-being at all times,
these are^
kilties and property thet constitute human nature ... o.
But th,, attempt at essenti.list defin.ti.n of human nature fail,,
in a quite
A, -t stands, th. d.dtniti.n is inadequate; tor net a!)
*c
yo<
/
humans seek just their o<an ujeii-being always; .ssome ar. altruistic, s<xne have
characterrst-c ^y.
other commitment,.
to
ego-sm,
by
replacing
rendering such internal
examples
suppose
Hoover,
uell-being-
egoism analytic.
(such a, human vegetables,
definition,
replacing
every
definition 1, again inadequate;
example,
avoid such tamtl.ar counter.ostance,
by
say
broad
m.ll-being',
And suppose to avoid other counter
morons and th. like),
man' by
thus
every normal human'.
^normalise
the
then
the
But
tor it fails to distinguish humans from, for
It applies equally to dolphin nature or, for that matter,
dolphins.
to aori11 a nature.
Of
4.
course
the
definition can again be patched,
by
appealing
to
the
(From previous page)
See Berry, p.30ff., from whom the quote is taken,
It
is worth spelling out a little the extent of agreement and
disagreement with Herder. Nhat is applauded is
1.
'Herder's dismissal
dismissal of
of the
the Enlightenment's
Enlightenment's conception
conception of human nature
as static, acultural and ahistorical' (Berry, p.32), but no^
that 'each culture
... should be
31.
Herder's cultural relativism,
t judged by some faulty perspective such
treated on its own merits and no! .
"nature' (p.30), or from any other perspective.
In the
as
la belle
p.u,77^^k
of th. text ("huh presupposes PPP),
a good many
pluralistic cross-cultural judgements are made and defended.
Order's relativisation of human nature to culture,
and embodiment
32.
Herder s relafivisatio
through language that human nature
of it in culture; for example,
it is
Mi th
* 32).
(p
can be seen to be specifically embodied in culture'
but
theoretical
point;
relativisation the notion loses its original
same
cultural nature is open to many of the
ojhile failing in this role,
Nor can language bear the weight
sorts of objections as human nature.
Herder loads upon it.
A
it is speech and with that reason
Herder's human chauvinism:
33.
Man can choose, man
is king'
that differentiates man.
and freedom,
can choose, communicate, solve puzzles,
<
<=Hrn^^s
(p.36).
1Wild animals are free, ---- -----) out elementary reasoning;
m these ^^=-7
;
and carryand many other humans. Furthermore, 33 gets Herder into serious
chi 1dren
trouble, not to say inconsistency, with 1.
5.
6.
drying on Nittg.nste.n,
Abraham,
essence, p.23ff.
Berry p.17.
Berry supplies severa
pre^nt, Just these condition, for an
1 other similar examples.
cluster of -features that separate humans from other mammals or
anatomical
the
biological specification of homo sapiens.
But the resulting
to
normalised
definition,
with its analytical egoism, does little more than such biological
definitions
of
human:
it does not supply a nature,
deliver
not
does
it
The notion of human
superbiological
features of political relevance.
thus fragments:
into the satisfactory enough biological notion of human,
an
unsatisfactory
superbiological (or sociobiological)
and
of
that
addition^
The Romantics
What is this further, problematic, nature?
nature or essence.
nature
can be read as arguing that there is none, no nature as distinct from culture,
cultural
off
Peeling
only local nature (Herder's term) which coincides with culture.
excretions and variations in order to reach an essence leaves,
liKe
Wittgenstein's artichoke, nothing.
of human nature is a theoretical item,
The notion
cultural variability,
amid
stabi1i ty
but designed as wel 1
particular
type
everywhere
else.
of
7
fashionj;
fact
and
that
received,
not,
the
introduced to
a constant bulwark against
to justify ^as natural or, failing that,
political
economy and legislature, and
provide
relativism,
as superior^
its
imposi t i on
such
Tlsf?s resilient notion has been widely applied in
i
is not so easily dissolved,
notion
by one illustration.
is wri tten large in much
political
but is defective,
3
However the
theory,
the embedding theory is sound.
does not show that it or
a
and
is
Hnd it is
and in its socio-political selectivity it is,
as the
a piece with human chauvinism (which would
assign an unduly privileged position to human beings in the ecological
scheme
of things).
under
7.
. the superbiological notion of human nature begins to dissol\
*
A
any attempt to set it down,
in much the way that attempts supporting
Hence the Enlightenment program of imposing enlightened Western cultur^
everywhere,
later emphasised by Bentham. 'The Legislator, lowing t
human nature is ever the same [different countries do not have
catalogues of pleasure and pain], can reform the laws and even transplan
them from one society to another' (Berry, p.18).
namrg. This is a theoretical notion which has been used for multifarious
reforious, social and political purposes. Typically the notion has been deployed in a effort toy
i
.7"& $ 11T
A
enforce various restrictive types of social arrangements, archie ones (including defence foc^s,
to
chauvinism
human
humans
that
there
ethically
something
about
special
humans
The notion of human nature - a nature or essence for alj_
disintegrate.
only
down
set
(some special classes of humans excepted perhaps)
are
stable or constant social
some
- presupposes
holding
features
and
for
all
across different cultures, which are furthermore distinctively human
peoples,
features.
peoples
The
is
presupposition fails,
fully
characteristics
taken
remain,
because once cultural variation between
into account,
which
some
only
furthermore
are
rather
shared
by
trivial
shared
various
animal
cultures, such as those of primates.
Consider,
books,
or
historical
first,
such
products or tools of more literary cultures as
of contemporary cultures as telephones and computers.
cultures
lacked
such items,
their
possession
or
Since
most
distribution
obviously cannot figure as part of what marks out human nature. Consider next,
what are commonly taken to be key components of (human) nature, certain
then,
basic human needs,
such as food and shelter.
free of cultural and environmental
as required in the way of shelter,
place to place.
of
ways,
common
under
8.
These requirements are far from
determinants.
For look at what is regarded
and how it varies from culture to culture,
(And even what is taken as basic can often be met in a myriad
though acceptably in some cultures only in a few fixed
ways.)
denominator is the rather trivial requirement of some sort of
more extreme conditions - a requirement also of wombats.
The
shelter
The situation
This claim concerning human chauvinism is argued in detail in EE. But the
claim concerning human nature is only sketchily defended in the ex -or
the alleged social-arrangement-dictating features of human nature,
like
similar alleged features of economic or technological
determinism, are
rather major obstacles to be removed - especially insofar as they
supposedly severely and inevitably restrict the character of
u ure
societies - than the main business of the present enterprise.
Fortunately then the claim,
that the superbiological notion of human
nature is a defective theoretical one which dissolves,
is defende
elsewhere: not only, in effect, in work of Romantics from Herder on, but
also in significant recent literature. Foucault, for example, can be read
as saying
*
that human nature is an invention of the Enlightenment which
dissolves: "his much discussed ... dissolution of man is nothing more, or
less,
than the claim that
the attempt to establish order upon a
scientific understanding of human nature is both profoundly mistaken an
profoundly unstable" (Philp, p.15, italics added).
5
with
1-ood,
sex,
and
so on,
considerably from race to race,
by
many
people
is hardly better.
vary
Europeans for example being very inefficient
tribal standards and unable to survive satisfactorily where tribal
9
flourish.
figain the somewhat
trivial
lowest common denominator
applies also to various groups of animals.
human
requirements
Dietary
by some more complex list of jointly necessary
nature
conditions,
Nor are attempts to mark out
more
or
loosely
by a cluster of natural
and
features,
the
sufficient
more
much
successful, or of direct political application without the importation of what
is culturally at issue - values.
In any case, such vague and general
impose little constraint at all on apolitical
emerge
direction,
lists as
since
a
variety of political arrangements is compatible with such listings.
Accordingly,
political
theory,
human
nature
as such is not an
important
constraint
on
or a theory of human nature a key ingredient in endeavours
11
work out a political philosophy or political directions
to
.
The reason is
the reason that determining the conditions for the good life would
like
not
impose a satisfactory constraint on a political theory, namely presupposition
12
failure.
Like the meaning of life ,
the good life fails to demarcate a
single
'?.
thing;
there
are many styles of good lives.
So too there
is
human
The
converse is seen in the extent to which tribal peoples gain weight
on European diets. At another level, consider the Maori attitude to, and
underlying revulsion by, cooked food: see Alpers, p.7-9.
10. For one such list, which however requires pruning and adjustment, see
Nilson, p.22. As it happens, Wilson does not make anything much of this
list (which does not supply necessary conditions), immediately presents a
parallel
list for insect societies - a list which does considerable
damage to more traditional claims about human nature - and then proceeds
in effect
to demolish main criteria that have been used to separate
humans from animals and to restrict cultures to human societies <e.a.
p. 39) .
For more on contemporary "scientific" efforts to deploy a theory of human
nature for social and political ends, see Appendix 2.
11.
Which is perhaps as well, since we still have so little reliable and
unprejudiced information as to what "human nature" amounts to, what its
variational possibilities, in different environments, might be, or of the
possibilities beyond past terrestrial selections of cultures.
12.
On which see Routley and Griffin.
and human nature,
nature
depending on the culture or social paradigm and
on
Nature, both human and not, varies with culture and environment.
the setting.
there is no unique stable superbiological
Because of this two-way dependence,
human nature.
of
corollary
6
rejection also,
across races and tribes,
The picture is flawed in much the same way,
the
on
top.
culture affects local nature.
as the familiar picture of
then,
consisting of given uninterpreted sense data,
as
is
with culture as a variable
There is no such culturally invariant division:
perception,
nature
of the usual picture of nature as given, as a
as misleading,
notion
stable
the dissolution of the notion of human
stable
across
(normal) perceivers, with interpretation imposed on the neutral data.
Nor therefore is culture something that can be creamed off the top, so to
find real human features or basic nature
to
speak,
Certainly,
underneath.
cultures can be destroyed; however what results from removal by destruction of
a culture is not something closer to real people,
culture.
So
organisation
but people with a destroyed
it is also with attempts like Hobbes or Rawls to peel
off
in order to locate in a
the the top,
political
quasi-analytical
or
quasi-historical way, a state of nature underneath or preceding some organised
state
or
other.
A
flawed picture,
derived from mistaken
or
questionable
presuppositions, is assumed.
Nhat will be found underneath, or in the original
(natural) state, is, it
is usually conveniently assumed, a nature that fits the view to be developed
with the
explained
the
and
culture's
right values very fortunately in-built.
is
privileged
image
position of some
of itself,
and
status quo -
elements of the
as well
dominant
as
a
Northern
be
serves
for
economic man,
7
dominant
social
hardly surprisingly, that
fully competitive possessive individualism (much the same model,
which
to
or justified is something like present socio-political arrangements
paradigm - underlying human nature turns out to be,
of
Given that what
for Enlightenment man,
for
the
that is,
rational
myths,
The myth of unique human nature functions,
etc.)
person",
perpetuate
to
other
tike many
or instit particular social arrangements
special
and
pr ivi1ege.
Thus too the myth of human nature is linked to other culture-based myths,
myths
the
predominantly
rational)
all
of
humans
(normal)
self-interested
- to
bring
maximizers
no firm starting point in human nature,
myths.
aggressive
(at
least
some of the myths bound
in
urban-industrial humans.
contemporary
as
individuals
as
they
are
Mi th
the
image
of
up
As there is no underlying hard ground,
associated
so there is none in these
The South Pacific Mas, and remains, rich in cultures Mhich upset these
of
the
Melanesians,
Polynesians
None
aboriginal
peoples
comprised societies of individually-oriented
after
especially,
lifestyles and
strongly communal
their
to
a loM sufficiency threshold had been reached,
source of criticism from the
repeated
preparedness
European cultures
Australian
or
myths.
and
as
insofar
associated
indeed
and
maximizers;
Mork
stop,
Mas a major
that
came
to
dominate the region.
forms and types of
Even
aggressiveness,
and approaches to
Mar,
often
taken to be solid ground, are culture and environment dependent, and vary Mi th
13
both
parameters .
Aggressiveness is often supposed to impose
huge
constraints
on political
arrangements.
But there is little substance to the
claim that humans are naturally aggressive independently of social or cultural
setting.
for
13.
The most that appears
instance
clear is that circumstances can be
through croMding or provocation or cultural
arranged,
relocation,
Mhere
A striking illustration of environmental variation is afforded by the
differences betMeen savannah dMelling and forest dMelling tribes of
baboons.
For a local illustration, consider Maori approaches to Mar
(like Mar conventions, a social phenomenon), before European corruption.
Thus Best reports that 'an individual, or a Mhole clan, might decline to
take part in an engagement on account of some evil omen,
and such an
action Mould be approved of' (p.15).
There are several, apparently
reliable, stories of Maoris engaged in Mar supplying the opposition Mith
equipment or ammunition, or temporarily abandoning their fighting effort
to help out the other (British) side, so the battle could proceed
properly.
8
14
of
peoples
cultures will become aggressive
familiar
more
but Mill just give up,
people of other cultures Mill not,
in the face of immense brutality.
types.
depends
upbn
Once
shortsightedly
again,
as fixed:
see
as people often do
but these can be of a Mide range of
Mhat is normally
accounted
varies Mi th culture and environment,
and
perhaps
Certainly some arrangements are required to
cope Mi th or suitably isolate aggression,
alternative
- and
certainly,
such
nature
people
Mhich
components
human
as
often
selfishness,
cooperativeness, individuality do.
What
much more important than either culture or nature
is
determining social arrangements is another factor:
social
Whatever
imposition.
one
May or another.
from
invariably
namely, outside control or
arrangements have evolved in a
local^nature and cultureican be overridden,
through
region
and neM arrangements imposed,
With long-standing arrangements,
Mithout,
imposition
is
and the changes in arrangements typically
the South Pacific has,
especially,
in
almost
involve
either violence in their adaption or mass migration of people or both.
last tMO hundred years,
in
In the
like much of the
been drastically so affected, in a complex May. And the changes,
neMer world,
still flowing strongly from the North, continue.
We
are
in the last days of the destruction of
old
and
cultures,
destruction is now to a considerable extent by more subtle cultural,
and
technological
Outside
direct
control can be exercised,
economic sanctions,
film
and
television (i.e.
economic
earlier
times.
in many ways less blatant
such as through introduction
monetary and loan policies,
as through exchange and training programs,
magazines,
14.
or occur,
intervention of one sort or another,
new technologies,
well
means than the cruder methods of slightly
textbooks,
through physical
the
etc.,
advertising
than
of
as
and
exemplifications of
Wilson's argument that humans are innately aggressive involves such an
invalid move: he looks at the behaviour of Semai men when taken out of
their nonviolent society'' by recruitment in a British colonial
army
(p.100)!
As well, Wilson's case rests on a dubious redefinition of
innateness, and a low redefinition of aggressiveness to take in forms of
mere (nonaggressive) conflict (pp.99-100).
9
process of cultural conversion and erosion;
this quieter
are
unwittingly, part
European peoples in the South Pacific are often
culture).
or rather than,
victims as well as,
now
but many of
perpetrators (cf.
US
and
Crough
Wheelwright).
Human
communities
have been
and many still are
as
to
insensiti
other human cultures as they are to the natural environment (witness Americans
Like an ecosystem, a culture can be destroyed,
and their allies in Vietnam).
pushed
creation
political
of
typically
This is
beyond redemption.
disaster
sufficiently
apace
areas proceeds
where
is possible at all,
recovery
a
sometimes of the order of human generations.
production
of
imperial ism,
- in
these politically
e.g.
USA
in
contaminated
Central America,
long
blatant
cases
There
recovery
is
period,
Yet there is increasing
regions,
Israel
the
Yet
disruption of cultu-e and lifestyle using violence.
by
-fur thermore,
perhaps
well-known.
in
especially
Lebanon,
through
Russia
in
Afghanistan, Indonesia in East Timor and West Papua, etc.
In the South Pacific, there are
but
the
strongest now is unquestionably the
businessmen,
films
can
many quieter Northern influences at work,
academics,
American.
American
companies,
tourists and warships, their technology and patents,
are the most evident and influential.
and television programs,
be various motives and aims (and assumptions) behind the
newer
There
cultural
behind endeavours such as the American
16
Granted it
everywhere
.
their "free enterprise
*
philosophy and practice
17
to American business
and
mostly contributes to American economic supremacy,
and
economic imperialism,
These disaster areas should perhaps be cordoned off li.e
by communicable disease,
but from continuing disruptive,
infec ted
outside
in ter-ference.
What is said about American cultural and political imperialism applies,
with adaption,
in a lesser way,
to imperialism and colonialism by other
nation-states such as USSR, Britain, France and Indonesia.. USA
L.. has no
in
the
third
world
is in part
monopoly on imperialism. US imperialism i......... documented and analysed in Chomsky and Herman.
Though
not md.riaMy a. th. experience "ith the Japanese ctor industry
has indicated.
10
to
the transfer of substantia! regional wealth and surplus value to the
But
national economic reasons &re not the only sort of reasons such
are
pursued;
apart
from the side-issue of integrity,
really do believe in the optimality of their local
USA.
policies
Americans
that many
ideals to the exclusion
of
other arrangements, there are deeper and somewhat more respectable ideological
reasons as Mel 1.
imperialistic
The
assumption
that
(a
distortions
technological
economic)
means.
can
be
underpinned
all human nature is at bottom really
instance highly economically oriented.
for
nature,
endeavours
political
means,
May:
they
by
American
like
Thus,
descr i pt ive
a
human
but for political
analogue of economic externalities)
and
lack
other peoples Mould choose the American (political
simply have not really been given the
For many peoples this is simply not true;
of
and
opportunity
or
for most other cultures let
us hope, or pray, that this is not the case. Alternatively, or as Mell, a more
arrogant
prescriptive assumption may be at Mork,
that all human nature ought
to be like American nature at its
best, because America not only has the best
18
May of life in the Morld and mostly the best Mays of doing things
, but has
a
special
hold
on rationality.
The free-enterprise
representative democracy American-style tacked on)
18.
system
(perhaps
is the rational
Mith
enterprise
Thus, for example, American agricultural textbooks and agricultural
spokespeople are fond of announcing that American agriculture is the best
in the Morld;
similarly for environmental
protection,
forestry,
technology, university education, and so on.
But since they are the
best,
it is evident that these American Mays should be exported,
isn't
it? Even granting the large assumptions, No, firstly, because that is to
neglect important regional and local variations and differences,
and
secondly because these Mays may interfere Mith other significant features
of regional life or culture.
It has not passed unremarked that the high standard of material life in
USA depends in part on a very fortunate inheritance (e.g. some of
the
best and deepest soils) and in part, as in Europe, on a loMer standard of
life and conditions elseMhere, upon siphoning off Meal th and especially
resources (US currently uses about one-fifth of Morld resources and 30 X
of Morld energy) from other regions.
To be sure, economic apologetics
proffer other explanations of American transcendence, e.g.
ingenious
constructions like that of Olson, built on a sandy logic of economic
actors collectively
locked into economically determined arrangements,
substantially independent of the resource base.
by genuine believers in
bridled
Certainly the system is sometimes peddl
,
embodied.
which Mas often
with the same evangelism as Christianity,
American way,
the
at least before science got at
rational
religion,
as the
seen and presented
yet, but on the
got at the free-enterprise religion
hasn't
i t. MeH, science
justification and
division heavily devoted to its
contrary now has a social
sufficiently to
19
philosophy has got at the system,
furtherance.
However some
_
tp,t it is no unique embodiment of rationality - there -s none sue
reveal
decidedly irrational practice in many circumstances.
is
but
a
preserve local
environments
end
if local goals are to
irrational
especial ly
Thus,
cultures, as much experience helps attest.
is aspects of
tt
with
false descriptive
and what can
assumption,
.what follows (though various of
are a main focus in
rejection,that
th. prescripts, assumption Mill .'so -.rg. °r 9^
its
the reasons for rejecting
underlying theme Mil! continue to be
An
recorded).
nor
broader
emerge
basic
human
.
nature
is
a
single
in
substantially
sort of political framework a society adopts. In
outside
cultural
nei ther
important
ways that are highly political
upon *from
that
or above, the variation can be
variation
<Mhich
turn
in
depends
stable
thing,
varies
but
the
to
relevant - relevant
freer societies, less imposed
largely accounted for through
The
environment,etc).
on
those of cuitura! pluralism, that culture
alternative
assumptions,
are then,
..cal human nature. Of course once
is part of "nature",
"human nature"
again
^nations-,
but
shaping in particular
can be pared back and back to try to
m this way what are taken to be
remove
important
superbi ologi c a
*
matures of human nature for political theory are also excised (e.g
that
make prisoners' dilemmas and commons' tragedies
cu1tura'
feature
one way
rathe
than another).
1?.
in
elaborating on h.M
has
explained
^"soc'ial"control
various extensile typ
p. 15.
12
exercised
py^.y of approved
Just as dttterent cultures can.mean different social arrangements,
so tn
, larger setting they can imply different political organisation and different
directions.
political
incongrous
Where
requisite differences
had.
arrangements
been imposed,
do
not
occur,
because
cultural differences can
b.^.
nnuerful force for change. Lihemse d^.loping elements of cultural difference
can
a potent base for social change - or resistance to imposed
be
in communities inhere other more orthodox
(especially)
a, economic mcertioes or penalties,
have
bases for change,
become inoperative or
-
change
such
tailed,
or
used,
but
are not avaitable.
Culture is hotter a double-edged instrument,
For
resisted.
though
example,
leading
not only to be
of
[valuable] features
indigenous
Pacific cultures are to be reactivated, as forces for change, some features of
these cultures are to be resisted (such as male domination),
features
modern Western cultures.
of
along mth
used
Features of culture are thus
and confront undesirable (implanted or imported) sources
resist
many
to
culture;
of
such as, inequitable political arrangements, excessive consumerism, persuasive
advertising
media and loaded news systems,
structures,
etc.
for
culture.
chief
build
and
competi tive
encouraging
culture afford a solid foundation - but also
prime sources of
up resistance against,
is as true for American culture as Antipodean.
This
reasons
alienating
^hy
so
job
build and design alternatives
It is important not only to
which elements of local
dismantle,
holloa suburbia,
mainstream American culture
violent,
and
so
forth,
is
is
that
so
to
antagonistic
One
of
the
ndividualistlc,
so
offering
or
movements
alternatives have been repressed by the dominant corporations and
the state apparatus (see especially Goldstein).
2.
The
Why work with such an unfavourable contrast case as Australian—^iety^
regional and environmental orientation.
cultural variation and their force for change,
contrast
than
US
In defence of theme.
for instance Melanesian culture.
13
g
it Mould no doubt be easier to
culture with some other culture which diverges
Australian culture,
<_on-_
more
Or,
strikingly
differe
y,
ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL PLURALLISM
*
Let us begin by sketching, in summary form, what political pluralism was, and then
explaining what it becomes under contemporary plurallism, ecopluralism in particular. These
new pluralisms, while they differ markedly from former political pluralsm, undoubtedly can
build upon it
Political pluralism used to be a theory viewing social life in terms of groups, which were
said to be the priwMry .s*oc/o/
On this theory, an individual's primary allegiance is not to
any abstract government but to groups, unions, clubs, churches. Thus there is no absolute
necessity for a highly unified political or legal order - whence developed a critical stance
towards the state and towards sovereignty among somg pluralists and so elements of anarchistic
pluralism.
There was, however, no systematic theory of political pluralism (a further anarchistic
feature). The position (and both British and American pluralism, however different) were
unified not by any doctrine but by crinco/ response to growth of the state.
A major theme was, and remains, moderate
(as further explained in EP). Humans
are neither isolated atoms, nor components of centralised states, but social creatures who
function in crisscrossing groups of their own choice. Moreover, groups are genuine objects
with choices, capacities, purposes, etc.
Pluralist society respects and tries to reconcile diverse interests of humans without
thwarting them. Groups communicate via negotiation and the like; their operations are not
delegative from some higher authority.
Contemporary ecological pluralism takes over most of these scene setting features, but
emphasizes the communitarian bases, and expands the scope of communities and groups to
include
communities, which include creatures and systems other than humans. Perhaps
the best known example of such a mixed community is that, introduced by Naess and
elaborated by Devall (in 89) of a Norwegian community of bears and wolves, sheep and
humans (but earlier Leopold and other had offered examples of expanded communities). A
problem which group theory hides, perhaps deliberately, but which such communities at once
expose, is that of internal conflict. Conflict cannot be avoided even by going right down to
families or individuals; for as much conflict may be bottled up in a family or even in one
*
Early versions of the first section of these notes drew heavily on Vincent, TAeonej of
ytote. The text takes up the working draft of 'Philosophy, politics and pluralism: II.
Anarchistic pluralism'.
2
individual as in a small group. That is, there are no pure conflict-free atoms from which to
build up group or community structure.
Conflict within individuals is strikingly exhibited in certain sorts of schizopherenia. But
it happens also in many humans. On conflict issues, in dilemmatic situations, and similar, one
part of a person pulls in one direction, another part in another. Or, more accurately, because
often no such neat separation into directional components can be affected, there are inconsistent
allegiances, derives, drives. Under orthodox theory, it is presumed that such conflicts,
personal inconsistency, can be removed by artificial fragmentation. What happens in orthodox
social theory is that individuals are effectively broken down and whittled down, not without
significant.... . into iJca/ components — classical individuals — with properly organised
(duly transitive, etc.) preferences and coherent desires. While such idealization is alright for
limited theoretical purposes, let us not falsey imagine that it is adequate for a satisfactory social
theory. Let us not pretend that such thin classical individuals offer a saatisfactory model for
rich actual individuals.
Ecopluralism not only extends the group basis; like gontc contemporary pluralism, the
variety of positions and practices is also much expanded. Early political pluralism (so-called)
was far from advocating a plural variety. (Figgin, an early British pluralist, would have been
shocked at such a supposition: Vincent p.182.) A fairly narrow normative consensus was
assumed, e.g. Christian morality in British "pluralism", American political arrangements in
American "pluralism". Indeed several American "pluralists", political scientists from Bentley
on, erroneously "saw pluralism as a description of the American political system. In this usage,
pluralism moves into the area of interest group and pressure group theory' (Vincent p.183).
Herein lies the route to
p/ura/hwn: While the state may remain discredited as a unitary
order, it is now seen a complex multiple entity, which tried to incorporate and theorize diversity
of group life. In the American version, groups are seen as interested in reaching some kind of
bargain. Government policy is the outcome of group pressures. Government is alleged to seek
out some abstract national interest.
Public police is ...' the equilibrium reached in this struggle at any given
moment' .... Today's loser, it is blithely assumed, will be tomorrow's
winner.
Most American pluralists of this ilk assume that the contest between
groups will be fair and that there is some kind of lurking normative
consensus in the background. Certain types of behaviour are
presumably un-American. Practical politics, therefore, for the American
pluralist is about bargaining, compromise and trade-offs. There is no
normative appraisal of the State, but rather an gjtp/anation anJ partial/y %
yn^ti/icarion o/ wAat t/tgy ta%g to
actaa//y tAg ca^g in tAg qo/irica/
qrocc.y^g.y of the USA. Government is not an impartial umpire. It
reflects the dominant coalition on a particular policy — although it will
try to maintain some balance. ... In American pluralism a group is
simply a collection or aggregation of individuals acting in specific roles.
3
Most significantly the American pluralists were not concerned with any
normative account of the State as an institution or practice. They were
far more interested in examing, empirically, the effects of group
pressures on the actual activity of government (Vincent p.190 emphasis
added).
In even more degenerate Eastern European forms, pluralism comes down to some sort of
multi-party electoral arrangements;
plurality just amounts to many parties. Political
arrangements can however remain highly paternalistic and authoritarian. Because we are
interested in genuine free pluralisms, we shall leave these desperate terms behind.
EXTRA SPACE
Now consider the organisational possibilities for the Earth, i The Earth divides variously
into (geographical) regions; under ecological organisation the decomposition will be into
ecoregions. Those regions that are occupied will be occupied by structures of (mixed)
communities. The assumption that each occupied region is occupied by a single community is
too simple to account even for the present impoverished arrangements offering on Earth. Some
regions are occupied by communities of communities,
community structure so to
say.2 It seems unlikely that on Earth, given a suitable choice of regions, it is necessary to
ascend beyond communities of communities to third-order community structures. Thus for
each region it is appropriate to begin with the ancient ideal of a community of communities.
But of course there will be higher-order structure involved, such as regional federations of
regions, and federations of these federations, and so on and up. Call this organisational
structure, the Earth frame. This frame is not of course unique; there are many other ways, of
varying levels of adequacy, of unscrambling an organisational grid.
1
Off the Earth, in free logical space, case arrangements are wry much greater. Not only
can many terrestrial limitations be transcended, for instance with wiser creatures than
humans, and many fairer regions, but the interaction of regions can be avoided, so that,
for example, an intense dense industrial society need not transmit its pollution outside
its own borders, indeed in the right circumstances it need not be polluting at all. A
beginning is made in investigating this richer structure by Nozick, but even his useful
beginnings leave much to be desired, as brought out in UT.
2
Whether communities of communities amount just to communities will depend upon
the final characterisation of community, or what sort of members they can have and
the extent and character of the interrelations of their members. If communities were
mere set-like objects, it would be a matter of the transitivity of membership; but
obviously communities are more than mere sets, internal relations counting for much.
4
The frame selected is in fact intimately tied to real mundane arrangements. For the short
time that they survived state interference, the Spanish anarchistic communities coexisted and
coevolved in genuine pluralistic fashion (as Dolgoffs sympathetic description has revealed).
That is by no means the only occasion on which the old ideal of a community of communities
(communitas communitatorum) has achieved partial realisation, but is one of the better known
recent examples involving anarchistic communities in a limited geographic region - at a time in
world history when state domination of social life continues to break up communities and
impose a grey uniformity across former community diversity. But the concern here is not with
what is, with present depressing (but temporary) political realities, but with how things might
well be, with different and - no difficult feat - superior political arrangements, in particular
pluralist arrangements.
A recent picture of pluralistic political arrangements by Nozick supposedly allows for
virtually anarchistic communities within an overarching minarchic framework. It would seem a
simple matter to vary this picture, in particular, to weaken or strengthen the overarching
framework; and that indeed the system of Spanish communities (which of course did not
persist) weakened the minimum state arrangements in true anarchistic fashion to zero. Nozick
has however a complex (and also seriously flawed) argument that variations are without
justification, that political possibilities which can be justified are omc/t tighter than the wide
range of the logical possibilities would suggest.
A crucial early question once an Earth frame is untangled is, for each structural level:
what are the broad organising principles? Consider a more important case, the regional level.
Will the same broad principles reappear for each region? Only in a very tenuous fashion, if
such desiderata as regional diversity are to be given appropriate play. Naturally these had better
be included some procedure or other for conflict resolution where conflict is severe, but there is
a wide variety of procedures of very varying merit; some procedures or other for the numerous
issues that have to be dealt with to keep communities functioning, such as to take a sample of
issues, burying the dead, taking care of the indigent.
*
A crucial question, for each structural level,is: what are the broad organisational
principles? One working idea is that in the sort of organisational framework sought will enable
a mix of desiderata to be pushed over some far out natural thresholds. The comy desiderata
include liberal and environmental objectives, such as those of freedom, liberation. Life, liberty,
pursuit of happiness, etc.
3
Levels of organisation, by geographical region (functional with a that), local, small
ecoregion, large ecoregion, ... (old large state), continent - federations, world federation.
Direction of world reorganisation: to a plurality of possibilities, with different possibilities
in different regions. Cities for those who like them in the substantially ecologically destroyed
urban land recipes of the North. Etc.
Diversity is a prime desideratum. We should rgjoicc in Jhw-yity where it recurs, and
encourage ir where it does not, subject as always to certain constraints. In particular, then,
attempt to impose fashionable ideologies everywhere should be strongly resisted; this includes
religious faith and other gospels such as those of market capitalism and state socialism. Such
drives to unity and conformity, and intellectual monoculture, should be derailed. Evidently in
an interlinked system such as the Earth form, federal organisation should include arrangements
to block imposition of ideologies by expansive neighbours on other regions. (Included herein
are states; here is yet another reason for the abolition of states.)
Not to be encouraged, but opposed, are mc.MMnic ging/c-way movements, such as
messianic catholism, messianic communism, and messianic capitalism. These come with a
amvcrya/Mtic perspectic, and a single, allegedly universal set of values: they do not, unless
severely cut down in size, fit into a generous plurallism. Needless to say, these universalistic
(one-tuming) movements cannot rationally justify their practices. It can no more be established
that there is only one god with such and such properties (e.g. those ascribed to Allah under
Islam) than it can be established that there is only one logic; indeed the justificatory situation is
considerably worse (imagine the faithful chanting each day, facing one Cambridge or other,
"There is no logic but classical logic ..."; of course most Anglo-American philosophers are
committed to something like this in their philosophical practice, but they rarely recognise the
character of the commitment).
Note: Many of the economic objectives presented as absolute, are not merely dubious. They
are not intrinsic values, but merely instrumental, and instrumental to goals that a community
may not have. Leading examples of such objectives are efficiency, production.
Out of the same stable as broad monoculturalism, with its uniform urban systems,
universities, etc., is the method of consensus (or
one opinion, as it might as well
have been called). Consensus — unless severely limited, as for instance to argument on a
pluralistic structure — is anti-pluralistic. Nonetheless there can be consensus of a sort at one
remove, metaconsensus on one story, "agreement" to differ.
Limited agreement does however have its virtues in conflict resolution.
* To be sure, cases where have to resolve what is to be done, how to act. Many ways to go:
single uniform recipe approach too absolutist. On the other hand, it is not entirely situational.
Set of recognised decent procedures.
6
The problematicness of conflict, and need for its removal, is much exaggerated. The
drive for conflict-free conditions is like, and linked to, the drive for consistency. But conflict is
not always undesirable, but often advantageous (and perhaps, as Heracleitus claimed,
necessary). Often conflict should just be allowed to stand; it does not require resolution.
Political and social arrangements should allow for it and be able to absorb it. Where removal is
required, it is often by achieved by distancing, regionalisations etc.
APPENDICES
1. On Walzer's p/ara/Mm there is a plurality of distributive systems. From Plato onwards it is
suggested that only one distributive arrangement that can be justified, (p.5). Walzer suggests
the Rawlsian picture of reeled strand choosers provides
modern arrangements. But
'Justice is a human construction, and it is doubtful that it can be made in only one way' (p.5).
Thus there is a plurality also of distributive justice. While the argument is plausible, its
construction prescription is not. Walzers' 7%Mt'.? (p.6) is: 'the principles of justice are
themselves pluralistic in form [whatever that means); that different social goods ought to be
distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents;
and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods
themselves — the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism'.
There is also a theory of goods, and f/teir distribution. In the usual form, people
distribute goods to people. The basic relation is a proc^Jarg. In fact there are many
procedures: given, allocating, exchanging, selling, etc. Walzer wants to claim: People
conceived create goods, which they then distribute among themselves. This is really a
Concatenation of two procedures. His iJea is to split goods into quaser sphere, and to have
different dibtributive criteria for different spheres. This is said to be complex e^aa/ity (p. 18)!
According to Walzer, there are sp/tereg/ or regions of competition, etc. For example, in
Pascal: strength, beauty, intelligence, devoteness;
but it could be: rugby, soccer, rules, horse racing, mountain climbing, etc.
However there are divisions, barriers between these — but they compete for key items e.g.
money, fields, etc. [so population growth is a total menance for a easily pluralistic society.)
1] 'Personal qualities and social goods have their own spheres of operation, where they work
their effects freely, spontaneously legitimately' (p.19) wAat does this seem: work? by
legitimally? etc.
2] Disregard of those sepaate spheres is tyranny; Attempting to convert one good in one place
to another in another is ruled out.
Meaning of "complex equality" (nothing much of equality about it): 'no citizens' standing in
one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other
sphere, with regard to one other good' (p.19). Thus political advantage does not confer
advantage in other spheres, e.g. health care, advoting, etc.
W 'open-ended distributive principle' (p.20): 'no social good x should be distributed to nea
.... who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to the
meaning of x'.
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y
ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL PLURALLISM^
Political pluralism was a theory viewing social life in terms of groups, which were
said to be the primary social objects. Further an individual's primary allegiance is not to
any abstract government but to groups, unions, clubs, churches. Thus there is no absolute
necessity for a highly unified political or legal order - whence developed a critical stance
towards the state and towards sovereignty among yomg pluralist^and so elements of
anarchistic pluralism.
There was, however, no systematic theory of political pluralism (a further anarchistic
feature.) The position (and both British and American pluralism, however different) were
unified not by any doctrine but by crit/ca/ response to growth of the state.
A major theme wa^aadd^a^ay&M^ one (as/in EP)t humans are neither isolated atoms,
nor components of centralised states, but social creatures who^werkedin crisscrossing
groups of their own choice. Moreover, groups are genuine objects with choices, capacities,
purposes, etc.
Pluralist society respects and tries to reconcile diverse interests of humans without
,
.
,
—
.
.
.
thwarting them. Groups communicate via negotiation etc.; their operations are not
delegadve from some higher authority.
Contemporary ecological pluralism takes over most of these scene setting features, but
emphasizes the communitarian bases, and expands the scope of communities and groups to
include
communities, which include creatures and systems other than humans.
Perhaps the best known example of such a mixed community is the exampley-^givaa by
Naess and elaborated by Devall (89^dhapter-^3)^of a Norwegian community of bears and
wolves, sheep and humans'. A problem which group theory hides, perhaps deliberately, but
which such communities at once expose, is that of internal conflict. Conflict cannot be
avoided even by going right down to familiar or individuals; for as much conflict may be
Early versions of the first section of these notes drew heavily on Vincent, TAcorier <?f
The text takes up the working drift of 'Philosophy, politics and pluralism: II.
Anarchistic pluralism',, and thus completes (so far as it can presently be taken) a series
on this generous topic
*.
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m..n<„, <l<AS,p. 31,). Today', loser, i, I, bh.hol, a,,u,„ed. wdl ho
tomorrow s wmner.
Most American pluralists of this ilk assume that the contest
tween groups wtll be fhir and that there is some kind of lurking
normative consensus in the background. Certain types of behaviour
are presumably un-American. Practical politics, therefore, fbr the
mertcan p urahst is about bargaining, compromise and trade-ofls
lore is no normative appraisal of the State, but rather an
of what they take to be
acm^
processesTnhXUSA
Gov
*
. dm^c^updTe^J^a
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the USA. Government
is
not an impartial umpire. It reflects
reflects the
the domii.^
dominant coalition on a
particular policy - although it will try to maintain some balance
*
I'.--D.
D. Roosevelt remarked, 'The
'
science of politics, indeed, mav
properly be said to be m large part the science of the adjustment of
conflicting group interests' (quoted in Nicholls, 1974, p. 2). This aim
is contrary to that of the English pluralists, who would have been
deeply critical of the idea that the State becomes a focal point for
group pressure, also that policy should emanate from dominant
coalitions of groups via the State apparatus. Individuals, in English
pluralism, pursue their goals within groups. The State should not be
inked to any such partial interests. Each of theSe groups is
recognized as a moral person with a legal status. In American
pluralism a group is simply a collection or aggregation of individuals
acting m specific roles. Most significantly the American pluralists
were not concerned with any normative account of the State as an
institution or practice. They were fhr more interested in examining
empirically, the effects of group pressures on the actual activity of
government,
th^y ^in not
cltscnsswn.
7bottled up in a family or even in one individual as in a small group. That is, there are no
<*/o
pure conflict-free it^ms from which to build up group or community structure.
'
@
Ecopluralism not only extends the group basis; like
contemporary pluralism, the
variety of positions and practices is much expanded. Early political pluralism (so-called)
was far from advocating a plural variety. (Figgin, an early British pluralist, would have
been shocked at such a supposition: Vincent p.182.) A fairly narrow normative consensus
was assumed, e.g. Christian morality in British "pluralism", American political
arrangements in American "pluralism". Indeed several American "pluralists", political
scientists from Bentley Erroneously on^'saw pluralism as a description of the American
political system. In this usage, pluralism moves into the area of interest group and pressure
group theory" (Vincent p.183). Herein lies the route to
While the state jLSxiiscredited as a unitary ordef} it is now seen a complex
multiple entity, which tried to incorporate and theorize diversity of group life. In the
American version, groups are seen as interested in reaching some kind of bargain.
Government policy is the outcome of group pressures. Government is alleged to seek out
some abstract national interest^In even more degenerate Eastern European forms, pluralism
comes down to some sort of multiparty electoral arrangements; plurality just amounts to
many parties. Political arrangements can however remain highly paternalistic and
. Because we are interested in genuine free pluralisms, we shall leave these
desperate ^rms behind.
/^copyV^ncent-l$0, on US pluraKstsof this sort]
/)^onsider the organisational possibilities for the Earth.i The Earth divides variously
into (geographical) rggto/ts; under ecological organisation the decomposition will be into
jporegions. Those regions that are occupied will be occupied by structures of (mixed)
communities. The assumption that each occupied region is occupied by a single community
is too simple to account even for the present impoverished arrangements offering on Earth.
Some regions are occupied by communities of communities,
community
structure so to say.z It seems unlikely that Earth, given a suitable choice of regions, it is
_
.
cm
1
Off the Earth, in free logicat space, case arrangements are very much greater. Not only
can many terrestrial iimiations be transcended, (widi for instance wiscr creatures than
humans, and many fairer regions, but the interaction of regions can be avoided, so that,
for example, an intense dense industrial society need not transmit its pollution outside
its own borders, indeed in the right circumstances it need not be polluting at all. A
beginning is made in investigating this richer structure by Nozick, but even his
beginnings leave much to be desired?
*.
4/7
2
Whether communities of communities amount just to communities will depend upon
the final characterisation of comwMnhy, or what sort of members they can have and
c?
/-
3
necessary to ascend beyond communities of communities to third-order community
structures. Thus for each region it is appropriate to begin with the ancient ideal of a
community of communities. But of course there will be higher-order structure involved,
such as regional federations of regions, and federations of these federations, and so on and
up. Call this organisational structure, the Earth frame. This frame is not of course unique;
there are many other ways, of varying levels of adequacy, of unscrambling an
organisational grid.
The frame selected is in fact intimately tied to real mundane arrangements. For the
short time that they survived state interference, the Spanish anarchistic communities
coexisted and coevolved in genuine pluralistic fashion (as Dolgoff s sympathetic description
has revealed). That is by no means the only occasion on which the old ideal of a
community of communities (communitas communitatorum) has achieved partial realisation,
but is one of the better known recent examples involving anarchistic communities in a
limited geographic region - at a time in world history when state domination of social life
continues to break up communities and impose a grey uniformity across former community
diversity. But the concern here is not with what is, with present depressing (but temporary)
political realities, but with how things might well be, with different and - no difficult feat superior political arrangements, in particular pluralist arrangements.
A recent picture of pluralistic political arrangements by Nozick supposedly allows for
virtually anarchistic communities within an overarching minarchic framework. It would
seem a simple matter to vary this picture, in particular, to weaken or strengthen the
overarching framework; and that indeed the system of Spanish communities (which of
course did not persist) weakened the minimum state arrangements in true anarchisdc fashion
to zero. Nozick has however a complex (and also seriously flawed) argument that
variations are without justification, that political possibilities which can be justified are mMc/z
tighter than the wide range of the logical possibilities would suggest.
A crucial early question once an Earth frame is untangled is, for each structural level:
what are the broad organising principles? Consider a more important case, the regional
level. Will the same broad principles reappear for each region? Only in a very tenu/ous
fashion, if such desiderate as regional diversity are to be given appropriate play. Naturally
the extent and character of the interrelations of their members. If communities were
mere set-like objects, it would be a matter of the transitivity of membership; but
obviously communities are more than mere sets, internal relations counting for much.
*j
these had better be some procedure or other for conflict resolution where conflict is severe,
but there is a wide variety of procedures of very varying merit; some procedures or other for
the numerous issues that have to be dealt with to keep communities functioning, such as to
take a sample of issues, burying the dead, taking care of the indigent.
A crucial question, for each structural level, is: what are the broad organisational
principles?
.
The working idea is that in the sort of organisational framework sought will enable a
mix of desiderata to be pushed over some far out natural thresholds. The, desiderata include
liberal and environmental objectives, each as those of freedom, liberation. Life liberty,
pursuit of happiness^etc.
Direction of world reorganisation: to a plurality of possibilities, with different
possibilities in different regions. Cities for those who like them in the substantially
ecologically destroyed urban land recipes of the North. Etc.
Diversity is a prime desideratum. We should re/'ozce in JivgrHfy where it recurs, and
if where it does not, subject as always to certain constraints. In particular, then,
attempts to impose fashionable ideologies everywhere should be strongly resisted; this
includes religious faith and other gospels such as those of market capitalism and state
socialism. Such drives to unity and conformity, and intellectualm^njt culture, should be
derailed. Evidently in an interlinked system such as the Earth form; federal organisation
should include arrangements to block imposition of ideologies by expansive neighbours on
other regions. (Included herein are states; here is yet another reason for the ahabition of
states.)
Not to be encouraged, but opposed, are
sing/c-way movements, such as
messianic catholism, messianic communism, and messianic capitalism. These come with a
M/uvcrM/Af/c perspectic, and a single, allegedly universal set of values: they do not, unless
severely cut down in size, fit into a generous plurallism. Needless to say, these
universalistic (one-turning) movements cannot rationally justify their practices. It can no
more be established that there is only one god with such and such properties (e.g. thvse
ascribed to Allah under Islam) than it can be established that there is only one logic; indeed
the justificatory situation is considerably worse (imagine the faithful chanting each day,
facing one Cambridge or other, "There is no logic but classical logic
of course most
Anglo-American philosophers are committed to something like this in their philosophical
practice, but they rarely recognise the character of the commitment).
Note: Many of the economic objectives presented as absolute, are not merely dubious.
They are not intrinsic values, but merely instrumental, and instrumental to %^that a
community may not have. Leading examples of such objectives are efficiency, production.
Out of the same stable as broad monoculturalism, with its uniform urban systems,
universities, etc., is the method of consensus (or
one opinion, as it might as well
have been called). Consensus - unless severely limited, as for instance to argument on a
pluralistic structure - is anti-pluralistic. Nonetheless there can be consensus of a sort at one
remove, metacon^ensus on^ one story, "agreement" to differ.
Limited agreement does however have its virtues in conflict resolution.
* To be sure, cases where have to resolve what is to be down, how to act. Many ways to
go: -si^i uniform recipe approach too absolutist. On the other hand act entirely situational.
Last of recognised decent procedures.
The problematicness of conflict, and need for its removal, is much exaggerated. The
drive for conflict-free conditions is like, and linked to, the drive for consistency. But
conflict is not always undesirable, but often advantageous (read perhaps, as Heracleitus
claimed, necessary). Often conflict should just be allowed to stand; it does not require
resolution. Political and social arrangements should allow for it and be able to absorb it.
C**------ -
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at
b'l
2051THE IRREFUTABILITY of anarchism
1.
GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE.
The State is like God:
the
anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is
commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed.
The parallel,
drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths.
While
the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe
that there are no states:
none are legitimate.
on the contrary, there are all too many, though
The important parallel is as to arguments.
The
agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed,
and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe
that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence
sitting position.
Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not
only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are
arguments, or at least solid considerations, against.
So it is with soundly
based anarchism, which can both fault arguments for the State
and produce
a case against the State.
A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again
emphasised by Bakunin^ is that of State and Church.
This institutional
comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised;
for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many
very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of
the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an
organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually
answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as
business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent
threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church
used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of
them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have
come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but
as a necessary evil.
Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will
be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove
that God exists.
Since the State is unnecessary, as well as
costly
and
typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other
respects, it should be superseded.
social arrangements.
And it can be succeeded, by alternative
�2
2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT
ARGUMENT.
The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the
collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by
alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State
activity being dispensed with.
The argument is not a straight substitution
argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything
accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements.
There is much
the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship
of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State
activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft,
corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land
and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or
environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should
not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and
subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest
destructive pine planting and woodchip projects).
The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or
damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial kind.
This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism.
The argument, implicit
in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of
the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest
and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions,
and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the
powerful groups the State tends to serve).
But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions
which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required.
For why should
people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their
collective interest?
Such functions can be performed, and performed better,
without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the
accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance
of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves".
The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case
2
form, considering each function in turn.
In each case the function is carried
out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the
people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements.
Consider, for
example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building
programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community
access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved
of infrastructure or hindered by the State.
Such beneficial services would in
general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally
�held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the
operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of
being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals
and powerful agencies.
Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal
types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than
individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to
apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community
welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are
privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private
individuals.
As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the
collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of
those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation.
But
those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective
interest.
In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is
retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality,
corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached.
State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may
be similarly removed or replaced.
These services, which include reduction of
violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services,
security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to
make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it.
do not.
They
Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by
communities themselves without intervention by the State.
Secondly, a great
many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence
of which the State is the main purveyor .and which is often the outcome of
WAvditai 3
the State's propping up of gross
.
A community which seriously
A
limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes
«//
gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for
many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving
violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and
many of those involving personal violence.
Such a left-leaning anarchism is
also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the
State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth
that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution.
As all
too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and
police inequitable distribution. 5? This then is the main classical argument
for anarchism.
The argument has however been challenged, both by historical
�and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot
act in their collective interest without coercion.
I
3.
THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE
LIKE.
The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for
anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the
Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where
individuals will not agree or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to
maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can
furnish.In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain
advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others’
contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from
others' restraint).
The claim is that only the State with its backing
of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed.
A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type,
Including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the
Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to
secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two
players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have
been separately imprisoned.
A State representative makes the following offers
separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while
his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while
the accomplice gets 8 years.
It so happens that if both prisoners remain
silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence.
if both confess they would each receive 4 years.
But
The "game" can be summarised
in the following "payoff" matrix:Prisoner 1
S(ilence)
C(onfess)
S
-1, -1
-8, 0
C
0, -8
S t rategies
-4, -4
The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free
at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in
each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other
does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also
in fact a minimax strategy).
For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes
free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by
confessing.
But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain
an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously
called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent.
�5
4. FOILING THE PRISONERS'
DILEMMA ARGUMENT.
It is bizarre that a dilemma
alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene,
forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an
optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course
the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemmas is
inessential, as is much else from the example.
But some features of the
prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption
that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate
or really cooperate.
Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation
assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are
dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in
their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed.
The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly
seriously limited.?
A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect
that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference.
It is claimed
that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate,
that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of
the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement'
(Taylor, p. 5).
Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is
very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently
encouraged privatisation
of life, the
extent of cooperation and trust would
o
undoubtedly be much higher.
The argument has to depend crucially then on
substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings,
e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large
measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people
were that unreliable and devious,tate arrangements involved in providing
public goods/-oueh as—taxatioa-y would not succeed either) .
That such assumptions
are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the
first.suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they
are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours
and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical
scepticism,
involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the
other security against default, and so on.
The question of the character of human interests and preferences
and the
extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is
fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and
also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities.
A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated
political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a
preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count
�is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings
of others nor on the social context in which that human operates.
While the
individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy
the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural
pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular
media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure
towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence,
And, sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community
A
(which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social
influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners'
Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State.
5.
WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED.
What the Dilemma-based case
for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are
outs tanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also
o’wt foot
damaging if unresolved, lint ypsoHved by State intervention, and only so
g-
fa
(optimally) resolved, ami Finallythat in the course of so resolving these
Dilemma situations, worse situations than those that are resolved are not
thereby induced.
These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be
satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging.
For several of the
conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional,
worse) and involve considerations about whichf reasonable parties can differ.
/W/’
chuck
The selection of Dilemmas,provides an example: after all there are many such
A
A
Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of
.—t>n Vi o!-c h
family -fs*tds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not
worthy of State attention.
There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be
satisfied at all.
For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games,
Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the
Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just
of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately
represented by what is called a supergame.
But in many such sequential
Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming
separated players with purely egoistic interests/^ For what sequential
games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be
dependent upon past performance of other players.
This dependence effectively
removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma
situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from
past social interaction.
In such supergames then, no intervention is required.
�7
Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing
the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that
they can really cooperate.
Equally important, and equally independent of the
State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so
the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate J'1
Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has
a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc.
A
Nor
is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal
strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives
they be required in recalcitrant cases), and
is known (should
is used even by the State, e.g.
But at no stage is the State
gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc.
required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners' Dilemmas
are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations
can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they
are not already catered for.
And in fact communal and cooperative organisation
did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in
the case of the Commons.
In sum, here also replacement works.
There are no important Dilemma
situations, it seems, where the State is essential.
The State has been thought
to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example,
that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour
is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart
from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective
goods - is through State control.But it is quite evident that there are
other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional
markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs).
Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations
/J
has very extensive effects, many of them negative, so that the gains made, if
any, in so resolving Dilemma^ situations, appear to be substantially outweighed
by the costs involved.
For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State
to put in the balance.
As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with
ty showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more
,
new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as/
/A
t * /<»
the working
differently with the State as a further player (since the State
may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.).
also to further arguments against the State.
These points lead
�9
to accept.
(Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to
those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation).
But institutional
checks which operate only insofar as a ^system*^ acceptable to the powerholders
is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration
of those checked,^ are not really checks at all.
£
gand preventing
The problem of controlling the power of the State, 'ur
IA
the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its
mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the
first place.
The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the
anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation.
8.
THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY.
responsible for actions deliberately undertaken.
A person is
This premiss can be derived,
if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent,
Taking responsibility
for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about
what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,A
4
determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision
over to someone or something else. , It implies, that is, moral autonomy,
Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom.
For the
autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject
to the will of another.
another so directs.
Even if it does what another directs, it is not because
In being free, not of constraints (both physical and
self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous
being is morally free.
A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory
(under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon
them.
Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and
with freedom.
An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some
imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject
such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State.
7
s
In sum, being a person,
as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority
of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on
, ika.
/J
18
personhiood implies^anarchism.
V
It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State",
one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy.
But such a "State", with no
independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve
it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism,
On the contrary,
such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic
organisation.
�10
9.
The replacement
THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE.
argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the
State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State
is not necessary.
But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom
or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of
real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable.
The gap may be closed by
appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various
times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked.
Examples of such
Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have
not been omitted.
There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are,
19
anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives,
and
there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic
20
arrangements within the State structure.
10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION.
The arguments
outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the
options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State
and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on.
For example, spontaneous
anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange
ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution
without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could
not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which
durable supersession of the State depends.
which these theoretical arguments.
A
The sort of anarchist society
will certainly be organised, but the
organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures
(and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening
of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct
democracy.
The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin
sometimes pictured it.
It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised
communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of
State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of
Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily.
Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by
representation and subject to a downward system of command.
Within each
community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth
and property, and no highly concentrated economic
power.
community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is
communally owned or not owned at all.
A
�11
While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and
also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, they offer
no detailed blueprint.
Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of
anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and
pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives.
11. STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION TO ANARCHIST SOCIETY ; THE FOREST SUCCESSION
MODEL OF REPLACEMENT BY AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE.
The main strategy, emerging
from the First Way, is that of replacement : transition to a new anarchist
social order proceeds by replacement or addption of the more satisfactory State
organisations and structures by organisations and structures of a more
anarchistic cast, and by removal or phasing out of remaining no longer
necessary or unsatisfactory State arrangements.
Replacement and supersession suggest a biological model, of such change
and succession as occurs where one forest type succeeds another; and such
a model is in turn very suggestive.
To make the model more definite, and
to give it some local colour, consider forest succession where a sub-tropical
rainforest replaces a eucalypt forest, as analogous to the case where anarchism
replaces a Statist society.
There is certainly a marked change in structure,
typically from a tall forest with a fairly open canopy to a more compact
closed forest with more layers of vegetation, much more local diversity and
a richer variety of life forms, especially floral forms.
A forest is not
merely a set of trees, but trees in structural arrangement and interdependence,
not merely on one another but on other life forms such as pollinating insects,
seed-carrying birds and animals, and so on; and the changes in structure
include changes in microclimate, in soil moisture levels and humus and
bacterial content.
The change of forest type may be by evolution, by hastened or induced
evolution, or by catastrophe (revolution) as when a eucalypt forest is
clearfelled and artificially succeeded by planted rainforest.
(Strictly,
there is a spectrum of practices and replacement strategies between evolutionary
and revolutionary, and various different revolutionary strategies; and the
standard evolutionary-revolutionary contrast presents a false dichotomy.)
Even reliance on predominantly evolutionary methods, which tend to be
very slow by human time scales may require some (management) practices, else
evolution towards rainforest will not begin or continue.
For example, seeds
for rainforest species may not be available if adjoining areas have been
stripped of suitable seed trees, e.g. by clearing or eucalypt conversion,
in which case it will be necessary to introduce seeds (of anarchist ideas,
methods, arrangements, etc.).
And rainforest evolution may not be able to
�13
12. APPLYING THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL.
How to apply the model is not
difficult to see in broad outline, and many of the further details have
been filled out by work, that can be described as indicating how allegiance
can be shifted in practice from where we mostly are to alternative social
22.
arrangements and life-styles built on self-management and mutual aid.
The seeds of anarchism should be broadcast or planted, anarchist (nonStatist)
arrangements instituted or strengthened, and efforts made to replace or
vulnerable Statist arrangements.^ Some of the practices are familiar :
'anarchist groups, clubs, pamphlets, broadcasts, newsletters, etc.; (anarchist)
cooperatives, exchanges, neighbourhood groups, rural communities, etc.
Others
are slightly less familiar: avoidance of State influence by arrangements beyond
State reach such as costless (or alternative currency) interchanges of
goods and services, action directed at removing decision-making from State
departments, such as forest services, and into citizen hands, and ultimately, to
decentralized local communities.
In this sort of way worthwhile State arrangements
can be replaced, and power can be progressively transferred from the State, and
returned to the community and to people more directly involved.
"V-
ht)
�FOOTNOTES
1.
Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London,
especially p. 139.
1973,
Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction
between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin.
2.
That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of
generally beneficial state activity - there is only a
(relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it
can be replaced in one way or another.
course uniquely determined.
Replacement is not of
Lines such replacements can take are
indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature,
consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid.
New York University Press,
1972, and also his Fields, Factories and
Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest
of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913.
3.
On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited
S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York,
1970, p. 206 ff. ; also
P.J. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary .
For recent discussion
of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law
court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone,
'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', A
Nomos / XIX^New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4.
V
4.
J-
Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest
case that can be made for the desirability of the State'
Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9).
(M. Taylor,
To cover all
arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants
of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of
Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations,
'Prisoner's
Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person
Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are
X
not merely e^gjistic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such
games are iterated.
As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate,
there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of
the same logical form - those where people do not contribute to
supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a
"collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where
people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum"
quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons,
�2
unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness).
That received arguments
of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the
wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere.
An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also
surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter
of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University
Press, New York,
5.
1980.
An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance
of population size in the arguments for the State.
But size is not
decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided
(or relocated) by organisation info
The figures
smaller communities.
given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which
suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5.
6.
It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State
alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation,
when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of
social cooperation.
7.
This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley,
Theories, Self Management, and
'Social
Environmental Problems' in
Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS,
Australian National University, 1980.
8.
As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence
has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges
from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self-
Managing Environment, Allison & BUfsby, London, 1979, chapter 10,
but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332.
Similar points
apply as regards many other Dilemma situations.
'In the. experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game
approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy
even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'.
Abrams, op. cit., p. 308.
9.
Cf.
the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.
�3
10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of
critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially
chapter 5.
11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal
prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including
cases where the State is one of the "adversaries".
12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife,
in modem economic and political theorising.
Both are to be
found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the firstJ^(with an
attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition^/
op. cit., p. 250 ff.
13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes
one's social roles
erf
and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze.
Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and
often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover
the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity.
cit., chapter 7.
A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way
o/icA
14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op.
in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off
regions.
15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent
of his Third Man argument.
16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II.
Fourth edition
(revised), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127.
The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental
problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the
dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1, 'upon which'
Marxists never had 'any well-considered view'
(p. 129).
17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and
Opposition 13 (1978), 199-217: see p. 209 and p.(^25jTP
18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. l/olff,
In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
No argument
is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute.
argument, for example^is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical
anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff.
Wolff's
i
nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining
�THE IRREFUTABILITY OF ANARCHISM
1.
GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE.
The State is like God:
the
anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is
commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed.
The parallel,
drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths.
While
the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe
that there are no states:
none are legitimate.
on the contrary, there are all too many, though
The important parallel is as to arguments.
The
agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed,
and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe
that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence
Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not
sit-ting position.
only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are
arguments, or at least solid considerations, against.
So it is with soundly
,
nene.
based anarchism^ which can both faults arguments for the State^and
(ncisi'je.
X case against the State.
A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again
emphasised by Bakunin^- is that of State and Church.Clx This institutional
comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised;
for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many
very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of
the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an
organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually
answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as
A
business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent
threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church
used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of
them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have
come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but
as a necessary evil
Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will
be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove
that God exists.
Since the State is unnecessary, as well as
costly
and
typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other
respects, it should be superseded.
social arrangements.,^
And it can be succeeded, by alternative
�2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT
ARGUMENT.
The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the
collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by
alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State
activity being dispensed with.
The argument is not a straight substitution
argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything
accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements.
There is much
the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship
of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State
activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft,
corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land
and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or
environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should
not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and
subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest
destructive pine planting and woodchip projects).
The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or
damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial J$ind.
This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism.
The argumertf:, implicit
in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of
the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest
and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions,
and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the
powerful groups the State tends to serve).
But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions
which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required.
For why should
people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their
collective interest?
Such functions can be performed, and performed better,
without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the
accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance
of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves".
The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case
2
form, considering each function in turn.
In each case the function is carried
out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the
people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements.
Consider, for
example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building
programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community
access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved
of infrastructure or hindered by the State.
Such beneficial services would in
general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally
�3
held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the
operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of
being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals
and powerful agencies.
Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal
types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than
individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to
apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community
welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are
privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private
individuals.
As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the
collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of
those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation.
But
those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective
interest.
In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is
retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality,
corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached.
State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may
be similarly removed or replaced.
These services, which include reduction of
violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services,
security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to
make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it.
do not.
They
Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by
communities themselves without intervention by the State.
Secondly, a great
many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence
of which the State is the main purveyor and which is often the outcome of
ol
3
the State's propping up of gross inequities.
A community which seriously
limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes
a//
gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for
many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving
violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and
many of those involving personal violence.
Such a left-leaning anarchism is
also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the
State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth
that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution.
As all
too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and
police inequitable distributionThis then is the main classical argument
for anarchism.
The argument has however been challenged, both by historical
�and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot
act in their collective interest without coercion.
3.
THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE
LIKE.
The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for
anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the
Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where
---------
(?)
individuals will not agree“or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to
maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can
4
furnish.
In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain
advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others'
contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from
others' restraint).
The claim is that only the State with its backing
of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed. (6J
A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type,
including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the
Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to
secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two
players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have
been separately imprisoned.
A State representative makes the following offers
separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while
his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while
the accomplice gets 8 years.
It so happens that if both prisoners remain
silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence.
if both confess they would each receive 4 years.
But
The "game" can be summarised
in the following "payoff" matrix:-
Prisoner 2
The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free
at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in
each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other
does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also
in fact a minimax strategy).
For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes
free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by
confessing.
But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain
an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously
called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent.
�5
4. FOILING THE PRISONERS'
DILEMMA ARGUMENT.
It is bizarre that a dilemma
alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene,
forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an
optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course
the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemma£is
inessential, as is much else from the example.
But some features of the
prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption
that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate
or really cooperate.
Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation
assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are
dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in
their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed.
The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly
seriously limited.?
A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect
that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference.
It is claimed
that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate,
that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of
the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement'
(Taylor, p. 5).
Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is
very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently
encouraged privatisation
of life, the
extent of cooperation and trust would
o
undoubtedly be much higher.
The argument has to depend crucially then on
substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings,
e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large
measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people
were that unreliable and deviousState arrangements involved in providing
public goodsy such as taxation', would not succeed either).
That such assumptions
are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the
first,suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they
are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours
and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical
scepticism,
involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the
other security against default, and so on.
The question of the character of human interests and preferences
and the
extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is
fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and
also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities.
A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated
political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a
preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count
�is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings
of others nor on the social context in which that human operates.
While the
individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy
the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural
pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular
media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure
towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence.
And^sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community
(which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social
influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners'
Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State.
5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED.'
What the Dilemma-based case
for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are
outstanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also
qaA'-fkc-l'
oft
damaging if unresolved,\but resolve^/by State intervention, and only so
A A- jZAz-zv
(optimally) resolved, and finally.that in the course of so resolving these
Dilemma situations, worse situation than those that are resolved are not
thereby induced.
These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be
satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging.
For several of the
conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional,
worse) and involve considerations about which reasonable parties can differ.
The selection of Dilemmas^provides an example^: after all there are many such
Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of
l/«o|on<c or
family, feuds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not
worthy of State attention.
There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be
satisfied at all.
For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games,
Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the
Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just
of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately
represented by what is called a supergame.
But in many such sequential
Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming
separated players with purely egoistic interests?^ For what sequential
games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be
dependent upon past performance of other players.
This dependence effectively
removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma
situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from
past social interaction.
In such supergames then, no intervention is required.
�7
Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing
the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that
they can really cooperate.
Equally important, and equally independent of the
State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so
the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate.
Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has
a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc.
A
Nor
is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal
strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives
they be required in recalcitrant cases), and
is known (should
is used even by the State, e.g.
But at no stage is the State
gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc.
required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners’ Dilemmas
are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations
can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they
are not already catered for.
And in fact communal and cooperative organisation
did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in
the case of the Commons.
In sum, here also replacement works.
There are no important Dilemma
situations, it seems, where the State is essential.
The State has been thought
to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example,
that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour
is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart
from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective
goods - is through State control.1-
But it is quite evident that there are
other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional
markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs).
Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations
has very extensive effects', many of them negative, so that the gains made, if
any, in so resolving Dilemma1
situations, appear to be substantially outweighed
by the costs involved.
For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State
to put in the balance.
As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with
its authority showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more
/A
of
important, new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as with the working
example, or differently with the State as a further player (since the State
may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.).
also to further arguments against the State.
These points lead
�8
6.
THE SECOND WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM PROBLEM RECURRENCE^/
The solution
by the State to problems of social organisation repeats or generates in more
dangerous form the very problems introduction of the State was designed to
solve, including new Dilemmas.
Suppose, for instance, the secular State really
were introduced in order to solve Prisoners' Dilemmas - introduced as opposed
to inherited from the religious State and the Church, and maintained to prop
up privilege and foster objectives that are not in its communities' interests -
then the array of States generates new Prisoners' Dilemmas, which there is no
Super-State to resolve by coercion.
Suppose, as the myth has it, the State
really were introduced in the interest of order and stability and to curb
violence; then the arrays of States resulting more than negates these advantages,
with instability, disorder and violence on a grander scale than before the
14
emergence of modem secular States.
7.
THE THIRD WAY : THE OVERSHOOT ARGUMENT,FROM THE INADEQUACY OF
INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ON STATE POWER.
Having ceded a monopoly on power to
the State, in order to resolve some dilemmas, some of them arising from an
oontrols or balances the power of the
inequitable distribution of power, what
State?
A Super-State.
And its power?
There is a
vicious infinite regress
if the reply to the question "What controls the controller?" is "a further
controller".^ The only promising way of avoiding this problem - other routes
lead (even more) directly to totalitarianism - is by having the first of these
controllers, the State, answer back to those in whose interests it is allegedly
established,
those of the society or group of communities it controls.
implies democratic methods of some kind.
Others go further:
This
'democracy Lis]
the only known means to achieve this control, the only known device by which
, 16
we can try to protect ourselves against the misuse of political power .
In this event, control has mostly failed.
Democracy is extremely attenuated,
even in those states that claim to practice it.
The exercise of power in modern
"democratic" states - much increased power reaching deep into peoples' lives,
power which has passed to certain political elites and is directed at the
attainment of such objectives as economic growth and material "progress" - is
often channelled through 'non-elected authority' and 'is not democratic in the
traditional meaning of the term'.In any case, indirect democratic and other
institutional checks are tenuous in as much as
they depend ultimately on the
toleration of those who have direct control of the forces of the State.
Experience seems to show that such toleration will only be shown so long as
democratic procedures deliver results that are not too disagreeable, that are
broadly in accord with what those who control the coercive power are prepared
�9
to accept.
(Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to
those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation).
But institutional
/I
checks which operate only insofar as a "system" acceptable to the powerholders
is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration
of those checked, are not really checks at all.
n.
? ’■
The problem of controlling the power of the State, u/surping and preventing
the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its
mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the
first place.
The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the
anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation.
8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY.
responsible for actions deliberately undertaken.
A person is
This premiss can be derived,
if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent.
Taking responsibility
for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about
what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,£»/
A
determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision
over to someone or something else.
It implies, that is, moral autonomy.
Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom.
For the
autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject
to the will of another.
another so directs.
Even if it does what another directs, it is not because
In being free, not of constraints (both physical and
self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous
being is morally free.
A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory
(under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon
them.
Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and
with freedom.
An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some
imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject
such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State.
In sum, being a person,
as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority
of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on
ike.
a
>18
personhood implies anarchism.
It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State",
one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy.
But such a "State", with no
independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve
it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism.
On the contrary,
such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic
organisation.
�10
9.
THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE.
The replacement
argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the
State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State
is not necessary.
But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom
or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of
real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable.
The gap may be closed by
appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various
times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked.
Examples of such
Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have
not been omitted.
There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are,
19
anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives,
and
there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic
20
arrangements within the State structure.
10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION.
The arguments
outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the
options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State
and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on.
For example, spontaneous
anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange
ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution
without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could
not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which
durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society
deJintafe.
which these theoretical arguments
will certainly be organised, but the
A
organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures
(and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening
of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct
democracy.
The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin
sometimes pictured it.
It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised
communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of
State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of
Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily.
Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by
representation and subject to a downward system of command.
Within each
community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth
Zand property, and no highly concentrated economic
power. A
community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is
communally owned or not owned at all.
�FOOTNOTES
1.
Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, 1973,
especially p. 139.
Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction
between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin.
2.
That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of
generally beneficial state activity - there is only a
(relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it
can be replaced in one way or another.
course uniquely determined.
Replacement is not of
Lines such replacements can take are
indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature,
consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid.
New York University Press,
1972, and also his Fields, Factories and
Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest
of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913.
3.
On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited
S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff.; also
P.O. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary.
For recent discussion
of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law
court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone,
'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', Anarchism(<y>»~7
Nomos, XIX), New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4.
4.
Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest
case that can be made for the desirability of the State'
Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9).
(M. Taylor,
To cover all
arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants
of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of
Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations,
'Prisoner's
Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person
Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are
not merely eristic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such
games are iterated.
As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate,
there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of
che same logical form - those where people do not contribute to
supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a
"collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where
people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum
quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons,
�2
unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness).
That received arguments
of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the
wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere.
An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also
surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter
of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University
Press, New York,
5.
1980.
An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance
of population size in the arguments for the State.
But size is not
decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided
(or relocated) by organisation into
smaller communities.
The figures
given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which
suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5.
6.
It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State
alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation,
when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of
social cooperation.
7.
This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, 'Social
Theories, Self Management, and
Environmental Problems' in
Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS,
Australian National University, 1980.
8.
As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence
has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges
from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self-
Managing Environment, Allison & Ba<sby, London, 1979, chapter 10,
<A./
but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332.
Similar points
apply as regards many other Dilemma situations.
(
'
'In the experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game
.
>
approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy
even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'.
Abrams, op. cit., p. 308.
).
Cf.
the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.
�10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of
critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially
chapter 5.
11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal
prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including
cases where the State is one of the "adversaries".
12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife,
in modern economic and political theorising.
Both are to be
found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the first (with an
attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition)
in Taylor.
For a
further criticism of such false dichotomies, see Routley, op.cit.,pp.250
13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes
one's social roles
and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze.
Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and
often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover
the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity.
14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op.
cit., chapter 7.
A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way
in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off
nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining
regions.
X
15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent
of his Third Man argument.
16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II.
Fourth edition
(revised), Routledge and Regan Paul, London, 1962, p.
129 and p.
127.
The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental
problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the
dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1,
Marxists never had 'any well-considered view'
'upon which'
(p. 129).
17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and
Opposition 13 ( 1978), 199-2 17: see p. 209 and p. 211 .
18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. Wolff,
In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
No argument
is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute.
Wolff's
argument, for example, is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical
anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff.
While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and
also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely,
no detailed blueprint.
they offer
Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of
anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and
pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives.
�19. Documented in The Anarchist Collectives (edited S. Dolgoff), Free Life Editions,
New York, 1974.
20. As B. Martin boldly asserts,
'The advantages of self-management and
alternative lifestyles are many and significant.
And these
alternatives are entirely feasible: there is plenty of evidence and
experience to support
operates.
their superiority over the present way society
The obstacles to self-management and alternative life
styles are powerful vested interests and institutional resistance to
change', Changing the Cogs, Friends of the Earth, Canberra, 1979,
p- 6.
21. As sketched in some of the material already cited, for example, Routley,
284 ff.
�
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b'l
2051THE IRREFUTABILITY of anarchism
1.
GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE.
The State is like God:
the
anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is
commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed.
The parallel,
drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths.
While
the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe
that there are no states:
none are legitimate.
on the contrary, there are all too many, though
The important parallel is as to arguments.
The
agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed,
and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe
that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence
sitting position.
Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not
only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are
arguments, or at least solid considerations, against.
So it is with soundly
based anarchism, which can both fault arguments for the State
and produce
a case against the State.
A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again
emphasised by Bakunin^ is that of State and Church.
This institutional
comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised;
for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many
very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of
the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an
organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually
answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as
business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent
threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church
used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of
them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have
come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but
as a necessary evil.
Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will
be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove
that God exists.
Since the State is unnecessary, as well as
costly
and
typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other
respects, it should be superseded.
social arrangements.
And it can be succeeded, by alternative
2
2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT
ARGUMENT.
The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the
collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by
alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State
activity being dispensed with.
The argument is not a straight substitution
argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything
accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements.
There is much
the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship
of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State
activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft,
corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land
and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or
environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should
not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and
subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest
destructive pine planting and woodchip projects).
The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or
damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial kind.
This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism.
The argument, implicit
in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of
the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest
and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions,
and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the
powerful groups the State tends to serve).
But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions
which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required.
For why should
people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their
collective interest?
Such functions can be performed, and performed better,
without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the
accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance
of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves".
The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case
2
form, considering each function in turn.
In each case the function is carried
out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the
people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements.
Consider, for
example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building
programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community
access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved
of infrastructure or hindered by the State.
Such beneficial services would in
general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally
held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the
operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of
being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals
and powerful agencies.
Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal
types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than
individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to
apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community
welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are
privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private
individuals.
As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the
collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of
those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation.
But
those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective
interest.
In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is
retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality,
corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached.
State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may
be similarly removed or replaced.
These services, which include reduction of
violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services,
security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to
make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it.
do not.
They
Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by
communities themselves without intervention by the State.
Secondly, a great
many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence
of which the State is the main purveyor .and which is often the outcome of
WAvditai 3
the State's propping up of gross
.
A community which seriously
A
limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes
«//
gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for
many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving
violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and
many of those involving personal violence.
Such a left-leaning anarchism is
also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the
State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth
that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution.
As all
too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and
police inequitable distribution. 5? This then is the main classical argument
for anarchism.
The argument has however been challenged, both by historical
and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot
act in their collective interest without coercion.
I
3.
THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE
LIKE.
The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for
anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the
Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where
individuals will not agree or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to
maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can
furnish.In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain
advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others’
contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from
others' restraint).
The claim is that only the State with its backing
of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed.
A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type,
Including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the
Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to
secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two
players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have
been separately imprisoned.
A State representative makes the following offers
separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while
his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while
the accomplice gets 8 years.
It so happens that if both prisoners remain
silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence.
if both confess they would each receive 4 years.
But
The "game" can be summarised
in the following "payoff" matrix:Prisoner 1
S(ilence)
C(onfess)
S
-1, -1
-8, 0
C
0, -8
S t rategies
-4, -4
The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free
at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in
each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other
does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also
in fact a minimax strategy).
For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes
free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by
confessing.
But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain
an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously
called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent.
5
4. FOILING THE PRISONERS'
DILEMMA ARGUMENT.
It is bizarre that a dilemma
alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene,
forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an
optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course
the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemmas is
inessential, as is much else from the example.
But some features of the
prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption
that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate
or really cooperate.
Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation
assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are
dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in
their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed.
The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly
seriously limited.?
A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect
that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference.
It is claimed
that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate,
that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of
the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement'
(Taylor, p. 5).
Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is
very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently
encouraged privatisation
of life, the
extent of cooperation and trust would
o
undoubtedly be much higher.
The argument has to depend crucially then on
substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings,
e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large
measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people
were that unreliable and devious,tate arrangements involved in providing
public goods/-oueh as—taxatioa-y would not succeed either) .
That such assumptions
are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the
first.suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they
are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours
and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical
scepticism,
involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the
other security against default, and so on.
The question of the character of human interests and preferences
and the
extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is
fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and
also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities.
A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated
political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a
preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count
is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings
of others nor on the social context in which that human operates.
While the
individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy
the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural
pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular
media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure
towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence,
And, sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community
A
(which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social
influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners'
Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State.
5.
WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED.
What the Dilemma-based case
for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are
outs tanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also
o’wt foot
damaging if unresolved, lint ypsoHved by State intervention, and only so
g-
fa
(optimally) resolved, ami Finallythat in the course of so resolving these
Dilemma situations, worse situations than those that are resolved are not
thereby induced.
These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be
satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging.
For several of the
conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional,
worse) and involve considerations about whichf reasonable parties can differ.
/W/’
chuck
The selection of Dilemmas,provides an example: after all there are many such
A
A
Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of
.—t>n Vi o!-c h
family -fs*tds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not
worthy of State attention.
There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be
satisfied at all.
For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games,
Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the
Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just
of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately
represented by what is called a supergame.
But in many such sequential
Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming
separated players with purely egoistic interests/^ For what sequential
games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be
dependent upon past performance of other players.
This dependence effectively
removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma
situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from
past social interaction.
In such supergames then, no intervention is required.
7
Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing
the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that
they can really cooperate.
Equally important, and equally independent of the
State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so
the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate J'1
Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has
a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc.
A
Nor
is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal
strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives
they be required in recalcitrant cases), and
is known (should
is used even by the State, e.g.
But at no stage is the State
gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc.
required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners' Dilemmas
are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations
can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they
are not already catered for.
And in fact communal and cooperative organisation
did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in
the case of the Commons.
In sum, here also replacement works.
There are no important Dilemma
situations, it seems, where the State is essential.
The State has been thought
to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example,
that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour
is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart
from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective
goods - is through State control.But it is quite evident that there are
other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional
markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs).
Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations
/J
has very extensive effects, many of them negative, so that the gains made, if
any, in so resolving Dilemma^ situations, appear to be substantially outweighed
by the costs involved.
For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State
to put in the balance.
As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with
ty showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more
,
new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as/
/A
t * /<»
the working
differently with the State as a further player (since the State
may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.).
also to further arguments against the State.
These points lead
9
to accept.
(Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to
those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation).
But institutional
checks which operate only insofar as a ^system*^ acceptable to the powerholders
is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration
of those checked,^ are not really checks at all.
£
gand preventing
The problem of controlling the power of the State, 'ur
IA
the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its
mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the
first place.
The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the
anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation.
8.
THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY.
responsible for actions deliberately undertaken.
A person is
This premiss can be derived,
if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent,
Taking responsibility
for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about
what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,A
4
determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision
over to someone or something else. , It implies, that is, moral autonomy,
Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom.
For the
autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject
to the will of another.
another so directs.
Even if it does what another directs, it is not because
In being free, not of constraints (both physical and
self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous
being is morally free.
A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory
(under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon
them.
Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and
with freedom.
An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some
imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject
such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State.
7
s
In sum, being a person,
as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority
of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on
, ika.
/J
18
personhiood implies^anarchism.
V
It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State",
one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy.
But such a "State", with no
independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve
it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism,
On the contrary,
such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic
organisation.
10
9.
The replacement
THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE.
argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the
State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State
is not necessary.
But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom
or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of
real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable.
The gap may be closed by
appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various
times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked.
Examples of such
Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have
not been omitted.
There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are,
19
anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives,
and
there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic
20
arrangements within the State structure.
10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION.
The arguments
outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the
options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State
and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on.
For example, spontaneous
anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange
ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution
without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could
not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which
durable supersession of the State depends.
which these theoretical arguments.
A
The sort of anarchist society
will certainly be organised, but the
organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures
(and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening
of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct
democracy.
The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin
sometimes pictured it.
It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised
communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of
State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of
Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily.
Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by
representation and subject to a downward system of command.
Within each
community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth
and property, and no highly concentrated economic
power.
community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is
communally owned or not owned at all.
A
11
While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and
also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, they offer
no detailed blueprint.
Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of
anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and
pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives.
11. STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION TO ANARCHIST SOCIETY ; THE FOREST SUCCESSION
MODEL OF REPLACEMENT BY AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE.
The main strategy, emerging
from the First Way, is that of replacement : transition to a new anarchist
social order proceeds by replacement or addption of the more satisfactory State
organisations and structures by organisations and structures of a more
anarchistic cast, and by removal or phasing out of remaining no longer
necessary or unsatisfactory State arrangements.
Replacement and supersession suggest a biological model, of such change
and succession as occurs where one forest type succeeds another; and such
a model is in turn very suggestive.
To make the model more definite, and
to give it some local colour, consider forest succession where a sub-tropical
rainforest replaces a eucalypt forest, as analogous to the case where anarchism
replaces a Statist society.
There is certainly a marked change in structure,
typically from a tall forest with a fairly open canopy to a more compact
closed forest with more layers of vegetation, much more local diversity and
a richer variety of life forms, especially floral forms.
A forest is not
merely a set of trees, but trees in structural arrangement and interdependence,
not merely on one another but on other life forms such as pollinating insects,
seed-carrying birds and animals, and so on; and the changes in structure
include changes in microclimate, in soil moisture levels and humus and
bacterial content.
The change of forest type may be by evolution, by hastened or induced
evolution, or by catastrophe (revolution) as when a eucalypt forest is
clearfelled and artificially succeeded by planted rainforest.
(Strictly,
there is a spectrum of practices and replacement strategies between evolutionary
and revolutionary, and various different revolutionary strategies; and the
standard evolutionary-revolutionary contrast presents a false dichotomy.)
Even reliance on predominantly evolutionary methods, which tend to be
very slow by human time scales may require some (management) practices, else
evolution towards rainforest will not begin or continue.
For example, seeds
for rainforest species may not be available if adjoining areas have been
stripped of suitable seed trees, e.g. by clearing or eucalypt conversion,
in which case it will be necessary to introduce seeds (of anarchist ideas,
methods, arrangements, etc.).
And rainforest evolution may not be able to
13
12. APPLYING THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL.
How to apply the model is not
difficult to see in broad outline, and many of the further details have
been filled out by work, that can be described as indicating how allegiance
can be shifted in practice from where we mostly are to alternative social
22.
arrangements and life-styles built on self-management and mutual aid.
The seeds of anarchism should be broadcast or planted, anarchist (nonStatist)
arrangements instituted or strengthened, and efforts made to replace or
vulnerable Statist arrangements.^ Some of the practices are familiar :
'anarchist groups, clubs, pamphlets, broadcasts, newsletters, etc.; (anarchist)
cooperatives, exchanges, neighbourhood groups, rural communities, etc.
Others
are slightly less familiar: avoidance of State influence by arrangements beyond
State reach such as costless (or alternative currency) interchanges of
goods and services, action directed at removing decision-making from State
departments, such as forest services, and into citizen hands, and ultimately, to
decentralized local communities.
In this sort of way worthwhile State arrangements
can be replaced, and power can be progressively transferred from the State, and
returned to the community and to people more directly involved.
"V-
ht)
FOOTNOTES
1.
Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London,
especially p. 139.
1973,
Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction
between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin.
2.
That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of
generally beneficial state activity - there is only a
(relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it
can be replaced in one way or another.
course uniquely determined.
Replacement is not of
Lines such replacements can take are
indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature,
consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid.
New York University Press,
1972, and also his Fields, Factories and
Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest
of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913.
3.
On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited
S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York,
1970, p. 206 ff. ; also
P.J. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary .
For recent discussion
of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law
court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone,
'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', A
Nomos / XIX^New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4.
V
4.
J-
Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest
case that can be made for the desirability of the State'
Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9).
(M. Taylor,
To cover all
arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants
of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of
Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations,
'Prisoner's
Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person
Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are
X
not merely e^gjistic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such
games are iterated.
As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate,
there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of
the same logical form - those where people do not contribute to
supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a
"collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where
people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum"
quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons,
2
unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness).
That received arguments
of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the
wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere.
An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also
surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter
of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University
Press, New York,
5.
1980.
An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance
of population size in the arguments for the State.
But size is not
decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided
(or relocated) by organisation info
The figures
smaller communities.
given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which
suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5.
6.
It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State
alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation,
when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of
social cooperation.
7.
This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley,
Theories, Self Management, and
'Social
Environmental Problems' in
Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS,
Australian National University, 1980.
8.
As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence
has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges
from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self-
Managing Environment, Allison & BUfsby, London, 1979, chapter 10,
but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332.
Similar points
apply as regards many other Dilemma situations.
'In the. experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game
approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy
even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'.
Abrams, op. cit., p. 308.
9.
Cf.
the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.
3
10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of
critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially
chapter 5.
11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal
prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including
cases where the State is one of the "adversaries".
12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife,
in modem economic and political theorising.
Both are to be
found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the firstJ^(with an
attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition^/
op. cit., p. 250 ff.
13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes
one's social roles
erf
and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze.
Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and
often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover
the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity.
cit., chapter 7.
A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way
o/icA
14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op.
in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off
regions.
15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent
of his Third Man argument.
16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II.
Fourth edition
(revised), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127.
The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental
problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the
dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1, 'upon which'
Marxists never had 'any well-considered view'
(p. 129).
17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and
Opposition 13 (1978), 199-217: see p. 209 and p.(^25jTP
18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. l/olff,
In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
No argument
is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute.
argument, for example^is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical
anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff.
Wolff's
i
nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining
THE IRREFUTABILITY OF ANARCHISM
1.
GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE.
The State is like God:
the
anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is
commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed.
The parallel,
drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths.
While
the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe
that there are no states:
none are legitimate.
on the contrary, there are all too many, though
The important parallel is as to arguments.
The
agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed,
and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe
that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence
Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not
sit-ting position.
only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are
arguments, or at least solid considerations, against.
So it is with soundly
,
nene.
based anarchism^ which can both faults arguments for the State^and
(ncisi'je.
X case against the State.
A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again
emphasised by Bakunin^- is that of State and Church.Clx This institutional
comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised;
for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many
very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of
the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an
organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually
answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as
A
business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent
threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church
used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of
them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have
come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but
as a necessary evil
Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will
be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove
that God exists.
Since the State is unnecessary, as well as
costly
and
typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other
respects, it should be superseded.
social arrangements.,^
And it can be succeeded, by alternative
2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT
ARGUMENT.
The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the
collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by
alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State
activity being dispensed with.
The argument is not a straight substitution
argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything
accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements.
There is much
the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship
of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State
activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft,
corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land
and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or
environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should
not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and
subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest
destructive pine planting and woodchip projects).
The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or
damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial J$ind.
This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism.
The argumertf:, implicit
in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of
the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest
and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions,
and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the
powerful groups the State tends to serve).
But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions
which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required.
For why should
people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their
collective interest?
Such functions can be performed, and performed better,
without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the
accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance
of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves".
The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case
2
form, considering each function in turn.
In each case the function is carried
out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the
people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements.
Consider, for
example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building
programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community
access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved
of infrastructure or hindered by the State.
Such beneficial services would in
general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally
3
held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the
operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of
being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals
and powerful agencies.
Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal
types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than
individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to
apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community
welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are
privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private
individuals.
As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the
collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of
those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation.
But
those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective
interest.
In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is
retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality,
corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached.
State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may
be similarly removed or replaced.
These services, which include reduction of
violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services,
security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to
make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it.
do not.
They
Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by
communities themselves without intervention by the State.
Secondly, a great
many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence
of which the State is the main purveyor and which is often the outcome of
ol
3
the State's propping up of gross inequities.
A community which seriously
limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes
a//
gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for
many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving
violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and
many of those involving personal violence.
Such a left-leaning anarchism is
also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the
State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth
that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution.
As all
too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and
police inequitable distributionThis then is the main classical argument
for anarchism.
The argument has however been challenged, both by historical
and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot
act in their collective interest without coercion.
3.
THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE
LIKE.
The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for
anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the
Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where
---------
(?)
individuals will not agree“or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to
maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can
4
furnish.
In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain
advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others'
contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from
others' restraint).
The claim is that only the State with its backing
of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed. (6J
A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type,
including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the
Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to
secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two
players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have
been separately imprisoned.
A State representative makes the following offers
separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while
his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while
the accomplice gets 8 years.
It so happens that if both prisoners remain
silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence.
if both confess they would each receive 4 years.
But
The "game" can be summarised
in the following "payoff" matrix:-
Prisoner 2
The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free
at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in
each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other
does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also
in fact a minimax strategy).
For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes
free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by
confessing.
But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain
an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously
called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent.
5
4. FOILING THE PRISONERS'
DILEMMA ARGUMENT.
It is bizarre that a dilemma
alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene,
forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an
optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course
the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemma£is
inessential, as is much else from the example.
But some features of the
prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption
that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate
or really cooperate.
Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation
assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are
dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in
their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed.
The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly
seriously limited.?
A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect
that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference.
It is claimed
that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate,
that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of
the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement'
(Taylor, p. 5).
Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is
very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently
encouraged privatisation
of life, the
extent of cooperation and trust would
o
undoubtedly be much higher.
The argument has to depend crucially then on
substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings,
e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large
measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people
were that unreliable and deviousState arrangements involved in providing
public goodsy such as taxation', would not succeed either).
That such assumptions
are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the
first,suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they
are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours
and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical
scepticism,
involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the
other security against default, and so on.
The question of the character of human interests and preferences
and the
extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is
fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and
also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities.
A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated
political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a
preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count
is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings
of others nor on the social context in which that human operates.
While the
individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy
the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural
pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular
media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure
towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence.
And^sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community
(which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social
influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners'
Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State.
5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED.'
What the Dilemma-based case
for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are
outstanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also
qaA'-fkc-l'
oft
damaging if unresolved,\but resolve^/by State intervention, and only so
A A- jZAz-zv
(optimally) resolved, and finally.that in the course of so resolving these
Dilemma situations, worse situation than those that are resolved are not
thereby induced.
These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be
satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging.
For several of the
conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional,
worse) and involve considerations about which reasonable parties can differ.
The selection of Dilemmas^provides an example^: after all there are many such
Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of
l/«o|on<c or
family, feuds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not
worthy of State attention.
There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be
satisfied at all.
For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games,
Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the
Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just
of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately
represented by what is called a supergame.
But in many such sequential
Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming
separated players with purely egoistic interests?^ For what sequential
games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be
dependent upon past performance of other players.
This dependence effectively
removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma
situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from
past social interaction.
In such supergames then, no intervention is required.
7
Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing
the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that
they can really cooperate.
Equally important, and equally independent of the
State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so
the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate.
Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has
a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc.
A
Nor
is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal
strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives
they be required in recalcitrant cases), and
is known (should
is used even by the State, e.g.
But at no stage is the State
gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc.
required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners’ Dilemmas
are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations
can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they
are not already catered for.
And in fact communal and cooperative organisation
did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in
the case of the Commons.
In sum, here also replacement works.
There are no important Dilemma
situations, it seems, where the State is essential.
The State has been thought
to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example,
that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour
is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart
from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective
goods - is through State control.1-
But it is quite evident that there are
other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional
markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs).
Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations
has very extensive effects', many of them negative, so that the gains made, if
any, in so resolving Dilemma1
situations, appear to be substantially outweighed
by the costs involved.
For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State
to put in the balance.
As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with
its authority showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more
/A
of
important, new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as with the working
example, or differently with the State as a further player (since the State
may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.).
also to further arguments against the State.
These points lead
8
6.
THE SECOND WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM PROBLEM RECURRENCE^/
The solution
by the State to problems of social organisation repeats or generates in more
dangerous form the very problems introduction of the State was designed to
solve, including new Dilemmas.
Suppose, for instance, the secular State really
were introduced in order to solve Prisoners' Dilemmas - introduced as opposed
to inherited from the religious State and the Church, and maintained to prop
up privilege and foster objectives that are not in its communities' interests -
then the array of States generates new Prisoners' Dilemmas, which there is no
Super-State to resolve by coercion.
Suppose, as the myth has it, the State
really were introduced in the interest of order and stability and to curb
violence; then the arrays of States resulting more than negates these advantages,
with instability, disorder and violence on a grander scale than before the
14
emergence of modem secular States.
7.
THE THIRD WAY : THE OVERSHOOT ARGUMENT,FROM THE INADEQUACY OF
INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ON STATE POWER.
Having ceded a monopoly on power to
the State, in order to resolve some dilemmas, some of them arising from an
oontrols or balances the power of the
inequitable distribution of power, what
State?
A Super-State.
And its power?
There is a
vicious infinite regress
if the reply to the question "What controls the controller?" is "a further
controller".^ The only promising way of avoiding this problem - other routes
lead (even more) directly to totalitarianism - is by having the first of these
controllers, the State, answer back to those in whose interests it is allegedly
established,
those of the society or group of communities it controls.
implies democratic methods of some kind.
Others go further:
This
'democracy Lis]
the only known means to achieve this control, the only known device by which
, 16
we can try to protect ourselves against the misuse of political power .
In this event, control has mostly failed.
Democracy is extremely attenuated,
even in those states that claim to practice it.
The exercise of power in modern
"democratic" states - much increased power reaching deep into peoples' lives,
power which has passed to certain political elites and is directed at the
attainment of such objectives as economic growth and material "progress" - is
often channelled through 'non-elected authority' and 'is not democratic in the
traditional meaning of the term'.In any case, indirect democratic and other
institutional checks are tenuous in as much as
they depend ultimately on the
toleration of those who have direct control of the forces of the State.
Experience seems to show that such toleration will only be shown so long as
democratic procedures deliver results that are not too disagreeable, that are
broadly in accord with what those who control the coercive power are prepared
9
to accept.
(Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to
those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation).
But institutional
/I
checks which operate only insofar as a "system" acceptable to the powerholders
is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration
of those checked, are not really checks at all.
n.
? ’■
The problem of controlling the power of the State, u/surping and preventing
the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its
mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the
first place.
The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the
anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation.
8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY.
responsible for actions deliberately undertaken.
A person is
This premiss can be derived,
if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent.
Taking responsibility
for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about
what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,£»/
A
determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision
over to someone or something else.
It implies, that is, moral autonomy.
Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom.
For the
autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject
to the will of another.
another so directs.
Even if it does what another directs, it is not because
In being free, not of constraints (both physical and
self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous
being is morally free.
A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory
(under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon
them.
Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and
with freedom.
An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some
imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject
such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State.
In sum, being a person,
as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority
of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on
ike.
a
>18
personhood implies anarchism.
It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State",
one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy.
But such a "State", with no
independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve
it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism.
On the contrary,
such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic
organisation.
10
9.
THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE.
The replacement
argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the
State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State
is not necessary.
But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom
or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of
real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable.
The gap may be closed by
appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various
times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked.
Examples of such
Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have
not been omitted.
There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are,
19
anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives,
and
there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic
20
arrangements within the State structure.
10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION.
The arguments
outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the
options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State
and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on.
For example, spontaneous
anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange
ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution
without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could
not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which
durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society
deJintafe.
which these theoretical arguments
will certainly be organised, but the
A
organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures
(and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening
of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct
democracy.
The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin
sometimes pictured it.
It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised
communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of
State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of
Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily.
Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by
representation and subject to a downward system of command.
Within each
community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth
Zand property, and no highly concentrated economic
power. A
community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is
communally owned or not owned at all.
FOOTNOTES
1.
Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, 1973,
especially p. 139.
Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction
between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin.
2.
That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of
generally beneficial state activity - there is only a
(relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it
can be replaced in one way or another.
course uniquely determined.
Replacement is not of
Lines such replacements can take are
indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature,
consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid.
New York University Press,
1972, and also his Fields, Factories and
Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest
of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913.
3.
On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited
S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff.; also
P.O. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary.
For recent discussion
of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law
court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone,
'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', Anarchism(<y>»~7
Nomos, XIX), New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4.
4.
Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest
case that can be made for the desirability of the State'
Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9).
(M. Taylor,
To cover all
arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants
of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of
Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations,
'Prisoner's
Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person
Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are
not merely eristic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such
games are iterated.
As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate,
there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of
che same logical form - those where people do not contribute to
supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a
"collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where
people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum
quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons,
2
unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness).
That received arguments
of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the
wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere.
An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also
surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter
of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University
Press, New York,
5.
1980.
An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance
of population size in the arguments for the State.
But size is not
decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided
(or relocated) by organisation into
smaller communities.
The figures
given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which
suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5.
6.
It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State
alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation,
when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of
social cooperation.
7.
This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, 'Social
Theories, Self Management, and
Environmental Problems' in
Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS,
Australian National University, 1980.
8.
As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence
has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges
from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self-
Managing Environment, Allison & Ba<sby, London, 1979, chapter 10,
<A./
but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332.
Similar points
apply as regards many other Dilemma situations.
(
'
'In the experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game
.
>
approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy
even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'.
Abrams, op. cit., p. 308.
).
Cf.
the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.
10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of
critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially
chapter 5.
11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal
prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including
cases where the State is one of the "adversaries".
12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife,
in modern economic and political theorising.
Both are to be
found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the first (with an
attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition)
in Taylor.
For a
further criticism of such false dichotomies, see Routley, op.cit.,pp.250
13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes
one's social roles
and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze.
Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and
often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover
the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity.
14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op.
cit., chapter 7.
A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way
in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off
nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining
regions.
X
15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent
of his Third Man argument.
16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II.
Fourth edition
(revised), Routledge and Regan Paul, London, 1962, p.
129 and p.
127.
The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental
problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the
dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1,
Marxists never had 'any well-considered view'
'upon which'
(p. 129).
17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and
Opposition 13 ( 1978), 199-2 17: see p. 209 and p. 211 .
18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. Wolff,
In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970.
No argument
is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute.
Wolff's
argument, for example, is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical
anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff.
While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and
also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely,
no detailed blueprint.
they offer
Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of
anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and
pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives.
19. Documented in The Anarchist Collectives (edited S. Dolgoff), Free Life Editions,
New York, 1974.
20. As B. Martin boldly asserts,
'The advantages of self-management and
alternative lifestyles are many and significant.
And these
alternatives are entirely feasible: there is plenty of evidence and
experience to support
operates.
their superiority over the present way society
The obstacles to self-management and alternative life
styles are powerful vested interests and institutional resistance to
change', Changing the Cogs, Friends of the Earth, Canberra, 1979,
p- 6.
21. As sketched in some of the material already cited, for example, Routley,
284 ff.
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2073
WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN flAClF/Stf
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu'
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
�2
dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done.
• Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils
There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter
attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them....
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death.
�3
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17).
‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are "resolved”.
�4
Deep-green chart:
dilemma
input
Arguments to
incompatible
prescriptions
->
Processing of dilemma,
directive
situational procedures
output
Corresponding Taoist chart:
Black
directive
Box
output
input
It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
�5
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
“unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.)
�6
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”).
2.
On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p. 160). On neo-Daoism, sec UT.
�7
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably
abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or,
perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang
wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and
virtually all the worst wars.
While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much
larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us
distinguish such wars as techno-powered, wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
�8
this effort).
Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading”
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LTp.152).3
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market
capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
3
There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be
appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
�9
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...).
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
(the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a
favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite
targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
• conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
• social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
�10
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
• elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
• force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
• contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in
• elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp
curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
�facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars — the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast
in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that
available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
defensive v/ax, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
�12
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information
accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars
both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence
‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’
strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really z7/-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
• seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222)
• surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
�13
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194).
• advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
• coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving
‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But
in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give
my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of
benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary
first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to
bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured
natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly
illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and
weakness turned hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
paradox).5
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
�14
The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p. 197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness,
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size,
such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive
technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small
technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria
for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off:
reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of
operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair
inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
�15
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
• War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
• Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6
This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
second premiss.
4. Standard and moral pacifism.
6
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
• capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
• capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
• repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist”
action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
�16
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
• It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and
continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire
consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and
important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery
can be thwarted in this way.
Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent
�17
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise
English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise
English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item:
‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any
circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds, stretched pacifism.'1 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”,
“fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism:
overcomprehensive might have been better.
�18
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p.10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes
pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong
one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8
Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
�19
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS
p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to
“second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152)
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow
too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than
�20
popularization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The
‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
�21
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
“natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
P2
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9
modified
9
results:
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
�22
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
Appendix
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will
prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be
done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
vandolence.
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
�23
‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in. Inquiry ); referred to as AL
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion
papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)-, referred to as MD.
R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in
environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
�
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2073
WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN flAClF/Stf
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu'
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
2
dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done.
• Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils
There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter
attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them....
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death.
3
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17).
‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are "resolved”.
4
Deep-green chart:
dilemma
input
Arguments to
incompatible
prescriptions
->
Processing of dilemma,
directive
situational procedures
output
Corresponding Taoist chart:
Black
directive
Box
output
input
It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
5
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
“unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.)
6
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”).
2.
On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p. 160). On neo-Daoism, sec UT.
7
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably
abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or,
perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang
wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and
virtually all the worst wars.
While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much
larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us
distinguish such wars as techno-powered, wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
8
this effort).
Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading”
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LTp.152).3
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market
capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
3
There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be
appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
9
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...).
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
(the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a
favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite
targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
• conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
• social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
10
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
• elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
• force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
• contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in
• elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp
curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars — the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast
in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that
available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
defensive v/ax, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
12
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information
accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars
both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence
‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’
strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really z7/-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
• seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222)
• surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
13
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194).
• advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
• coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving
‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But
in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give
my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of
benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary
first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to
bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured
natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly
illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and
weakness turned hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
paradox).5
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
14
The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p. 197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness,
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size,
such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive
technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small
technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria
for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off:
reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of
operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair
inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
15
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
• War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
• Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6
This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
second premiss.
4. Standard and moral pacifism.
6
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
• capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
• capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
• repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist”
action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
16
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
• It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and
continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire
consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and
important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery
can be thwarted in this way.
Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent
17
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise
English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise
English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item:
‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any
circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds, stretched pacifism.'1 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”,
“fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism:
overcomprehensive might have been better.
18
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p.10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes
pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong
one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8
Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
19
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS
p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to
“second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152)
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow
too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than
20
popularization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The
‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
21
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
“natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
P2
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9
modified
9
results:
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
22
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
Appendix
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will
prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be
done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
vandolence.
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
23
‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in. Inquiry ); referred to as AL
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion
papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)-, referred to as MD.
R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in
environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
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Box 14: Green Projects in Progress
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. a new democratic public sphere of empowered,
decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of
national and regional state structures to facilitate
legal, economic, educational and cultural values and
practices, to support those local citizens lacking in
material and cultural resources, and to settle the many
disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of
any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local,
direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures
at the national level will make life for traditional
political parties very difficult if not impossible.
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participation in politics in the US, almost exclusively at the
local level^?.
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a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to
revitalise local participation and local political power in his
As one of a range of far’strong democracy'.
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A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL
THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES
There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to
For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and
commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift
of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their
implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be
guaranteed.
__
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is
put in a sharp form as follows:1*
Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can
there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will
yield a way of protecting environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which
effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even
democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic
ocout-r
outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for
instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an
antidemocratic tyrant.3
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon
holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green
theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic,
political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly
from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the
‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which
3
Goodin condensing Saward p.168.
( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few
absolutes and little certainty.)
Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
nullified in UTD.
�make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain
their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a
common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of
democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens.
These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their
importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values
which the imperative represents.4
As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien,
and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As
more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic,
authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are
offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of
which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
\ first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to
convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through
‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable
principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well
beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the
interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore,
there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given
the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect
these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7
Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5.
Cf. p.12 essay.
[Reference]
[Reference]
�3
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.).
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
CO
l
Qf~
(it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers).
Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society,
given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees
the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as
desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and
the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The
basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our
communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and
other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined
by ecological imperatives’8
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie
with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted
democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand,
they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while
revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but
rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are
inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values,
laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have
instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable
canonical force.9
familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
What Skyward proposes instead is dep
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
8
9
[Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of
Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage.
[ref].
�4
... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests
that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit
is unjustifiable.10
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a
central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed
decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical
requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances
where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be
required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is
certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously
represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun
(again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures,
attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby
removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
)
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.11
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal
change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans.
10
11
Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of
principles, policy objectives or the like.
[Ref. and page]
.
/
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�11
4.
Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating
structures.
The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which
organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating
the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford
Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is
constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure
itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts.
Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of
seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-
dissipating structure.
To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R,
where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of
worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my
world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued
items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and
perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is
a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where
such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an
element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of
Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to
subsets or types within Q.33)
Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops.
Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here
is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory.
+1
X
/ \
„ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2}
R = — is as shown by arrows.
T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component
-1
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
33
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t
but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T).
�11
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
in
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10.
n
�12
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t.
t
c
Cl
C4
a
C2
c3
b
at
b2
a2
bi
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
absolutism
realism
objectivism
in
rough
contrast
respectively
with
maximizing rationalism
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
pluralism
nonrealism
nonjectivism
satisizing rationalism
Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we
might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10.
�13
actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards
centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic,
implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument
here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional
arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The
state is organisationally otiose.
Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised
functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work
discloses.36
36
Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to
putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is
explained) and Sylvan 95.
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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. a new democratic public sphere of empowered,
decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of
national and regional state structures to facilitate
legal, economic, educational and cultural values and
practices, to support those local citizens lacking in
material and cultural resources, and to settle the many
disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of
any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local,
direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures
at the national level will make life for traditional
political parties very difficult if not impossible.
This
development is to be applauded because too many citizens
in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of
the possibilities of democratic participation and often
equate democracy with voting rituals® . /zCtZJ/J
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participation in politics in the US, almost exclusively at the
local level^?.
Barber is perhaps the most prominent example of
a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to
revitalise local participation and local political power in his
As one of a range of far’strong democracy'.
reaching reforms,, including the establishment of 'neigborhood
assemblies', he advocates 'a national civic communications
vision
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8.2.95
A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL
THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES
There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to
For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and
commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift
of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their
implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be
guaranteed.
__
This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is
put in a sharp form as follows:1*
Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can
there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will
yield a way of protecting environments?
However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not
really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which
effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even
democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic
ocout-r
outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for
instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an
antidemocratic tyrant.3
A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox
against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon
holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green
theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or
compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident
conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value).
Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:
The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic,
political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly
from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the
‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which
3
Goodin condensing Saward p.168.
( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few
absolutes and little certainty.)
Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and
nullified in UTD.
make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain
their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a
common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of
democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens.
These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their
importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values
which the imperative represents.4
As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien,
and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As
more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes.
A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is
protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as
authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic,
authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are
offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of
which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions.
\ first illustration is directed against Porritt:
A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like
‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive
production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6
Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and
targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if
the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their
organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to
convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through
‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable
principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted.
A second example looks at an alleged
contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots
democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global
conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature,
and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a
limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our
environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are
proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well
beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the
interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore,
there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given
the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect
these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7
Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5.
Cf. p.12 essay.
[Reference]
[Reference]
3
The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A
further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are
proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles,
however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power.
‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic
procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves
turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for
their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic
procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress.
(Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.).
To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims
CO
l
Qf~
(it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers).
Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society,
given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees
the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as
desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and
the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The
basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our
communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and
other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined
by ecological imperatives’8
In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold
ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie
with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted
democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand,
they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while
revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but
rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change.
The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s
important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter
indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists
of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are
inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values,
laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have
instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable
canonical force.9
familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value.
What Skyward proposes instead is dep
Out therewith go deep-green positions.
8
9
[Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of
Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage.
[ref].
4
... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests
that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit
is unjustifiable.10
Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a
central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and
democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed
decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical
requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances
where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be
required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is
certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously
represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun
(again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures,
attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.
In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby
removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There
needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political
)
culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a
familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that
‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more
particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’.
Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the
implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green
political theory.11
But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led
(retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just
elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable
living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal
change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans.
10
11
Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of
principles, policy objectives or the like.
[Ref. and page]
.
/
/“■
w
/’
11
4.
Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating
structures.
The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which
organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating
the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford
Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is
constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure
itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts.
Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of
seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-
dissipating structure.
To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R,
where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of
worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my
world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued
items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and
perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is
a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where
such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an
element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of
Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to
subsets or types within Q.33)
Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops.
Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here
is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory.
+1
X
/ \
„ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2}
R = — is as shown by arrows.
T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component
-1
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
33
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t
but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T).
11
Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to
tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand
leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items.
Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
in
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10.
n
12
central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t.
t
c
Cl
C4
a
C2
c3
b
at
b2
a2
bi
Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a
flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say.
What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central
control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy
without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order,
including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute
rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34
Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural
considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required
for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there
need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c),
and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective
value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts
contrast sets emerge:35
centralism
elitism
statism
absolutism
realism
objectivism
in
rough
contrast
respectively
with
maximizing rationalism
decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism
pluralism
nonrealism
nonjectivism
satisizing rationalism
Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we
might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of
Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.
For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10.
13
actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards
centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic,
implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument
here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional
arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The
state is organisationally otiose.
Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised
functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work
discloses.36
36
Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to
putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is
explained) and Sylvan 95.
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Handwritten notes and typescript papers with handwritten emendations and annotations, 'A fundamental dilemma for (deep-) green political theory? Democratic or authoritarian procedures' (dated 8.2.95), and 'Technical interlude, strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures'.
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Lake George - Floor - Pile 7
Box 14: Green Projects in Progress
Lake George House
Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7
-
https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2a58a736a0fbf8719d74d4ee50c7d4ca.pdf
07f4f100b518084f6934e2d356da87a8
PDF Text
Text
PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental
problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not
be adequately addressed.
Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade,
impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why
the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More
immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far
enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More
thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question
entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread
problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly
recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper
paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers
lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow
band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more
satisfactory answer can be broached.
Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant
paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems,
and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the
problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers
to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer
through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among
significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through
its standard history is dismal environmental news.
0. Focal questions and deeper answers.
Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate.
In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify
such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering,
many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More
recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation
procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave
entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on).
Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly,
Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their
own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy
their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through
human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this:
because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting
enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms,
paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats
and of the earth.
1
In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23).
�Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental
impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring
through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies,
and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they
may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat
superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a
community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so
resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less
superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive
paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production
ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2
An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating
action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea
systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever.
Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect
termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are
opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an
elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes
of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are
also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social
paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's
routing procedures.
Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding
topography on action space.
Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also
correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new
species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically
engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize.
The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures,
creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical
sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans
are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a
great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained,
what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however
2
3
4
For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see
further Routley.
I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is
the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their
damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant
philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard.
As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How
people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial
�3
through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently
aligned paradigms.
One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig
cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket):
Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots
many
emergent
problems
interlinked
proximate
causes
plural
supporting
sources
multiple
interlinked
roots
Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single
answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are
plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are
plural.5
What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the
pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be
the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for
such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea
structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and
sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is
source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and
other rational transmission connections.6)
explanation, of them.
History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there
are plausible alternative histories.
While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments
virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot
roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots,
normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on).
A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The
�4
These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they
resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate
roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also
go astray, wrongly directed or whatever.
There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated—
including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions,
and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal
questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been
addressed elsewhere.
1. Problems and paradigms.
Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different
components, and admit and deserve separate explanation.
la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions.
A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already
been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework
independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor
problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such
indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of
• sustaining biodiversity and
• maintaining significant wilderness.8
Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable
survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding
problems.
In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are
(at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how
they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of
Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in
fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of
what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental
problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much
oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots
metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to
mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme
of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because
rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may
not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where
they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or
(genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc.
Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis,
bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development,
etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start.
7
See Sylvan and Bennett, GE.
8
As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands
Project.
�5
problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters.
Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very
little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys
us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and
expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their
habitats.
To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on
offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as
comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get
to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very
difficult situation.
That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars
uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these
sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are
supported by particular ideologies.
lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on.
A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical
sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation
function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required
to
faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc.
A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional
and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social
group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is
meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the
community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes
delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we
can work back towards the underlying models.
The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a
complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g.
metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen
that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely
discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations:
thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life
(Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes
(Conant),
presuppositions
(Collingwood),
For details see again Greening of Ethics.
See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24.
See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous
account of culture see Sylvan 86.
It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas.
�6
Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An
ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a
propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a
paradigm can be discerned and elaborated.
Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation
of capsule themes. Here is a combination example:
TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant
paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13
Taoism
Deep Ecology
Dominant (Western)
Paradigm
Harmony with nature,
±rough Tao
Harmony with nature
Domination over nature
Nature valuable in itself;
“humanism” rejected
Natural environment
valued for itself
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
Levelling of differences;
wide impartiality
Biocentric egalitarianism
Human supremacy
Supplies ample
Earth supplies limited
Ample resources with
substitutes
Following Tao-te
Spiritual goals,
especially self-realisation
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Enlightenment
Self-realisation
Personal (material)
enrichment
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Doing with enough;
recycling
Consumerism
Non-competitive lifestyle;
voluntary simplicity
Cooperative lifestyle
Competitive lifestyle
Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus
Decentralised/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
Centralised/urban centred/
national focus
Hierarchy without
power structure;
anarchoid
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Power structure
hierarchical
Limited technology
Appropriate technology
High technology
Considerable caution
Precautionary practice
Risking taking (verging
upon adventurism)
13
This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly
expanded.
�7
I
As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green
lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and
prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role
model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem
ideosystems, eschews deontics.)
Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors'
worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world.
In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be
changed, not rolled.
2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers
and suggested remedies.
Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective.
Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong.
TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies
Source
Defective
practice answers
Remedy
Objections
DI.
Ignorance
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2.
Unintended consequences
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2a
Faulty technique,
or technology
Repairs
Repairs already
made
D3
Deviation (from
theory, etc.)
Education (for failure
to limit deviance)
Adherence
a. Deviation
uneliminable, or
b. Adherence
no remedy
D4.
Systemic lock-in
(through poverty,
ensnarement in
market forces, etc.)
Trap removal
a. Explains
only certain
cases, and
b. Due to
paradigmatic
features
D5.
Insensitivity or
insensibility
Problem
apprised
Remedy tried;
background
ideological
blockage
Source single paradigm
Remedies proposed (among others)
Christianity (mainstream
Catholicism)
Scientific enlightenment, or
alternative (Eastern) religion
D3a
Defective paradigm
answers
Pl.
i
�8
Pla.
Protestantism and its ethic
P2.
P2a
Cartesianism
Dualism
P2b
Mechanism
Monism
Anti-dualism
Modified holism
Substance metaphysics
P3.
P3a Possessive individualism
P3aa Personalism
Organicism
Process metaphysics
Non-reductionism
Transpersonalism
P4.
Capitalism
Socialism
P5.
Industrialism
Pre-industrialism (romanticism)
Post-industrialism
P5a Technocratic bureaucracy
P5aa. Transnational business
Enlightenment
Anti-enlightenment
P6a
Materialism
Anti-materialism
Spiritualism
P8.
P8a
Patriarchy, Masculinism
Human domination
of humans
Feminism
Anti-domination
(anti-hierarchy)
P6.
Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific
or partial) include:
Source
Typical remedy suggested
Platonism
New metaphysics
Leibnitzianism
New metaphysics
Kantianism
C onsequentialism
Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy:
reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism
Continental philosophy
Utilitarianism
Economism
New social science, or ethics
Contractarianism
Consequentialism
Domination transfer
Domination removal
Adolescencism
Infantilism (from Freudian physchology)
Maturation
Maturation
And so on.
A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in
dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely
�9
separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems.
That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but
what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be
encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we
should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses
ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange
answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and
Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’).
Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick
— in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted.
The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be
mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad.
But the sources of mental
sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we
have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is
something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in
other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No
doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory.
Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put
into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society,
to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern
institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth.
3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources.
Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat
perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these
topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual:
neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main
tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources:
• Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems,
‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and
specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over
nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.
One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows:
Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity
has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological
crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology
14
15
It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as
preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3.
White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian
apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole
area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall,
snowed.
�10
developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the
scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the
democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to
produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development,
however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to
nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’,
namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the
animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and
destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress,
a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action,
not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an
extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation
worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will.
Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it
‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16
What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was
the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse
the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or
isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some
such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable
development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more
sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as
regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite
for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy.
Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should
undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that
philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ...
responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection
today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played
a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in
Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18
• Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.
Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1)
prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the
aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of
reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not
impossible.19
16
17
18
19
Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of
Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue
continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott.
Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask,
first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do.
Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to
preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced
back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help
expose.
Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really,
while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1.
There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed
environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy),
of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning,
�11
More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course
accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies.
• Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes
denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes,
upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of
the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20
While Descartes was undoubtedly
extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is
accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such.
Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment,
widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems.
• Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some
potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented
is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a
heavy Heideggerean influence:
The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For
metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode
(sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the
absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present,
the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability
of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a
“natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of
anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can
all be traced back to metaphysics.
Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no
going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness
overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and
metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering,
exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as
vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native
healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system.
We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the
Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms
of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually
ensconced technocratic rationalism.21
An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining
20
21
see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser
or lost Greek strands.
For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising
Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes
contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the
environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely
maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in
keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy.
Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety
mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental]
problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This
charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep
Ecology (now included in UTD).
�12
rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics,
characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions
or mere Western seeds.
Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western
metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or
plenum metaphysics.22
• Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’
(e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those
of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and
theistic scholastic hang-overs).
• Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social
evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were
revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism
for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a
matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the
theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to
subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a
means of production.23
But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of
nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes
nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for
the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme
was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower
Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem
contribution.
♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial
progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the
present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots
[of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26
Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in
commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that
industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without
22
23
24
25
26
27
For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic
relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews.
Grundrisse p.409f.
Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further
Hargrove p.25.
M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper
presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a
managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and
more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip
side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the
evident problem.
Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin.
Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2.
�13
any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily,
subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and
powers those uses of industrial technique and practice.
• Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of
women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28
‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as
follows:
... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both
historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against
the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying
the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the
Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe
that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we
simultaneously address our gender issues.30
Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes:
• Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread
assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or
creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or
classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the
solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety
of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over
from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or
being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from
Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore,
Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social
ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from
deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a
prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus:
all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an
extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and
Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology.
Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships
—domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows
that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in
small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a
Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a
more critical assessment see GEF.
See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3).
John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91.
Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to
transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often
reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along
with unrelational property claims.
Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But
he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination
of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3,
p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology.
�14
harmonious man-nature relationship.32
Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of
dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the
dominated.
• A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected
ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33
• Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems.
Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in
educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for
instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as,
so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are
transported full circle back to defective practice answers.
4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers
A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the
main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two
stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation.
D.
Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in
possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them.
(Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical
theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.)
Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time,
perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed
off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such
matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying
‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and
unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste
watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of
their industry. That should now be a bad joke.
Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however
exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why
environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling
32
33
34
35
Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given
humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale
communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments.
Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within
Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion
reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be
covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be
represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality.
Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and
Bennett.
Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24.
�a
15
within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better
regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives,
controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or
tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources.
But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard
economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure,
environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely
that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental
consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental
shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try
to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream
theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these
“well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its
wilderness and remarkable diversity.
Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting
(collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be
correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts
like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming
practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended
consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough
information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective
collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or
another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural
practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land
agriculture.
Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the
consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently
appreciated.
But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or
concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into
bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial
pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But
some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses,
nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their
obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from
theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm.
P.
Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed,
36
It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The
Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and
transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property
confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who
made those points, also observed).
�16
business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes:
1.
Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental
impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps
social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example,
substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same
might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently
made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and
so forth).
To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not,
on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from
metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus
subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems
which take them as derived from metaphysics.
2.
While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right
circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are
necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different
paradigms;
for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms,
Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism.
At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter
decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and
ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also
conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological
degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example
(much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary
documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian
dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology
is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological
project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice.
Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar
damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well
established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence.
3.
The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover
environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western
paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the
technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness
37
While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly
environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to
the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to
have the means, and so on.
�17
again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism
incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese
chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East.
The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of
non-Westem paradigms, including for example:
Other Abrahamic religions
Islam
(Judaism
Confucianism
Shintoism
Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island.
What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There
is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their
intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts
are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic.
Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged
by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent.
4.
All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are
less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be
encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms.
While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often
they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often
criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements,
such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines
criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all
his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.)
Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism
and much else.
5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation.
Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one
paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious
paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or
sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in
requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite
circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within
that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in
calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto
38
Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large
fauna.
�18
mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and
their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience.
The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and
cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less
“advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental
vandalism and degradation locally and regionally.
Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated
environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to
grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9
They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines
were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39
40 They evolved primarily in
the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred,
and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism.
Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful
cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings.
TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems
Transfer
of technology,
industry and
problems to
other regions
Inflation
intensification
and spread of
problems to
larger regions
Technologicalindustrial
development
within
ideological
cultural
framework
development
within another ,
\ or different /
• framework
/
Multiple
sources
of
various regional
problems
39
40
The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing
resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event,
the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has
limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way
industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big
price tag).
Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were
not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc.
�19
Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into
history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other
cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its
own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for
instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West).
Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from
environmental crises.
While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises,
are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not
all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such
as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus,
in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar,
arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage
using industrial machinery.
An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types
of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant
cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they
mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration.
Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive
environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated:
TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms.
Oriental ideologies:
Taoism (classical)
Jainism
recessive traditions,
now with tiny
followings and little
political influence.
Indigenous cultures:
Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda)
Amazonian Indians, etc.
Western philosophies:
old
Stoicism
Spinozism
new
Deep green theories, such as deep ecology.
under certain
favourable
interpretations
Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with
their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be
worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise.
What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large
�20
families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class
(neither, and perhaps both).
DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms.
To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly
paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3).
Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include
considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have
always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed;
because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought;
because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on.
It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or
religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse.
Some family
characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms:
* Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction
of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive
impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz
(though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was
heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and
human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact
recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these
contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an
enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious
corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure
is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which
technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he
was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had
all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge
in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous
technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and
(through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he
For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application
of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172.
‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines,
which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’,
Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and
technological activities, see Aiton.
�21
abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active
and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of
major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43
Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent
friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was
sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and
superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy,
effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed
throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which
they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are
now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has
superficially appeared.
Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing
inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental
activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz
joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term
advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts
deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now
widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal
stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing
to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia
hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of
nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an
orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt
Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which
may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later
developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial
fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way
that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily.
An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for
improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even
positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can
be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the
theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46
43
44
45
46
Cottingham p.24, p.26.
Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong.
Glacken p.506.
Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement,
setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic
work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only
�22
* Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any
system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature
transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is
entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as
his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47
The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only
instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex
machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation
language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to
assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world,
the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral
significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose
to confer or project upon it.
Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts,
purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it.
It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49
Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and
Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His
practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and
possessors of nature’.50
* devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting
human chauvinism);51 as a corollary,
* entitlement to domination, dominion over nature;
* short-term framework;
* maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects.
Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these
features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally
significant corollaries, such as:
* an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails.
47
48
49
50
51
Instead ecological forestry
tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available.
It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put
before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance.
Reese p. 102.
Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by
Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There
are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2.
Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews.
See Discourse VI.
Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An
appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as
short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental
crisis.
�23
and ecological agriculture will come to prevail.
• a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural
environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new
mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep
of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way.
A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are
bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly
paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or
matter enough.
6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy.
It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to
Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms.
Stripped of metaphor, there are
environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an
environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the
humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to
satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and
large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main
unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be
tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping
there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be
made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness),
there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and
inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate.
Richard Sylvan*
via Bungendore, OZ.
APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial
environments.
That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic)
environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently
Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition
53
It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental
practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to
such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon
enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under
estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern
action and practice, especially reflective and rational action.
On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot
philosophy, see Appendix 1.
An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference,
University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise.
Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9.
�24
for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with
nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper
ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging
themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to
criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though
not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example,
what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of
philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual
negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”,
and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and
creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged;
Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which
takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental
mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms.
There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would
remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to
dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western
philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature
seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield
alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many
philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form
part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support
for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer
support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism
(e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of
what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter,
there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which
may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic.
Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared
about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was
very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil
See e.g. Hargrove, p.21.
Consider the sorts of exceptions:
• minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation,
such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans.
• figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and
Evelyn.
• medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and
were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or
perfection.
In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary
sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of
these claims will be made elsewhere.
�25
♦
quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57
Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he
alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s
indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to
a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology)
including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value,
denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower
existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and
axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the
illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding
epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic
access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply
separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human,
humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to
nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with
control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves
cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best
comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the
earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59
APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and
mistreatment of (mere) animals.
Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in
classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or
rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian
philosophy.
Descartes cherished a scheme
for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the
human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge
of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex
behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought,
and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a
fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’:
There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen—
that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an
utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal,
however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary
organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet
cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying).
By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs
as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make
59
Hargrove, p.29.
This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided
relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much
elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified.
On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood.
�26
themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less
reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^®
These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received
fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between
humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray,
and do not sustain the conclusion drawn.
Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing
words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are
dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and
dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a
sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals,
whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language.
Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”.
There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or
do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not.
Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand
inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not.
None of reasoning, thought and
understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60
61
For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate,
including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and
respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the
vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many
sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort)
documented.
Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually
all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in
kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume
afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other
supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have
been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed
inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance
in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that
animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what
they do or choose to do, and so on.
Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly,
60
61
Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes.
For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is
decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine
representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter
11.
�27
but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an
outcome of rectified method,
Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be
supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62
As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics,
despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’
moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology,
whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply
a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make
so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among
innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’.
Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human
life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology,
was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent
creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before
Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For
Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the
possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet
in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue
to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things
exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view
of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s
creation....63
So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward.
environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final
causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to
smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no
doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted).
However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones.
Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes
and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64
Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes.
Nonetheless,
dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern
deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For,
according to him,
...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other
elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and
nature into an unequal relationship:
Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant
conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the
62
63
64
Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason
was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of
established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g.
concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt
obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get
his rationalistic roadshow moving.
Cottingham, ibid.
On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11.
�most curious moments of human imbecility.65
APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions.
A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books.
In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to
focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as
lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture
and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed
industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on.
More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’—
similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human
behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism.
But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels
no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as
accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended
target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an
ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the
facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of
causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through
an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example
of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation
through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made
and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it
acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here.
Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often
hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making
information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of
like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing
conservation, and so on.
Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question
that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and
solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as
causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps
to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal
explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians,
65
66
Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy.
No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic:
that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on
to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and
towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from
factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes.
�29
representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial
societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so
redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain
ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”.
So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of
childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive
attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic
dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the
centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas
originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15).
Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages,
Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly
arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is
manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive
adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and
person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There
is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile
culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority
figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and
vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly
satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole
social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread
individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human
are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without
coming to know or properly experience alternatives.
The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound,
resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal
For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us.
Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing)
practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not
leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus,
Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests
rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy.
‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the
third page of the main text.
A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological
terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the
following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument:
‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of
society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the
hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to
domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16).
But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or
between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms.
�30
growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not
exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature
mixed communities.
Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be
decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments
and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health.
Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us,
now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no
longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural
surrounding can even now be restored.
In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a
certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading
to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about
for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing
erosion of life-support systems.
REFERENCES
E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics
13(1991) 127-137.
A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental
Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990.
J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41.
J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.
C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press,
1974.
A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991?
A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10.
R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992.
A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993.
C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967.
E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989.
J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of
utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177
M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991.
Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep
ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in
‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)!
�31
A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany
N.Y., 1993.
F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991.
J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974
D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989.
D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H.
Croom Helm 1984.
V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993.
C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973;
referred to as FF.
R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in
Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980.
R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental
Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980;
referred to as EE.
R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion
papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982.
P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994.
R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS
Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.
R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986.
R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP.
The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993.
S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982.
J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred
to as EP3.
�
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PARADIGMATIC ROOTS
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental
problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not
be adequately addressed.
Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade,
impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why
the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More
immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far
enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More
thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question
entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread
problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly
recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper
paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers
lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow
band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more
satisfactory answer can be broached.
Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant
paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems,
and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the
problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers
to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer
through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among
significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through
its standard history is dismal environmental news.
0. Focal questions and deeper answers.
Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate.
In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify
such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering,
many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More
recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation
procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave
entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on).
Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly,
Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their
own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy
their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through
human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this:
because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting
enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms,
paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats
and of the earth.
1
In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23).
Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental
impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring
through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies,
and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they
may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat
superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a
community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so
resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less
superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive
paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production
ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2
An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating
action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea
systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever.
Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect
termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are
opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an
elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes
of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are
also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social
paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's
routing procedures.
Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding
topography on action space.
Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also
correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new
species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically
engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize.
The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures,
creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical
sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans
are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a
great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained,
what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however
2
3
4
For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see
further Routley.
I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is
the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their
damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant
philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard.
As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How
people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial
3
through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently
aligned paradigms.
One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig
cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket):
Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots
many
emergent
problems
interlinked
proximate
causes
plural
supporting
sources
multiple
interlinked
roots
Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single
answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are
plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are
plural.5
What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the
pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be
the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for
such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea
structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and
sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is
source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and
other rational transmission connections.6)
explanation, of them.
History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there
are plausible alternative histories.
While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments
virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot
roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots,
normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on).
A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The
4
These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they
resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate
roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also
go astray, wrongly directed or whatever.
There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated—
including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions,
and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal
questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been
addressed elsewhere.
1. Problems and paradigms.
Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different
components, and admit and deserve separate explanation.
la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions.
A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already
been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework
independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor
problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such
indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of
• sustaining biodiversity and
• maintaining significant wilderness.8
Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable
survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding
problems.
In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are
(at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how
they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of
Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in
fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of
what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental
problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much
oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots
metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to
mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme
of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because
rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may
not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where
they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or
(genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc.
Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis,
bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development,
etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start.
7
See Sylvan and Bennett, GE.
8
As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands
Project.
5
problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters.
Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very
little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys
us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and
expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their
habitats.
To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on
offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as
comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get
to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very
difficult situation.
That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars
uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these
sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are
supported by particular ideologies.
lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on.
A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical
sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation
function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required
to
faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc.
A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional
and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social
group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is
meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the
community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes
delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we
can work back towards the underlying models.
The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a
complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g.
metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen
that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely
discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations:
thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life
(Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes
(Conant),
presuppositions
(Collingwood),
For details see again Greening of Ethics.
See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24.
See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous
account of culture see Sylvan 86.
It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas.
6
Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An
ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a
propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a
paradigm can be discerned and elaborated.
Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation
of capsule themes. Here is a combination example:
TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant
paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13
Taoism
Deep Ecology
Dominant (Western)
Paradigm
Harmony with nature,
±rough Tao
Harmony with nature
Domination over nature
Nature valuable in itself;
“humanism” rejected
Natural environment
valued for itself
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
Levelling of differences;
wide impartiality
Biocentric egalitarianism
Human supremacy
Supplies ample
Earth supplies limited
Ample resources with
substitutes
Following Tao-te
Spiritual goals,
especially self-realisation
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Enlightenment
Self-realisation
Personal (material)
enrichment
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Doing with enough;
recycling
Consumerism
Non-competitive lifestyle;
voluntary simplicity
Cooperative lifestyle
Competitive lifestyle
Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus
Decentralised/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
Centralised/urban centred/
national focus
Hierarchy without
power structure;
anarchoid
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Power structure
hierarchical
Limited technology
Appropriate technology
High technology
Considerable caution
Precautionary practice
Risking taking (verging
upon adventurism)
13
This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly
expanded.
7
I
As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green
lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and
prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role
model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem
ideosystems, eschews deontics.)
Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors'
worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world.
In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be
changed, not rolled.
2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers
and suggested remedies.
Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective.
Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong.
TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies
Source
Defective
practice answers
Remedy
Objections
DI.
Ignorance
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2.
Unintended consequences
Relevant
information
Information
now available
D2a
Faulty technique,
or technology
Repairs
Repairs already
made
D3
Deviation (from
theory, etc.)
Education (for failure
to limit deviance)
Adherence
a. Deviation
uneliminable, or
b. Adherence
no remedy
D4.
Systemic lock-in
(through poverty,
ensnarement in
market forces, etc.)
Trap removal
a. Explains
only certain
cases, and
b. Due to
paradigmatic
features
D5.
Insensitivity or
insensibility
Problem
apprised
Remedy tried;
background
ideological
blockage
Source single paradigm
Remedies proposed (among others)
Christianity (mainstream
Catholicism)
Scientific enlightenment, or
alternative (Eastern) religion
D3a
Defective paradigm
answers
Pl.
i
8
Pla.
Protestantism and its ethic
P2.
P2a
Cartesianism
Dualism
P2b
Mechanism
Monism
Anti-dualism
Modified holism
Substance metaphysics
P3.
P3a Possessive individualism
P3aa Personalism
Organicism
Process metaphysics
Non-reductionism
Transpersonalism
P4.
Capitalism
Socialism
P5.
Industrialism
Pre-industrialism (romanticism)
Post-industrialism
P5a Technocratic bureaucracy
P5aa. Transnational business
Enlightenment
Anti-enlightenment
P6a
Materialism
Anti-materialism
Spiritualism
P8.
P8a
Patriarchy, Masculinism
Human domination
of humans
Feminism
Anti-domination
(anti-hierarchy)
P6.
Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific
or partial) include:
Source
Typical remedy suggested
Platonism
New metaphysics
Leibnitzianism
New metaphysics
Kantianism
C onsequentialism
Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy:
reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism
Continental philosophy
Utilitarianism
Economism
New social science, or ethics
Contractarianism
Consequentialism
Domination transfer
Domination removal
Adolescencism
Infantilism (from Freudian physchology)
Maturation
Maturation
And so on.
A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in
dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely
9
separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems.
That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but
what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be
encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we
should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses
ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange
answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and
Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’).
Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick
— in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted.
The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be
mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad.
But the sources of mental
sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we
have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is
something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in
other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No
doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory.
Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put
into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society,
to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern
institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth.
3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources.
Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat
perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these
topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual:
neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main
tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources:
• Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems,
‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and
specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over
nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.
One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows:
Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity
has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological
crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology
14
15
It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as
preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3.
White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian
apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole
area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall,
snowed.
10
developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the
scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the
democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to
produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development,
however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to
nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’,
namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the
animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and
destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress,
a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action,
not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an
extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation
worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will.
Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it
‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16
What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was
the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse
the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or
isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some
such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable
development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more
sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as
regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite
for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy.
Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should
undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that
philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ...
responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection
today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played
a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in
Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18
• Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.
Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1)
prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the
aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of
reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not
impossible.19
16
17
18
19
Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of
Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue
continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott.
Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask,
first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do.
Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to
preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced
back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help
expose.
Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really,
while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1.
There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed
environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy),
of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning,
11
More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course
accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies.
• Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes
denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes,
upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of
the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20
While Descartes was undoubtedly
extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is
accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such.
Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment,
widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems.
• Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some
potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented
is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a
heavy Heideggerean influence:
The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For
metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode
(sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the
absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present,
the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability
of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a
“natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of
anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can
all be traced back to metaphysics.
Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no
going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness
overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and
metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering,
exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as
vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native
healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system.
We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the
Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms
of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually
ensconced technocratic rationalism.21
An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining
20
21
see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser
or lost Greek strands.
For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising
Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes
contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the
environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely
maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in
keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy.
Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety
mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental]
problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This
charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep
Ecology (now included in UTD).
12
rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics,
characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions
or mere Western seeds.
Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western
metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or
plenum metaphysics.22
• Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’
(e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those
of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and
theistic scholastic hang-overs).
• Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social
evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were
revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism
for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a
matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the
theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to
subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a
means of production.23
But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of
nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes
nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for
the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme
was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower
Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem
contribution.
♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial
progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the
present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots
[of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26
Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in
commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that
industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without
22
23
24
25
26
27
For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic
relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews.
Grundrisse p.409f.
Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further
Hargrove p.25.
M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper
presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a
managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and
more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip
side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the
evident problem.
Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin.
Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2.
13
any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily,
subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and
powers those uses of industrial technique and practice.
• Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of
women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28
‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as
follows:
... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both
historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against
the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying
the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the
Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe
that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we
simultaneously address our gender issues.30
Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes:
• Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread
assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or
creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or
classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the
solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety
of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over
from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or
being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from
Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore,
Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social
ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from
deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a
prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus:
all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an
extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and
Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology.
Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships
—domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows
that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in
small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a
Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a
more critical assessment see GEF.
See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3).
John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91.
Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to
transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often
reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along
with unrelational property claims.
Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But
he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination
of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3,
p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology.
14
harmonious man-nature relationship.32
Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of
dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the
dominated.
• A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected
ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33
• Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems.
Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in
educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for
instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as,
so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are
transported full circle back to defective practice answers.
4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers
A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the
main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two
stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation.
D.
Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in
possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them.
(Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical
theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.)
Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time,
perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed
off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such
matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying
‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and
unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste
watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of
their industry. That should now be a bad joke.
Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however
exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why
environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling
32
33
34
35
Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given
humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale
communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments.
Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within
Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion
reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be
covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be
represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality.
Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and
Bennett.
Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24.
a
15
within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better
regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives,
controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or
tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources.
But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard
economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure,
environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely
that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental
consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental
shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try
to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream
theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these
“well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its
wilderness and remarkable diversity.
Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting
(collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be
correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts
like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming
practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended
consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough
information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective
collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or
another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural
practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land
agriculture.
Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the
consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently
appreciated.
But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or
concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into
bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial
pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But
some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses,
nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their
obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from
theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm.
P.
Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed,
36
It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The
Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and
transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property
confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who
made those points, also observed).
16
business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes:
1.
Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental
impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps
social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example,
substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same
might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently
made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and
so forth).
To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not,
on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from
metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus
subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems
which take them as derived from metaphysics.
2.
While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right
circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are
necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different
paradigms;
for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms,
Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism.
At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter
decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and
ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also
conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological
degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example
(much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary
documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian
dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology
is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological
project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice.
Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar
damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well
established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence.
3.
The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover
environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western
paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the
technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness
37
While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly
environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to
the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to
have the means, and so on.
17
again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism
incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese
chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East.
The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of
non-Westem paradigms, including for example:
Other Abrahamic religions
Islam
(Judaism
Confucianism
Shintoism
Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island.
What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There
is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their
intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts
are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic.
Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged
by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent.
4.
All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are
less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be
encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms.
While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often
they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often
criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements,
such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines
criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all
his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.)
Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism
and much else.
5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation.
Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one
paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious
paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or
sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in
requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite
circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within
that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in
calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto
38
Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large
fauna.
18
mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and
their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience.
The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and
cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less
“advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental
vandalism and degradation locally and regionally.
Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated
environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to
grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9
They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines
were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39
40 They evolved primarily in
the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred,
and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism.
Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful
cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings.
TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems
Transfer
of technology,
industry and
problems to
other regions
Inflation
intensification
and spread of
problems to
larger regions
Technologicalindustrial
development
within
ideological
cultural
framework
development
within another ,
\ or different /
• framework
/
Multiple
sources
of
various regional
problems
39
40
The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing
resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event,
the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has
limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way
industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big
price tag).
Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were
not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc.
19
Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into
history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other
cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its
own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for
instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West).
Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from
environmental crises.
While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises,
are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not
all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such
as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus,
in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar,
arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage
using industrial machinery.
An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types
of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant
cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they
mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration.
Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive
environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated:
TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms.
Oriental ideologies:
Taoism (classical)
Jainism
recessive traditions,
now with tiny
followings and little
political influence.
Indigenous cultures:
Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda)
Amazonian Indians, etc.
Western philosophies:
old
Stoicism
Spinozism
new
Deep green theories, such as deep ecology.
under certain
favourable
interpretations
Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with
their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be
worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise.
What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large
20
families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class
(neither, and perhaps both).
DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms.
To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly
paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3).
Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include
considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have
always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed;
because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought;
because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on.
It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or
religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse.
Some family
characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms:
* Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction
of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive
impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz
(though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was
heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and
human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact
recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these
contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an
enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious
corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure
is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which
technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he
was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had
all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge
in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous
technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and
(through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he
For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application
of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172.
‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines,
which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’,
Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and
technological activities, see Aiton.
21
abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active
and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of
major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43
Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent
friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was
sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and
superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy,
effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed
throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which
they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are
now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has
superficially appeared.
Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing
inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental
activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz
joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term
advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts
deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now
widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal
stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing
to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia
hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of
nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an
orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt
Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which
may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later
developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial
fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way
that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily.
An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for
improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even
positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can
be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the
theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46
43
44
45
46
Cottingham p.24, p.26.
Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong.
Glacken p.506.
Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement,
setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic
work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only
22
* Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any
system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature
transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is
entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as
his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47
The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only
instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex
machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation
language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to
assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world,
the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral
significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose
to confer or project upon it.
Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts,
purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it.
It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49
Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and
Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His
practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and
possessors of nature’.50
* devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting
human chauvinism);51 as a corollary,
* entitlement to domination, dominion over nature;
* short-term framework;
* maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects.
Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these
features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally
significant corollaries, such as:
* an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails.
47
48
49
50
51
Instead ecological forestry
tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available.
It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put
before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance.
Reese p. 102.
Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by
Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There
are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2.
Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews.
See Discourse VI.
Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An
appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as
short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental
crisis.
23
and ecological agriculture will come to prevail.
• a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural
environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new
mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep
of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way.
A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are
bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly
paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or
matter enough.
6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy.
It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to
Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms.
Stripped of metaphor, there are
environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an
environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the
humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to
satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and
large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main
unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be
tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping
there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be
made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness),
there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and
inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate.
Richard Sylvan*
via Bungendore, OZ.
APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial
environments.
That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic)
environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently
Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition
53
It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental
practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to
such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon
enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under
estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern
action and practice, especially reflective and rational action.
On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot
philosophy, see Appendix 1.
An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference,
University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise.
Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9.
24
for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with
nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper
ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging
themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to
criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though
not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example,
what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of
philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual
negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”,
and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and
creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged;
Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which
takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental
mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms.
There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would
remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to
dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western
philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature
seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield
alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many
philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form
part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support
for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer
support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism
(e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of
what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter,
there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which
may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic.
Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared
about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was
very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil
See e.g. Hargrove, p.21.
Consider the sorts of exceptions:
• minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation,
such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans.
• figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and
Evelyn.
• medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and
were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or
perfection.
In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary
sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of
these claims will be made elsewhere.
25
♦
quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57
Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he
alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s
indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to
a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology)
including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value,
denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower
existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and
axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the
illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding
epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic
access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply
separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human,
humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to
nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with
control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves
cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best
comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the
earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59
APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and
mistreatment of (mere) animals.
Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in
classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or
rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian
philosophy.
Descartes cherished a scheme
for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the
human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge
of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex
behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought,
and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a
fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’:
There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen—
that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an
utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal,
however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary
organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet
cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying).
By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs
as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make
59
Hargrove, p.29.
This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided
relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much
elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified.
On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood.
26
themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less
reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^®
These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received
fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between
humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray,
and do not sustain the conclusion drawn.
Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing
words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are
dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and
dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a
sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals,
whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language.
Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”.
There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or
do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not.
Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand
inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not.
None of reasoning, thought and
understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60
61
For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate,
including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and
respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the
vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many
sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort)
documented.
Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually
all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in
kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume
afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other
supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have
been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed
inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance
in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that
animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what
they do or choose to do, and so on.
Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly,
60
61
Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes.
For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is
decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine
representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter
11.
27
but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an
outcome of rectified method,
Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be
supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62
As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics,
despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’
moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology,
whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply
a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make
so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among
innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’.
Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human
life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology,
was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent
creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before
Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For
Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the
possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet
in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue
to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things
exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view
of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s
creation....63
So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward.
environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final
causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to
smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no
doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted).
However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones.
Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes
and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64
Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes.
Nonetheless,
dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern
deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For,
according to him,
...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other
elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and
nature into an unequal relationship:
Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant
conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the
62
63
64
Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason
was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of
established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g.
concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt
obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get
his rationalistic roadshow moving.
Cottingham, ibid.
On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11.
most curious moments of human imbecility.65
APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions.
A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books.
In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to
focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as
lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture
and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed
industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on.
More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’—
similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human
behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism.
But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels
no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as
accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended
target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an
ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the
facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of
causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through
an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example
of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation
through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made
and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it
acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here.
Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often
hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making
information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of
like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing
conservation, and so on.
Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question
that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and
solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as
causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps
to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal
explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians,
65
66
Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy.
No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic:
that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on
to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and
towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from
factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes.
29
representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial
societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so
redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain
ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”.
So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of
childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive
attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic
dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the
centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas
originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15).
Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages,
Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly
arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is
manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive
adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and
person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There
is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile
culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority
figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and
vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly
satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole
social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread
individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human
are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without
coming to know or properly experience alternatives.
The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound,
resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal
For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us.
Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing)
practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not
leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus,
Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests
rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy.
‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the
third page of the main text.
A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological
terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the
following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument:
‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of
society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the
hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to
domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16).
But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or
between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms.
30
growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not
exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature
mixed communities.
Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be
decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments
and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health.
Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us,
now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no
longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural
surrounding can even now be restored.
In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a
certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading
to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about
for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing
erosion of life-support systems.
REFERENCES
E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985.
R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics
13(1991) 127-137.
A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental
Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990.
J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41.
J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.
C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press,
1974.
A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991?
A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10.
R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992.
A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993.
C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967.
E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989.
J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of
utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177
M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991.
Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep
ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in
‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)!
31
A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany
N.Y., 1993.
F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991.
J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974
D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989.
D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H.
Croom Helm 1984.
V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993.
C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991.
V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973;
referred to as FF.
R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in
Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National
University, 1980.
R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental
Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980;
referred to as EE.
R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion
papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982.
P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994.
R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS
Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.
R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986.
R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP.
The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993.
S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982.
J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred
to as EP3.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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THE MODERN CITY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM
It is widely assumed, for instance by philosophers, most of whom are
urban creatures, that large modern cities are valuable institutions and
whatever the very serious costs and deprivations of modern city living, the
advantages considerably outweigh the costs.
There are those who are not
persuaded that that is so.
The image of the mob is part of our image of the city,J
and the
city is the carrier of the best and the worst of civilization
(S. Diamond, In Search for the Primitive p.167)
- but the latter is also a pretty dubious customer according to Diamond.
Note:
1.
The modern city as a reducer of variety
2.
The metropolitan state, with landscope dominated by the city.
The
drain, power relation, etc.
3.
The loss of contact with the natural
4.
The way commerce controls the city: the secondary and substitutional
role of people.
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
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THE MODERN CITY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM
It is widely assumed, for instance by philosophers, most of whom are
urban creatures, that large modern cities are valuable institutions and
whatever the very serious costs and deprivations of modern city living, the
advantages considerably outweigh the costs.
There are those who are not
persuaded that that is so.
The image of the mob is part of our image of the city,J
and the
city is the carrier of the best and the worst of civilization
(S. Diamond, In Search for the Primitive p.167)
- but the latter is also a pretty dubious customer according to Diamond.
Note:
1.
The modern city as a reducer of variety
2.
The metropolitan state, with landscope dominated by the city.
The
drain, power relation, etc.
3.
The loss of contact with the natural
4.
The way commerce controls the city: the secondary and substitutional
role of people.
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Box 76, item 679: The modern city as an environmental problem
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Box 76: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes
Como House
Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3
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Text
MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV?
Begond moraL extens ion isms.
Some
find
us
of
mereig
not
ourseives
at
with
odds
mainstream
environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg
disastrous, not
ontg
for
mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but
uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate
from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg,
a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh
to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern
USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes.
the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons
Rgain
wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne.
extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL
MoraL
apparatus
conventLonaL
Lts
begond
(but
certaLnLg
subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed,
certaLn
confLnes to
unwarranted)
or eLse, more LLkeLg,
has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend
wag
the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the
assumptions
vatue,
(equaL
appLLed to a wider
cLass
equat
of
rLghts,
of
adjustment,
consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg
equaL
a
(Rs
subjects.
moraL
egaLLtarLan
wLth
tgpe,
generaL
moraL
ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff.,
under
and
the
tgpicaL and usefuL weapon
movements
of
Liberation
with
proceed
couLd
Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a
MoraLisms
Nature
LabLe
more
rLghts
and
accurate
movements
Less
but
equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL
to
moraLitg
bend
to
iLLegitimate
certain
interests,
etc),
are
equaLitg,
standing,
but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least
on the boundaries, as it
ex tens Lon isms
endeavour
not onLg do the
since
(rights,
such
impressive
pubLLcLg
extensLonLsms
purposes,
extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved
(though
is!
from
Seen
a
wider
perspective,
environmentaL
not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go,
in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where
theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted,
it remains. The zones
of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai
as
forests,
species,
ecosgstems,
continue
mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE,
things
be
to
p.llf.1).
Nor
can
such
substantiaL
to
open
the
sorts
of
invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated
efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite
which
extensions,
extensions
operate,
such
as
sentience,
LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe,
the
verg
characteristics
pain-receptivitg,
idea
of
an
on
interests,
environmentaL
ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite
respect
for
naturat
sgstems
and
communities,
founders
on the moraL rights
position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff).
�Mang
a
Ls
MoraLLtg
weapon,
purpose
depLoged bg pressure and
often
interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to
and
justLfg
wLde
a
actLvLtg
of
range
and
hostLLe
practices
ground
naturaL
to
envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr
needs
generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met
there
though
even
are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there
Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu
and PLgden - have a poLnt
MoraLLtLes
Lt
when
MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew
and
to
coMes
The
MoraLLtg.
such
HLnckfuss
through
daMage
of
seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the
often
benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and
work
often
the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under
wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts.
Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls
oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk,
conduct
to
LMpossLbLe
concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the
response
to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg
LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg,
tougher
dLstLnctLon,
(practLcaL
hard
j^s
(whLch
axLoLogg
to
to
avoLd)
MaLntaLn,
between
there
Ls a further
deontLc
expressLons
Rnd
deontLes.
and
practLcat
between
expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth
and
such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a
soLLd
case
agaLnst
objectLve
or
absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks.
Hagbe
the
net
a
carefuL
practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t
on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?,
LMpact
soMe
of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can
doesn t
MoraLLtg
coLLect
a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg
constraLn
that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg
affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest
appear
to
be
turned
around
through
abuses,
of
an
Ls
Lnput
on
chauvLnLstLc,
as
such
froM
sLaverg,
huMan
MoraLLtg.
huMan
Even so the
persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are
not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg
posLtLveLg
Ln
thLngs
contrLbute
couLd
that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar,
MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the
prospect of More, More protectLon,
Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls
tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through
verg
channeLLed
MoraL
ftowLng,
through
aLL
too
LegaL
often,
rather
to
the
than
wrong
dLfferent
LnstLtutLons;
wLth
fraMeworks,
part Les,
such
as
the
Lt
Ls
the benefLts
strong
and
estabLLshed.
HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls,
Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for
peace
(MoraLLtg
beLng
a
MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be.
-2-
�Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide
an assauit on the environMent instead of other
creatures,
subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones,
or
a
prettg
easg
feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern
technoLogicaL
LLke
was
that
course,
of
is;
Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom
guns
another
or
(huMan,
Ls now deeptg
natLonat, state or race),
LLkeLg,
More
entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part
supportLng
of
scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg
socLaL
can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg
not
and
appLLed,
successfuttg
Must
awaLt
Ls
Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the
protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on.
There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars
antL-MoraLLsts)
equated)
nottons:
MoraL
status,
rLghts,
sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs
But the tern
can
scarceLg
escape
attogether
MoraL
def Ln Lt tons
Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg
reveaL)
that
tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for
to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe
such
MoraL
group:
narrower
the
ang
Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the
use
ttght
of
as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL.
Lssue
coMMon
cLuster
consLderatLon, retevance,
a
on
foLLowLng
These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to
.
...
the
standing,
consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates
perMissions,
to
are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg
MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns
(often
(guaLnt
ethicai )
(hunan)
actors,
as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL
attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces
Ln
the
Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL
that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM
objects
MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends
to
be
shunned
Ln
The
notion
of
deeper environMentaL theorg.
SiMoraL
RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies.
standing,
introduced
notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag
environMentaL
heavg,
but
ethics.
It
is
anaiogg
questionabte
bg
a
Major,
with the RngLo-RMerLcan
but
d3Maging,
danaging because, verg briefLg,
rote
it wouLd paint a
rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that
have not froM those
territorg.
that
have
MoraL
standing
-
across
Much
conpLex
More
Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence
criterion
in
of MoraL standing is
probieM soLving;
absoiuteLg basic
reasonabLg addressing
of
a
in environMentaL thinking and
the Lssue of MoraL
standLng
Must
be
vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of
thLs
Ls
so
evLdent,
especLaLLg
gLven
the
MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL
�standing. In the sane vein,
an
a necessarg condition ... for
Lt is stated that
ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing
adequate
Such statements are suretg overstatements.
For,
Ln
pLace,
fLrst
the
there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones,
which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL
ecoLogLcat
Rodman s
deep
Naess s
(e.g.
ecotogg,
sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can
cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg
warranted
make
standing
rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing.
For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's
moraL
of
notLon
attempt
(Ln
NP)
to
a
make
standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic,
part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii
as ahistoricai, a piece of
footnoted
Regan s
retrospective
account
of
Legisiation).
as
But,
it
happens,
standing, according to which a being has
moraL
morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg
a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion
as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the
exposed
(thus
biconditionaL
invoLved
in
the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the
conditions
tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest
bg
sgstem about
be
to
buiidozed,
or
the
Moon
about
to
be
bg
tourized
an
Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags
that
wiii
at Low
we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be
that
affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps
in
a
modified
wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so,
such
a
deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic;
for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings,
which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed
to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition
standLng,
something
his
footnoted
for
moraL
account does not guarantee. The LegaListic
notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL.
Rn
initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns
its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is
for
ang
sufficientLg
comprehensive
notion
of
a
sometimes entering into moraL
consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason,
some decidedtg restrictive
assumptions,
concerning
interests
and
whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter
assessment
on
modeL
dubious
it imports
rights
into
ethicaL
occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can
significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates
terms
of
having
of
thing
in
certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas
what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests,
sort
of
that
couLd
or
be
the
have interests, even as derived (as in the case of
LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often
-4-
indeed,
�Legat
have
to
standing
to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc.,
is
begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts.
room
Of course there ts constderabte
standtng
not ton
the
widen
to
Legat
of
tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and
(which
"cLaimants
to admit, through representatton, other
to
the
PresentLg,
courts.
for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist
cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag
and
persons
of broadentng the standtng not ton
objects,
agatn
because
to
encompass
Limitations
the
the
mang
requisite
environmentaL
nottons of tnterests and rtghts
impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do
not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts
accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs,
the
MonuMents,
and
bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of
Ontg
constderabtg.
do,
Like
naturat
these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts
tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the
wodet
Legat
be overcome.
coutd
be
recogntsed,
account
of
the
Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg
anaLogg
behtnd,
Left
unimpeded
fresh
a
and
now
standtng
woraL
rather
propose
free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to
an expLLcatton of
Recordtng to them,
can be construed atong these LLnes.
whtch
For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X
fISl.
tnterests
Lts
theg sag
Ln
that
weLL-betng
have postttve moraL weight
stLpuLattng
theg re
the
but
this;
theg re
or
(PP. p.3). RctuaLLg,
not
free
simpig
to
given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg
sttputate,
recogntze Ln proceeding at once to
consider various
to their
standard answers
basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore
in
LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg
a
than
effect
substitute
a
tortuous
Less
nameLg
account,
generaLLtg
(in
interpretation)
MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence
positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG:
pureLg
since
future
items
mag
have
ancestors). Either wag the account is
weight
and
having
moraL
continued
some
moraL
circutar,
or
shouLd however be
significance,
since
having
X
of
wetfare
has
deLeted,
as mag dead
positive
moraL
standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster.
p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg
cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg
circutar,
H33.
But
has
X
then
as
moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight.
a
expLication,
the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt
expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg.
Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do?
-5-
The
troubie
�Ls
except
that
theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL
partLcuLar
on
standing, the notion Ln fact does verg
because
hoMe
Ma Ln
whose
eth Les,
chauvLnLstLc
base
does
whLch
LLes
wLthLn
the
not
extend
or
traveL
unsatLsfactorg;
wLth
as
coMpetence,
or
m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL
The
personhood).
are
(such
cLassLfLcatLons
bLoLogLcaL
socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or
potentLaL
standLng
MoraL
Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth
spec Les
the
of
the wLder
to
onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to
not
ctassLfLcatLons
ethLcaL
MeMbershLp
are
theg
trad Lt LonaL
of
weLL
for
ethLcs,
It Ls one of those
confLnes
envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed
confuse
envLronmentaL
Ln
work
Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt.
there
not Lons,
LLttLe
enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE)
DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then,
no
satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP -
or
Lt
eLsewhere
It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe,
seens.
non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng.
Rather
the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The
for
reason
the
needs
what
cost-benefLt
LMperatLves
be
to
Looked
at
presuppose
a
Morat
Ln
appLLcatLons
assessments,
(whLch
thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present
Lt wouLd decLsLvetg
Ls evLdent enough:
usefuL work,
space,
about
enthusLasM
and
deLLMLt
of
the
categorLcaL
of
deLLMLtatLons
behLnd
proposed
some
notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the
humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc
foLd
(partLg
moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg
bg use of the term
achLeved
Ls
search
unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so
Morat
search space towards the confLnes of the
thLs
MoraL
confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan
forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes
appLLcatLons
the
neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of
Lts
LLmLtatLons.
ConsLder
standLng
moraL
Lnstead
of
work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what
supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL
standLng
(m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X,
e.g.
Let
to
Lt
theg
otherwLse
not
atone,
do
not
to
confLne
Lt
or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but
(cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around,
thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of
whereas
Lf
Lacks m-s,
Lt
Lt does not have thLs protectLon,
3
Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt .
def Ln Lt Lon
of
moraL
standLng
...
Lf
somethLng
weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count
Lts
Lf a
Lnterests,
Lt does not count,
....
Indeed, so Lt Ls
Lacks
(p.t+).
The
moraL
saLd,
standLng,
defLnLtLon
Bg
Lts
however
deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght
to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng
moraL
wLthout
pLcture
of
assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems
m-s
are
dLscounted,
and
trade-offs
contempLated, p.16).
-6-
of
Ltems
wLth
m-s
are
soon
�Such
appLication
an
if
division;
accordingtg
LmpLies
an
unfortunate
aLL-or-nothing
item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets
nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng
Lf
be
and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd
standing
contrasted
with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat
such
tgpoLogg,
that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The
as
tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant
such as having vaiue, weLL-being,
appropriate
p.!2).^
the
character
aLL-or-nothing
from
at Least Modified becomes evident
of
various
(e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties
capacities,
so
and
and
forth;
to
moraL
standing
distinctions
soon
duties)
(direct
to
needs
be
introduced
as
opposed
to
(indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg
regarding
duties
autonomg,
and
postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP
ethicaL
That
preferences,
features
adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent
boundarg
consists
in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing
is
assumed
to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg
PSI. floraL agents
iff
But
have a presumptive dutg to
X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.).
presumptive
are
duties
even
more
prone
to
be
bg
upset
circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion
the
notion
overriding
expands);
standing,
p.S),
the
forged
connections
things
than
without
much too simpLe, as wiLL
are
for
appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required
purposes
so
operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged
around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding
moraL
decentLg]
X [to treat it moraLLg
moraL
a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg
cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties,
which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue,
and extent of vaLue (see SM).
Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration
comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with
having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing
account,
and
counted,
perhaps
(if
sometimes
that
wouLd
be
taken
into
in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL
attributes are evidentLg a subcLass
commonpLace
vaLue
of
surprising,
vaLue
as
attributes,
e.g.
in
the
confiation
CaLLicott).
is
Possessing
intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL
status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant.
Indeed
PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to
intrinsic
vaLue
with their being
evident,
and
considerabLe,
(p.S)
and before Long has identified moraL standing of things
vaLuabte
prove
in
damaging.
Goodpaster
themseLves
Towards
Lapses
(p.I6).
Such
equations
are
not
the end of his essag, on being moraLLg
from
-7-
moraL
considerabiLitg
into
�that
Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte,
Ln
vatue-for-itsetf,
psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities
sophLstLcated
unnecessaritg
seen
Lt Ls true
when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be
Lts
for
vatued
own
(p.320);
sake
Lt not so obvious that theg are too
but
sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon
at
work Ln Goodpaster s
hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg
between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of
and
vatue
ontg
—
consLderabLLLtg
to
appears
obtaLn
where
vatue Ls
unreduced
(LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter;
for
exanpte
tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when
as
where,
of
conceptLon
Lts
(p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and
noraL consLderabLLLtg
vatue
Ls
no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter,
characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion).
The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps
to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if
exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is
point
even
norat
the
obvioustg
Less
stopping
vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has
for
estate
no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat
vatue
verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg
(a
accessibte
nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose
(for
further, what is not at att untiketg, that
sgstens
natch
that
Moon
the
has
fornations
sone
shoutd
be
the
that
thensetves,
into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of
taken
projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But
insist
or
naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a
the
defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in
which
is
considerabititg
Lt
woutd
be
LnptausLbte
to
Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the
right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes.
It
is
just
not
the
feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be
separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the
circte have
suggests
different
sone
exanpte,
For
connotations.
notions
beLng
Ln
noraL
the
consLderabLe
norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account,
suitabte
not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg
requires
the iten in question has interests or at Least a
such
tetos),
an
that
agent
discussion-setting
can
phrase
be
deserves
norat
weLL-being
towards
considerate
notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31
does
norat
retevance,
R
different
get
nere
artifacts
are
norattg
etc.,
dependent,
quarrg
that
(a
Goodpaster s
Rnd nornattg the
notion
do
presunabtg
nornattg
woutd
not.
Nor,
not
it
erroneoustg,
reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons
norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains
context
Like
that
another different notion sonetines
equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though
since
does
nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3
inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect,
appear,
(as
or
consideration ).
certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.)
woutd
norat
an
etusive,
has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of
-8-
�high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto
other
chase.
the
however,
Since
these
are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like
notLons
MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or
-
scrapped
we
qutetLg
can
bgpass
the
vaiue
the
nuances and differences.
CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect,
wider notion and Moraiitg,
if
wag
theg
inportant
in
which
not
at
derivative,
Least
with
R
dependent.
Most
connect is through LiMitat ions on interference.
MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue.
LittLe
R
More
preciseLg,
a
actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as
MoraL
to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such
reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a
sensitive Matter
MainLg
because
deontic
principLes
do
not excLude
soMe
vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we
of
reduction
-
shaLL be obLiged to return.
Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg,
and
standing
Like,
the
vaLue
notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists,
in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are
however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it
triviaL
is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte
vaLue
circuMstances);
the
(in
Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where
the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes
soMething Morai.
It
this notion too that has induced the unwarranted
narrow ing of focus,
to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer,
certainig wrong,
to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather,
etc.
what
is
MoraL
has
to
do
with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain
iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with
justice
and
goodness),
features
refLected
fornaLLg
in
suitabLe
universaLizabiiitg of principie.^
So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate
at
narrower
certain
ethicaL
tgpes,
which excLude the wider environnent. The
width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing
ethicaL*.
equivaLent
ethics
a
of
(For
coMparison,
rec Lass ification
as
consider
"environMentat
bg
MoraL
its
originaL
the effect in environMentat
MoraLs"
environMentat
or
Moratitg").
$2.
Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages.
EthicaL standing does
not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM
door
for
hearing.
a
hearing;
in
an
ethicaL
it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the
Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even,
if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse
for identifging standing and rights (short
assuMption
that
of
the
astonishing
but
prevaLent
aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences
are giossed over, having MoraL rights is
equated
with
having
MoraL
standing
�The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8)
CaLLicott).
(e.g.
Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions
(expioitation
consideration
free
not
exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie
for
Underneath
consideration).
MoraL
these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions;
triviaL
MoraL
deserving
since wh3t is piausibie for
costs,
of
for
just
not
the
More
that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in
one
but
the ethicaL door,
consideration
are
assuMption
the
rendered
that
equivaLent
having
and
rights
standing
or
a coMMon Middie terM, such as
through
having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For
exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has
iff it has (or even have) rights.
(or can have) interests, i.e.
iMpiicit
appear
but
(with
Minor
Such
equations
quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it
etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things;
but
Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted
of (huManoid) interest.
notion
If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been
said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights.
But
theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation.
contrast
Bg
with
anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk
and institutions aitogether, and with Mang
utiLitarians,
who
view
notion
of
considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in
g
passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be
(MoraL)
rights
with
certain
unduLg
narrow
theories
rights,
of
which wouLd have, if theg stood,
decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough
for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie
view,
Regan's
particuLar
the rights view
(as if
an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the
attention,
worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL
it
has
score
heaviLg
been
proMoted
since
in environMentat ethics Literature and it does
exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs,
in certain
areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats.
R
theorg
of
rights
a
coMprises
representation (in the fashion of other
package,
which can be given fornaL
theories)
genetic
as
containing
the
foLLowing coMponents:
D. a definition of a right, and
P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights.
Rs
MatheMaticaL
exaMpLes
(such
as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL
there is a good deat of stippage between D
ord inarg
usage
controts
and
P.
But
because
of
the
More
on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of
postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg
includes as weLL
0.
a
set
of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or
cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C)
R. a set
of
reduction
scheMes
for
eiiMinating
transLation, reduction ruLes, etc.
-10-
rights
Locutions,
e.g.
bg
�The
of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends
theory
partLcuLar
LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng
genetLc
such
breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL,
accordLng
to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd
It
guarantee.
Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven
some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of
and
treatment.
respectfuL
to
patLents
canonLcat
RLthough
expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form
to
[not]
, where
-
onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt
X[s]
of
The rLght
as
for
Lnstance
not
Ln
to
permtts
(the
pLuraLLsatLon
partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted
the rLghts vLew
features
onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln
back
dLstrLbutLng
context
not
are
The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the
harm .
LncLuded
forms
Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of
to
actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated,
unduLg
agents
moraL
has a LLttLe
more
thLs
LrreducLbLe
the
Ls
Lt
poLnt,
(Ln
rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the'
sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.)
be
UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL
crLtLcLsed,
Ln
sLgnLfLeant
rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge.
respects
Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend
theg
and
heavLLg
upon
-
though
do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the
unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of
thLs
defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs,
to
anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the
certaLn
Lssue of defLnLtLon.
To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached
fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg
the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz.
11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or
grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag.
of
gLven
rLghts
sLmLLar core:
hLm
the
Ln
bg
MLLL
(whLch
of
...
account
Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a
a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg
possessLon
The
moraL
somethLng
socLetg
to
protect
ought to defend...', MLLL
provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed
to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does
whLch
Regan
after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls,
rLght
not
LncLude,
and
quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s
Lnsurance
cover
Ls
supposed
to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed
Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out,
Regan, now
features
of
rLghts
LmLtatLng
FeLnberg s
Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag.
trLcks,
trLes
to
puLL
substantLve
out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear
the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for
-11-
such
acts
�than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features
of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset:
is entitied to treatment of a certain kind
is to assert that someone...
...
To wake a ciaim
and
that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To
a
make
individuais,
ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against...
(p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a
ciaim
imports
much
the
that
ordinarg
notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts
entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a
transaction between individuais^,
thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed
it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making
directig to the ciaimant,
such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend,
at
tea
one
sunset,
doing ang of those things in ang straightforward
not
is
sense. There is nothing significant due or owed,
directed at
other
took
individuais
in
the
the
demanding
assertions
wag,
or
at
need
not
be
aii;
and
no
entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it
as
requires
weii
as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items
tgpicaiig introduced bg
or 'to . Someone who makes a
that
ciaims
ciaim
that
something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims
are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements.
Rnd
if
is
it
ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to
start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg).
Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification
of
the
definitions
OED
integration
and
it with Miii's definition. Upon
of
separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg
much
the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits:
M2.
Vaiid
entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg).
The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig,
or
have
obtain
or
something,
characteristic fiii to
to
in
act
a
certain
"justifiabie
justifiabie
to
(to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each
something
entaiis
and
mag
to
be
entitiement
ciaims
sufficient,
ent ireig
warrant
vaiid.
from
Thirdig,
and
ang case entitiing ones, and that
in
are
i.e.
dubious ciaims-against preconceptions,
without
be
regarded
appears
most
need
not
ciaim
restrict
to
on
but
aiso
the
ciaim
because
make
or
the
sheds
unduig
and
expected ciass of rights havers or
haver
of
a
it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if
something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing
potentiaiig?)
important
entitiement
hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the
right
as
grounds
morai
ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that
improves upon
invoived
an
sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig
some
adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation
has
converseig
an entitiement to have something. Secondig,
is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement
if
(To)
phrase
wag , which gives the
of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something,
entitiement
the
stake
that
ciaims. Thus use of the term
-12-
can
ciaim
(at
ieast
makes it an
�even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on
behatf
of
wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade
through
indirectLg,
representatives;
the tern
but
representatives" suggests
verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg
wake
the
to
interests" shouid not be afforded
rights" to
dubious inference from
bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance.
R Lot hangs on choice of basic
(as
then
terms
other
in
chaiienging
phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to
right'
newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that
entitLement
cLaim'
and
are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries
partLg in terms of the others)
tautoLogous.
and
expticative
satisfactorg
UeLL,
Like
definitions
that
M2
definitions
virtuaLLg
are
are
but
anaLgtic,
preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness
of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that
it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of
entitLement,
putative
entitLement'
expression,
right , i.e. it
a
since
doesn t
a
becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is
that
appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe,
better
something,
is
write
in
To
vaLiditg.
avoid
a
is
sLightLg
a reaL or supposed
to
amounts
sometimes
cLaim
cLaim'
these
probLems
with
avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression
basic definition
something,
R
vaLid
in that something (after
fiLL
to
into
in M2) and avoid disappearance of the
VaLid
something,
on
to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights).
term
suitabie
entitLement,
titiement ;
is
which
a
or
a
is
titiement
aLLeged
or
putative
mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6.
That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a
aLLeged
(e.g.
vacuitg
quant ificationaL
recognised
right',
Const,
with
cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation
ground
inf.
of
a
or
right;
of
to,
suitabie
hence,
an
of the thing
in,
deontic
principLe,
cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie
[for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement
[for
X]
R .
Requirements
for
what conditions objects (Rs) and
suitabiLitg,
subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows.
Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to),
MiLL,
as
interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL
titiements are to be vaLidated:
depend
on
compLiance
its
independentLg
estabLished'
the vaLiditg of
with
(p.270),
derivation from these correct moraL
stack, the vaguer
a
right (to)
moraL
principLes
us
return
a
right,
whose
correct
that
he
beiieves,
takes
up,
must
have been
vaLiditg
principLes.
to
as to how
provides...guidance
princ ip Les
i.e.
Let
It
is
the
removing
the
"moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version,
is a
M3. VaLid titiement,
from
correct
moraL
principLes,
appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate:
-13-
to
some
(categoriaLLg
�H3S.
premLsses
correct worst prtncLpLes
SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as
to R
vaLLd dertvatton
cone Lus con
There Ls a tttLement to
R
RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R
Ls
then
LmmedLate,
bg
f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to
suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff
X
has
a
tttLement,
vaLLd
Trow
correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon
wag
estabLLsh.
candLdates
The
fLLL
to
R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g.
out
freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg
sound
LLfe,
needs,
support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these
candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least
severaL
basLc
restrLct
the
quaLLftcatLon,
consLderabLe
and
categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that
can have the purported tttLement.
Such a scheme, as f13S
not
(whLLe
entLretg
wLthout
adequate
eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of
and revests much about rtghts.
derLved
important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of
ought
to
protect
can
hoLders,
be
regards
as
correct
moraL
rLght , of a requLrement
and
therefore
rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon,
dLffuse
correLatLve
dutLes
3pptg
prtncLpLes,
to
Ls
no
doubt
Ls thus a consequentLaL
over
vaLLd
characterLstLc poLnt of
R
tLtLements.
as socLetLes
Lt
transmLt
uphoLd,
feature.
SLmLLarLg
such
obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not
feature
from
thetr
character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component
of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of
that
soctetg
that
that reLevant soctettes ought to
part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent
dertvatLve
be
separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as
uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to
derLvatLons;
to
rtghts
In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs
dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For
true
duLg
3
rLght,
but
somethtng
foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance,
Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve
others,
free
from
unnecessarg
suffering
then
moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng;
-14-
�and
prohLbLtLon
the
functor
Ls
transnLtted
the
down
cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents
R
derLvatLon.^
Ls
consequentLaL
a
feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe.
(ThLs
Ls
whg
Regan
can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn
where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231).
SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that
seLf-evLdent
puretg
or
rLghts.
axLonatLc
a
aLwags
defence
It foLLows, then, that ang theorg
rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons.
cLaLns
are
no
For ang rLght that stands up, that
connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls
Lags
there
of
that
seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts
to
(such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such
as
that
RnerLcan)
the
announces seLf-evLdent rLghts,
Ls nLstaken. RLghts are
aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten.
ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts,
and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever
to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes,
as
there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds,
are
rLghts
and
generated
fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of
pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls
a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon
renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns,
etc.
-
but
Ln
the
derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that
argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes.
Because
of
theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe
after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg
envLronnentaL
ethLcaL
enterprLses.
not
are
But
Ln
essentLaL
absoLuteLg
a
strongLg
for
LndLvLduaLLstLc
rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg
LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg,
Lt Ls a snart strategg to
nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do
thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents.
RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance,
of
the
force
theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters
stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of
others
(hence
the
Lnportance
Ln
a
noraL
consLderatLons,
whLch
noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng
rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and
rotes,
of
Ln
persuasLve
so
Lnsurance
sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts
prLncLpLes,
and
truno
on.
argunentatLve
reasons
too,
Lnputed
rLghts
are
Lnportant
Ln
reLnforcLng
gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg,
Ln
The
socLaL
advantages
LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon
of
rLghts
accordLngLg
offers
not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts
of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest:
-15-
he
�aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang
is
woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back
Lt ts not a consequence that Me
prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL,
the
can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there
potnt
no
ts
advantage
or
Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get
theM.
to
to
aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can
get
aLong
wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us.
R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there
Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having
senttence,
tnterest,
as
such
etc.
(a
rather
now
rtghts,
of
faniLiar test). Constder
tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive.
Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln
Ln
the
Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL
theg coutd be incorporated,
Ln
defLntttons
McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though
(OED,
vLctnttg
other
preMtss
the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have
rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is
RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg
RI
is
observes,
not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much
in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has
had
Mang
with
notabtg
rivaLs,
interests
repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing
(rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^
How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide
accreditation
and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings
out),
1)
inc Lud ing: we
Usage;
speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as
don't
possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg).
and
non-usage
to
has
be
backed
In fact we do,
bg other consideration if arbitrariness and
prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp.
160-1).
2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as
to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM
(again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^
it
of
and
coupied
3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that
protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for
right
it
cLaiM).
Must
have
Nothing
characteristicaLLg
an
interest
however
requires
afford
(FreedMan,
is
that
reasoning
a right is a
sonething
to
a
have
p.16^., who upsets the inferred
the
protection
rights
that
of an interest; as far as the Meaning of
goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*)
exercising
roughig
if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation
with
sgnongnous
have;
others
and
Confusion
of
having
right
with
right
a
a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though
these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising
or
to
cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted
transition,
such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a
cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate
-16-
to
do
with
the
�Mak Lng
bg
c La LMS
of
a
hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS
hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns).
R
creature
or
LteM
wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the
sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such
as exercLsabLe rLghts,
Lndeed
Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then
conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must
presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe
but
reLevant
actLvLtg),
requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the
such
notLon
of
rLght.
of
For
Lnstance,
the
Lnterest-protectLng
aspect
of
tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not
froM
the
notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests
(especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of
Lnterests).
R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to
rLghts
restrLct
to
persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton
that
what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe
conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts
to persons, or to
LndLvLduaLs,
or
persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to
LndLvLduaLs
and
"persons".
RLL
these
restr Let Lons
on
rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for
LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged
dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon.
or
�§3.
and rebuiLding environMentaLLg.
the rLghts vLew
Deconstructing
Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts
LndLvLduaL
to
Consider,
a
subjects,
LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to
cope
decentLg
spec Les,
concernLng rare 3nd endangered
(e.g.
Regan s
pp.395-6).
prob Lens of our tines, such as those
envLronnentaL
Major
wLth
forest
does
restrLctLon
ecosgsteMs,
wLLderness,
foLLow
froM
not
even
etc.
hLs
own
defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg
LnfLLtrated,
as
postuLates
the
concerning
are eLaborated. It is not
rights
uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to
individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in
p.39S)
RR,
a
arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins,
brief
because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs
(In
sgLLogistic
extended
IndividuaLs
forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs.
not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species.
do
Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So
the
rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare
endangered
or
species
right-hoLders needn t be
individuaLs,
aniMais.)
of
so
The
restricted
beginning
after
aLL,
onLg
the
species
(with
a
if
are
paradigMs
MoraL
the
about
or
MeMbers
species
e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then
treated,
individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan
view
as
Look
undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone
further
non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species
theiisetves.
it
Makes
of
announces,
rights
The
Species
are not
individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of
species
to
is
view
3ngthing
rights
individuaLs.
(p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation
is actuaLLg offered),
are
not
MereLg
the
right-hoLders;
paradigMatic
theg
right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the
exhaust
iron-fisted thene of
(p.361),
according
the
to
aLLeged
individuaListic
nature
of
MoraL
rights
which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg
appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL
and
LegaL
usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction.
Uhg
trg
to
iMpose
such
an
iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq
atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view?
EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg.
a
rebuiit
rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More
protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group,
in virtue of princ ip Les such as
that significant endangered species ought to be protected.
creatures
wouLd
hoLd
different
But
then
different
rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that
aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid,
this,
On
but as a Matter of definition) in
and
basis
(the
of
inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of
the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account
but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions.
-18-
of
rights,
�restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s
The
package, that can simpig be pee Led off.
rLghts
appt LeatLons
of
super-imposed
theorg,
the
but
Ls
essentLaL
wLth
for
the
given
coherence
a super-individuaL, such as a specLes,
If
postuLates.
equaLLtg
hetd rLghts on an equaL basts
It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major
Lt,
composLng
LndLvLduaLs
the
then
the
wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL
super-individuaL
Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE
on
bLocentrLc
egaLitarianism;
DC,
Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing
p.3S).
through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment
of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg.
IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts
view,
theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls
meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and
deconstructLon
on
of
the
rLghts
exactLg
view
thLs
Ls
EquaLLtg
done.
assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to
from
dLrectLg
dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg
features
absoLute
are
quaLLt Les, theg do
Ls
aspect ref Leets
and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg
rLghts
foLLow
that
(p.368). It does
not come Ln degrees
not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of
Ltems
the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL
bund Les
equaL
that
have
have
rLghts
of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow
from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a
certain
Ln
LmpartLaLLtg
treatment
(often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm).
equaLLtg
NeLther
nor
assumptLons
LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge
then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts
To
them
fend
we
have
to
foLLow
gLven.
the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the
LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the
rLght
respectfuL
to
treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag,
both
beLng
imported
parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated
as
justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls
rLght
those
of
who
have
argued
Ls
basic
the
Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment
(p.277),
where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng
aLL
suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg.
ConsLder
subjects'
vaLue
as
- what we LL caLL Lnherent
LndLvLduaLs
vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg
p.23S ff.).
(pp p.37;
Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming
sLmLLarLg
to
HR
various
postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent
vaLue
can
be
varied,
pLace of Lnherent vaLue,
LndLvLduaL
as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then,
Ln
LnLtLaL or connate vaLue,
X,
or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X,
defined,
for
ang
Ltem
if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a
mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt
assumed
that,
for
Ls
ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came
-17-
�connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised,
Ls
Lt
as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load.
showing
Before
that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the
notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing
(certain
affairs
individual
tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not
that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or
tgpes
aLL
positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd
negative
vaLue
connate
disboLicainess,
if
(their
ontoLogicaL
no
nonexistence
proofs
objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate
doubt
have
decidedLg
to
adding
their
the existence of top connate vaLue
of
are
vaLues
somewhat
thus
initiaL
Like
LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood,
at
an
best
initiaL
assignment.
The
assignments
Like those of initiaL
are
probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg
vaLue;
connate
out
themseLves
presumptive
those
of
inherent
vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort
their
bg
initiaL
Life-stgLes,
can
which
vaLue,
then
intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a
be
theg
states
worLd-Lines,
posteriori
a
diminished as
or
increased
receive
probabiLLtg
assignments.
Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL
and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting
prtncLpLes,
features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant.
0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to
carrg
enough
(not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect
principLe.
appears
Examination
to
show that it can, at Least to this extent:
insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on
respectfuL
fact,
Ln
individuat
bg
to
item
substitute
connate
made
is
principLe,
principLe
as
aLso
to
repLace
required,
nameig
resuLts
defence
of
the
modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the
bg
shows,
where
the
the same substitutions as before. The modified
principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items
which
have
connate
that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect
wags
in
and
presupposed
argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon
vaLue
right
throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs
that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the
modified
the
features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg
concerning
respect
to
inherent
for
work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg
those
vaLue
succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It
treatment
suffices,
inherent
principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for
individuaLs,
and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment.
Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted,
but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a
fuLLer
de-
and
re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded
environmentaL rights theorg
offered.
But
it
which
repLaces
the
moraL
rights
view
wiLL
be
is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of
-20-
�the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt
Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts
theorg
(e.g.
can
PP,p.32),
perhaps
(minus
remain
totaLitg
the
cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence.
But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact,
most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of
rLghts movement. Nonethe Less?
animat
the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL
h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe
supererogatorg;
Lt
(p.351,p.3^.6) to
thLs
permLssLbLe
Ls
vegetarianism Ls
(p.39!+);
But
(p.3^6).
obLLgatorg'
cone Lus Lon
the
appear
to
most
the
arguments
the
not
Ls
Lt
that
Ls
estab LLsh
not
to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng
Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg
presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages).
vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons
Ls
Lt
given,
wrong
to
purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg
obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a
vegetarLan
beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and,
'16
----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc
), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the
argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do
not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no
proper
of
focus
Regan's
sLnce
attach,
such
practLces
tgpLcaLLg
dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les
of
practLces
huntLng-gatherLng
LLfestgLes,
of
doubt
Lead
LncLude
to
the
the gardenLng cuLtures of the
Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes.
Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page
3nd
351
with
eatLng
dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of
(as
these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes
weLL
as
mtnor
ones),
newfangLed
Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and
so
R chLef reason gLven Ls that
on.
end
theLr
LLves are brought to an untLmeLg
antmaLs'
(e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct
tLme
has
come,
vegetarLanLsm,
that
or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead.
Mhat precLudes respectfuL use?
Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more
connected
theorLes,
such
as
aLL
that
consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as
restrLctLons,
wLthout
further
Large
sent Lent
utLLLtarLanLsm,
are
Longer
no
sentient
or
entaLL
moraL
deserve
such
dLetarg
assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of
circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to
which
beLngs
than
eat
dead
creatures,
things
which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC
exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is
aLreadg dead, but of causing
prematureLg,
Ln
order
death
(or,
to
a
Lesser
extent,
Letting
die)
to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product.
For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate
moraL
standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg.
Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to
-21-
�anLmaLs
bauLk
anLmaLs.
Rnd
at
for
sone
patLents,
Papuans
the
rLghts
extensive
to LLfe and LLveLhood to
own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between
Regan's
noraL agents and moraL
treatment,
such
admLttLng
ground
of
treatment
dLfferentLaL
further
and pLgs, a
peopLe
dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed.
Regan s
dLfferentLaL
justLfgLng
for
So how tLght
Ls
Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst
arguMent,
tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk
of the crucLaL argument
ff.)
dLd
not
treat
resources.
Nor
dLd
theg
(p.3{+^);
receptacLes
does
sLmpLg
cuLtures
tradLtLonaL
renewabLe
(p.3t*3
appLg.
not
anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as
as
anLmaLs
treat
Lnstruments
mere
excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that
of
tradLtLonaL
unLLke
peopLes,
provLsLon (p.3t*3), are
prLncLpLe
dubLous
admLtted
commercLaL
under
derLved
supposedLg
who
farmers
Regan's
from
prLncLpLe
LLbertg
respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R
the
LncLudLng
fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng
requLres
whLch
that
treatment
creatures
of
vaLue
Lnherent
are
however
Some
excLuded.
Ls
not
of
for
prLncLpLe,
the
countervaLLLng
respectfuL
No
excLuded.
LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue
persLst, come what mag.
There
use
Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have
(p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not
wLth
a
(p.331,
stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more
the
Ln
practLces
the
vLoLate the respect
crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs,
food,
Papua,
pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not
exchanged
often
or
consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer
groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln
who
Large
and
Bg
does
rLghts are therebg
a
acquLre
not
Ln
LndLctLons
Lnterference
rLght
text
Regan s
to
(and
eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng
the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng
tradLtLonaL
the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons
that Lt Ls
LLfestgLes
LnadmLssLbLe.
Such
are
aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt
Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that
LLfe
anLmaLs
brLnqtrg
to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such
prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe
use
or
harmfuL
destructLve
wLth
LncompatLbLe
bLoconatLvLst
the
vLoLence
"LLbertg"
assumptLons,
no
(p.287);
prLncLpLes
matter
as
Lnterpreted.
dLffLcuLt
how
wouLd
maxLMLae
never
to
bLoconatLvLsm appears
Lndeed
to
NonetheLess,
LLve bg, are hLghLg
appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg
who
an
to
mang
vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL
dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL
happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or
MorLd
magbe a
Ls
not
verg
rendered
LnadmLssLbLe.
ilagbe
The
RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL;
dLfferent
predator-free
sLn-eradLcated
RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed?
-22-
post-naturaL
worLd
Ls
�$4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts
and
substantiaL prob tews.
tivehood:
and
predation, territoriatitg
other
the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers
Despite
have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that
* Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the
human
as
those
of
instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see
for
animats,
sort
sane
e.g. RR, PR).
* Rnimats
have
various
For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that
rights.
humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and
from
excessive
interference.
these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg
Mhite
neither necessarg nor sufficient
significant
connections,
inasmuch
rights),
having
for
as
rights
are
nonethetess
protect
permissibie
there
to
serve
worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such
de-foresters,
as
mag
otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human
practices
sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their
interests. For exampie, much animai
suffering.
causes
experimentation
unnecessarg
quite
there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare
Thus
and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced,
and
easier
obtain
to
positive
action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of
sociai
protection
the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be
underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists.
Granted animats have rights, some of them
higher
humans
rights
nohumans,
widespread
a
have,
main
animats
phenomenon
of
predation,
a
par
with
those
that
question (pace Freg) concerns which
outstanding
particutartg,
on
have.
Because
especiatig
of
the
essential to the continued tivetihood of
mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult
one
(and
one
comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest
Regan
induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when
a
herbivore s
interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued
sustenance,
avoidabte
others
as
in
human
Predation is not of course the ontg source of
territoriatitg,
slaughter of whates and dotphins.
serious
conflict
of
interests;
for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg
in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected).
Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population
been
converted
into
increase
serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and
associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective
the
but
integral
part
much
of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's,
hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic
as
themes
probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism
reduces
an
have
individuats,
that
those
items
items
such
(constituting the base ctass) have a fixed
-23-
�(equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for
and
that
vaLues
(derived)
Ls
ecosystems,
of
whaLes
additive
an
simpLy
functLon
the
of
aLLenabLe,
such
structures,
organised
and
or
atoms
as
Lt.
within
CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue
are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon
and
LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a
infringing
path,
and
maximization
preservatLon
enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to
has
that
LndLvLduaL
(Lnherent)
LnLtLaL
to
everg
simiLarLy
woraL
exLstence
(and
vaLue
suboptimaL
The rights view
desLderata.
contLnued
Like
the
considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved
shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions,
and the reasons for revising the vaLue
eLsewhere
than
which are wore
LncLude
sun
the
of
predators,
theLr
LndLvLduaL
escaLation
The
the
of
theg
though
components,
be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth
mag
LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn
vaLue.
detaLL
Ln
the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems,
(Ln
tgpLcaLLg
expLaLned
are
assumptions,
the
through
probLems
wLthout
system,
reductLon
of
theorLes deserves,
rights
however, some eLaboratLon.
R
serLous
cLash
of
Lnterest,
as
between carnLvores and herbLvores,
fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg
rLghts,
of
unLess
too
Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the
many
extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures
exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a
Ln
contLnuLng
mistaken
to
eLevatLon
that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls
LnfrLnged
bg
LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe.
a
MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe
cases
of
to
Lnterfere
some
Ln
predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu
rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to
avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be
appLLed
hoLd
to
gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated
issues
in
these
bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but
at
further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf,
verg
Least,
dubiousLg
permissibLe.
High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of
probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are
On
contrary,
the
virtuaLLy
aLL
the
remaining
naturaL
radicaLLg
unsatisfactory.
systems containing Large
carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL
states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a
Can t
an
rights
to,
right
fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute
though
their
rLghts to Life.
to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from
unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some
confLict,
and
inconsistency
even, of
rights,
obLigations
and
so
on,
is
inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags.
Some
can,
but
not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often
-24-
�significant) sorts of cases. In these terns,
bg
accommodated
Mag
of
up
confLLct
sgstematic
reguLar
such
confLLct
anatogous
S3tisfactoriig
It Ls too reguLar,
deontLc
does
sgstem
not
because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc
cases,
structures: for then much too much
rather
not
of rLghts or prLncLpLes.
confLLet
sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent
muLtipLg
is
predatton
Ls
time
cases.
R
confLLct,
repuzziing
spent
undermines
MhLch
fash Lon to deaL wLth
sattsfactorg
more
redecLdLng
and
the
point and force of
prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach
(no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach:
right.
feeL
doesn't
p.33)
DC,
at
aLL
Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek
R
Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature.
R
aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in
superior
excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and
Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood
to
right
does
not
an
give
unquaLified
Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords
onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse.
In these terms, a Lion
that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate
Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The
different.
Mith
situation
their
take
chances.
rights to Life are not
predatorg
is
essentiaLLg
not
LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find
LJeak,
themseives in threatening situations, such as
traveL
humans
animats
or
wiiderness
If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe
therebg
or
action
highspeed
infringed
animats
where
(and
defending
their
animats
are
territories
LnvoLved,
not
shouid
be
HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL,
persecuted).
except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their
chances
with
naturaL
predators.
Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming
with
predation
and
Like
issues
happens,
what
grips
is through zoning, or more generaLLg through
bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface
what
to
and
eisewhere.
is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness
can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves
of
out
a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens
are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did
wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions
big
For
wiiderness
as
Locus,
Lt
is
much
to think hoLLsticaLLg,
easier
predation as an LntegraL and significant part of
such
a
rich
naturaL
the
as
to see
structure
rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting.
(The
adjustment
of
ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need
invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg;
wiiderness
is an appropriatetg generat
notion, not get a proper name.)
The
action
of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness
areas, in taking preg conservativeLg,
Ln defending their territories and so
-25-
on,
�LnvoLves
no
LtseLf
Ln
infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls
huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need
for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a
career.
that
tresspassLng
Darwin
Ln
earLg
hLs
brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the
a
OnLg
deng
Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as
with
predatLon,
to
undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses
and
repLacenents
of
sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng
naturaL
MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde,
thought
Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst
sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg,
huMan-engtneered
that
even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan
breakdown,
who
efforts,
whtch
especLaLLg
are
prone
to
soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg
can
theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the
More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs
the
as
there
are
and
More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters
norMaLLg
straightforward
huMan
chLLdbirth,
provide
weLL-docuMented
ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or
the
of
evidence
as
MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one
the
ecoLogicaL
Laws
to
of
encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does
better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive
huMan
interference
Ln
naturaL regions.
It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue
a Lwags
as
poLiticaL
high
wickedness,
evoLutionarg
not
it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of
as
Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not
there
inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate
Long
is
process
-
that
the
no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered
with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might
have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved
adapted
in
weLL
wag
a
to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their
enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent
it is far froM cLear that Nature
of such huMans,
provides
rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL
an
optiMat
sgsteM;
Law" argued for eLsewhere:
see SM).
The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step
with
deontic
best
MoraLLtg,
principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to
sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see
were
with
that
vaLue
SH).
Even
it
be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt.
Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing
environnent;
naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite
and often dazzLing,
Lf
LeveLs of vaLue.
Richard SgLvan
via Bungendore
-26-
for
the
adequate,
�RustraLia 2621
NOTES
1-
For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of
that
thought
environmentaL
Lt far
of southern and western Rmerican schooLs,
out
fLows
the
surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that
emerges
typLcaLLy
the
froM
prestigious
More
universities
Ln
LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres
LLke Oxford.
2.
May
ThLs
a
strike
MoraL
as
theorist
aiMost
cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics -
as curious as a
order
in
aLso
and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are
different.
assessMents
Cost/benefit
depend on a vaLue theory of
soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity.
3-
EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and
amounts
what
choice
seLf-appointed chosen,
(p.!*).
makers
entitLement
a
to
in
There
are
probiems
according
PP,
to
we free and rationaL
use
regarding
of
contexts, since entitLement moves in the
these
rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights.
The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a
devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving
a
moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But
neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage.
MoraL
notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges
and
catagoriaL
features
are
investigated and put to principLed
work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the
dLvisions
of
ref Leets
cLassification
things in terms of such features, where theg appLy,
as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy
these
features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not.
(Even if they were and a hierarchy
aLL
Not
probiematic.
resuLted,
hierarchies
are
need
that
damaging,
e.g.
ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may
oniy
were
when
be.
not
be
mereLy
It
is
hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to,
power or priviLege or favour,
that
theg
warrant
the
criticism
hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy
been
directed
at
certain
power
hierarchies are of this sort.)
-27-
hierarchies;
but
not
aLL
�UorrLes
about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order
and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers
an
(west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth
LMpoverLshed
ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears
both
as
deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such
Ln
where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts
Regan's,
Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon.
5.
StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on
standLng
vaLue-Ln-LtseLf
wLth
Freg,
Ln
equates
who
worst
and proceeds to bound Lt
(p.!+S),
beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs
part
happens as
coLLapse
of
a
of
wore
wLdespread
huwanLstLc
utLLLtarLan
Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further
casuaLLtg.
6.
PossLbLLLtg
and
forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes
probabtLLtg
are basLc to the Ma Ln
arguwents
the
to
LMMoraLLtg
of
nucLear arrangements: see LiP.
7.
But
Fox
has
M3de
a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg
repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an
attempt
Ls
bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg
enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM
woraLLtg
as
Ln
a
generaL
bad
Lnstttutton,
cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much
enMeshed
whtch
damage,
Ls
of
has a poor
thoroughtg
Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg;
Lt
does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg.
8.
UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But
what
are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent
prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features.
8.
SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts
taLk
resuLt
froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged
that
rLghts
are
verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that
sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg,
prtncLpLe
of
such
p3rstMong,
as
OccuM s
weLL
as
provLdtng
a
pasttng
such
propertLes,
such
as
betng
objeettons
of such crude LnstruMents as
OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have
have
a
razor, such ent Lt Les
shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts
(as
bg
derLvatLve
rLghts;
froM
rLghts
certaLn
obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts
are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects.
-28-
�10.
The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern
Ls
one,
a
verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20
right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to
senses of the substantive
brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN.
RLthough
the
takes
anaLgsis
frow
off
one Ma Ln OED sense, the
eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected
1.3
as
whLch
that
MoraLLg just or due
concerned
Ls
(as in
LnvoLveMent
activities);
be
no
issues concerning opportunitg (as in
rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights
state-iMposed
such
equitg or ... which is
right-doing ). But there wiLL
Main
Ln
wLth
senses,
not
to
in
participate
are priMariig issues for MoraL
these
actors.
11.
reLevant
or coMMunities to capabie or
individuats
within
theM,
i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies.
The
status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such
exact
arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00
is
or
further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00
a
is.
13.
Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for
who
Leaps
to the cone Lus ion that sentience,
beings and the "higher
...
is
an
the fact that huMan
aniMats have experiences or MentaL
states
the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg
(p.^3). No arguMent at aLL
are possessors of MoraL rights
than
appeaL
to
(other
is to be found for this ciatM, a
authoritg)
surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting
for
Freg,
faiLure
suppig
to
others
arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the
MereLg citing
Light of his eartier reMarks that
sentieneg
as
a
criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it
is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe
respects are provided ...
arguMents in these
subsequent chapters, such arguMents
are
. Rs we shaLL see in
scarce
on
the
ground
(p.33).
lit-
Too Leg s
anaLgsis
standard
account
substituting
can
"right
of
for
desires ,
an
wouLd Mark out
onLg
subcLass
rights,
of
be
upgraded,
and brought into Line with
(adopted
to"
Ln
EE,
p.176),
chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt
iMportant
roughLg
consequentiai
exercisabLe
criticisM teLLs against EE).
-2?-
feature
rLghts
(a
of
a
siMLLar
�IS.
Rn important exanpLe is the argunent
which
bg
broken
is
concedLng
to
that
vaLue,
equat
not
p.33,
PP
aLL hunans, serLousLg
genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need
have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss.
16.
London,1932).
RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega,
the
But
qutte
not
Ls
natter
not a reputation of
sLnpLe,
so
vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats
decisive.
carefuL definition, which wouLd however render
nore
R
sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is
'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg
OED account,
so
upon
the
vegetabie
a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL
foods;
food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of
Life'.
17.
that
not
decisivetg
support vegetartantsn, even
inproved
connerciat
faming
does
UtLLitarianisn
invoLving
s Laugh ter
and
of
so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive
aninats,
argunent).
Ln
Rnd
fact
fLawed
the
case
utititarian
vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work
for
of
one
choice
of
of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36).
13.
sone
Uhite
such
terntnoLogg
distinction
singuLarLg
is
unfortunate
given
the
non-obsoiete
patient . Most aninats are not patients.
senses of the noun
13.
the
inportant,
is
For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict
such
as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as
regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and
threats
to
rabid
foxes
to
the
crunch;
hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the
then
strict
norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane
aLL
and
hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s
egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones
for
cases,
for
subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and
respectfuL
defective
farngard
greater
C3n
practices
vaLue
assunption
be
p.3^.2).
condenned,
R
is snuggLed into the rights
view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth
(see
DE,
si).
20.
On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn.
21.
Predation bg Large carnivores can
conpared
with
hunan
travet
be
usefuLLg,
sporting
and
predation
(no
accident
of
-30-
course)
favourabig,
accidents. UhiLe the
nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order
aninaL
and
of
nagnitude,
appears
to invoLve
�rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though
reduct ton
tn
vatue
tn
the
removat
tt
tnvotve
may
some
of on-gotng ttves, tt atso
offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts.
REFERENCES
J.B.
A
t
Catttcott,
On
the
tntrtnstc
vatues
of
nonhuman
spectes'
tn
The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press,
1386; pp.138-172.
R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London,
1377.
J.
Fetnberg,
The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and
Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press;
Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68.
U.
Fox,
R postcrtpt on
2(1+) (1385) 17-23.
deep
ecotogy
and
tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter
The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs
B. Freedman,
Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168.
R.G. Frey,
Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats,
1880.
K.E. Goodpaster,
308-325.
Ctarendon,
Oxford,
On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378)
I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con,
Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386.
J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373.
H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good
tn
Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136.
C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty,
1385.
E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs
5(1383 )l+7-61.
T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383;
to as HR.
T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs',
Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP.
J. Rodman,
Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an
-31-
�ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing
UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56.
J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer
and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer
and Pierce, pp.185-8.
R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to
animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR.
R. Rout Leg,
In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe
cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC.
R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL
Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB.
R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and
nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU
1981+; referred to as UP.
R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental
Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL
Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE.
'
1
T. Rgan,
The case for animaL rights'
in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39.
%
C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects
Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+.
R.
SgLvan,
R critique of deep ecoiogg',
1+1(1985); referred to as DE.
Radicatj^hiLosophg
1+0(1985) ana
R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in
Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN.
D. VanDeVeer
and
C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees,
UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP.
�
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MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV?
Begond moraL extens ion isms.
Some
find
us
of
mereig
not
ourseives
at
with
odds
mainstream
environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg
disastrous, not
ontg
for
mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but
uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate
from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg,
a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh
to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern
USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes.
the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons
Rgain
wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne.
extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL
MoraL
apparatus
conventLonaL
Lts
begond
(but
certaLnLg
subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed,
certaLn
confLnes to
unwarranted)
or eLse, more LLkeLg,
has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend
wag
the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the
assumptions
vatue,
(equaL
appLLed to a wider
cLass
equat
of
rLghts,
of
adjustment,
consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg
equaL
a
(Rs
subjects.
moraL
egaLLtarLan
wLth
tgpe,
generaL
moraL
ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff.,
under
and
the
tgpicaL and usefuL weapon
movements
of
Liberation
with
proceed
couLd
Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a
MoraLisms
Nature
LabLe
more
rLghts
and
accurate
movements
Less
but
equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL
to
moraLitg
bend
to
iLLegitimate
certain
interests,
etc),
are
equaLitg,
standing,
but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least
on the boundaries, as it
ex tens Lon isms
endeavour
not onLg do the
since
(rights,
such
impressive
pubLLcLg
extensLonLsms
purposes,
extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved
(though
is!
from
Seen
a
wider
perspective,
environmentaL
not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go,
in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where
theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted,
it remains. The zones
of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai
as
forests,
species,
ecosgstems,
continue
mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE,
things
be
to
p.llf.1).
Nor
can
such
substantiaL
to
open
the
sorts
of
invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated
efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite
which
extensions,
extensions
operate,
such
as
sentience,
LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe,
the
verg
characteristics
pain-receptivitg,
idea
of
an
on
interests,
environmentaL
ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite
respect
for
naturat
sgstems
and
communities,
founders
on the moraL rights
position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff).
Mang
a
Ls
MoraLLtg
weapon,
purpose
depLoged bg pressure and
often
interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to
and
justLfg
wLde
a
actLvLtg
of
range
and
hostLLe
practices
ground
naturaL
to
envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr
needs
generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met
there
though
even
are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there
Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu
and PLgden - have a poLnt
MoraLLtLes
Lt
when
MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew
and
to
coMes
The
MoraLLtg.
such
HLnckfuss
through
daMage
of
seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the
often
benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and
work
often
the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under
wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts.
Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls
oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk,
conduct
to
LMpossLbLe
concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the
response
to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg
LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg,
tougher
dLstLnctLon,
(practLcaL
hard
j^s
(whLch
axLoLogg
to
to
avoLd)
MaLntaLn,
between
there
Ls a further
deontLc
expressLons
Rnd
deontLes.
and
practLcat
between
expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth
and
such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a
soLLd
case
agaLnst
objectLve
or
absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks.
Hagbe
the
net
a
carefuL
practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t
on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?,
LMpact
soMe
of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can
doesn t
MoraLLtg
coLLect
a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg
constraLn
that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg
affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest
appear
to
be
turned
around
through
abuses,
of
an
Ls
Lnput
on
chauvLnLstLc,
as
such
froM
sLaverg,
huMan
MoraLLtg.
huMan
Even so the
persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are
not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg
posLtLveLg
Ln
thLngs
contrLbute
couLd
that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar,
MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the
prospect of More, More protectLon,
Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls
tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through
verg
channeLLed
MoraL
ftowLng,
through
aLL
too
LegaL
often,
rather
to
the
than
wrong
dLfferent
LnstLtutLons;
wLth
fraMeworks,
part Les,
such
as
the
Lt
Ls
the benefLts
strong
and
estabLLshed.
HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls,
Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for
peace
(MoraLLtg
beLng
a
MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be.
-2-
Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide
an assauit on the environMent instead of other
creatures,
subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones,
or
a
prettg
easg
feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern
technoLogicaL
LLke
was
that
course,
of
is;
Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom
guns
another
or
(huMan,
Ls now deeptg
natLonat, state or race),
LLkeLg,
More
entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part
supportLng
of
scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg
socLaL
can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg
not
and
appLLed,
successfuttg
Must
awaLt
Ls
Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the
protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on.
There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars
antL-MoraLLsts)
equated)
nottons:
MoraL
status,
rLghts,
sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs
But the tern
can
scarceLg
escape
attogether
MoraL
def Ln Lt tons
Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg
reveaL)
that
tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for
to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe
such
MoraL
group:
narrower
the
ang
Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the
use
ttght
of
as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL.
Lssue
coMMon
cLuster
consLderatLon, retevance,
a
on
foLLowLng
These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to
.
...
the
standing,
consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates
perMissions,
to
are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg
MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns
(often
(guaLnt
ethicai )
(hunan)
actors,
as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL
attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces
Ln
the
Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL
that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM
objects
MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends
to
be
shunned
Ln
The
notion
of
deeper environMentaL theorg.
SiMoraL
RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies.
standing,
introduced
notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag
environMentaL
heavg,
but
ethics.
It
is
anaiogg
questionabte
bg
a
Major,
with the RngLo-RMerLcan
but
d3Maging,
danaging because, verg briefLg,
rote
it wouLd paint a
rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that
have not froM those
territorg.
that
have
MoraL
standing
-
across
Much
conpLex
More
Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence
criterion
in
of MoraL standing is
probieM soLving;
absoiuteLg basic
reasonabLg addressing
of
a
in environMentaL thinking and
the Lssue of MoraL
standLng
Must
be
vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of
thLs
Ls
so
evLdent,
especLaLLg
gLven
the
MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL
standing. In the sane vein,
an
a necessarg condition ... for
Lt is stated that
ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing
adequate
Such statements are suretg overstatements.
For,
Ln
pLace,
fLrst
the
there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones,
which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL
ecoLogLcat
Rodman s
deep
Naess s
(e.g.
ecotogg,
sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can
cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg
warranted
make
standing
rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing.
For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's
moraL
of
notLon
attempt
(Ln
NP)
to
a
make
standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic,
part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii
as ahistoricai, a piece of
footnoted
Regan s
retrospective
account
of
Legisiation).
as
But,
it
happens,
standing, according to which a being has
moraL
morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg
a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion
as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the
exposed
(thus
biconditionaL
invoLved
in
the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the
conditions
tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest
bg
sgstem about
be
to
buiidozed,
or
the
Moon
about
to
be
bg
tourized
an
Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags
that
wiii
at Low
we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be
that
affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps
in
a
modified
wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so,
such
a
deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic;
for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings,
which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed
to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition
standLng,
something
his
footnoted
for
moraL
account does not guarantee. The LegaListic
notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL.
Rn
initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns
its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is
for
ang
sufficientLg
comprehensive
notion
of
a
sometimes entering into moraL
consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason,
some decidedtg restrictive
assumptions,
concerning
interests
and
whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter
assessment
on
modeL
dubious
it imports
rights
into
ethicaL
occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can
significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates
terms
of
having
of
thing
in
certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas
what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests,
sort
of
that
couLd
or
be
the
have interests, even as derived (as in the case of
LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often
-4-
indeed,
Legat
have
to
standing
to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc.,
is
begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts.
room
Of course there ts constderabte
standtng
not ton
the
widen
to
Legat
of
tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and
(which
"cLaimants
to admit, through representatton, other
to
the
PresentLg,
courts.
for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist
cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag
and
persons
of broadentng the standtng not ton
objects,
agatn
because
to
encompass
Limitations
the
the
mang
requisite
environmentaL
nottons of tnterests and rtghts
impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do
not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts
accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs,
the
MonuMents,
and
bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of
Ontg
constderabtg.
do,
Like
naturat
these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts
tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the
wodet
Legat
be overcome.
coutd
be
recogntsed,
account
of
the
Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg
anaLogg
behtnd,
Left
unimpeded
fresh
a
and
now
standtng
woraL
rather
propose
free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to
an expLLcatton of
Recordtng to them,
can be construed atong these LLnes.
whtch
For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X
fISl.
tnterests
Lts
theg sag
Ln
that
weLL-betng
have postttve moraL weight
stLpuLattng
theg re
the
but
this;
theg re
or
(PP. p.3). RctuaLLg,
not
free
simpig
to
given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg
sttputate,
recogntze Ln proceeding at once to
consider various
to their
standard answers
basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore
in
LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg
a
than
effect
substitute
a
tortuous
Less
nameLg
account,
generaLLtg
(in
interpretation)
MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence
positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG:
pureLg
since
future
items
mag
have
ancestors). Either wag the account is
weight
and
having
moraL
continued
some
moraL
circutar,
or
shouLd however be
significance,
since
having
X
of
wetfare
has
deLeted,
as mag dead
positive
moraL
standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster.
p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg
cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg
circutar,
H33.
But
has
X
then
as
moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight.
a
expLication,
the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt
expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg.
Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do?
-5-
The
troubie
Ls
except
that
theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL
partLcuLar
on
standing, the notion Ln fact does verg
because
hoMe
Ma Ln
whose
eth Les,
chauvLnLstLc
base
does
whLch
LLes
wLthLn
the
not
extend
or
traveL
unsatLsfactorg;
wLth
as
coMpetence,
or
m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL
The
personhood).
are
(such
cLassLfLcatLons
bLoLogLcaL
socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or
potentLaL
standLng
MoraL
Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth
spec Les
the
of
the wLder
to
onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to
not
ctassLfLcatLons
ethLcaL
MeMbershLp
are
theg
trad Lt LonaL
of
weLL
for
ethLcs,
It Ls one of those
confLnes
envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed
confuse
envLronmentaL
Ln
work
Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt.
there
not Lons,
LLttLe
enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE)
DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then,
no
satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP -
or
Lt
eLsewhere
It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe,
seens.
non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng.
Rather
the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The
for
reason
the
needs
what
cost-benefLt
LMperatLves
be
to
Looked
at
presuppose
a
Morat
Ln
appLLcatLons
assessments,
(whLch
thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present
Lt wouLd decLsLvetg
Ls evLdent enough:
usefuL work,
space,
about
enthusLasM
and
deLLMLt
of
the
categorLcaL
of
deLLMLtatLons
behLnd
proposed
some
notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the
humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc
foLd
(partLg
moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg
bg use of the term
achLeved
Ls
search
unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so
Morat
search space towards the confLnes of the
thLs
MoraL
confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan
forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes
appLLcatLons
the
neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of
Lts
LLmLtatLons.
ConsLder
standLng
moraL
Lnstead
of
work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what
supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL
standLng
(m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X,
e.g.
Let
to
Lt
theg
otherwLse
not
atone,
do
not
to
confLne
Lt
or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but
(cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around,
thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of
whereas
Lf
Lacks m-s,
Lt
Lt does not have thLs protectLon,
3
Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt .
def Ln Lt Lon
of
moraL
standLng
...
Lf
somethLng
weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count
Lts
Lf a
Lnterests,
Lt does not count,
....
Indeed, so Lt Ls
Lacks
(p.t+).
The
moraL
saLd,
standLng,
defLnLtLon
Bg
Lts
however
deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght
to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng
moraL
wLthout
pLcture
of
assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems
m-s
are
dLscounted,
and
trade-offs
contempLated, p.16).
-6-
of
Ltems
wLth
m-s
are
soon
Such
appLication
an
if
division;
accordingtg
LmpLies
an
unfortunate
aLL-or-nothing
item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets
nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng
Lf
be
and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd
standing
contrasted
with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat
such
tgpoLogg,
that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The
as
tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant
such as having vaiue, weLL-being,
appropriate
p.!2).^
the
character
aLL-or-nothing
from
at Least Modified becomes evident
of
various
(e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties
capacities,
so
and
and
forth;
to
moraL
standing
distinctions
soon
duties)
(direct
to
needs
be
introduced
as
opposed
to
(indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg
regarding
duties
autonomg,
and
postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP
ethicaL
That
preferences,
features
adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent
boundarg
consists
in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing
is
assumed
to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg
PSI. floraL agents
iff
But
have a presumptive dutg to
X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.).
presumptive
are
duties
even
more
prone
to
be
bg
upset
circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion
the
notion
overriding
expands);
standing,
p.S),
the
forged
connections
things
than
without
much too simpLe, as wiLL
are
for
appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required
purposes
so
operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged
around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding
moraL
decentLg]
X [to treat it moraLLg
moraL
a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg
cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties,
which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue,
and extent of vaLue (see SM).
Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration
comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with
having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing
account,
and
counted,
perhaps
(if
sometimes
that
wouLd
be
taken
into
in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL
attributes are evidentLg a subcLass
commonpLace
vaLue
of
surprising,
vaLue
as
attributes,
e.g.
in
the
confiation
CaLLicott).
is
Possessing
intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL
status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant.
Indeed
PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to
intrinsic
vaLue
with their being
evident,
and
considerabLe,
(p.S)
and before Long has identified moraL standing of things
vaLuabte
prove
in
damaging.
Goodpaster
themseLves
Towards
Lapses
(p.I6).
Such
equations
are
not
the end of his essag, on being moraLLg
from
-7-
moraL
considerabiLitg
into
that
Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte,
Ln
vatue-for-itsetf,
psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities
sophLstLcated
unnecessaritg
seen
Lt Ls true
when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be
Lts
for
vatued
own
(p.320);
sake
Lt not so obvious that theg are too
but
sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon
at
work Ln Goodpaster s
hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg
between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of
and
vatue
ontg
—
consLderabLLLtg
to
appears
obtaLn
where
vatue Ls
unreduced
(LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter;
for
exanpte
tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when
as
where,
of
conceptLon
Lts
(p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and
noraL consLderabLLLtg
vatue
Ls
no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter,
characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion).
The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps
to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if
exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is
point
even
norat
the
obvioustg
Less
stopping
vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has
for
estate
no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat
vatue
verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg
(a
accessibte
nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose
(for
further, what is not at att untiketg, that
sgstens
natch
that
Moon
the
has
fornations
sone
shoutd
be
the
that
thensetves,
into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of
taken
projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But
insist
or
naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a
the
defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in
which
is
considerabititg
Lt
woutd
be
LnptausLbte
to
Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the
right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes.
It
is
just
not
the
feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be
separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the
circte have
suggests
different
sone
exanpte,
For
connotations.
notions
beLng
Ln
noraL
the
consLderabLe
norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account,
suitabte
not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg
requires
the iten in question has interests or at Least a
such
tetos),
an
that
agent
discussion-setting
can
phrase
be
deserves
norat
weLL-being
towards
considerate
notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31
does
norat
retevance,
R
different
get
nere
artifacts
are
norattg
etc.,
dependent,
quarrg
that
(a
Goodpaster s
Rnd nornattg the
notion
do
presunabtg
nornattg
woutd
not.
Nor,
not
it
erroneoustg,
reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons
norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains
context
Like
that
another different notion sonetines
equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though
since
does
nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3
inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect,
appear,
(as
or
consideration ).
certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.)
woutd
norat
an
etusive,
has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of
-8-
high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto
other
chase.
the
however,
Since
these
are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like
notLons
MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or
-
scrapped
we
qutetLg
can
bgpass
the
vaiue
the
nuances and differences.
CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect,
wider notion and Moraiitg,
if
wag
theg
inportant
in
which
not
at
derivative,
Least
with
R
dependent.
Most
connect is through LiMitat ions on interference.
MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue.
LittLe
R
More
preciseLg,
a
actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as
MoraL
to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such
reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a
sensitive Matter
MainLg
because
deontic
principLes
do
not excLude
soMe
vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we
of
reduction
-
shaLL be obLiged to return.
Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg,
and
standing
Like,
the
vaLue
notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists,
in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are
however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it
triviaL
is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte
vaLue
circuMstances);
the
(in
Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where
the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes
soMething Morai.
It
this notion too that has induced the unwarranted
narrow ing of focus,
to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer,
certainig wrong,
to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather,
etc.
what
is
MoraL
has
to
do
with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain
iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with
justice
and
goodness),
features
refLected
fornaLLg
in
suitabLe
universaLizabiiitg of principie.^
So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate
at
narrower
certain
ethicaL
tgpes,
which excLude the wider environnent. The
width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing
ethicaL*.
equivaLent
ethics
a
of
(For
coMparison,
rec Lass ification
as
consider
"environMentat
bg
MoraL
its
originaL
the effect in environMentat
MoraLs"
environMentat
or
Moratitg").
$2.
Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages.
EthicaL standing does
not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM
door
for
hearing.
a
hearing;
in
an
ethicaL
it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the
Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even,
if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse
for identifging standing and rights (short
assuMption
that
of
the
astonishing
but
prevaLent
aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences
are giossed over, having MoraL rights is
equated
with
having
MoraL
standing
The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8)
CaLLicott).
(e.g.
Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions
(expioitation
consideration
free
not
exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie
for
Underneath
consideration).
MoraL
these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions;
triviaL
MoraL
deserving
since wh3t is piausibie for
costs,
of
for
just
not
the
More
that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in
one
but
the ethicaL door,
consideration
are
assuMption
the
rendered
that
equivaLent
having
and
rights
standing
or
a coMMon Middie terM, such as
through
having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For
exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has
iff it has (or even have) rights.
(or can have) interests, i.e.
iMpiicit
appear
but
(with
Minor
Such
equations
quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it
etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things;
but
Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted
of (huManoid) interest.
notion
If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been
said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights.
But
theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation.
contrast
Bg
with
anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk
and institutions aitogether, and with Mang
utiLitarians,
who
view
notion
of
considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in
g
passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be
(MoraL)
rights
with
certain
unduLg
narrow
theories
rights,
of
which wouLd have, if theg stood,
decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough
for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie
view,
Regan's
particuLar
the rights view
(as if
an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the
attention,
worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL
it
has
score
heaviLg
been
proMoted
since
in environMentat ethics Literature and it does
exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs,
in certain
areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats.
R
theorg
of
rights
a
coMprises
representation (in the fashion of other
package,
which can be given fornaL
theories)
genetic
as
containing
the
foLLowing coMponents:
D. a definition of a right, and
P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights.
Rs
MatheMaticaL
exaMpLes
(such
as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL
there is a good deat of stippage between D
ord inarg
usage
controts
and
P.
But
because
of
the
More
on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of
postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg
includes as weLL
0.
a
set
of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or
cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C)
R. a set
of
reduction
scheMes
for
eiiMinating
transLation, reduction ruLes, etc.
-10-
rights
Locutions,
e.g.
bg
The
of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends
theory
partLcuLar
LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng
genetLc
such
breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL,
accordLng
to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd
It
guarantee.
Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven
some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of
and
treatment.
respectfuL
to
patLents
canonLcat
RLthough
expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form
to
[not]
, where
-
onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt
X[s]
of
The rLght
as
for
Lnstance
not
Ln
to
permtts
(the
pLuraLLsatLon
partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted
the rLghts vLew
features
onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln
back
dLstrLbutLng
context
not
are
The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the
harm .
LncLuded
forms
Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of
to
actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated,
unduLg
agents
moraL
has a LLttLe
more
thLs
LrreducLbLe
the
Ls
Lt
poLnt,
(Ln
rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the'
sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.)
be
UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL
crLtLcLsed,
Ln
sLgnLfLeant
rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge.
respects
Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend
theg
and
heavLLg
upon
-
though
do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the
unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of
thLs
defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs,
to
anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the
certaLn
Lssue of defLnLtLon.
To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached
fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg
the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz.
11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or
grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag.
of
gLven
rLghts
sLmLLar core:
hLm
the
Ln
bg
MLLL
(whLch
of
...
account
Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a
a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg
possessLon
The
moraL
somethLng
socLetg
to
protect
ought to defend...', MLLL
provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed
to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does
whLch
Regan
after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls,
rLght
not
LncLude,
and
quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s
Lnsurance
cover
Ls
supposed
to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed
Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out,
Regan, now
features
of
rLghts
LmLtatLng
FeLnberg s
Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag.
trLcks,
trLes
to
puLL
substantLve
out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear
the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for
-11-
such
acts
than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features
of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset:
is entitied to treatment of a certain kind
is to assert that someone...
...
To wake a ciaim
and
that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To
a
make
individuais,
ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against...
(p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a
ciaim
imports
much
the
that
ordinarg
notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts
entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a
transaction between individuais^,
thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed
it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making
directig to the ciaimant,
such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend,
at
tea
one
sunset,
doing ang of those things in ang straightforward
not
is
sense. There is nothing significant due or owed,
directed at
other
took
individuais
in
the
the
demanding
assertions
wag,
or
at
need
not
be
aii;
and
no
entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it
as
requires
weii
as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items
tgpicaiig introduced bg
or 'to . Someone who makes a
that
ciaims
ciaim
that
something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims
are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements.
Rnd
if
is
it
ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to
start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg).
Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification
of
the
definitions
OED
integration
and
it with Miii's definition. Upon
of
separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg
much
the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits:
M2.
Vaiid
entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg).
The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig,
or
have
obtain
or
something,
characteristic fiii to
to
in
act
a
certain
"justifiabie
justifiabie
to
(to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each
something
entaiis
and
mag
to
be
entitiement
ciaims
sufficient,
ent ireig
warrant
vaiid.
from
Thirdig,
and
ang case entitiing ones, and that
in
are
i.e.
dubious ciaims-against preconceptions,
without
be
regarded
appears
most
need
not
ciaim
restrict
to
on
but
aiso
the
ciaim
because
make
or
the
sheds
unduig
and
expected ciass of rights havers or
haver
of
a
it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if
something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing
potentiaiig?)
important
entitiement
hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the
right
as
grounds
morai
ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that
improves upon
invoived
an
sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig
some
adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation
has
converseig
an entitiement to have something. Secondig,
is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement
if
(To)
phrase
wag , which gives the
of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something,
entitiement
the
stake
that
ciaims. Thus use of the term
-12-
can
ciaim
(at
ieast
makes it an
even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on
behatf
of
wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade
through
indirectLg,
representatives;
the tern
but
representatives" suggests
verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg
wake
the
to
interests" shouid not be afforded
rights" to
dubious inference from
bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance.
R Lot hangs on choice of basic
(as
then
terms
other
in
chaiienging
phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to
right'
newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that
entitLement
cLaim'
and
are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries
partLg in terms of the others)
tautoLogous.
and
expticative
satisfactorg
UeLL,
Like
definitions
that
M2
definitions
virtuaLLg
are
are
but
anaLgtic,
preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness
of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that
it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of
entitLement,
putative
entitLement'
expression,
right , i.e. it
a
since
doesn t
a
becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is
that
appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe,
better
something,
is
write
in
To
vaLiditg.
avoid
a
is
sLightLg
a reaL or supposed
to
amounts
sometimes
cLaim
cLaim'
these
probLems
with
avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression
basic definition
something,
R
vaLid
in that something (after
fiLL
to
into
in M2) and avoid disappearance of the
VaLid
something,
on
to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights).
term
suitabie
entitLement,
titiement ;
is
which
a
or
a
is
titiement
aLLeged
or
putative
mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6.
That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a
aLLeged
(e.g.
vacuitg
quant ificationaL
recognised
right',
Const,
with
cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation
ground
inf.
of
a
or
right;
of
to,
suitabie
hence,
an
of the thing
in,
deontic
principLe,
cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie
[for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement
[for
X]
R .
Requirements
for
what conditions objects (Rs) and
suitabiLitg,
subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows.
Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to),
MiLL,
as
interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL
titiements are to be vaLidated:
depend
on
compLiance
its
independentLg
estabLished'
the vaLiditg of
with
(p.270),
derivation from these correct moraL
stack, the vaguer
a
right (to)
moraL
principLes
us
return
a
right,
whose
correct
that
he
beiieves,
takes
up,
must
have been
vaLiditg
principLes.
to
as to how
provides...guidance
princ ip Les
i.e.
Let
It
is
the
removing
the
"moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version,
is a
M3. VaLid titiement,
from
correct
moraL
principLes,
appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate:
-13-
to
some
(categoriaLLg
H3S.
premLsses
correct worst prtncLpLes
SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as
to R
vaLLd dertvatton
cone Lus con
There Ls a tttLement to
R
RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R
Ls
then
LmmedLate,
bg
f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to
suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff
X
has
a
tttLement,
vaLLd
Trow
correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon
wag
estabLLsh.
candLdates
The
fLLL
to
R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g.
out
freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg
sound
LLfe,
needs,
support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these
candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least
severaL
basLc
restrLct
the
quaLLftcatLon,
consLderabLe
and
categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that
can have the purported tttLement.
Such a scheme, as f13S
not
(whLLe
entLretg
wLthout
adequate
eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of
and revests much about rtghts.
derLved
important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of
ought
to
protect
can
hoLders,
be
regards
as
correct
moraL
rLght , of a requLrement
and
therefore
rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon,
dLffuse
correLatLve
dutLes
3pptg
prtncLpLes,
to
Ls
no
doubt
Ls thus a consequentLaL
over
vaLLd
characterLstLc poLnt of
R
tLtLements.
as socLetLes
Lt
transmLt
uphoLd,
feature.
SLmLLarLg
such
obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not
feature
from
thetr
character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component
of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of
that
soctetg
that
that reLevant soctettes ought to
part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent
dertvatLve
be
separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as
uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to
derLvatLons;
to
rtghts
In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs
dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For
true
duLg
3
rLght,
but
somethtng
foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance,
Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve
others,
free
from
unnecessarg
suffering
then
moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng;
-14-
and
prohLbLtLon
the
functor
Ls
transnLtted
the
down
cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents
R
derLvatLon.^
Ls
consequentLaL
a
feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe.
(ThLs
Ls
whg
Regan
can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn
where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231).
SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that
seLf-evLdent
puretg
or
rLghts.
axLonatLc
a
aLwags
defence
It foLLows, then, that ang theorg
rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons.
cLaLns
are
no
For ang rLght that stands up, that
connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls
Lags
there
of
that
seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts
to
(such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such
as
that
RnerLcan)
the
announces seLf-evLdent rLghts,
Ls nLstaken. RLghts are
aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten.
ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts,
and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever
to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes,
as
there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds,
are
rLghts
and
generated
fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of
pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls
a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon
renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns,
etc.
-
but
Ln
the
derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that
argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes.
Because
of
theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe
after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg
envLronnentaL
ethLcaL
enterprLses.
not
are
But
Ln
essentLaL
absoLuteLg
a
strongLg
for
LndLvLduaLLstLc
rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg
LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg,
Lt Ls a snart strategg to
nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do
thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents.
RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance,
of
the
force
theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters
stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of
others
(hence
the
Lnportance
Ln
a
noraL
consLderatLons,
whLch
noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng
rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and
rotes,
of
Ln
persuasLve
so
Lnsurance
sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts
prLncLpLes,
and
truno
on.
argunentatLve
reasons
too,
Lnputed
rLghts
are
Lnportant
Ln
reLnforcLng
gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg,
Ln
The
socLaL
advantages
LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon
of
rLghts
accordLngLg
offers
not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts
of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest:
-15-
he
aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang
is
woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back
Lt ts not a consequence that Me
prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL,
the
can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there
potnt
no
ts
advantage
or
Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get
theM.
to
to
aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can
get
aLong
wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us.
R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there
Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having
senttence,
tnterest,
as
such
etc.
(a
rather
now
rtghts,
of
faniLiar test). Constder
tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive.
Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln
Ln
the
Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL
theg coutd be incorporated,
Ln
defLntttons
McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though
(OED,
vLctnttg
other
preMtss
the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have
rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is
RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg
RI
is
observes,
not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much
in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has
had
Mang
with
notabtg
rivaLs,
interests
repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing
(rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^
How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide
accreditation
and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings
out),
1)
inc Lud ing: we
Usage;
speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as
don't
possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg).
and
non-usage
to
has
be
backed
In fact we do,
bg other consideration if arbitrariness and
prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp.
160-1).
2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as
to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM
(again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^
it
of
and
coupied
3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that
protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for
right
it
cLaiM).
Must
have
Nothing
characteristicaLLg
an
interest
however
requires
afford
(FreedMan,
is
that
reasoning
a right is a
sonething
to
a
have
p.16^., who upsets the inferred
the
protection
rights
that
of an interest; as far as the Meaning of
goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*)
exercising
roughig
if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation
with
sgnongnous
have;
others
and
Confusion
of
having
right
with
right
a
a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though
these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising
or
to
cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted
transition,
such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a
cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate
-16-
to
do
with
the
Mak Lng
bg
c La LMS
of
a
hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS
hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns).
R
creature
or
LteM
wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the
sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such
as exercLsabLe rLghts,
Lndeed
Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then
conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must
presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe
but
reLevant
actLvLtg),
requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the
such
notLon
of
rLght.
of
For
Lnstance,
the
Lnterest-protectLng
aspect
of
tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not
froM
the
notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests
(especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of
Lnterests).
R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to
rLghts
restrLct
to
persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton
that
what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe
conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts
to persons, or to
LndLvLduaLs,
or
persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to
LndLvLduaLs
and
"persons".
RLL
these
restr Let Lons
on
rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for
LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged
dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon.
or
§3.
and rebuiLding environMentaLLg.
the rLghts vLew
Deconstructing
Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts
LndLvLduaL
to
Consider,
a
subjects,
LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to
cope
decentLg
spec Les,
concernLng rare 3nd endangered
(e.g.
Regan s
pp.395-6).
prob Lens of our tines, such as those
envLronnentaL
Major
wLth
forest
does
restrLctLon
ecosgsteMs,
wLLderness,
foLLow
froM
not
even
etc.
hLs
own
defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg
LnfLLtrated,
as
postuLates
the
concerning
are eLaborated. It is not
rights
uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to
individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in
p.39S)
RR,
a
arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins,
brief
because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs
(In
sgLLogistic
extended
IndividuaLs
forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs.
not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species.
do
Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So
the
rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare
endangered
or
species
right-hoLders needn t be
individuaLs,
aniMais.)
of
so
The
restricted
beginning
after
aLL,
onLg
the
species
(with
a
if
are
paradigMs
MoraL
the
about
or
MeMbers
species
e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then
treated,
individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan
view
as
Look
undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone
further
non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species
theiisetves.
it
Makes
of
announces,
rights
The
Species
are not
individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of
species
to
is
view
3ngthing
rights
individuaLs.
(p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation
is actuaLLg offered),
are
not
MereLg
the
right-hoLders;
paradigMatic
theg
right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the
exhaust
iron-fisted thene of
(p.361),
according
the
to
aLLeged
individuaListic
nature
of
MoraL
rights
which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg
appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL
and
LegaL
usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction.
Uhg
trg
to
iMpose
such
an
iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq
atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view?
EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg.
a
rebuiit
rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More
protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group,
in virtue of princ ip Les such as
that significant endangered species ought to be protected.
creatures
wouLd
hoLd
different
But
then
different
rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that
aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid,
this,
On
but as a Matter of definition) in
and
basis
(the
of
inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of
the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account
but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions.
-18-
of
rights,
restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s
The
package, that can simpig be pee Led off.
rLghts
appt LeatLons
of
super-imposed
theorg,
the
but
Ls
essentLaL
wLth
for
the
given
coherence
a super-individuaL, such as a specLes,
If
postuLates.
equaLLtg
hetd rLghts on an equaL basts
It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major
Lt,
composLng
LndLvLduaLs
the
then
the
wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL
super-individuaL
Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE
on
bLocentrLc
egaLitarianism;
DC,
Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing
p.3S).
through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment
of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg.
IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts
view,
theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls
meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and
deconstructLon
on
of
the
rLghts
exactLg
view
thLs
Ls
EquaLLtg
done.
assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to
from
dLrectLg
dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg
features
absoLute
are
quaLLt Les, theg do
Ls
aspect ref Leets
and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg
rLghts
foLLow
that
(p.368). It does
not come Ln degrees
not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of
Ltems
the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL
bund Les
equaL
that
have
have
rLghts
of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow
from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a
certain
Ln
LmpartLaLLtg
treatment
(often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm).
equaLLtg
NeLther
nor
assumptLons
LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge
then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts
To
them
fend
we
have
to
foLLow
gLven.
the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the
LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the
rLght
respectfuL
to
treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag,
both
beLng
imported
parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated
as
justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls
rLght
those
of
who
have
argued
Ls
basic
the
Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment
(p.277),
where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng
aLL
suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg.
ConsLder
subjects'
vaLue
as
- what we LL caLL Lnherent
LndLvLduaLs
vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg
p.23S ff.).
(pp p.37;
Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming
sLmLLarLg
to
HR
various
postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent
vaLue
can
be
varied,
pLace of Lnherent vaLue,
LndLvLduaL
as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then,
Ln
LnLtLaL or connate vaLue,
X,
or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X,
defined,
for
ang
Ltem
if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a
mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt
assumed
that,
for
Ls
ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came
-17-
connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised,
Ls
Lt
as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load.
showing
Before
that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the
notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing
(certain
affairs
individual
tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not
that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or
tgpes
aLL
positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd
negative
vaLue
connate
disboLicainess,
if
(their
ontoLogicaL
no
nonexistence
proofs
objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate
doubt
have
decidedLg
to
adding
their
the existence of top connate vaLue
of
are
vaLues
somewhat
thus
initiaL
Like
LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood,
at
an
best
initiaL
assignment.
The
assignments
Like those of initiaL
are
probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg
vaLue;
connate
out
themseLves
presumptive
those
of
inherent
vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort
their
bg
initiaL
Life-stgLes,
can
which
vaLue,
then
intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a
be
theg
states
worLd-Lines,
posteriori
a
diminished as
or
increased
receive
probabiLLtg
assignments.
Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL
and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting
prtncLpLes,
features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant.
0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to
carrg
enough
(not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect
principLe.
appears
Examination
to
show that it can, at Least to this extent:
insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on
respectfuL
fact,
Ln
individuat
bg
to
item
substitute
connate
made
is
principLe,
principLe
as
aLso
to
repLace
required,
nameig
resuLts
defence
of
the
modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the
bg
shows,
where
the
the same substitutions as before. The modified
principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items
which
have
connate
that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect
wags
in
and
presupposed
argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon
vaLue
right
throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs
that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the
modified
the
features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg
concerning
respect
to
inherent
for
work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg
those
vaLue
succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It
treatment
suffices,
inherent
principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for
individuaLs,
and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment.
Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted,
but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a
fuLLer
de-
and
re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded
environmentaL rights theorg
offered.
But
it
which
repLaces
the
moraL
rights
view
wiLL
be
is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of
-20-
the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt
Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts
theorg
(e.g.
can
PP,p.32),
perhaps
(minus
remain
totaLitg
the
cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence.
But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact,
most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of
rLghts movement. Nonethe Less?
animat
the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL
h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe
supererogatorg;
Lt
(p.351,p.3^.6) to
thLs
permLssLbLe
Ls
vegetarianism Ls
(p.39!+);
But
(p.3^6).
obLLgatorg'
cone Lus Lon
the
appear
to
most
the
arguments
the
not
Ls
Lt
that
Ls
estab LLsh
not
to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng
Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg
presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages).
vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons
Ls
Lt
given,
wrong
to
purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg
obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a
vegetarLan
beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and,
'16
----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc
), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the
argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do
not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no
proper
of
focus
Regan's
sLnce
attach,
such
practLces
tgpLcaLLg
dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les
of
practLces
huntLng-gatherLng
LLfestgLes,
of
doubt
Lead
LncLude
to
the
the gardenLng cuLtures of the
Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes.
Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page
3nd
351
with
eatLng
dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of
(as
these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes
weLL
as
mtnor
ones),
newfangLed
Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and
so
R chLef reason gLven Ls that
on.
end
theLr
LLves are brought to an untLmeLg
antmaLs'
(e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct
tLme
has
come,
vegetarLanLsm,
that
or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead.
Mhat precLudes respectfuL use?
Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more
connected
theorLes,
such
as
aLL
that
consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as
restrLctLons,
wLthout
further
Large
sent Lent
utLLLtarLanLsm,
are
Longer
no
sentient
or
entaLL
moraL
deserve
such
dLetarg
assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of
circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to
which
beLngs
than
eat
dead
creatures,
things
which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC
exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is
aLreadg dead, but of causing
prematureLg,
Ln
order
death
(or,
to
a
Lesser
extent,
Letting
die)
to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product.
For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate
moraL
standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg.
Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to
-21-
anLmaLs
bauLk
anLmaLs.
Rnd
at
for
sone
patLents,
Papuans
the
rLghts
extensive
to LLfe and LLveLhood to
own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between
Regan's
noraL agents and moraL
treatment,
such
admLttLng
ground
of
treatment
dLfferentLaL
further
and pLgs, a
peopLe
dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed.
Regan s
dLfferentLaL
justLfgLng
for
So how tLght
Ls
Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst
arguMent,
tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk
of the crucLaL argument
ff.)
dLd
not
treat
resources.
Nor
dLd
theg
(p.3{+^);
receptacLes
does
sLmpLg
cuLtures
tradLtLonaL
renewabLe
(p.3t*3
appLg.
not
anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as
as
anLmaLs
treat
Lnstruments
mere
excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that
of
tradLtLonaL
unLLke
peopLes,
provLsLon (p.3t*3), are
prLncLpLe
dubLous
admLtted
commercLaL
under
derLved
supposedLg
who
farmers
Regan's
from
prLncLpLe
LLbertg
respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R
the
LncLudLng
fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng
requLres
whLch
that
treatment
creatures
of
vaLue
Lnherent
are
however
Some
excLuded.
Ls
not
of
for
prLncLpLe,
the
countervaLLLng
respectfuL
No
excLuded.
LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue
persLst, come what mag.
There
use
Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have
(p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not
wLth
a
(p.331,
stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more
the
Ln
practLces
the
vLoLate the respect
crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs,
food,
Papua,
pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not
exchanged
often
or
consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer
groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln
who
Large
and
Bg
does
rLghts are therebg
a
acquLre
not
Ln
LndLctLons
Lnterference
rLght
text
Regan s
to
(and
eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng
the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng
tradLtLonaL
the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons
that Lt Ls
LLfestgLes
LnadmLssLbLe.
Such
are
aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt
Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that
LLfe
anLmaLs
brLnqtrg
to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such
prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe
use
or
harmfuL
destructLve
wLth
LncompatLbLe
bLoconatLvLst
the
vLoLence
"LLbertg"
assumptLons,
no
(p.287);
prLncLpLes
matter
as
Lnterpreted.
dLffLcuLt
how
wouLd
maxLMLae
never
to
bLoconatLvLsm appears
Lndeed
to
NonetheLess,
LLve bg, are hLghLg
appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg
who
an
to
mang
vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL
dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL
happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or
MorLd
magbe a
Ls
not
verg
rendered
LnadmLssLbLe.
ilagbe
The
RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL;
dLfferent
predator-free
sLn-eradLcated
RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed?
-22-
post-naturaL
worLd
Ls
$4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts
and
substantiaL prob tews.
tivehood:
and
predation, territoriatitg
other
the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers
Despite
have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that
* Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the
human
as
those
of
instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see
for
animats,
sort
sane
e.g. RR, PR).
* Rnimats
have
various
For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that
rights.
humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and
from
excessive
interference.
these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg
Mhite
neither necessarg nor sufficient
significant
connections,
inasmuch
rights),
having
for
as
rights
are
nonethetess
protect
permissibie
there
to
serve
worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such
de-foresters,
as
mag
otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human
practices
sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their
interests. For exampie, much animai
suffering.
causes
experimentation
unnecessarg
quite
there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare
Thus
and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced,
and
easier
obtain
to
positive
action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of
sociai
protection
the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be
underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists.
Granted animats have rights, some of them
higher
humans
rights
nohumans,
widespread
a
have,
main
animats
phenomenon
of
predation,
a
par
with
those
that
question (pace Freg) concerns which
outstanding
particutartg,
on
have.
Because
especiatig
of
the
essential to the continued tivetihood of
mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult
one
(and
one
comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest
Regan
induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when
a
herbivore s
interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued
sustenance,
avoidabte
others
as
in
human
Predation is not of course the ontg source of
territoriatitg,
slaughter of whates and dotphins.
serious
conflict
of
interests;
for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg
in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected).
Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population
been
converted
into
increase
serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and
associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective
the
but
integral
part
much
of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's,
hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic
as
themes
probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism
reduces
an
have
individuats,
that
those
items
items
such
(constituting the base ctass) have a fixed
-23-
(equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for
and
that
vaLues
(derived)
Ls
ecosystems,
of
whaLes
additive
an
simpLy
functLon
the
of
aLLenabLe,
such
structures,
organised
and
or
atoms
as
Lt.
within
CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue
are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon
and
LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a
infringing
path,
and
maximization
preservatLon
enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to
has
that
LndLvLduaL
(Lnherent)
LnLtLaL
to
everg
simiLarLy
woraL
exLstence
(and
vaLue
suboptimaL
The rights view
desLderata.
contLnued
Like
the
considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved
shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions,
and the reasons for revising the vaLue
eLsewhere
than
which are wore
LncLude
sun
the
of
predators,
theLr
LndLvLduaL
escaLation
The
the
of
theg
though
components,
be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth
mag
LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn
vaLue.
detaLL
Ln
the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems,
(Ln
tgpLcaLLg
expLaLned
are
assumptions,
the
through
probLems
wLthout
system,
reductLon
of
theorLes deserves,
rights
however, some eLaboratLon.
R
serLous
cLash
of
Lnterest,
as
between carnLvores and herbLvores,
fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg
rLghts,
of
unLess
too
Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the
many
extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures
exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a
Ln
contLnuLng
mistaken
to
eLevatLon
that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls
LnfrLnged
bg
LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe.
a
MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe
cases
of
to
Lnterfere
some
Ln
predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu
rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to
avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be
appLLed
hoLd
to
gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated
issues
in
these
bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but
at
further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf,
verg
Least,
dubiousLg
permissibLe.
High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of
probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are
On
contrary,
the
virtuaLLy
aLL
the
remaining
naturaL
radicaLLg
unsatisfactory.
systems containing Large
carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL
states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a
Can t
an
rights
to,
right
fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute
though
their
rLghts to Life.
to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from
unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some
confLict,
and
inconsistency
even, of
rights,
obLigations
and
so
on,
is
inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags.
Some
can,
but
not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often
-24-
significant) sorts of cases. In these terns,
bg
accommodated
Mag
of
up
confLLct
sgstematic
reguLar
such
confLLct
anatogous
S3tisfactoriig
It Ls too reguLar,
deontLc
does
sgstem
not
because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc
cases,
structures: for then much too much
rather
not
of rLghts or prLncLpLes.
confLLet
sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent
muLtipLg
is
predatton
Ls
time
cases.
R
confLLct,
repuzziing
spent
undermines
MhLch
fash Lon to deaL wLth
sattsfactorg
more
redecLdLng
and
the
point and force of
prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach
(no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach:
right.
feeL
doesn't
p.33)
DC,
at
aLL
Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek
R
Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature.
R
aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in
superior
excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and
Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood
to
right
does
not
an
give
unquaLified
Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords
onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse.
In these terms, a Lion
that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate
Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The
different.
Mith
situation
their
take
chances.
rights to Life are not
predatorg
is
essentiaLLg
not
LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find
LJeak,
themseives in threatening situations, such as
traveL
humans
animats
or
wiiderness
If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe
therebg
or
action
highspeed
infringed
animats
where
(and
defending
their
animats
are
territories
LnvoLved,
not
shouid
be
HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL,
persecuted).
except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their
chances
with
naturaL
predators.
Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming
with
predation
and
Like
issues
happens,
what
grips
is through zoning, or more generaLLg through
bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface
what
to
and
eisewhere.
is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness
can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves
of
out
a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens
are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did
wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions
big
For
wiiderness
as
Locus,
Lt
is
much
to think hoLLsticaLLg,
easier
predation as an LntegraL and significant part of
such
a
rich
naturaL
the
as
to see
structure
rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting.
(The
adjustment
of
ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need
invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg;
wiiderness
is an appropriatetg generat
notion, not get a proper name.)
The
action
of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness
areas, in taking preg conservativeLg,
Ln defending their territories and so
-25-
on,
LnvoLves
no
LtseLf
Ln
infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls
huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need
for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a
career.
that
tresspassLng
Darwin
Ln
earLg
hLs
brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the
a
OnLg
deng
Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as
with
predatLon,
to
undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses
and
repLacenents
of
sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng
naturaL
MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde,
thought
Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst
sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg,
huMan-engtneered
that
even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan
breakdown,
who
efforts,
whtch
especLaLLg
are
prone
to
soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg
can
theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the
More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs
the
as
there
are
and
More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters
norMaLLg
straightforward
huMan
chLLdbirth,
provide
weLL-docuMented
ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or
the
of
evidence
as
MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one
the
ecoLogicaL
Laws
to
of
encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does
better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive
huMan
interference
Ln
naturaL regions.
It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue
a Lwags
as
poLiticaL
high
wickedness,
evoLutionarg
not
it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of
as
Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not
there
inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate
Long
is
process
-
that
the
no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered
with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might
have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved
adapted
in
weLL
wag
a
to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their
enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent
it is far froM cLear that Nature
of such huMans,
provides
rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL
an
optiMat
sgsteM;
Law" argued for eLsewhere:
see SM).
The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step
with
deontic
best
MoraLLtg,
principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to
sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see
were
with
that
vaLue
SH).
Even
it
be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt.
Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing
environnent;
naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite
and often dazzLing,
Lf
LeveLs of vaLue.
Richard SgLvan
via Bungendore
-26-
for
the
adequate,
RustraLia 2621
NOTES
1-
For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of
that
thought
environmentaL
Lt far
of southern and western Rmerican schooLs,
out
fLows
the
surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that
emerges
typLcaLLy
the
froM
prestigious
More
universities
Ln
LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres
LLke Oxford.
2.
May
ThLs
a
strike
MoraL
as
theorist
aiMost
cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics -
as curious as a
order
in
aLso
and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are
different.
assessMents
Cost/benefit
depend on a vaLue theory of
soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity.
3-
EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and
amounts
what
choice
seLf-appointed chosen,
(p.!*).
makers
entitLement
a
to
in
There
are
probiems
according
PP,
to
we free and rationaL
use
regarding
of
contexts, since entitLement moves in the
these
rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights.
The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a
devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving
a
moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But
neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage.
MoraL
notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges
and
catagoriaL
features
are
investigated and put to principLed
work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the
dLvisions
of
ref Leets
cLassification
things in terms of such features, where theg appLy,
as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy
these
features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not.
(Even if they were and a hierarchy
aLL
Not
probiematic.
resuLted,
hierarchies
are
need
that
damaging,
e.g.
ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may
oniy
were
when
be.
not
be
mereLy
It
is
hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to,
power or priviLege or favour,
that
theg
warrant
the
criticism
hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy
been
directed
at
certain
power
hierarchies are of this sort.)
-27-
hierarchies;
but
not
aLL
UorrLes
about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order
and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers
an
(west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth
LMpoverLshed
ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears
both
as
deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such
Ln
where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts
Regan's,
Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon.
5.
StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on
standLng
vaLue-Ln-LtseLf
wLth
Freg,
Ln
equates
who
worst
and proceeds to bound Lt
(p.!+S),
beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs
part
happens as
coLLapse
of
a
of
wore
wLdespread
huwanLstLc
utLLLtarLan
Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further
casuaLLtg.
6.
PossLbLLLtg
and
forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes
probabtLLtg
are basLc to the Ma Ln
arguwents
the
to
LMMoraLLtg
of
nucLear arrangements: see LiP.
7.
But
Fox
has
M3de
a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg
repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an
attempt
Ls
bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg
enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM
woraLLtg
as
Ln
a
generaL
bad
Lnstttutton,
cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much
enMeshed
whtch
damage,
Ls
of
has a poor
thoroughtg
Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg;
Lt
does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg.
8.
UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But
what
are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent
prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features.
8.
SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts
taLk
resuLt
froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged
that
rLghts
are
verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that
sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg,
prtncLpLe
of
such
p3rstMong,
as
OccuM s
weLL
as
provLdtng
a
pasttng
such
propertLes,
such
as
betng
objeettons
of such crude LnstruMents as
OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have
have
a
razor, such ent Lt Les
shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts
(as
bg
derLvatLve
rLghts;
froM
rLghts
certaLn
obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts
are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects.
-28-
10.
The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern
Ls
one,
a
verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20
right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to
senses of the substantive
brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN.
RLthough
the
takes
anaLgsis
frow
off
one Ma Ln OED sense, the
eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected
1.3
as
whLch
that
MoraLLg just or due
concerned
Ls
(as in
LnvoLveMent
activities);
be
no
issues concerning opportunitg (as in
rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights
state-iMposed
such
equitg or ... which is
right-doing ). But there wiLL
Main
Ln
wLth
senses,
not
to
in
participate
are priMariig issues for MoraL
these
actors.
11.
reLevant
or coMMunities to capabie or
individuats
within
theM,
i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies.
The
status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such
exact
arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00
is
or
further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00
a
is.
13.
Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for
who
Leaps
to the cone Lus ion that sentience,
beings and the "higher
...
is
an
the fact that huMan
aniMats have experiences or MentaL
states
the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg
(p.^3). No arguMent at aLL
are possessors of MoraL rights
than
appeaL
to
(other
is to be found for this ciatM, a
authoritg)
surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting
for
Freg,
faiLure
suppig
to
others
arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the
MereLg citing
Light of his eartier reMarks that
sentieneg
as
a
criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it
is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe
respects are provided ...
arguMents in these
subsequent chapters, such arguMents
are
. Rs we shaLL see in
scarce
on
the
ground
(p.33).
lit-
Too Leg s
anaLgsis
standard
account
substituting
can
"right
of
for
desires ,
an
wouLd Mark out
onLg
subcLass
rights,
of
be
upgraded,
and brought into Line with
(adopted
to"
Ln
EE,
p.176),
chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt
iMportant
roughLg
consequentiai
exercisabLe
criticisM teLLs against EE).
-2?-
feature
rLghts
(a
of
a
siMLLar
IS.
Rn important exanpLe is the argunent
which
bg
broken
is
concedLng
to
that
vaLue,
equat
not
p.33,
PP
aLL hunans, serLousLg
genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need
have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss.
16.
London,1932).
RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega,
the
But
qutte
not
Ls
natter
not a reputation of
sLnpLe,
so
vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats
decisive.
carefuL definition, which wouLd however render
nore
R
sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is
'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg
OED account,
so
upon
the
vegetabie
a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL
foods;
food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of
Life'.
17.
that
not
decisivetg
support vegetartantsn, even
inproved
connerciat
faming
does
UtLLitarianisn
invoLving
s Laugh ter
and
of
so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive
aninats,
argunent).
Ln
Rnd
fact
fLawed
the
case
utititarian
vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work
for
of
one
choice
of
of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36).
13.
sone
Uhite
such
terntnoLogg
distinction
singuLarLg
is
unfortunate
given
the
non-obsoiete
patient . Most aninats are not patients.
senses of the noun
13.
the
inportant,
is
For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict
such
as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as
regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and
threats
to
rabid
foxes
to
the
crunch;
hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the
then
strict
norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane
aLL
and
hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s
egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones
for
cases,
for
subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and
respectfuL
defective
farngard
greater
C3n
practices
vaLue
assunption
be
p.3^.2).
condenned,
R
is snuggLed into the rights
view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth
(see
DE,
si).
20.
On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn.
21.
Predation bg Large carnivores can
conpared
with
hunan
travet
be
usefuLLg,
sporting
and
predation
(no
accident
of
-30-
course)
favourabig,
accidents. UhiLe the
nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order
aninaL
and
of
nagnitude,
appears
to invoLve
rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though
reduct ton
tn
vatue
tn
the
removat
tt
tnvotve
may
some
of on-gotng ttves, tt atso
offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts.
REFERENCES
J.B.
A
t
Catttcott,
On
the
tntrtnstc
vatues
of
nonhuman
spectes'
tn
The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press,
1386; pp.138-172.
R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London,
1377.
J.
Fetnberg,
The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and
Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press;
Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68.
U.
Fox,
R postcrtpt on
2(1+) (1385) 17-23.
deep
ecotogy
and
tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter
The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs
B. Freedman,
Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168.
R.G. Frey,
Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats,
1880.
K.E. Goodpaster,
308-325.
Ctarendon,
Oxford,
On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378)
I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con,
Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386.
J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373.
H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good
tn
Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136.
C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty,
1385.
E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs
5(1383 )l+7-61.
T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383;
to as HR.
T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs',
Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP.
J. Rodman,
Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an
-31-
ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing
UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56.
J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer
and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer
and Pierce, pp.185-8.
R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to
animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR.
R. Rout Leg,
In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe
cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC.
R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL
Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB.
R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and
nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU
1981+; referred to as UP.
R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental
Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL
Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE.
'
1
T. Rgan,
The case for animaL rights'
in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39.
%
C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects
Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+.
R.
SgLvan,
R critique of deep ecoiogg',
1+1(1985); referred to as DE.
Radicatj^hiLosophg
1+0(1985) ana
R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in
Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN.
D. VanDeVeer
and
C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees,
UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP.
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l 89 - .r
1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N.
Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from
;-1
SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German,
British or Fre nch) viewpoint.
This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial
section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean
s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect
the morality
o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt.
eitlH_•t
t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e
als o
a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with
what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans,
or for the American
sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and
t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the
r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It
c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no
moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear
ar r angemen ts involve.
Mtwh o f
U~A,
CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n
structure of the argument
Pag e No
§O.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral
l.
i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the
f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter.
§1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the
2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war.
War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt
featur es o f nucle ar wars.
2
0
§2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations
-~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war.
The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted.
Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus:
s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated.
Li mits of st ate e n titlement.
§3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars.
One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is
pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of
the ke y argumen t elabo r ated.
§L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important
a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ .
Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality ,
p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles.
§ 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~·
De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata:
p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence
not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of
nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the
pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through
<l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the
c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of
1.
5
11
1 !•
17
�Page No
!,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es;
separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle:
the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of
this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion
and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism .
AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence .
piu,.,f
Till·lll H.
56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national
daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of
nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas .
The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and
f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate
iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much
less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of
tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode].
§7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their
_supporl e rs.
Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs
37
43
fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the
nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts.
§8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e
ethical res 1lts.
Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate
and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate
approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it.
FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and
geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention.
Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r
1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative
po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons.
49
The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l
mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of
ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to
loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On
Scl1;!1l
t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to
and Anders.
Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption .
Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death
dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e.
H
64
�.1,t . . ..
Page No
~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y
a nd on regional strat egies.
Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments
t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration .
Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear
dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons.
Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and
deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution
afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes:
what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation
in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social
and po litical adjus tment.
iii
73
�ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!)
NtlCLEAR
DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated,
~ Ll
o r n~ arly
HO
th11 n e of even t he larges
d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war.
invo l ve,
and
threatened
sa id
to
so
differ
co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a
CertFdnly ma s sive
PX
hAnges
Gt1ch
as
nuc.le:ir
wars
exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e
neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of
Muc h
at
forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at
bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often
f r om
eit her
just
wars.
new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther
wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will
se rv e
as
initial
ethical
ba se.
Al though nuclear wars are, thus
non ex i s tent
(extrapolat e
va r ie tiea,
objects,
1
nuclear
wa rs
from n very limited
Ia
fnr, only a decidedly
menac1.ng
class
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nu .lear
experlence 2 )
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical
or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
- - - ------- ---- -1,
The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forc e fully:
'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral
issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could
ima g ine:
we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs
significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures
and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y,
peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h
it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there
implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to
give it , e .g.
sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence,
pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds,
ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality.
�111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 •
explosio n
A large-sca le nuclear
involv es
war
of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region;
a [unction of two main parameter s:
distr i bution.
Such
strnt.egic ) nuclear
quant l t leo
of
a
war
war
quantity
diffe rs
which
explosivc n,
ts
markedly
limited,
nnd
(megatonn age
wh ere
from
by
the
a
of
t:,Hget.s
it i s
ex plosive)
limited
assumptio n,
the
to
and
(tactical
much
or
smaller
chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y
arc
cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in
a
given
reg ion.
Though
t he
focus
in
what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir
prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no
nucl.car
arsenal
means
a
separate
st r ike 1
s ince
a
is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1
waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns
second
iss ue ,
et c. ).
4
Because
of
these
of
follow -up
or
connecti ons, much of the ca se made
acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent .
How nuclear wars
reHultlng
d-Lffer
from
oth er
war s:
wars and states and th e
-- ---------- - -- - --
llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war.
of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c
two
party
(or
thinking,
A model
is
th e
severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or
trib e bat tle ~.
A picture of
war
thu s
refle c tion
r e quirement s
for
legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical
on
advances have
trad iti ona l
now
theo ry
ender ed
of
war,
emerg ed,
inapprop riate
ha rdly
and
especiall y
sometimes
surprisin gly,
as
a
result
inapplica ble.
of
The
made no allowance for such
J.
Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially
the type of strike :lnvolved.
Though the sequence is j_mportant for the
mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the
immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge.
4.
'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no
limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars:
t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e
undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven
a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and
present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed
purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European
"theatre'' , is really a myth.
5.
There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of
prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal
wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given,
etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a
mu h deeper wa y,
�j
phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s
Tokyo.
rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th
And
j t.'
many
occurred
wi.th
Dre s d e n
and
further crucial effects be yond mass
bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions .
Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument
1Jnchors,
Lo
historica l
were
accounted
unjust
war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control:
the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n
ar1ncd
'war'
of
content io n
or
comba t;
cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience .
but
other
are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8
proLagon ists, antag onists or players;
means
and
or
wrong.
to elabo rate
by
means
of
forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es
in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ;
noun
linkages
G
to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter),
and
of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions
Firstly ,
r e tain
always
a
f nction
of
sens es
of
the
States are the
forces c omprising armed soldiers are
the
a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent
Thus wars ar _ external or internal
states or their rule.
(c.ivi.l),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have
transform ~d,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged
with
nuclear states.
lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states :
6.
An obvious
:i.n short, wars
ar e
There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term
1
war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d
in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt
( OED) o n wa r,
7.
But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between
clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more
me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s
the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of
nation--s tates.
8.
Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and
unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone
.t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l
sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e.
James
proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a
wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12).
What it boiled down to,
howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil,
especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l
sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through
wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc .
�.:1n uut
,~01•1p
of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture,
and are
nltcr i ng
by
the
s tructu r e.
Wars
j _Lu a t
from
c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of
(other wi se
defect ive)
politi ca l organ isatio n of states ;
they are a
ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation .
helps
wa r
arise
War
Thls seman t.ically based pictur e
of
exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and
deterr ence
d t: vo lves into an
war-m akers ,
argume nt
agains t
aga.in st
states .
In
the
fact
( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d)
on
the
war-d eclare rs
and
tradit ional theory , wars wer e
r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as
t heir
r emoved
t1 e
right
of
r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es;
states
or
the argume nt
was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the
c our ts 9, while states
did
not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of
th e law courts ).
But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim
at e
place
of
wars;
ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a
l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for
examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc.
Let. us
a
h OW\ ) V1_. r
to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on
-
basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s
tates or sets (axes)
of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars.
·ompr litive
game s,
could
be
won.
attent uated form for some "victo rs")
Lhc World vfars.
strate gy.
surrou nding
trad i tional ly
firstl y
for
mass ive
armed
wa rs,
Like
exchan ges
such
as
th •re may well be no winnin g
in
ar e as
the
of
No r thern
very
hemisp here
countr yside.
Thus,
and
the
second ly,
for
laying
the
was te
_£Dint
of
of
substa ntially
substa ntiall y
oblite rated 10 ,
(cxe rcl sed
and
most
as
nothin g
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play" .
are
huge
war
seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d:
a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that
prepar ed
that:
That assum ption still held good ~hough in
Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settle d with main protag onists
player s
It war; assume d
An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n
metro polita n
agglom e ra tio ns
9.
to
main
Hence
elabor ately
f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ;
Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p
. 776, top).
The
argume nt
presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva
te
dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way,
it looks as if it could be readil y
t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern
ment, or at least
effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a
t that time to be
one state!
�5
hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e.
.:uid
ot her
Lhf'
e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pu re de t e rr e nc e .
to
mil i tary
Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff,
Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in
tar gets
r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ;
and
military
e xchanges.
principle 11
This feature iG fundnnent al as
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality.
ways
to
The special effects of
nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
canno t
w3rs
be
legitimat e ly
confined.
l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s
uz0ne
<lestr uc ti on,
s hockwav es,
suc h
effe cts
gign nt l c fum i gat i on s
§2.
a nd
th e
e nti re l y
rapid
••.
speed
special effects (presente d in
Schell)
include
radioacti vity,
pu lses, fireball or firestorm
e tc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e
mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s.
The mora l s ituation:
be c ome
as
el ec troma gnet1 c
<lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s,
com pounded
Th e se
the
r ecent
tend e ncy
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
considera tions
to
It is particula rly important
i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient
distinctio n
mo r a lity
or local or nat :l. onal
and ~ ..e5:..diency.
What is done in war, especiall y
between
advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the
l ') .
There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or
extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e
no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves "
suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical
ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on.
Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of
pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective
me d ical int e rvention
(PL, p.313).
Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf
the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons
de veloped in the tex~.
Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are
resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and
t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other
things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" .
11.
In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed
wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc.
�l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH'
Much
t.h at
oug h t
war ,
of
or
othenlis e 12,
not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or
anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like .
we
liv e
not
go
in
a rat her bar barous age :
unremarke d,
if
the
th e horrors of the twentieth century will
history
Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd
ge t s
writt e n
as
wi pi ng
moves :
based
on
"stra t e gy"
disad van t ages ,
of
mor a lly
excluded
actions,
·a J.culaU o ns.
charncterist i ca---1J:x
its
is.
that
rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in
o t
con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr
d0.Lcrmi nes
(accurately)
str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o
induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e
such
Hllitarily
its
e xp<'di e n cy .
by
gains
own
i.t _o u~ !:_, morally,
cons i d e r i n g
and
Eac h
side
only
lo s 8e s a s
a
in a military encounter
own
its
advantages
and
r e sult. of alterna tJve possible
to consider those of the other side( s) as
well.
In
t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality .
I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted
wa y,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of
eLc.) .
Such
t he
class lcal
through
"bald
an
inc r emental
a
distinct
nrgumen t
tc.tt1s .
g
a r gument
from
an
t ha t
th e
It
would
And
(bu t
The
externally
wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e .
ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed.
the
of
li mit)
escalation
man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit.
assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as
enforced
force,
Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated.
Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue,
reall y
this
Thus t oo
follow
from
i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n
nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the
s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable .
c onfusion
Nuclear
12.
For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the
c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness.
These
t li cn1<•s
run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n
th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r.
13.
As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a
hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e
prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument
Jike
the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s
a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
Th e
fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or
more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1..
�i'
war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n .
for
the
l
anc,
r or
players
Still the !irgument
is
inc onclu s ive;
can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate,
examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4
A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by
of
mo ·al i t y:
lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to
take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y
c<;p,~, f,11 ly
t lw
1
constraint s
from the ot her s'ido.
11w~Liou not onl y
as
to
ma y
well
enc ount e r,
So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps
it
wlw t
o u g ht
to
do
in
mor a lly
permi ss ibl e
si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in
the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf.
But the last question do e s
not,
in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y .
There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having
0:x.pe<.lienc y,
even
under
extreme
to
give
way
to
circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war
involves .
Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of
give
to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often
way
morality
eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations.
t hcorc~ical
fac t
is
that
both
deliver
f r om
us
But the
the
vnlue
the o q'.: .
to
Expedlency
fact,
but
urg('s ,
tba t
does
foreign
takes
local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e
conside rat i on s .
proper charact risa t i on , a
remote
By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its
much
univ• r sa lizable
mor e
univ e rsal
pr inciples .
rePultan t
i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y
fairness,
eq u ita billty and
of
value
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principl e s,
jus t ice.
distributio n
c ertain
requ i rements
of
general
Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable
value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly
Ttie
no t
It assumes, or
what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of
or
to
cruci al
simply
narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable .
even
bound
moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same,
eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue
miraculousl y
are
placed
1 :.,
.
Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic
Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e
of
·va l untioi1~:;
pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under
14.
11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1
i nt e rr e pla cement,
from
the
same
As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely
I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war.
�B
.
expr d 1e1cy
assessm ents 16 •
ic
c~ n
For expedie ncy loes not elude
deontic
presen tation:
be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right",
or ft lvcn tight formal
rest•mb le
charac terisat ion .
The
charac terisat ion
will
normal ly
that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to,
or
arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds.
Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity
~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi
ned.
util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as
cnn
Thus
onside ring only expedie ncy;
intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ;
meet
do
it
Lt does not, unlike the
me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the
individ ual
uti.lity
of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say.
There
are
dc•ont.o .logis ts
r egardin g war
mora ll y
howeve r
signlfic a11t
e.speci ally,
17
•
which
differe nces,
between
utilita rians
serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re
In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have
permis sible,
or
to
seemed
to
effect
some
to
rend er
justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards
~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not
permit.
already
and
partisa nship ,
since
utilita rians
But
this
is
would
reject the
descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly';
wherea s an
a im
in
what
follows
is
to
avoid
meta-e thical
me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not
there
is
a
neutra lity.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which
ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn.
S('Vcr al
moral
partisa nship,
VJ.rtua ily all positio n s
grc•
that
the
obltter ation
of
major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous.
If
tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists
who seem to
feel
no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for
some Rus si a n
ones, s imply increas e the costs
involve d,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
l.5.
The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ",
nationa lism
and
pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which
exces siv e
applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi
ng a
person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards
treatme nt.
The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require
ment of
morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require
ment
to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte
nds to
strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry).
Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72.
16.
The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail
especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic .
17.
Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and
Hare
the other, i.n Collen et al.
by
Pl ato ;
see
on
�:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs
Tile
ncounlere d;
_!: hen try to work down
again.
fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally
oul of perspecti ve, morally.
abandon
or
Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has
tended
to
suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also
do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does
not
m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that
to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be
Cons id er
t he
w11rld ,·inpl r1•.
be
so thern
risi.ng
(hemisphe re)
no
one's
advant3ge .
strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of
Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try
nil lear
to
exchange
in
the
North,
There
would
southern
to
be
waters
encourage
a
hardly
an
of US
all - out
point then in securing
institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much
espe . ially
given
the
apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts.
tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e:
lhc present point :1.
has
and
tts
power,
limitatio ns,
is
an
thnt ( t he fnct of) moral
inadequat e
But
conse nsus
const r aint without accompany ing
struct ural adjus tments.
For , typJrnlly ,
<lifferc11 tly
to
nationa l
impose
interest
ls
taken
hosta ges
or
override
morality,
e ven
holding
civilian
populatio ns
kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ).
unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian
such
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitut ion
of
jus tificatio n;
fails
in
The
first,
expedienc y
,
.
C.!.BSSC,S
And,
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overridin g
for
morality ,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of
:important
or
irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary
cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
mo r al
interests ,
of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the
case of LSN war.
18 .
As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts
in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her
than based on national interests .
�Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis ,
Ii:!.
It
nol
be
pretended
expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y ,
that
tha t
of
it
i.s
"group
but
n montl basi, as distJnct from one of
ego1 sm " ).
There
no
1s
special
moral
d.ispensa ll on
fo r governments.
j ndiv iduals :
ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or
analys is of obligation.
Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for
For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed
semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds;
no
di ff e r e nce
organisation.
extenuating
killers:
whether
X
is
an · individual
States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion
reaso ns
aside,
be having
just
as
beeu
conce ded , special moral dispensations;
more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism.
cannot
immorally
makes
system, grou p or
of
Lebano n)
are,
as brigands or mass
there is no moral difference.
Certainly t here are gro unds on which states
or
individual
or
and it
f11rnish
two
(incompatibl e)
their a gents
01:
have
claimed ,
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities ,
a
s atis factory
state
moral
theory
or public one and a
private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual
morality
becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3
ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate
mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled
Y are permuted .
special
01 1t
cover
(e.g.
to
considerati.ons
citizen
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or pe rson can be
der iv ati ve
damage
For
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are der ivative
prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency .
particular,
a
sta te is not
1 morally)
survivrd .
In
entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even
ow n
( at
for
its
Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge.
19 .
There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or
see Routley a nd Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
Lines:
�11
!-: ' )
'j.J.
The i_ni t i<d argument
p:1cifli;m
yield
arguments
to
the
tmmora1 lt.1_
of _ LSN
wars.
to
tb e
1mmora1it.y
of war.
But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire
controversi a l in an area where th ere is no
go od
r·ason
to
Argumen ts
be
for
controve rsial.
Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of
LSN
wars follows .
All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime.
nil
wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
ways of settling po litlcal issues between states .
wa r s
who
Not
are
Among more or l es s admissible
th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors
volu11l'cer
:w
Ho ldlers
nnd
whos<'
actfon
does
no t
6pi.ll
ov er
on to
noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants
were kjl.led in war.
conscrip tlon,
Since the esta bl i shme nt
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms;
induction
prac tices
as
near-d es titute, wars hav e
modern massive war s are
far
removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian
por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ).
imrnornl,
Most
s orts
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such
a n exte nt as LS N war s .
The first argument to th e
immorality
of
LSN
wars
and
of
sufficientl y
larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong.
P2.
LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts.
P3.
Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong .
( KA)
LSN wnrs ar• wrong.
The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set
of
Lhis
type.
the
(KA )
t·cpL1ccs
But the
qu1. te
'kl.11:!.ng
su ff i c l en tly
11v :i.l.
crcH tu res' .
Thu s
t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a
cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or
i. nvolvecl
f ocus
can
destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans
fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a
on
arguments
Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen.
vadu tlo n
of
not
ll
fir s t
uitable
directly
Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding
�th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) .
The argumenL Js valid,
,1L t a .kcd)
on
the
basi :3
but
of
may
each
be
attacked
( and
of its p1·emisses.
has
in
ef fe ct
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves
11
what
is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are,
in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport
o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said
robbed;
but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong,
to
"involve."
providing
For
which
instance,
that person ' s
assistance
belng
is also wrong.
But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter
accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20
As aga inst P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
mi lit ary
nuclear
targets.
wars
can
be
encounters
But given the character of
nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets.
net
merely
the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all
the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings.
fnlloul
There i s
down-wlnd
from
military
pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of
uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl
tnrgcts
US
and
For example, t he radioactive
will affect large conc entratio ns o(
European
t argets ,
and
may
affe ct
as Conn <l o.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
cffcrl ) 2 1.
t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side
If missiles wer e c haracte ristically
r.eliAbly
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc
diagn osed.
21.
According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are
rcs ponsJblc
only
for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our
freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even U
these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
conseq uences .
Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is
pernicious ,
a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions .
�whicl1 was
intend ed
unfort unatel y
only
went
off
to
destro y
an
unma1H1<HI
und e r g round
Such claims shou ld be reject ed :
ci ty.
dou bl e
effect
Noneth e l ess
the
circum sta nc es
differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo
ns lbl f'
,1
for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce
the
the
thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e
~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on.
innkc
silo
course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d
th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under
could
missil e
j
t was not as if t he y had
del iberat ely
aimed
at
The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of]
respo nsibil ity
Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of
the act.
~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of
argued
tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation .
the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' .
killin g
and
P2,
it
The equivo cation is induc ed by
be
conc eded
that
de libera te
milJta ry ,
e . g.
farmer s
or
goods
or
servic es
bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs .
used
exclud ed
as
innoce nt .
The
s econd
d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2.
other.
for
re a sons,
it
by
proper ly
point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s
Bec a use P2 s o amende d is
less
defen sible,
is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'.
What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status
of what is
mixtur e
of
tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs.
requir e
the
qualif icatio n
'delib e rate'
or
done,
So 'delib erate'
gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so
does Pl.
not
t he
Second ly, it will be
conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin
g of t hos e
a
It
no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi
litary ef f ort,
whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of
not
be
charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin
guish able,
by
and
ma y
of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will
be made .
will b
are
While it will
Pl
For Pl
do es
'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22
Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none
the worse for that, and
Lhere
is
no
seriou s
p·o blem
in
markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s,
people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and
J.s,
mnrco v'r,
no
need
to
adopt
action
chains .
There
the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of
statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic
22.
Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ).
The sugge stion depend s
upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent
ion, and wrong ness
with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri
ne.
�,1
rlns:;
":'i
,c mnk.t~
t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try
t:(,
endenvourlng
c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then
i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants.
there
Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met,
.tr,~
for
;ir311mcnts
the
prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl
and
Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t
tend
will
For examp le, one argument for
v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory.
Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one,
(to
poi.nt)
,
re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns
mi n f nn l
from
-~_gume nts
§4 .
the
understate
sc,rio usly
doing
so
23
histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts
on
wars,
just
ur
dreamed
by
conlemporary
"free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and
opponents
communis t
im portant
the
The conclusion t hat LS,'
wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified -
1e
that
fail s to treat them with the
.0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments .
r.;omet. lti
to
of
is
Americ a
inspired,
me r ely
not
or
et c),
th e
of
same
The
conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al
t:irnt•s ,
(or jusL
wars.
first
One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the
;>1
:irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it
to
no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killc.:<l (cf.
be
Barnes , p .77.5) .
A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be
fought
by
morally
which
impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate
killing of noncombatants .
The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e
legitimate
of
means ,
discrimination
(betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
/. ~:,
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
')
(
I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' .
7.3.
Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military
in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One
;.rngLP
favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line
between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there
in
are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g.
c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of
See a l so PL , p.312, where a
their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r.
uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed .
2 1~.
Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common
lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally
usage. of
�- - - -··---·--
Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f
being that of net evil to net good:
pro ro rLi on
cor; tr-:
up
proporclonality,
'the damage to be infljcted and
lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed
the damage and costs ,
req 1irement:
disproportio nate
to
goods
moral
pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R
er i t1! rlon
of
the
which
doctrine
through war .
"improvement"
ln
achieved
of
confined,
nationally
no t
ar
that
way.
ov e r a ll
co n sequences
of
abstaining
i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts":
c ondi. tion s
"nmel.ioratlve "
wn y
the
'a nation wages war
justly
than
Similarly
on l y
if
the
for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent
s:1tisfy
for
bad,
from war ' (Barnes, p.72) .
LSN wars can
in
these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch
Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also
wa rLl ,
nnd
war
According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r
c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
are
Entangl ed with the
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less
th e
taking
by
p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this
(PL,
arms'
the
e :a mple
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r
t!il'
v0 ry
d lf !<r<' n t'Jy,
cx rhanges .
1 lmilcd
prospccUJ
of:
succl'SS
for
whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in
Wha t
some
sm11ll
strictly
state
limited
clltc ,
or
nucl ea r
is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict
with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right
intention.
Fo r
One (by no means
be arg ued to in various ways.
c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and
r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that,
1
wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as
a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
25 .
Til e principle can
26 .
wars where t he targets ar e
c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he
For such wars remain unjust on
pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect .
on lif e
several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were
s ys tnms, etc.
mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of
nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be
nucl 'lH
kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are
The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear
ndded ).
Zi.
Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of
fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack,
�t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what
are
se e n
as
b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars
can
b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed.
Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion
of
medieva l
theory
oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e
was
no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf.
lltt J e
is
wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc
se nsitive
howe ver,
me rit,
( a nd
when
issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently).
a r g uments
are
not
do
There
.In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents,
dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s
h i st orica l r e quireme nts
Barnes, p .778).
not
simply
commit
argumen t s
matters
underlyi ng
the
Finally , these argumen ts from
any
presc r iptive
fallacy;
from
historic al
autho r ity
for
to
th e
mo r al
c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed,
a nd
nome times applied , were justifie d.
As they are.
I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the
mo ral
rightnes s
or
justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist
str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin
e on
co ntempor ary
u n ti l
times.
Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they
arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and
This
ls
the
involve
beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars :
such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once
remov ed
( a nd
e ven,
howr• vcr you look
conse ns us
violence 28 •
Ht
very
f requentl y , when it is not) .
il morally .
a r gument;
it
The argume nt i.s not
proceeds
expedi.en cy
that
is
duly
They a re morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
fr om similar results from the full sweep of
ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion.
The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortuna tely
deta ils
can
be
de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents
28.
one,
from
shortcu t.
For
for
just
war
These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear.
For
the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it.
The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types
of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent
revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion
be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at
l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may
be co nd emned
'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of
l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311).
Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only
legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in
a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780).
�.l /
whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate.
w.1r
were
i_;ornctimes
a rriv ed
at
or
l n fact conditions for just
defended through pr inciples of such moral
th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative
been
done .
work
already
The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has
in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is
maxim j.sati on
utl lHy
has
is
final ly
ac complished,
LSN
adopted,
wars
are
howe ve r
excluded
ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an
·
g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1
l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ;
wars
Llw l
involv e
on
LSN
1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure,
tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in
utllitarlan
Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 •
L1i; ldon.
The arguments
ovcrwhc .lming
so
moral
far
case
outlined
against
such
mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n
principles
are
de riv able
from
agains t
some
LSN
wa rs.
LSN
would
su bstanti ally
wo rse
are
tha n
exhaust
th e
violate
thes e
of the theories just considered).
These
ac countable,
condition
not
( again
th e obligation to maint a in
earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems :
we
do
For there are oth e r significant
war
pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns :
p,cnera tions, to whom
wars
we
the r.-esponsibility to futur e
pas s
to
th e
" recei ved
the
world
it".
Such
on"
not
in
conservative
principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are
bound
to
be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war.
§5.
The shi ft to nuclear deterrence:
suppo rt
nuclear
arguments to its immorality .
Those
who
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars ,
by
pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars.
What i s being
done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om
war:
deterrence
is
most
important
precisely
engagement
in
preventing
in
LSN
such
wars from ever
occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values.
it
is
continued ,
deterrence
is
the
.9nly
practical
d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
29.
For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail,
complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'.
are
But compare Hardin.
though
not
in
�a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented
in:
mutually
;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31
Su,h c1aims as to the roles and
dubious,
for
seve ral
reasons.
objective s
of
deterrence
If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
s uperior ity.
than
th i s,
and
sometime s
even
a
mili ta ry
goal.
In fac t there ha s
renewed
driv e
for
Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32
process
decidedl y
A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce,
despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only -
been a que st for more
are
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate
for dctct"rence .
On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its"
impu.ls e
there
has
been
almost
unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318).
A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what
sold
31.
is
being
11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor:
marketed
a nd
deterrence has
It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es
"flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e
ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s
is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely
out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it.
It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e
for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r
intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use
nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he
third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official
military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and
nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM,
p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
[1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front,
which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine
deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it
la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff.
�i.ncrt.:ascd the probability
nrms-race
type
t hat
of
LSN
war.
More
precis ely,
deterrence
of
th e
is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion
for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and
hns
to
that
,,,·te nt
least en hanced its prospect s of occurring .
at
r easons also, connected with pure
original
setting),
the last 30 years.
the
deterrence
and
with
the
For other
"cold
war"'
(its
probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to main tain credibility
overridden
or
with
''sacrificed"
a
population
whos e
real
for
military objectives;
state of military readiness;
etc.
The situation has
many
ther e
sober
analysts
century , i.e.
think
before 2000 .
is
a
high
There are s e veral
interests
are
being
the dangerous and risky
now
been
reached
where
pr obability of an LSN war this
routes
to
such
a
probability
assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to
an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and
Amer lean
2000.
alerts,
hav e
been
lucky
already .
In
of
nuclear
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that th e
For
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucia l
the
arms
of nuclear acci dent and human or
t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf .
:l.ncrease
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
r e veals
the
exchange .
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l
race,
on
sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the
Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in r e cent years.
Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128).
�20
conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) .
s e em s
no
way
Fof better
or
worse,
ther e
to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and
t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight .
IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it
proha bJ~
that
LSN
an
war
will
d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it
proba bl e
that
c entury.
And that is enough
a
grossly
occur this ce ntury.
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
i.mmoral.
For then it follows ( by
plausi ble
that
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
warrant
morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome.
de terrence
highly
is
evasiv e
act.Lon.
We
ought
That in turn implies taking steps ,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That i.s but the first of several ways we shall
nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies.
The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of
war h a s of cour s e been disputed.
LSN
The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows :
Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying.
The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with
ar c
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much ava i lable evidence counters this
More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper ).
What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the
ce r tnin ly
Ther e by, through det errence, we
si t uation,
since
have
already
got
into
t.h e probA.bility.
immoral
of
r aising
The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity
of nucle ar deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense
war,
against
evidence
s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an
LSN war .
LSN
a nd
way
of
princ iple s
mapping
war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war.
mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic
connecti ng
pr inciples .
moral
arg uments
Such principles
The
fl rst
of
the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only
be
pr ob3ble
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
�i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur .
Thus, f or
example ,
s i nc e
is
it
wrong
to
ki l l
a
large
noncomb atant
po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k
and
wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out,
which
nuclea r de terre nce does .
botl1
of
For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally
entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t
ho se
of third part y no nal i gned
most
Like
"' t tuations .
defeat by
example ,
0
t a te s .
sub s t an ti ve
Unless
mo ra l
count erexamp l es,
the
second
principl es oc c u r s.
probabi lity
that
par t
princ ipl e s
in
Cl
runs
into
dilemma.
and
of
a c c ord i ng l y,
Cl
e ncount e rs
to
require
complic ation.
For
apparen t trouble where clash of
Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the
oc curs
X
ord er
to
apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 •
nuclec1r
ethi s,
d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to
t o avoid a greater evil.
pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y
c r ashes,
in
dct:crrcn ce ,
make
that
t he
Cons i der for example the
passeng er
plane
he
ic
flying
sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y
Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of
ihe r e
(though
the r e
explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not
ls
a
of fs e t
clash
or
of
principl e s, as §6
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greate r e vil.
I L can be a r gued that it is:
argumen t
from
t he
pr e vious
a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le
perhaps
f rom
more
such is pa rt of
succe s s
credence
t he
de terrence .
th a n
the
of
the
popular
However this inductiv e
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
driver's
argumen t,
'the
happy
acciden t
has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is
unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war
34.
point
a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet
(des pite some close calla ) , he won't,
th a t
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D.
Johnston .
There are more
dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es.
For example , in inciting people to
c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d.
Thus, t o ta ke C,
Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi
i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj.
But surely
Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence .
But spelling out
what 'dir ec tly' means
in terms of short causal chains over which
r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to
ot her connect ing princ i ples.
�·2
(p. 100) .
lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power
incrt.' ,ise
111
Russian
strengt h,
the
ri se
r e 1aU. ons,
th e
of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc .
(cf.
simllarly Cox ).
There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Dl.
De errencc will not continu e to work,
and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that
D2 .
De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war.
The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again
persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together :
some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r.
proliferati on,
the
emergence
bu t the focus is on the ( in
An initial
of lesser nuc lear powers.
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect
Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that
lt. -i~i
us e of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
11
lesser
very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th
stat e .
Moreover
scarcitJ
;::i nd
o f chea per suppli es, etc ,
weapo n
systems,
more
or
Lcrror
s ltua ttons,
deterrence
power
lnvolv e s 36 ,
being mainta.ined :
costs
Wi t h so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
balanc e
of
have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record.
lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds .
of
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that
pres en t
for
wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war
through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased.
powrr
opportunities
growing
nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to.
wec1pons
.lnltlnl
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline,
and
the
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
arms
war ,
races,
with
such
as
probabili.ty
Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
35.
that
deterrence
practice
increases
It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations
weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf.
n 1clcar
p .. 2JO n.
36.
supposi ng
th e
armed with
Lackey, MM,
The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the
proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were
nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
dcle rrenc e.
Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of
scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled.
�probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in
poli c y,
US
especiall y
th e
rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides
to
rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being
advantage
of
ov erwhelme d,
USA
the
to
take
superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy
the
tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets
con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as
hostages ),
thereby
war.
also
weakens
the
case
against
resort
to
nucle a r
detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t
of
mutual
understan ding,
leaders, and even some
nuclear.
sha r ed
principle s ,
cooperati on
supe r-states.
and
soundness
transmi ss i on
Finally,
impor tant)
level
judgement
among
of
of
and
informati on
between
It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s
in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for
instance,
follow
through on delusions of one sort or another.
deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
the
other
It is al so tha t
side ,
which
slde ' s
threat
is to the other' (P L, p.313) .
we
think' • 38
But
about
what
the
o t her
considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of
evidence,
that
on e
perceptio n of what is
possible
resul t
As
s ide
side
thinks
e rror.
Not
thinks ,
there
only
not
can be
is
a
there
sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n;
must now be severe doubts
cffectlvc ly.
"conv inc ing "
There is a grain of truth in
the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other
what
be
a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t
strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rationa l
principle s
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not
to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward
defence)
have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is
some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies :
we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and
i.rrntiona llty .
J8.
Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the
West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not
understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'.
This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e.
�24
idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA
and in UK) that
LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won.
The suppor ter of det er rence
connec ting
rrlnci ple s
ri val case.
such
J1as
not
onl y
to
defeat
a rgumen ts
Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing
as
For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly
~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_.
t hr o ugh
practic e
of
Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed
( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl),
only
a
feeble
case
through
the
questio na b le obv ers e of Cl,
Cl i.
If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X,
nppears open .
•
For it has to be shown that
deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war ,
and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that
deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options
.
o
The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill
be argu e d.
reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim.
up i-hc v ery
cond 1 t:1.ons
probab ility
of
suc h
for
a
an
LSN
war,
it
So ,
for
When nuclear deterr e nce set s
can
ha rdly
have
reduced
th e
war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o
when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le.
More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi
e d, it i s
c..! l1 0l l f',h
refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong.
LO
out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t.
altcrn1 1LJvc
pe rmissi ble
courses
of
a c tion
condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ;
to be no t merely
alrigh t ,
bu t
;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA,
r ig ht.
But
I t is not enough to make
For t he re certain ly seem to
withou t
deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory.
uniciue ne s s
includi ng
fright
To surpass t hese option s, a
nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown
es tablish ing
such
a
39.
LSN
war s ,
withou t
.(cf.
Jl
11
claim,
to
fear
or
is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39
OED)
40
•
For
most
people,
portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough
from
be
the costs or problem s of
Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by
t hr ea t s
not
the
enormo us
expense ,
t rouble
vivid scenari os
to
deter
t hem
and wastage of
An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre
nce is the
way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum
stances .
Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu
res , the
an s wl!r hn-, to be, No.
�- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -
p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em.
det t·r rl'ncc
And
deterren ce
i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of
by
such
means
ourse not immoral .
(whi ch
miJit4ry
(Sc.h e ll was not
immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New
Yo rk .)
But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is
deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where
this
o bj e ct,
a
LSN
war., itself is no t
permiss ible.
The argumen t for this is
thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple
C2 .
l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong.
Hence
since
p re para t i on,
LS N wars
nuc l ear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterren ce
deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong .
claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X:
wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn
i
Y•
wi11at
W.'.1 S
wrong.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
Z may
both
be
41
i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1.
"
Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that
L SN wa r
implies
complete
prepara tion
for
Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the
Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls
(which
tr ied
the
major
war
c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e
Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or
waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l
tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan
or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in
Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added).
But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the
become
J ncreasi ngly
liable
to
question .
wrongne ss
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty,
deceptio n,
mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally
unde sirable traits.
Li l .
Nor a re
ordered
be cause
wrong,
equally
degr e es of wrongne ss required :
wrongs can simply be
as
reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some
it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z
cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally
evil. Thus, e.g. William s:
.
partiall y
labourin g
are both
wrong or
.
there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy
on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a
nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil
a s the second.
This is because both are held to be absolute ly
forbidde n.
Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to
"S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ
mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and
3 lg a numbe r;
s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numeri c , lly from 3!
�26
a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s.
Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as
sever~]
other
fea tures.
LSN
war ,
already
writes
in
In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t
ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pret e nce.
Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e
for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence.
too
sophistica t ed
for
bluff
alone
to
Military
succeed:
t here
preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in
t he
ot her
hand ,
has
to
is
now
be serious
deterr ence .
But,
on
c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for
wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly:
imply attemp t ed X.
c omplete preparatio n for X does
not
It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed
with wha l is prcpa·ed
whell1er
intelligenc e
for
under
c ertain
conditio ns.
Comple te
preparation ,
for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a
(proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an
be
taken
of
connecting
for
granted .
Principle C2
principles .
is
part
way
not
the
line
in
a
series
pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that
A
con necting X with a tt empted X:
perh,ps
down
if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong
as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not .
But the se ries ends ;
off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to
the
(thoug h
it cuts
claims
of
various religious pos i tio ns.
For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong
then
X
the
co n temp l ati on
con sidcra t Jon
of
of
is
wrong
carrying out Xis wrong.
or
that
non-action- oriented
The point ap plies equally to sexual
fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares .
no Lhing
mere
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable ,
and in some senses are all too thinka ble.
Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each
common ly
involves
lt connects with.
decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanyin g the increased probability are
certain
r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves;
nol
I ho:a·
of
mere
pas s ! vc
.o nt emµ l at f on
I,,
1
'.
Howev er
oll
the
sets
of
these are
connectl.ng
�n
prL nc lple s
invoked
except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of
wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased.
c ho:;c n
One rea son for th1s is that the
means
o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do
s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft .
The inc r eased prohabi llty
of
an
evil
out come
o l.mply makcB things worse .
Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but
thi s
accompa nied
by
threats
and
a threaten ing posture .
pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved,
announce ment
For some pa rty , th e
if
deterr e nce
s ucce ed :
the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible .
n uc 1 L' i1 r
deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le:
CJ.
of
is
to
This aspect of
if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also
wr o ng ;
or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng .
The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form
CG .
If Xis wrong so is a cond itional
r eq uires
some
further
ex planati on.
the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere
of' • 4 3
thre ate ning
~
Apar t
intensio n
to
A condit'o na l
do
intentio ns
e . g.
themselv es,
1
the
t ha t ) .
C
to
(or
in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style:
the
most
cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the
oblj gati on
form
a
are
not
impossi ble
claim
in
whnt
or even remote or imp r obable:
(spe c ifica lly those involvin g
cornmitn e nt)
for
follows
certain
is
tha t
s ort s
there
of
discusse d
an
it is obligato ry
conditio ns
the conditi ons
typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l
fund ame ntal
cred1ble
functor:
To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the
involv ed
whic h
intensio n is a judgemen t of
is some intensio nal functor,
f rom
X
enemy .
The
are intensio nal funct ors
threaten ing ,
intendin g ,
and
whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate
the
immoral ity
42 .
There is plenty of scope for f ur ther
elabora tion
here.
Passiv e
s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to
make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other
worlds where e vil oc curs .
43.
The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be
confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The
Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey
strike :
Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten
them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the
problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e
theories of condi ti onality.
of
nuclear
deterren ce.
Natural ly
again
there
are
many
�28
no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions
c.ont. :•mplat J.on,
t'1l nld.ng,
dreaming, etc.
of
e.g .
fail,
those
of
The.r e is also a n interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) ,
expecting,
awaiting
and
the
like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:.
Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is
then
threatcn.ing
X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that
to do
into
prac tic e
(e.g.
if
wrong
'What is wrong
putting
something
committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to
that
into
pract i ce.
beginning as fo] lows:
The
point
ca n
if worlds where
alternative ly
X
happens
be
are
put
argued semanti cal ly,
exclude d
then
so
are
adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen.
The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons.
nuclear
war
obta i n.
However t he required c onditional form can be derived
form,
is
through
only c onditionall y threatened , i.e .
the
f ollowing
wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if
argument:-
c.
should certain cond itions
particular,
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it
wrong,
44.
so
a lso
is
simple
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
arg uments
the
Observe, furthermore that if something Xis
have b en wrong in the first place.
ear lier
from
su bstitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions;
by
Firstly ,
threatening X if C,
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to e sta blish CG it is
Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272.
It
i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as
Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue of
slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and
also,
i.n view of CJ,
not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral
oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked
out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t.
S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops:
se
PL, p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
"i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is
open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality
mentione d below.
�29
enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r
If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X.
CG'.
The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to
ca us es
more
t roubl e .
a
serious
threat,
Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often
contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e
is
t l1r e o.tene d
what
l
.
i s wrong , to prevent t,1c
occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n
f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been
by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion
at all to pr oceed t o action on
plaus ible
Lhrc a t s .
removes
i t
the
support
bas i s
for
of
threats.
s i mpl i f ied CJ.
Insofar
A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l.
sense
co nditi on s,
is
con s i de r a
accide nt .
intended,
For the challenge
grossly
immo r al
unconvincing,
case
wh e r e
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
ci rcum st ances
th e
result
from
improbable
To bring this
an
intricat e
Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her
not .
is
in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
thr ea t s to under t a ke
out
is
Principle CJ is not
ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ.
says
this
Hence the shift to serious
one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible.
which
as
it
is
way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in
the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the
thr eat
nor
ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al
more
.. pra ctic al "
rep r es e n t atives
grounds.
Further more,
while
states
thei r
and
ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to
immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot:
it
moral
principled agents they ar e or take
natu r es ,
to
t he
kinds
of
th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains).
i nsignif i c ant
mora lly
would
run
For su c h agents , who may
counter
to
comprise
their
a
not
proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
a s CJ are no t in doubt.
The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e
--- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of
ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The
quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is
i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n.
�30
t.hrcnt involved
then
is
it
Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t,
inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no
Lhen by CJ deterren ce
depcn<l
is
wrong .
The
maintain ed.
sub-argu ment
on se ri ous threats is a practica l one:
Lf
it
s
no t
seri ous
Bu t if i t j s ser io us
that
nu c l ea r
dete r re nce
name l y , that if the t h rea t s were
not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro
ugh ,
then
the
op posit ion
would flnd out, in one way or a nother.
could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l
wi LhouL
A policy of bluff
system ,
f or
examp l e,
coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n .
Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems
maintain ing
such
a
po licy
weapons , espec ially
informa lion
would
clown
during
l i kel y
times
escape
the
of
there
would
be
ma jor
di f fic u l t ies
i.n
chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear
change
through
in
gov e rn ing
el i t es ,
a nd
the
op pos itio n i ntellige nce.
But then ,
since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d .
Ther e a re
as
we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s.
On e is t hat
nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts
a bo ut
the
r ationa lity
of
carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity
essentia l. to its effec t iven ess .
To be effec tive then i t mu s t
be
s e r i ous
( c f.
Benn).
Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of
one
centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent.
CG,
Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d
with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e
C4 .
If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is
n!so wr0ng.
The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o
die tionarie s,
etc . ' .
of
'a
d claratio r
of
intent
to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury,
It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of
deter rence,
which
in tend ing to go to war .
princip l e ,
th a t
turn
0 11
C4
is
s ome
pa r a doxes
the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout
Princ i ple
C4
is
j us t i f i e d
th rough
th e
s i mplified
inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do
wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s
p inc.iple
some
an
ex tr emel y
position
prevail.
Si mplif i ed
wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the
excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly.
Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d
to
�Jl
agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows :
argue
siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when
the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng
to go to LSN wa r
when
the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong .
Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such
an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows.
He nc e
nuclear
deter rence
is
wrong.
But like virtua lly every
utilita rian
princip les
utiJita rian grounds .
deontic
t hems e lv es ,
princip le ,
princ i ples
For it is not difficu lt to
except
thos e
flowing
from
CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on
outline
str a tegic
situati ons
wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear
det e rr ence.
But
on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon
C4.
For
it
likewis e
fs
not
princip les
C3
difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE
innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d
by
maximum
expe cted
a nd
utility .
pu rsuit
Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o
avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism
,
scrappi ng
the
sp ots
not
by
doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around
with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will
trou bl e
of
wit h
utilit a riani sm.
enable
So
.i. t
them
to
evade
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y
illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its
mo r al
f avour
depend s
upon uti.lita rian ass umption s .
Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of
fwbst,r ntial
1itil.ita ri a n
e l ements '
(PD,
p.287).
consequ e n tia l
elemen ts
systems
incl ud e
must
infiltr ate,
an
with
the
' ass umption
if
Eve n
observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one
e thic s
thing
this
upon
must
hav e
astonis hing
confla ting
utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e
particu lar
that
assump tion
produce s
normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he
a ct
Kavka
thereup on
t ries
the paradox es of · deterre nce'.
wi t h
maximum
expecte d
to
The
utility
'( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great
deal of utility
- -
46.
·•---- ---- -
Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip
le (PD ,
p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler,
Bentham ,
Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as
to why the
pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4
to argue,
like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora
l' (cf .
Kavb p.29 1 ).
It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les
(espec iall y the
maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka
's f irst
paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see
PD.
�.
, •"
.
12
i.s
s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87).
:;t
obj ec tions
as
This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h
ut il i taria nism
i self:
it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or
vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e .
usud l
stratc ~y
of
of
Kavka tries t he
weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the
~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising
u t i lit y
can mora l ly e njo i u.
But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies
fo l Low
fr om
t he
normative
( p . 28 7) • 11 7
what
ov erridde n
by
C4
s u ppo sed
u t il i t a rian
to
a ssumptio ns '
Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s
way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t
and
is
assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns
o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e
t h at .•.
in
produce ,
situa t i on s ,
are
whe n
moral
c ombi ned
dilemmas .
in
si tu a t i ons
These
are
not
s uc h
th e
f udg ed
as sump ti on
as
special
de t e rr e nt
c a ses
where
one
decnti c
pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e
c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it
int e nd
right
to
to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian
gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) .
wr ong :
that judg ement is not ov e rr i den.
Nuc lear de t e rr e nce
is
also
t he
case
is
t hat
in
r emai ns
Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4
i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion,
what
is
th e~e
s pe cial
p.290) .
situations,
Howeve r ,
t her e
ar e
count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives .
For
.ln
t he s e
is
wrong .
s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what
Howe ver
it
is
ha rdly
ne ws,
but
a
standing
objection,
that
ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g .
Spec ial
s pons on s hip
de t e rre nt
may
appea r
s itua t i.on a,
where
under
ntl lit a ri a n
t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l.
char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he
47 .
deterrence
de t e r r e nce
is
very
likely
As
to
Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n
cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument
f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 .
Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles,
but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s
with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in
the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e
with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s .
�sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely
tp
lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well.
This is ve ry far removed from the real world
su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e.
si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the
deterrence
probabiU.ty
is
of
LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence .
that
<l1~ont <:
principles
sllbject
Even if it were
mistakenly
to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to
avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working
such
RS
supposed
de ontic
principles
C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons.
Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it
equi. r es,
by wa y of the following principle:
CS.
If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
circumstances;
and
that
commitment
is
to
act
itself wrong .
lso wrong.
wrongly
in
cer-tain
Nuclear deterrence is
however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions .
And
as
wi th
conditional
intention,
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
th a t
su perstates
and
controlling
commitmen t
and
their
intention
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
did
not
occur)
is
enough
to
establish
the
relevant
The dangerous strategy of
launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a
thut
have
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence.
Now the connecting principles
suffice
logically ,
but
are
nucl ar
deterrence,
for
weighty
principle
would
detachment
from
the
by complete preparat i on fo r and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
parad ox ical:
det e rrence.
ir self
By
case .
i nstance
conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
sound
wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
one
applied:
it
ou t
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unl ess
i ts
ha s
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
chang ed, e.g .
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direct ion can be drastically
at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare,
�to purely mi l i t ary targe ts).
Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different
sort s
of
ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e .
a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s
I
There
wh i ch start from the
commonplace ob se r va ti o n that
~
All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in
favou r
of
nuclear
deterrence
are
broadl y
ut ilitar i an.
In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many
t hat
inf iltra t ed
hav e
the
e thi.c a l
l i t erature ,
ar e
those
of
ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the
one
playe r,
t h r>
USA.
Utilitar ia nism ,
t hough
s till
looking
of
those
expedie ncy -·
advantage
of
basically
at
~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
posi t io n,
a nd
consider
[ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity
sup po r t t d
by
o t he r
na tional i ties
othe rwi s e .
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains,
dflrive s from ut il i tarianism.
118
Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst
de terrence,
either
by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme
Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence
or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme ,
Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments.
The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
f av our
d ir ec tion:
48 .
of de terrence.
moral
arguments
Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
a ft e r all it is widely
thought
that
u tilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and
a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent
de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a
much t oug her ent e rprise.
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was
· cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the
conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes
t.o deterre nce .
An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can
be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological
~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily
he way
of
<lcontic
connecting
pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail.
In the light of these
prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical
positi ons would go.
After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of
stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even.
�seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition.
pol it i ca l
s yst em
whic h
depends
in
some
uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo.
It hardly does
measure
then
for
a
upon consensus , to rely on
Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e
just
thnt
appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on:
how
it
ls
applied;
with
which
maximisa tion recipes; along with what other
r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well);
genc>rous
arc
utll i.ty·
assignmen ts
or
upon
With
different
(and · a rguably
superior)
va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results
emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49
basic
reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4).
LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility.
deterrenc e
out to
whi.c h increases th
other
recipes
of
feasible
a
how
for such things as preservat l on of national
sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc.
assumptio ns ,
and on
Any
policy
such
The
It is that
as
nuclear
probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e
alternati ves,
conseque ntialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance ,
Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) .
The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism
o[
ut j lltaria nlsm,
beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of
l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else
11t i l i tarla ni sm
when
applied
One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this:
by
to
addressin g
s ome
of
the
inadequac ies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e.
on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether
to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the
improbabi l ity of other options working.
deep,
uti ~itarlanis m
If the deterrenc e
probabili ty-well
is
morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
pro babl e.
49.
Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the
discussio n
inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally
opposed conclusio ns are reached.
(Hardin 's approach tends however to
expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-know n to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilit arl.an ism'.
The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to
stand comes from L, Mirlin.
�36
wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s
likPly
to
work
or not.
indepe nde nt
deterrence
are
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
i.s
Moral
princi p~s
not
are
through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how
ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be .
depend
.Lt
If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the
probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter .
det:crmlne<l
whcrhc r
of
upon
firm to stand.
Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
a nd
of
the results util i ta r ianism delivers
uncert ainty
measures>
util itari anism off ers
In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle ,
utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and.
The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism.
(orm
shows
at
special
int e rests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
probability- well
state ,
have
hi gh
1s
deep ,
utilities,
nat io n- s tat e
and
spe cial
It does not yie ld a deterrence polici;
ind eed
hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ).
11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a
o[
act
most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s
under very
il
The
acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity;
These
seque nce
di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult
dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left
(as
also
associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardl y be argued that
deterrence
is
t he
pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence.
Along wit h the argument s, there are
dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence.
other
concom.itant
conventiona l wa rs .
f or
Firstly, the peace it has provided
011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re
smaller-s cale
reasons
is
no
deep
is
s hort age of
And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous
pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
r ange
of
51..
Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the
simplificat ion .
In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h
the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e
(ref rred to in footnote 49 ).
52.
Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm
the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open.
becaus e
�- - - -- - -- - - - - - ·
-
37
fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and
t ec lrn1 .:fl.1,
j)C:lc (_~ ,
p 0:i
It thofl not
offer
genu i ne
of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo
nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e
·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ).
Secon dly, there
enorm ous
is
cost,
mora l
-~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe
nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t
moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami
liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly
Marx i st
way,
in
terms
of
destr uctiv e capac i ty and what
'the
ls
contr a dic tion
ne e ded
f or
betwe en
what
cons truct iv
the
is
spent
for
devel opme nt'
( PL,
p . 316) .
§6.
Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts
from
natio nal
dange rs
nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene
sis of nucle ar dilem mas.
to
Whil e
there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle
ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also
counr c ·-arg ument s,
that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe
ciall y to
Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l
just:!.fiab ili ty
of
nucle ar
war
pr e para tion
in
the
_p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es.
The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an
elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift,
of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the
local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or
f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and
every bit
a r gu1r.e nt
from
local dang ers.
dom inati on ;
a nd
dubio us
fir st
of
all
seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 .
atom ic
s urren der
and
so
avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ).
prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more
than these ;
third
eleme nt ,
name ly,
loss
of
basic
rig hts
there
with these .
black mail
of
forei gn
appea seme nt
In fact nucle ar
is
ways
a
cruc ial
of
life
This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the
dange r of
forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at
e eleme nt from risk of
Thoug h
and
(free dom, equa lity, etc .) and
fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human
dign ity, etc .) and
int eg rat ed
that
The two go toget her,
sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh
t adop t a polic y
or
as
It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be
en
tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er:
forei gn
as
black mail.
dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic
value s it does
imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin
ation , freed om to choos e vario us
natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi
on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s
can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta
nce, as is comm onpla ce in the
�"[ r
•e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through
the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a
nti clcnr
prepnratlon
incr easi ngly
nuclear
risks,
state
demands,
extensive
etc.
But
what
nuclear destruction, also
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
ti, _ material
of
53
of the cherJshed life-style.
So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut
bnse
me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51•
fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of
lncku
cogency
an d
rings
ho 1 low,
It
is
basic
values
and
ri ghts
hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c:
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
ci tati.o n
of
religious
values at politica l ceremonies;
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
from
demand s
of
the
military-indus trial
of
private
wealth
and
vnl \les
appealed
to
category:
in
and
anot he r,
them
having
However
arising
to
do
with
th e
an argument isn't, or
associations.
And
the
rights
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice .
this
of
power.
oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury
that t he argument 1.s a
omplex , many concerned with foreign
domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many
conccut ·at:1.on
pious
of
"communism"
of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of cnpi talism.
communi.sm
has
What has
been
happened
here
confused
with
of
course
(the
t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion ,
association,
is
reality
basic
information,
that
( the
of)
state
values,
etc.,
ideal
socialist
namely
etc.),
of)
and
certain
so does
derivative~ threaten basic values.
One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear
LSN
wa r,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preservtng
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold.
Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life.
54 .
The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1.
.... ,
�'lQ
J,
Simi la r ci. ue s tions
dominntion
and
arJs e
as
regard s
blackmail.
argumeq;; H from
er, e
Justification
danger
which
is
itself
open
questioned (i n §8 ), both from the
to
ser i ous
point
foreign
of the methods of extensi ve nuclear
preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e
structure
of
of
question,
v iew
of
nation
and
basic
states,
a
i s subsequently
valu s,
such
as
freedom, and oth r wise.
But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or
dangers
are
no t,
t hese
from
natlonal
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
prcpnration, and
jus tific, tlon.
have
They
been
have
par t of many people ' s
accepted
in
moral
by
policy
outlook.
particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar
however ,
the
makers
as
affording
moral
fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form
Wi thi n
frnmework the moral justification holds good .
others,
ar gumen t s
arguments
not
a
c onv entio nal
Northern
It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in
preparatio n
do
such
engenders
establis h
a
moral
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
not
also
face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls
specif ically moral one.
,1
impressed
by
And
for
ma ny
other s
again,
who
are
who
not
so
or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
peop)c
Such
live
beyond
For such
the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al
counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged .
Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated
people
who
live
in
people.
Consi de r
some
a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet)
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nucl~ar
d ter r c nce
(a s under pr inciple Cl).
For such isolated people, who may
ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no
nucl ea r
diJ emma ,
and
nuclear
lo cations may have problems
problems
people.
as
deterrence
to
natio nal
is wro ng.
dangers,
genuine
People in less fo r tu na te
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
In doing so
i mmorally;
and
f or
through
similar
nuclea r
reasons
deterrence , superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventi onal No rthern framework is
�j_mpug rwd.
conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l
Tht'. same
argument::
put
a
reflective
i s olat e d pe rson, and check
S! 11 ci>
Amer ican
the
or-
resulting
by
a
substitution
Russi.an 1n the position of such an
asse ssment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f
m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y
transfixed,
t h <~
c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality.
The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending
whc her
on
the
arguments
are
appU.ed
as
rega rds a superstate or not.
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something
Jn
orde r
t hP
meet
of
the nuclear armoury that it has.
Or, weakening the theme to
ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it
retain
i1
t
l east
solid
a
ou~
core of the nu c 1ear devices it has.
(moretlly]
to
For su bs equent
argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for
inst a nce
be cause
of
the
character
the
of
pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of
g rou nds
to
those
di. sa rmame nL
supporting
ag ainst
a
the
dangerous
SS
reason 55•
prudent:ial
the me
nuclea r
Northern values supposedly being
On
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentiall y
Jrralto nal.
It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is
a
s11 hopLimal
st rategy ,
li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma
si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games .
that
a
su peri or
would
be
cooperative
For
expen sive ,
re source s,
dr ai ning
of
such
t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1.
55.
admitted
arrangement s.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
ra nge of other r espects .
future
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the
lik . could be achif?Ved , would
agreeme nt
So it should
arrangement s
would
be
much
less
risky ,
destructive of the environment , a nd so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local
expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
�rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~
unfortunate ly
rather
remote:
only
the
ca make
their
polici es
sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e
nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate :
proceed,
largely
unabated .
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state
one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a
one's
a rsen a l,
umbrella.
nu c l ear
pre paration ,
th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md
for
huddl es
conf l.dencc
in
!ts
and
which
under
co ntrast s
ncouragcd elsewhe r e .
st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear
grrH1nd
one
anoth e r's
But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by
dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nu clear
in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly
thr oug h some supcrstate 's
nuclear
COVt!r
super-· ally
Does a "d epe nd ent"
on a s 1pc r -a lly,
rather
tha n
strangely
have
that
exchange
on its territory?
mu ch
Jt s ally's opponen t ?
Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or
nuclear
must
stag e
a
Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y
l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of
superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d .
Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e
it
<loes
theme ,
not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers
f rom SST nnd end s as follows:
DST.
Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he
facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally .
ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd
same
goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ).
Nor do the arguments of f ered for
SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments
striking l y
illu str ated
by
the
case
the
for
DST. 56
This
is
more
of more remot e nuclear dependent states.
Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in
j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans
of
the
Sovi et
Union.
Nor
ar e
they
thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical
56.
As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions
o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign
nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g.
eco nomic consideratio ns
such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs.
�ca1 1acity to launc h
mot j .ve Lo
<.111y
<l o
look convincing .
carries
full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but
R
wc .i ght.
reasons
In
fact,
the
with
a rgumen t
from
of
For there
arg ument
t he
only
is
qucstLonable
non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs.
of
58
domina tion
In this way
too)
the
from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified .
such
supe r state
foreign
li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of
a
economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d.
fore(•
lack(ing]
so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol
For similar
1 it t le
'clearly
danger
because
nuclear
of
umbrella,
superstate
dang er
facilities
and
th e
tha t would be removed wi th
With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these
sorts
a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may
b e defeated along analogous lines .
The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and
peoples,
break
theme
the
of
a
of
monolithic West.
differently
situated
This is a theme especially
favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n.
und i.ffrrentiatcd unit.
dep1!nd0nL
i;tntes
with
But
this
l eadi ng
idea,
NATO
desig ne d
powers ,
and
In this the West is a single
in
and
part
to
align
lesser
to justify pu tting them at
nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West.
The West is
not
so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it
(i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is
now
coming
unde r
attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the.
und er lying retaliatory model that
0
Safety lies in weapons ,
More weapons i mply more. security59 ,
Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear.
a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s
from nuclear submar ines ) .
Europe ans are ar guing in
present
of
syslem
is
more
a
similar
wa y,
that
the
a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e
Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 .
58 .
The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2.
59 .
Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson.
argument
for
it,
s ee
Threats
to
�Thompson, p.251);
envi s -1ged
and thnt: w-ithou!:
Lhcut.r e
for
a
h\icJ. ,;,)ll''
instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be
limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l
thf'
is now seen by US
( ut not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons assumptions
are
qu es tioned,
other
assumptions
of
the
retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely
ci
Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
o
Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament,
as
opposed ,
say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or,
takin g off from the previ ous point,
~
Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through
ar e
proper
methods,
armaments ,
etc.)
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resoLuti.on at the int er national level.
It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no
ordinary
level
do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
r e ally
warranted,
frontier
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60
and
explana tion
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
already
nation-states.
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted
and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c.
nation-state
system ':
For 'forc e has
[a]
permanent
plac,~
in
the
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
Th
resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites
Ass~mbli.ng
r eferred
th~
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
de v e lope d
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 )
to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east
60.
yields
the
both
and
their
supporters.
deontic dilemma. often
ought
not
to
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
for prudential reasons (as
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alter native systems , see
su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on
i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s .
argu ed
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
�·,,,,._
44
SST and DST).
tl w
Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction
of
virtues
parac.onsisteot
logic),
but
( c onc octed
61
prod uced
by
war itself 62 , or
at
war
and
its
version
of
the
deon tic
least war which spr.·eads beyond purely
mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably
e . g.
nuclear
, a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions.
ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense
di 1 emma
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, t he
ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on
asper.ts
to
do
(since
ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) .
military
arrangeme nt s,
The ma in dil emma arises
from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of
war.
War
is
requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold);
but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es .
war
can
undPr
also
ce rtain
justified.
be
se e n
as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that
ctrcumstanees
Thus
' some
these
reall y
ju tifications
0
evi l
consequences
Regis
of
war '
(Walls ,
p.260).
accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed
normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible
the
The doctrine of " ju st
But
this
argume nts
when
perfo rmed
under
is no better or mor e morally
for
uti l itorianism
as
bein g
corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e .
W;n· and preparedness for
61 .
wa r
als o
gene rate
s ubsidiary
di.lemmas
f or
Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence
the
best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of
world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii).
Green
also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e
asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he
is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s
down):
though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no
othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue.
Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops
d :llemma;
they s peak of ' th e
dilemma of how to prev ent the use
Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation i n terms of a mora l
political paradox of de terrence •.. the
of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13).
In
too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in
Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs.
But
it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework.
62.
Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account
of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein.
�. ...
inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and
difficult
prohlcms
au t ho f· t c y:
'one
of
th e
~0s t
o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying
the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL,
p.324).
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts.
The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed
by
t he
co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n
national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a .,
"
lnd.lvidual
li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) .
othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas ,
( poll U ca l)
obl lgations
to
s for
example
(the
question
the
extent
of
one' s
a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as
one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear
res c•archer
It also accentuates
of
politic a l
obligation s
armame nt s
and
processor
or
eva sion
is
their
considered f urther in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re
several
ques Ions
to
'Wh, t. should my sta t e
be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e
be
doing
and
influence, d epending on who one is.
I do?
1
one
Jives,
-
do?',
on
whi c h
one
may
exert
influences, i.e.
in
what
l it tle
There is not only the question 'What shou ld
a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending
a nd
ar e
on
whe re
sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or
on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the
questions
' What
sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64
Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o
act ion-or ien t ed
questions .
Each
of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas .
The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
di ffe rently,
pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy.
obliga tory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas.
T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and
security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and
autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state.
64.
For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility
of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out
Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate
than they are .
�moral d il emmas ure not
l i t.t>r;,Lure
f, !.,
•
widely
or
well
und er stood,
p...." t'ticular]y
__
e 1-1
~ 1i
in
ca .1
Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e
utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which
giv•s
to
rise
them
but
the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve
acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y.
d i lemma doe
Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons
a
not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better
a nd worse ways
By
01t .
wh c h
assessments,
contr a st
f orm
the
with
basis
s uc h
e thical
theories ,
preanalytical
oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l
dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s.
Reactions an
f rom
the
res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas
fix.
nuclear
The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to
<lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to
temporary
Thus ,
crutch .
for
as
world' GG , that
b st"
j
ethical
RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o
way
a
of
neve r
exerci s ing
"mora lly
ou r
s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld .
fu nctor
s peak
moral
A similar
th e
'strictly
mor;il
Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role
but
de t e er e nc: e
th e
c i rc um s t a nce s.
de ter r .nc e,
is
be
in a fallen
to
" second
a
acceptability '
object
mus t
cert ainly
one
str ictly
and
wrong,
is
of
from th e
conditional
be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a
optlon
as
to
of
what
the
to
nucl ear
do
in
Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion
though
a
"morally
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
can
shift
'moral
c ond i tional '
while
a ccepta bi U.ty ,
good",
responsibility
d~t c rrcnce
fix.
·s
(as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic
of
we
gra s p
examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the
possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e
acceptable''
emerge
neverthel e ss
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
that
war
in
the
pursu e
circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as
Sar t re;
a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller
t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood.
66.
Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n
1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2.
6 7.
As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order
logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable'
hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s .
The
Australian,
February
12-13
�!i
'.rnp erior
pol Ley ~
nsscrabled
(in
sufficien tly
it
is
§5-§6),
a
dt! cidetlly
reasons
of
·1
}-toor
the
opti_ n,
sort
reasons
i'o r
that
are
decisive
already
for those,
outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find
no
genuine
of
nuc le ar
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re,
stal1.:s'
own mald.n&_.
fix
a
It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the
Lhc
escaJAtio n
of
In these respects the
situation
is
like
peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble
relations hips , and build up
though
and
U.:, A,
has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by
the USA and the USSR in in teractio n.
th:1 t
The
one
there by.
It
is
build-up.
The fact i
programme is t o be in addition to existing
( which
are
to
Sovi et
that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does.
esources
myth,
a
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear
in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response
bui ld·-up,
nucl~a ·
with
onflJctin g obligatio ns
generally
agr eed
The recent (1980)
United
to
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) .
The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly,
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
indicates
especiall y
that
merely
route
by
a
taken
advanced
response
to
capita list
t he
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
USA and its NATO
state
socialism ).
would not have been feasible without compleme nting
And independe nt evidence,
t l1 ere
is then a direct outcome
suc h
as
Soviet-Si no
confronta tion,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
n.:.iti.ons .
There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts
nation-st.' .ltes
and
the
nuclear
f ix .
arrangeme nts are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increa singly
present wo rld polJU.cal structure .
is
widely
promulgat ed
.'.lrrangcm ents :
it .is'
seen
On
the
dil emma
as
one
hand,
with
t he
these
result
through
political
that
the
i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state
n world of sovereign states . • .
which
brought
the
�wo.ld
to
the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ).
nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into
On th e other hand, th e
the
statist
form,
into
arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast.
stutlst
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the
and
security,
to
defend
national
inter est s ,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
advantageous
of
confrontation,
st ate
to
(!),
provid e
but underneath there ore other
sovereign
st a tes
and
frame work
the
rlnd
peace
The
military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and
polit i cally
favoured
of
inequa l ity
it
supports .
The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e
statist
arrangements
a nd
interr e lations
( conomic
ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock
a rr nngcme nl.s
of
s overeign
where
the
pa ttern
world
states And zones of inter e st .
t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one .
side
the
rivalries,
into
conflict i ng
the
present
The argument to th1. s
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer .
The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for
the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd
social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled
and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) .
"We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
appara tus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68
Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements,
by
th ing s
S llCh
as
the
SALT negotiation s ;
shown
there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a
(growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a
rule , partly held in place by deterrence .
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this , there are cases
rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US i s
68 .
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e
not
over.duly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would free ly
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
�diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~
adj~c ~nt
~estcrn
oil
supp li es :
concerning,
were
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf .
th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212).
§8 .
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
results.
in itia l political fall-out from the ethical
Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limJt~tions
on
the
thu s inevitable.
and
more
or
power s of states.
Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re
The limitations may be reache d by agreement
and
negotiation ,
less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly
worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war.
As with other fixes produced by
there
are
suggested
ways
the
structural
ar rangements
of
states,
ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts,
inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure
nnd
power
·elations
extrastate approaches .
of
state s
(and,
in the limit, remove t hem altogether) ,
All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" ,
attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations , etc . , are interstate ;
sovereign
state .
The
s ame
goes
(graduated) unilate ral disarmament .
about the nation- state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
les s
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empi rical
fact ,
is it part icula r ly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s.
as
a
We are certainly
free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s
demise
sacred
it is not a particularl y well justified political form;
it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through
fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers,
lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s
are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by
conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like
these .
Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders
regarded the
institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration
between city-st a t es , not seeing
its
social,
structurally -emergent,
characte r.
�50
approaches take one of
Extrnstr1te
ittlernat ional
of slate s.
r.ol
two
rou tes,
way
~Ile
to
l~,
ge nuine
power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e .
but they are
Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to
world governmen t, is alre ady there in the
international
law-courts.
Wer e
the
courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal
acl ion, that· medie val
principle
theo ri. t s
saw
to
all
disputes,
could
in
be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S
and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T.
given
intrastate
s n fflcienl
least jilitial]y)
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t
upon
war deterrence ,
though
not by military means.
perhaps
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
effective without police and jails or
their
and
equiva l ent
supcr-statist
back-up
eq uivalent
for
of
economic
other
penalties;
and
the
either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite
substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will
typicnlJy
be
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
pa rt i es.
repC'ilt
uninvolved
short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
rt .
Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying
ec:t
t. n
gri.ps
with
the
nuclear
though mostly 1n passing to be
to
problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned,
dismi ss ed 71 ,
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
-·--------- - - - -- -70.
Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is
a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of
the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the
uni on.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By
contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid
and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR ,
UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together;
and the one recent
attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e .
The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns
.illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification
of
Germany
should be resi sted;
instead a more rational regional
deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany
sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border
regio n, and so on.
71 .
Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical , etc.
Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour
wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations.
�5l
thermonuclear war .
By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like
the
new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions,
combined
with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls:
unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s
considered
however
beginning
to
be
cf.
Way
and
is
more
sometimes
The Way Up,
sympatheti cally
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing
inte rna tiona l
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
but lt is making
Galtung).
much
by
Up
mora lly
There is
integrated
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320).
A main argume nt for the Way Up is
just
a
repetition
of
that
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners'
Tragedy
of t he Commons.
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
herdsmen
as
best
solutions
regards
to
problems
as
the
of
organisation,
public order and, more rec ently, as to
So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are
but
nation·-states ,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now
sort
such
It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the
state - a r e r equired to ensure
espe cially,
Dilemma,
of superstnt e.
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
of
thcjr
be
order-imposing
corr espo, dingly weakened.
ar gum ent s
are
role,
and
But all
political
this
is
obligation
to
There a re, then, many problems
through
these
A
further
theoretical
with
h:1.tch
the
is
Way
that
Up,
a
both
"tragedy"
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated
72 .
will
72.
stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
that
states
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
prac t ical.
assume
to
See further loutley and Routley
especially Griffin.
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the
thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state
enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital.
�again .
The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h
no prospect at all of getting
su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose.
Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century
ago ,
In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we
have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before
Wo rld
War
TI.
The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied
soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United
Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has
grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United
Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less
influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui,
pp.2-3 ).
The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line .
future
For
t he
foreseeable
nuclea r
ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s
as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of
opcrnt l vc
world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear
hostlllt i es .
extre~ely
I n some ways, this is just as well.
monol ithic,
woul d
World
gov ernme n t
would
cer t ainly ,
whatever
it s
( g ray?)
politic al
colour,
{~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e
impose
damage
on
to
It
undesira b le
l eve l
Ideological,
r equ1 site
the world an
many
remaining
of
inde e d
u nity
political
and
parad 'gmatic ,
cannot
be
and,
e c o nomi c
sepa r atio n
expect e d
in
some
crucial
respects,
unity.
of
Moreover ,
give n
Northern
main
within nuclea r dea dlines.
swee ping
more
sovereig nty , c o ul d
blockages
and
agr ~ements,
be
negotiated?
dea dl ocks
i1
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
When not even
endless
of
of
that
state
series
of s uch state reconciliation.
a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e
the
of
The s ame
Way
Up
nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged
•
-
through the Unit ed Nations);
73.
it
limitations
almost
the
cultures,
nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is
(e .g .
would
systems. 7 3
The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly
much
be
f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with
all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism.
·1
n .:ltur.:iL
an
7 11
Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
gov e rnment,
see Galtung.
Naturall y the objections to world
gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to
mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf .
Ma zrui ).
Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can
be
genuinely
s yn thesized with the Way Down.
�jJ
There is
arrnrgemant s
regrettably
and
als o
conventions
much
are
e~ tdert ce
frequ ently
concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are
scntJments
signed
does
slide
smoothly
that
not
not
1nce rnational
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable dee d s .
bode
well
ever be rcc1chcd.
ln
<'nnv,•11t f< n
any
great
deal:
openly
violated.
I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one
fon·C!,
of
lofty
It
for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t
wl 1I C'h
tn
nl1
the
following
intEirna t i ona l
i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en,
w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc
includes
a
Even agreements states have
are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or
not
tr ea tie s ,
1
,
t h ton genocide.
Genoc i de
ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with
inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group
as such:
ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to
the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
i.n who l e or i n pa rt.
f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e :
dJrcct
and
public
shall
Beside genoc ide th e
c onspira cy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide o r any of
punl.shed ,
whether
they
are
the
othe r
act s
responsible rul er s, priva te
individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue
nucl~ar
genocide,
inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e ,
complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de.
mentioned
ca lculat ed
that
a
larg er
st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would
almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
conspir acy
repr:esentati .v
'S
does
to
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
pa r ticular
it
of the
and
as
involving
i.ncitement .
nuclea r
s t a tes
acts
ass oci a ted
with
genocide,
in
Some wel.i - known political and military
would
thus
ap pear
to
be
li.able
to
indictment . and punishment und er internation al law .
7L1.
Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms
control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t
suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp.
210- 13).
Reasons
include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n
drlvc f or strategic super ior ity .
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports.
in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden.
76.
The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the
Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff .
Most of the points
text
of
the
�The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the
appare11t
I mpot ence
interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
ne:.rer
to
nuclear
the
" brink"
is
now
taken
to
ind ica te
contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l
tias
gi v en
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions .
The
According
to
can
reorganise
the
radical
namely
n iclear
in
Sc.hell ' s
1
unsatis factoriness
situat .l on
The
should
the foundations of politic c l thought'
pollllcal
t.iicy opvrate •. ,
the
indicates
inst itutions
Fate
lead
political
of
to
req u i red
a
t he
Earth .
' ful l-sca le
to
make
't he
co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which
and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ...
its
political
li fe' (p.219).
However Schell himself tri e s to
avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by
the
of
the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed
stands,
Schell
reexaminatio n o f
world ' c
and
book
a new
a rrangements,
thesis that the nuc l ear problem
national
( f r om
and
work of our age'
else overimpressed
by
political t he oris ts.
the
7
Z
history,
c onstitute
So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or
real ities
of
(unstable)
nation-states ,
do
most
But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al
rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation.
There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too
11nthinklngly)
with
an
an tiquated
s ystem
many
present
state
arrangements,
representative
century
communications
•ery
different
condition;
in
a
77.
when
and
the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state
and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier.
of
( a llegedly
17th
we re
willing ly ,
The feat ures
go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he
especially ,
us
even
of poli t ical a rrangements which t he
nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion .
best
of
even
dem ocratic)
techno log y,
more
were
t he
and
primit i v e
d iscerned,
In the br iefs prese nt ed
A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e
national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l
( sec Co x , p. 225).
Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is
thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival "
bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an
undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1.
�for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz
an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged .
But such systems con tinue to
opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es
und c r mi ne<l.
prese nt
Nuclear
problems
rep r esentative
have
political
emphasized
have
been
several other defici encies in
arrangement s.
In
particular,
they
have
rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles
Euro pe a n
countri es.
cen tury
ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved.
issues,
~
i s sues.
The
least, be reduced.
reduced
excessive
power
back
at
dev e lopme nts ,
pro cedures,
But the route down through
issue-regul ated
large
i mposes
and
complex
other
modern
requirement s.
states
What
lnl t .t1-1.l
s maller
a s iL ls
to
inf or med
citizens
gro uping
than
approx i mate
of
a
g lant
satisfa ctory
good will.
As
the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n
the
l.nf ormation
by
are
stn tes,
government
recent
tec hnologic al
called for a re smaller
Firstly,
in
present
information
and
democratic
progressive
procedure,
of
control,
nation-stat es,
channels, and so f o r.th.
ncc e ptable
the
from
These
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
even
·release
the
and
distributio n
distortion
r estrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Aga in, especi a lly with new and less
systems , there is little excuse for thls.
information ,
upward
depends
But there ar e
e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited
pub} l t:1 y
and
Secondly , democracy, insofar
political
rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on).
flow
major
li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with
lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation.
a nd
on
of governments would, to that ex tent at
grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education.
cx pe n,, ive
lea st
governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e
poss ibl e ev en in
mu ch
elected
wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost
f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer
polic:y
th e
It is past time
for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once
(i n
some
Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g
make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major
19tl1
in
of
data
featu res
in
have
a vailab ility
major communicati on
helped
in
making
present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e
�56
co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's
nuclear
superstates
are
often
seen
to
be
gJlemma
type
situation
th e
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
llardin1.
A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
political
questi oning
current
arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
le~sl), takes the following shape:•
Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain
j,rnt iff.-.d
111
te1·ms
of
dolng
ut
.eas t
where
and
are
so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns
en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those
arrangement s,
requirement s
(as
certainly
in
who
operate
under
the
muc h of the West) the basic
mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met .
•
l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have
these
requirement s.
For
guarnntce the prospect of
arrangement s.
nation-stat es,
good
meaningful
lives
those
to
under
their
yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
meet
at least in the North, can no longer
such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way.
support
to
A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before
its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ;
m.-iny
and
ceased
s tate
to
Furthermore a
acquiesc e
in
or
engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn) .
Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have
should
be
amended .
have
their
justificatio n,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
not all) natlon-stat es:
natio n- s t ate
f orfeited
it ls not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed .
There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control
stght
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of
wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
irn lerlyi.ng politica l
theory.
Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar
contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since
Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68).
�r;7
rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both
c lai m
popular
Ln
and
mandate
ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! ,
power~.
put
a
value
hi3 lier
where,
nlrea y
illustrated
milita ry situa ti ons:
viol.1ted
the
'IH' t:.1k er s
on
some
have
more often , they act without it or
as
The sit1.1at-ton has been reached
sove reignty
nation al
survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210;
is
-✓ hl.'lfe
where
than
'nuc l ear:
they do on human
for copio us evidence see
Kupe r).
Thi s
by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
the
principles
of
just
warfare
repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples.
much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l
have
been
blatantJ.y
Such states have forfeited
respect or internal political obedienc e;
so, on other grounds, have many other state s .
It could just be, of course, as is oft en
a lt er nat ives,
that have
been
re s arc hlng
glimpsed,
though
of world go vernment).
dismissed,
for
s tirc withou
very
no possibly better alterna tives .
but
little
As
to
whether
all
has
such
are
no
been
expended
on
opportunity
do
to
work,
a nd
not
Appea r
to
give
we
alternative s
w~y
Down.
There
working tow ar d s the wea kening
es pec .i.ally
can
be
the
may
and
ha ve
been
given
know very little a bou t how humans
suff icicnt
org anisi ng and trying out alternative
accessi ble
alter natives
instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely
operate under su bstantially different arrangement s.
But,
t ime
arrangemen t s,
to
even
once
again,
proc eed
thos e
nuclear
very far on
of
the
mor e
be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in
breakdown
of
t he
large r
s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem.
ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd
while
t here
But alternat i ves the r e are,
effor t
toking the risk of being dogmati c;
little
d e ad ii ne[,
tha t
t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e
0
op Li. on
or
insinuated ,
nuclear
st a tes,
Thus i t woul d be
s oc i a l
arrangemen t s,
theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly
off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x.
But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of
dll emrna
to
th t:
exclusion of all olh .rs:
quite the contra r y .
t he
nuclear
We can no t only
afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r
seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her )
con st rain ts ;
Indeed, given the urge ncy,
the
direness
of
t he
si tuat i on ,
we
�58
:,hou1d
~s
be
fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such
boRged
rlown
( a nd
v ery
on
a rms
limitations
ner,ot inti o n s
m"thod::i
should
si~nifica nt
be
undemocratic
perservered
concessions
unrepr•sentativ e)
between main nuclear states.
wi.th,
from
cert ai nly
tJ nd
and
the
attemp t s
superstates,
made
to
e.g .
No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even s uch
a
wring
further
jointly
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
new .
The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have
la rg e r
eve r y
liberal
or
huma nitarian
been
on
issue that has matte r ed:
from ou tside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or
nnd
it '
by
furnishing
self ·- organising
characte r is tically Bottom-Up
famiL l ar
cons i de rations
are
methods
an
alternatives
practically
wi t hout
which
never
virtually
upon
bypass
it ,
Top-Down.
Such
but part of the more general , and very effective,
case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
supply,
but
whic h
effectively and [or
can
almost
t hat
invariably
mnttcr
le ss
be
obta i ned, where required, more
e x pensive ly
without
them
(and
their
monopo1 i.es) •
In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions,
impo sed ,
or
acqulc s ced
and nuclear weapons .
frequently
from
time
being ,
movement
have
in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations
The opposition to th e
local
a nd
neighbourhood
esca lating
grou ps,
nuclear
fix
has
come
some of them now feder a ted
:1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate).
!we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1
that
These
groups
have
in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the
some
a ga inst
nuclear-free
nu c le a r
neighbourhoods .
equipment
The
patchwo r k
grass-roo ts
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American
Europe
will
E11 ropc wil l
these
mnke
it
a
saf er
place :
American shores.
nuclear
r emoved
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements
installations
It is
succeed
a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free.
g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced.
Ln
having
The chances of
�mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and
Exc:c•p l
in
the
case
of
Eu ope,
where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication .
8Cr i ou s ly
And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is
failing
partly
g iant
fashioned
military-in dustrial allianc e.
inc r easJ. ngly
dominated
and
largely
domi na t ed
financially
ideo l ogically.
much
propped
exaggerat ed.
no t
nnd
c1d c quatcJJ
and
ec onomically
some
of
and,
in
some mea sure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
countered
as
mil.itary
by
The
means .
i .,"
in
basic
any
mode of
mUitary .
But
mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by
the Sovi e ts is a
problem,
t here
are
several
ways
other
predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it.
on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down
alternative
is
it domina ted economicall y , by the US A.
doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant
in sofa r
a
up by the NATO powers '
i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and
ls
anyon'
Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n
polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA ,
c a1;e
Does
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a
or Brasil say?
Th Rt
other?
social
methods
but
also
some
and
much
r eliance
on
These should include not
state-suppl ied
social
decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of
orga nlsat{ons,
than
me thods,
or
r estructurin g, such as
power
to
dispersed
local
mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
East e rn Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
r es tructuring
internal,
so
is
especiall y
situa tions, is to
st a t e-contrived
79.
break
make
any
military
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of
int e rch1nge,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
s abotage
the
West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove
For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of
some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which
appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need
be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options.
�60
ot.hC'r
motl ves
fo r,
and
Western
popul ar
suppor t
Eu r ope ,
for
f or,
long
j.
much
Uitary
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean
nucl e ar
umbrella
for its defe nce .
Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least,
1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging
t he
world
in
the
i nterests
of
its own security .
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European
impositlon.
There
wo rl<l, wha t
LS N war
is
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing othe r parts of t he
Europe,
rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d.
which
has
long
exporte d
There ar e better. options
than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe.
-·-·- -----
--·- . ·--
80.
Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at
s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups
fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through
devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated
uni ts
it
in tegra t e d.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge
wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance,
sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c.
The net effect (as c.
Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of
militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high.
One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of
Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t
th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62).
Ycl
th
1 9 112 (wa r
r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly
untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence
r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to
military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81 .
In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l
supporting deterrenc e policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would b e
further co rroded.
In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas,
to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s
there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many
f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by
m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gi.( t
pro Jee ts .
If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e
l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e
versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended
to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g.
as part of the
strnteg y of the "cold war".
~
�6J
What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press
b,oa rl out1 i.nc;
fof
::tccordingly
i.ic>
perceptive
t r ansarmamen t,
to
i.e.
conversion
outer
edges
of
graduat e d
the
movements,
alternative social defence arrangements).
Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go,
t hrough
in
i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction
an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more
wa y
clear
namely
all
the
disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's
s ur t~cc ,
inc luding
especially
Europe.
For
once
the
state is demoted , its
i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance
on
dec i s i on- making
its
diminished
de ci s ion-making - once all that is
happe n ) ,
one
in
duly
favour
of
allowed
more localised cont r ol and
for
(it
does
not
need
to
major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem
o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty .
Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty
has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken
we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
important
and
wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
stn r- c .
The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
s uch
as
mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation .
On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments
fr om
nat iona l
conce rni ng
part i cul a r.
dangers
.lndividual
also
and
grou p
rights
and
In
their
freedoms,
by
t he
that
nation- s tate .
matter
The
are
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
t hem,
as
sma ller
or
exclusivel y
nation-state is neith r sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not?
ri sks
are
civil
necessarily
th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties
nec e ss ary
pl ace
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None o f ti e rights and freedoms
g ua r a n te ed
disintegrate.
in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln:
To
be
sure,
th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not
---~------ ----82.
The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than
a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s.
The ste ps to disarmament ;ire
well-known , e.g.
the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o
modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as
Euro pe, et c .
�62
hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of
moslly
to
wont
be
sure
t hat
nucle
or
arc
othe r
outsiders.
People
t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course,
i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be
Russ nns
natlon- states.
t
controlle d
by
Amiirican s
or
Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives
not a rational rout e to these ends .
In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way
dilemmas
the
as
nuclear
out
of
such
deo ntic
fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much
more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of
things
those
the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare
and a ut onomy;
wc,1pons.
but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by
The
main reasons are fam il iar :
threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values,
such
the
removal
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstanc es
as
welfare
and
autonomy,
for
many
cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in
a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another
with
nuclear
weapons ).
ideological
party
the
o pportunity
armed
There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons;
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
remain
welfare
for
(because
costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e
accompanyin g sec urity measures).
Thus
the
appropriate ly
de vi ces
and
nuclea r
fix
limiting
weapo ns
is
resolv ed ,
theoretical ly
it
can
deploy,
and
how ),
and
rate,
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be
s ince
any
sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear
con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty .
pra ctice ,
at
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e
au s pices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
aga i nsl the state .
Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since
sovereignt y
reduction
in
ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons .
83.
the
Ind eed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s.
Until
human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for
on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
�agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) .
to
far
with
the
superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further:
for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation.
i.nto
both
milita ry
s yst ems - and
( c ivil)
Rather
it
is
industrial production of the states
So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being
concerned.
ti ed
solidly
resisted by super states.
Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s
and
espec i ally
against
the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t
serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r.
variety
of
organ is ed
forms.
These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear
war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or
wld •l y,
from
such
s t e ps
ns
Once again it will take a
The
indir ect l y.
the
forms
of
action
range
block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the
rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s,
t he
to
withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes.
They inc l ud e as we ll the whole
r a ng e
nuclea r
facilities
i nstal l a tions
and
of
nonviolent
(methods
protest
which
method s
against
do
exclude
not
i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new
model
.
8'~
resistance and de f e nce organisations).
It is important to realise that petitioning of
powe r
state
representat i ves
and
ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored,
th e r esul t s disco u r aging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a mor e com prehensive politi c al
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in
alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially
alternative
defence
forms.
85
Sufficient
d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp.
85.
For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g.
fu rt her Appe ndix 2.
Martin .
As to what to do, see
�64
APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE
or
MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Sch e ll, and to Anders.
A
ncrtes
of
nucl cn r
prophet s
lw a
pr odu c ed
a
EJ e r:les
of
ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of
l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the
nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith
the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary.
The most
wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th.
This skillful
piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep
phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is
not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for
a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect
j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
f or
i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e
defects .
Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage:
to selec t one example ,
consider
the
claim
that
' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e
[ human] spec i.es
nothing else t hat we undertake together can make
any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense
(p.1 73, rearranged ).
Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate
moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally
ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when
compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s
el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds.
Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor
spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r
presently
a rrang ed
nuclear
ho l oca usts .
l.
The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e
l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d
there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally
we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire
to
the
be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination,
A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being
r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s
a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t
t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity .
But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on
i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or
group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such:
a
l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted
w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it ,
While the
sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e)
w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a
poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s
rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all
f al l Rcy.
J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all
po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to
al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all:
t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1.
�was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes,
two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers:
Sl.
Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on
arth (the
2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and
S2.
111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only
those of morality
a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon).
It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its
apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications
of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he
humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Th ·-- exDmp l e
Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real
po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does
t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl
appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of
con tracting the world to North Arner.lea .
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y
out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schel l's,
by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4
Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e
mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for
unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would
however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
o( S2 , se Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s
and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er
are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box .
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pando ra's box.
Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more
effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e
immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind
pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing
t'r""l .
�66
th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense.
But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest
wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the
de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means
ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of
c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e .
Ther e are man y examples of
technological advances that have not been t ak en
adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have
be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special
a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns .
Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about
nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if
thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons
i t would not tell
aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and
the
limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work ,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the
" J.abnrn t.ories".
Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we
hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r
weapons in concer t, e . g .
for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or
firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war,
and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested
and lypothelical in chara ct er.
The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to
Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially.
This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2
being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply
penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended
by
Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to
be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl
Such ar e
all eged imp lications of ex tinction ;
but the fact is that the truths of
arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of
gods or g iraffes .
In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly
powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form.
Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and
tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving
pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not
e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording
to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an
impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In
imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the
strea m of huma n t.ime,
The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for
huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies
that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and
futur e
(p . 14 0) 6 •
Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s
time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass'
(p. lli3) .
But it: is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tens e s depend
on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but
no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other
time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o
other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons).
And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h
at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to
exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor
there were any human
beings.
- •••-- - - H•--- -
--- - - - - -
S.
Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry
ha s a wea pon it will u se it.
6.
Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future
repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73.
(etc.)
is
�Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer
even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for
wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been,
if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e
would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n
mm1y
other org anisms would be differe n t.
Temporal themes do not la c k
' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion.
be
Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g
metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism
and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in
talki ng ab out what does not exist).
Thus, for example, Schell takes over
dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to
i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y
in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims.
The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main
tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory:
the simple and basic fact [si c!]
th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng
there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) .
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenche d
philo sophical
dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d
elsewhere 7.
Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans:
trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n
emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and
may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles ,
songs ,
Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to
p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss ,
and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of
the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not
worthwhi. le. 8
Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both.
'The death of
mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining
lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166)
a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a
per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even
if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d,
becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of
prec edi ng lif e and on the
very
questiona ble
represent ation
of
this
mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e .
From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an
absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that
' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly
'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+;
S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally
i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental
Ph i l oso n~
(ed i ted D.
Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social
Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980.
8.
Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of
the
argument
from
�68
rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e .
1 011
Nor are all pe opl e
C<JuaJJy locked
in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d,
th e
po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR.
Nor,
---
1
i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme,
(in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go
theme, ,iccord ing to which
-S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really)
distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9
B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is
compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows:
'
t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with
nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding.
At
least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated
e l sewhere :
we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons
of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of
t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) .
But this is more of an
argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and
unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention
those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely
ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points:
we are
pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of
all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152).
And
again '[ as] perpe trators
we co nvey t he steady message
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless; that
it had bee n judg ed acceptable
fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign
against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as
is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply
dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e
less .
Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by
representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among
wi ll c :1
Schell
--- ·------·---- - - -
9.
An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is
responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on
of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r
re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng,
whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch
bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry,
a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election
especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l
o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al
processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of
political control .
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows:
'The
self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne
or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it
to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en
for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in
the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning .
Fur ther
't he world
chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194):
the world'?
This
connec ts
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fuodamental s, e .g.
for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against
soc inli.sm.
In the'
.nurse of
th:fA
argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s
assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the
end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) .
�mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only
represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which
offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter
may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility,
st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated
th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation
generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s,
part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc.
(the whole ea r th
theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed,
unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scatter ed and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the
conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternative s.
At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Wa y Up.
So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar
simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns
( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the
r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it
is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to
military-indus trial organisation and ways of life .
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd ,
more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of
nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies .
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e
a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial
feature
Ls
the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear]
supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed
science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al
inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he
h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base,
the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state,
and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns
anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
ma le- female
re l ations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything
11.
Sec p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin.
The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er
analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164.
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph .
j
�nee ds to be accompl ished at once;
and
the clus~~ - of damaging power and
do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of sta tes.
[n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats
th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st
between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics.
The teaching that
'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times,
ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134).
So 'stat es
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l
then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by
destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions .
Even if
all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is
13.
These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated
packag e,
compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
('TI C" rgy, sp ecr,
sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the
newer
Enlightenme nt (but
Faustian ) vlr tues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one
main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the
type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues .
Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the
Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel
maximls ation
of knowledge
paradoxes of omniscience .
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also
l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
t heo rems).
IL, .
R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also
drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral
science.
There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al
dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single,
source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out
of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and
those
who
control
them, for they are simply caught up by this
out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a
machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like
other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false .
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical
dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and
promoted , while other alternative s were not.
Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And
murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitran t
technologie s.
They also admit of being made t o look
r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if
it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation.
�7l
claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the
r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context,
t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its
n uc l ear pol i cies . 15
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational.
As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war,
Schell leave s
us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the
right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187).
Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via
jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having
s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t
war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s
t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the
like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the
mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include
sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred.
It is on this basis th a t peace
ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as
•xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185).
Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to
undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means
arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately
th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous
c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
( p .189 ):
but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is
ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from
ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends
( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
a r e wo n).
It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being
defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no
o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just
wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand
improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional
war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme
t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between
na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme
d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
tha t coul d s e rv e , and
there is also th e possibility of more cooperative
behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n
assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit
as if war and violence were
thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for
winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are
pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of
understandl ngs , conventions and rules .
The y are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if no t a logic .
Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what
i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic]
plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd,
15.
Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context.
- j
�72
rcnGonab.le, rational.
However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap
semn nti.cal trJ.ck .
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or
nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion
(as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning;
but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in,
extraloglca lly.
There are various ways these va lue assignments may
be
determined, to meet moral requirement s or not;
but in nuclear s tr ~tegic
planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In
fact,
'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general
commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he
policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying
with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he
emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng
11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i
viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat
of
thi s
unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd
locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends
on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the
Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l
be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t .
16.
Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own
ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of
deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions .
17.
Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g .
it
wishful]y
thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix
radioactiv ~ ashes .
has be en
f rom th e
The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing
mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e
one, but a n ideological one:
eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture
dominance of the riva i deo l ogy .
18.
An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n
appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"'negate" incoming USSR missiles .
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction;
although
involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of
intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention
to proceed.
Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an
intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed
how satisfactor ily in another matter
by a dis ti nction between
longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing
�.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility
and on Regional ~~rategie ~
What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one
hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be .
So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In
presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt•
pol te l. cs .
The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl
r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states,
a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to
work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still
l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people
many for
th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of
othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s,
r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of
ce r tain soci al a r r angements .
Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t.
They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn
doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's
being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they
like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat
arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l
argument take s t he following lin es:
1.
The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a
d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore
2.
Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a
differenc e . Hence
3.
Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when
thint s go wr ong.
There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be
resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can "
t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e .
While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together
th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many
other i. nd lvidua ls do.
In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful
f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in
ma nner
M (e.g.
morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at
con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly.
Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al
s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in
ways t hat do make a differenc e.
An i ndividual is not exonerate d from
r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument .
While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are
di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of
more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical
di s obedi enc e.
An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in
Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards
defenc e
or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g.
nuc lear weapons productio n and
de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace
fun ds,
Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political
act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since
th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As
we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or
puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities.
1.
Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e
se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt
g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood.
- II
�.,I<,'
Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under
Ro1ne
sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate
tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s,
etc., and o
such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the
state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e
Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing
cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individua l need bear.)
One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
wea pon s to, fo
example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e
wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the
we~pons for such war.
The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like
those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the
manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But
j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence
productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through
d e fence taxes .
The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the
a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be :
Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns?
Or with making
c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like?
What follows applies primarily to
people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people .
Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot
insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions ,
perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take
act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the
national defenc e effort?
It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no
dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be
re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ;
for in this case moral
obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are
alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does
not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the
respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further
moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts.
\n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear
war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s
working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n
this:
to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional
defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good
thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for
different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper
rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of
s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give
t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in
remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing
ower from ind ividuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little
more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to
contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly
mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is
Seattle
in
�"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more
that ch:ing,.. tha t .
H
T
~~ s
intact,
and
deeper
(ecological )
sch emes
Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a
su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking
for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper
se t of cha nge s in the superstates .
For those whose very limited political
i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow
goa ]
ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er
c ontr ol .
The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e
diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln
much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers).
There
i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local
a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps
towards
s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance,
wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with
the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases
and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to
por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear
ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite
s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ).
That much is easy, in
pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e
Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is
preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been
a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint
Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is
e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of
d e t erre nc e ' • 6
More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that
economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e
Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone
not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of
1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included
Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al
readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e
5.
Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1.
How slight
t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA .
Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor
one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated:
from a
Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe
( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important.
A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy
will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series .
and
alternative s,
�76
whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even
dh,r ,, r t i ng
"d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence
gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat
in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and
c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive.
I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers 8 ,
a nd
s hould be preparing now, socia lly and
e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war.
Howev er
ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and
inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s
favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield
poli t i c al powe r .
But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed
r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj
so
why bot he r".
One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of
Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic .
A
mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political
re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o
bcf;1l l
th e m.
These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to
o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them.
It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e :
rather i t is that i t seems
unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes
~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear.
war.
Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in
6.
Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on
conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The
point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture ,
as
Hawke~ notes.
The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as
also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms
c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war
fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role
can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is
not in any do u bt:
'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the
vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e
Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e;
quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17).
Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities
put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk.
' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s
Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate
int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A
prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f .
Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since
Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic
consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the
ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put
Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk
.for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s .
A
worthwhile
re presenta tive
government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s
tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain
t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t
wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term
co mme r c ial considerati ons.
7.
As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of
a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment.
8.
Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as
the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively
insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e.
�77
achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t.
-yen those who believe
tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life)
do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessmen t: . 9
Richard Routle y*
9.
Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g.
Mart in .
There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for
example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so
dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical
scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts .
*
The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C.
Pigden , R.
Good in, N.
Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
cor r espondenc e with G.
Fo ley.
J.
Norma n has helped in its final
organisat ion.
The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in
Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y
in 1982 .
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1968.
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 .
T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980.
R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers
in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra,
1982.
R.
Routley and V. Routley , 'The
Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8.
irrefutab ility
of
ana rchism' ,
Social
�80
R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions'
in
Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984.
R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House,
York, 1982.
New
J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker,
February
48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This
P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth
t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book.
1,
8,
and
15,
1982,
pp.47-11 3,
T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 .
G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971.
D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983.
F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy
Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 .
T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An
19 72.
American
Tr agedy,
Times
(ed.
Books,
F.T.
London,
E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York,
198 1.
Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and
Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981.
probabi lity,
Austral ian
R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960.
M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview ,
Colorado . 1979.
Boulder ,
t
M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977.
R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970.
B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New
1982).
Society
S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982.
( Nov .
18,
�
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l 89 - .r
1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N.
Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from
;-1
SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German,
British or Fre nch) viewpoint.
This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial
section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean
s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect
the morality
o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt.
eitlH_•t
t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e
als o
a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with
what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans,
or for the American
sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and
t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the
r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It
c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no
moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear
ar r angemen ts involve.
Mtwh o f
U~A,
CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n
structure of the argument
Pag e No
§O.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral
l.
i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the
f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter.
§1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the
2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war.
War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt
featur es o f nucle ar wars.
2
0
§2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations
-~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war.
The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted.
Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus:
s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated.
Li mits of st ate e n titlement.
§3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars.
One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is
pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of
the ke y argumen t elabo r ated.
§L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important
a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ .
Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality ,
p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles.
§ 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~·
De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata:
p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence
not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of
nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the
pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through
<l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the
c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of
1.
5
11
1 !•
17
Page No
!,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es;
separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle:
the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of
this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion
and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism .
AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence .
piu,.,f
Till·lll H.
56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national
daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of
nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas .
The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and
f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate
iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much
less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of
tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode].
§7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their
_supporl e rs.
Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs
37
43
fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the
nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts.
§8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e
ethical res 1lts.
Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate
and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate
approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it.
FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and
geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention.
Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r
1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative
po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons.
49
The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l
mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of
ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to
loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On
Scl1;!1l
t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to
and Anders.
Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption .
Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death
dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e.
H
64
.1,t . . ..
Page No
~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y
a nd on regional strat egies.
Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments
t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration .
Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear
dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons.
Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and
deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution
afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes:
what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation
in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social
and po litical adjus tment.
iii
73
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!)
NtlCLEAR
DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated,
~ Ll
o r n~ arly
HO
th11 n e of even t he larges
d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war.
invo l ve,
and
threatened
sa id
to
so
differ
co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a
CertFdnly ma s sive
PX
hAnges
Gt1ch
as
nuc.le:ir
wars
exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e
neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of
Muc h
at
forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at
bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often
f r om
eit her
just
wars.
new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther
wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will
se rv e
as
initial
ethical
ba se.
Al though nuclear wars are, thus
non ex i s tent
(extrapolat e
va r ie tiea,
objects,
1
nuclear
wa rs
from n very limited
Ia
fnr, only a decidedly
menac1.ng
class
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nu .lear
experlence 2 )
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical
or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
- - - ------- ---- -1,
The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forc e fully:
'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral
issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could
ima g ine:
we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs
significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures
and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y,
peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h
it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there
implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to
give it , e .g.
sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence,
pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds,
ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality.
111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 •
explosio n
A large-sca le nuclear
involv es
war
of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region;
a [unction of two main parameter s:
distr i bution.
Such
strnt.egic ) nuclear
quant l t leo
of
a
war
war
quantity
diffe rs
which
explosivc n,
ts
markedly
limited,
nnd
(megatonn age
wh ere
from
by
the
a
of
t:,Hget.s
it i s
ex plosive)
limited
assumptio n,
the
to
and
(tactical
much
or
smaller
chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y
arc
cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in
a
given
reg ion.
Though
t he
focus
in
what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir
prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no
nucl.car
arsenal
means
a
separate
st r ike 1
s ince
a
is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1
waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns
second
iss ue ,
et c. ).
4
Because
of
these
of
follow -up
or
connecti ons, much of the ca se made
acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent .
How nuclear wars
reHultlng
d-Lffer
from
oth er
war s:
wars and states and th e
-- ---------- - -- - --
llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war.
of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c
two
party
(or
thinking,
A model
is
th e
severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or
trib e bat tle ~.
A picture of
war
thu s
refle c tion
r e quirement s
for
legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical
on
advances have
trad iti ona l
now
theo ry
ender ed
of
war,
emerg ed,
inapprop riate
ha rdly
and
especiall y
sometimes
surprisin gly,
as
a
result
inapplica ble.
of
The
made no allowance for such
J.
Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially
the type of strike :lnvolved.
Though the sequence is j_mportant for the
mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the
immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge.
4.
'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no
limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars:
t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e
undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven
a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and
present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed
purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European
"theatre'' , is really a myth.
5.
There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of
prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal
wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given,
etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a
mu h deeper wa y,
j
phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s
Tokyo.
rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th
And
j t.'
many
occurred
wi.th
Dre s d e n
and
further crucial effects be yond mass
bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions .
Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument
1Jnchors,
Lo
historica l
were
accounted
unjust
war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control:
the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n
ar1ncd
'war'
of
content io n
or
comba t;
cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience .
but
other
are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8
proLagon ists, antag onists or players;
means
and
or
wrong.
to elabo rate
by
means
of
forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es
in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ;
noun
linkages
G
to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter),
and
of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions
Firstly ,
r e tain
always
a
f nction
of
sens es
of
the
States are the
forces c omprising armed soldiers are
the
a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent
Thus wars ar _ external or internal
states or their rule.
(c.ivi.l),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have
transform ~d,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged
with
nuclear states.
lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states :
6.
An obvious
:i.n short, wars
ar e
There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term
1
war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d
in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt
( OED) o n wa r,
7.
But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between
clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more
me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s
the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of
nation--s tates.
8.
Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and
unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone
.t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l
sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e.
James
proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a
wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12).
What it boiled down to,
howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil,
especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l
sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through
wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc .
.:1n uut
,~01•1p
of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture,
and are
nltcr i ng
by
the
s tructu r e.
Wars
j _Lu a t
from
c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of
(other wi se
defect ive)
politi ca l organ isatio n of states ;
they are a
ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation .
helps
wa r
arise
War
Thls seman t.ically based pictur e
of
exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and
deterr ence
d t: vo lves into an
war-m akers ,
argume nt
agains t
aga.in st
states .
In
the
fact
( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d)
on
the
war-d eclare rs
and
tradit ional theory , wars wer e
r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as
t heir
r emoved
t1 e
right
of
r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es;
states
or
the argume nt
was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the
c our ts 9, while states
did
not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of
th e law courts ).
But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim
at e
place
of
wars;
ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a
l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for
examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc.
Let. us
a
h OW\ ) V1_. r
to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on
-
basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s
tates or sets (axes)
of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars.
·ompr litive
game s,
could
be
won.
attent uated form for some "victo rs")
Lhc World vfars.
strate gy.
surrou nding
trad i tional ly
firstl y
for
mass ive
armed
wa rs,
Like
exchan ges
such
as
th •re may well be no winnin g
in
ar e as
the
of
No r thern
very
hemisp here
countr yside.
Thus,
and
the
second ly,
for
laying
the
was te
_£Dint
of
of
substa ntially
substa ntiall y
oblite rated 10 ,
(cxe rcl sed
and
most
as
nothin g
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play" .
are
huge
war
seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d:
a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that
prepar ed
that:
That assum ption still held good ~hough in
Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settle d with main protag onists
player s
It war; assume d
An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n
metro polita n
agglom e ra tio ns
9.
to
main
Hence
elabor ately
f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ;
Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p
. 776, top).
The
argume nt
presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva
te
dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way,
it looks as if it could be readil y
t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern
ment, or at least
effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a
t that time to be
one state!
5
hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e.
.:uid
ot her
Lhf'
e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pu re de t e rr e nc e .
to
mil i tary
Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff,
Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in
tar gets
r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ;
and
military
e xchanges.
principle 11
This feature iG fundnnent al as
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality.
ways
to
The special effects of
nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
canno t
w3rs
be
legitimat e ly
confined.
l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s
uz0ne
<lestr uc ti on,
s hockwav es,
suc h
effe cts
gign nt l c fum i gat i on s
§2.
a nd
th e
e nti re l y
rapid
••.
speed
special effects (presente d in
Schell)
include
radioacti vity,
pu lses, fireball or firestorm
e tc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e
mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s.
The mora l s ituation:
be c ome
as
el ec troma gnet1 c
<lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s,
com pounded
Th e se
the
r ecent
tend e ncy
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
considera tions
to
It is particula rly important
i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient
distinctio n
mo r a lity
or local or nat :l. onal
and ~ ..e5:..diency.
What is done in war, especiall y
between
advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the
l ') .
There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or
extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e
no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves "
suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical
ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on.
Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of
pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective
me d ical int e rvention
(PL, p.313).
Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf
the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons
de veloped in the tex~.
Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are
resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and
t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other
things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" .
11.
In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed
wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc.
l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH'
Much
t.h at
oug h t
war ,
of
or
othenlis e 12,
not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or
anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like .
we
liv e
not
go
in
a rat her bar barous age :
unremarke d,
if
the
th e horrors of the twentieth century will
history
Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd
ge t s
writt e n
as
wi pi ng
moves :
based
on
"stra t e gy"
disad van t ages ,
of
mor a lly
excluded
actions,
·a J.culaU o ns.
charncterist i ca---1J:x
its
is.
that
rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in
o t
con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr
d0.Lcrmi nes
(accurately)
str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o
induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e
such
Hllitarily
its
e xp<'di e n cy .
by
gains
own
i.t _o u~ !:_, morally,
cons i d e r i n g
and
Eac h
side
only
lo s 8e s a s
a
in a military encounter
own
its
advantages
and
r e sult. of alterna tJve possible
to consider those of the other side( s) as
well.
In
t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality .
I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted
wa y,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of
eLc.) .
Such
t he
class lcal
through
"bald
an
inc r emental
a
distinct
nrgumen t
tc.tt1s .
g
a r gument
from
an
t ha t
th e
It
would
And
(bu t
The
externally
wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e .
ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed.
the
of
li mit)
escalation
man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit.
assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as
enforced
force,
Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated.
Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue,
reall y
this
Thus t oo
follow
from
i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n
nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the
s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable .
c onfusion
Nuclear
12.
For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the
c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness.
These
t li cn1<•s
run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n
th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r.
13.
As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a
hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e
prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument
Jike
the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s
a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
Th e
fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or
more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1..
i'
war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n .
for
the
l
anc,
r or
players
Still the !irgument
is
inc onclu s ive;
can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate,
examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4
A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by
of
mo ·al i t y:
lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to
take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y
c<;p,~, f,11 ly
t lw
1
constraint s
from the ot her s'ido.
11w~Liou not onl y
as
to
ma y
well
enc ount e r,
So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps
it
wlw t
o u g ht
to
do
in
mor a lly
permi ss ibl e
si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in
the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf.
But the last question do e s
not,
in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y .
There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having
0:x.pe<.lienc y,
even
under
extreme
to
give
way
to
circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war
involves .
Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of
give
to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often
way
morality
eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations.
t hcorc~ical
fac t
is
that
both
deliver
f r om
us
But the
the
vnlue
the o q'.: .
to
Expedlency
fact,
but
urg('s ,
tba t
does
foreign
takes
local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e
conside rat i on s .
proper charact risa t i on , a
remote
By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its
much
univ• r sa lizable
mor e
univ e rsal
pr inciples .
rePultan t
i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y
fairness,
eq u ita billty and
of
value
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principl e s,
jus t ice.
distributio n
c ertain
requ i rements
of
general
Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable
value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly
Ttie
no t
It assumes, or
what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of
or
to
cruci al
simply
narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable .
even
bound
moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same,
eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue
miraculousl y
are
placed
1 :.,
.
Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic
Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e
of
·va l untioi1~:;
pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under
14.
11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1
i nt e rr e pla cement,
from
the
same
As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely
I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war.
B
.
expr d 1e1cy
assessm ents 16 •
ic
c~ n
For expedie ncy loes not elude
deontic
presen tation:
be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right",
or ft lvcn tight formal
rest•mb le
charac terisat ion .
The
charac terisat ion
will
normal ly
that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to,
or
arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds.
Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity
~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi
ned.
util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as
cnn
Thus
onside ring only expedie ncy;
intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ;
meet
do
it
Lt does not, unlike the
me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the
individ ual
uti.lity
of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say.
There
are
dc•ont.o .logis ts
r egardin g war
mora ll y
howeve r
signlfic a11t
e.speci ally,
17
•
which
differe nces,
between
utilita rians
serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re
In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have
permis sible,
or
to
seemed
to
effect
some
to
rend er
justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards
~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not
permit.
already
and
partisa nship ,
since
utilita rians
But
this
is
would
reject the
descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly';
wherea s an
a im
in
what
follows
is
to
avoid
meta-e thical
me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not
there
is
a
neutra lity.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which
ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn.
S('Vcr al
moral
partisa nship,
VJ.rtua ily all positio n s
grc•
that
the
obltter ation
of
major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous.
If
tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists
who seem to
feel
no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for
some Rus si a n
ones, s imply increas e the costs
involve d,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
l.5.
The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ",
nationa lism
and
pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which
exces siv e
applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi
ng a
person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards
treatme nt.
The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require
ment of
morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require
ment
to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte
nds to
strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry).
Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72.
16.
The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail
especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic .
17.
Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and
Hare
the other, i.n Collen et al.
by
Pl ato ;
see
on
:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs
Tile
ncounlere d;
_!: hen try to work down
again.
fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally
oul of perspecti ve, morally.
abandon
or
Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has
tended
to
suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also
do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does
not
m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that
to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be
Cons id er
t he
w11rld ,·inpl r1•.
be
so thern
risi.ng
(hemisphe re)
no
one's
advant3ge .
strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of
Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try
nil lear
to
exchange
in
the
North,
There
would
southern
to
be
waters
encourage
a
hardly
an
of US
all - out
point then in securing
institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much
espe . ially
given
the
apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts.
tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e:
lhc present point :1.
has
and
tts
power,
limitatio ns,
is
an
thnt ( t he fnct of) moral
inadequat e
But
conse nsus
const r aint without accompany ing
struct ural adjus tments.
For , typJrnlly ,
<lifferc11 tly
to
nationa l
impose
interest
ls
taken
hosta ges
or
override
morality,
e ven
holding
civilian
populatio ns
kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ).
unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian
such
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitut ion
of
jus tificatio n;
fails
in
The
first,
expedienc y
,
.
C.!.BSSC,S
And,
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overridin g
for
morality ,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of
:important
or
irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary
cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
mo r al
interests ,
of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the
case of LSN war.
18 .
As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts
in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her
than based on national interests .
Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis ,
Ii:!.
It
nol
be
pretended
expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y ,
that
tha t
of
it
i.s
"group
but
n montl basi, as distJnct from one of
ego1 sm " ).
There
no
1s
special
moral
d.ispensa ll on
fo r governments.
j ndiv iduals :
ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or
analys is of obligation.
Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for
For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed
semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds;
no
di ff e r e nce
organisation.
extenuating
killers:
whether
X
is
an · individual
States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion
reaso ns
aside,
be having
just
as
beeu
conce ded , special moral dispensations;
more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism.
cannot
immorally
makes
system, grou p or
of
Lebano n)
are,
as brigands or mass
there is no moral difference.
Certainly t here are gro unds on which states
or
individual
or
and it
f11rnish
two
(incompatibl e)
their a gents
01:
have
claimed ,
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities ,
a
s atis factory
state
moral
theory
or public one and a
private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual
morality
becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3
ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate
mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled
Y are permuted .
special
01 1t
cover
(e.g.
to
considerati.ons
citizen
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or pe rson can be
der iv ati ve
damage
For
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are der ivative
prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency .
particular,
a
sta te is not
1 morally)
survivrd .
In
entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even
ow n
( at
for
its
Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge.
19 .
There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or
see Routley a nd Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
Lines:
11
!-: ' )
'j.J.
The i_ni t i<d argument
p:1cifli;m
yield
arguments
to
the
tmmora1 lt.1_
of _ LSN
wars.
to
tb e
1mmora1it.y
of war.
But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire
controversi a l in an area where th ere is no
go od
r·ason
to
Argumen ts
be
for
controve rsial.
Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of
LSN
wars follows .
All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime.
nil
wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
ways of settling po litlcal issues between states .
wa r s
who
Not
are
Among more or l es s admissible
th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors
volu11l'cer
:w
Ho ldlers
nnd
whos<'
actfon
does
no t
6pi.ll
ov er
on to
noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants
were kjl.led in war.
conscrip tlon,
Since the esta bl i shme nt
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms;
induction
prac tices
as
near-d es titute, wars hav e
modern massive war s are
far
removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian
por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ).
imrnornl,
Most
s orts
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such
a n exte nt as LS N war s .
The first argument to th e
immorality
of
LSN
wars
and
of
sufficientl y
larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong.
P2.
LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts.
P3.
Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong .
( KA)
LSN wnrs ar• wrong.
The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set
of
Lhis
type.
the
(KA )
t·cpL1ccs
But the
qu1. te
'kl.11:!.ng
su ff i c l en tly
11v :i.l.
crcH tu res' .
Thu s
t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a
cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or
i. nvolvecl
f ocus
can
destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans
fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a
on
arguments
Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen.
vadu tlo n
of
not
ll
fir s t
uitable
directly
Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding
th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) .
The argumenL Js valid,
,1L t a .kcd)
on
the
basi :3
but
of
may
each
be
attacked
( and
of its p1·emisses.
has
in
ef fe ct
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves
11
what
is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are,
in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport
o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said
robbed;
but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong,
to
"involve."
providing
For
which
instance,
that person ' s
assistance
belng
is also wrong.
But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter
accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20
As aga inst P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
mi lit ary
nuclear
targets.
wars
can
be
encounters
But given the character of
nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets.
net
merely
the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all
the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings.
fnlloul
There i s
down-wlnd
from
military
pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of
uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl
tnrgcts
US
and
For example, t he radioactive
will affect large conc entratio ns o(
European
t argets ,
and
may
affe ct
as Conn <l o.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
cffcrl ) 2 1.
t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side
If missiles wer e c haracte ristically
r.eliAbly
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc
diagn osed.
21.
According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are
rcs ponsJblc
only
for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our
freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even U
these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
conseq uences .
Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is
pernicious ,
a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions .
whicl1 was
intend ed
unfort unatel y
only
went
off
to
destro y
an
unma1H1<HI
und e r g round
Such claims shou ld be reject ed :
ci ty.
dou bl e
effect
Noneth e l ess
the
circum sta nc es
differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo
ns lbl f'
,1
for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce
the
the
thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e
~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on.
innkc
silo
course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d
th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under
could
missil e
j
t was not as if t he y had
del iberat ely
aimed
at
The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of]
respo nsibil ity
Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of
the act.
~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of
argued
tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation .
the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' .
killin g
and
P2,
it
The equivo cation is induc ed by
be
conc eded
that
de libera te
milJta ry ,
e . g.
farmer s
or
goods
or
servic es
bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs .
used
exclud ed
as
innoce nt .
The
s econd
d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2.
other.
for
re a sons,
it
by
proper ly
point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s
Bec a use P2 s o amende d is
less
defen sible,
is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'.
What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status
of what is
mixtur e
of
tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs.
requir e
the
qualif icatio n
'delib e rate'
or
done,
So 'delib erate'
gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so
does Pl.
not
t he
Second ly, it will be
conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin
g of t hos e
a
It
no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi
litary ef f ort,
whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of
not
be
charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin
guish able,
by
and
ma y
of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will
be made .
will b
are
While it will
Pl
For Pl
do es
'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22
Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none
the worse for that, and
Lhere
is
no
seriou s
p·o blem
in
markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s,
people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and
J.s,
mnrco v'r,
no
need
to
adopt
action
chains .
There
the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of
statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic
22.
Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ).
The sugge stion depend s
upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent
ion, and wrong ness
with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri
ne.
,1
rlns:;
":'i
,c mnk.t~
t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try
t:(,
endenvourlng
c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then
i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants.
there
Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met,
.tr,~
for
;ir311mcnts
the
prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl
and
Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t
tend
will
For examp le, one argument for
v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory.
Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one,
(to
poi.nt)
,
re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns
mi n f nn l
from
-~_gume nts
§4 .
the
understate
sc,rio usly
doing
so
23
histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts
on
wars,
just
ur
dreamed
by
conlemporary
"free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and
opponents
communis t
im portant
the
The conclusion t hat LS,'
wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified -
1e
that
fail s to treat them with the
.0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments .
r.;omet. lti
to
of
is
Americ a
inspired,
me r ely
not
or
et c),
th e
of
same
The
conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al
t:irnt•s ,
(or jusL
wars.
first
One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the
;>1
:irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it
to
no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killc.:<l (cf.
be
Barnes , p .77.5) .
A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be
fought
by
morally
which
impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate
killing of noncombatants .
The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e
legitimate
of
means ,
discrimination
(betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
/. ~:,
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
')
(
I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' .
7.3.
Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military
in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One
;.rngLP
favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line
between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there
in
are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g.
c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of
See a l so PL , p.312, where a
their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r.
uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed .
2 1~.
Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common
lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally
usage. of
- - - -··---·--
Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f
being that of net evil to net good:
pro ro rLi on
cor; tr-:
up
proporclonality,
'the damage to be infljcted and
lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed
the damage and costs ,
req 1irement:
disproportio nate
to
goods
moral
pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R
er i t1! rlon
of
the
which
doctrine
through war .
"improvement"
ln
achieved
of
confined,
nationally
no t
ar
that
way.
ov e r a ll
co n sequences
of
abstaining
i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts":
c ondi. tion s
"nmel.ioratlve "
wn y
the
'a nation wages war
justly
than
Similarly
on l y
if
the
for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent
s:1tisfy
for
bad,
from war ' (Barnes, p.72) .
LSN wars can
in
these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch
Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also
wa rLl ,
nnd
war
According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r
c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
are
Entangl ed with the
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less
th e
taking
by
p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this
(PL,
arms'
the
e :a mple
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r
t!il'
v0 ry
d lf !<r<' n t'Jy,
cx rhanges .
1 lmilcd
prospccUJ
of:
succl'SS
for
whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in
Wha t
some
sm11ll
strictly
state
limited
clltc ,
or
nucl ea r
is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict
with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right
intention.
Fo r
One (by no means
be arg ued to in various ways.
c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and
r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that,
1
wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as
a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
25 .
Til e principle can
26 .
wars where t he targets ar e
c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he
For such wars remain unjust on
pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect .
on lif e
several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were
s ys tnms, etc.
mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of
nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be
nucl 'lH
kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are
The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear
ndded ).
Zi.
Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of
fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack,
t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what
are
se e n
as
b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars
can
b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed.
Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion
of
medieva l
theory
oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e
was
no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf.
lltt J e
is
wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc
se nsitive
howe ver,
me rit,
( a nd
when
issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently).
a r g uments
are
not
do
There
.In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents,
dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s
h i st orica l r e quireme nts
Barnes, p .778).
not
simply
commit
argumen t s
matters
underlyi ng
the
Finally , these argumen ts from
any
presc r iptive
fallacy;
from
historic al
autho r ity
for
to
th e
mo r al
c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed,
a nd
nome times applied , were justifie d.
As they are.
I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the
mo ral
rightnes s
or
justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist
str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin
e on
co ntempor ary
u n ti l
times.
Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they
arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and
This
ls
the
involve
beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars :
such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once
remov ed
( a nd
e ven,
howr• vcr you look
conse ns us
violence 28 •
Ht
very
f requentl y , when it is not) .
il morally .
a r gument;
it
The argume nt i.s not
proceeds
expedi.en cy
that
is
duly
They a re morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
fr om similar results from the full sweep of
ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion.
The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortuna tely
deta ils
can
be
de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents
28.
one,
from
shortcu t.
For
for
just
war
These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear.
For
the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it.
The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types
of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent
revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion
be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at
l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may
be co nd emned
'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of
l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311).
Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only
legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in
a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780).
.l /
whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate.
w.1r
were
i_;ornctimes
a rriv ed
at
or
l n fact conditions for just
defended through pr inciples of such moral
th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative
been
done .
work
already
The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has
in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is
maxim j.sati on
utl lHy
has
is
final ly
ac complished,
LSN
adopted,
wars
are
howe ve r
excluded
ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an
·
g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1
l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ;
wars
Llw l
involv e
on
LSN
1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure,
tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in
utllitarlan
Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 •
L1i; ldon.
The arguments
ovcrwhc .lming
so
moral
far
case
outlined
against
such
mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n
principles
are
de riv able
from
agains t
some
LSN
wa rs.
LSN
would
su bstanti ally
wo rse
are
tha n
exhaust
th e
violate
thes e
of the theories just considered).
These
ac countable,
condition
not
( again
th e obligation to maint a in
earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems :
we
do
For there are oth e r significant
war
pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns :
p,cnera tions, to whom
wars
we
the r.-esponsibility to futur e
pas s
to
th e
" recei ved
the
world
it".
Such
on"
not
in
conservative
principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are
bound
to
be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war.
§5.
The shi ft to nuclear deterrence:
suppo rt
nuclear
arguments to its immorality .
Those
who
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars ,
by
pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars.
What i s being
done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om
war:
deterrence
is
most
important
precisely
engagement
in
preventing
in
LSN
such
wars from ever
occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values.
it
is
continued ,
deterrence
is
the
.9nly
practical
d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
29.
For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail,
complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'.
are
But compare Hardin.
though
not
in
a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented
in:
mutually
;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31
Su,h c1aims as to the roles and
dubious,
for
seve ral
reasons.
objective s
of
deterrence
If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
s uperior ity.
than
th i s,
and
sometime s
even
a
mili ta ry
goal.
In fac t there ha s
renewed
driv e
for
Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32
process
decidedl y
A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce,
despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only -
been a que st for more
are
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate
for dctct"rence .
On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its"
impu.ls e
there
has
been
almost
unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318).
A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what
sold
31.
is
being
11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor:
marketed
a nd
deterrence has
It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es
"flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e
ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s
is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely
out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it.
It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e
for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r
intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use
nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he
third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official
military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and
nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM,
p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
[1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front,
which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine
deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it
la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff.
i.ncrt.:ascd the probability
nrms-race
type
t hat
of
LSN
war.
More
precis ely,
deterrence
of
th e
is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion
for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and
hns
to
that
,,,·te nt
least en hanced its prospect s of occurring .
at
r easons also, connected with pure
original
setting),
the last 30 years.
the
deterrence
and
with
the
For other
"cold
war"'
(its
probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to main tain credibility
overridden
or
with
''sacrificed"
a
population
whos e
real
for
military objectives;
state of military readiness;
etc.
The situation has
many
ther e
sober
analysts
century , i.e.
think
before 2000 .
is
a
high
There are s e veral
interests
are
being
the dangerous and risky
now
been
reached
where
pr obability of an LSN war this
routes
to
such
a
probability
assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to
an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and
Amer lean
2000.
alerts,
hav e
been
lucky
already .
In
of
nuclear
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that th e
For
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucia l
the
arms
of nuclear acci dent and human or
t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf .
:l.ncrease
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
r e veals
the
exchange .
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l
race,
on
sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the
Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in r e cent years.
Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128).
20
conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) .
s e em s
no
way
Fof better
or
worse,
ther e
to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and
t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight .
IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it
proha bJ~
that
LSN
an
war
will
d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it
proba bl e
that
c entury.
And that is enough
a
grossly
occur this ce ntury.
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
i.mmoral.
For then it follows ( by
plausi ble
that
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
warrant
morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome.
de terrence
highly
is
evasiv e
act.Lon.
We
ought
That in turn implies taking steps ,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That i.s but the first of several ways we shall
nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies.
The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of
war h a s of cour s e been disputed.
LSN
The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows :
Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying.
The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with
ar c
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much ava i lable evidence counters this
More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper ).
What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the
ce r tnin ly
Ther e by, through det errence, we
si t uation,
since
have
already
got
into
t.h e probA.bility.
immoral
of
r aising
The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity
of nucle ar deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense
war,
against
evidence
s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an
LSN war .
LSN
a nd
way
of
princ iple s
mapping
war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war.
mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic
connecti ng
pr inciples .
moral
arg uments
Such principles
The
fl rst
of
the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only
be
pr ob3ble
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur .
Thus, f or
example ,
s i nc e
is
it
wrong
to
ki l l
a
large
noncomb atant
po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k
and
wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out,
which
nuclea r de terre nce does .
botl1
of
For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally
entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t
ho se
of third part y no nal i gned
most
Like
"' t tuations .
defeat by
example ,
0
t a te s .
sub s t an ti ve
Unless
mo ra l
count erexamp l es,
the
second
principl es oc c u r s.
probabi lity
that
par t
princ ipl e s
in
Cl
runs
into
dilemma.
and
of
a c c ord i ng l y,
Cl
e ncount e rs
to
require
complic ation.
For
apparen t trouble where clash of
Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the
oc curs
X
ord er
to
apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 •
nuclec1r
ethi s,
d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to
t o avoid a greater evil.
pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y
c r ashes,
in
dct:crrcn ce ,
make
that
t he
Cons i der for example the
passeng er
plane
he
ic
flying
sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y
Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of
ihe r e
(though
the r e
explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not
ls
a
of fs e t
clash
or
of
principl e s, as §6
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greate r e vil.
I L can be a r gued that it is:
argumen t
from
t he
pr e vious
a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le
perhaps
f rom
more
such is pa rt of
succe s s
credence
t he
de terrence .
th a n
the
of
the
popular
However this inductiv e
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
driver's
argumen t,
'the
happy
acciden t
has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is
unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war
34.
point
a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet
(des pite some close calla ) , he won't,
th a t
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D.
Johnston .
There are more
dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es.
For example , in inciting people to
c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d.
Thus, t o ta ke C,
Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi
i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj.
But surely
Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence .
But spelling out
what 'dir ec tly' means
in terms of short causal chains over which
r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to
ot her connect ing princ i ples.
·2
(p. 100) .
lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power
incrt.' ,ise
111
Russian
strengt h,
the
ri se
r e 1aU. ons,
th e
of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc .
(cf.
simllarly Cox ).
There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Dl.
De errencc will not continu e to work,
and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that
D2 .
De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war.
The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again
persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together :
some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r.
proliferati on,
the
emergence
bu t the focus is on the ( in
An initial
of lesser nuc lear powers.
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect
Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that
lt. -i~i
us e of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
11
lesser
very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th
stat e .
Moreover
scarcitJ
;::i nd
o f chea per suppli es, etc ,
weapo n
systems,
more
or
Lcrror
s ltua ttons,
deterrence
power
lnvolv e s 36 ,
being mainta.ined :
costs
Wi t h so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
balanc e
of
have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record.
lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds .
of
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that
pres en t
for
wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war
through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased.
powrr
opportunities
growing
nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to.
wec1pons
.lnltlnl
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline,
and
the
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
arms
war ,
races,
with
such
as
probabili.ty
Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
35.
that
deterrence
practice
increases
It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations
weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf.
n 1clcar
p .. 2JO n.
36.
supposi ng
th e
armed with
Lackey, MM,
The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the
proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were
nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
dcle rrenc e.
Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of
scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled.
probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in
poli c y,
US
especiall y
th e
rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides
to
rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being
advantage
of
ov erwhelme d,
USA
the
to
take
superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy
the
tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets
con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as
hostages ),
thereby
war.
also
weakens
the
case
against
resort
to
nucle a r
detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t
of
mutual
understan ding,
leaders, and even some
nuclear.
sha r ed
principle s ,
cooperati on
supe r-states.
and
soundness
transmi ss i on
Finally,
impor tant)
level
judgement
among
of
of
and
informati on
between
It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s
in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for
instance,
follow
through on delusions of one sort or another.
deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
the
other
It is al so tha t
side ,
which
slde ' s
threat
is to the other' (P L, p.313) .
we
think' • 38
But
about
what
the
o t her
considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of
evidence,
that
on e
perceptio n of what is
possible
resul t
As
s ide
side
thinks
e rror.
Not
thinks ,
there
only
not
can be
is
a
there
sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n;
must now be severe doubts
cffectlvc ly.
"conv inc ing "
There is a grain of truth in
the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other
what
be
a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t
strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rationa l
principle s
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not
to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward
defence)
have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is
some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies :
we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and
i.rrntiona llty .
J8.
Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the
West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not
understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'.
This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e.
24
idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA
and in UK) that
LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won.
The suppor ter of det er rence
connec ting
rrlnci ple s
ri val case.
such
J1as
not
onl y
to
defeat
a rgumen ts
Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing
as
For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly
~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_.
t hr o ugh
practic e
of
Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed
( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl),
only
a
feeble
case
through
the
questio na b le obv ers e of Cl,
Cl i.
If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X,
nppears open .
•
For it has to be shown that
deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war ,
and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that
deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options
.
o
The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill
be argu e d.
reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim.
up i-hc v ery
cond 1 t:1.ons
probab ility
of
suc h
for
a
an
LSN
war,
it
So ,
for
When nuclear deterr e nce set s
can
ha rdly
have
reduced
th e
war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o
when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le.
More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi
e d, it i s
c..! l1 0l l f',h
refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong.
LO
out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t.
altcrn1 1LJvc
pe rmissi ble
courses
of
a c tion
condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ;
to be no t merely
alrigh t ,
bu t
;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA,
r ig ht.
But
I t is not enough to make
For t he re certain ly seem to
withou t
deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory.
uniciue ne s s
includi ng
fright
To surpass t hese option s, a
nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown
es tablish ing
such
a
39.
LSN
war s ,
withou t
.(cf.
Jl
11
claim,
to
fear
or
is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39
OED)
40
•
For
most
people,
portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough
from
be
the costs or problem s of
Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by
t hr ea t s
not
the
enormo us
expense ,
t rouble
vivid scenari os
to
deter
t hem
and wastage of
An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre
nce is the
way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum
stances .
Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu
res , the
an s wl!r hn-, to be, No.
- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - -
p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em.
det t·r rl'ncc
And
deterren ce
i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of
by
such
means
ourse not immoral .
(whi ch
miJit4ry
(Sc.h e ll was not
immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New
Yo rk .)
But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is
deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where
this
o bj e ct,
a
LSN
war., itself is no t
permiss ible.
The argumen t for this is
thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple
C2 .
l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong.
Hence
since
p re para t i on,
LS N wars
nuc l ear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterren ce
deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong .
claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X:
wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn
i
Y•
wi11at
W.'.1 S
wrong.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
Z may
both
be
41
i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1.
"
Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that
L SN wa r
implies
complete
prepara tion
for
Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the
Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls
(which
tr ied
the
major
war
c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e
Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or
waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l
tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan
or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in
Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added).
But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the
become
J ncreasi ngly
liable
to
question .
wrongne ss
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty,
deceptio n,
mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally
unde sirable traits.
Li l .
Nor a re
ordered
be cause
wrong,
equally
degr e es of wrongne ss required :
wrongs can simply be
as
reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some
it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z
cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally
evil. Thus, e.g. William s:
.
partiall y
labourin g
are both
wrong or
.
there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy
on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a
nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil
a s the second.
This is because both are held to be absolute ly
forbidde n.
Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to
"S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ
mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and
3 lg a numbe r;
s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numeri c , lly from 3!
26
a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s.
Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as
sever~]
other
fea tures.
LSN
war ,
already
writes
in
In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t
ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pret e nce.
Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e
for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence.
too
sophistica t ed
for
bluff
alone
to
Military
succeed:
t here
preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in
t he
ot her
hand ,
has
to
is
now
be serious
deterr ence .
But,
on
c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for
wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly:
imply attemp t ed X.
c omplete preparatio n for X does
not
It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed
with wha l is prcpa·ed
whell1er
intelligenc e
for
under
c ertain
conditio ns.
Comple te
preparation ,
for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a
(proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an
be
taken
of
connecting
for
granted .
Principle C2
principles .
is
part
way
not
the
line
in
a
series
pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that
A
con necting X with a tt empted X:
perh,ps
down
if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong
as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not .
But the se ries ends ;
off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to
the
(thoug h
it cuts
claims
of
various religious pos i tio ns.
For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong
then
X
the
co n temp l ati on
con sidcra t Jon
of
of
is
wrong
carrying out Xis wrong.
or
that
non-action- oriented
The point ap plies equally to sexual
fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares .
no Lhing
mere
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable ,
and in some senses are all too thinka ble.
Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each
common ly
involves
lt connects with.
decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanyin g the increased probability are
certain
r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves;
nol
I ho:a·
of
mere
pas s ! vc
.o nt emµ l at f on
I,,
1
'.
Howev er
oll
the
sets
of
these are
connectl.ng
n
prL nc lple s
invoked
except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of
wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased.
c ho:;c n
One rea son for th1s is that the
means
o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do
s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft .
The inc r eased prohabi llty
of
an
evil
out come
o l.mply makcB things worse .
Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but
thi s
accompa nied
by
threats
and
a threaten ing posture .
pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved,
announce ment
For some pa rty , th e
if
deterr e nce
s ucce ed :
the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible .
n uc 1 L' i1 r
deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le:
CJ.
of
is
to
This aspect of
if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also
wr o ng ;
or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng .
The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form
CG .
If Xis wrong so is a cond itional
r eq uires
some
further
ex planati on.
the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere
of' • 4 3
thre ate ning
~
Apar t
intensio n
to
A condit'o na l
do
intentio ns
e . g.
themselv es,
1
the
t ha t ) .
C
to
(or
in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style:
the
most
cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the
oblj gati on
form
a
are
not
impossi ble
claim
in
whnt
or even remote or imp r obable:
(spe c ifica lly those involvin g
cornmitn e nt)
for
follows
certain
is
tha t
s ort s
there
of
discusse d
an
it is obligato ry
conditio ns
the conditi ons
typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l
fund ame ntal
cred1ble
functor:
To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the
involv ed
whic h
intensio n is a judgemen t of
is some intensio nal functor,
f rom
X
enemy .
The
are intensio nal funct ors
threaten ing ,
intendin g ,
and
whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate
the
immoral ity
42 .
There is plenty of scope for f ur ther
elabora tion
here.
Passiv e
s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to
make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other
worlds where e vil oc curs .
43.
The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be
confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The
Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey
strike :
Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten
them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the
problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e
theories of condi ti onality.
of
nuclear
deterren ce.
Natural ly
again
there
are
many
28
no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions
c.ont. :•mplat J.on,
t'1l nld.ng,
dreaming, etc.
of
e.g .
fail,
those
of
The.r e is also a n interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) ,
expecting,
awaiting
and
the
like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:.
Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is
then
threatcn.ing
X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that
to do
into
prac tic e
(e.g.
if
wrong
'What is wrong
putting
something
committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to
that
into
pract i ce.
beginning as fo] lows:
The
point
ca n
if worlds where
alternative ly
X
happens
be
are
put
argued semanti cal ly,
exclude d
then
so
are
adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen.
The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons.
nuclear
war
obta i n.
However t he required c onditional form can be derived
form,
is
through
only c onditionall y threatened , i.e .
the
f ollowing
wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if
argument:-
c.
should certain cond itions
particular,
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it
wrong,
44.
so
a lso
is
simple
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
arg uments
the
Observe, furthermore that if something Xis
have b en wrong in the first place.
ear lier
from
su bstitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions;
by
Firstly ,
threatening X if C,
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to e sta blish CG it is
Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272.
It
i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as
Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue of
slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and
also,
i.n view of CJ,
not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral
oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked
out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t.
S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops:
se
PL, p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
"i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is
open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality
mentione d below.
29
enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r
If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X.
CG'.
The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to
ca us es
more
t roubl e .
a
serious
threat,
Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often
contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e
is
t l1r e o.tene d
what
l
.
i s wrong , to prevent t,1c
occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n
f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been
by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion
at all to pr oceed t o action on
plaus ible
Lhrc a t s .
removes
i t
the
support
bas i s
for
of
threats.
s i mpl i f ied CJ.
Insofar
A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l.
sense
co nditi on s,
is
con s i de r a
accide nt .
intended,
For the challenge
grossly
immo r al
unconvincing,
case
wh e r e
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
ci rcum st ances
th e
result
from
improbable
To bring this
an
intricat e
Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her
not .
is
in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
thr ea t s to under t a ke
out
is
Principle CJ is not
ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ.
says
this
Hence the shift to serious
one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible.
which
as
it
is
way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in
the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the
thr eat
nor
ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al
more
.. pra ctic al "
rep r es e n t atives
grounds.
Further more,
while
states
thei r
and
ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to
immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot:
it
moral
principled agents they ar e or take
natu r es ,
to
t he
kinds
of
th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains).
i nsignif i c ant
mora lly
would
run
For su c h agents , who may
counter
to
comprise
their
a
not
proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
a s CJ are no t in doubt.
The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e
--- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of
ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The
quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is
i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n.
30
t.hrcnt involved
then
is
it
Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t,
inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no
Lhen by CJ deterren ce
depcn<l
is
wrong .
The
maintain ed.
sub-argu ment
on se ri ous threats is a practica l one:
Lf
it
s
no t
seri ous
Bu t if i t j s ser io us
that
nu c l ea r
dete r re nce
name l y , that if the t h rea t s were
not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro
ugh ,
then
the
op posit ion
would flnd out, in one way or a nother.
could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l
wi LhouL
A policy of bluff
system ,
f or
examp l e,
coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n .
Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems
maintain ing
such
a
po licy
weapons , espec ially
informa lion
would
clown
during
l i kel y
times
escape
the
of
there
would
be
ma jor
di f fic u l t ies
i.n
chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear
change
through
in
gov e rn ing
el i t es ,
a nd
the
op pos itio n i ntellige nce.
But then ,
since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d .
Ther e a re
as
we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s.
On e is t hat
nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts
a bo ut
the
r ationa lity
of
carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity
essentia l. to its effec t iven ess .
To be effec tive then i t mu s t
be
s e r i ous
( c f.
Benn).
Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of
one
centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent.
CG,
Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d
with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e
C4 .
If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is
n!so wr0ng.
The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o
die tionarie s,
etc . ' .
of
'a
d claratio r
of
intent
to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury,
It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of
deter rence,
which
in tend ing to go to war .
princip l e ,
th a t
turn
0 11
C4
is
s ome
pa r a doxes
the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout
Princ i ple
C4
is
j us t i f i e d
th rough
th e
s i mplified
inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do
wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s
p inc.iple
some
an
ex tr emel y
position
prevail.
Si mplif i ed
wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the
excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly.
Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d
to
Jl
agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows :
argue
siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when
the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng
to go to LSN wa r
when
the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong .
Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such
an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows.
He nc e
nuclear
deter rence
is
wrong.
But like virtua lly every
utilita rian
princip les
utiJita rian grounds .
deontic
t hems e lv es ,
princip le ,
princ i ples
For it is not difficu lt to
except
thos e
flowing
from
CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on
outline
str a tegic
situati ons
wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear
det e rr ence.
But
on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon
C4.
For
it
likewis e
fs
not
princip les
C3
difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE
innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d
by
maximum
expe cted
a nd
utility .
pu rsuit
Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o
avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism
,
scrappi ng
the
sp ots
not
by
doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around
with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will
trou bl e
of
wit h
utilit a riani sm.
enable
So
.i. t
them
to
evade
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y
illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its
mo r al
f avour
depend s
upon uti.lita rian ass umption s .
Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of
fwbst,r ntial
1itil.ita ri a n
e l ements '
(PD,
p.287).
consequ e n tia l
elemen ts
systems
incl ud e
must
infiltr ate,
an
with
the
' ass umption
if
Eve n
observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one
e thic s
thing
this
upon
must
hav e
astonis hing
confla ting
utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e
particu lar
that
assump tion
produce s
normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he
a ct
Kavka
thereup on
t ries
the paradox es of · deterre nce'.
wi t h
maximum
expecte d
to
The
utility
'( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great
deal of utility
- -
46.
·•---- ---- -
Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip
le (PD ,
p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler,
Bentham ,
Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as
to why the
pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4
to argue,
like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora
l' (cf .
Kavb p.29 1 ).
It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les
(espec iall y the
maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka
's f irst
paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see
PD.
.
, •"
.
12
i.s
s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87).
:;t
obj ec tions
as
This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h
ut il i taria nism
i self:
it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or
vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e .
usud l
stratc ~y
of
of
Kavka tries t he
weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the
~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising
u t i lit y
can mora l ly e njo i u.
But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies
fo l Low
fr om
t he
normative
( p . 28 7) • 11 7
what
ov erridde n
by
C4
s u ppo sed
u t il i t a rian
to
a ssumptio ns '
Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s
way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t
and
is
assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns
o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e
t h at .•.
in
produce ,
situa t i on s ,
are
whe n
moral
c ombi ned
dilemmas .
in
si tu a t i ons
These
are
not
s uc h
th e
f udg ed
as sump ti on
as
special
de t e rr e nt
c a ses
where
one
decnti c
pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e
c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it
int e nd
right
to
to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian
gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) .
wr ong :
that judg ement is not ov e rr i den.
Nuc lear de t e rr e nce
is
also
t he
case
is
t hat
in
r emai ns
Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4
i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion,
what
is
th e~e
s pe cial
p.290) .
situations,
Howeve r ,
t her e
ar e
count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives .
For
.ln
t he s e
is
wrong .
s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what
Howe ver
it
is
ha rdly
ne ws,
but
a
standing
objection,
that
ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g .
Spec ial
s pons on s hip
de t e rre nt
may
appea r
s itua t i.on a,
where
under
ntl lit a ri a n
t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l.
char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he
47 .
deterrence
de t e r r e nce
is
very
likely
As
to
Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n
cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument
f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 .
Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles,
but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s
with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in
the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e
with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s .
sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely
tp
lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well.
This is ve ry far removed from the real world
su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e.
si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the
deterrence
probabiU.ty
is
of
LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence .
that
<l1~ont <:
principles
sllbject
Even if it were
mistakenly
to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to
avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working
such
RS
supposed
de ontic
principles
C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons.
Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it
equi. r es,
by wa y of the following principle:
CS.
If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
circumstances;
and
that
commitment
is
to
act
itself wrong .
lso wrong.
wrongly
in
cer-tain
Nuclear deterrence is
however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions .
And
as
wi th
conditional
intention,
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
th a t
su perstates
and
controlling
commitmen t
and
their
intention
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
did
not
occur)
is
enough
to
establish
the
relevant
The dangerous strategy of
launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a
thut
have
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence.
Now the connecting principles
suffice
logically ,
but
are
nucl ar
deterrence,
for
weighty
principle
would
detachment
from
the
by complete preparat i on fo r and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
parad ox ical:
det e rrence.
ir self
By
case .
i nstance
conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
sound
wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
one
applied:
it
ou t
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unl ess
i ts
ha s
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
chang ed, e.g .
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direct ion can be drastically
at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare,
to purely mi l i t ary targe ts).
Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different
sort s
of
ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e .
a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s
I
There
wh i ch start from the
commonplace ob se r va ti o n that
~
All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in
favou r
of
nuclear
deterrence
are
broadl y
ut ilitar i an.
In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many
t hat
inf iltra t ed
hav e
the
e thi.c a l
l i t erature ,
ar e
those
of
ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the
one
playe r,
t h r>
USA.
Utilitar ia nism ,
t hough
s till
looking
of
those
expedie ncy -·
advantage
of
basically
at
~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
posi t io n,
a nd
consider
[ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity
sup po r t t d
by
o t he r
na tional i ties
othe rwi s e .
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains,
dflrive s from ut il i tarianism.
118
Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst
de terrence,
either
by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme
Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence
or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme ,
Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments.
The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
f av our
d ir ec tion:
48 .
of de terrence.
moral
arguments
Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
a ft e r all it is widely
thought
that
u tilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and
a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent
de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a
much t oug her ent e rprise.
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was
· cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the
conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes
t.o deterre nce .
An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can
be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological
~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily
he way
of
<lcontic
connecting
pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail.
In the light of these
prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical
positi ons would go.
After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of
stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even.
seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition.
pol it i ca l
s yst em
whic h
depends
in
some
uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo.
It hardly does
measure
then
for
a
upon consensus , to rely on
Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e
just
thnt
appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on:
how
it
ls
applied;
with
which
maximisa tion recipes; along with what other
r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well);
genc>rous
arc
utll i.ty·
assignmen ts
or
upon
With
different
(and · a rguably
superior)
va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results
emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49
basic
reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4).
LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility.
deterrenc e
out to
whi.c h increases th
other
recipes
of
feasible
a
how
for such things as preservat l on of national
sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc.
assumptio ns ,
and on
Any
policy
such
The
It is that
as
nuclear
probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e
alternati ves,
conseque ntialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance ,
Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) .
The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism
o[
ut j lltaria nlsm,
beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of
l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else
11t i l i tarla ni sm
when
applied
One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this:
by
to
addressin g
s ome
of
the
inadequac ies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e.
on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether
to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the
improbabi l ity of other options working.
deep,
uti ~itarlanis m
If the deterrenc e
probabili ty-well
is
morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
pro babl e.
49.
Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the
discussio n
inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally
opposed conclusio ns are reached.
(Hardin 's approach tends however to
expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-know n to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilit arl.an ism'.
The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to
stand comes from L, Mirlin.
36
wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s
likPly
to
work
or not.
indepe nde nt
deterrence
are
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
i.s
Moral
princi p~s
not
are
through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how
ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be .
depend
.Lt
If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the
probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter .
det:crmlne<l
whcrhc r
of
upon
firm to stand.
Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
a nd
of
the results util i ta r ianism delivers
uncert ainty
measures>
util itari anism off ers
In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle ,
utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and.
The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism.
(orm
shows
at
special
int e rests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
probability- well
state ,
have
hi gh
1s
deep ,
utilities,
nat io n- s tat e
and
spe cial
It does not yie ld a deterrence polici;
ind eed
hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ).
11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a
o[
act
most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s
under very
il
The
acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity;
These
seque nce
di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult
dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left
(as
also
associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardl y be argued that
deterrence
is
t he
pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence.
Along wit h the argument s, there are
dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence.
other
concom.itant
conventiona l wa rs .
f or
Firstly, the peace it has provided
011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re
smaller-s cale
reasons
is
no
deep
is
s hort age of
And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous
pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
r ange
of
51..
Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the
simplificat ion .
In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h
the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e
(ref rred to in footnote 49 ).
52.
Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm
the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open.
becaus e
- - - -- - -- - - - - - ·
-
37
fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and
t ec lrn1 .:fl.1,
j)C:lc (_~ ,
p 0:i
It thofl not
offer
genu i ne
of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo
nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e
·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ).
Secon dly, there
enorm ous
is
cost,
mora l
-~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe
nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t
moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami
liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly
Marx i st
way,
in
terms
of
destr uctiv e capac i ty and what
'the
ls
contr a dic tion
ne e ded
f or
betwe en
what
cons truct iv
the
is
spent
for
devel opme nt'
( PL,
p . 316) .
§6.
Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts
from
natio nal
dange rs
nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene
sis of nucle ar dilem mas.
to
Whil e
there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle
ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also
counr c ·-arg ument s,
that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe
ciall y to
Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l
just:!.fiab ili ty
of
nucle ar
war
pr e para tion
in
the
_p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es.
The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an
elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift,
of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the
local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or
f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and
every bit
a r gu1r.e nt
from
local dang ers.
dom inati on ;
a nd
dubio us
fir st
of
all
seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 .
atom ic
s urren der
and
so
avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ).
prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more
than these ;
third
eleme nt ,
name ly,
loss
of
basic
rig hts
there
with these .
black mail
of
forei gn
appea seme nt
In fact nucle ar
is
ways
a
cruc ial
of
life
This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the
dange r of
forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at
e eleme nt from risk of
Thoug h
and
(free dom, equa lity, etc .) and
fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human
dign ity, etc .) and
int eg rat ed
that
The two go toget her,
sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh
t adop t a polic y
or
as
It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be
en
tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er:
forei gn
as
black mail.
dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic
value s it does
imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin
ation , freed om to choos e vario us
natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi
on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s
can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta
nce, as is comm onpla ce in the
"[ r
•e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through
the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a
nti clcnr
prepnratlon
incr easi ngly
nuclear
risks,
state
demands,
extensive
etc.
But
what
nuclear destruction, also
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
ti, _ material
of
53
of the cherJshed life-style.
So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut
bnse
me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51•
fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of
lncku
cogency
an d
rings
ho 1 low,
It
is
basic
values
and
ri ghts
hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c:
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
ci tati.o n
of
religious
values at politica l ceremonies;
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
from
demand s
of
the
military-indus trial
of
private
wealth
and
vnl \les
appealed
to
category:
in
and
anot he r,
them
having
However
arising
to
do
with
th e
an argument isn't, or
associations.
And
the
rights
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice .
this
of
power.
oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury
that t he argument 1.s a
omplex , many concerned with foreign
domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many
conccut ·at:1.on
pious
of
"communism"
of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of cnpi talism.
communi.sm
has
What has
been
happened
here
confused
with
of
course
(the
t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion ,
association,
is
reality
basic
information,
that
( the
of)
state
values,
etc.,
ideal
socialist
namely
etc.),
of)
and
certain
so does
derivative~ threaten basic values.
One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear
LSN
wa r,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preservtng
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold.
Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life.
54 .
The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1.
.... ,
'lQ
J,
Simi la r ci. ue s tions
dominntion
and
arJs e
as
regard s
blackmail.
argumeq;; H from
er, e
Justification
danger
which
is
itself
open
questioned (i n §8 ), both from the
to
ser i ous
point
foreign
of the methods of extensi ve nuclear
preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e
structure
of
of
question,
v iew
of
nation
and
basic
states,
a
i s subsequently
valu s,
such
as
freedom, and oth r wise.
But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or
dangers
are
no t,
t hese
from
natlonal
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
prcpnration, and
jus tific, tlon.
have
They
been
have
par t of many people ' s
accepted
in
moral
by
policy
outlook.
particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar
however ,
the
makers
as
affording
moral
fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form
Wi thi n
frnmework the moral justification holds good .
others,
ar gumen t s
arguments
not
a
c onv entio nal
Northern
It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in
preparatio n
do
such
engenders
establis h
a
moral
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
not
also
face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls
specif ically moral one.
,1
impressed
by
And
for
ma ny
other s
again,
who
are
who
not
so
or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
peop)c
Such
live
beyond
For such
the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al
counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged .
Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated
people
who
live
in
people.
Consi de r
some
a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet)
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nucl~ar
d ter r c nce
(a s under pr inciple Cl).
For such isolated people, who may
ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no
nucl ea r
diJ emma ,
and
nuclear
lo cations may have problems
problems
people.
as
deterrence
to
natio nal
is wro ng.
dangers,
genuine
People in less fo r tu na te
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
In doing so
i mmorally;
and
f or
through
similar
nuclea r
reasons
deterrence , superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventi onal No rthern framework is
j_mpug rwd.
conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l
Tht'. same
argument::
put
a
reflective
i s olat e d pe rson, and check
S! 11 ci>
Amer ican
the
or-
resulting
by
a
substitution
Russi.an 1n the position of such an
asse ssment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f
m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y
transfixed,
t h <~
c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality.
The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending
whc her
on
the
arguments
are
appU.ed
as
rega rds a superstate or not.
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something
Jn
orde r
t hP
meet
of
the nuclear armoury that it has.
Or, weakening the theme to
ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it
retain
i1
t
l east
solid
a
ou~
core of the nu c 1ear devices it has.
(moretlly]
to
For su bs equent
argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for
inst a nce
be cause
of
the
character
the
of
pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of
g rou nds
to
those
di. sa rmame nL
supporting
ag ainst
a
the
dangerous
SS
reason 55•
prudent:ial
the me
nuclea r
Northern values supposedly being
On
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentiall y
Jrralto nal.
It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is
a
s11 hopLimal
st rategy ,
li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma
si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games .
that
a
su peri or
would
be
cooperative
For
expen sive ,
re source s,
dr ai ning
of
such
t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1.
55.
admitted
arrangement s.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
ra nge of other r espects .
future
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the
lik . could be achif?Ved , would
agreeme nt
So it should
arrangement s
would
be
much
less
risky ,
destructive of the environment , a nd so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local
expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~
unfortunate ly
rather
remote:
only
the
ca make
their
polici es
sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e
nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate :
proceed,
largely
unabated .
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state
one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a
one's
a rsen a l,
umbrella.
nu c l ear
pre paration ,
th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md
for
huddl es
conf l.dencc
in
!ts
and
which
under
co ntrast s
ncouragcd elsewhe r e .
st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear
grrH1nd
one
anoth e r's
But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by
dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nu clear
in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly
thr oug h some supcrstate 's
nuclear
COVt!r
super-· ally
Does a "d epe nd ent"
on a s 1pc r -a lly,
rather
tha n
strangely
have
that
exchange
on its territory?
mu ch
Jt s ally's opponen t ?
Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or
nuclear
must
stag e
a
Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y
l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of
superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d .
Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e
it
<loes
theme ,
not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers
f rom SST nnd end s as follows:
DST.
Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he
facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally .
ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd
same
goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ).
Nor do the arguments of f ered for
SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments
striking l y
illu str ated
by
the
case
the
for
DST. 56
This
is
more
of more remot e nuclear dependent states.
Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in
j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans
of
the
Sovi et
Union.
Nor
ar e
they
thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical
56.
As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions
o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign
nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g.
eco nomic consideratio ns
such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs.
ca1 1acity to launc h
mot j .ve Lo
<.111y
<l o
look convincing .
carries
full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but
R
wc .i ght.
reasons
In
fact,
the
with
a rgumen t
from
of
For there
arg ument
t he
only
is
qucstLonable
non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs.
of
58
domina tion
In this way
too)
the
from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified .
such
supe r state
foreign
li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of
a
economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d.
fore(•
lack(ing]
so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol
For similar
1 it t le
'clearly
danger
because
nuclear
of
umbrella,
superstate
dang er
facilities
and
th e
tha t would be removed wi th
With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these
sorts
a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may
b e defeated along analogous lines .
The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and
peoples,
break
theme
the
of
a
of
monolithic West.
differently
situated
This is a theme especially
favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n.
und i.ffrrentiatcd unit.
dep1!nd0nL
i;tntes
with
But
this
l eadi ng
idea,
NATO
desig ne d
powers ,
and
In this the West is a single
in
and
part
to
align
lesser
to justify pu tting them at
nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West.
The West is
not
so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it
(i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is
now
coming
unde r
attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the.
und er lying retaliatory model that
0
Safety lies in weapons ,
More weapons i mply more. security59 ,
Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear.
a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s
from nuclear submar ines ) .
Europe ans are ar guing in
present
of
syslem
is
more
a
similar
wa y,
that
the
a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e
Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 .
58 .
The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2.
59 .
Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson.
argument
for
it,
s ee
Threats
to
Thompson, p.251);
envi s -1ged
and thnt: w-ithou!:
Lhcut.r e
for
a
h\icJ. ,;,)ll''
instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be
limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l
thf'
is now seen by US
( ut not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons assumptions
are
qu es tioned,
other
assumptions
of
the
retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely
ci
Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
o
Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament,
as
opposed ,
say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or,
takin g off from the previ ous point,
~
Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through
ar e
proper
methods,
armaments ,
etc.)
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resoLuti.on at the int er national level.
It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no
ordinary
level
do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
r e ally
warranted,
frontier
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60
and
explana tion
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
already
nation-states.
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted
and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c.
nation-state
system ':
For 'forc e has
[a]
permanent
plac,~
in
the
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
Th
resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites
Ass~mbli.ng
r eferred
th~
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
de v e lope d
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 )
to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east
60.
yields
the
both
and
their
supporters.
deontic dilemma. often
ought
not
to
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
for prudential reasons (as
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alter native systems , see
su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on
i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s .
argu ed
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
·,,,,._
44
SST and DST).
tl w
Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction
of
virtues
parac.onsisteot
logic),
but
( c onc octed
61
prod uced
by
war itself 62 , or
at
war
and
its
version
of
the
deon tic
least war which spr.·eads beyond purely
mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably
e . g.
nuclear
, a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions.
ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense
di 1 emma
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, t he
ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on
asper.ts
to
do
(since
ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) .
military
arrangeme nt s,
The ma in dil emma arises
from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of
war.
War
is
requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold);
but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es .
war
can
undPr
also
ce rtain
justified.
be
se e n
as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that
ctrcumstanees
Thus
' some
these
reall y
ju tifications
0
evi l
consequences
Regis
of
war '
(Walls ,
p.260).
accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed
normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible
the
The doctrine of " ju st
But
this
argume nts
when
perfo rmed
under
is no better or mor e morally
for
uti l itorianism
as
bein g
corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e .
W;n· and preparedness for
61 .
wa r
als o
gene rate
s ubsidiary
di.lemmas
f or
Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence
the
best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of
world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii).
Green
also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e
asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he
is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s
down):
though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no
othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue.
Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops
d :llemma;
they s peak of ' th e
dilemma of how to prev ent the use
Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation i n terms of a mora l
political paradox of de terrence •.. the
of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13).
In
too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in
Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs.
But
it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework.
62.
Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account
of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein.
. ...
inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and
difficult
prohlcms
au t ho f· t c y:
'one
of
th e
~0s t
o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying
the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL,
p.324).
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts.
The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed
by
t he
co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n
national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a .,
"
lnd.lvidual
li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) .
othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas ,
( poll U ca l)
obl lgations
to
s for
example
(the
question
the
extent
of
one' s
a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as
one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear
res c•archer
It also accentuates
of
politic a l
obligation s
armame nt s
and
processor
or
eva sion
is
their
considered f urther in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re
several
ques Ions
to
'Wh, t. should my sta t e
be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e
be
doing
and
influence, d epending on who one is.
I do?
1
one
Jives,
-
do?',
on
whi c h
one
may
exert
influences, i.e.
in
what
l it tle
There is not only the question 'What shou ld
a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending
a nd
ar e
on
whe re
sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or
on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the
questions
' What
sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64
Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o
act ion-or ien t ed
questions .
Each
of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas .
The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
di ffe rently,
pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy.
obliga tory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas.
T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and
security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and
autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state.
64.
For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility
of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out
Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate
than they are .
moral d il emmas ure not
l i t.t>r;,Lure
f, !.,
•
widely
or
well
und er stood,
p...." t'ticular]y
__
e 1-1
~ 1i
in
ca .1
Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e
utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which
giv•s
to
rise
them
but
the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve
acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y.
d i lemma doe
Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons
a
not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better
a nd worse ways
By
01t .
wh c h
assessments,
contr a st
f orm
the
with
basis
s uc h
e thical
theories ,
preanalytical
oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l
dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s.
Reactions an
f rom
the
res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas
fix.
nuclear
The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to
<lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to
temporary
Thus ,
crutch .
for
as
world' GG , that
b st"
j
ethical
RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o
way
a
of
neve r
exerci s ing
"mora lly
ou r
s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld .
fu nctor
s peak
moral
A similar
th e
'strictly
mor;il
Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role
but
de t e er e nc: e
th e
c i rc um s t a nce s.
de ter r .nc e,
is
be
in a fallen
to
" second
a
acceptability '
object
mus t
cert ainly
one
str ictly
and
wrong,
is
of
from th e
conditional
be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a
optlon
as
to
of
what
the
to
nucl ear
do
in
Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion
though
a
"morally
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
can
shift
'moral
c ond i tional '
while
a ccepta bi U.ty ,
good",
responsibility
d~t c rrcnce
fix.
·s
(as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic
of
we
gra s p
examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the
possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e
acceptable''
emerge
neverthel e ss
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
that
war
in
the
pursu e
circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as
Sar t re;
a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller
t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood.
66.
Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n
1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2.
6 7.
As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order
logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable'
hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s .
The
Australian,
February
12-13
!i
'.rnp erior
pol Ley ~
nsscrabled
(in
sufficien tly
it
is
§5-§6),
a
dt! cidetlly
reasons
of
·1
}-toor
the
opti_ n,
sort
reasons
i'o r
that
are
decisive
already
for those,
outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find
no
genuine
of
nuc le ar
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re,
stal1.:s'
own mald.n&_.
fix
a
It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the
Lhc
escaJAtio n
of
In these respects the
situation
is
like
peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble
relations hips , and build up
though
and
U.:, A,
has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by
the USA and the USSR in in teractio n.
th:1 t
The
one
there by.
It
is
build-up.
The fact i
programme is t o be in addition to existing
( which
are
to
Sovi et
that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does.
esources
myth,
a
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear
in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response
bui ld·-up,
nucl~a ·
with
onflJctin g obligatio ns
generally
agr eed
The recent (1980)
United
to
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) .
The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly,
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
indicates
especiall y
that
merely
route
by
a
taken
advanced
response
to
capita list
t he
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
USA and its NATO
state
socialism ).
would not have been feasible without compleme nting
And independe nt evidence,
t l1 ere
is then a direct outcome
suc h
as
Soviet-Si no
confronta tion,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
n.:.iti.ons .
There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts
nation-st.' .ltes
and
the
nuclear
f ix .
arrangeme nts are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increa singly
present wo rld polJU.cal structure .
is
widely
promulgat ed
.'.lrrangcm ents :
it .is'
seen
On
the
dil emma
as
one
hand,
with
t he
these
result
through
political
that
the
i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state
n world of sovereign states . • .
which
brought
the
wo.ld
to
the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ).
nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into
On th e other hand, th e
the
statist
form,
into
arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast.
stutlst
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the
and
security,
to
defend
national
inter est s ,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
advantageous
of
confrontation,
st ate
to
(!),
provid e
but underneath there ore other
sovereign
st a tes
and
frame work
the
rlnd
peace
The
military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and
polit i cally
favoured
of
inequa l ity
it
supports .
The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e
statist
arrangements
a nd
interr e lations
( conomic
ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock
a rr nngcme nl.s
of
s overeign
where
the
pa ttern
world
states And zones of inter e st .
t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one .
side
the
rivalries,
into
conflict i ng
the
present
The argument to th1. s
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer .
The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for
the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd
social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled
and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) .
"We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
appara tus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68
Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements,
by
th ing s
S llCh
as
the
SALT negotiation s ;
shown
there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a
(growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a
rule , partly held in place by deterrence .
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this , there are cases
rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US i s
68 .
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e
not
over.duly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would free ly
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~
adj~c ~nt
~estcrn
oil
supp li es :
concerning,
were
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf .
th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212).
§8 .
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
results.
in itia l political fall-out from the ethical
Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limJt~tions
on
the
thu s inevitable.
and
more
or
power s of states.
Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re
The limitations may be reache d by agreement
and
negotiation ,
less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly
worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war.
As with other fixes produced by
there
are
suggested
ways
the
structural
ar rangements
of
states,
ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts,
inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure
nnd
power
·elations
extrastate approaches .
of
state s
(and,
in the limit, remove t hem altogether) ,
All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" ,
attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations , etc . , are interstate ;
sovereign
state .
The
s ame
goes
(graduated) unilate ral disarmament .
about the nation- state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
les s
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empi rical
fact ,
is it part icula r ly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s.
as
a
We are certainly
free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s
demise
sacred
it is not a particularl y well justified political form;
it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through
fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers,
lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s
are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by
conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like
these .
Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders
regarded the
institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration
between city-st a t es , not seeing
its
social,
structurally -emergent,
characte r.
50
approaches take one of
Extrnstr1te
ittlernat ional
of slate s.
r.ol
two
rou tes,
way
~Ile
to
l~,
ge nuine
power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e .
but they are
Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to
world governmen t, is alre ady there in the
international
law-courts.
Wer e
the
courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal
acl ion, that· medie val
principle
theo ri. t s
saw
to
all
disputes,
could
in
be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S
and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T.
given
intrastate
s n fflcienl
least jilitial]y)
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t
upon
war deterrence ,
though
not by military means.
perhaps
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
effective without police and jails or
their
and
equiva l ent
supcr-statist
back-up
eq uivalent
for
of
economic
other
penalties;
and
the
either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite
substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will
typicnlJy
be
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
pa rt i es.
repC'ilt
uninvolved
short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
rt .
Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying
ec:t
t. n
gri.ps
with
the
nuclear
though mostly 1n passing to be
to
problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned,
dismi ss ed 71 ,
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
-·--------- - - - -- -70.
Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is
a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of
the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the
uni on.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By
contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid
and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR ,
UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together;
and the one recent
attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e .
The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns
.illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification
of
Germany
should be resi sted;
instead a more rational regional
deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany
sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border
regio n, and so on.
71 .
Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical , etc.
Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour
wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations.
5l
thermonuclear war .
By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like
the
new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions,
combined
with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls:
unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s
considered
however
beginning
to
be
cf.
Way
and
is
more
sometimes
The Way Up,
sympatheti cally
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing
inte rna tiona l
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
but lt is making
Galtung).
much
by
Up
mora lly
There is
integrated
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320).
A main argume nt for the Way Up is
just
a
repetition
of
that
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners'
Tragedy
of t he Commons.
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
herdsmen
as
best
solutions
regards
to
problems
as
the
of
organisation,
public order and, more rec ently, as to
So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are
but
nation·-states ,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now
sort
such
It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the
state - a r e r equired to ensure
espe cially,
Dilemma,
of superstnt e.
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
of
thcjr
be
order-imposing
corr espo, dingly weakened.
ar gum ent s
are
role,
and
But all
political
this
is
obligation
to
There a re, then, many problems
through
these
A
further
theoretical
with
h:1.tch
the
is
Way
that
Up,
a
both
"tragedy"
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated
72 .
will
72.
stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
that
states
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
prac t ical.
assume
to
See further loutley and Routley
especially Griffin.
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the
thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state
enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital.
again .
The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h
no prospect at all of getting
su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose.
Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century
ago ,
In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we
have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before
Wo rld
War
TI.
The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied
soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United
Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has
grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United
Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less
influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui,
pp.2-3 ).
The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line .
future
For
t he
foreseeable
nuclea r
ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s
as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of
opcrnt l vc
world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear
hostlllt i es .
extre~ely
I n some ways, this is just as well.
monol ithic,
woul d
World
gov ernme n t
would
cer t ainly ,
whatever
it s
( g ray?)
politic al
colour,
{~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e
impose
damage
on
to
It
undesira b le
l eve l
Ideological,
r equ1 site
the world an
many
remaining
of
inde e d
u nity
political
and
parad 'gmatic ,
cannot
be
and,
e c o nomi c
sepa r atio n
expect e d
in
some
crucial
respects,
unity.
of
Moreover ,
give n
Northern
main
within nuclea r dea dlines.
swee ping
more
sovereig nty , c o ul d
blockages
and
agr ~ements,
be
negotiated?
dea dl ocks
i1
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
When not even
endless
of
of
that
state
series
of s uch state reconciliation.
a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e
the
of
The s ame
Way
Up
nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged
•
-
through the Unit ed Nations);
73.
it
limitations
almost
the
cultures,
nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is
(e .g .
would
systems. 7 3
The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly
much
be
f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with
all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism.
·1
n .:ltur.:iL
an
7 11
Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
gov e rnment,
see Galtung.
Naturall y the objections to world
gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to
mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf .
Ma zrui ).
Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can
be
genuinely
s yn thesized with the Way Down.
jJ
There is
arrnrgemant s
regrettably
and
als o
conventions
much
are
e~ tdert ce
frequ ently
concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are
scntJments
signed
does
slide
smoothly
that
not
not
1nce rnational
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable dee d s .
bode
well
ever be rcc1chcd.
ln
<'nnv,•11t f< n
any
great
deal:
openly
violated.
I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one
fon·C!,
of
lofty
It
for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t
wl 1I C'h
tn
nl1
the
following
intEirna t i ona l
i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en,
w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc
includes
a
Even agreements states have
are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or
not
tr ea tie s ,
1
,
t h ton genocide.
Genoc i de
ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with
inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group
as such:
ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to
the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
i.n who l e or i n pa rt.
f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e :
dJrcct
and
public
shall
Beside genoc ide th e
c onspira cy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide o r any of
punl.shed ,
whether
they
are
the
othe r
act s
responsible rul er s, priva te
individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue
nucl~ar
genocide,
inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e ,
complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de.
mentioned
ca lculat ed
that
a
larg er
st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would
almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
conspir acy
repr:esentati .v
'S
does
to
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
pa r ticular
it
of the
and
as
involving
i.ncitement .
nuclea r
s t a tes
acts
ass oci a ted
with
genocide,
in
Some wel.i - known political and military
would
thus
ap pear
to
be
li.able
to
indictment . and punishment und er internation al law .
7L1.
Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms
control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t
suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp.
210- 13).
Reasons
include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n
drlvc f or strategic super ior ity .
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports.
in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden.
76.
The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the
Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff .
Most of the points
text
of
the
The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the
appare11t
I mpot ence
interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
ne:.rer
to
nuclear
the
" brink"
is
now
taken
to
ind ica te
contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l
tias
gi v en
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions .
The
According
to
can
reorganise
the
radical
namely
n iclear
in
Sc.hell ' s
1
unsatis factoriness
situat .l on
The
should
the foundations of politic c l thought'
pollllcal
t.iicy opvrate •. ,
the
indicates
inst itutions
Fate
lead
political
of
to
req u i red
a
t he
Earth .
' ful l-sca le
to
make
't he
co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which
and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ...
its
political
li fe' (p.219).
However Schell himself tri e s to
avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by
the
of
the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed
stands,
Schell
reexaminatio n o f
world ' c
and
book
a new
a rrangements,
thesis that the nuc l ear problem
national
( f r om
and
work of our age'
else overimpressed
by
political t he oris ts.
the
7
Z
history,
c onstitute
So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or
real ities
of
(unstable)
nation-states ,
do
most
But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al
rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation.
There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too
11nthinklngly)
with
an
an tiquated
s ystem
many
present
state
arrangements,
representative
century
communications
•ery
different
condition;
in
a
77.
when
and
the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state
and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier.
of
( a llegedly
17th
we re
willing ly ,
The feat ures
go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he
especially ,
us
even
of poli t ical a rrangements which t he
nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion .
best
of
even
dem ocratic)
techno log y,
more
were
t he
and
primit i v e
d iscerned,
In the br iefs prese nt ed
A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e
national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l
( sec Co x , p. 225).
Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is
thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival "
bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an
undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1.
for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz
an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged .
But such systems con tinue to
opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es
und c r mi ne<l.
prese nt
Nuclear
problems
rep r esentative
have
political
emphasized
have
been
several other defici encies in
arrangement s.
In
particular,
they
have
rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles
Euro pe a n
countri es.
cen tury
ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved.
issues,
~
i s sues.
The
least, be reduced.
reduced
excessive
power
back
at
dev e lopme nts ,
pro cedures,
But the route down through
issue-regul ated
large
i mposes
and
complex
other
modern
requirement s.
states
What
lnl t .t1-1.l
s maller
a s iL ls
to
inf or med
citizens
gro uping
than
approx i mate
of
a
g lant
satisfa ctory
good will.
As
the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n
the
l.nf ormation
by
are
stn tes,
government
recent
tec hnologic al
called for a re smaller
Firstly,
in
present
information
and
democratic
progressive
procedure,
of
control,
nation-stat es,
channels, and so f o r.th.
ncc e ptable
the
from
These
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
even
·release
the
and
distributio n
distortion
r estrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Aga in, especi a lly with new and less
systems , there is little excuse for thls.
information ,
upward
depends
But there ar e
e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited
pub} l t:1 y
and
Secondly , democracy, insofar
political
rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on).
flow
major
li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with
lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation.
a nd
on
of governments would, to that ex tent at
grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education.
cx pe n,, ive
lea st
governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e
poss ibl e ev en in
mu ch
elected
wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost
f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer
polic:y
th e
It is past time
for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once
(i n
some
Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g
make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major
19tl1
in
of
data
featu res
in
have
a vailab ility
major communicati on
helped
in
making
present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e
56
co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's
nuclear
superstates
are
often
seen
to
be
gJlemma
type
situation
th e
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
llardin1.
A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
political
questi oning
current
arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
le~sl), takes the following shape:•
Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain
j,rnt iff.-.d
111
te1·ms
of
dolng
ut
.eas t
where
and
are
so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns
en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those
arrangement s,
requirement s
(as
certainly
in
who
operate
under
the
muc h of the West) the basic
mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met .
•
l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have
these
requirement s.
For
guarnntce the prospect of
arrangement s.
nation-stat es,
good
meaningful
lives
those
to
under
their
yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
meet
at least in the North, can no longer
such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way.
support
to
A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before
its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ;
m.-iny
and
ceased
s tate
to
Furthermore a
acquiesc e
in
or
engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn) .
Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have
should
be
amended .
have
their
justificatio n,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
not all) natlon-stat es:
natio n- s t ate
f orfeited
it ls not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed .
There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control
stght
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of
wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
irn lerlyi.ng politica l
theory.
Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar
contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since
Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68).
r;7
rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both
c lai m
popular
Ln
and
mandate
ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! ,
power~.
put
a
value
hi3 lier
where,
nlrea y
illustrated
milita ry situa ti ons:
viol.1ted
the
'IH' t:.1k er s
on
some
have
more often , they act without it or
as
The sit1.1at-ton has been reached
sove reignty
nation al
survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210;
is
-✓ hl.'lfe
where
than
'nuc l ear:
they do on human
for copio us evidence see
Kupe r).
Thi s
by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
the
principles
of
just
warfare
repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples.
much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l
have
been
blatantJ.y
Such states have forfeited
respect or internal political obedienc e;
so, on other grounds, have many other state s .
It could just be, of course, as is oft en
a lt er nat ives,
that have
been
re s arc hlng
glimpsed,
though
of world go vernment).
dismissed,
for
s tirc withou
very
no possibly better alterna tives .
but
little
As
to
whether
all
has
such
are
no
been
expended
on
opportunity
do
to
work,
a nd
not
Appea r
to
give
we
alternative s
w~y
Down.
There
working tow ar d s the wea kening
es pec .i.ally
can
be
the
may
and
ha ve
been
given
know very little a bou t how humans
suff icicnt
org anisi ng and trying out alternative
accessi ble
alter natives
instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely
operate under su bstantially different arrangement s.
But,
t ime
arrangemen t s,
to
even
once
again,
proc eed
thos e
nuclear
very far on
of
the
mor e
be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in
breakdown
of
t he
large r
s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem.
ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd
while
t here
But alternat i ves the r e are,
effor t
toking the risk of being dogmati c;
little
d e ad ii ne[,
tha t
t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e
0
op Li. on
or
insinuated ,
nuclear
st a tes,
Thus i t woul d be
s oc i a l
arrangemen t s,
theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly
off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x.
But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of
dll emrna
to
th t:
exclusion of all olh .rs:
quite the contra r y .
t he
nuclear
We can no t only
afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r
seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her )
con st rain ts ;
Indeed, given the urge ncy,
the
direness
of
t he
si tuat i on ,
we
58
:,hou1d
~s
be
fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such
boRged
rlown
( a nd
v ery
on
a rms
limitations
ner,ot inti o n s
m"thod::i
should
si~nifica nt
be
undemocratic
perservered
concessions
unrepr•sentativ e)
between main nuclear states.
wi.th,
from
cert ai nly
tJ nd
and
the
attemp t s
superstates,
made
to
e.g .
No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even s uch
a
wring
further
jointly
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
new .
The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have
la rg e r
eve r y
liberal
or
huma nitarian
been
on
issue that has matte r ed:
from ou tside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or
nnd
it '
by
furnishing
self ·- organising
characte r is tically Bottom-Up
famiL l ar
cons i de rations
are
methods
an
alternatives
practically
wi t hout
which
never
virtually
upon
bypass
it ,
Top-Down.
Such
but part of the more general , and very effective,
case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
supply,
but
whic h
effectively and [or
can
almost
t hat
invariably
mnttcr
le ss
be
obta i ned, where required, more
e x pensive ly
without
them
(and
their
monopo1 i.es) •
In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions,
impo sed ,
or
acqulc s ced
and nuclear weapons .
frequently
from
time
being ,
movement
have
in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations
The opposition to th e
local
a nd
neighbourhood
esca lating
grou ps,
nuclear
fix
has
come
some of them now feder a ted
:1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate).
!we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1
that
These
groups
have
in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the
some
a ga inst
nuclear-free
nu c le a r
neighbourhoods .
equipment
The
patchwo r k
grass-roo ts
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American
Europe
will
E11 ropc wil l
these
mnke
it
a
saf er
place :
American shores.
nuclear
r emoved
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements
installations
It is
succeed
a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free.
g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced.
Ln
having
The chances of
mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and
Exc:c•p l
in
the
case
of
Eu ope,
where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication .
8Cr i ou s ly
And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is
failing
partly
g iant
fashioned
military-in dustrial allianc e.
inc r easJ. ngly
dominated
and
largely
domi na t ed
financially
ideo l ogically.
much
propped
exaggerat ed.
no t
nnd
c1d c quatcJJ
and
ec onomically
some
of
and,
in
some mea sure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
countered
as
mil.itary
by
The
means .
i .,"
in
basic
any
mode of
mUitary .
But
mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by
the Sovi e ts is a
problem,
t here
are
several
ways
other
predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it.
on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down
alternative
is
it domina ted economicall y , by the US A.
doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant
in sofa r
a
up by the NATO powers '
i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and
ls
anyon'
Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n
polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA ,
c a1;e
Does
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a
or Brasil say?
Th Rt
other?
social
methods
but
also
some
and
much
r eliance
on
These should include not
state-suppl ied
social
decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of
orga nlsat{ons,
than
me thods,
or
r estructurin g, such as
power
to
dispersed
local
mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
East e rn Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
r es tructuring
internal,
so
is
especiall y
situa tions, is to
st a t e-contrived
79.
break
make
any
military
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of
int e rch1nge,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
s abotage
the
West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove
For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of
some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which
appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need
be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options.
60
ot.hC'r
motl ves
fo r,
and
Western
popul ar
suppor t
Eu r ope ,
for
f or,
long
j.
much
Uitary
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean
nucl e ar
umbrella
for its defe nce .
Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least,
1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging
t he
world
in
the
i nterests
of
its own security .
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European
impositlon.
There
wo rl<l, wha t
LS N war
is
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing othe r parts of t he
Europe,
rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d.
which
has
long
exporte d
There ar e better. options
than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe.
-·-·- -----
--·- . ·--
80.
Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at
s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups
fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through
devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated
uni ts
it
in tegra t e d.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge
wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance,
sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c.
The net effect (as c.
Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of
militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high.
One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of
Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t
th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62).
Ycl
th
1 9 112 (wa r
r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly
untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence
r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to
military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81 .
In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l
supporting deterrenc e policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would b e
further co rroded.
In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas,
to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s
there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many
f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by
m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gi.( t
pro Jee ts .
If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e
l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e
versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended
to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g.
as part of the
strnteg y of the "cold war".
~
6J
What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press
b,oa rl out1 i.nc;
fof
::tccordingly
i.ic>
perceptive
t r ansarmamen t,
to
i.e.
conversion
outer
edges
of
graduat e d
the
movements,
alternative social defence arrangements).
Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go,
t hrough
in
i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction
an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more
wa y
clear
namely
all
the
disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's
s ur t~cc ,
inc luding
especially
Europe.
For
once
the
state is demoted , its
i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance
on
dec i s i on- making
its
diminished
de ci s ion-making - once all that is
happe n ) ,
one
in
duly
favour
of
allowed
more localised cont r ol and
for
(it
does
not
need
to
major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem
o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty .
Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty
has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken
we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
important
and
wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
stn r- c .
The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
s uch
as
mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation .
On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments
fr om
nat iona l
conce rni ng
part i cul a r.
dangers
.lndividual
also
and
grou p
rights
and
In
their
freedoms,
by
t he
that
nation- s tate .
matter
The
are
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
t hem,
as
sma ller
or
exclusivel y
nation-state is neith r sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not?
ri sks
are
civil
necessarily
th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties
nec e ss ary
pl ace
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None o f ti e rights and freedoms
g ua r a n te ed
disintegrate.
in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln:
To
be
sure,
th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not
---~------ ----82.
The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than
a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s.
The ste ps to disarmament ;ire
well-known , e.g.
the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o
modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as
Euro pe, et c .
62
hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of
moslly
to
wont
be
sure
t hat
nucle
or
arc
othe r
outsiders.
People
t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course,
i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be
Russ nns
natlon- states.
t
controlle d
by
Amiirican s
or
Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives
not a rational rout e to these ends .
In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way
dilemmas
the
as
nuclear
out
of
such
deo ntic
fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much
more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of
things
those
the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare
and a ut onomy;
wc,1pons.
but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by
The
main reasons are fam il iar :
threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values,
such
the
removal
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstanc es
as
welfare
and
autonomy,
for
many
cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in
a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another
with
nuclear
weapons ).
ideological
party
the
o pportunity
armed
There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons;
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
remain
welfare
for
(because
costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e
accompanyin g sec urity measures).
Thus
the
appropriate ly
de vi ces
and
nuclea r
fix
limiting
weapo ns
is
resolv ed ,
theoretical ly
it
can
deploy,
and
how ),
and
rate,
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be
s ince
any
sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear
con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty .
pra ctice ,
at
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e
au s pices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
aga i nsl the state .
Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since
sovereignt y
reduction
in
ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons .
83.
the
Ind eed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s.
Until
human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for
on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) .
to
far
with
the
superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further:
for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation.
i.nto
both
milita ry
s yst ems - and
( c ivil)
Rather
it
is
industrial production of the states
So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being
concerned.
ti ed
solidly
resisted by super states.
Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s
and
espec i ally
against
the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t
serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r.
variety
of
organ is ed
forms.
These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear
war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or
wld •l y,
from
such
s t e ps
ns
Once again it will take a
The
indir ect l y.
the
forms
of
action
range
block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the
rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s,
t he
to
withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes.
They inc l ud e as we ll the whole
r a ng e
nuclea r
facilities
i nstal l a tions
and
of
nonviolent
(methods
protest
which
method s
against
do
exclude
not
i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new
model
.
8'~
resistance and de f e nce organisations).
It is important to realise that petitioning of
powe r
state
representat i ves
and
ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored,
th e r esul t s disco u r aging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a mor e com prehensive politi c al
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in
alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially
alternative
defence
forms.
85
Sufficient
d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp.
85.
For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g.
fu rt her Appe ndix 2.
Martin .
As to what to do, see
64
APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE
or
MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Sch e ll, and to Anders.
A
ncrtes
of
nucl cn r
prophet s
lw a
pr odu c ed
a
EJ e r:les
of
ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of
l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the
nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith
the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary.
The most
wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th.
This skillful
piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep
phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is
not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for
a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect
j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
f or
i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e
defects .
Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage:
to selec t one example ,
consider
the
claim
that
' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e
[ human] spec i.es
nothing else t hat we undertake together can make
any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense
(p.1 73, rearranged ).
Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate
moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally
ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when
compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s
el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds.
Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor
spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r
presently
a rrang ed
nuclear
ho l oca usts .
l.
The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e
l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d
there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally
we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire
to
the
be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination,
A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being
r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s
a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t
t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity .
But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on
i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or
group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such:
a
l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted
w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it ,
While the
sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e)
w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a
poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s
rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all
f al l Rcy.
J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all
po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to
al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all:
t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1.
was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes,
two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers:
Sl.
Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on
arth (the
2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and
S2.
111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only
those of morality
a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon).
It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its
apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications
of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he
humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Th ·-- exDmp l e
Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real
po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does
t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl
appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of
con tracting the world to North Arner.lea .
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y
out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schel l's,
by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4
Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e
mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for
unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would
however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
o( S2 , se Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s
and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er
are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box .
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pando ra's box.
Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more
effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e
immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind
pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing
t'r""l .
66
th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense.
But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest
wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the
de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means
ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of
c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e .
Ther e are man y examples of
technological advances that have not been t ak en
adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have
be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special
a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns .
Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about
nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if
thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons
i t would not tell
aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and
the
limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work ,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the
" J.abnrn t.ories".
Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we
hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r
weapons in concer t, e . g .
for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or
firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war,
and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested
and lypothelical in chara ct er.
The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to
Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially.
This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2
being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply
penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended
by
Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to
be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl
Such ar e
all eged imp lications of ex tinction ;
but the fact is that the truths of
arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of
gods or g iraffes .
In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly
powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form.
Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and
tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving
pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not
e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording
to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an
impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In
imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the
strea m of huma n t.ime,
The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for
huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies
that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and
futur e
(p . 14 0) 6 •
Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s
time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass'
(p. lli3) .
But it: is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tens e s depend
on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but
no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other
time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o
other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons).
And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h
at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to
exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor
there were any human
beings.
- •••-- - - H•--- -
--- - - - - -
S.
Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry
ha s a wea pon it will u se it.
6.
Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future
repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73.
(etc.)
is
Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer
even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for
wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been,
if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e
would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n
mm1y
other org anisms would be differe n t.
Temporal themes do not la c k
' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion.
be
Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g
metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism
and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in
talki ng ab out what does not exist).
Thus, for example, Schell takes over
dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to
i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y
in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims.
The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main
tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory:
the simple and basic fact [si c!]
th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng
there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) .
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenche d
philo sophical
dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d
elsewhere 7.
Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans:
trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n
emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and
may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles ,
songs ,
Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to
p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss ,
and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of
the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not
worthwhi. le. 8
Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both.
'The death of
mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining
lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166)
a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a
per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even
if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d,
becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of
prec edi ng lif e and on the
very
questiona ble
represent ation
of
this
mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e .
From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an
absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that
' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly
'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+;
S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally
i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental
Ph i l oso n~
(ed i ted D.
Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social
Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980.
8.
Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of
the
argument
from
68
rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e .
1 011
Nor are all pe opl e
C<JuaJJy locked
in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d,
th e
po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR.
Nor,
---
1
i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme,
(in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go
theme, ,iccord ing to which
-S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really)
distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9
B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is
compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows:
'
t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with
nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding.
At
least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated
e l sewhere :
we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons
of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of
t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) .
But this is more of an
argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and
unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention
those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely
ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points:
we are
pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of
all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152).
And
again '[ as] perpe trators
we co nvey t he steady message
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless; that
it had bee n judg ed acceptable
fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign
against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as
is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply
dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e
less .
Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by
representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among
wi ll c :1
Schell
--- ·------·---- - - -
9.
An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is
responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on
of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r
re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng,
whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch
bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry,
a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election
especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l
o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al
processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of
political control .
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows:
'The
self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne
or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it
to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en
for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in
the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning .
Fur ther
't he world
chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194):
the world'?
This
connec ts
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fuodamental s, e .g.
for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against
soc inli.sm.
In the'
.nurse of
th:fA
argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s
assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the
end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) .
mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only
represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which
offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter
may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility,
st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated
th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation
generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s,
part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc.
(the whole ea r th
theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed,
unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scatter ed and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the
conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternative s.
At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Wa y Up.
So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar
simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns
( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the
r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it
is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to
military-indus trial organisation and ways of life .
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd ,
more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of
nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies .
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e
a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial
feature
Ls
the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear]
supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed
science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al
inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he
h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base,
the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state,
and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns
anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
ma le- female
re l ations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything
11.
Sec p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin.
The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er
analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164.
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph .
j
nee ds to be accompl ished at once;
and
the clus~~ - of damaging power and
do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of sta tes.
[n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats
th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st
between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics.
The teaching that
'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times,
ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134).
So 'stat es
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l
then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by
destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions .
Even if
all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is
13.
These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated
packag e,
compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
('TI C" rgy, sp ecr,
sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the
newer
Enlightenme nt (but
Faustian ) vlr tues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one
main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the
type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues .
Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the
Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel
maximls ation
of knowledge
paradoxes of omniscience .
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also
l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
t heo rems).
IL, .
R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also
drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral
science.
There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al
dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single,
source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out
of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and
those
who
control
them, for they are simply caught up by this
out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a
machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like
other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false .
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical
dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and
promoted , while other alternative s were not.
Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And
murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitran t
technologie s.
They also admit of being made t o look
r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if
it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation.
7l
claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the
r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context,
t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its
n uc l ear pol i cies . 15
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational.
As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war,
Schell leave s
us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the
right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187).
Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via
jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having
s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t
war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s
t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the
like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the
mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include
sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred.
It is on this basis th a t peace
ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as
•xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185).
Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to
undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means
arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately
th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous
c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
( p .189 ):
but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is
ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from
ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends
( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
a r e wo n).
It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being
defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no
o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just
wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand
improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional
war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme
t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between
na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme
d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
tha t coul d s e rv e , and
there is also th e possibility of more cooperative
behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n
assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit
as if war and violence were
thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for
winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are
pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of
understandl ngs , conventions and rules .
The y are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if no t a logic .
Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what
i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic]
plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd,
15.
Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context.
- j
72
rcnGonab.le, rational.
However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap
semn nti.cal trJ.ck .
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or
nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion
(as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning;
but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in,
extraloglca lly.
There are various ways these va lue assignments may
be
determined, to meet moral requirement s or not;
but in nuclear s tr ~tegic
planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In
fact,
'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general
commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he
policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying
with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he
emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng
11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i
viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat
of
thi s
unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd
locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends
on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the
Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l
be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t .
16.
Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own
ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of
deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions .
17.
Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g .
it
wishful]y
thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix
radioactiv ~ ashes .
has be en
f rom th e
The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing
mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e
one, but a n ideological one:
eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture
dominance of the riva i deo l ogy .
18.
An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n
appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"'negate" incoming USSR missiles .
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction;
although
involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of
intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention
to proceed.
Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an
intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed
how satisfactor ily in another matter
by a dis ti nction between
longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing
.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility
and on Regional ~~rategie ~
What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one
hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be .
So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In
presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt•
pol te l. cs .
The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl
r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states,
a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to
work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still
l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people
many for
th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of
othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s,
r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of
ce r tain soci al a r r angements .
Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t.
They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn
doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's
being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they
like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat
arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l
argument take s t he following lin es:
1.
The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a
d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore
2.
Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a
differenc e . Hence
3.
Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when
thint s go wr ong.
There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be
resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can "
t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e .
While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together
th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many
other i. nd lvidua ls do.
In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful
f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in
ma nner
M (e.g.
morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at
con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly.
Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al
s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in
ways t hat do make a differenc e.
An i ndividual is not exonerate d from
r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument .
While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are
di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of
more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical
di s obedi enc e.
An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in
Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards
defenc e
or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g.
nuc lear weapons productio n and
de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace
fun ds,
Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political
act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since
th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As
we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or
puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities.
1.
Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e
se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt
g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood.
- II
.,I<,'
Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under
Ro1ne
sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate
tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s,
etc., and o
such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the
state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e
Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing
cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individua l need bear.)
One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
wea pon s to, fo
example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e
wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the
we~pons for such war.
The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like
those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the
manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But
j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence
productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through
d e fence taxes .
The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the
a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be :
Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns?
Or with making
c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like?
What follows applies primarily to
people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people .
Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot
insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions ,
perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take
act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the
national defenc e effort?
It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no
dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be
re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ;
for in this case moral
obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are
alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does
not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the
respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further
moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts.
\n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear
war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s
working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n
this:
to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional
defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good
thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for
different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper
rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of
s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give
t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in
remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing
ower from ind ividuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little
more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to
contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly
mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is
Seattle
in
"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more
that ch:ing,.. tha t .
H
T
~~ s
intact,
and
deeper
(ecological )
sch emes
Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a
su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking
for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper
se t of cha nge s in the superstates .
For those whose very limited political
i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow
goa ]
ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er
c ontr ol .
The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e
diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln
much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers).
There
i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local
a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps
towards
s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance,
wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with
the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases
and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to
por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear
ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite
s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ).
That much is easy, in
pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e
Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is
preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been
a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint
Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is
e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of
d e t erre nc e ' • 6
More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that
economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e
Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone
not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of
1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included
Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al
readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e
5.
Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1.
How slight
t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA .
Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor
one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated:
from a
Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe
( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important.
A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy
will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series .
and
alternative s,
76
whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even
dh,r ,, r t i ng
"d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence
gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat
in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and
c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive.
I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers 8 ,
a nd
s hould be preparing now, socia lly and
e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war.
Howev er
ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and
inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s
favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield
poli t i c al powe r .
But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed
r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj
so
why bot he r".
One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of
Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic .
A
mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political
re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o
bcf;1l l
th e m.
These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to
o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them.
It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e :
rather i t is that i t seems
unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes
~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear.
war.
Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in
6.
Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on
conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The
point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture ,
as
Hawke~ notes.
The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as
also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms
c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war
fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role
can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is
not in any do u bt:
'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the
vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e
Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e;
quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17).
Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities
put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk.
' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s
Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate
int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A
prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f .
Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since
Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic
consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the
ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put
Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk
.for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s .
A
worthwhile
re presenta tive
government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s
tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain
t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t
wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term
co mme r c ial considerati ons.
7.
As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of
a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment.
8.
Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as
the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively
insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e.
77
achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t.
-yen those who believe
tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life)
do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessmen t: . 9
Richard Routle y*
9.
Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g.
Mart in .
There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for
example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so
dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical
scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts .
*
The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C.
Pigden , R.
Good in, N.
Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
cor r espondenc e with G.
Fo ley.
J.
Norma n has helped in its final
organisat ion.
The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in
Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y
in 1982 .
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1956;
to a$ A/i,.
G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren
Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE.
Situation ,
referred
c.u.
Beck,
T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71.
D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions
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in
Australia ,
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Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press,
1982, pp . 771-784.
R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon
s.
&
Schuster , New York, 1981 .
Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? Or, on trying to be rational about
war', Appl led Philosoph y, to appear.
nuclear
P. Berg, Re!:._1::habitlng a Sepa_rate Countr.y, Pl anet Drum, San Francisco , 1979.
M, Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlan
Pr inceton, Princeton UP, 19 74.
(eds.),
War
and
H.C. Coombs, 'The ec onomi c and social consequen ces of
(Septembe r 1983) 8-9.
Moral
nuclear
Responsi bility,
Natuni
war ',
5
A.i'!. Cox, Russian Roulette: the Superpowe r Game , Times Books, London, 1982 .
J. Dahlltz, Nuclear
Arms Control: with
McPhec Gribble, Melbourne , 1983.
effective
internati onal
G. Foley, ' Jonathan Schell : Genius - Phi losop her - Rewrite
Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS.
Man ',
agreemen ts.
t ypescript ,
G. Foley, Nucl ea r Prophets. The True and the False_, typescrip t, Bri sbane, 1983.
J. Galtung, The True Worlds, Free Press, New Yo r k, 1981.
D, Gautier, 'Deterren ce, maximisa tion , and rationali ty ' , in The Security Gamble:
Deterrenc e Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, (ed. D. MacLean), Rowman and
Littlefie ld , To t owa, N.J ., to appear ; also f ort hcoming in Et hics, April
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R.E. Goodin, 'Disarmam ent as a moral certainty ', Et_l2ics 95 ( 1984 ) , to appear.
P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic : The Theory
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of
Nuclear
Deterrenc e,
Ohio
State
N. Griffi n, ' Lifeboat USA', Discussio n Papers in Environme ntal Philosoph y fi8,
Research School of SociRl Sciences, Australia n National Universit y , 1983.
Grou nd Ze ro Orgnnisat ion, Nuclear War: What's lo It For
York, 1982.
You?
Pocke t Books , New
R. Bardin, 'Unilater al vers us mutual disarmame nt', Philosoph y and Public Affairs
12 (1983) 236-54.
J.E. Hare nnd C.B. Joynt, Ethi c s and Internati onal Affairs,
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R.M. ll;,r.e, Applicati ons
o[
Moral Philosop ~, M&Q1t1illan, l,~rn,hin , 1972.
R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decis~on, McGraw-H ill,
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New
H. Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960.
G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal
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of
Philosol?.!"1y
G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory
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and
75
(1978)
Decision
12
G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public
Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU.
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D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e',
Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979.
in
Moral
Problems
(ed.
James
D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' ,
Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM.
D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka
and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64.
a nd
Har de n',
Phil osopl'l_
B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to
appear.
A.A. Mazrui ,
A World Federatio n of Cultures: An African Pe rspective , Free Press,
New York , 1976.
J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War,
Affairs , New York, 1959.
Cou ncil
on
Reli.gi on
and
Inte r nati onal
T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre ', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24.
J. Narveson, 'Vlolence and War ', i n Regan, pp.109 -146.
National Conferenc e of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Wa r and Peace, ' The
challenge of peace: God's promise and our re s ponse' , Origins 12 (20) (1982)
306-328; refer red to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter '.
Oxford E_i~~lish Dictionar y, Oxford, 1971; referred to as QED.
B. Paski.ns and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth , London, 1979.
G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingen cies 4. Nuclear Disasters , A Rep o rt to
the Comn1issio n for the Future, Governmen t Printer, Wel lington, New Zealand,
1982.
P. Ramsay, The Just War : force and political responsib il itt, Scribner, New York,
1968.
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 .
T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980.
R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers
in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra,
1982.
R.
Routley and V. Routley , 'The
Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8.
irrefutab ility
of
ana rchism' ,
Social
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R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions'
in
Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984.
R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House,
York, 1982.
New
J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker,
February
48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This
P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth
t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book.
1,
8,
and
15,
1982,
pp.47-11 3,
T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 .
G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971.
D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983.
F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy
Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 .
T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An
19 72.
American
Tr agedy,
Times
(ed.
Books,
F.T.
London,
E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York,
198 1.
Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and
Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981.
probabi lity,
Austral ian
R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960.
M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview ,
Colorado . 1979.
Boulder ,
t
M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977.
R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970.
B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New
1982).
Society
S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982.
( Nov .
18,
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Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out
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Typescript (photocopy) draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'War and peace. 1: on the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 5. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University.
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Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'metaphysical fallout from the nuclear predicament', Philosophy & Social Criticism, 10(3-4):19-34, https://doi.org/10.1177/019145378401000303.
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Box 59: Nuclear
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Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Top Shelf > Pile 3
Box 60: Ethics and Theoretical Ethics
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Box 61, Item 1415: Notes on environmental ethics
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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Australian National University Office > Main Bookshelves > Fourth Shelf > Pile 2
Box 61: Ethics and Theoretical Ethics
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BRIEF CORRECTION VERSION
THE END OF THE WORLD
of the grandest philosophical problems are formulated In terms of the
Hany
way of the world, how the world Is, what there Is In the world - using, that vs,
an uncritical and pre-analytic notion of the world. Thus It Is with questcons as
to
the
nature
the world, the basic stuff and components of the world, the
of
arguments for realism, the Issue of universals and categories,
of
the
objectivity
and of ethics (e.g. whether values and directives are In the world);
values
thus It Is especially with the
foundations
semantics
of
supposedly
(meaning
being determined through what Is In or corresponds In the world); and so on. But
the
under
dissolves
notion
critical
Investigation, and therewith many grand
problems - often pressing on always on-going reductionist agendas such
of empiricism - are.
the
The
world
one
God,
as
that
If not resolved, at least relocated.
goes
the
the
way of the good life, the meaning of life, the Bomb,
one 1?^
...
theory,
(a)<^
. For there are many worlds, a
whole lattice of worlds, bottoming on the null world Into which all the apparent
richness encountered Is
worlds
projected,
allegedly
ascending
through
the
austere
of the nominalism and empiricism, through the richer world of Platonism,
to the very rich worlds of romanticism and Hegelianism, as lllustrated:-
Lattlce of putatively actual worlds (p-actuaI worIds)
Rn example of an austere world Is Smart's world, the world Smart would
see
for
adequate
Individuals
science
composed
by
(which
Is
set-theoretic
all
that
upon
to
a world of certain
counts),
operations
Uke
them,
but
with
no
properties or relations (except set membership), no propositions, no beliefs, no
lntent(s )lons,
categories,
no
values,
consciousness,
nothing
Insofar
else.
unlikely
null
world
everything
else
-
values,
as It matters, reduces; the rest comprises
constructions, projections, and the like. Rs
apparently
For
where
well
everything
-1-
as
the
bottom
world,
the
Is somehow fabricated from
�nothing (even extreme Idealists
contractions
start
projections),
and
with
batch
some
Ideas
of
their
tor
Is a top world, but a trivial one which
there
Includes everything, all properties true and false and other, all
objects
both
as existing and not, etc.
Before details proceed very far, then, distinctions are usually Introduced,
belongs In a world, to Its domain or one of Its domains, and what
what
between
holds In It In one way or another
ordinance,
the
In
outlined
type
slgnlfleantly,
(truly,
Imperatively
or
by
This refinement leads to a more complex theory of worlds (of
etc.).
which Integrates the apparently separate worlds of
JB)
Wittgenstein’s Tractalus,
“the" world that comprises the domain of objects
with
“the" world as everything that Is the case, the totality of true propositions or
of facts. But the salient point Is that after this Integrating there remain many
worlds,
many not merely possible and Impossible worlds, but many candidates for
"the" actual world, wang actual worlds1. For
Instance, whatever physically
adequate worlds are contained In the selected actual world of a theory will also
be actual.
If Incomplete.
These
If that s what they are, do not prevent us
re levatIons,
distressing
speaking as we normally do, sensibly and significantly, of and about the
any
than
more
fact that there are several sorts and styles of meaningful
the
Ilves along with a variety of modern lifestyles that are
logical particles (Imp I les, not, every,
most
very
not
all
at
or
us from thinking and talking about the meaning of life. Like
stops
meaningful,
world,
...), the world Is a determinable,
with the worlds of the refined lattice Its determinates.
this
By
protested,
that's
ways
and
rendering
of
the world we
unique enough?!
we share’,
empiricists
philosophers,
pretty mad, and ready to
especially, are usually
objections
earlier,
stage,or
the
world
burst
In
and
realists
with a
unique. Surely,
suitably
though perhaps narrowing the class of determinates under
us,
the world
But descriptions like the world we live In ,
are still far from uniquely discriminating.
It s
and around
live In, the world we share, out there
of
range
the world ,
That Is to forget about culture for
one thing; much depends on who we are, which subculture
belong
we
to.
Tribal
will find themselves In a spIrIt-saturated landscape, where Qulneans
aborigines
live In a highly Impoverished '‘land". (But the aborigines
mistake. But mistake or not, either
can
be
what
Is
but
about
spoken
Is
a
primitive
those
by
speaking about the world In which they dwell. )
There’s
unless
we re
something
phenomenologlstIc
something else. That, the
theories,
there,
out
which
theories, though
Is
there
Idealistic),
objection
what
Is
has
a
Isn't there? Something or other (we grant,
but
continues,
Is
uniquely
to
determining jA Is
conflate
worlds
with
been going on here all along. No worlds are not
partial
Isomorphism.
But
worlds
too
have
a
multiplicity, [to elaborate]
What Is neglected Is that ’world’
Itself Is
-2-
a
theoretical
term,
not
an
�observational
one,
there are Important observational components In any
though
determination of this or that world. There can be
well as one (actual) world theory,
since
theories
multiple
world
theories
as
Indeed not merely as well as but better than,
data
commonsense
match
multiple
better,
and only defective
ontological themes force retreat to one world theories.
to save the world, from radical fragmentat Ion, Ua Ismann
Perhaps
levels of descriptions and Ryle talked
doubt,
a
given
sizeable
enough
thick
bag
high
enough,
successful
of
of
thin
and
thick
talked of
No
descriptions.
enough level of worlds? or corresponding
reductions, this sort of trick will work,
[explain trick] But It Is not how we do commonly talk. Ue talk - and
this
Just
two world sort of talk was what the levels of description theory was designed to
get
of - of the physicists' (or Eddington's) world and the commonsense (or
rid
StebbIngs') world, find
descriptions do describe,
look
we
when
at
what
correspond Ing
the
levels
of
It Is these different worlds.
i
i
i
»
If a determinate world Is not given, what guides selection Is the choice of
base
for
world
3nd
semantical
philosophical
Investigations.
As for theory
choice, a range of factors do so. But there Is considerable virtue In taking the
object-theoretic
minimizing
direction,
which
Is
dlametrIcally
opposed
the
to
main
directIonof empirical and positivistic philosophy, namely the way
of richness,
diversity
ecologies I-type
and
features,
complexity.
subject
The
recipe
Is:
Satlslze
those
on
naturally to common-sens lea I constraints on
what exists and what Is true.
Richard Sy Ivan
NOTES
1.
At
least on 3 pluralist view of things, such as Is taken In PPP. Of course
any non-trlvlal theory will rule
some
rivals
centrally true from Its stance. For Instance
Platonic
out
as
not
object-theory
true
so
or
not
rules
out
worlds with their existent universals and Lewis s theory wtth Its
Implausible
existent counterpart worlds. (These other theories are at best
plural1stIcally-true).
2.
While
Ualsmann's
levels or strata are discrete, Ryle s account appears to-
allow for a continuous alternative. Ryle s suggestions
are
explained
and
applied In Ceertz, p.Bff.
3.
Hence the max ImIzIng of reductions? which has great technical appeal.
I*.
As will be explained In a later version of this paper, the theory of worlds
3-
�given has very little In common with Goodman s ways of world Making.
Indeed
Goodman’s fletlonallsm-cum-conventlonallsm will be severely criticised.
REFERENCES
C. Geertz, The InterpretatIon of Cultures, Basic Books, Hew York, 1373.
N. GoodMan, Problems and Projects, BObbs-Merrlll, New York,
N. GoodMan, Ways of Uorldmaklng, Harvester, Sussex,
R. Rout ley,
1372.
1378.
Exploring Melnong's Jungle and Beyond,
Research
School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1380; referred to as JB.
6. Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume 2
the relevant essays are
J
Thinking and
reflecting
and
The
thinking
of
thoughts ’ .
R. Sylvan,
Philosophy,
politics
and
pluralism:
relevant
modellings
and
arguments , Research Series In Logic and Metaphysics #2, Research bchool of
Social Sciences, Australian National University,
1385; referred to as PPP.
A.
F. Ualsmann,
Flew)/Serles , Blackwell, Oxford,
-4-
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Draft Papers
Description
An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
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BRIEF CORRECTION VERSION
THE END OF THE WORLD
of the grandest philosophical problems are formulated In terms of the
Hany
way of the world, how the world Is, what there Is In the world - using, that vs,
an uncritical and pre-analytic notion of the world. Thus It Is with questcons as
to
the
nature
the world, the basic stuff and components of the world, the
of
arguments for realism, the Issue of universals and categories,
of
the
objectivity
and of ethics (e.g. whether values and directives are In the world);
values
thus It Is especially with the
foundations
semantics
of
supposedly
(meaning
being determined through what Is In or corresponds In the world); and so on. But
the
under
dissolves
notion
critical
Investigation, and therewith many grand
problems - often pressing on always on-going reductionist agendas such
of empiricism - are.
the
The
world
one
God,
as
that
If not resolved, at least relocated.
goes
the
the
way of the good life, the meaning of life, the Bomb,
one 1?^
...
theory,
(a)<^
. For there are many worlds, a
whole lattice of worlds, bottoming on the null world Into which all the apparent
richness encountered Is
worlds
projected,
allegedly
ascending
through
the
austere
of the nominalism and empiricism, through the richer world of Platonism,
to the very rich worlds of romanticism and Hegelianism, as lllustrated:-
Lattlce of putatively actual worlds (p-actuaI worIds)
Rn example of an austere world Is Smart's world, the world Smart would
see
for
adequate
Individuals
science
composed
by
(which
Is
set-theoretic
all
that
upon
to
a world of certain
counts),
operations
Uke
them,
but
with
no
properties or relations (except set membership), no propositions, no beliefs, no
lntent(s )lons,
categories,
no
values,
consciousness,
nothing
Insofar
else.
unlikely
null
world
everything
else
-
values,
as It matters, reduces; the rest comprises
constructions, projections, and the like. Rs
apparently
For
where
well
everything
-1-
as
the
bottom
world,
the
Is somehow fabricated from
nothing (even extreme Idealists
contractions
start
projections),
and
with
batch
some
Ideas
of
their
tor
Is a top world, but a trivial one which
there
Includes everything, all properties true and false and other, all
objects
both
as existing and not, etc.
Before details proceed very far, then, distinctions are usually Introduced,
belongs In a world, to Its domain or one of Its domains, and what
what
between
holds In It In one way or another
ordinance,
the
In
outlined
type
slgnlfleantly,
(truly,
Imperatively
or
by
This refinement leads to a more complex theory of worlds (of
etc.).
which Integrates the apparently separate worlds of
JB)
Wittgenstein’s Tractalus,
“the" world that comprises the domain of objects
with
“the" world as everything that Is the case, the totality of true propositions or
of facts. But the salient point Is that after this Integrating there remain many
worlds,
many not merely possible and Impossible worlds, but many candidates for
"the" actual world, wang actual worlds1. For
Instance, whatever physically
adequate worlds are contained In the selected actual world of a theory will also
be actual.
If Incomplete.
These
If that s what they are, do not prevent us
re levatIons,
distressing
speaking as we normally do, sensibly and significantly, of and about the
any
than
more
fact that there are several sorts and styles of meaningful
the
Ilves along with a variety of modern lifestyles that are
logical particles (Imp I les, not, every,
most
very
not
all
at
or
us from thinking and talking about the meaning of life. Like
stops
meaningful,
world,
...), the world Is a determinable,
with the worlds of the refined lattice Its determinates.
this
By
protested,
that's
ways
and
rendering
of
the world we
unique enough?!
we share’,
empiricists
philosophers,
pretty mad, and ready to
especially, are usually
objections
earlier,
stage,or
the
world
burst
In
and
realists
with a
unique. Surely,
suitably
though perhaps narrowing the class of determinates under
us,
the world
But descriptions like the world we live In ,
are still far from uniquely discriminating.
It s
and around
live In, the world we share, out there
of
range
the world ,
That Is to forget about culture for
one thing; much depends on who we are, which subculture
belong
we
to.
Tribal
will find themselves In a spIrIt-saturated landscape, where Qulneans
aborigines
live In a highly Impoverished '‘land". (But the aborigines
mistake. But mistake or not, either
can
be
what
Is
but
about
spoken
Is
a
primitive
those
by
speaking about the world In which they dwell. )
There’s
unless
we re
something
phenomenologlstIc
something else. That, the
theories,
there,
out
which
theories, though
Is
there
Idealistic),
objection
what
Is
has
a
Isn't there? Something or other (we grant,
but
continues,
Is
uniquely
to
determining jA Is
conflate
worlds
with
been going on here all along. No worlds are not
partial
Isomorphism.
But
worlds
too
have
a
multiplicity, [to elaborate]
What Is neglected Is that ’world’
Itself Is
-2-
a
theoretical
term,
not
an
observational
one,
there are Important observational components In any
though
determination of this or that world. There can be
well as one (actual) world theory,
since
theories
multiple
world
theories
as
Indeed not merely as well as but better than,
data
commonsense
match
multiple
better,
and only defective
ontological themes force retreat to one world theories.
to save the world, from radical fragmentat Ion, Ua Ismann
Perhaps
levels of descriptions and Ryle talked
doubt,
a
given
sizeable
enough
thick
bag
high
enough,
successful
of
of
thin
and
thick
talked of
No
descriptions.
enough level of worlds? or corresponding
reductions, this sort of trick will work,
[explain trick] But It Is not how we do commonly talk. Ue talk - and
this
Just
two world sort of talk was what the levels of description theory was designed to
get
of - of the physicists' (or Eddington's) world and the commonsense (or
rid
StebbIngs') world, find
descriptions do describe,
look
we
when
at
what
correspond Ing
the
levels
of
It Is these different worlds.
i
i
i
»
If a determinate world Is not given, what guides selection Is the choice of
base
for
world
3nd
semantical
philosophical
Investigations.
As for theory
choice, a range of factors do so. But there Is considerable virtue In taking the
object-theoretic
minimizing
direction,
which
Is
dlametrIcally
opposed
the
to
main
directIonof empirical and positivistic philosophy, namely the way
of richness,
diversity
ecologies I-type
and
features,
complexity.
subject
The
recipe
Is:
Satlslze
those
on
naturally to common-sens lea I constraints on
what exists and what Is true.
Richard Sy Ivan
NOTES
1.
At
least on 3 pluralist view of things, such as Is taken In PPP. Of course
any non-trlvlal theory will rule
some
rivals
centrally true from Its stance. For Instance
Platonic
out
as
not
object-theory
true
so
or
not
rules
out
worlds with their existent universals and Lewis s theory wtth Its
Implausible
existent counterpart worlds. (These other theories are at best
plural1stIcally-true).
2.
While
Ualsmann's
levels or strata are discrete, Ryle s account appears to-
allow for a continuous alternative. Ryle s suggestions
are
explained
and
applied In Ceertz, p.Bff.
3.
Hence the max ImIzIng of reductions? which has great technical appeal.
I*.
As will be explained In a later version of this paper, the theory of worlds
3-
given has very little In common with Goodman s ways of world Making.
Indeed
Goodman’s fletlonallsm-cum-conventlonallsm will be severely criticised.
REFERENCES
C. Geertz, The InterpretatIon of Cultures, Basic Books, Hew York, 1373.
N. GoodMan, Problems and Projects, BObbs-Merrlll, New York,
N. GoodMan, Ways of Uorldmaklng, Harvester, Sussex,
R. Rout ley,
1372.
1378.
Exploring Melnong's Jungle and Beyond,
Research
School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1380; referred to as JB.
6. Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume 2
the relevant essays are
J
Thinking and
reflecting
and
The
thinking
of
thoughts ’ .
R. Sylvan,
Philosophy,
politics
and
pluralism:
relevant
modellings
and
arguments , Research Series In Logic and Metaphysics #2, Research bchool of
Social Sciences, Australian National University,
1385; referred to as PPP.
A.
F. Ualsmann,
Flew)/Serles , Blackwell, Oxford,
-4-
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Box 69: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes
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https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/67b27de117524030d45b6db0a625bad2.pdf
a92ad477704fdf667fdab4a346c2f0f2
PDF Text
Text
WORKING DRAFT
CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
Many of you know that Canberra was originally
Griffin.
This
talk
is
dedicated
by
designed
simply
not
an
key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially
making
Servant
the
Nature
of
Man,
'land
to
...
be
the
accorded
He rejected
'concentration
discerned instead elements of a
and
His approach was holistic, and
different 'consciousness' (the word is his).
took
the
and
architect
designer but one of Australia’s early deeper ecologists.
landscape
Burley
You may not know that Griffin, an
to him.
American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was
on
Walter
respect
he
due to a highly developed and
perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or
as
mere section of a map’.
a
Canberra, now no mere section of map, is perhaps
the best approximation anywhere to a deeper ecological city;
but it is not only
removed from Griffin’s original conception but far from deep ecological ideals.
*
*
*
*
*
The objective of the larger investigation, of which this
is
part,
to
gauge
the
extent
to
Australian
which
contrasted with American culture, contains developable
will
underpin
under which many
a
sketches
a
culture, especially as
elements
(seeds)
which
different political framework from the bastardised capitalism
people
presently
labour
and
local
environment
frequently
It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the
suffers.
political course
interested
in
charted
as
environmentally
alternative structures:
or
socially
disastrous
to
be
it is enough, for example, to view them
as far from satisfactory, or very far from
worlds,
talk
those
of
the
best
of
attainable
to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to
�increasing ecological resistance [negative action j against environment
like^and ecological construction [direct positive action].
the
and
vandalism^/
There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that
for
the
especially
hope,
damage^?,
grounds
give
remarkable level of environmental activism that has
It is worth trying to pull together
somehow emerged among the people.
some
of
these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts,
and increasing the level of concern and activism.
Without doubt
attitudes
different
towards
practices,
and
cultures
have
the
approaches,
different
different
Indeed appreciation of,
environment.
practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally
dependent:
for
compare,
American Jews and American Indians.
instance,
Most
nonimperial cultures had ~ and where they still survive uncorrupted still havi.
less
much
exploitative
industrial
and
to
not
practices
whose
North,
exploitation
approaches
the
merely
environmental
control
lost
their
of
local
typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination.
in
But occasionally, notably
retained
gross
permit
the
of
those
than
but to a marked extent depend upon such practices.
vandalism
Mostly these more benign cultures have however
environments,
environment
sufficient
autonomy
the
to
adjacent
Pacific,
regional
cultures
have
slow or even halt environmental destruction.
Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked
in
Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land.
One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially
in
the
South,
is
to
foster
both
sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy;
socialism
and
indigenous
certain
for
cultural
instance
land rights movements.
differences
to
support
way
of
Melanesian
For, where the cultures have
not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is
rapid
and, more
a
comparatively
activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social
�The question arises whether
paradigms.
elsewhere
the
in
also
can
differences
serve
Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in
transition to different
less
environmentally
social
exploitative
paradigms.
transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture.
a
Such
cultural
Can
features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite
differences?
In the case of Australia, a basis
is
there
both
the / land
in
</* U
culture,
and things
and
the
<L-
appear sufficiently different from that in the cultures
A
of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for
Of
the
for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some
need
semblance of integrity, there is little doubt.
that
is,
there
differentiation.
cultural
in
is
It
platitudinous
becoming
the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many
local natural environments and ecosystems
unless
the
in
we
Antipodes
break
from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised
loose
work
North and
towards
establishment
of
a
elements of regionalism in the North, despite a
in
some
parts,
rising
tide
war.
of
For despite
environmental
the industrialised North still appears in the grip of
established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of
nuclear
environmentally
culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy.
destructive
concern
less
different
disaster,
such
Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority
movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go
largely
alone
as
Nor
is
it
task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in
the
Australia because as well as the
advantage
of
the
ground
and
its
southern
KJ
and seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. But
A
like, most] new and more fragile developments they need attention and^if speedy
location,
careful
cultivation
Such
a task is rendered urgent also by other matters of
0
environmental and human concern, not
but
colossal
biological
losses
st the gathering signs of
nuclear
ykthrough rapid destruction of, e.g.
r
3
war,
tropical
�rainforests, indeed, mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere
humans now establish.
How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to
&
A ;
alter approaches to the environment? As i/ the title of the ^lk it operates in
organising principles
L
okr the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge^which lifts the
the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like
and
design
environmental way on the ropes of regional
links
A
culture.
working
picture
that
the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like
most images of the more abstract distorts across
the
is
that
of
a
bridge
suspension
the gap often separating people from the natural environment.
There are
people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment,
like
so
(Of course people may be part of the natural environment:
exclude ' -hew
that
important
overlap.)
The
different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges
the
picture
doesn’t
connecting bridges may be of very
good
for
careful
foot
traffic,
�through
the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech
bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans.
the
But it
is
structure of all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter
The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons
particularly.
ot
culture if you will.
So
different
witii
different
cultures,
carrying
bridges
see the,component in the middle
d
philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of
approaches.
It
is
better
different
to
the
nuts
and bolts and rivets of the bridges, but rather as the design and engineering of
the structures.
types,
computing
It has its analytical parts, looking at the
the
loads
stresses
and
on them;
them
- the social paradigms embedded in the cultures.
select
substructures
Philosophy, the link
subject is then the architecture and engineering of the business.
5
their
and it also has its more
holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and
of
components,
�philosophy
figuratively,
Less
assumptions
that is, to be considered for
deep ecology, asks deeper
of
assumptions
assumptions
replacement,
and
deeper
questions,
of
example
free
fundamenta]
the
other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions
all
paradigms.
for
extracting
embodied in a culture or social way or life, i.e.
social
operative
Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not
or marxist philosophies.
enterprise
the
assembles
ancl
culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions,
a
of
isolates
In
what are sometimes called the
tills respect philosophy - which includes much more than
conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects,
logic,
as
the
science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of
arguments and methodology of all other sciences.
philosophical
investigation
1'he
assumptions
deeper
such
when put together yield a philosophy in
extracts,
ci c^y
the more popular sense (as e.g.
in philosophy of life or , the
free
enterprise
4
philosophy):
any
in
case
the
will be a philosophical theory or the
result
rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done.
By largely philosophical investigation then,
of
assumptions
the
techniques we try
with
contrasted
operative
test
to
apparent
we
trij.ce
Northern social paradigms;
the
adequacy
social
of
and
especially
as
alternatives with some environmental support
So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some
base.
results are illustrated in diagram^
•
J.
s.
Details of other positions, the old /and
culture
positions
(as
typically
offer
environmental
a
projected),
transition
alternative
And
from
are
left
and
the
counter
included in the diagram
the
while
new
the
dominant
it
may
Wester/l paradigm
appear
to
indeed is - a long
political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative,
of
the
and by sociological
assemblage,
the
organise
the
intermediate
steps is not so great;
each
and the steps can, and have, been
�To illustrate the way transitions can
taken one at a time.
of the first line (row) in macro-economic form.
details
construed
components
package typically includes
environmient ,
as
this
to
minimal
quality
life
of
But the
and
with subtractions for externalities such as noise
and
and
pollution,
perhaps
*--- —,
M
with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness.
this way we arrive si Mew left thinking with the objective
subject
to considerable reservations, X(RR).
of
material
goes
back
philosophy;
Greek
to
In
growth
The real break however comes with
members of the counterculture, the hippies and Yippiesy for example, though
idea
the
objective functin to be maximized gets much complicated,
A
the
so
such
in a rough way stanadard of living.
representing
as
consider
The dominant objective
is to maximize some economic package of goods and services
being
made,
be
the
namely, the abandonment of growth and
maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing
goals
At
the macroeconopic level, the idea gets^represented by the goal of a steady-state
or sustain able economy, though the alternative environmental objective will
be
for something much less inflexible and ^rationalistic than economists have so tar
sketched.
I
In
fact
the
"emerging
steady-state
paradigm",
which
Daly/
'
for
example^/advocates, affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm,
differing only as to growth and
paradigms
would include
steady state position;
remove
the
transition.
convenient
reserves
themes.
But
a
fuller
diagram
of
among others such advanced corporate capitalism - the
so it would involve a
JI simplification
over
higher-dimensional
diagram,
and
of the two dimensional left-right
However, the high" dimensional diagram indicates how a better argued
A
transition ,can be made;
essentially by combining steady-state arguments against
0
macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions with the Left -yocialist case against
Even so, even with the combin/catioms, which does touch
themes.
Cl
human relations , ^anthropocentric framework would not have been left behind,
microeconomic
T
deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter
7
G-fiP
�Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying
model takes us towards the following familiar picture:
social
society consists
of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g.
they are not
genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort
of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have
(e.g.
certain
a
to
ability
few
but
of
these
At bottom, these individuals have
calculate).
utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize;
and
competitive (by virtue of scarcity).
are
they
so
that they are possessive, and possess
capital.
The
distinctive
the
means
Their other feature is
production,
of
to
this
about
self-interested
Features
There is nothing compulsory, or
Individuals
picture.
this
are
individuals
competing
these
approximating
matter
of
particularly
nurture,
abstract
nature.
not
of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result oi
training, not human nature, as a comparison
where
their
To ensure
the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive
is
apparatus of the (minimal) state.
natural,
land,
of the American model is of course is that
feature
individuals can separately accumulate the means of production.
entitlement
e.g.
individuals
are
like
not
helps
this,
individuals embody rationality either:
with
othei'
show.
traditional
cultures,
lior do these archtypal
only a question-begging
argument
leads
to the American model as something naturally required.
The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model.
introduces
certain
The
relations.
human
chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they
do
not
left
omit
models
are
social
The left
still
human
relations:
the
further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to
full community relations,
independent
value.
That
recognising
is
a
creatures
and
nonhuman
things
as
of
bigger step, a step that no Western political
institutions make requisite allowance
for,
Western value theories do not accommodate.
8
and
that
mainstream
underpinning
�The arguments from traditional cultures can also be
illustrated
the
and
paradigms
cultures such as those
models
Melanesia
of
them.
underlie
that
and
directed
Polynesia,
the
In traditional
of
many
against
the
operative
assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted.
Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there
is
good
prospect
more
thwarting
of
destructive practices.
environmentally
Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed.
But much of the
inhabited
and
there are
already
observable
features
distinctive
unscathed
World
in
questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial
other,
even
or
lesser,
of
features
not exhaust features of the accompanying
out
leave
There are
cultures
significant
as
artistic
and
intellectual
to
icing.
be
This
discerned,
sure,
does
affords
European
culture
This
alternatives.
a
have
an
somewhat
as
that
in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian
gives
the
basis
of
the
aesthetic
route
to
environmental
But there are as well more important omissions and discrepancies
In particular, the dominant American paradigm
religion;
but
Northern
features.
precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such
evidenced
So
conspicuous
other
usually
cultural
industrial culture, though economically dominated
accompanying
classes
The incomplete social paradigms outlined do
cultural features to be considered
surprisingly
Although
the cultures will have to be invoked if
change in approach is to be hastened in this way.
rather
now
cultures,
World
New
is
Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently
dominant
the
less
environmentally
peoples of predominantly European stock.
by
governed
of
assumptions
and
New
also
neglected
are
many
prominent values of American culture.
9
omits
reference
to
established
of the connected older and formerly more
�The
American
search
tor
environmentally
acceptable
has
alternatives
regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or
Indeed the primary attempts to
spiritual elements, and associated past values .
"the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken
establish
a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way.
and
sample
(For example, Nash provides a
list of the books he considers important in the rise of the
representative
virtually all that proceed beyond ecology
new environmentalism:
depend
on
an
appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.)
In the context of American culture the appeal
something
to
be
said for it.
to
proportion
do
act
in
accordance
and, unlike
with
response.
And, secondly, religious values do clash with
dominant
Northern
paradigm.
has
features
For, firstly, a high proportion of the American
population profess some active religious commitment;
substantial
religious
This
sort
of
that
conflict
the
was
Australia,
socially
precepts
approved
of
perceived,
considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the
a
case
the
with
of
Melanesian society (p.9):
The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was
...
torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which
carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of
enlightened self-interest.
Both aspects were a direct contradiction
of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of
Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the
minds of the people.
While the Christian religion was widely
compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism,
with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another,
it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow.
It ran also contrary to the
religion
of
individualism
and
self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was
followed by the majority of Europeans ...
It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant
Northern
paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved
it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans.
a
partial answer:
compartmentalisation.
10
There is
Religion tor most is a separate thing
�fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not
upset
the
business
standard
week.
such as human poverty:
to
Thus for most believers religion does not
Only for a minority does it directly
penetrate deep.
escape
touch
immediate
matters
why should we expect it to work for the Environment?
Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious
perceptions
the
within
American population, and^reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter
things.
but even if some of the effects of a religious return would
beneficial,
and
domination
nature
were
be
negative
Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset.
with any depth to it appears most unlikely.
scientific
world
Unless moreover the position
abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious
traditions the environmental effects would
"the
view".
scientific
(as
for
the case for its
much
virtue
front-end-in.
shape.
trying
in
It
return
to
the
There
is
world
view
in
such
great
is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or
social
it is that this perspective, a paradigm,
paradigm.
So
incorporates
it is far from uniquely determined.
more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g.
view).
rival
view with these sorts of weaknesses
But nor is the so called scientific
cannot account for;
dominant
to
the
Consider, for instance, the matter of the
existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc.
no
testifies).
Religion in America has lost out to
In part it failed deservedly:
view could explain.
Watt
In any case such a reversal
world view was seriously deficient and it did not account
more
highly
be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a
to
narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable.
of
be
a richer
intensional
the
There are
scientific
These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking
a theological way.
11
�There is a
set
second
quasi-religious
character
reasons
of
of
some
not
tor
sort,
a
These
the
on
turn
irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion
success.
is unlikely to have much
understood
as
(the
a
barely relevant
generally
impose
Pantheistic or
Jewish,
Christian,
whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia.
strongly
to
endeavouring
first)
’.
irreligious
Australia,
post-Christian
has
it
society, in which religion (is)
Even if that formulation
character
of
understanding much else about the culture,
the
e.g.
an
is
the
exaggeration
is a fact and is the
society
the
’best
is
said,
been
curious
to
extent
the
state’s protrusion into Australian social life.
If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach
to
hastened j paradigm
transition - and a related approach through mysticism or
transcen f1 ism excluded for analogous reasons and because of the
the
earthiness
There are other significant features
culture - what alternatives are open?
of the culture running against major elements of the dominant Western
which
can
be
perhaps
applied
approaches to turn matters
features
of
the
culture
around.
to
more
much
detach
effectively
indicate
To
of
from
than
quasi-religious
prospects
the
paradigms,
dominant
paradigm,
of
applying
consider how
Australian culture contrasts with American.
Australian mainstream culture
transition
from
the
dominant
is
already
American
political left has much stronger support in
difficult
to
some
culture.
Australia
way
along
the
leftward
is not merely that the
It
than
USA.
It
is
not
indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show
its left—displacement from the dominant Western paradigm.
some elements of the contrast:-
12
The next table
lists
�TABLE 2.
CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE
—-- —>
SCALE OF INCREASE
individualistic ethos
inacceptability of socialist institutions
inegalitarian attitudes
POSITIVE
inegalitarian practices
ITEMS (PER
level of consumerism
CAPITA
maximization quest
WHERE
imperialist drive
relevant)
extent of violence
police and military commitment
high technology involvement
functional rationality
environmental inactivism
USA
AUSTRALIA
SCALE OF
INCREASE
level of urbanisation
legal obstacles to environmental action
NEGATIVE
{practices, such as dedication of
wilderness
ITEMS
administrative delays in implementing
environmental practices, such as
pollution requirements, recycling, etc.
Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items
13
in
the
�contrast.
themes
Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on
first
for
opposed to American, it appears that prospects
indeed
This
better.
important
environmental
spectators
the
applying
culture
are
theme requires ela^boration and confirmation.
The task can profitably be combined with others:
for
the
rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as
of
diagram
in
an
with
there is much work
empirical
here
both
and for environmental
bent
activists.
A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires
and their eommund'B, distinguishing
theses:
/
Let us focus on transition theses,
ought to be done (ideologically)
what
and
normative
and
factual
transition
factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is
weak
A
firstly
confirmation,
^/undergoing a transition away
from
the
dominant
confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g.
better results could be obtained in Australia;
paradigm,
social
has
been
Presumably similar or
Marsh).
but appropriate samplings of the
community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being
a
neglected
undoubtedly
field
in
Another
Australia.
weak
transition
factual
thesis
holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the
also
ertreii human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia
have
to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm,
come
but again comparative—figures
sociological
work
are
entirely
of
data
to
Though
impressionistic
tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia
than OSA - indeed more intensive than
piece
lacking.
anywhere
else,
an
immensely
build upon - we lack solid confirmation.
sociogeographers to do.
14
important
There is much for
�Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been
largely
taken
granted,
for
that
generally, l&ght to^undergoing
Western
and
paradigms
an
towards
and
to
rguments.
the
repeat
furthermore
alternative.
environmental
thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and
time
dominant
from
away
variations (such as those of advocated corporate
their
capitalism an.d of the post-industrial society) ,
transitivity*
shift,
paradigm
major
a
culture, indeed Western culture
Australian
to
ought
be
complex normative
That
isn’t
there
fortunately
It is also argued against there, but> to sum up
the opposition case, unconvincingly.
Given then that the transition is going on,
and
to
ought
going
be
on,
ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how
indeed
do environmental activists
emerging
are
enough.
clear
it
encourage
in
Australia.
Preliminary
answers
Not only should activists be continuing with what
I
they
are
directing
doing
organisations
the
and
environmental
and
those
like,
to
supposed
action
(public)
further
them,
of
industrial
prluwryprimarily,
regulate
not merely by membership drives and environmental
influence
to
and
swing
the
should
education.
be
dominant^ regional culture , for the
w
potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change
been achieved.
sources
They should also be aiming to increase their support bases , but
organisations.
endeavouring
the
against
than
has
thus/
There are two major parts to this further practice which can run
in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part:
0
More negatively.it
z
involves
curring
down
and
countering
the
flow
propaganda
in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especiall
the North.
That is important in reversing the extent
It
includes
Northern
from
co-^option
a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such
as gently lopping
anti-American
of
of
off
the
tall
poppies
and anti-Nor them activities.
15
pedalling
the
stuff,
and
careful
The latter practices (which should
�not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well
aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence
environmental
regional
other
with
policies
•
More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other
despised
features
It
alternative paradigms
commonly
is
intellectuals
Northern
are,
of
course,
like
those
nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones,
of
appreciation
natural
local
The features to tye
Lawrence).
cultural characters are held (e.g
I
the
egalitarian,
along
environments.
with
the
consider the effects of these, decently applied, in
or
antiauthoritarian,
A
rapidly increasing
taken
to
things,
conomics, in local
As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a pain problem being its I hra/sv
restriction in
communities
promoted
in Fair go and Enough* s
with egalitarian methods as
combines
markets.
cultural
Nonmaximizing, for example, is
reflected in the She’ll be right and It'11 do approach dften
enough:
and
note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the
ambassadors,
and
commonly
culture that work directly towards themes of
Australian
of
also
to male relationships:
(including
cultural transformation:
nonhumans).
but encourage
its
extension
So, to conclude, the potential is^for
we must help to realise it
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term ’approaches’ is intended to include both theory and practice,
espoused ideology and behaviour.
2.
They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual
positions.
At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more
ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by
new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent
fashion.
3.
Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American
naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some
have seen in it.
16
both
�4.
By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of
this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras,
parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many.
17
�P
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c
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&
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Draft Papers
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WORKING DRAFT
CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
Many of you know that Canberra was originally
Griffin.
This
talk
is
dedicated
by
designed
simply
not
an
key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially
making
Servant
the
Nature
of
Man,
'land
to
...
be
the
accorded
He rejected
'concentration
discerned instead elements of a
and
His approach was holistic, and
different 'consciousness' (the word is his).
took
the
and
architect
designer but one of Australia’s early deeper ecologists.
landscape
Burley
You may not know that Griffin, an
to him.
American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was
on
Walter
respect
he
due to a highly developed and
perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or
as
mere section of a map’.
a
Canberra, now no mere section of map, is perhaps
the best approximation anywhere to a deeper ecological city;
but it is not only
removed from Griffin’s original conception but far from deep ecological ideals.
*
*
*
*
*
The objective of the larger investigation, of which this
is
part,
to
gauge
the
extent
to
Australian
which
contrasted with American culture, contains developable
will
underpin
under which many
a
sketches
a
culture, especially as
elements
(seeds)
which
different political framework from the bastardised capitalism
people
presently
labour
and
local
environment
frequently
It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the
suffers.
political course
interested
in
charted
as
environmentally
alternative structures:
or
socially
disastrous
to
be
it is enough, for example, to view them
as far from satisfactory, or very far from
worlds,
talk
those
of
the
best
of
attainable
to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to
increasing ecological resistance [negative action j against environment
like^and ecological construction [direct positive action].
the
and
vandalism^/
There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that
for
the
especially
hope,
damage^?,
grounds
give
remarkable level of environmental activism that has
It is worth trying to pull together
somehow emerged among the people.
some
of
these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts,
and increasing the level of concern and activism.
Without doubt
attitudes
different
towards
practices,
and
cultures
have
the
approaches,
different
different
Indeed appreciation of,
environment.
practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally
dependent:
for
compare,
American Jews and American Indians.
instance,
Most
nonimperial cultures had ~ and where they still survive uncorrupted still havi.
less
much
exploitative
industrial
and
to
not
practices
whose
North,
exploitation
approaches
the
merely
environmental
control
lost
their
of
local
typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination.
in
But occasionally, notably
retained
gross
permit
the
of
those
than
but to a marked extent depend upon such practices.
vandalism
Mostly these more benign cultures have however
environments,
environment
sufficient
autonomy
the
to
adjacent
Pacific,
regional
cultures
have
slow or even halt environmental destruction.
Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked
in
Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land.
One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially
in
the
South,
is
to
foster
both
sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy;
socialism
and
indigenous
certain
for
cultural
instance
land rights movements.
differences
to
support
way
of
Melanesian
For, where the cultures have
not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is
rapid
and, more
a
comparatively
activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social
The question arises whether
paradigms.
elsewhere
the
in
also
can
differences
serve
Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in
transition to different
less
environmentally
social
exploitative
paradigms.
transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture.
a
Such
cultural
Can
features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite
differences?
In the case of Australia, a basis
is
there
both
the / land
in
</* U
culture,
and things
and
the
<L-
appear sufficiently different from that in the cultures
A
of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for
Of
the
for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some
need
semblance of integrity, there is little doubt.
that
is,
there
differentiation.
cultural
in
is
It
platitudinous
becoming
the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many
local natural environments and ecosystems
unless
the
in
we
Antipodes
break
from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised
loose
work
North and
towards
establishment
of
a
elements of regionalism in the North, despite a
in
some
parts,
rising
tide
war.
of
For despite
environmental
the industrialised North still appears in the grip of
established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of
nuclear
environmentally
culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy.
destructive
concern
less
different
disaster,
such
Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority
movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go
largely
alone
as
Nor
is
it
task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in
the
Australia because as well as the
advantage
of
the
ground
and
its
southern
KJ
and seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. But
A
like, most] new and more fragile developments they need attention and^if speedy
location,
careful
cultivation
Such
a task is rendered urgent also by other matters of
0
environmental and human concern, not
but
colossal
biological
losses
st the gathering signs of
nuclear
ykthrough rapid destruction of, e.g.
r
3
war,
tropical
rainforests, indeed, mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere
humans now establish.
How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to
&
A ;
alter approaches to the environment? As i/ the title of the ^lk it operates in
organising principles
L
okr the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge^which lifts the
the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like
and
design
environmental way on the ropes of regional
links
A
culture.
working
picture
that
the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like
most images of the more abstract distorts across
the
is
that
of
a
bridge
suspension
the gap often separating people from the natural environment.
There are
people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment,
like
so
(Of course people may be part of the natural environment:
exclude ' -hew
that
important
overlap.)
The
different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges
the
picture
doesn’t
connecting bridges may be of very
good
for
careful
foot
traffic,
through
the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech
bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans.
the
But it
is
structure of all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter
The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons
particularly.
ot
culture if you will.
So
different
witii
different
cultures,
carrying
bridges
see the,component in the middle
d
philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of
approaches.
It
is
better
different
to
the
nuts
and bolts and rivets of the bridges, but rather as the design and engineering of
the structures.
types,
computing
It has its analytical parts, looking at the
the
loads
stresses
and
on them;
them
- the social paradigms embedded in the cultures.
select
substructures
Philosophy, the link
subject is then the architecture and engineering of the business.
5
their
and it also has its more
holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and
of
components,
philosophy
figuratively,
Less
assumptions
that is, to be considered for
deep ecology, asks deeper
of
assumptions
assumptions
replacement,
and
deeper
questions,
of
example
free
fundamenta]
the
other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions
all
paradigms.
for
extracting
embodied in a culture or social way or life, i.e.
social
operative
Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not
or marxist philosophies.
enterprise
the
assembles
ancl
culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions,
a
of
isolates
In
what are sometimes called the
tills respect philosophy - which includes much more than
conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects,
logic,
as
the
science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of
arguments and methodology of all other sciences.
philosophical
investigation
1'he
assumptions
deeper
such
when put together yield a philosophy in
extracts,
ci c^y
the more popular sense (as e.g.
in philosophy of life or , the
free
enterprise
4
philosophy):
any
in
case
the
will be a philosophical theory or the
result
rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done.
By largely philosophical investigation then,
of
assumptions
the
techniques we try
with
contrasted
operative
test
to
apparent
we
trij.ce
Northern social paradigms;
the
adequacy
social
of
and
especially
as
alternatives with some environmental support
So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some
base.
results are illustrated in diagram^
•
J.
s.
Details of other positions, the old /and
culture
positions
(as
typically
offer
environmental
a
projected),
transition
alternative
And
from
are
left
and
the
counter
included in the diagram
the
while
new
the
dominant
it
may
Wester/l paradigm
appear
to
indeed is - a long
political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative,
of
the
and by sociological
assemblage,
the
organise
the
intermediate
steps is not so great;
each
and the steps can, and have, been
To illustrate the way transitions can
taken one at a time.
of the first line (row) in macro-economic form.
details
construed
components
package typically includes
environmient ,
as
this
to
minimal
quality
life
of
But the
and
with subtractions for externalities such as noise
and
and
pollution,
perhaps
*--- —,
M
with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness.
this way we arrive si Mew left thinking with the objective
subject
to considerable reservations, X(RR).
of
material
goes
back
philosophy;
Greek
to
In
growth
The real break however comes with
members of the counterculture, the hippies and Yippiesy for example, though
idea
the
objective functin to be maximized gets much complicated,
A
the
so
such
in a rough way stanadard of living.
representing
as
consider
The dominant objective
is to maximize some economic package of goods and services
being
made,
be
the
namely, the abandonment of growth and
maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing
goals
At
the macroeconopic level, the idea gets^represented by the goal of a steady-state
or sustain able economy, though the alternative environmental objective will
be
for something much less inflexible and ^rationalistic than economists have so tar
sketched.
I
In
fact
the
"emerging
steady-state
paradigm",
which
Daly/
'
for
example^/advocates, affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm,
differing only as to growth and
paradigms
would include
steady state position;
remove
the
transition.
convenient
reserves
themes.
But
a
fuller
diagram
of
among others such advanced corporate capitalism - the
so it would involve a
JI simplification
over
higher-dimensional
diagram,
and
of the two dimensional left-right
However, the high" dimensional diagram indicates how a better argued
A
transition ,can be made;
essentially by combining steady-state arguments against
0
macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions with the Left -yocialist case against
Even so, even with the combin/catioms, which does touch
themes.
Cl
human relations , ^anthropocentric framework would not have been left behind,
microeconomic
T
deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter
7
G-fiP
Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying
model takes us towards the following familiar picture:
social
society consists
of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g.
they are not
genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort
of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have
(e.g.
certain
a
to
ability
few
but
of
these
At bottom, these individuals have
calculate).
utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize;
and
competitive (by virtue of scarcity).
are
they
so
that they are possessive, and possess
capital.
The
distinctive
the
means
Their other feature is
production,
of
to
this
about
self-interested
Features
There is nothing compulsory, or
Individuals
picture.
this
are
individuals
competing
these
approximating
matter
of
particularly
nurture,
abstract
nature.
not
of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result oi
training, not human nature, as a comparison
where
their
To ensure
the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive
is
apparatus of the (minimal) state.
natural,
land,
of the American model is of course is that
feature
individuals can separately accumulate the means of production.
entitlement
e.g.
individuals
are
like
not
helps
this,
individuals embody rationality either:
with
othei'
show.
traditional
cultures,
lior do these archtypal
only a question-begging
argument
leads
to the American model as something naturally required.
The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model.
introduces
certain
The
relations.
human
chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they
do
not
left
omit
models
are
social
The left
still
human
relations:
the
further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to
full community relations,
independent
value.
That
recognising
is
a
creatures
and
nonhuman
things
as
of
bigger step, a step that no Western political
institutions make requisite allowance
for,
Western value theories do not accommodate.
8
and
that
mainstream
underpinning
The arguments from traditional cultures can also be
illustrated
the
and
paradigms
cultures such as those
models
Melanesia
of
them.
underlie
that
and
directed
Polynesia,
the
In traditional
of
many
against
the
operative
assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted.
Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there
is
good
prospect
more
thwarting
of
destructive practices.
environmentally
Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed.
But much of the
inhabited
and
there are
already
observable
features
distinctive
unscathed
World
in
questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial
other,
even
or
lesser,
of
features
not exhaust features of the accompanying
out
leave
There are
cultures
significant
as
artistic
and
intellectual
to
icing.
be
This
discerned,
sure,
does
affords
European
culture
This
alternatives.
a
have
an
somewhat
as
that
in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian
gives
the
basis
of
the
aesthetic
route
to
environmental
But there are as well more important omissions and discrepancies
In particular, the dominant American paradigm
religion;
but
Northern
features.
precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such
evidenced
So
conspicuous
other
usually
cultural
industrial culture, though economically dominated
accompanying
classes
The incomplete social paradigms outlined do
cultural features to be considered
surprisingly
Although
the cultures will have to be invoked if
change in approach is to be hastened in this way.
rather
now
cultures,
World
New
is
Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently
dominant
the
less
environmentally
peoples of predominantly European stock.
by
governed
of
assumptions
and
New
also
neglected
are
many
prominent values of American culture.
9
omits
reference
to
established
of the connected older and formerly more
The
American
search
tor
environmentally
acceptable
has
alternatives
regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or
Indeed the primary attempts to
spiritual elements, and associated past values .
"the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken
establish
a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way.
and
sample
(For example, Nash provides a
list of the books he considers important in the rise of the
representative
virtually all that proceed beyond ecology
new environmentalism:
depend
on
an
appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.)
In the context of American culture the appeal
something
to
be
said for it.
to
proportion
do
act
in
accordance
and, unlike
with
response.
And, secondly, religious values do clash with
dominant
Northern
paradigm.
has
features
For, firstly, a high proportion of the American
population profess some active religious commitment;
substantial
religious
This
sort
of
that
conflict
the
was
Australia,
socially
precepts
approved
of
perceived,
considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the
a
case
the
with
of
Melanesian society (p.9):
The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was
...
torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which
carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of
enlightened self-interest.
Both aspects were a direct contradiction
of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of
Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the
minds of the people.
While the Christian religion was widely
compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism,
with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another,
it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow.
It ran also contrary to the
religion
of
individualism
and
self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was
followed by the majority of Europeans ...
It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant
Northern
paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved
it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans.
a
partial answer:
compartmentalisation.
10
There is
Religion tor most is a separate thing
fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not
upset
the
business
standard
week.
such as human poverty:
to
Thus for most believers religion does not
Only for a minority does it directly
penetrate deep.
escape
touch
immediate
matters
why should we expect it to work for the Environment?
Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious
perceptions
the
within
American population, and^reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter
things.
but even if some of the effects of a religious return would
beneficial,
and
domination
nature
were
be
negative
Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset.
with any depth to it appears most unlikely.
scientific
world
Unless moreover the position
abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious
traditions the environmental effects would
"the
view".
scientific
(as
for
the case for its
much
virtue
front-end-in.
shape.
trying
in
It
return
to
the
There
is
world
view
in
such
great
is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or
social
it is that this perspective, a paradigm,
paradigm.
So
incorporates
it is far from uniquely determined.
more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g.
view).
rival
view with these sorts of weaknesses
But nor is the so called scientific
cannot account for;
dominant
to
the
Consider, for instance, the matter of the
existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc.
no
testifies).
Religion in America has lost out to
In part it failed deservedly:
view could explain.
Watt
In any case such a reversal
world view was seriously deficient and it did not account
more
highly
be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a
to
narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable.
of
be
a richer
intensional
the
There are
scientific
These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking
a theological way.
11
There is a
set
second
quasi-religious
character
reasons
of
of
some
not
tor
sort,
a
These
the
on
turn
irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion
success.
is unlikely to have much
understood
as
(the
a
barely relevant
generally
impose
Pantheistic or
Jewish,
Christian,
whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia.
strongly
to
endeavouring
first)
’.
irreligious
Australia,
post-Christian
has
it
society, in which religion (is)
Even if that formulation
character
of
understanding much else about the culture,
the
e.g.
an
is
the
exaggeration
is a fact and is the
society
the
’best
is
said,
been
curious
to
extent
the
state’s protrusion into Australian social life.
If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach
to
hastened j paradigm
transition - and a related approach through mysticism or
transcen f1 ism excluded for analogous reasons and because of the
the
earthiness
There are other significant features
culture - what alternatives are open?
of the culture running against major elements of the dominant Western
which
can
be
perhaps
applied
approaches to turn matters
features
of
the
culture
around.
to
more
much
detach
effectively
indicate
To
of
from
than
quasi-religious
prospects
the
paradigms,
dominant
paradigm,
of
applying
consider how
Australian culture contrasts with American.
Australian mainstream culture
transition
from
the
dominant
is
already
American
political left has much stronger support in
difficult
to
some
culture.
Australia
way
along
the
leftward
is not merely that the
It
than
USA.
It
is
not
indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show
its left—displacement from the dominant Western paradigm.
some elements of the contrast:-
12
The next table
lists
TABLE 2.
CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE
—-- —>
SCALE OF INCREASE
individualistic ethos
inacceptability of socialist institutions
inegalitarian attitudes
POSITIVE
inegalitarian practices
ITEMS (PER
level of consumerism
CAPITA
maximization quest
WHERE
imperialist drive
relevant)
extent of violence
police and military commitment
high technology involvement
functional rationality
environmental inactivism
USA
AUSTRALIA
SCALE OF
INCREASE
level of urbanisation
legal obstacles to environmental action
NEGATIVE
{practices, such as dedication of
wilderness
ITEMS
administrative delays in implementing
environmental practices, such as
pollution requirements, recycling, etc.
Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items
13
in
the
contrast.
themes
Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on
first
for
opposed to American, it appears that prospects
indeed
This
better.
important
environmental
spectators
the
applying
culture
are
theme requires ela^boration and confirmation.
The task can profitably be combined with others:
for
the
rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as
of
diagram
in
an
with
there is much work
empirical
here
both
and for environmental
bent
activists.
A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires
and their eommund'B, distinguishing
theses:
/
Let us focus on transition theses,
ought to be done (ideologically)
what
and
normative
and
factual
transition
factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is
weak
A
firstly
confirmation,
^/undergoing a transition away
from
the
dominant
confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g.
better results could be obtained in Australia;
paradigm,
social
has
been
Presumably similar or
Marsh).
but appropriate samplings of the
community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being
a
neglected
undoubtedly
field
in
Another
Australia.
weak
transition
factual
thesis
holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the
also
ertreii human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia
have
to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm,
come
but again comparative—figures
sociological
work
are
entirely
of
data
to
Though
impressionistic
tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia
than OSA - indeed more intensive than
piece
lacking.
anywhere
else,
an
immensely
build upon - we lack solid confirmation.
sociogeographers to do.
14
important
There is much for
Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been
largely
taken
granted,
for
that
generally, l&ght to^undergoing
Western
and
paradigms
an
towards
and
to
rguments.
the
repeat
furthermore
alternative.
environmental
thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and
time
dominant
from
away
variations (such as those of advocated corporate
their
capitalism an.d of the post-industrial society) ,
transitivity*
shift,
paradigm
major
a
culture, indeed Western culture
Australian
to
ought
be
complex normative
That
isn’t
there
fortunately
It is also argued against there, but> to sum up
the opposition case, unconvincingly.
Given then that the transition is going on,
and
to
ought
going
be
on,
ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how
indeed
do environmental activists
emerging
are
enough.
clear
it
encourage
in
Australia.
Preliminary
answers
Not only should activists be continuing with what
I
they
are
directing
doing
organisations
the
and
environmental
and
those
like,
to
supposed
action
(public)
further
them,
of
industrial
prluwryprimarily,
regulate
not merely by membership drives and environmental
influence
to
and
swing
the
should
education.
be
dominant^ regional culture , for the
w
potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change
been achieved.
sources
They should also be aiming to increase their support bases , but
organisations.
endeavouring
the
against
than
has
thus/
There are two major parts to this further practice which can run
in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part:
0
More negatively.it
z
involves
curring
down
and
countering
the
flow
propaganda
in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especiall
the North.
That is important in reversing the extent
It
includes
Northern
from
co-^option
a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such
as gently lopping
anti-American
of
of
off
the
tall
poppies
and anti-Nor them activities.
15
pedalling
the
stuff,
and
careful
The latter practices (which should
not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well
aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence
environmental
regional
other
with
policies
•
More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other
despised
features
It
alternative paradigms
commonly
is
intellectuals
Northern
are,
of
course,
like
those
nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones,
of
appreciation
natural
local
The features to tye
Lawrence).
cultural characters are held (e.g
I
the
egalitarian,
along
environments.
with
the
consider the effects of these, decently applied, in
or
antiauthoritarian,
A
rapidly increasing
taken
to
things,
conomics, in local
As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a pain problem being its I hra/sv
restriction in
communities
promoted
in Fair go and Enough* s
with egalitarian methods as
combines
markets.
cultural
Nonmaximizing, for example, is
reflected in the She’ll be right and It'11 do approach dften
enough:
and
note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the
ambassadors,
and
commonly
culture that work directly towards themes of
Australian
of
also
to male relationships:
(including
cultural transformation:
nonhumans).
but encourage
its
extension
So, to conclude, the potential is^for
we must help to realise it
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term ’approaches’ is intended to include both theory and practice,
espoused ideology and behaviour.
2.
They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual
positions.
At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more
ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by
new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent
fashion.
3.
Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American
naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some
have seen in it.
16
both
4.
By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of
this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras,
parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many.
17
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Box 71: Unlisted and Untitled Boxes
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https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4a68c59658b0327290244eaa123b1a1c.pdf
9cdae0065a05f92db97d3155a90e0b6b
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Text
■k
METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT
A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented
works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
main nuclear predicament, r’own to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts
The most
transient superficialities of much of the political commentary,
circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
with the
widely
slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth,
This skillful piece of
unc annily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological
themes of Anders.
So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often
To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle
be considered together,
media-philosophy
In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings,
their work.
is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear
It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of
arrangements.
the
exhibits,
both
the
claim
that
species
....
that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense
...’
of
aftermath
nuclear
Unfortunately
attack.
it
also
philosophically and factually, severe defects.
’without
is
it
Some of
simply rubbish:
to
take
one example,
consider
... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human]
nothing else
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is
no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become
morally neutral.
compared
with
Moral
more
issues remain moral issues:
important
elsewhere, e.g. p.130).
moral
issues
(as
they don’t cease to be so when
Schell
effectively
acknowledges
And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be
entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts.
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two
of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders.
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction
assumption); and
52.
In the absence of humans, very many notions,
not only those of morality and
value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a
more
sympathetic
philosophical
form,
these
notions
depend
for
actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption) .
their
sense
on an
�2
S2 which give Anders’
It is applications of
philosophical depth,
paradoxical
and Schell’s work some of its apparent
and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the
propositions
But
generated.
the
frequent
applications
S2
of
depend
essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make
past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
the
Granted that
assumption SI
is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as
technological
means appear
available
extinct;^
granted
centres of
prospect
the
of
to make it
large-scale
nuclear
Western civilization with obliteration.
the light of present - admittedly inadequate -
true,
to render Homo sapiens
war
does
threaten
leading
Even so SI appears unlikely in
Even in Canada, which
information.
lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in
certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies).
SI
is extremely flimsy.
It depends,
for example,
Schell’s argument to
on an unjustified extrapolation
from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very
North American thing, of contracting the world to North America.
all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least,
to be more charitable, in North
America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e.
eliminated
in
the nuclear
holocaust.)
Some of
(All that matters,
its human population will be
the data
upon,
Schell relies
for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the .ozone layer, was significantly out of
date even when he wrote.
Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in
ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well
from North
A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced
to South.
about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others,
Southern Hemisphere,
such as
New Zealand
and southern
at
indicates that parts of the
latitudes of
Latin America
could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.
Doomsday prophets
may appear
to have
gained new
purchase
through
recent
belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war.
(if
But
although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to
the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war,
extinction assumption3.
they do not sustain the
On the available evidence, human life will continue, though
no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example^ in many southern
mid-latitude coastal reqions outside zones of radiation fall-out.
More generally,
life will go on,
though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss
of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures.
Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as
already set
, in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe.
Much of the
/r
�3
way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible.
insist
the
upon
of
"impossibility
unlearning”
the
Thus both Anders and Schell
means of manufacturing nuclear
It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good
bombs.
medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
theory
Daniken’s
of an
"high"
earlier
In virtue
technology).
they would
of S2,
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that
the notion
no longer made
impossibility-of-unlearning
eventual
use
of
sense.
But
what
message
is
the
-
as
if
technology
the
they
again want
inevitability
having
learnt
to
suggest
have
been advanced.But
technological advances
cases of
they
that have
are not
not been
tenable.
the
development
and
else
was
of
the
the
means
determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice.
views
with
There
all
Certainly such
are many
taken advantage of,
and
examples of
there are even
technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or
used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond
the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear
Even if this were true just
"experiments".
weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments"
of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut
And in fact
the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons.
Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear
scientific work, 1to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not
Again they have
interfere with the■ observers and those outside the "laboratories" .
latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the
cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic
effects,
such
circulation and
enough with it
in character,
or changes in coupled atmospheric
Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely
radiation fields.
these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical
as
fireballs
or
firestorms,
Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative
modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of
S2 .
The penetration
Schell
and
Anders,
of
but
in S2, is not something peculiar to
Western philosophy, European philosophy
human
chauvinism, as
is
product
a
of
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version
It has also deeply
of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.).
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of
especially.
Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a
product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged
MB
�4
implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no
way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes.
As
very many propositions
with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones:
about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans
or their communities.
In
Schell,
Kantian
obnoxious
is
chauvinism
human
dished
Thoughts and
form.
up
a
in
particularly
time
propositions,
powerful
history and
tenses,
and
and
memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings
-
future or merely potential
past or
humans are certainly not enough.
humans are not enough,
persons
that are not
Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.),
’... the
thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because
as
soon as it is, we are not.
In imagining any other event, we look ahead
moment that is still within the stream of human time,
a
later
rational
Though we no doubt have it
into past,
(p.143).
local
may
well
be
able
to
truly.
it
have
Schell
there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past,
(p.140)*^.
Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that
erroneously denies that:
present, and future ...’
divides time
creature
The thought is however
... ’.
perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now.
falsely,
to a
present and
future’: so annihilation cannot
’come to pass’
But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a
time
ordering
(perceptible
to
many
creatures
other
than
humans,
but
not
depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to
to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures,
the present,
and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may
also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to
pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth.
Before that
there was a time before there were any human beings.
argument for the demise of time, that ’what has been will no longer be
Anders’
even what
has
been’ ,
is also explicitly (and narrowly)
’for what
verificationist :
would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
is no
remain
one
remember the
to
many
sorts
of
things
difference;
organisms would be different.
that have been’
for
one,
Temporal
the
(AA p.245).
history
themes do not lack
if there
There would
recorded
in
many
still
other
’legitimacy because not
registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not
matters of human verification.
Here,
as
elsewhere,
the
human
chauvinism
is
mixed
with
other
distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and
�ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking
about
does
what
exist)
not
Thus,
for
metaphysics from Freud, according to whom
example,
takes
Schell
dubious
over
it is indeed impossible to imagine our own
death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still
present
spectators"
as
refuting
the
(p.138).
fact
In
first.
clause goes
second
The
is
there
counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s
distance
difficulty
great
no
a good
describing
in
The
claims.
towards
same, goes
for
Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds,
value theory:
evil,
’... the simple and basic fact [sic!]
harm,
or
service
lamenting
rejoicing
or
that before there can be good or
must
there
be
life ,
human
life
These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have
(p.171).
been exposed and criticised elsewhere/, e.g. HC).
Naturally many
things will disappear with the extinction of humans:
trivially
there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no
more human communities,
human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so
But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will
forth.
accordingly be
’no thought,
no love,
sacrifice, no image, no song ...'.
For there are, and may continue to exist, other
than humans with emotion,
creatures
no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no
struggles, songs,
...
Nor will the ending of
.
all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have
been ’all in vain’, meaningless, and already so to say dead.
The decay of the solar
system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human
A
activities were not worthwhile.*
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from
their shared
assumptions SI
of a Second Death,
(in Revelations)
under
SI,
is
reckoned
meaningless
rendered
and S2.
a
and
species
death’,
and
all
extinction came
redeployed by both.
’second death’ ,
already
already ’overhung with death’
’a second
It is these that underlie the biblical notion
’seems
(S p.166).
because
to
Thus,
not merely one’s own but
future
to
pass,
generations
the
(S
stronger
be
by
’The death of mankind ,
S2 and
dead’
(AA
SI
p.244,
remaining
S p.166)
life
is
and
is
too, more trivially, a person faces
in addition that greater death of the
p.166,
p.115).
However
even
notion would not be vindicated,
if
nuclear
because
it
depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on
the very
questionable representation
of
this
meaninglessness as
a sort
of death.
There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same
time.
The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base.
�6
From SI,
together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute
in degree,
doesn’t differ
theme that
the universality of peril
comes
’we are all
exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult
to
with
SI.
In
situation,
there is no contrast (AE p.64;
because
recognise’,
event,
any
are
peoples
southern Patagonia
Indians of
the
all
not
This theme falls
S p.150).
by
imperilled
equally
the
better placed
being rather
nuclear
than the
Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or
Germans of northern Europe.
incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places.
likewise,
Nor,
Schell
are all
contrast
(in
to
people equally responsible,
a pernicious
repeatedly infiltrates.
Anders)
This
is
theme^ which,
the
theme,
Pogo
according to which
S3.
Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes
onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But
there is also, mixed in,
a weaker more
plausible claim that gives lie
to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared).
An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme11 runs as follows: ’...
the
world’s
leaders
political
...
they
though
now menace
the earth with nuclear
At least, this is
weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
true for democracies'
(pp.229-30).
pose
since we pay for extinction and
sense,
threat of it,
the
... we are
(For the populations of the superpowers this is true
the authors of that extinction.
in a positive
theme is elaborated elsewhere:
The
while for
support the governments that
the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world
it is
true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger)
(p.152).
But
this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by
revealing
its
allegedly
govern,
insensitivity
not
to
and
unresponsiveness
to
affected
by
mention
those
its
the
activities
populace
who
are
they
not
But Schell conveniently neglects all such
represented at all (namely foreigners).
points:
of
many
'... we are potential mass killers.
The moral cost of nuclear armaments is
it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions'
And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life
(p.152),
that
not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for
to be killed' (p.153).
Little of this is true.
Those who campaign against
nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible,
destruction,
and
responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them.
Nor
and
the
are
like,
does responsibility
attributes
decisions
to
certainly
— or
everyone
taken
—
not
the
the unlikely
fall
in "liberal
on
authors
opinions as
those
democracies"
who
have
of
potential
to worth
done
less.
Schell illegitimately
Responsibility for
even by representatives
(in the unlikely
�event of
this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be
traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is
only
representative of a
party which offers a complex and often
ill-characterised
package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in
the (uncommon)
can responsibility,
event of a clear
still of a qualified
single issue referendum, which is adopted,
sort, be
for it, not to everyone in the community.
sheeted home, to those who voted
While S3 is false, there is an important
related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person.
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part
of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have
failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions.
The sovereign system is out of step
with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme).
Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the
frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses
sight of
this important
critique of
the
theme (indicated
state whi?V
the conclusion
arrives at
is,
that
by and
pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell s
scattered
large,
the nation-state
and
has outlasted
Schell
fragmentary.
its usefulness,
and
that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required
as a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards
the Way Up to world political control.
Solutions to
the nuclear dilemma come,
way,
from the Top Down;
(cf.
p.230).
if not easily, in a similar simplistic
those who can must appeal
to the Top,
to those who govern
Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations,
such as SALT, and in world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and
especially p.227,
treaties,
bottom paragraph).
Given the record of
these organisations and
the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith.
Nor is a
serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the
origins of nuclear technology,
to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider
effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and , more
generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders$f and elsewhere.13 The roots of
the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of
nation-states,
but
penetrate
also
into
key
components
of
those
states,
their
�8
and
controlling classes,
their
military,
their supporting bureaucracies.
And both
within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in
key components
of
states,
the
power and domination (and, often,
superiority by the
[nuclear]
science
interrelated forms.
surplus
product
nature)
to
super-states, to
involves
accumulated
can be
is
enables
is the
for
Thus the push for
domination,
large nation-state,
at home
(from
the drive
be achieved through military-oriented
and
main power-base
The
feature
the accompanying privilege).
which
technology,
and
and crucial
a conspicuous
and
from
abroad,
several
in
where enough
and
bled
from
proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-
technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy.
In changing
the prospect of
to eliminate
arrangements
structural
the
nuclear
war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, the nation
state;
it
sweepingly,
also
is
important
remove
to
state
relations,
political
alter
trouble-making
political arrangements,
in
to
key
components
patterns
embedded
namely patterns of domination,
organisation,
human-animal
relations,
but
in
of
in
state,
and,
all
these
social
and
patterns manifested not only
relations,
white-coloured
human-nature
more
the
relations;
to
male-female
in
remove,
short,
However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and
chauvinistic relations.
the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled
separately.
And there
the problems
can largely be narrowed
to certain problems of
states and certain key components of states.
In what analysis he does offer of the
contrast of
familiar false
"raison
d’etat"
and
the
justifies the means is
themselves
to
problem with states,
state expediency with morality,
Socratic-Christian
ethics.
every sort’
(p.134).
anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’.
argument is
as a
contrast between
teaching
that
’the
end
the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed
commit crimes of
extinction nullifies
The
Schell repeats the
So
’states may do virtually
Schell then argues however, that
end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the
far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined
with ontological
assumptions.
Even if all
humans were extinguished (as under SI)
ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials,
actual
or
not.
The
ends-means
argument
can
however
be
repaired
to
remove
such
objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification
by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by ’relevant’, in this
context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of
its nuclear policies.a nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses,
would
undoubtedly
frustrate
the realisation of relevant
state ends.
�9
So
even
expediency
an
from
perspective,
policies
super-state
are
open
severe
to
criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war,
Schell leaves us in
A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and
no doubt.
to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
power
War arises from
how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity^
(p.188).
to wage war.
to organise
On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people
sovereignty.
is impossible
side, without war it
On the other
for war.
to preserve
Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands.
The
first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small
nonmilitary states.
the macro-state system is entrenched, it
Now that
easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities
life,
which include self-interest,
that
peace
readily
are
arrangements
aggression,
dismissed
as
of international
It is on this basis
hatred.
fear,
is however
unrealistic,
utopian,
even
(amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell’s
further
nuclear "war"
that
theme
is not
war
threatens,
however,
to
undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument
and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity.
Fortunately the not-war
theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of
war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is
neither necessary nor sufficient for war.
What is correct is that nuclear wars are
very different from previous conventional wars
(cf. WP) .
that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have.
to claim
Schell goes on
But nuclear attacks can
certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on
not all wars or games are won).
one side
’no one’s
happen,
But
being defeated
what
these
on a decision by arms.
strength fails
sorts
of
until
considerations
nuclear wars are not wars, but
But in nuclear "war
this doesn’t
both sides have been annihilated’
contribute
to
showing
is
(p.190).
again
that they are not wars of certain sorts,
not
that
e.g., not
just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on.
have
persisted
into
nuclear
times
does
damage
to
That conventional wars
Schell's argument
that nuclear
weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise
of war
court
has left no means
of
appeal
has
mistaken propositions:
been
to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final
removed
(pp.192-193).
The
theme depends
on a
pair of
that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea
�10
that war of
some sort has
to
be
the
final
court of appeal
between nations (for
there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility
of more cooperative behaviour,
e.g.
joint referenda).
The
social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the 'logic of war
theme also
imports the
theme) that war has to
proceed to the technological limit — as if war and violence were thoroughly natural
activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.),
and ruleless activities.
On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations
such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war
but from what is
now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning .
The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the
world
is
now
entangled
in
are
perfectly
sound,
logical,
rational.
However
Logic in no way justifies the
represents little more than a cheap semantical trick.
present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable.
logics of decision (as presented, e.g.,
be applied
planning;
in strategic
but
this
There are
for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can
they do not
yield
specific results without
desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values
being pumped in, extralogically .
There are various ways these value assignments may
be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning
they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency^?.
For the most part,
however, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation,
to
cover
something
like
’reasoning
and rational
considerations entering
into
the
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with
policy or strategy of’.
the term ’logic of’, should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes
its unreasonableness.
supposed
rationality
(even from a national
fail:^ yet
threat of
the
this
further and
For
of
stresses (p.213)
instance he
threatening
use
interest viewpoint)
success
of deterrence
unjustifiable and
of nuclear
the disparity between the
weapons and
the
irrationality
of actually using them should the threat
doctrine depends on the credibility of
irrational use.
the
Indeed Schell wants to go still
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
but
the argument
depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,
along with
the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation.
irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
pp.201-2);
Nuclear deterrence may well be
�11
NOTES
This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth,
according to Schell, and to Anders’ of my monograph referred to as WP, where
Several points, only touched ijpcn in this review, are further developed.
References are by way of authors’ names or else through obvious acronyms, given
in the list of references which follows.
1. The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets, where many
leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so
considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in
entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the
better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so
presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is
debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the
free West props up) , it still gives humans a further chance for goou
lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation
removes that all-important opportunity.
But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his
contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for
which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives.
Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point
can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously
effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all
lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives
remain.
To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of
an each to all fallacy.
Jasper’s idea that "the free life that they try
to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down
when applied to all participating people.
None can gain free lives by
extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even.
2. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ remarkably similar versions of
S2 is made in Foley Ju.
3. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will
require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows
needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals.
4. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC
explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the
remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of
argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a
deeper metaphysical level.
The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same
technological Pandora’s box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive
exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy
�targeting
in
particular
of
Southern
Hemispheric
internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones).
sites
(including
5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much.
The most intrepid of
these studies.
Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worstQ '
case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens
cannot be excluded’ (p.1299).
The study admits that, in the scenario
described,
’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to
extinctions immediately’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of
long-term human survival are exaggerated.
In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid
latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern
latitudes.
For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates
appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many
agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1287 case
29, and p.1286).
Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface
ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps
minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor
activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge).
No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and
peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of
nuclear
holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and
strategists have an interest in minimizing them.
And there is certainly
substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn.
For
Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a
global nuclear war remain ... uncertain ... because of a lack of
information on various important processes [among other things] ... the
environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked
changes in the composition of the atmosphere’, again among other things.
Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational.
The way to err
is clear.
marxist
persuasion,
determinists
of
merely
by
technological
6. Not
induction
that
if the
argues
by
straight
Hackworth, a former US general,
use
it.
US military has a weapon it will
present and future (etc.) is
7. The appalling theme that humans create past,
repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173.
8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB.
9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one
is responsible, the whole thing is out of control.
The technological
version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More
satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political
control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear
things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed.
The vested
interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military
�13
weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby).
Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these
powerful groups, so losing control of political processes.
The argument
is flawed at its final stage.
For many influential politicians either
belong to or represent vested interests.
Thus, though there is no doubt
some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested
interests than to run out of political control.
11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185).
Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’ (p.194): the world? This
connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the 'free enterprise
(USA) nation,
and against socialism.
12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP §8, where too the case against
the state from
nuclear dilemmqj'is elaborated.
13. Anders’ explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are
presented more straightforwardly in Martin.
The incomplete list of items
given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation,
paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
energy, speed, satisfaction,
. .., for the
newer
Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference—satisfaction, for instance, or utility.
And
the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but
worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as
rational, which again it is not. C Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth
has it. consists in maximisation,.a suitable mix of these virtues.
*
4
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
The maximisation of self-interest
theorems and associated paradoxes,
runs
into
Newcomb
’s paraj^dox and special cases
(individual or national)
situations.
The
maximisation of power, as
such as Prisoners Dilemma
Christian-Islamic
God,
encounters
the paradox of
the
symbolised in
parallel
maximisation
of
knowledge,
paradoxes of
the
omnipotence,
or
no
consistent
objects
which
are
omnipotent
There are
omniscience.
the
The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be
omniscient.
epitome of rationality, also leads
leads to
to inconsistency in the case of more
important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of
Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems).
15. R & D,
though directed by military requirements
and the arms race, also
�14
drives the arms race.
science.
Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby
anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the
ecological fix).
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of
control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also
running out of control.
But technological determinism, like other
varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be
persisted with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit
not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting
with often recalcitrant technologies.
They also admit of being made to
look ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution,
then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it
will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population
regulation!
16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context.
17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of
deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions.
(ar
18. Even the
irrationality of /retaliatory * first-strike)
use has been
contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thougnt that America will rise like
a phoenix from the radioactive ashes.
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing
motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a
retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the
future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered -tor
the conjecturAL targeting of Latin America.
19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed
to "negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral
paradoxes of deterrence
take a different direction.
For although
�15
involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions
of intensional functors.
One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where
the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly
threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though
credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style
derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles
when the persistent practice, which Implies an intention, is to increase
the number.
This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is
another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate
practice,
a
time-honoured
method
of
removing
contradictions
by
conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
REFERENCES
G. Anders,
Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H.
Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as
AA.
G. Anders,
Zeitenende:
Endzeitand
Gedanken
atomaren
zur
Situation,
C.H.
Beck,
Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE.
7
'
F. Barnaby,
’Will
be
there
a
War' ,//» Aus tralia
Nuclear
Nuclear
War,
J
(ed.
M. Denborough) , Croom Helm, Australia, 1983?
I.J.
Benton
and G.W.
Partridge,
’"Twilight
at Noon"
overstated’,
13
Ambio
(1984)
49-51.
B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man
P.J. Crutzen,
Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972.
’Darkness after a nuclear war’, Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4.
M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983.
P.R. Erlich and others,
’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’,
Science
222 (1983) 1293-1300.
G. Foley,
’Jonathan
Schell:
Genius
-
Philosopher
-
Rewrite
Man’,
typescript,
Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS.
G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983.
�16
in
’A Soldier’s Refragfljt’, , Australia
D. Hackworth,
Croom Helm, Australia, 1983
vi^vC
Nuclear War,
(ed. M. Denborough),
/zor-/z
»
K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press,
1961.
B. Martin,
Strategy Against
Roots
Grass
War,
Freedom Press,
1984, "ter
Nottingham,
a-p-peax.
L. Mumford,
The Myth of
the Machine,
2 vols.,
Harcourt
Brifce
,
New York,
1970.
G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the
Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982.
R. Routley and
N. Griffin,
'Unravelling
the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982.
R. Routley,
Meinong’s
Exploring
Jungle
and
Beyond,
Research
School
of
Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB.
R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear
deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984j
R. and
V. Routley,
Philosophy
(ed.
'Human
chauvinism
D. Manujson and
and
Environmental
others),
Research
ethics’,
School of
in
Environmental
Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC.
J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F.
R.P.
Turco
and
others,
'Nuclear
winter:
global
consequences
explosions’ , Science 222 (1983) 1283-92.
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977.
of
multiple nuclear
�Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and tht?_ _ea£_t]i, according to
SchelT~and Anders.
Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption.
Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro
pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death
dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence.
�METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT*
A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented
works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels;
with the
widely
in this the series contrasts
transient superficialities of much of the political commentary.
circulated
influential
and
text
the
of
series
is
undoubtedly that
uncannily
some
of
the
the apparently
deep phenomenological
So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often
themes of Anders.
be considered together.
their work.
redeploys
of
This skillful piece of
slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth.
media-philosophy
The most
To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle
In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings,
is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear
It is especially valuable for its
arrangements.
the
aftermath
of
nuclear
vivid and horrifying scenarios of
Unfortunately
attack.
it
also
exhibits,
both
philosophically and factually, severe defects.
Some of
’without
is
it
simply rubbish:
to
take
one
example,
consider
the
... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human]
nothing else
claim that
species
....
that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense . . . ’
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is
no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become
Moral
morally neutral.
compared
with
more
issues remain moral issues: they don’t cease to be so when
important
elsewhere, e.g. p.130).
moral
issues
(as
Schell
effectively
acknowledges
And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be
entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts.
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two
of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction
assumption); and
52.
value,
In
the absence of humans,
very many notions,
not only
those of morality and
but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a
form,
for their
X 2
actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).
more
sympathetic
philosophical
these
notions
depend
sense
on an
�2
S2 which give Anders’ and Schell’s work some of its apparent
It is applications of
and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the
philosophical depth,
paradoxical propositions generated.
But the frequent applications of S2 depend
essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make
past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Granted that assumption SI
the
technological
means appear
extinctgranted
the
prospect
is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as
available to
of
make it
nuclear
large-scale
to render Homo sapiens
true,
war
does
threaten
leading
Even so SI appears unlikely in
centres of Western civilization with obliteration.
the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Canada, which
lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in
certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies).
SI
is
extremely flimsy.
for example,
It depends,
Schell s argument to
on an unjustified extrapolation
from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very
North Zunerican thing, of contracting the world to North America.
(All that matters,
all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North
America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in
the nuclear
holocaust.)
Some of
the data
Schell relies
upon,
for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of
date even when he wrote.
Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in
ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well
from North
A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced at
to South.
about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others,
indicates that parts of the
Southern Hemisphere,
latitudes of
such as
New Zealand
and
southern
Latin America
could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.
Doomsday prophets
belated) scientific
may appear
forecasts of
to have
gained new
purchase through
recent
a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war.
(if
But
although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to
the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the
extinction assumption3.
On the available evidence, human life will continue, though
no
doubt with new complications and
mid-latitude coastal
life will go on,
for example
in many southern
regions outside zones of radiation fall-out.
More generally,
simplifications,
though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss
of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures.
Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as
already set
, in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe.
Much of the
�3
way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible.
insist
upon
unlearning"
of
"impossibility
the
Thus both Anders and Schell
means of
the
manufacturing nuclear
It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good
bombs.
medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken’s
of an
theory
"high"
earlier
they would
of S2,
In virtue
technology).
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that
the notion
longer
no
made
sense.
But what
message
is
the
-
as
if
impossibility-of-unlearning
eventual
use
of
the
technology
they
to suggest
again want
learnt
having
the
of
inevitability
with
the
development
and
all
the means
determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice.
views have
been advanced.
technological advances
cases of
But
are not
they
that have
been
not
tenable.
Certainly such
are many
There
taken advantage of,
was
else
examples of
there are even
and
technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or
used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond
the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear
weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments".
Even if this were true just
of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut
the
argument against
previous
inevitability
the
of nuclear weapons.
And
in
fact
Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear
work,
scientific
large-scale
to
weapons
and
independent
experiments which
interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories".
latched onto major points:
cumulative
such
effects,
of
effects
as
in particular,
fireballs
or
Again they have
we have at present no way of testing the
wreapons
in
concert,
firestorms,
or
changes
nuclear
large
do not
e.g.
in
for
more
holistic
atmospheric
coupled
circulation and
radiation fields.
enough with
these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical
it,
in character.
Short of a large-scale nuclear war,
and likely
Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative
modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of
S2.
The
Schell
penetration
and
Anders,
of human
but
is
a
chauvinism,
product
of
as
in S2,
Western
is not
something peculiar
philosophy,
European
to
philosophy
especially.
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version
of
just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.).
S2
being
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and
has
been extended
It has also deeply
under the
influence of
Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a
product
of
human
conventions,
and
would
vanish
with
humans!
Such
are
alleged
�4
implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no
way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes.
with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones:
As
very many propositions
about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans
or their communities.
In
human
Schell,
obnoxious Kantian
form.
dished
is
chauvinism
and
Thoughts
up
in
propositions,
a
particularly
time
powerful
history and
tenses,
and
and
memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings
future or merely potential humans are not enough,
- past or
that are not
persons
Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.),
humans are certainly not enough.
’... the
thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because
as
it
soon as
is, we are not.
In imagining any other event, we look ahead
moment that is still within the stream of human time,
... ’.
a
later
rational
erroneously denies that:
present, and future ...’
into past,
divides time
may
well
be
to
able
ordering
time
it
have
Schell
truly.
there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past,
(p.140)7.
Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that
present and future’: so annihilation cannot
But it is simply false that the tenses are human;
(p.143).
local
creature
The thought is however
Though we no doubt have it
perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now.
falsely,
to a
(perceptible
to
many
creatures
’come to pass’
the tenses depend on a
other
than humans,
but
not
depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to
to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures,
the present,
and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may
also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to
pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth.
Before that
there was a time before there were any human beings.
Anders’ argument for the demise of time,
even what has been’,
is also
that
’what has been will no longer be
explicitly (and narrowly)
’for what
verif icationist:
would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
is no
remain
one
remember the things
to
many
sorts
organisms would
of
difference;
be different.
that have been’
for
one,
Temporal
the
(AA p.245).
history
themes do not lack
if there
There would
still
many
other
recorded
in
’legitimacy because not
registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not
matters of human verification.
Here,
as
elsewhere,
the
human
chauvinism
is
mixed
with
other
distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and
�5
ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking
about
exist)0.
not
does
what
Thus,
Schell
example,
for
takes
over
dubious
metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own
death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still
present
spectators"
as
refuting
(p.138).
fact
In
first.
the
clause goes
second
The
there
is
great
no
situations which undermine both Freud’s
counterfactual
a good
distance
difficulty
claims.
in
towards
describing
The same goes
for
Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds,
value theory:
evil,
'... the simple and basic fact [sic!]
or
service
(p.171).
lamenting
harm,
rejoicing
or
that before there can be good or
there
be
must
life’,
human
life
These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have
been exposed and criticised elsewhere, e.g. LIC).
Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially
there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no
more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so
But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will
forth.
’no thought,
accordingly be
no love,
sacrifice, no image, no song
no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no
For there are, and may continue to exist, other
...’.
creatures than humans with emotion, struggles,
songs,
...
Nor will the ending of
.
all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have
been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead.
The decay of the solar
system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human
9
activities were not worthwhile.
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from
their shared assumptions SI
of a Second Death,
(in Revelations)
under
SI,
rendered
is
and S2.
reckoned
meaningless
a
and
species
and
all
extinction came
redeployed
'second death',
already
already 'overhung with death'
'a second death',
It is these that underlie the biblical notion
'seems
(S p.166).
because by
to
to
pass,
generations
the
(S
stronger
be
Thus,
not merely one's own but
future
by both.
'The death of mankind',
S2 and
dead'
(AA
SI remaining
p.244,
S p.166)
life is
and is
too, more trivially, a person faces
in addition that greater death of the
p.166,
p.115).
However
even
notion would not be vindicated,
if
nuclear
because
it
depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on
the very
questionable representation
of. this
meaninglessness as
a sort
of death.
There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same
time.
The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base.
�6
together with the minor principle
From SI,
doesn’t differ
in degree,
comes
extinction being an absolute
that
the universality of
peril
theme that
we are all
exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult
to
recognise’,
with
In
SI.
situation,
there is no contrast (AE p.64;
because
any
event,
not
Indians of
the
peoples
all
Germans of northern Europe.
ihis theme falls
imperilled
equally
are
southern Patagonia
S p.150).
being rather
by
nuclear
the
better placed
than the
Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or
incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places.
Nor,
Schell
likewise,
contrast
(in
all
are
to
people
equally responsible,
a
repeatedly infiltrates.
Anders)
pernicious
This
is
the
theme which
Pogo theme,
according to which
S3.
Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes
onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But
there
is also, mixed
a weaker more
in,
plausible claim that gives lie
to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared).
An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeH runs as follows: ’...
the
world’s
leaders
political
...
though they
now menace
weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
true for democracies’
(pp.229-30).
positive
pose
the
since we
sense,
threat of it,
At least, this is
theme is elaborated elsewhere:
The
... we are
(For the populations of the superpowers this is true
the authors of that extinction.
in a
with nuclear
the earth
pay for extinction and
support the governments that
the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is
while for
true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger/
But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by
(p.152).
revealing
insensitivity
its
unresponsiveness
and
to
many
of
the
populace
they
allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not
represented at all (namely foreigners).
But Schell conveniently neglects all such
’... we are potential mass killers.
points:
that it makes of all of us underwriters of
(p.152).
The moral cost of nuclear armaments is
the slaughter of hundreds of millions
And again ’[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life
not only is not sacred but is worthless;
(p.153).
everyone to be killed’
that
... .it had been judged acceptable for
Little of this is true.
Those who campaign against
nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible,
destruction,
and
responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them.
Nor
and
the
are
like,
does responsibility
certainly
— or
everyone
attributes
to
decisions
taken
—
not
the
the unlikely
fall
in "liberal
on
authors
opinions as
those
democracies"
who
have
of
to
done
potential
worth
Schell
less.
even by representatives
illegitimately
Responsibility
for
(in the unlikely
�7
event of
this happening
in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be
traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is
only
representative of a
party which offers
a complex and often ill-characterised
package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted,
still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted
can responsibility,
for it, not to everyone in the community.
While S3 is false, there is an important
related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person.
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part
of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have
failed to change our
pre-nuclear institutions.
The sovereign system is out of step
with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme).
Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the
frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses
sight of
this important
arrives
at
state which is,
the
critique of
theme (indicated pp.187-8).
the conclusion
that
by and
large,
Yet S4 forms part of Schell s
scattered and
the nation-state has outlasted
fragmentary.
Schell
its usefulness,
and
that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required
as a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards
the Way Up to world political control.
Solutions to
way,
the nuclear dilemma come,
from the Top Down;
(cf. p.230).
those
if not easily, in a similar simplistic
who can must appeal
to the Top,
to those who govern
Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations,
such as SALT, and in world government,
especially p.227,
bottom paragraph).
through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and
Given the record of
these organisations and
treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith.
Nor is a
serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the
origins of nuclear technology,
to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider
effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But
some of
the requisite
deeper analysis of
the nuclear situation and, more
The roots of
generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere.
the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically —aligned arrangements of
nation-states,
but
penetrate
also
into
key
components
of
those
states,
their
�8
and their supporting bureaucracies.
their controlling classes,
military,
And both
within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in
key components
of
states,
the
science
for
super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented
in several
enables
domination,
and
which
involves
superiority by the
and
technology,
forms.
interrelated
surplus
the drive
Thus the push for
the accompanying privilege).
power and domination (and, often,
[nuclear]
feature is
a conspicuous and crucial
product
can be
accumulated
at home
(from
where enough
large nation-state,
is the
The main power-base
from abroad,
and
and
bled
from
nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the highj
15
technology research and development means to ever more expendable powei and energy*
prospect of nuclear
war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mam power-base, the nation
state; it is also important to alter key components of the state, and, more
sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and
In changing
the
structural
political arrangements,
in
state
relations,
political
arrangements
chauvinistic relations .
relations,
but
in
the
eliminate
namely patterns of domination,
organisation,
human-animal
to
patterns manifested not only
relations,
white-coloured
human-nature
relations;
to
remove,
male-female
in
short,
However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and
the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled
And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of
separately.
states and certain key components of states.
analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the
familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between
The teaching that 'the end
"raison d’etat" and the Socratic—Christian ethics.
justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed
In what
themselves
to
commit crimes of
every
sort’
(p.134).
So
'states may do virtually
Schell then argues however, that
extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the
argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined
anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’.
with ontological
assumptions.
Even if all humans were
extinguished (as under SI)
ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials,
The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such
actual or not.
objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification
by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this
context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of
I6
its nuclear policies.
A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends.
�9
So
even
from
an
perspective,
expediency
policies
super-state
open
are
severe
to
criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war,
Schell leaves us in
A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and
no doubt.
power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
War arises from
how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity
(p.188).
to wage war.
to organise
On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people
for war.
sovereignty.
On the other
side, without war it
is impossible
to preserve
The
Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands.
first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small
the macro-state
Now that
nonmilitary states.
system is entrenched, it is however
easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities
life,
which include self-interest,
that
peace
are
arrangements
aggression,
readily
fear,
hatred.
as
dismissed
of international
is on this basis
It
unrealistic,
utopian,
even
(amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.L85).
Schell’s further
theme
nuclear
that
"war"
is not
war threatens,
however,
to
undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument
and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity.
theme needs much qualification,
Fortunately the not-war
and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of
war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is
neither necessary nor sufficient for war.
very different
What is correct is that nuclear wars are
from previous conventional wars
(cf. WP).
Schell goes on
that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have.
to claim
But nuclear attacks can
certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on
not all wars or games are won).
one side being defeated
’no
happen,
But
what
one’s
these
on a decision by arms.
strength
sorts
of
fails
war
this doesn t
until both sides have been annihilated’
considerations
nuclear wars are not wars, but
But in nuclear
contribute
to
showing
is
(p.190).
again
that they are not wars of certain sorts,
not
that
e.g., not
just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success anu
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on.
that conventional wars
have
argument
persisted
into
nuclear
times
does
damage
to
Schell’s
that nuclear
weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise
of war
court
has left no means
of
appeal
has
mistaken propositions:
been
to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final
removed
(pp. 192—193) •
The
theme depends
on a
pair of
that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea
�10
that
war of
some
sort has
to be
final "court of appeal" between nations (for
the
there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility
of more cooperative behaviour,
joint referenda).
e.g.
imports the
The theme also
social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war
that war has to
theme)
proceed to the technological limit ~ as if war and violence were thoroughly natural
activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.),
On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations
and ruleless activities.
such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war
but from what is
now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning .
The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the
world
is
entangled
now
in
are
perfectly
sound,
logical,
represents little more than a cheap semantical trick.
rational.
however this
Logic in no way justifies the
present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable.
There are
logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can
be applied
in
strategic
planning;
but
yield specific results without
they do not
desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values
being pumped in, extralogically .
There are various ways these value assignments may
be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning
they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency
however,
to
cover
something
like
’reasoning
(even from a national
fail:18 yet
threat of
further and
of
stresses (p.213)
threatening
use
interest viewpoint)
the success
this
considerations entering
into
the
’the illogic of deterrence’, for he emphasizes
For instance he
unreasonableness.
rationality
rational
and
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with
the term ’logic of’, should write of
supposed
lor the most pait,
’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation,
policy or strategy of’.
its
.
of deterrence
unjustifiable and
the disparity between the
weapons and
of nuclear
the
irrationality
of actually using them should the threat
doctrine depends on the credibility of
irrational use.
the
Indeed Schell wants to go still
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
but
the argument
depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,
along with
the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation.
irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
pp.z-01~2>;
Nuclear deterrence may well be
ft
�NOTES
This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth,
according to Schell, and to Anders' of my monograph referred to as WP, where
several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed.
References are by way of authors' names or else through obvious acronyms, given
in the list of references which follows.
. The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many
leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so
considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in
entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the
better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so
presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is
debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the
free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good
lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation
removes that all-important opportunity.
But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his
contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for
which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives.
Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point
can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously
effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all
lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives
remain.
To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of
an each to all fallacy.
Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try
to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down
when applied to all participating people.
None can gain free lives by
extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even.
. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of
S2 is made in Foley JS.
. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will
require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows
needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals.
. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC
explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the
remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency.
It is this sort of
argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a
deeper metaphysical level.
The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same
technological Pandora's box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive
exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy
�12
targeting
in
particular
of
Southern Hemispheric
internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones).
sites
(including
5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much.
The most intrepid of
these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case
circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot
be excluded’ (p.1299).
The study admits that, in the scenario described,
’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions
immediately ’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human
survival are exaggerated.
In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid
latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern
latitudes.
For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates
appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many
agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1237 case
29, and p.1286).
Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface
ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps
minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor
activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge).
No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and
peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of
nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many statesmen and
strategists have an interest in minimizing them.
And there is certainly
substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn.
For
Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a
global nuclear war remain
. . . uncertain .. . because of a lack of
information on various important processes [among other things] ... The
environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked
changes in the composition of the atmosphere*, again among other things.
Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational.
The way to err
is clear.
6. Not
merely
by
technological
determinists
of
marxist
persuasion.
Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction that if the
US military has a weapon it will use it.
7. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future (etc.) is
repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173.
8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB.
9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one
is responsible, the whole thing is out of control.
The technological
version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More
satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political
control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear
things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed.
The vested
interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military
�13
weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby).
Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these
powerful groups, so losing control of political processes.
The argument
is flawed at its final stage.
For many influential politicians either
belong to or represent vested interests.
Thus, though there is no doubt
some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested
interests than to run out of political control.
11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185).
Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This
connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation,
and against socialism.
12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP ^8, where too the case against
the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated.
13. Anders' explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are
presented more straightforwardly in Martin.
The incomplete list of items
given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation,
paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
energy, speed, satisfaction,
..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference-satisfaction, for instance, or utility.
And
the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but
worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as
rational, which again it is not.
Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth
has it, consists in maximisation, of a suitable mix of these virtues.
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
The maximisation of self-interest
theorems and associated paradoxes
(individual or national) runs into Newcomb's paradox and special cases of
The maximisation of power, as
it such as Prisoners Dilemma situations.
the
Christian-lslamic
God,
encounters the paradox of
symbolised in
the
parallel
maximisation
of
knowledge,
paradoxes of
omnipotence,
or
There
are
no
consistent
objects
which
arc
omnipotent
omniscience.
the
The
drive
for
maximum
consistency,
often
taken
to
be
omniscient.
epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more
important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of
Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems).
15. R & D,
though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
�14
drives the arms race.
science.
Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby
anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the
ecological fix).
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of
control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also
running out of control.
But technological determinism, like other
varieties of stronger (nonanalytlc) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be
persisted with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit
not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting
with often recalcitrant technologies.
They also admit of being made to
look ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution,
then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it
will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population
regulation!
16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context.
17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of
deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions.
18. Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been
contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like
a phoenix from the radioactive ashes.
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing
motive" for
retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a
retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the
future dominance of the rival ideology.
Such a motive has been offered
for the conjectured targeting of Latin America.
19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed
to "negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral
paradoxes of deterrence
take a different direction.
For although
�involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions
of intensional functors.
One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where
the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly
threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though
credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style
derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles
when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase
the number.
This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is
another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate
practice,
a
time-honoured
method
of
removing
contradictions
by
conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
REFERENCES
G. Anders,
AA.
Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H.
G. z\nders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken
Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE.
zur
Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as
atomaren
F. Barnaby, ’Will there be a Nuclear War’, in Australia
M. Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37.
I.J.
Benton
49-51.
and G.W.
Partridge,
’"Twilight
at Noon"
Situation,
and
Beck,
C.H.
War,
Nuclear
overstated', Ambio
(ed.
(1984)
13
B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972.
P.J. Crutzen, ’Darkness after a nuclear war', Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4.
M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983.
P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’,
222 (1983) 1293-1300.
G. Foley,
'Jonathan Schell: Genius Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS.
Philosopher
-
Rewrite
Man',
Science
typescript,
G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983.
D. Hackworth, 'A Soldier's Report’, Australia and Nuclear War,
Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12.
(ed. M. Denborough),
K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press,
�16
1961.
B. Martin, Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Nottingham, 1984.
L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace, New York, 1970.
G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the
Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982.
R. Routley and N. Griffin, ’Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB.
of
Social
R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear
deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as WP.
R. and V. Routley, ’Human chauvinism and Environmental ethics’, in Environmental
Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC.
J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F.
R.P.
Turco and others, ’Nuclear winter: global
explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-92.
consequences
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977.
of
multiple
nuclear
�
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■k
METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT
A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented
works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
main nuclear predicament, r’own to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts
The most
transient superficialities of much of the political commentary,
circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
with the
widely
slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth,
This skillful piece of
unc annily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological
themes of Anders.
So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often
To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle
be considered together,
media-philosophy
In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings,
their work.
is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear
It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of
arrangements.
the
exhibits,
both
the
claim
that
species
....
that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense
...’
of
aftermath
nuclear
Unfortunately
attack.
it
also
philosophically and factually, severe defects.
’without
is
it
Some of
simply rubbish:
to
take
one example,
consider
... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human]
nothing else
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is
no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become
morally neutral.
compared
with
Moral
more
issues remain moral issues:
important
elsewhere, e.g. p.130).
moral
issues
(as
they don’t cease to be so when
Schell
effectively
acknowledges
And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be
entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts.
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two
of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders.
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction
assumption); and
52.
In the absence of humans, very many notions,
not only those of morality and
value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a
more
sympathetic
philosophical
form,
these
notions
depend
for
actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption) .
their
sense
on an
2
S2 which give Anders’
It is applications of
philosophical depth,
paradoxical
and Schell’s work some of its apparent
and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the
propositions
But
generated.
the
frequent
applications
S2
of
depend
essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make
past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
the
Granted that
assumption SI
is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as
technological
means appear
available
extinct;^
granted
centres of
prospect
the
of
to make it
large-scale
nuclear
Western civilization with obliteration.
the light of present - admittedly inadequate -
true,
to render Homo sapiens
war
does
threaten
leading
Even so SI appears unlikely in
Even in Canada, which
information.
lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in
certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies).
SI
is extremely flimsy.
It depends,
for example,
Schell’s argument to
on an unjustified extrapolation
from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very
North American thing, of contracting the world to North America.
all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least,
to be more charitable, in North
America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e.
eliminated
in
the nuclear
holocaust.)
Some of
(All that matters,
its human population will be
the data
upon,
Schell relies
for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the .ozone layer, was significantly out of
date even when he wrote.
Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in
ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well
from North
A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced
to South.
about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others,
Southern Hemisphere,
such as
New Zealand
and southern
at
indicates that parts of the
latitudes of
Latin America
could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.
Doomsday prophets
may appear
to have
gained new
purchase
through
recent
belated) scientific forecasts of a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war.
(if
But
although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to
the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war,
extinction assumption3.
they do not sustain the
On the available evidence, human life will continue, though
no doubt with new complications and simplifications, for example^ in many southern
mid-latitude coastal reqions outside zones of radiation fall-out.
More generally,
life will go on,
though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss
of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures.
Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as
already set
, in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe.
Much of the
/r
3
way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible.
insist
the
upon
of
"impossibility
unlearning”
the
Thus both Anders and Schell
means of manufacturing nuclear
It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good
bombs.
medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
theory
Daniken’s
of an
"high"
earlier
In virtue
technology).
they would
of S2,
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that
the notion
no longer made
impossibility-of-unlearning
eventual
use
of
sense.
But
what
message
is
the
-
as
if
technology
the
they
again want
inevitability
having
learnt
to
suggest
have
been advanced.But
technological advances
cases of
they
that have
are not
not been
tenable.
the
development
and
else
was
of
the
the
means
determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice.
views
with
There
all
Certainly such
are many
taken advantage of,
and
examples of
there are even
technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or
used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond
the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear
Even if this were true just
"experiments".
weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments"
of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut
And in fact
the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons.
Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear
scientific work, 1to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not
Again they have
interfere with the■ observers and those outside the "laboratories" .
latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the
cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic
effects,
such
circulation and
enough with it
in character,
or changes in coupled atmospheric
Short of a large-scale nuclear war, and likely
radiation fields.
these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical
as
fireballs
or
firestorms,
Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative
modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of
S2 .
The penetration
Schell
and
Anders,
of
but
in S2, is not something peculiar to
Western philosophy, European philosophy
human
chauvinism, as
is
product
a
of
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version
It has also deeply
of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.).
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has been extended under the influence of
especially.
Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a
product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged
MB
4
implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no
way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes.
As
very many propositions
with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones:
about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans
or their communities.
In
Schell,
Kantian
obnoxious
is
chauvinism
human
dished
Thoughts and
form.
up
a
in
particularly
time
propositions,
powerful
history and
tenses,
and
and
memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings
-
future or merely potential
past or
humans are certainly not enough.
humans are not enough,
persons
that are not
Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.),
’... the
thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because
as
soon as it is, we are not.
In imagining any other event, we look ahead
moment that is still within the stream of human time,
a
later
rational
Though we no doubt have it
into past,
(p.143).
local
may
well
be
able
to
truly.
it
have
Schell
there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past,
(p.140)*^.
Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that
erroneously denies that:
present, and future ...’
divides time
creature
The thought is however
... ’.
perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now.
falsely,
to a
present and
future’: so annihilation cannot
’come to pass’
But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a
time
ordering
(perceptible
to
many
creatures
other
than
humans,
but
not
depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to
to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures,
the present,
and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may
also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to
pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth.
Before that
there was a time before there were any human beings.
argument for the demise of time, that ’what has been will no longer be
Anders’
even what
has
been’ ,
is also explicitly (and narrowly)
’for what
verificationist :
would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
is no
remain
one
remember the
to
many
sorts
of
things
difference;
organisms would be different.
that have been’
for
one,
Temporal
the
(AA p.245).
history
themes do not lack
if there
There would
recorded
in
many
still
other
’legitimacy because not
registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not
matters of human verification.
Here,
as
elsewhere,
the
human
chauvinism
is
mixed
with
other
distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and
ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking
about
does
what
exist)
not
Thus,
for
metaphysics from Freud, according to whom
example,
takes
Schell
dubious
over
it is indeed impossible to imagine our own
death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still
present
spectators"
as
refuting
the
(p.138).
fact
In
first.
clause goes
second
The
is
there
counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud’s
distance
difficulty
great
no
a good
describing
in
The
claims.
towards
same, goes
for
Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds,
value theory:
evil,
’... the simple and basic fact [sic!]
harm,
or
service
lamenting
rejoicing
or
that before there can be good or
must
there
be
life ,
human
life
These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have
(p.171).
been exposed and criticised elsewhere/, e.g. HC).
Naturally many
things will disappear with the extinction of humans:
trivially
there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no
more human communities,
human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so
But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will
forth.
accordingly be
’no thought,
no love,
sacrifice, no image, no song ...'.
For there are, and may continue to exist, other
than humans with emotion,
creatures
no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no
struggles, songs,
...
Nor will the ending of
.
all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have
been ’all in vain’, meaningless, and already so to say dead.
The decay of the solar
system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human
A
activities were not worthwhile.*
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from
their shared
assumptions SI
of a Second Death,
(in Revelations)
under
SI,
is
reckoned
meaningless
rendered
and S2.
a
and
species
death’,
and
all
extinction came
redeployed by both.
’second death’ ,
already
already ’overhung with death’
’a second
It is these that underlie the biblical notion
’seems
(S p.166).
because
to
Thus,
not merely one’s own but
future
to
pass,
generations
the
(S
stronger
be
by
’The death of mankind ,
S2 and
dead’
(AA
SI
p.244,
remaining
S p.166)
life
is
and
is
too, more trivially, a person faces
in addition that greater death of the
p.166,
p.115).
However
even
notion would not be vindicated,
if
nuclear
because
it
depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on
the very
questionable representation
of
this
meaninglessness as
a sort
of death.
There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same
time.
The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base.
6
From SI,
together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute
in degree,
doesn’t differ
theme that
the universality of peril
comes
’we are all
exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult
to
with
SI.
In
situation,
there is no contrast (AE p.64;
because
recognise’,
event,
any
are
peoples
southern Patagonia
Indians of
the
all
not
This theme falls
S p.150).
by
imperilled
equally
the
better placed
being rather
nuclear
than the
Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or
Germans of northern Europe.
incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places.
likewise,
Nor,
Schell
are all
contrast
(in
to
people equally responsible,
a pernicious
repeatedly infiltrates.
Anders)
This
is
theme^ which,
the
theme,
Pogo
according to which
S3.
Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes
onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But
there is also, mixed in,
a weaker more
plausible claim that gives lie
to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared).
An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme11 runs as follows: ’...
the
world’s
leaders
political
...
they
though
now menace
the earth with nuclear
At least, this is
weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
true for democracies'
(pp.229-30).
pose
since we pay for extinction and
sense,
threat of it,
the
... we are
(For the populations of the superpowers this is true
the authors of that extinction.
in a positive
theme is elaborated elsewhere:
The
while for
support the governments that
the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world
it is
true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger)
(p.152).
But
this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by
revealing
its
allegedly
govern,
insensitivity
not
to
and
unresponsiveness
to
affected
by
mention
those
its
the
activities
populace
who
are
they
not
But Schell conveniently neglects all such
represented at all (namely foreigners).
points:
of
many
'... we are potential mass killers.
The moral cost of nuclear armaments is
it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions'
And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life
(p.152),
that
not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for
to be killed' (p.153).
Little of this is true.
Those who campaign against
nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible,
destruction,
and
responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them.
Nor
and
the
are
like,
does responsibility
attributes
decisions
to
certainly
— or
everyone
taken
—
not
the
the unlikely
fall
in "liberal
on
authors
opinions as
those
democracies"
who
have
of
potential
to worth
done
less.
Schell illegitimately
Responsibility for
even by representatives
(in the unlikely
event of
this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be
traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is
only
representative of a
party which offers a complex and often
ill-characterised
package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in
the (uncommon)
can responsibility,
event of a clear
still of a qualified
single issue referendum, which is adopted,
sort, be
for it, not to everyone in the community.
sheeted home, to those who voted
While S3 is false, there is an important
related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person.
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part
of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have
failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions.
The sovereign system is out of step
with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme).
Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the
frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses
sight of
this important
critique of
the
theme (indicated
state whi?V
the conclusion
arrives at
is,
that
by and
pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell s
scattered
large,
the nation-state
and
has outlasted
Schell
fragmentary.
its usefulness,
and
that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required
as a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards
the Way Up to world political control.
Solutions to
the nuclear dilemma come,
way,
from the Top Down;
(cf.
p.230).
if not easily, in a similar simplistic
those who can must appeal
to the Top,
to those who govern
Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations,
such as SALT, and in world government, through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and
especially p.227,
treaties,
bottom paragraph).
Given the record of
these organisations and
the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith.
Nor is a
serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the
origins of nuclear technology,
to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider
effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and , more
generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders$f and elsewhere.13 The roots of
the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of
nation-states,
but
penetrate
also
into
key
components
of
those
states,
their
8
and
controlling classes,
their
military,
their supporting bureaucracies.
And both
within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in
key components
of
states,
the
power and domination (and, often,
superiority by the
[nuclear]
science
interrelated forms.
surplus
product
nature)
to
super-states, to
involves
accumulated
can be
is
enables
is the
for
Thus the push for
domination,
large nation-state,
at home
(from
the drive
be achieved through military-oriented
and
main power-base
The
feature
the accompanying privilege).
which
technology,
and
and crucial
a conspicuous
and
from
abroad,
several
in
where enough
and
bled
from
proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-
technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy.
In changing
the prospect of
to eliminate
arrangements
structural
the
nuclear
war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, the nation
state;
it
sweepingly,
also
is
important
remove
to
state
relations,
political
alter
trouble-making
political arrangements,
in
to
key
components
patterns
embedded
namely patterns of domination,
organisation,
human-animal
relations,
but
in
of
in
state,
and,
all
these
social
and
patterns manifested not only
relations,
white-coloured
human-nature
more
the
relations;
to
male-female
in
remove,
short,
However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and
chauvinistic relations.
the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled
separately.
And there
the problems
can largely be narrowed
to certain problems of
states and certain key components of states.
In what analysis he does offer of the
contrast of
familiar false
"raison
d’etat"
and
the
justifies the means is
themselves
to
problem with states,
state expediency with morality,
Socratic-Christian
ethics.
every sort’
(p.134).
anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’.
argument is
as a
contrast between
teaching
that
’the
end
the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed
commit crimes of
extinction nullifies
The
Schell repeats the
So
’states may do virtually
Schell then argues however, that
end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the
far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined
with ontological
assumptions.
Even if all
humans were extinguished (as under SI)
ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials,
actual
or
not.
The
ends-means
argument
can
however
be
repaired
to
remove
such
objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification
by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by ’relevant’, in this
context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of
its nuclear policies.a nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses,
would
undoubtedly
frustrate
the realisation of relevant
state ends.
9
So
even
expediency
an
from
perspective,
policies
super-state
are
open
severe
to
criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war,
Schell leaves us in
A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and
no doubt.
to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
power
War arises from
how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity^
(p.188).
to wage war.
to organise
On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people
sovereignty.
is impossible
side, without war it
On the other
for war.
to preserve
Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands.
The
first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small
nonmilitary states.
the macro-state system is entrenched, it
Now that
easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities
life,
which include self-interest,
that
peace
readily
are
arrangements
aggression,
dismissed
as
of international
It is on this basis
hatred.
fear,
is however
unrealistic,
utopian,
even
(amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell’s
further
nuclear "war"
that
theme
is not
war
threatens,
however,
to
undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument
and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity.
Fortunately the not-war
theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of
war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is
neither necessary nor sufficient for war.
What is correct is that nuclear wars are
very different from previous conventional wars
(cf. WP) .
that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have.
to claim
Schell goes on
But nuclear attacks can
certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on
not all wars or games are won).
one side
’no one’s
happen,
But
being defeated
what
these
on a decision by arms.
strength fails
sorts
of
until
considerations
nuclear wars are not wars, but
But in nuclear "war
this doesn’t
both sides have been annihilated’
contribute
to
showing
is
(p.190).
again
that they are not wars of certain sorts,
not
that
e.g., not
just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on.
have
persisted
into
nuclear
times
does
damage
to
That conventional wars
Schell's argument
that nuclear
weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise
of war
court
has left no means
of
appeal
has
mistaken propositions:
been
to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final
removed
(pp.192-193).
The
theme depends
on a
pair of
that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea
10
that war of
some sort has
to
be
the
final
court of appeal
between nations (for
there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility
of more cooperative behaviour,
e.g.
joint referenda).
The
social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the 'logic of war
theme also
imports the
theme) that war has to
proceed to the technological limit — as if war and violence were thoroughly natural
activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.),
and ruleless activities.
On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations
such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war
but from what is
now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning .
The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the
world
is
now
entangled
in
are
perfectly
sound,
logical,
rational.
However
Logic in no way justifies the
represents little more than a cheap semantical trick.
present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable.
logics of decision (as presented, e.g.,
be applied
planning;
in strategic
but
this
There are
for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can
they do not
yield
specific results without
desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values
being pumped in, extralogically .
There are various ways these value assignments may
be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning
they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency^?.
For the most part,
however, ’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation,
to
cover
something
like
’reasoning
and rational
considerations entering
into
the
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with
policy or strategy of’.
the term ’logic of’, should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes
its unreasonableness.
supposed
rationality
(even from a national
fail:^ yet
threat of
the
this
further and
For
of
stresses (p.213)
instance he
threatening
use
interest viewpoint)
success
of deterrence
unjustifiable and
of nuclear
the disparity between the
weapons and
the
irrationality
of actually using them should the threat
doctrine depends on the credibility of
irrational use.
the
Indeed Schell wants to go still
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
but
the argument
depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,
along with
the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation.
irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
pp.201-2);
Nuclear deterrence may well be
11
NOTES
This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth,
according to Schell, and to Anders’ of my monograph referred to as WP, where
Several points, only touched ijpcn in this review, are further developed.
References are by way of authors’ names or else through obvious acronyms, given
in the list of references which follows.
1. The distinguishing term is from Foley’s Nuclear Prophets, where many
leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so
considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in
entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the
better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so
presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is
debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the
free West props up) , it still gives humans a further chance for goou
lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation
removes that all-important opportunity.
But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his
contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for
which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives.
Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point
can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously
effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all
lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives
remain.
To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of
an each to all fallacy.
Jasper’s idea that "the free life that they try
to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down
when applied to all participating people.
None can gain free lives by
extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even.
2. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders’ remarkably similar versions of
S2 is made in Foley Ju.
3. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will
require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows
needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals.
4. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC
explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the
remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of
argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a
deeper metaphysical level.
The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same
technological Pandora’s box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive
exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy
targeting
in
particular
of
Southern
Hemispheric
internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones).
sites
(including
5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much.
The most intrepid of
these studies.
Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worstQ '
case circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens
cannot be excluded’ (p.1299).
The study admits that, in the scenario
described,
’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to
extinctions immediately’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of
long-term human survival are exaggerated.
In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid
latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern
latitudes.
For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates
appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many
agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1287 case
29, and p.1286).
Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface
ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps
minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor
activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge).
No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and
peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of
nuclear
holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen and
strategists have an interest in minimizing them.
And there is certainly
substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn.
For
Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a
global nuclear war remain ... uncertain ... because of a lack of
information on various important processes [among other things] ... the
environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked
changes in the composition of the atmosphere’, again among other things.
Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational.
The way to err
is clear.
marxist
persuasion,
determinists
of
merely
by
technological
6. Not
induction
that
if the
argues
by
straight
Hackworth, a former US general,
use
it.
US military has a weapon it will
present and future (etc.) is
7. The appalling theme that humans create past,
repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173.
8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB.
9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one
is responsible, the whole thing is out of control.
The technological
version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More
satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political
control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear
things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed.
The vested
interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military
13
weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby).
Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these
powerful groups, so losing control of political processes.
The argument
is flawed at its final stage.
For many influential politicians either
belong to or represent vested interests.
Thus, though there is no doubt
some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested
interests than to run out of political control.
11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185).
Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
’the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons’ (p.194): the world? This
connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the 'free enterprise
(USA) nation,
and against socialism.
12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP §8, where too the case against
the state from
nuclear dilemmqj'is elaborated.
13. Anders’ explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are
presented more straightforwardly in Martin.
The incomplete list of items
given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation,
paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
energy, speed, satisfaction,
. .., for the
newer
Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference—satisfaction, for instance, or utility.
And
the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but
worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as
rational, which again it is not. C Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth
has it. consists in maximisation,.a suitable mix of these virtues.
*
4
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
The maximisation of self-interest
theorems and associated paradoxes,
runs
into
Newcomb
’s paraj^dox and special cases
(individual or national)
situations.
The
maximisation of power, as
such as Prisoners Dilemma
Christian-Islamic
God,
encounters
the paradox of
the
symbolised in
parallel
maximisation
of
knowledge,
paradoxes of
the
omnipotence,
or
no
consistent
objects
which
are
omnipotent
There are
omniscience.
the
The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be
omniscient.
epitome of rationality, also leads
leads to
to inconsistency in the case of more
important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of
Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems).
15. R & D,
though directed by military requirements
and the arms race, also
14
drives the arms race.
science.
Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby
anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the
ecological fix).
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of
control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also
running out of control.
But technological determinism, like other
varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be
persisted with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit
not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting
with often recalcitrant technologies.
They also admit of being made to
look ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution,
then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it
will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population
regulation!
16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context.
17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of
deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions.
(ar
18. Even the
irrationality of /retaliatory * first-strike)
use has been
contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thougnt that America will rise like
a phoenix from the radioactive ashes.
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing
motive" for retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a
retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the
future dominance of the rival ideology. Such a motive has been offered -tor
the conjecturAL targeting of Latin America.
19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed
to "negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral
paradoxes of deterrence
take a different direction.
For although
15
involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions
of intensional functors.
One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where
the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly
threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though
credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style
derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles
when the persistent practice, which Implies an intention, is to increase
the number.
This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is
another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate
practice,
a
time-honoured
method
of
removing
contradictions
by
conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
REFERENCES
G. Anders,
Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H.
Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as
AA.
G. Anders,
Zeitenende:
Endzeitand
Gedanken
atomaren
zur
Situation,
C.H.
Beck,
Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE.
7
'
F. Barnaby,
’Will
be
there
a
War' ,//» Aus tralia
Nuclear
Nuclear
War,
J
(ed.
M. Denborough) , Croom Helm, Australia, 1983?
I.J.
Benton
and G.W.
Partridge,
’"Twilight
at Noon"
overstated’,
13
Ambio
(1984)
49-51.
B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man
P.J. Crutzen,
Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972.
’Darkness after a nuclear war’, Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4.
M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983.
P.R. Erlich and others,
’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’,
Science
222 (1983) 1293-1300.
G. Foley,
’Jonathan
Schell:
Genius
-
Philosopher
-
Rewrite
Man’,
typescript,
Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS.
G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983.
16
in
’A Soldier’s Refragfljt’, , Australia
D. Hackworth,
Croom Helm, Australia, 1983
vi^vC
Nuclear War,
(ed. M. Denborough),
/zor-/z
»
K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press,
1961.
B. Martin,
Strategy Against
Roots
Grass
War,
Freedom Press,
1984, "ter
Nottingham,
a-p-peax.
L. Mumford,
The Myth of
the Machine,
2 vols.,
Harcourt
Brifce
,
New York,
1970.
G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the
Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982.
R. Routley and
N. Griffin,
'Unravelling
the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982.
R. Routley,
Meinong’s
Exploring
Jungle
and
Beyond,
Research
School
of
Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB.
R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear
deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984j
R. and
V. Routley,
Philosophy
(ed.
'Human
chauvinism
D. Manujson and
and
Environmental
others),
Research
ethics’,
School of
in
Environmental
Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC.
J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F.
R.P.
Turco
and
others,
'Nuclear
winter:
global
consequences
explosions’ , Science 222 (1983) 1283-92.
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977.
of
multiple nuclear
Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and tht?_ _ea£_t]i, according to
SchelT~and Anders.
Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption.
Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro
pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death
dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence.
METAPHYSICAL FALL-OUT FROM THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT*
A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented
works on nuclear war.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
main nuclear predicament, down to metaphysical levels;
with the
widely
in this the series contrasts
transient superficialities of much of the political commentary.
circulated
influential
and
text
the
of
series
is
undoubtedly that
uncannily
some
of
the
the apparently
deep phenomenological
So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often
themes of Anders.
be considered together.
their work.
redeploys
of
This skillful piece of
slightest of the "prophets", Schell’s The Fate of the Earth.
media-philosophy
The most
To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle
In particular, Schell’s little book, for all its political shortcomings,
is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear
It is especially valuable for its
arrangements.
the
aftermath
of
nuclear
vivid and horrifying scenarios of
Unfortunately
attack.
it
also
exhibits,
both
philosophically and factually, severe defects.
Some of
’without
is
it
simply rubbish:
to
take
one
example,
consider
the
... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human]
nothing else
claim that
species
....
that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense . . . ’
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is
no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become
Moral
morally neutral.
compared
with
more
issues remain moral issues: they don’t cease to be so when
important
elsewhere, e.g. p.130).
moral
issues
(as
Schell
effectively
acknowledges
And the claim should be questioned on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rats a survivor species, unlikely to be
entirely exterminated under presently-arranged nuclear holocausts.
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two
of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction
assumption); and
52.
value,
In
the absence of humans,
very many notions,
not only
those of morality and
but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a
form,
for their
X 2
actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).
more
sympathetic
philosophical
these
notions
depend
sense
on an
2
S2 which give Anders’ and Schell’s work some of its apparent
It is applications of
and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the
philosophical depth,
paradoxical propositions generated.
But the frequent applications of S2 depend
essentially on SI.3 For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make
past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Granted that assumption SI
the
technological
means appear
extinctgranted
the
prospect
is by no means ruled out as a real possibility, as
available to
of
make it
nuclear
large-scale
to render Homo sapiens
true,
war
does
threaten
leading
Even so SI appears unlikely in
centres of Western civilization with obliteration.
the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Canada, which
lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in
certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies).
SI
is
extremely flimsy.
for example,
It depends,
Schell s argument to
on an unjustified extrapolation
from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very
North Zunerican thing, of contracting the world to North America.
(All that matters,
all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North
America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in
the nuclear
holocaust.)
Some of
the data
Schell relies
upon,
for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, was significantly out of
date even when he wrote.
Other effects than ozone destruction, such as variations in
ultraviolent radiation and temperature levels, apparently extrapolate even less well
from North
A factually superior study of nuclear disaster produced at
to South.
about the same time as Schell’s, by Preddey and others,
indicates that parts of the
Southern Hemisphere,
latitudes of
such as
New Zealand
and
southern
Latin America
could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.
Doomsday prophets
belated) scientific
may appear
forecasts of
to have
gained new
purchase through
recent
a nuclear winter following upon nuclear war.
(if
But
although these forecasts certainly add a new, and alarming, ecological dimension to
the very damaging consequences of large-scale nuclear war, they do not sustain the
extinction assumption3.
On the available evidence, human life will continue, though
no
doubt with new complications and
mid-latitude coastal
life will go on,
for example
in many southern
regions outside zones of radiation fall-out.
More generally,
simplifications,
though likely seriously and irreversibly impoverished through loss
of valuable nonhuman systems and creatures.
Nuclear prophets usually see the world (though with most of it carried along) as
already set
, in crucial respects, on the route to nuclear catastrophe.
Much of the
3
way taken is seen as both inevitable and irreversible.
insist
upon
unlearning"
of
"impossibility
the
Thus both Anders and Schell
means of
the
manufacturing nuclear
It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee, would furnish a good
bombs.
medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken’s
of an
theory
"high"
earlier
they would
of S2,
In virtue
technology).
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly that
the notion
longer
no
made
sense.
But what
message
is
the
-
as
if
impossibility-of-unlearning
eventual
use
of
the
technology
they
to suggest
again want
learnt
having
the
of
inevitability
with
the
development
and
all
the means
determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice.
views have
been advanced.
technological advances
cases of
But
are not
they
that have
been
not
tenable.
Certainly such
are many
There
taken advantage of,
was
else
examples of
there are even
and
technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or
used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond
the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear
weapons, notably that they do not allow "experiments".
Even if this were true just
of nuclear weapons - and it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not rebut
the
argument against
previous
inevitability
the
of nuclear weapons.
And
in
fact
Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear
work,
scientific
large-scale
to
weapons
and
independent
experiments which
interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories".
latched onto major points:
cumulative
such
effects,
of
effects
as
in particular,
fireballs
or
Again they have
we have at present no way of testing the
wreapons
in
concert,
firestorms,
or
changes
nuclear
large
do not
e.g.
in
for
more
holistic
atmospheric
coupled
circulation and
radiation fields.
enough with
these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical
it,
in character.
Short of a large-scale nuclear war,
and likely
Nonetheless enough data can be assembled to carry through informative
modellings, which point to the improbability of SI, and so undermine applications of
S2.
The
Schell
penetration
and
Anders,
of human
but
is
a
chauvinism,
product
of
as
in S2,
Western
is not
something peculiar
philosophy,
European
to
philosophy
especially.
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders’ version
of
just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.).
S2
being
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and
has
been extended
It has also deeply
under the
influence of
Wittgenstein’s work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a
product
of
human
conventions,
and
would
vanish
with
humans!
Such
are
alleged
4
implications of extinction: but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no
way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes.
with necessary truths and falsehoods so with contingent ones:
As
very many propositions
about the world do not depend in any way for their truth-value or content on humans
or their communities.
In
human
Schell,
obnoxious Kantian
form.
dished
is
chauvinism
and
Thoughts
up
in
propositions,
a
particularly
time
powerful
history and
tenses,
and
and
memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings
future or merely potential humans are not enough,
- past or
that are not
persons
Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.),
humans are certainly not enough.
’... the
thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because
as
it
soon as
is, we are not.
In imagining any other event, we look ahead
moment that is still within the stream of human time,
... ’.
a
later
rational
erroneously denies that:
present, and future ...’
into past,
divides time
may
well
be
to
able
ordering
time
it
have
Schell
truly.
there is no "later" ’outside the human tenses of past,
(p.140)7.
Human extinction eliminates ’the creature that
present and future’: so annihilation cannot
But it is simply false that the tenses are human;
(p.143).
local
creature
The thought is however
Though we no doubt have it
perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now.
falsely,
to a
(perceptible
to
many
creatures
’come to pass’
the tenses depend on a
other
than humans,
but
not
depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to
to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures,
the present,
and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may
also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to
pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth.
Before that
there was a time before there were any human beings.
Anders’ argument for the demise of time,
even what has been’,
is also
that
’what has been will no longer be
explicitly (and narrowly)
’for what
verif icationist:
would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
is no
remain
one
remember the things
to
many
sorts
organisms would
of
difference;
be different.
that have been’
for
one,
Temporal
the
(AA p.245).
history
themes do not lack
if there
There would
still
many
other
recorded
in
’legitimacy because not
registered [or verified] by anyone’; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not
matters of human verification.
Here,
as
elsewhere,
the
human
chauvinism
is
mixed
with
other
distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and
5
ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking
about
exist)0.
not
does
what
Thus,
Schell
example,
for
takes
over
dubious
metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own
death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still
present
spectators"
as
refuting
(p.138).
fact
In
first.
the
clause goes
second
The
there
is
great
no
situations which undermine both Freud’s
counterfactual
a good
distance
difficulty
claims.
in
towards
describing
The same goes
for
Schell’s extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds,
value theory:
evil,
'... the simple and basic fact [sic!]
or
service
(p.171).
lamenting
harm,
rejoicing
or
that before there can be good or
there
be
must
life’,
human
life
These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas (which have
been exposed and criticised elsewhere, e.g. LIC).
Naturally many things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially
there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no
more human communities, human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so
But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will
forth.
’no thought,
accordingly be
no love,
sacrifice, no image, no song
no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no
For there are, and may continue to exist, other
...’.
creatures than humans with emotion, struggles,
songs,
...
Nor will the ending of
.
all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have
been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead.
The decay of the solar
system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human
9
activities were not worthwhile.
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from
their shared assumptions SI
of a Second Death,
(in Revelations)
under
SI,
rendered
is
and S2.
reckoned
meaningless
a
and
species
and
all
extinction came
redeployed
'second death',
already
already 'overhung with death'
'a second death',
It is these that underlie the biblical notion
'seems
(S p.166).
because by
to
to
pass,
generations
the
(S
stronger
be
Thus,
not merely one's own but
future
by both.
'The death of mankind',
S2 and
dead'
(AA
SI remaining
p.244,
S p.166)
life is
and is
too, more trivially, a person faces
in addition that greater death of the
p.166,
p.115).
However
even
notion would not be vindicated,
if
nuclear
because
it
depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on
the very
questionable representation
of. this
meaninglessness as
a sort
of death.
There is no such Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same
time.
The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base.
6
together with the minor principle
From SI,
doesn’t differ
in degree,
comes
extinction being an absolute
that
the universality of
peril
theme that
we are all
exposed to peril in the same degree’, which is accordingly ’disguised’ and ’difficult
to
recognise’,
with
In
SI.
situation,
there is no contrast (AE p.64;
because
any
event,
not
Indians of
the
peoples
all
Germans of northern Europe.
ihis theme falls
imperilled
equally
are
southern Patagonia
S p.150).
being rather
by
nuclear
the
better placed
than the
Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or
incapacitated by it; the prospects are different in different countries and places.
Nor,
Schell
likewise,
contrast
(in
all
are
to
people
equally responsible,
a
repeatedly infiltrates.
Anders)
pernicious
This
is
the
theme which
Pogo theme,
according to which
S3.
Responsibility for the present nuclear predicament (fiasco, really) distributes
onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But
there
is also, mixed
a weaker more
in,
plausible claim that gives lie
to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared).
An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeH runs as follows: ’...
the
world’s
leaders
political
...
though they
now menace
weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
true for democracies’
(pp.229-30).
positive
pose
the
since we
sense,
threat of it,
At least, this is
theme is elaborated elsewhere:
The
... we are
(For the populations of the superpowers this is true
the authors of that extinction.
in a
with nuclear
the earth
pay for extinction and
support the governments that
the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is
while for
true only in the negative sense that they fail try to do anything about the danger/
But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by
(p.152).
revealing
insensitivity
its
unresponsiveness
and
to
many
of
the
populace
they
allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not
represented at all (namely foreigners).
But Schell conveniently neglects all such
’... we are potential mass killers.
points:
that it makes of all of us underwriters of
(p.152).
The moral cost of nuclear armaments is
the slaughter of hundreds of millions
And again ’[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life
not only is not sacred but is worthless;
(p.153).
everyone to be killed’
that
... .it had been judged acceptable for
Little of this is true.
Those who campaign against
nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear—committed parties so far as is possible,
destruction,
and
responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them.
Nor
and
the
are
like,
does responsibility
certainly
— or
everyone
attributes
to
decisions
taken
—
not
the
the unlikely
fall
in "liberal
on
authors
opinions as
those
democracies"
who
have
of
to
done
potential
worth
Schell
less.
even by representatives
illegitimately
Responsibility
for
(in the unlikely
7
event of
this happening
in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be
traced back to those represented, since among many other things, a representative is
only
representative of a
party which offers
a complex and often ill-characterised
package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted,
still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted
can responsibility,
for it, not to everyone in the community.
While S3 is false, there is an important
related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person.
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part
of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4.
The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell’s fashion, with all of us] have
failed to change our
pre-nuclear institutions.
The sovereign system is out of step
with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme).
Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the
frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses
sight of
this important
arrives
at
state which is,
the
critique of
theme (indicated pp.187-8).
the conclusion
that
by and
large,
Yet S4 forms part of Schell s
scattered and
the nation-state has outlasted
fragmentary.
Schell
its usefulness,
and
that new political institutions more ’consonant with the global reality’ are required
as a matter of urgency.
But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.12 At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards
the Way Up to world political control.
Solutions to
way,
the nuclear dilemma come,
from the Top Down;
(cf. p.230).
those
if not easily, in a similar simplistic
who can must appeal
to the Top,
to those who govern
Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations,
such as SALT, and in world government,
especially p.227,
bottom paragraph).
through the United Nations (see p.225ff. and
Given the record of
these organisations and
treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith.
Nor is a
serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the
origins of nuclear technology,
to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider
effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But
some of
the requisite
deeper analysis of
the nuclear situation and, more
The roots of
generally, of the roots of war can be found in Anders and elsewhere.
the nuclear predicament are not confined to the ideologically —aligned arrangements of
nation-states,
but
penetrate
also
into
key
components
of
those
states,
their
8
and their supporting bureaucracies.
their controlling classes,
military,
And both
within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in
key components
of
states,
the
science
for
super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented
in several
enables
domination,
and
which
involves
superiority by the
and
technology,
forms.
interrelated
surplus
the drive
Thus the push for
the accompanying privilege).
power and domination (and, often,
[nuclear]
feature is
a conspicuous and crucial
product
can be
accumulated
at home
(from
where enough
large nation-state,
is the
The main power-base
from abroad,
and
and
bled
from
nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the highj
15
technology research and development means to ever more expendable powei and energy*
prospect of nuclear
war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mam power-base, the nation
state; it is also important to alter key components of the state, and, more
sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and
In changing
the
structural
political arrangements,
in
state
relations,
political
arrangements
chauvinistic relations .
relations,
but
in
the
eliminate
namely patterns of domination,
organisation,
human-animal
to
patterns manifested not only
relations,
white-coloured
human-nature
relations;
to
remove,
male-female
in
short,
However not everything needs to be accomplished at once; and
the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled
And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of
separately.
states and certain key components of states.
analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the
familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between
The teaching that 'the end
"raison d’etat" and the Socratic—Christian ethics.
justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed
In what
themselves
to
commit crimes of
every
sort’
(p.134).
So
'states may do virtually
Schell then argues however, that
extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the
argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined
anything whatever in the name of [their] survival’.
with ontological
assumptions.
Even if all humans were
extinguished (as under SI)
ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials,
The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such
actual or not.
objections: instead it is claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification
by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this
context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of
I6
its nuclear policies.
A nuclear war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends.
9
So
even
from
an
perspective,
expediency
policies
super-state
open
are
severe
to
criticism, for example as motivationally irrational in the nuclear risks taken.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war,
Schell leaves us in
A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and
no doubt.
power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
War arises from
how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation-states
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity
(p.188).
to wage war.
to organise
On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people
for war.
sovereignty.
On the other
side, without war it
is impossible
to preserve
The
Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as it stands.
first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small
the macro-state
Now that
nonmilitary states.
system is entrenched, it is however
easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities
life,
which include self-interest,
that
peace
are
arrangements
aggression,
readily
fear,
hatred.
as
dismissed
of international
is on this basis
It
unrealistic,
utopian,
even
(amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.L85).
Schell’s further
theme
nuclear
that
"war"
is not
war threatens,
however,
to
undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument
and the argument based on its nuclear-war making capacity.
theme needs much qualification,
Fortunately the not-war
and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of
war as ’a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end’ (p.189): but this is
neither necessary nor sufficient for war.
very different
What is correct is that nuclear wars are
from previous conventional wars
(cf. WP).
Schell goes on
that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have.
to claim
But nuclear attacks can
certainly have ends (even if large nuclear wars cannot be won in the older sense: but
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on
not all wars or games are won).
one side being defeated
’no
happen,
But
what
one’s
these
on a decision by arms.
strength
sorts
of
fails
war
this doesn t
until both sides have been annihilated’
considerations
nuclear wars are not wars, but
But in nuclear
contribute
to
showing
is
(p.190).
again
that they are not wars of certain sorts,
not
that
e.g., not
just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success anu
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on.
that conventional wars
have
argument
persisted
into
nuclear
times
does
damage
to
Schell’s
that nuclear
weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise
of war
court
has left no means
of
appeal
has
mistaken propositions:
been
to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final
removed
(pp. 192—193) •
The
theme depends
on a
pair of
that concerning the demise of conventional war, and the idea
10
that
war of
some
sort has
to be
final "court of appeal" between nations (for
the
there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility
of more cooperative behaviour,
joint referenda).
e.g.
imports the
The theme also
social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war
that war has to
theme)
proceed to the technological limit ~ as if war and violence were thoroughly natural
activities, independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.),
On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations
and ruleless activities.
such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war
but from what is
now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning .
The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive arrangements the
world
is
entangled
now
in
are
perfectly
sound,
logical,
represents little more than a cheap semantical trick.
rational.
however this
Logic in no way justifies the
present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable.
There are
logics of decision (as presented, e.g., for the classical case in Jeffrey) which can
be applied
in
strategic
planning;
but
yield specific results without
they do not
desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values
being pumped in, extralogically .
There are various ways these value assignments may
be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning
they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency
however,
to
cover
something
like
’reasoning
(even from a national
fail:18 yet
threat of
further and
of
stresses (p.213)
threatening
use
interest viewpoint)
the success
this
considerations entering
into
the
’the illogic of deterrence’, for he emphasizes
For instance he
unreasonableness.
rationality
rational
and
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with
the term ’logic of’, should write of
supposed
lor the most pait,
’logic of’ tends to be used very loosely, as a word of general commendation,
policy or strategy of’.
its
.
of deterrence
unjustifiable and
the disparity between the
weapons and
of nuclear
the
irrationality
of actually using them should the threat
doctrine depends on the credibility of
irrational use.
the
Indeed Schell wants to go still
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
but
the argument
depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,
along with
the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation.
irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
pp.z-01~2>;
Nuclear deterrence may well be
ft
NOTES
This is a revised version of ’Appendix 1. On the fate of mankind and the earth,
according to Schell, and to Anders' of my monograph referred to as WP, where
several points, only touched upon in this review, are further developed.
References are by way of authors' names or else through obvious acronyms, given
in the list of references which follows.
. The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many
leading anti-nuclear prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so
considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work comes out in
entirely the wrong direction. It gives heavy philosophical attire to the
better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so
presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is
debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the
free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good
lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation
removes that all-important opportunity.
But of course Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his
contention is that there are circumstances where, and principles for
which, a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives.
Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point
can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously
effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all
lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives
remain.
To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of
an each to all fallacy.
Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try
to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down
when applied to all participating people.
None can gain free lives by
extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even.
. A detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of
S2 is made in Foley JS.
. Should S2 appeal, as it may, to suitable communities of humans, SI will
require reformulation in similar terms; and the argument that follows
needs minor adjustment, with appropriate groups replacing individuals.
. Thus the Last Person argument, important in environmental ethics (as HC
explains), is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting for instance the
remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency.
It is this sort of
argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a
deeper metaphysical level.
The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same
technological Pandora's box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
Nuclear extinction would presumably require a different and more massive
exchange than is usually assumed in nuclear war scenarios, with heavy
12
targeting
in
particular
of
Southern Hemispheric
internationally-recognised nuclear-free zones).
sites
(including
5. Nor do recent scientific studies claim as much.
The most intrepid of
these studies, Erlich and others, only contends that in certain worst-case
circumstances, ’the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot
be excluded’ (p.1299).
The study admits that, in the scenario described,
’it seems unlikely ... Homo spaiens would be forced to extinctions
immediately ’, and the difficulties indicated in the way of long-term human
survival are exaggerated.
In particular, many of the drastic effects predicted for Northern mid
latitudes are reflected in very much milder form in equivalent Southern
latitudes.
For example, temperatures for regions with maritine climates
appear likely to vary by only a few degrees and perhaps neglibly for many
agricultural purposes after 100 days (cf. Turco and others, p.1237 case
29, and p.1286).
Similarly the extent of nuclear darkness and of surface
ultraviolet radiation will be appreciably less in the South and perhaps
minor for many crucial purposes, such as photosynthesis and human outdoor
activity, after 100 dayss (cf. the data in Benton and Partridge).
No doubt some scientifically respectable sections of the environmental and
peace movements have an interest in exaggerating the probable effects of
nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many statesmen and
strategists have an interest in minimizing them.
And there is certainly
substantial margin for error and for variation in conclusions drawn.
For
Crutzen (p.59) is right that ’analyses of the environmental effects of a
global nuclear war remain
. . . uncertain .. . because of a lack of
information on various important processes [among other things] ... The
environment might become extremely hostile, because of hitherto overlooked
changes in the composition of the atmosphere*, again among other things.
Such uncertainty bodes considerable caution as rational.
The way to err
is clear.
6. Not
merely
by
technological
determinists
of
marxist
persuasion.
Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction that if the
US military has a weapon it will use it.
7. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future (etc.) is
repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173.
8. For detailed refutation of these assumptions, see JB.
9. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
10. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one
is responsible, the whole thing is out of control.
The technological
version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed below (fn 15). More
satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political
control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear
things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed.
The vested
interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military
13
weapons industry, and research and academic communities (cf. Barnaby).
Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these
powerful groups, so losing control of political processes.
The argument
is flawed at its final stage.
For many influential politicians either
belong to or represent vested interests.
Thus, though there is no doubt
some ’lack of control’, political processes tend rather to reflect vested
interests than to run out of political control.
11. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: ’The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit’ (p.185).
Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This
connects of course with the faulty ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the "free enterprise" (USA) nation,
and against socialism.
12. A more detailed discussion is given in WP ^8, where too the case against
the state from nuclear dilemmas is elaborated.
13. Anders' explanation is elaborated in Foley; some of the themes are
presented more straightforwardly in Martin.
The incomplete list of items
given, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation,
paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
14. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth,
energy, speed, satisfaction,
..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference-satisfaction, for instance, or utility.
And
the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but
worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as
rational, which again it is not.
Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth
has it, consists in maximisation, of a suitable mix of these virtues.
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation
The maximisation of self-interest
theorems and associated paradoxes
(individual or national) runs into Newcomb's paradox and special cases of
The maximisation of power, as
it such as Prisoners Dilemma situations.
the
Christian-lslamic
God,
encounters the paradox of
symbolised in
the
parallel
maximisation
of
knowledge,
paradoxes of
omnipotence,
or
There
are
no
consistent
objects
which
arc
omnipotent
omniscience.
the
The
drive
for
maximum
consistency,
often
taken
to
be
omniscient.
epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more
important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (by virtue of
Godel’s theorem and associated limitative theorems).
15. R & D,
though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
14
drives the arms race.
science.
Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix (thus especially Mumford, in part thereby
anticipating Commoner’s parallel indictment of technology-choice in the
ecological fix).
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of
control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-ofcontrol machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also
running out of control.
But technological determinism, like other
varieties of stronger (nonanalytlc) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be
persisted with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit
not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting
with often recalcitrant technologies.
They also admit of being made to
look ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution,
then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it
will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population
regulation!
16. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell’s context.
17. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that ’the logic of
deterrence’ is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions.
18. Even the irrationality of retaliatory (or first-strike) use has been
contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like
a phoenix from the radioactive ashes.
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell’s problem of the "missing
motive" for
retaliating to a large strike (p.204), namely, not a
retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the
future dominance of the rival ideology.
Such a motive has been offered
for the conjectured targeting of Latin America.
19. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star-war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed
to "negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral
paradoxes of deterrence
take a different direction.
For although
involving negation, they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions
of intensional functors.
One type of paradox (considered in WP §5, where
the immorality of deterrence is argued) derives from a policy of credibly
threatening war without however intending to proceed to war, though
credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style
derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles
when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase
the number.
This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is
another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate
practice,
a
time-honoured
method
of
removing
contradictions
by
conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
REFERENCES
G. Anders,
AA.
Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H.
G. z\nders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken
Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE.
zur
Beck, Munchen, 1956; referred to as
atomaren
F. Barnaby, ’Will there be a Nuclear War’, in Australia
M. Denborough), Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 2-37.
I.J.
Benton
49-51.
and G.W.
Partridge,
’"Twilight
at Noon"
Situation,
and
Beck,
C.H.
War,
Nuclear
overstated', Ambio
(ed.
(1984)
13
B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, Knopf, New York, 1972.
P.J. Crutzen, ’Darkness after a nuclear war', Ambio 13 (1984) 52-4.
M. Denborough (ed.), Australian & Nuclear War, Croom Helm, Australia, 1983.
P.R. Erlich and others, ’Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war’,
222 (1983) 1293-1300.
G. Foley,
'Jonathan Schell: Genius Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS.
Philosopher
-
Rewrite
Man',
Science
typescript,
G. Foley, Nuclear Prophets. The True and the False, typescript, Brisbane, 1983.
D. Hackworth, 'A Soldier's Report’, Australia and Nuclear War,
Croom Helm, Australia, 1983, 209-12.
(ed. M. Denborough),
K. Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, (trans. E.B. Ashton), University of Chicago Press,
16
1961.
B. Martin, Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Nottingham, 1984.
L. Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, 2 vols., Harcourt Brace, New York, 1970.
G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the
Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982.
R. Routley and N. Griffin, ’Unravelling the meanings of life’, Discussion Papers in
Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Research School
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB.
of
Social
R. Routley, War and Peace I. On the Ethics of Large-Scale Nuclear War and Nuclear
deterrence and the Political Fall-Out, Discussion Papers in Environmental
Philosophy #5, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as WP.
R. and V. Routley, ’Human chauvinism and Environmental ethics’, in Environmental
Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; referred to as HC.
J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982; referred to as S./F.
R.P.
Turco and others, ’Nuclear winter: global
explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-92.
consequences
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977.
of
multiple
nuclear
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