5 20 144 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4806440e025cfc5ea6631620bfddc532.pdf 3cd4e6697a512b5b75d9d97be3baa8de PDF Text Text 15 nght. 'Vital force without restraint', mtentionaily excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally/^ w/tm/i i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. - Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the Brian Medhn, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it designed to reveal deep difficulties m contemporary political, and especially alternative, t oug t Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action be/bre the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing �17 Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise" ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be ucrive, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e . ummg th. forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident hen, that some of th. dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restating the negaZ components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider th. of . al on-c-operadon with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded ar. forms of pacifism o er active an plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance . Pacifism can easily resist being forced into thes. sorts of circumstances: it has y resources, as an extensive senes of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ ent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. of rendennZ semantical strategy of som. dictmnan.s', Th f h ""nT Z" "" biassed definitions. y ave stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and ve" Z of violence, from state and interstate to, what ,s noL oZZ^"""' "t^ ^'nce. Caii the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to us. violence, according to which stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism 'h' inverse is very far from being (uniMs Znof hf c e f T diff^mml" f """"" different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. n several, substantially Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called "mra/ pacifism, has looked a very easy al arg.t to moral philosophers. Many th. effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a "fana icaP- H "inconsistent", "insensitive", treZ ' Z"' " accommodating and reat ng moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous stretched pacifism "-ent wZt oT 7 Zen Zs S 7 "Z Z" ways. So far from bemg stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism might have been better. as pacifism: �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa *s deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to second best' consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <9t/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nouVigrg enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: ^tr^rc/z^ /?<2cz/z.wz (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* * I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace'. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace' (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just taking aZzoMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/zg/zt for it-through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war'. But now 'only force will prevail', as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted'. 'What must be done' must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 15 nght. 'Vital force without restraint', mtentionaily excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally/^ w/tm/i i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. - Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the Brian Medhn, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it designed to reveal deep difficulties m contemporary political, and especially alternative, t oug t Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action be/bre the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing 17 Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise" ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be ucrive, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e . ummg th. forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident hen, that some of th. dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restating the negaZ components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider th. of . al on-c-operadon with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded ar. forms of pacifism o er active an plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance . Pacifism can easily resist being forced into thes. sorts of circumstances: it has y resources, as an extensive senes of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ ent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. of rendennZ semantical strategy of som. dictmnan.s', Th f h ""nT Z" "" biassed definitions. y ave stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and ve" Z of violence, from state and interstate to, what ,s noL oZZ^"""' "t^ ^'nce. Caii the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to us. violence, according to which stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism 'h' inverse is very far from being (uniMs Znof hf c e f T diff^mml" f """"" different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. n several, substantially Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called "mra/ pacifism, has looked a very easy al arg.t to moral philosophers. Many th. effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a "fana icaP- H "inconsistent", "insensitive", treZ ' Z"' " accommodating and reat ng moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous stretched pacifism "-ent wZt oT 7 Zen Zs S 7 "Z Z" ways. So far from bemg stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism might have been better. as pacifism: 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa *s deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to second best' consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <9t/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nouVigrg enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: ^tr^rc/z^ /?<2cz/z.wz (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* * I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace'. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace' (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just taking aZzoMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/zg/zt for it-through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war'. But now 'only force will prevail', as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted'. 'What must be done' must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. * Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Partial draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, undated. Pages also numbered 15, 17, 19, 21, 22. Later title of paper: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Partial xc on Taoism. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 12.89 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f9e5f52">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f9e5f52</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b660995c442b4ed34e33174523ca0eaf.pdf e2754cf92cd4759c1c7554709975a749 PDF Text Text 94K Fraser Court, Kingston, 2604. 6th February, 1975 Dear Sir, A possible change of government later this year should not be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. Thus in September Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant urged us to buy more. In January the Prime Minister insisted that wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our 'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is business. That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial- consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the motor vehicle industry. This industry is widely recognised as a major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently, the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely silent on the subject. The employment in this environmenta lly damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by the unions to the miserable nature of the work. In normal times of full employment the immigration program played an essential part in maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs. The impression of the early days of the Labor government that Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage, independence and principle has long since faded. But nowhere is the lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with · the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'. The Prime Minister has attempted to quell doubts about environmenta l hazards by appealing to the inadequate standards of the Internationa l Atomic Energy Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either. Mr. Connor, displaying a similar slavish concern for what the internationa l neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle on the matter of ur a 11 /um sales. The request for a public inquiry to enable adequate public discussion of the momentous moral issues involved in ur.ani- um sales has been refused, on the thin and question-begg ing grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely concluded contract and others in the pipeline. The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use. The moral position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material, may be likened to that of an arms or heroin peddler - obtaining a comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs to other people. Just as in the case of the a..rft'\S or heroin dealer, the moral responsibili ty of the supplier cannot be evaded by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his customer. V. & R. Routley �94K Fraser Court, Kingston, 2604. 6th February, 1975 Dear Sir, A possible change of government later this year should not be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. Thus in September Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant urged us to buy more. In January the Prime Minister insisted that wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our 'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is business. That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial__: consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the motor vehicle industry. This industry is widely recognised as a major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently, the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely silent on the subject. The employment in this environmentally damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by the unions to the miserable nature of the work. In normal times of full employment the immigration program played an essential part in maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs. The impression of the early days of the Labor government that Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage, independence and principle has long since faded. But nowhere is the lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'. The Prime Minister has attempted to quell doubts about environmental hazards by apF ealing to the inadequate standards of the International Atomic Energy Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either. Mr. Connor, displaying a similar slavish concern for what the international neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle on the matter of u r ,i A ,'ufrL sales. The request for a public inquiry to enable adequ~te public discussion of the momentous moral issues involved in l.lia.ni~ .um sales has been refused, on the thin and question-begging grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely concluded contract and others in the pipeline. The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use. The moral position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material, may be likened to that of an atMJ or heroin peddler - obtaining a comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs to other people. Just as in the case of the a.rAt! or heroin dealer, the moral responsibility of the supplier cannot be evaded by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his customer. V. & R. Routley � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 94K Fraser Court, Kingston, 2604. 6th February, 1975 Dear Sir, A possible change of government later this year should not be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. Thus in September Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant urged us to buy more. In January the Prime Minister insisted that wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our 'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is business. That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial- consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the motor vehicle industry. This industry is widely recognised as a major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently, the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely silent on the subject. The employment in this environmenta lly damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by the unions to the miserable nature of the work. In normal times of full employment the immigration program played an essential part in maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs. The impression of the early days of the Labor government that Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage, independence and principle has long since faded. But nowhere is the lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with · the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'. The Prime Minister has attempted to quell doubts about environmenta l hazards by appealing to the inadequate standards of the Internationa l Atomic Energy Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either. Mr. Connor, displaying a similar slavish concern for what the internationa l neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle on the matter of ur a 11 /um sales. The request for a public inquiry to enable adequate public discussion of the momentous moral issues involved in ur.ani- um sales has been refused, on the thin and question-begg ing grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely concluded contract and others in the pipeline. The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use. The moral position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material, may be likened to that of an arms or heroin peddler - obtaining a comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs to other people. Just as in the case of the a..rft'\S or heroin dealer, the moral responsibili ty of the supplier cannot be evaded by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his customer. V. & R. Routley 94K Fraser Court, Kingston, 2604. 6th February, 1975 Dear Sir, A possible change of government later this year should not be a matter for too much concern, since the difference in policies between the Labor government and the conservative alternative is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. Thus in September Dr. Cairns told us all to work harder, and at Christmas Mr. Bryant urged us to buy more. In January the Prime Minister insisted that wage demands were the cause of inflation, and in February our 'socialist' Treasurer who had previously exhorted us to buy more cars, tells us, in effect, that the business of Australia is business. That the Labor government, although presenting itself as one of "change and reform", has a commitment to the industrial__: consumer status quo and protecting business, and an aversion to politically difficult decisions approaching that of its predecessors is demonstrated by its determination that there shall be no restructuring (even on a long-term basis) of employment in the motor vehicle industry. This industry is widely recognised as a major polluter and waster of resources, and was, until recently, the favourite target of several ministers who are now strangely silent on the subject. The employment in this environmentally damaging industry which the government is determined to preserve without change, on a long term basis and apparently at virtually any cost, is of such poor quality that the industrial sabotage which was common a few years ago and is now reappearing was attributed by the unions to the miserable nature of the work. In normal times of full employment the immigration program played an essential part in maintaining the supply of workers to fill these undesirable jobs. The impression of the early days of the Labor government that Australians had somehow managed to elect a government of courage, independence and principle has long since faded. But nowhere is the lack of these qualities so clear as in the decision to compete with the opposition in the development stakes and to proceed withthe sale of uranium for 'peaceful purposes'. The Prime Minister has attempted to quell doubts about environmental hazards by apF ealing to the inadequate standards of the International Atomic Energy Authority and by stating that no one overseas to whom he spoke cared a jot about the hazards of pollution from controlled nuclear plants or waste, and that (therefore) no one here should either. Mr. Connor, displaying a similar slavish concern for what the international neighbours think, claims that the Australian government would become a laughing stock if it attempted to act with courage and principle on the matter of u r ,i A ,'ufrL sales. The request for a public inquiry to enable adequ~te public discussion of the momentous moral issues involved in l.lia.ni~ .um sales has been refused, on the thin and question-begging grounds that this would jeopardise one prematurely concluded contract and others in the pipeline. The switch to nuclear fission energy sources which the Australian government's decision will greatly assist is likely to impose enormous burdens and risks on future people for nuclear waste disposal as long as 200,000 years in the future on conservative estimates. There are clear alternatives to its use. The moral position of Australia, as an important supplier of this material, may be likened to that of an atMJ or heroin peddler - obtaining a comfortable existence for itself at the expense of enormous costs to other people. Just as in the case of the a.rAt! or heroin dealer, the moral responsibility of the supplier cannot be evaded by the pretence that the moral decision is entirely that of his customer. V. & R. Routley  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 23, Item 1: Val Routley and Richard Routley to "Sir", 6 Feb 1975 Subject The topic of the resource Two copies of typescript letter addressed to "Sir", from Val Routley (later Val Plumwood) and Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan). The letter to government addresses nuclear energy. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 23, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975-02-06 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, [2] leaves. 3.65 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondences Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:329e04d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:329e04d</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - not numbered or identified in locator field Box 23: More Green https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4702be7f7ad689d9b8f0976dbfea321b.pdf 8ffeeac3fdaf406e7b76aa237ecb18fe PDF Text Text �DEEP ECOLOOY AHO OREEH POLITICS Deep Ecology ts an envtronMentaL theory or pLatforM wtth poLtttcaL stgntftcant wtth pLatforM LMpLtcattons. Green PoLtttcs ts a poLtttcaL envtronMentaL LMpLtcattons. Both arose tn Large part tn reactton to prevatLtng envtronMentaL practtces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theorettcaL refLectton, Green PoLtttcs on practtcaL actton. Deep and tnvesttgatton questtontng of the underLytng doMtnant attttudes, seen as the Major source of ecoLogtcaL and other probLeMs, Led to arttcuLatton of the Deep Ecology pLatforM, partly outLtned tn "slogan" forM tn the foLLowtng table. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED ~ITH OOMIHAHT ATTITUDES OOMrnAtn ATT HUDES (OOMrnAtH PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EttV IROHMEHTAL PARADIGM] Hature a Resource; Intrtnstc Value conftned to HuMans Natural EnvtronMent Valued for ltseLt; Btocentrtc E9aLttartantsM MatertaL EconoMtc Growth a predoMtnant goaL Hon-MatertaL Goals, espectaLLy ConsuMertsM Dotng wtth Enough/RecycLtng CoMpettttve LtfestyLe Cooperattve Ltfeway CentraLtzed/ Urban Centred/ DecentraLtzed/ Btoregtonat/ · Hetghbourhood focus tia t Lona L focus SeLf-ReaLtzatton Power structure HterarchtcaL Hon-hterarchtcaL/ Grassroots DeMocracy Htgh Technology Approprtate Technology ~htLe Deep Ecology grew froM the work of one envtronMentaL phtLosopher (Haess tn 1972), Green PoLtttcs arose (tn ~est GerMany stnce 1976) froM the synthests of several MoveMents - ecology, ctttzens, aLternattve, peace and other MoveMents. The platforM of Green PoLtttcs, whtch ts butlt around four ptllars soctaL responstbtltty, grassroots deMocracy, and non-vtoLence ecology, reflects these ortgtns. The ftrst of these ptLLars, ecology, ts based on the stMpLe theMe that LtMtted ecoLogtcaL systeMs cannot sustatn unltMtted econoMtc growth, or such questtonabLe types of growth as nuclear power, wtthout sertous rtsk of daMage and degeneratton. The Green atM ts to Move to systeMs of productlon and consuMptton whtch Matntatn and restore natural processes and cycles rather than doMtnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wtth nature. The second ptllar of Green Poltttcs, soctal responstbtltty, tMpLtes opposttton to the tnequaltttes tn power and doMtnatton relattonshtps of present soctety, and reMovaL of dtscrtMtnatton, econoMtc hardshtp and explottatton, both regtonaLly and as regards the Thtrd ~orld. The Green atM - to be achteved prtMartly froM below, ts to butLd stable and just soctaL through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wtth coMprehenstve deMocrattc rtghts and freedoMs (both tn GerMany -1- �and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd ~orLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon .of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (LocaL, coMMunLty and dLstrLct) whLch are 9Lven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpLLes the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not MereLy by More powerfuL peopLe, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and aLso, More posLtLveLy, actLve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLaL protest, resLstance and defence. The coMpatLbLLLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underLyLng prLncLpLe: that a just, non-vLoLent, huMane• end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vLoLent, LnhuMane Means. 1 Green PoLLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLaL change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecoLogLcaLLy focussed Deep EcoLogy pLatforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of MoveMents of whLch Deep EcoLogy represents one LMportant strand. The Lnter-reLatLons are shown pLctorLaLLy at the second LeveL of the foLLowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM l. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IN PLACE B p 1. Deep EcoLogy fundaMentaLs; e.g. BuddhLst (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-Phi.LosophLc (P) uLtLMate bases C I 2 Exp Lana.t Lon DLrecti.on 2. Deep Ecology platforM 2C . ReforMi.st envLronMental posi.ti.on 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green platforM Der Lvat Lon Di.recti.on j 3 . . General norMs and theMes, substantLaLLy derLved froM pLatforM ~- PartLcular norMs and concrete decLsLons, applyi.ng to relevant practLcaL sLtuatLons . The ecoLogLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not 90 very deep; Lt May onLy be based upon reforM envLronMentaLLsM (or shaLLow ecoLogy as Lt used to be • Starred notes LndLcate poLnts at whLch readLngs wLth the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken. -2- �catted), whLch aLMs to reforM soMe of the worst abuses and excesses of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross pottutLon, extensLve despotLatLo n of land and takes and oceans, tLttte thought for the future, MLstreatMen t of anLMals, etc. On shallow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltsetf, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMent atty, for what Lt can be used for by huMans. By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e.g. froM preMLsses of level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcat ty valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted . ThLs projectLon of furtherr,ore , egatLtarLan or Lr,partLatLt y prLncLptes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of tLfe Ln the natural world, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtte, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanL sM. The prLncLple, not part of Green PolLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversL al of the central prLncLptes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to explaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted . Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLo n through what Ls ' •3 . presented as a ' core der,ocracy Ln the b~osphere . Deep Ecology grew out of a phLtosophL cal dP~penLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLs t scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the sur, of theLr ator,LstLc parts; eMergent eler,ents, tLke lLfe, organLsatLo n, etc.). Deep Ecology quLckly allLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcutar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLture of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy. ~Lth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surpr~s~ng that there Ls lLttle dLrectty about such r,aLn pLllars of Green PotLtLcs as socLal responsLbLl Lty and non-vLotenc e Ln the platforM of Deep Ecology. However Deep Ecology Ls cor,patLble wLth these Green pLllar prLncLptes, and Lndeed perr,Lts theLr derLvatLon. ~hat Ls supposed to result are general norMs, lLke Ho exploLtatLo n, Ho subjectLon, Ho vLolence, at level 3. (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLolenc e prLncLple froM the Deep Ecology prLncLple of r,axLMLzLng Self-realLs atLon Ls atter,pted by Haess Ln the frar,ework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLloso phy).•~ A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan relatLons wLth the natural envLronMen t, away froM doMLnant exploLtatLv e practLces. The natural envLronr,ent coMprLses Lter,s of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng hur,ans (who are not above or separate fror, Lt), and accordLngty Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable Lter,s warrant, and not LrresponsLb ly. Thus Lt would be contrary whLch to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued Lter,s vLolently such (consLder however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do wLdespread phenor,ena as "rape of the envLronMen t", ·of the land", •of the forests"). SLnce hur,ans are not apart fror, or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology platforr, that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLolence towards other hur,ans or classes of huMans. Because Lt covers a pluralLty of posLtLons, LncludLng shallow ecologLcal posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More ar,elLoratLv e and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further rer,oved froM dor,Lnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and r,ore radLcat. ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMenta ts, and focusses on Ldeats and theory, Green PotLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal poLLtLcat probler,s of an envLronr,en tat or socLat kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pottutLon or MLssLte deptoyMent, and (LLke the Peace Mover,ent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLples or workLng out an envLronMen tat (or peace) phLtosophy. Because of Lts envLronMen tal depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural -3- �radLcaL the envLronMent Lssues, such as wLLderness, rare specLes, and transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMagLng LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLoLence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcaL actLon, LncLudLng typLcaL protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLoLence aLso LMpLLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary practLces, socLaL defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLoLent Methods and socLaL defence, other Lesser factLons hoLd that force Ls necessary to brLng about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy pLatforM LncLudes severaL prLncLpLes that wouLd be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLpLes (whLch however, unLLke BLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM, wouLd not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLML2Ln9 SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of seLf-reaLLsatLon of varLous reLLgLous posLtLons, of the fuLL unfoLdLng and deveLopMent of the person, Ls vastLy expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to LncLude brLngLng to fuLL fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but aLL that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded SeLf, whLch Ls taken to be not MereLy one's faMLLy or feLLows or feLLow natLonaLs, nor MereLy ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whoLe huMan race, but the whoLe naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-reaLLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personaL seLf-Lnterest prLncLpLe, has an exceLLent phLLosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as appLLed to huMans or neLghbourLng cLasses of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcuLt Matter Ln the case of uLtLMate prLncLpLes, SeLfreaLLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLLosophLcaL or reLLgLous posLtLons at LeveL I of the doubLe pyraMLd, froM those that heLp sustaLn Deep EcoLogy. However the expansLon LnvoLved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow seLf to coMprehensLve SeLf, severs the usuaL justLfLcatory LLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's seLf-Lnterests wLth · those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan SeLf, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcaL and spLrLtuaL ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the sLogan sLogan, "SLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends". one uses and where one LLves technoLogy of are those concernLng what kLnd (the Matter of dweLLLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent vaLue and the LLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLML2atLon eMphasLsed both MaterLaL goaLs and MaterLaL Means, partLcuLarLy personaL consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyLes are approprLate? Deep EcoLogy, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLaL and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasL2es the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLLabLe. The resuLt, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, doLng wLth enough, and, More generaLLy, practLces whLch LLe LLght on the Land and the naturaL worLd. In a properLy ecoLogLcaL way of doLng thLngs, these wLLL be Lntegrated (Ln syMbLotLc and other naturaL styLes) wLth the naturaL systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the naturaL fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLL accordLngLy be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, -4- �ecologtcal grouptngs - or btoregtonal, as they have coNe to be called. • 7 Approprtate Means tnclude, tn turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory .of Deep Ecology. HLgh technologLes such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLal socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMental and socLal costs and rLsks such technologLcal forMs LMpose. On both deep and green perceptLons, what Ls requLred are relLable careful technologLes whLch are not ecologLcally daMagLng or socLally rLsky or otherwLse undesLrable; but the technologLes adMLtted wLll dLffer accordLng to the prLncLples of the posLtLons they answer back to (e.g . farMLng technLques wLlt need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLtLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLptes as bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM). In each case the practLcat use of approprLate technology falls at the bottoM, actLon level, of the double . •a pyraN~d. WhLle Deep Ecology supplLes an appeatLng blueprLnt for dLfferent socLal and lLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLal feature of Deep Ecology: EcologLcal ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other older LdeologLes (e.g. of relLgLous, or of revolutLonary, conscLousness). What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtual or LdeologLcal conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personal and socLat to coMprehend the full envLronMental predLcaMent. In thLs explanatLon, of how people get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLples. A thorough conversLon process Lnvolves elevatLon to the top livet, spLrLtuat transcendence of the daLly econoMLc and polLtLcat actLon level. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLlt be put Ln place, lLke Green PolLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures. LLke the fundaMental sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcologLcal ConscLousness. SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMptatLon, are derLved froM the fundaMental sources. But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecologLcat experLence, Lnclude value reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon seeLng thLngs dLfferently, and coMLng to apprecLate the worth and well-beLng of other thLngs. Connected wLth these wLdened experLentLal bases, and LnforMLng theM, goes a holLstLc shLft Ln values and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon, affordLng dLrect lLnkage wLth parts and wholes of the natural world. •IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the real world, a convert to Deep Ecology , a fellow and advocate of Lts Messages and lLfe-ways . ESSAY QUESTIOHS I. To what extent do Green PolLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the saMe probleMs? CrLtLcally coMpare and contrast theLr proposa l s, especLally as regards the natural and the buLlt envLronMent. 2. Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four, levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to explaLn carefully the LnterrelatLons aMong these levels. Uhere does Green PolLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probleMatLc scheMe? 3 . "BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM - Ln prLncLple appears as a key theMe of Deep Ecology. CrLtLcally assess Lts adequacy. Shouldn't Green PolLtLcs Lnctude such a prLncLpte? 4. Is Non-vLolence an unstated prLncLple of Deep Ecology? ExplaLn why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLolence to the degree Lt Ls? In your answers . take -5- \ �account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLctLons between the use of vLoLence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vloLence Ln nature; ttt. the need for coerclve Methods to preserve the natural envtronMent. 5. Uhat justlfLes expandLng _seLf-reallsatLon to SeLf-reaLlsatlon? ExpLaLn the Meanlng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLlsatLon for Deep Ecology and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Uhy does lt not feature ln Green PolLtlcs? 6. ExpLaLn the MeanLng of the deLLberateLy vague slogan ·slMple ln Means, rlch ln ends·, or of soMe other hlgh-lMpact slogan of Deep Ecology. Indlcate how the vagueness Mlght work for and agalnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLons, and lndlcate soMe of the suggest applled, alternattves. these of raMLflcatlons 7. OutLlne btoregtonaLL3M, lndlcatlng what practlcaL envlronMental probleMs bloreglonallsM lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bloreglonallsM derlved froM Deep Ecology? Conslder to what extent bloregLonallsM fLts wLth the slogan, •Thlnk globally, act LocaLly". deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vlews of Deep Ecology and Green PolLtLcs on the role of varlous types of technology. 8~ Is More hLgh technology an unprobleMatLc soLutLon to 9. Uhat Ls EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ecology? If Lt ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLltlcs? 10. A reLatlonaL, total-fLeLd LMage of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quletLy oMLtted froM the orLglnal pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? READINGS 1: DEEP ECOLOGY AND GREEN POLITICS The Greens consLder theMseLves the poLltLcal voLce of the cLtLzens' MoveMents, that Ls, ecology, antl-nuclear-power, peace, feMLnLst, and others. Most MeMbers of the Green party are also actLvLsts Ln one or More of those MoveMents, and thLs dLverse orLentatLon Ls reflected Ln the wLngs, or factLons, of the party: the vLslonary/hollstlc Greens, the Eco-Greens, the peace-MoveMent Greens, and the radlcal-Left Greens. A great deaL of overlapplng occurs wlth any categor~z~ng of Green LdentltLes and soMe people say there are no actual factlons, but clearly there are dtfferent prtorltLes aMong the four clusters. The More that people perceLved the LnterconnectLons aMong prLncLpLes of ecologLcaL wlsdoM, a truly secure peace, an econoMy wLth a future, and a partLcLpatory deMocracy wLth power channeled dLrectly froM the grassroots Level, the More they notLces the absence of such LdeaLs aMong the exLsttng poLLtlcaL partles. [Green] pollcLes are gutded by long-terM v~s~ons for the future and are founded on four basLc prLncLples: ecology, socLal responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy, and nonvLoLence. The fLrst of the ·four pLLlars, • ecology, has several MeanLngs Ln Green poLLtLcs. Green poLLtLcs, Ls Lnherently hoLLstLc Ln theory and practLce. It Ls based on ecoLogLcal, or ·network·, thLnkLng, a terM used frequently by the Greens. EcoLogLcaL thLnkLng also Lncludes the realLzatLon that the seeMLngLy -6- �rtgtd structures we percetve Ln our envLronMent are actually ManLfestatLons of underlytng processes, of nature's contLnual dynaMLc flux. Interrelatedness and ongoLng process are the lessons the Greens take froM and apply to the ecosysteMs surroundLng us. They support •soft" energy productLon (such as solar power) that works wLth the cycles of the sun, the water, and the wLnd, and the flow of the rLvers. They call for the developMent of approprLate technology that reflects our Lnterdependence wLth the Earth. They advocate regeneratLve agrLculture that replenLshes the soLl and Lncorporates natural Means of pest control. Above all, the Greens deMand a halt to our ravagLng of natural "resources" and our poLsonLng of the bLosphere through the duMpLng of toxLc wastes, the accuMulatLon of so-called acceptable levels of radLatLon exposure, and the pollutLon of the aLr. The broader applLcatLons of ecologLcal thLnkLng lead to ·socLal ecology, the perceptton of soctetal structures and huMan Lnteracttons as an Lntrtcate web of dynaMLc systeMs that are sLMultaneously Lnterrelated parts and coMplete Ln theMselves. That eMphasLs on relatLonshLps and Lnterconnecttons Ls the basts of the Greens' ecologtcal work that focuses specLfLcally on envLronMental protectLon. TheLr prograMs Ln thts area call for huMans to ftnd our place Ln the ecosysteMs: ~e defLne ecologLcal polLtLcs as those Measures that understand huMan betngs and our envLronMent as beLng part of nature. HuMan lLfe, too, Ls eMbedded Ln the lLfe cycles of the ecosysteMs; we Lnterfere wLth our actLons and thLs, Ln turn, acts back on us. ~e Must not destroy the stabLlLty of the ecosysteMs. In partLcular, ecologtcal polLtLcs presents an all-encoMpassLng rejectLon of an econoMy of exploLtatLon and plunderLng of natural resources and raw MaterLals, as well as the destructLve LnterventLon Lnto the cycles of nature's household. The second of the four pLllars, ·soctal responsLbLlLty, • Ls understood by Most Greens to Mean socLal justLce and assurance that the poor and the workLng class wLll not get hurt by prograMs to restructure the econoMy and our consuMer socLety ecologtcally. The radLcal-left Greens, however, read sozLal as a codeword for socLalLsM, that Ls, deMocratLc MarxLsM~ SLnce that polLtLcal Model Ls specLfLcally not what the vLsLonary, lLberal and conservatLve Greens have Ln MLnd, a battle developed over establLshLng the basLc prLncLples. The MajorLty wanted the new party to stand for possLbLlLtLes other than etther socLalLsM or the capLtalLst status quo. The radLcal-left contLngent, on the other hand, LnsLsted on not only Lncludtng socLalLsM but also on excludLng nonvLolence as a guLdLng prLncLple. So one of the four pLllars, lLke so Much else Ln the Green party, has a paradoxLcal character: Lt Means soMethLng dLfferent Ln dLfferent parts of the party. All factLons of the party concur that socLal, econoMLc and ecologLcal Lssues are Lnherently lLnked. The ecologLcal and socLal spheres belong Lnseparably together: the econoMy of nature Ls ltnked to the econoMy of huMans for better or worse . The thLrd pLllar, grassroots deMocracy, was LnspLred by the ~est GerMan cLtLzens' MoveMents throughout the 1970s, whLch Ln turn were Lnfluenced by the cLvLl rLghts, ecology, consuMer, and other MoveMents ~n the Un~ted States. OLrect, or partLcLpatory, deMocracy locates a greater aMount of power and control wLth the local groups, the grassroots. ThLs orLentatLon ~nforMs the structure of the Green party. An organLzatLon structured wtth partLcLpatory deMocracy sets Lts basLc polLcy accordLng to the votLng at large asseMblLes. It allows LndLvLduals access to all party offLcLals, and Lt eschews hLerarchLcal structure. Instead of allowtng power to be concentrated Ln a few people who -7- �reMaLn at the top of a hLerarchy for years, such groups generally elect steerLng coMMLttees. The fourth pLllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and •structural vLolence, • that Ls, vLolence and oppress Lon LMposed by the state and by LnstLtutLons. (See ReadLng 4; Green PolLtLcs, pp.3-4, 29-43) The tenets of [the Deep Ecology] MoveMent Nay perhaps be roughly forNulated as follows: (1) The well-beLng of nonhuMan lLfe on Earth has value Ln Ltself. ThLs value Ls Lndependent of any LnstruNental usefulness for LLMLted huNan purposes. (2) RLchness and dLversLty Ln lLfe forMs contrLbute to thLs value and Lnterfere Ls a further value Ln Ltself. (3) HuMans have no rLght to destructLvely wLth nonhuMan lLfe except for purposes of satLsfyLng vLtal needs. (4) Present Lnterference Ls excessLve and detrLMental. (5) Present polLcLes Must therefore be changed. (6) The necessary polLcy changes affect basLc econoMLc and LdeologLcal structures and wLll be the More drastLc the longer Lt takes before sLgnLfLcant change Ls started. (7) The LdeologLcal change Ls MaLnly that of apprecLatLng lLfe qualLty (focusLng on sLtuatLons LnvolvLng Lnherent. value). (8) Those who subscrLbe to the foregoLng poLnts have an oblLgatLon dLrectly or LndLrectly to try to LMpleMent the necessary changes. (Defence, p.266) It should be fully apprecLated that the sLgnLfLcant tenets of the Deep Ecology MoveMent are clearly and forcefully norMatLve. They express a value prLorLty systeM only Ln part based on results (or lack of results) of scLentLfLc research. Today, ecologLsts try to Lnfluence polLcy-MakLng bodLes largely resource and through threats, through predLctLons concernLng pollutants depletLon, knowLng that polLcy-Makers accept at least certaLn MLnLMUM norMs concernLng health and just dLstrLbutLon. There are polLtLcal potentLals Ln thLs MoveNent whLch should not be overlooked and whLch have lLttle to do wLth pollutLon and resource depletLon. In plottLng possLble futures, the norMs should be freely used and elaborated. (Shallow and Oeep 1 p.99) A Major dLfference between the theorLes lLes Ln the dLstrLbutLon of values. Deep ecology, lLke sLMpler utLlLtarLanLsM, offers a unLque LnLtLal dLstrLbutLon: each lLvLng thLng Ls assLgned equal value and nothLng else has LntrLnsLc value. Value Ls assessed through soMe MLx of value-NakLng characterLstLcs, LncludLng such defeasLble ecologLcal unLversals as stabLlLty, resLlLence, naturalness, rLchness, scarcLty and so forth . But there are consLderable dLversLty, constraLnts on how thLs Ls done . . . . One constraLnt, that of LMpartLalLty whLch excludes certaLn types of class chauvLnLsM, a thLng cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another sLMply by vLrtue of belongLng to soNe specLes (e.g. beLng huNan) or favoured bLologLcal class; such class features are not Ln theMselves value-MakLng characterLstLcs. Such an account of how value Ls assessed reNaLn however far froM specLfLc, and soMetLMes of lLttle use Ln practLce. (CrLtLque, pp.59- 60) POINTS OF UNITY 1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. Ue base our phLlosophy on a proper understandLng of the purposes and workLngs of nature and do not try to LNpose an Ldeology upon Lt . Ue seek to transforM socLety based upon thLs understandLng. 2. CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY. Ue conduct all our MeetLngs accordLng to the prLncLples of consensus deNocracy, eNphasLzLng unanLMous or near-unanLMous agreeMent on all decLsLons. No representatLve May Make decLsLons on behalf of the Greens wLthout the approval of the entLre NeMbershLp. Ue encourage the use of consensus deMocracy Ln all socLal, econoMLc and polLtLcal LnstLtutLons. -8- �3. NONVIOLENCE AND FREEDOM. ~e oppose the threat or use of phystcal vtolence to resolve tnternatlonat, clvll, polltlcal and personal confllcts. ~e encourage the nonvlolent enforceMent of all prlvate and publlc rules and Laws. ~e recognlEe that a nonvlolent soclety would be a very free soclety and encourage tolerance of others' vlews and actlons. ~- SOCIAL ECOLOGY. ~e eMphaslze the connectton of doMlnatlon and vlolence toward the envlronMent and toward our fellow huMans. ~e seek a nonvlolent soclety ln whlch the needs of lndlvlduals, coMMunltles and bloreglons are balanced and lntegrated and ln whlch econoMtc resources are used consclousty, deMocratlcaLLy and approprlatety to further thls end. 5. STRATEGY. ~e wlLL oppose ecologlcatty and soclatty destructlve pollcles and dlsobedlence clvll and protest practlces through nonvlolent polltlcal actlvltles. ~e wlLL proMote alternatlve projects and lnstltutlons conslstent wlth our Green phllosophy. ~e wlLL cooperate ln solldarlty wlth all groups ln substantlal agreeMent wlth these polnts of unlty as partlclpants ln the lnternatlonal Green MoveMent. (Deep Ecology, pp.36-7). 2: DEEP ECOLOGY LEVELS In dlscusslng the relatlonshlp between deep ecology and Major tradltlons such as BuddhlsM and Chrlstlanlty, Naess stresses that people can agree broadly on a set of prlnctptes and dlsagree greatly on other aspects of ldeology and other tradttlons thusly: In order to factlttate dlscusslon lt May be helpful to dlsttngutsh a coMMon platforM (baste prlnclples) of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phllosophles and rellglons froM whlch that platforM (baste prlnctples) ls derlved, lf the platforM ls forMulated as a set of norMs and hypotheses lf . verballEed, are Buddhlst, (factual assuMptlons). The fundaMentals, or phllosophlc wlth persuaslons, rettgtous other Taolst, Chrtsttan or of afftnltles to the baste vlews of Splnoza, Uhltehead, Hetdegger, or others. The fundaMentals are Mutually More or Less lncoMpattble or at Least dtfflcult to coMpare l~ terMs of cognltlve contents. The tncoMpattblltty does not affect the deep ecology prlnclples adversely. The baste prlnclples wlthln the deep ecology MoveMent are grounded ln retlglon or phllosophy. In a Loose sense, tt May be sald to be dertved froM the fundaMentals. Because these are dtfferent, the sltuatlon only reMlnds us that very slMllar or even tdenttcal conclustons May be drawn froM dlvergent preMlses. The prlnclples (or platforM) are the . saMe, the fundaMentaL preMlses dtffer. In order to clartfy the dtscusston one Must avold Looktng for one deftntte phllosophy or rellgton aMong the supporters of the deep ecologlcal MoveMent. Fortunately there ls a rlch Manlfold of klnds of consequences dertved froM the prlnclples. The dtscusston has four Levels to take lnto account: verballzed fundaMentaL phllosophlcal and rellglous ldeas and lntultlons, the deep ecology baste prlnclples, the More or Less general consequences dertved froM the platforM Llfestytes and general pollcles of every klnd - and Lastly, descrlpttons of concrete sltuatlons and declstons Made ln theM. (See DlagraM 1) Arne Naess has atteMpted to provlde a Loglcal dlagraM or systeMatlzatlon of hls own verslon of deep ecology or ecosophy whtch he calls •Ecosophy r·. He -9- �caLLs thts a norMattve systeM whtch tncLudes both norMs (or baste values) and factual hypotheses_ The Lower norMs or actton stateMents are dertved froM the top norMs tn a Loosely LogtcaL sense_ The top or Most baste norMs are arrtved at by the deep questtontng Lntutttve process_ Naess stresses that Ecosophy T Ls onLy hts verston of deep ecology, and that Many versLons need to be worked out_ SoMe people NLght be crLtLcaL that Many of the norMs of deep ecology are heLd on an tntutttve basts, but Naess potnts out aLL theortes begtn soMewhere beyond LogtcaL constructtons_ (DEEP ECOLOGY, pp-225-7) In order to factLttate dtscusston about deep ecology aMong phtLosophers tt May be heLpfuL to dtsttngutsh a coMMon pLatforM of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phtLosophtes and reLtgtons froM whtch that pLatforM Ls derLved, tf tt ts forMuLated as a set of norMs and hypotheses (factual assuMpttons)_ The terM 'pLatforM' ts preferred to 'prtncLpLe' because the Latter May be NLsunderstood to refer to the uLtLMate fundaMentaLs_ FurtherMore, the forMuLatton of a pLatforM should be short and conctse (as a synopsts), whereas the fundaMentaLs, tf verbaLtzed, are Buddhtst, Taotst, ChrLstLan or of other reLtgtous ktnds, or they are phtLosophLc wtth afftntttes to the baste vtews of SpLnoza, ~hLtehead, HeLdegger, or others_ The fundaMentaLs are MutuaLLy More or Less LncoMpatLbLe or at Least dtffLcuLt to coMpare tn terMs of cognLttve contents_ Supporters of deep ecology May have great dLfftcuLttes understandtng each other's uLtLMate vLews_ The pLatforM of the deep ecology MoveMent Ls grounded tn reLtgLon or phLLosophy tncLudtng ethLcs_ It May be saLd to be derLved froM these fundaMentaLs_ As used here the terM 'dertved' ts open to a vartety of LnterpretatLons_ If the vaLLdLty of a norM or a hypothesLs Ls justLfLed by reference to one defLnLte set of assuMptLons of a phtLosophtcaL or reLLgtous ktnd, the norM or hypothests ts Ln a sense dertved froM those assuMpttons_ The set acquLres a character of preMLses for parttcuLar concLusLons_ But cLoseLy · sLMLLar or even tdenttcaL concLustons May be drawn froM sets of LncoMpatLbLe preMLses_ ThLs expLaLns the coMbLnatLon of 'bewLLderLng' dLverstty of vLews at the deepest LeveL wtth agreeMent of vtews at the next LeveL_ In assesstng constructLve crttLctsM of deep ecology Lt Ls useful to try to ftnd out whLch LeveL Ls LnvoLved_ An exaMpLe: In the tntroductLon to hLs The EthLcs of EnvtronMentaL Concern, (Oxford: BLackweLL 1983), Robtn AttfLeLd says: Yet I do not accept, wLth the so-caLLed 'deep, Long-range ecology MoveMent', the vtew that our prLncLpaL Loyalty should be focussed not on feLLow-huMans or feLLow creatures but on the bLosphere as an organtc whole, __ _ I suppose there are soMe supporters of the deep ecology MOVeMent who propose focusstng Loyalty on the bLosphere as an organLc whole Ln the sense suggested by AttfteLd_ The conceptLon of the bLosphere as an organLc whole and of such a kLnd of Loyalty belongs to the reaLM of fundaMentaLs, that Ls LeveL one, rather than to the other Levels_ Therefore that AttfLeLd does not accept the vtew he descrtbes ts not relevant tn arguMentatton for or agatnst deep ecology- One Matn potnt tn deep ecology ts tts deep arguMentatton, that ts, arguMentatton froM uLttMate (phLLosophLcaL, reLtgtous) preMtsses, but there Ls rooM for very dLfferent sets of such preMLsses_ A supporter of deep ecology May or May not have any conceptton of a prLMary Loyalty focussed on the bLosphere as an organtc whole_ [The] dtsttnctLon of Levels Ls useful when tryLng to ptn down exactly what a crttLcLsM Ls focusstng on_ The dLagraM furnLshes onLy a ktnd of stattc ModeL_ -10- �A supporter of deep ecology wLLL norMaLLy ModLfy the sentences at the dLfferent Levels froM tLMe to tLMe. Hew LnforMatLon May change any hypotheses and therefore also change norMs whLch Ln part have been justLfLed on the basLs of the hypotheses beLng changed. Renewed ethLcaL consLderatLon or new LnforMatLon May Make the supporter change a norM. If a norM Ls changed norMally new sets of hypotheses are Lnvolved, and old ones are dLscarded. ThLs agaLn wLLl cause reverberatLons Ln a sMaLLer or greater part of the fLeld. F roM a po Ln t of v Lew of no rMa t Lve sys teMa t t·~a t Lons what goes on when changes are Made at one or More Levels Ls rather coMpLLcated. But part of Lt Ls processes of derLvatLon. OLagraM l pretends only to Lllustrate LMportant dLfferences of the Levels of derLvatLon and the specLfLc character of Level 2. It represents a condensed forMulatLon of the deepest-Level norMs and hypotheses whLch supporters of the deep ecology MoveMent can agree upon. ThLs Level Ls LLLustrated as the penultLMate (next to ultLMate) Level of arguMentatLon characterLstLc of those supporters of deep ecology who try to artLculate theLr baste vLews. At the thLrd and fourth Level dLsagreeMents May arLse. At the fLrst Level supporters May dLsagree, or fLnd each others vLews' LncoMprehensLb le, or LncoMparable as to valLdLty. Ls not a Measure of value prLorLtLes or of A 'dLrectLon of derLvatLon ethLcaL prLorLtLes. And Lt does not LMply that what Ls derLved Ls a Means Ln relatLon to what Lt Ls derLved froM. A sLMple exaMple Ls enough to clarLfy thLs. FroM 'do not kLlL huMans! ·, follows, Lf you concede 'all Mothers are huMans' the conclusLon 'do not kLLL your Mother!'. ThLs rather concrete norM Ls here derLved froM the More general and abstract one. But thLs does not LMply that huMans Ln general have a hLgher value or a kLnd of prLorLty Ln relatLon to Mothers. It does not say that Ln a norM confLLct you should be More careful not to kLLL huMans than not to kLLL your Mother. An absurd posLtLon! And Lastly, Lt Ls rather strange to refraLn froM kLllLng your Mother as a Means to a goal, · naMely not to kLLL huMans. The forMulatLons of Level 2 have the character of proposals. It May turn out that proposals wLLL dLffer substantLaLLy or show a natural dLversLty of terMLnologLcal and conceptual LdLosyncracLes . UnhappLLy Lt Ls quLte coMMon to MLx the, Ln a broad sense, LogLcal relatLon of derLvatLon wLth other relatLons. These are at Least as LMportant, but nevertheless are dLfferent. (BASIC, pp.1-5) ScheMatLcally we May represent the total vLews LMpLLed Ln the MoveMent by and norMs streaMs of derLvatLon f roM 'h Lghest', L.e. Most fundaMentaL sLtuatLons. lLfe partLcular Ln descrLptLve assuMptLon, to partLcular decLsLons Answers to the deepest questLon, L.e. hLghest norMatLve prLncLples and basLc assuMptLons about the world MLddle range answers. Lower derLvatLonaL Level derLvatLons towards decLsLons Ln partLcular LLfe sLtuatLons. Level of actLon Ln concrete partLcular sLtuatLons. The LLLustratLon reseMbles those of hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeMs. One MaLn dLfference Ls that soMe sentences at the top Level are norMatLve, expressed by LMperatLves. ThLs Makes Lt possLble to furnLsh preferably LMperatLves at the Lowest derLvatLonaL Level, sentences such as ·Turn to the Left!" ·voteforN.N. !. Just as Ln hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeM, Let us say Ln physLcs, only the two upper Levels of the pyraMLd Ls thought of as part of physLcs as a systeM, only those parts are Ln norMatLve systeMs characterLstLc of the total systeM. -11- �The sentences change. Ln the Lowest part change froM day to day as LLfe sLtuatLons The above kLnd of presentLng the derLvatLonaL structure of a totaL vLew Must not be taken too serLousLy. SoMe wLLL absoLuteLy refuse even to consLder such a way of exposLtLon. And Lt does not Ln any Manner characterLze thLnkLng wLthLn the deep ecoLogLcaL MoveMents. SoMe of us wLth a professLonaL background of scLence and anaLytLcaL phLLosophy fLnd Lt heLpfuL, however. Arne Naess's systeMatLEatLon LLLustrates the reLatLonshLp of deep ecoLogy's basLc prLncLpLes or Lts "platforM" (LeveL 2), to varLous · possLbLe and relLgLous "fundaMentaL preMLsses on the one hand (LeveL 1) and varLous possLbLe theoretLcaL and practLcaL "consequences" on the other (LeveLs 3 and~). Althou~h thLs systeMatLzatLon Ls presented Ln terMs of "fundaMentaL preMLsses, consequences", and a dLrectLon of "derLvatLon• froM LeveLs (1) to(~), thLs should not be taken to Mean that a sentence at one Level Ls held to follow by vLrtue of necessLty or probabLLLty froN sentences at a prevLous Level L.e~, Naess Ls not proposLng a deductLve or an LnductLve systeM. As he coMMents hLMself, Lt Ls only Ln a "Loose sense• that the deep ecology pLatforM "May be saLd to be derLved froM fundaMentaLs·. In other words, derLvatLon or precLseness Ls a Matter of deLLMLtLng a range of possLble LnterpretatLons. For exaNpLe, we MLght proceed froN a fundaMentaL (L.e. Level 1) reLLgLous or phLLosophLcal preMLss such as "ALL Ls One" or the SpLnozLst Ldea that "there Ls onLy one 'substance• • and, Ln the sense descrLbed, "derLve" the (More precLse) central "plank" Ln the deep ecology "pLatforM" that "there are no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcaL fLeld", or that "aLl entLtLes are constLtuted by theLr relatLonshLps" (LeveL 2). Further precLsatLon MLght express the realLsatLon that "the sense of oneself as a skLn encapsulated ego Ls not Ln accord wLth thLs ' seaMLess web' ontoLogy• (Level 3). None of the steps Ln the above exaMpLe Ls held to foLLow by necessLty (deductLve Lnference) or probabLLLty (LnductLve Lnference) froM sentences at a prevLous LeveL. ALL we have (Ln logLcaL terMs) Ls a chaLn of precLsatLons fLowLng Ln one or Many possLble dLrectLons of LnterpretatLon. Ue could have easLLy started froM the saMe vague, general fundaMentaL preMLss and proceeded to deveLop a chaLn of precLsatLons Ln a very dLfferent dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. Thus, the "dLrectLon of derLvatLon· shown Ln the dLagraMMatLc LLlustratLon of Naess's systeMatLsatLon shouLd be understood as referrLng to both the leveL of precLsatLon and the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. The greater the Level of precLsatLon the More evLdent the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon (or what Naess has prevLousLy referred to as the "defLnLteness of LntentLon")_ Uhat Ls the vaLue of tryLng to provLde a systeMatLsatLon of deep ecology (or any other faLrLy coMprehensLve vLew) when the connectLve LLnks between fundaMentaL preMLsses (LeveL I) and practLcaL consequences (Level~) are as weak as that of "possLbLe LnterpretatLon"? An LMportant answer Must be that such a systeNatLsatLon eMphasLses the contLnuaLLy-beLng-forgotten fact that our Most sophLstLcated and precLse, non-trLvLaL (L ~e. nontautoLogLcaL) reasonLngs are aLways eMbedded or grounded Ln a very generaL "underLyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are." ThLs eMphasLs, thLs contLnual reMLndLng, constLtutes the Most sLgnLfLcant and dLstLnctLve structural feature of deep ecologLcaL thought. (GUIDING STARS, pp.203-4) OnLy LeveL one contaLns phLLosophLes (LncLudLng MetaphysLcs, of course) and expLLcLt reLLgLous foundations. There Ls, and hopefuLLy wLLL never be, Many sLgnLfLcant COMMon characterLstLcs on Level 1. The cLeanLng of 'rubbLsh' on thLs Level Ls a hazardous undertakLng froN MY poLnt of vLew. -12- �In a coMprehensLve phLLosophy of Level l, for lnstance ln an 'ecosophy' ln MY terMlnoLogy, every key terM of the pLatforM forMuLatlon, (Level 2), would have to be .coM"ented upon and elucLdated. ThLs "ay be seen as a clearLng up operatlon. A hlgher level of preclseness Ls achLeved and eLLMLnatlon of ph~Losoph~caLLy unsuLtable rhetorLcs. (HOTES ON SYLVAN, pp.8-9) 3: ON BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM The Lntultlon of blocentrlc equaLlty ls that aLL thlngs Ln the blosphere have an equal rlght to Llve and bLossoM and to reach thelr own LndLvlduaL forMs of unfoLdLng and self-reaLlzatlon wlthln the Larger SeLf-reallzatlon. Thls basLc Lntultlon Ls that aLL organLsMs and entltles Ln the ecosphere, as parts of the lnterreLated whole, are equal Ln LntrlnsLc worth. Naess suggests that bLocentrlc equaLLty as an LntuLtlon Ls true ln prLncLpLe, although ln the process of LLvLng, aLL specLes use each other as food, shelter, etc. Mutual predatlon ls a b~ologLcal fact of lLfe, and "any of the world's relLgLons have struggled wLth the spLrltuaL lMpllcatlons of thts. SoMe anlMaL llberatlonLsts who atteMpted to sLde-step thLs probLeM by advocatlng vegetarLanlsM are forced to say that the entLre plant ktngdo" LncLudLng raLn forests have no rLght to thelr own exlstence. ThLs evaslon fLles ln the face of the basLc LntuLtlon of equalLty. Aldo Leopold expressed thLs Lntultlon when sald huMans are •pLaLn cLtlzens• of the btotlc coMMunlty, not Lord and Master over all other specLes. BlocentrLc equaLlty ls lntlMateLy related to the aLL-LnclusLve SeLfreaLlzatLon ln the sense that Lf we harM the rest of Nature then we are harMLng ourselves. There are no boundarles and everythlng ls lnterreLated. But Lnsofar as we percelve thlngs as LndLvLduaL organlsMs or entLtLes, the LnsLght draws us to respect aLL huMan and nonhuMan lndLvLduals ln theLr own rLght as parts of the whole wLthout feeLLng the need to set up hlerarchLes of specles wlth huMans at the top. The practlcaL LMpLlcatlons of thLs lntultlon or norM suggest that we should LLve wlthLn MlnLMuM rather than MaxlMUM lMpact on other specLes and on the Earth ln general. Thus we see another aspect of our guldlng prLnclpLe: ·slMpLe ln Means, rLch ln ends.• (Deep EcoLog~, pp.167-9) blospherLcaL egaLltarlanlsM Ln prlnclpLe' and certaln The abstract terM slMlLar terMs whlch I have used, do perhaps More harM than good. They suggest a posLtLve doctrLne, and that ls too Much. The LMportance of the LntultLon ls but MOMentary, only perhaps the rather lts capaclty to counteract, Less seeMs what towards attltude Lordly and consequentlaL, self-congratulatory developed, Less coMplex, Less MlracuLous. A rlch varLety of acceptable Motlves can be forMuLated for belng More reluctant to Lnjure of klLL a LLvLng beLng of klnd A than a beLng of klnd B. The cultural settlng ls dLfferent for each belng Ln each culture, furtherMore there are few general norMs, only vague guLdeLLnes. One factor: felt nearness, deterMlnes Largely our capactty to ldentLfy ourselves wlth a sort of beLng, to suffer when they suffer. One cannot put forth ethLcaL rules of conduct wlthout takLng such feeltngs and our lLMlted capacLtLes serLously. If Lt Ls dLffLcuLt to avotd klLLLng A because of Lts sMalLness, whereas klLLlng B ls easlLy avolded, we tend to protect B rather than A. Indeed we Llve wLth an obvLous dLversLty of obLlgatlons. Ue have speclaL oblLgatlons towards our own chLldren: Ln Most cultures any anlMaL May be kLLLed ln order to feed one's starvLng chlLd. ObLlgatLons toward specLes that have been MeMbers of our llfe coMMunLty for Long perLods are greater than toward accldentaL vlsltors. FurtherMore, we have the -13- �relevance of sufferLng: capacLty of sufferLng? Is the sufferLng of A less than that of B? Has A the The sLMpLe thLng I try to convey here L3 that an ethLcs concernLng dLfferences between non-huMan LLvLng beLngs Ls of a coMparable level of coMpLexLty to ethLcs concernLng dLfferent people and groups wLth whoM we have to do. (lntuLtLon, p.202) Those of us who procLaLM the rLght of all LLfe forMs to LLve and bLossoM thLnk of thLs rLght as an aspect of the 'value Ln LtseLf' whLch we attrLbute to the bLosphere wLth Lts closely Lnterconnected LLfe forMs. The procLaMatLon seeMs to steM froM an LntuLtLon for whLch a graduatLon Ls soMethLng foreLgn. If there Ls such a basLc rLght, Lf Lt can be gLven a faLrly precLse MeanLng, Lt Ls the naMe for all lLfe forMs. It Ls LMportant enough to be terMed bLospherLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM. But Lt Ls perhaps the best to abstaLn froM such Labels. They LnvLte a varLety of LnterpretatLons Most of whLch May be MLsLeadLng. As to the consequences of a posLtLve answer, I thLnk we can learn froM certaLn cultures of hunters and gatherers where bLg anLMaLs are only kLLled after elaborate cereMonLes and excuses'. There Ls acknowLedgeMent of equal rLght, but also of a rLght to kLlL Ln order to Meet vLtaL needs. There Ls a 'norM conflLct' whLch Ls solved through addLtLonal norMs: the perforMance of certaLn rLtes and behavLors of other kLnds. What I thLnk we need not proclaLM Ls that we as huMans are Most or More valuable, or have a hLgher rLght. ~e need not say '1 have a hLgher rLght to LLve and bLossoM than you have, obnoxLus MosquLto, so I kLLL you!' or 'BeLng Much More valuable than you are, I kLlL you and your offsprLng, dLrty rat!' In so far as we have vLtal needs to kLlL, and Ln so far as Lt Ls LnevLtabLe Ln practLce, we May justLfy thLs through varLous norMs whLch are Ln harMony wLth general ecoLogLcal thLnkLng. Do these words solve the relevant probLeMs? Of course not. ~hat I aM drLvLng at Ls the prLorLty of MaLntaLnLng a sort of egalLtarLanLsM Ln p~LncLple. How we can LLve thLs that prLncLpLe Ls a questLon of ethLcs Ln a very general sense, proceedLng froM Many prLncLples whLch LnevLtably Lead to norM confLLcts requLrLng adjustMents froM day to day. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, pp.27-9) AccordLng to Naess, a bLospherLc egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe, of equal value of to the all LLfe, Ls an LntuLtLveLy clear and obvLous value axLoM', at least aLMost ecoLogLcaL fLeLd-worker' (73, p96)!. But eMpLrLcaL surveys would certaLnLy not sustaLn Haess's claLMs. The prLncLpLe seeMs generally neLther LntuLtLve nor obvLous, and Ln several ways Lt appears LncoMpatLbLe wLth the wLder deep ecology pLatforM. It Ls not even obvLous that soMethLng has value by vLrtue of havLng LLfe. On the contrary, value seeMs, lLke yellowness, to be Much More patchLLy dLstrLbuted across the unLverse. SpecLal places, for Lnstance, are especLaLLy valuable. Hor Ls value always dLstrLbuted on LLvLng thLngs, but colours toMbs of the dead; and soMetLMes Lt flakes off consteLlatLons of LLvLng thLngs, for exaMpLe thLngs Ln excess, such as Locusts or rats Ln a plague. But even Lf every LLvLng thLng were assLgned value, Lt would not follow (Ln the way soMetLMes LnvaLLdLy argued) that every thLng has Lt equally. ~hLLe Lt could be saLd that thLngs are equal Ln havLng Lt, thLs Ls rather LLke pretendLng that people are equal Ln an LnegaLLtarLan socLety where all have soMe Money - a subterfuge. Indeed proposed prLncLpLes of deep ecology LnforM us, correctly, that soMe ecoLogLcaL LteMS are More valuable than others. For Lnstance, a certaLn sort of coMpLexLty Ls a vLrtue (Naess 73, prLncLpLe (6)), so presuMabLy an LteM wLth that coMpLexLty Ls More valuable than a sLMple bLoLogLcal LteM. SLMLLarLy, dLversLty of systeM Ls a vLrtue, a prLMe ground of value (prLncLpLe (2)). The upshot appears to be that a hLghly dLverse ecosysteM Ls More valuable -14- �than a sLMpLLfLed and LMpoverLshed one_ FurtherMore, bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM Ls LnconsLstent wLth the hoLLstLc, antL-reducLLonL3tLc, antL-LndLvLduaLL3tLc ethos whLch deep ecoLogy LMports froM hoLLstLc ecotogy. AnaLogous concLu3Lons can be reached for •equaL rLghts• forMuLatLons_ For one thLng, equaL rLghts are characterLstLcally based on equal MerLt or equal worth_ For another, arguMents lLke those gLven can be rerun wLth rLghts suppLantLng values_ As a theoretLcaL prLncLpLe, bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM has to be scrapped_ The LMMense dLffLcuLtLes of such a prLncLpLe Ln practLce Naess had already partLally recognLsed, qualLfyLng egalLtarLanLsM to equalLty Ln prLncLple 'because any realLstLc praxLs necessLtates soMe kLllLng, exploLtatLon, and suppressLon' (p_95). The extent of erosLon Ln equalLty thLs affords reMaLns obscure; but Lt couLd be close to total, wLth theoretLcaL equaLLty LapsLng whenever confLLct of rLghts or values LooMed_ Such egaLLtarLanLsM would be LLke a MaxLM of honesty Ln prLncLpLe, whLch appLLed Ln practLce only when Lt was not LnconvenLent; that Ls, but an eMpty MaxLM_ ~hatever Naess's Lntended qualLfLcatLon, Lt stLLL seeMs to people wLth Much practLcaL experLence on the Land or Ln gardenLng, especLaLLy Ln places where the surroundLng natural envLronMent has not been totally transforMed, that he has consLderabLy underestLMated the extent of quaLLfLcatLon needed, and that the prLncLpLe. BLospherLc strangle to begLn does quaLLfLcatLon due theLr own shelter or supply not do who egaLLtarLanLsM Ln practLce Ls for people sustenance, but pass the busLness of ecosysteM Lnterference and ModLfLcatLon on to others (as they typLcaLLy pass the butchery of theLr Meat and the LLke on to others)_ Even were Lt desLrabLe, unLversaL hunter-gatherLng Ls no Longer possLbLe or feasLbLe, wLth so Many Mostly unsuLted and LLL-adapted huMans; and a substantLaL even hunter-gatherers terMLnate the LLves of Many creatures Lnterference wLth theLr rLghts to LLve and bLossoM - and, More LMportant, and dLrectty LnterferLng substantLaLLy ModLfy theLr envLronMents, thus LndLrectly wLth enorMous nuMbers of LLvLng thLngs_ ~hatever rLghts sLMpLer LLvLng organLsMs, especLaLLy ones such as bacterLa and vLruses, have to LLve and bLossoM, they have decLdedLy quaLLfLed and Much attentuated ones. ULth bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM (Ln prLncLpLe) the deep ecology MoveMent has Latched onto a prLncLple whLch Ls both too powerful, and yet, Lf the ·Ln prLncLpLe" quaLLfLcatLon Ls appLLed so as to cover typLcaL LLfestyLes of deep ecoLogLsts, a prLncLpLe so rLddLed wLth exceptLons as to barely hang together. But wLthout soMe of the Lntended force of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM, deep ecology Ls Ln danger of coLLapsLng (LLke Many of Lts followers) Lnto an LnterMedLate posLtLon, as no other part of the pLatforM adequately sustaLns Lts LLMLted separatLon_ Part of what Ls sought wLth the egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe Lnterference, huMan Lnterference to an extent and on a scale far below that of theMe the Ls already afforded a basLs Ln presently prevaLLLng Ls what wLth values-Ln-nature and outsLde the huMan sphere, sLnce Lnterference of value Ls (Lpso facto) LLMLted. Such a prLncLpLe of LLMLted Interference deserves, Ln any case, separate forMuLatLon (whLch Lt usually gaLns Ln deep ecology pLatforMs)_ But even so Lt hardly achLeves the requLsLte separatLon, sLnce LnterMedLate posLtLons can, and do, grant or MaLntaLn soMe such prLncLpLe of lLMLted or reduced Lnterference (thus e-g- BLrch, AttfLeLd, SLnger)_ ~hat Ls requLred Ls a posLtLve equLvaLent of the separatLng feature, of the rejectLon of the greater vaLue assuMptLon, and therewLth of the rejectLon of huMan supreMacy, of the value pLcture of huMans as always nuMber one_ What Ls needed, More generaLLy, Ls a prLncLpLe teLLLng agaLnst the favourLng of one over others sLMpLy on the basLs of specLes, a specLes - huMans Ln partLcuLar -15- �prLncLple of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty, to gLve Lt a sLMLlar grandLose tLtle. There Ls soMe reason to suspect that, as elsewhere, a requLreMent of LMparttalLty has been hardened Lnto one of egalLtarLanLsM, that faLrness, because often dLfftcult to assess, has been MLstakenly taken to Lnvolve equaltty. BLospecLes LMpartLalLty LMplLes the avoLdance of specLes chauvLnLsM, that Ls the avotdance of unfaLr treatMent of LteMs outstde the gLven specLes. Because unfaLr, the treatMent concerned lacks any sufftctent justLfLcatLon. Hence, the avotdance of spectes chauvtnLsM Lnvolved Ls effectLvely that prevLously explaLned as a specLal case of class chauvLnLsM. SLMLlarly, the requLreMent of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty Ls a specLal case of the requlreMent of class (or natural group) LMpartlallty, for whlch the arguMents are the saMe as those for the avoldance of class chauvLnLsM. The danger of specLes partLalLty, of favourLng soMe specLes, Ls Much encouraged by a specles fallacy, whLch Ls coMMonly lnvoked ln favourlng huMans. ThLs Ls the error of concludLng that because a few MeMbers of the specles have accoMplLshed soMethtng of (LMMense) value, all MeMbers of the spectes therefore are (hlghly) valuable; all MeMbers of the specles Manage to free-load for the rtde, obtatned by a few MeMbers, so to say. The arguMent, once challenged, usually falls back on an arguMent that goes by way of capacltLes: the reMaLnLng MeMbers of the specles have the capactty to achleve these sorts of thlngs also. But, fLrstly, that Ls not true: LntellLgence, skLlls, and the lLke, vary soMewhat wtthLn specLes, and froM our narrow perspectLve, vary consLderably aMong huMans, soMe of whoM have no capacLty for advanced MatheMatLcs or MusLc. a Secondly, Lt requLres More than capacLty: Lt requLres cLrcuMstances, favourable envlronMent to exercLse theM (hence, ln part, the folly of More huMans ln conspLcuously suboptLMal cLtLes), together wLth a wlll and drlve actually to follow through approprLately on capacLtLes. (CrLtLque, pp.12-16) 4. NON-VIOLENCE The fourth plllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and -structural vlolence·, that Ls, vLolence and oppresslon LMposed by the state and by Lnstltutlons. For these reasons the Greens support the concept of self-deterMlnatLon for lndLvLduals and groups. They also advocate peace educatLon Ln the schools, whLch would teach nonvLolent Means of conflLct resolutLon and show chLldren that the cult of the soldLer Ls a cultural, not a natural condltLon. The Greens also call for an end to the vLolence and oppressLon toward woMen, chLldren, and MLnorLty groups so coMMon Ln patrLarchal socLetLes. They want to develop a nonexploLtatlve econoMlc systeM Ln whLch eMployee-owned and -controlled busLnesses replace huge operatlons dLctated by or corporate lnterests. They want to transforM our vlolent state the relatLonshLp wlth nature lnto one of balance and respect. Petra Kelly expresses the centralLty of thLs prLncLple when she says, ·NonvLolence Ls the essentLal Lngredtent ln an ecologLcal socLety. • Most of the Greens eMphatLcally eMbrace the prLncLple of Although nonvLolence, they also realLze that Lts appllcatLon Ls often probleMatLc. Roland Vogt polnted out one of the areas of confll~tlng values: What we have not yet accoMplLshed Ls to say how we show ourselves to be nonvLolent at the MOMent when we partLcLpate Ln governMental functLons, because the state Ls Ltself an LnstLtutLon of vLolence. For exaMple, how wlll a Green cLty counctl act agalnst people who don't pay thelr rent, although they really could because they recelve welfare or because they earn enough. The norMal course Ls warnLng, warnLng, evLctLon notLce, and then evLctLon by force and by polLce. We haven't solved thLs. That Ls, there are stLll no thought-out concepts of how we can reconcLle the deMands of socLal -16- �responsLbLL Lty wLth the deMands of non vLoLence. The Greens extend theLr prLncLpLe of nonvLoLence to theLr actLve resLstance agaLnst the Most MassLve and potentLaLLy deadly "anLfestatL on of structural vLoLence: the nuclear arMs race proMoted by the MLLLtary-L ndustrLaL coMpLex and the governMent. In theLr natLonaL headquarter s Ln Bonn the Greens have a poster of OandhL s adage "there Ls no way to peace; peace Ls the way• and one of Thoreau 0 Those who eMbrace nonvLoLent cLvLL dLsobedLenc e, coMMLttLng breaches of Law on the grounds of conscLence, are prepared to suffer · vLoLence or punLshMent theMseLves rather than LnfLLct vLoLence or LnjustLce on others or share responsLbLL Lty for such acts by reMaLnLng passLve. •1,, however, the Law Ls so proMuLgated that Lt of necessLty Makes you an agent of LnjustLce agaLnst another, then I say to you: Break the Law." The MajorLty of Greens strongly endorse - and lLve - the concept of actLve, nonvLoLence resLstance. However, the MarxLst-orL ented MeMbers of the party have never been fully supportLve of that prLncLpLe. They vLew Lt "ereLy as a ·MoralLstLc " tactLc that should be abandoned Ln favor of escaLatLng resLstance Lf Lt does not prove suffLcLentL y effectLve. Petra Kelly's account of the LeftLsts' attLtude on thLs Lssue was sLMLlar to what we had heard froM Many other Greens: They do not understand that nonvLolent actLon Ls an extre"ely subversLve force. They thLnk Lt's harMLess, Ls a for" of obedLence, and changes nothLng, that Lt's LLke beggLng froM the state. ·1t's just a tactLc, a toot," they say. To theM everythLng Ls to be used. But there are soMe thLngs you should never "Lsuse - or even use. They are sLMpLy LntegraL. NonvLoLence cannot be coMproMLsed. Although Many of the advocates of nonvLoLent . resLstance argued that ·such a course cannot be dLsMLssed as "Merely MoraLLstLc" sLnce Lt Ls also absolutely ratLonaL (that Ls, hLstory shows that vLoLence breeds vLolence - structural as welt as personal - so we "ust fLnd another way to effect change, especLaLLy Ln the nuclear age). For Most MeMbers of the greens the choLce was clear, as expressed wLth a cLtatLon froM MartLn Luther KLng: •~e no Longer have a choLce or nonvLoLence between vLoLence and nonvLoLence . The choLce Ls eLther nonexLsten ce." (Green PoLLtLcs, pp.~3-7) Deeply coMMLtted persons Ln the ecology Move"ent sense the vuLnerabLLL ty of natural processes to huMan LnterventLo n, and the fundaMentaL necessLty of MaLntaLnLng bLologLcal dLversLty. AffLrMatLon of the LntegrLty of ecosysteMs frequently LnvoLves a caMpaLgn to save froM developMent soMe rLver of canyon or wLLderness area. In a real sense, ecologLcaL resLstance LnvoLves beco"Lng frLends wLth another specLes or a rLver or a MountaLn, for exaMpLe. In general, the resLster takes up the burden of responsLbLl Lty, the burden of wLtnessLng for the other as Self. ThLs process of befrLendLng "ay be based on ArLstotle's crLterLa for frLendshLp: the proMotLon of the other's good for the other's own sake. Or frLendshLp can be the extensLon of self. When OandhL was asked Lf hLs good deeds Ln a vLLLage expressed hLs huManLtarLa nLsM, he repLLed he worked "to serve no • GandhL s stateMent defLned MaturLty. ALtruLsM was one else but Myself unnecessary because hLs self eMbraced the whole vLLLage. 0 There are Many dLfferent tactLcs of LndLvLduaLs and organL2atLo ns Ln save the Earth•, but or poLLtLcaL caMpaLgns whLch seek to ·save the rLver -17- �there Ls one overrLdLng or baste norM of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng: non-vLoLence. Ecology teaches us that MankLnd Ls not the center of LLfe on the planet. Ecology has taught us that the whole earth Ls part of our "body" and that we Must Learn to respect Lt as we respect ourselves. As we feel for ourselves, we Must feel for aLL forMs of LLfe - the whales, the seals, the forests, the seas. The treMendous beauty of ecoLogLcaL thought Ls that Lt shows us a pathway back to an understandLng and an apprecLatLon of LLfe LtseLf - an understandLng and apprecLatLon that Lt Ls LMperatLve to that very way or LLfe. As wLth the whales and the seals, LLfe Must be saved by nonvLoLent confrontatLons, by what the Quakers caLL "bearLng wLtness•. A person bearLng wLtness Must accept responsLbLLLty for beLng aware of an LnjustLce. The person May then choose to do soMethLng or stand by, but he May not turn away Ln Lgnorance. The Greenpeace ethLc Ls not onty to personally bear wLtness to atrocLtLes agaLnst lLfe; Lt Ls to take dLrect actLon to prevent theM. ~hLLe actLon Must be dLrect, Lt Must also be non-vLoLent. Ue Must obstruct a wrong wLthout offerLng personal vLoLence to Lts perpetrators. Ue Must know that our greatest strength Ls LLfe LtseLf, and the coMMLtMent to dLrect our lLves to prbtect others. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng could be defLned as keepLng the peace of the neLghborhood. Rarely are vandals or vLolent neLghbors welcoMe Ln the neLghborhood. Uhen the neLghbors Lnclude rLvers and MountaLns, seashores and prarLes, then the LntegrLty of the ecosysteM Ls MaLntaLned. In hLs explLcatLon of GandhL's theory of nonvLoLence, Arne several norMs of nonvLoLent potLtLcat caMpaLgns. These Lnctude: Naess lLsts l. Announce your case and the goal of your caMpaLgn explLcLtty and clearly, dLstLnguLshLng essentLaLs froM nonessentLats. 2. Seek personal contact wLth your opponent and be avaLLable to hLM. · BrLng confLLctLng groups Lnto personal contact. 3. Turn your opponent Lnto a beLLever Ln and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or expLoLt hLM. ~- You provoke your opponent Lf you deLLberateLy or carelessly destroy hLs property. of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng denounce theorLsts LeadLng nonvLoLence as tactLcs. But as Rober ALtken RoshL wrote: vLoLence versus Non-vLoLence Ls not just a tactLc for people who Make Lt a practLce ... The end Ls the Means, Ln other words. Look at poLLtLcaL hLstory or at the hLstory of any MoveMents. Uhen we work for certaLn goals, those goals tend to betray us. Ue defeated L.B. Johnson only to get RLchard NLxon. Ue got rLd of the B-1 BoMber (teMporarLLy) and the CruLse MLssLle appeared. Ue have to Make our actLon the goal. Our actLon Must LtseLf be the truth. Our actLon Must be Lts own defense, Lts own procLaMatLon, Lts own purpose. (Letter to the author, June 1982) Both on practLcaL and ethLcaL grounds, vLoLence Ls rejected as a Mode of ecotogLcal resLstance. TerrorLst attacks on nuclear plants or MLssLle sLtes could cause ·red" alerts and vLolent responses froM governMent agencLes. PLacLng one's own LLfe at rLsk, such as sLttLng Ln front of bulldozers or polLce cars at a deMonstratLon to protest destructLon of the raLn forest, May be LLLegaL but not vLoLent. And spontaneous acts such as the decoMMLssLonLng of a power generator or bulldozer May draMatLze the contLnuLng destructLon of a -18- �spectal ecosysteM. Ecologtcal reststance also Means defendtng natural dtverstty through educatLon, publLc speakLng, and use of lawsuLts; tryLng to convert publtc opLnton to the cause; and tnforMLng poltttctans and dectsLon Makers. ResLstance Ls another naMe for afftrMatLon - joyful affLrMatton of the tntegrLty of Nature, natural dLversLty, and MLnLMuM huMan LMpact on place. (Deep Ecolo9H, pp.16-17) The Deep Ecology MOVeMent and peace MoveMent. Ftfteen years ago close cooperatton between supporters of deep ecology and actLvtsts Ln the peace MoveMent was out of reach. Rather suddenly thts sttuatton Ls totally changed. SoMe of us, ltke Myself, favour unLlateral dtsarMaMent and establtshMent of MtlLtant, but unherotc, non-vtolent defence. At thts potnt Lt ts tMportant for actLvtsts to stress the dtstLnctLon between actLon, caMpaLgn and MOVeMent. They May be tllustrated by three concentrLc cLrcles. The LnnerMost coMprLse the dLrect actLons wLthLn a caMpatgn, for Lnstance, a dated deMonstratLon at a parttcular locatLon agatnst the butldtng of a daM, or the non-vtolent obstructton of the transport of the MachLnery on the way to the daM sLte. ThLs May be part of a ten year old caMpaLgn to save a rtver (LncludLng of course tts ecosysteM) froM developMent of soMe sort. Ten dLrect acttons May be fatlure, but nevertheless theLr LMpact May conflLct, contrtbute to vLctory of the caMpaLgn. (Or May polarLze the antt-actLvtsts Many what Ls That contrLbutLng to the faLlure of the caMpatgn? MaLntaLn.) The rLver caMpaLgn together wLth other analogous caMpaLgns May be seen as part of a MoveMent of greater or lesser generaltty. A MoveMent to save rtvers, or More generally a conservatton MoveMent. Many caMpatgns May be fatlures, but the MOVeMent goes on. (Hates on Poltttcs, pp.l~-JS) Gandhtan and other forMs of non-vtolence are wtdely found wLthtn the deep ecologLcal MoVeMent. There Ls a reluctance to accept destructLon of MachLnery Ln efforts to stop destructton even of holy places. There Ls soMe dtsagreeMent on thts and related subjects. I do not thtnk that the coMpletely general norMs of care and consLderatLon should be looked upon as part of the specLftc platforM of the deep ecology MoveMent . . (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, p.31) In suM, the paradtgM of deep ecology Ls revolutLonary tn tts MetaphysLcs, epLsteMology, and cosMology, but deep ecologLsts do not seek to overthrow governMents by force of arMs or to Lssue anythLng lLke a coMprehensLve, alleMbracLng polLtLcal prograM for brLngLng about the new order. The conteMporary deep ecology MoveMent seeMs to be what Robert NLsbet has called a "wLthdrawal and renewal" MoveMent such as has perLodLcally arLsen .Ln ~estern socLety sLnce the fall of the RoMan EMpLre. There ts no poltttcal party of "deep ecology,· no cadre of poltttcal revoluttonarte s. Thts ts not an approprtate approach for deep ecologtsts. No frontal confrontatLons wLth reforMLst envLronMental tsts or wLth the doMLnant socLal/polttLc al order Ls destred. It would be counter-product Lve by Maktng people More defensLve of thetr LdeologLcal posLtLon. Deep ecology Ls not an atteMpt to add one More tdeology Ln the crowded fLeld of Modern LdeologLes. Deep ecologLsts are questLng for ways to lLberate and cultLvate the ecologLcal conscLousness. FroM ecologtcal conscLousness wtll naturally flow an ecologtcal reststance. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.316-17) 5: ON SELF-REALIZATION Naess: Self-realtzatLo n ts the realtzatLon of -19- the potentLaltttes of ltfe. �OrganLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln three ways gLve us Less dLversLty than organLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln one hundred ways. Therefore, the selfreaLLzatLon we experLence when we LdentLfy wLth the unLverse Ls heLghtened by an Lncrease Ln the nuMber of ways Ln whLch LndLvLduals, socLetLes, and even specLes and lLfe forMs realLze theMselves. The greater the dLversLty, the, the greater the self-realLzatLon. ThLs seeMLng duaLLty between LndLvLduaLs and the totalLty Ls encoMpassed by what I call the Self and the ChLnese call the Tao. Most people Ln deep ecology have had the feelLng - usually, but not always, Ln nature - that they are connected wLth soMethLng greater than theLr ego, greater than theLr naMe, theLr faMLLy, theLr specLaL attrLbutes as an LndLvLdual - a feelLng that Ls often called oceanLc because Many have Lt on the ocean. ULthout that LdentLfLcatLon, one Ls not easLLy drawn to becoMe LnvoLved Ln deep ecology. Many people have thLs feeLLng when they see a death struggle - for Lnstance tLny anLMaLs LLke fLtes or Mosquttoes fLghtLng for thetr ltves. Uhen they see anLMals sufferLng, they May LdentLfy wLth LLfe forMs they usually don't LdentLfy wLth. Such sLtuatLons offer us an opportunLty to develop a More Mature poLnt of vLew. Insofar as thLs conversLon, these deep feelLngs are reLLgLous, deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, and those people who have done the Most to Make socLetLes aware of the destructLve way Ln whLch we LLve Ln reLatLon to natural settLngs have had such relLgLous feeLLngs. Rachel Carson, for exaMpLe, says that we cannot do what we do, we have no reLLgLous or ethLcaL justLfLcatLon for behavLng as we do toward nature. Her arguMent Ls not calculated or reasonable Ln the usual sense, sayLng that, Lf we contLnue poLsonLng nature, we wLLl be Less healthy, or wLLL have fewer resources, and so on. She Ls sayLng that we are sLMply not perMLtted to behave Ln that way. SoMe wLll say that nature Ls not Man's property, Lt's the property of God; others wLLL say Lt Ln other ways. The MaLn poLnt Ls that deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, fundaMental LntuLtLons that everyone Must cuLtLvate Lf he or she Ls to have a LLfe based on values and not functLon LLke a coMputer. Uhereas shallow ecology, Lf taken to Lts logLcaL extreMe, Ls lLke a coMputerLzed, cost-benefLt anaLysLs for huMans. (SLMpLe tn Means, p.11) If the terM seLf-reaLLzatLon Ls applLed, Lt should be kept Ln MLnd that Me", "ego , and self have shLftLng denotatLons. NothLng Ls evLdent and •1·, LndLsputabLe. Even that we are Ls debatable Lf we Make the questLon dependent upon answertng what we are. Self-realLzatLon Ln Lts absolute MaxLMUM Ls, as I see Lt, the Mature experLence of oneness Ln dLversLty as depLcted Ln the above verse. The MLnLMUM Ls the seLf-reaLL2atLon by More of Less consLstent egotLsM - by the narrowest experLence of what constLtutes one's self and a MaxLMUM of alLentatLon. As eMpLrLcaL beLngs we dweLL soMewhere Ln between, but Lncreased MaturLty LnvoLves tncrease of the wLdeness of the self. The seLf-reaLtzatton MaxLMuM should not necessarLLy be conceLved as a MystLcal or MedLtattonaL state. ·ey MedLtatLon soMe perceLve the Self tn the self by the self; others by the path of knowledge and stLLl others by the path of work (karMa-yoga) [Gtta: Chapter 13,, verse 2~]. GandhL was a karMa-yoga, reaLLzLng hLMseLf through socLaL and poLLtLcaL actLon. The terMs MystLcal unLon and MystLcLsM are avoLded here for three reasons: Ftrst, strong Mysttcal tradLtLons stress the dtssolutLon of Lndtvtdual selves Lnto a nondLversLfLed supreMe whole. Both froM cultural and ecoLogLcaL poLnt of vtew dLversLty and LndLvtdualLty are essentLaL. Second, there Ls a strong terMLnoLogtcaL trend wtthtn sctenttftc coMMuntttes to assoctate MysttcLsM wtth MystLcs tend to agree that MysttcaL ThLrd, confuston. and vagueness conscLousness Ls rarely sustatned under norMal, everyday condLttons. But strong, -20- �w~de LdentLfLcatLon can color experLence under such condLtLons. GandhL was only MargLnally concerned wLth 'nature'. In hLs ashraM poLsonous snakes were perMLtted to tLve LnsLde and outsLde huMan dwettLngs. AntL-poLson MedLcLnes were frowned upon~ GandhL LnsLsted that trust awakens trust, and that snakes have the saMe rLght to tLve land btossoM as the huMans. (IdentLfLcatLon, pp.259-6) In keepLng wLth the spLrLtual tradLtLons of Many of the worlds s retLgLons, the deep ecology norM of setf-reatL2atLon goes beyond the Modern western self hedonLstLc whLch Ls defLned as an Lsotated ego strLvLng prLMarLly for gratLfLcatLon or for a narrow sense of LndLvLduat satvatLon Ln thLs tLfe or the next. ThLs socLatty prograMMed sense of the narrow self or socLat self dLslocates us, and leaves us prey to whatever fad or fashLon Ls prevalent Ln our socLety or socLat reference group. Ue are thus robbed of be9LnnLn9 the search for our unLque spLrLtuat/b.LologLcal personhood. SpLrLtual growth, or unfotdLng, begLns when we cease to understand or see ourselves as Lsolated and narrow coMpetLng egos and begLn to LdentLfy wLth other huMans forM our faMLly and frLends to, eventually, our specLes. But the deep ecology sense of self requLres a further MaturLty and growth, an LdentLfLcatLon whLch goes beyond huManLty to Lnclude the nonhuMan world. Ue Must see beyond our narrow conteMporary cultural assuMptLons and values, and the conventLonat wLsdoM of our tLMe and place, and thLs Ls best achLeved by the MedLtatLve deep questLonLng process. Only Ln thLs way can we hope to attaLn full Mature personhood and unLqueness. A nurturLng nondoMLnatLng socLety can help Ln the "real work" of becoMLng a whole person. The ·real work• can be suMMarLzed syMbolLcally as the realLzatLon of "self-Ln-Self- where ·setf· stands for organLc wholeness. ThLs process of the full unfoldLng of the self can also be SUMMarLzed by the phrase, •No one Ls saved untLt we are all saved,· where the phrase •one• Lncludes not only Me, an LndLvLduat huMan, but all huMans, whales, grLzzly bears, whole raLn forest ecosysteMs, MountaLns and rLvers, the tLnLest MLcrobes Ln the soLt, and so on. (Deep Ecology, pp.66-7) of norM SubscrLbLng to these prLncLples, Naess asserts, coMes froM the self-realLzatLon, that ·.~. wLth MaturLty, huMan beLngs wLtl experLence joy and sorrow when other tLfe forMs experLence sorrow. Not only wLll we feet sad when our brother or the dog or cat feels sad, but we wLll grLeve when lLvLng beLngs, LncludLng landscapes, are destroyed. In our cLvLlLzatLon, we have vast Means' of destructLon at our dLsposal but extreMely lLttle MaturLty Ln our feelLngs. Only a very narrow range of feetLngs have Lnterested Most huMan beLngs untLt now.• ThLs deepenLng of feetLngs seeMs to run counter . to the trend Ln Modern socLety toward superfLcLat relatLonshLps . . . . Arne Naess asserts that ·setfrealLzatLon cannot develop far wLthout sharLng joys and sorrows wLth others, or More fundaMentalty, wLthout the developMent of the narrow ego of the sMall chLld Lnto the coMprehensLve structure of a Self that coMprLses all huMan beLngs. The ecologLcal MoveMent -- as Many earlLer phLlosophLcat MoveMents -- takes a step further and asks for developMent such that, there Ls a deep LdentLfLcatLon of LndLvLduals wLth all lLfe." I suggest that the leaders of the ecology MoveMent devetopMent theLr ethLcs after they had Moved along thLs path of Self-reatLzatLon. (Stone/Sky, pp.6-7) But what Ls wrong wLth the wLdely applauded atteMpt, runnLng through Much LdeatLstLc and Eastern thLnkLng, to explLcate value through self-realLsatLon? FLrstly, lLke utLlLtarLan explLcatLons, such as those through happLness and satLsfactLon, Lt Ls Much too experLentLal. It renders value a feature of those -21- �who exper~ence value - roughly of valuers - rather than of what ~s valued, and bears value. It Ls lLke sayLng that colour Ls a Matter of those (huMans) who perceLve colour, not of the (coMposLtLon of) thLngs that are coloured. And reMove the experLences, those undertakLng self-realLsatLon, as Ln the days before lLfe appears and value dLsappears. And that too Ls wrong. Secondly, even Lf self-realLsatLon were always worthwhLle and never tLed to by contrast wLth lLfe - there are exaMpLes of value whLch fall beyond evLl (Ln presented often seLf-reaLLsatLon. A certaLn sort of dLrectLon Ls bLocheMLstry texts Lnterested Ln explaLnLng lLfe) as a MLnLMal condLtLon of lLfe of an organLsr1 or syster1: caLL that dLrectLon, s·eLf-dLrecti.on. Thus, deep ecology, Lnsofar as Lt values (just) LLfe, values (just) self-dLrectLon. In these terMs, the contractLon froM seLf-dLrectLon to self-realLsatLon, as Ln Ecosophy T, Looks LLke a M~stake. A s~r1LLar M~stake appears to underLLe contractLons to ecologLcal conscLousness (as Ln Devall); for self-realLsatLon Looks rer1arkabLy L~ke consc~ous seLf-d~rectLon, roughly an LntersectLon of seLf-dLrectLon wLth conscLousness. The argur1ents asser1bLed thus underMLne both of what Devall presents as the uLtLMate norMs of deep ecology', nar1eL~eLf-reaLLsatLon and bLocentrLsM. 'These are not proved but "felt"' (83, p.5). But they are not felt, at least by those who perceLve value beyond what lLves; rather they are dLsproved, by a serLes of counterexar1ples to each as uLtLr1ate norr1s. (CrLtLque, pp.2~-5) In partLcular presentatLons of a partLcular phLLosophy froM whLch the Naess-SessLon platforM Ls derLved, naMely Ecosophy r' I use a Model where 'Self-realLzaHon!' and sLr1LLar short forr1uLatLons are taken to express a top norr1 of a norr1atLve systeM. ~e r1ay artLcuLate 'r1odeLs' of a very cor1prehensLve norr1atLve syster1, and use Lt to explore the LnterrelatLons of our own vLews and those of others. I have extensLvely used a Model of a cor1prehensLve yLew I call 'Ecosophy r ·' and I use only one top norM whLch on the Most crude ser1antLcaL Level Ls expressed by a one word sentence 'seLf-realLzatLon! '. A r1aLn LnspLratLon for - the choLce cor1es froM the use of the terN by GandhL. Another MaLn LnspLratLon Ls the strong trend Ln Uestern LndustrLaL states towards an LndLvLdualLsM favourLng lLfe as a Long ego-trLp full of 'happenLngs' . In France there Ls a group of 'egologLsts' , the nar1e beLng chosen as a contrast to 'ecologLsts ' : ~hatever the reLatLons between LndLvLdual beLngs, huMan nature Ls such that the egocentred Lnterests of each of us Ls stronger than any other. To foster the kLnds of soLLdar~ty the pol~t~cal left ~s taLkLng about, or the soLLdarLty wLth other lLfe forMs wh~ch . ecologLsts (the greens) preach, w~ll therefore never succeed and ~s apt to hurt the LndLvLduaL . ' seLf-reaL~zatLon!' Ls a norM that LnLtLaLLy arLses vLvLd Lnterest aMong those who are LnfLuenced by the ego-trLp trend, but are then astonLshed and bewLLdered by the d~stLnctLons between ego, self and Self. Th~s ~s new to Most of theM and they are often Led to recons~der theLr LndLvLduaL~st posLtLon. ThLs reconsLderLng Ls for Me a confLrMatLon of the SocratLc value of the choLce of forr1ulatLon. The r1aLn poLnt Ln thLs connectLon Ls that huMans undergo a r1aturLn9 process, and only Lf thLs process coMes to a 'prer1ature' halt, LndentLfLcatLon wLth others and solLdarLty faLL to develop. If we, as I do, add the SpLnozLst (courageous) hypothes~s that the joy and equLMLndedness you exper~ence as a Mature person ~s deeper and rLcher than that you exper~ence as an ~r1r1ature grown 'reaLLzaHon of the (wLde) Self!' gets to be an ~nstructi.ve and ~nsp~rLng up, -22- �forMu l,a. The Self-realLzatLo n norM proposed by Me has been taken too serLously as Lf one, two or three world expressLons were adequate phLLosophLcaL expressLons of a hL9hest' norM. An adequate expressLon LMplLes that the LntrLcate subject ego, se Lf, Se Lf ', that Ls, b Lo Log Lea L, soe La L and Hetaphys Lea L se Lf ar·e dLstLnguLshed. Only Ln relatLon to a faLrly Large body of phLlosophLcaL analysLs we can forMulate adequate phLlosophLcal prLncLples. It has always been that way. (Notes on Sylvan, pp.17-19) HY 0 6: OH LIFESTYLE The deep ecologLcal MoveMent Ls recruLted froM people who do not look upon natural surroundLngs as a Means for recreatLon and repaLr. LLfe and work Ln natural surroundLngs Ls a vLtal concern. The rLchness of that LLfe Ls so vast, and the Means are so sLMple, that they have dLffLculty understandLng why others seeM to need Means on a level of coMplLcatLon and sophLstLcatLon that Ls unLque Ln the hLstory of [huMan]kLnd. They cannot but fLght agaLnst the acceleratLng destructLon of nature due to the MaLntaLnLng and expandLng the productLon of such Means. They do not thLnk people who serLousLy reflect upon the reLatLon between Means and ultLMate LntrLnsLc values can justLfy the present polLcLes. As an LllustratLon of dLfferent Means/end ratLos, coMpare the dLrect and LndLrect technologLcal requLreMent of a faMLly wLth MeMbers froM 8 to 80 years old lLvLng Ln a natural surroundLng and goLng cross-country skLLng together, wLth that of a faMLly doLng slaloM at a bLg fashLonable skL resort. (PhLlosophLcal. Aspects, pp.35-6) 0 RLch Ln ends, sLMple Ln Means!.' HuMan Lnterference Ln the ecosphere can only be reduced to tolerable levels Lf people, and especLally the average (or econoMLcally above average) people of the LndustrLal states adopt lLfe styles requLrLng sLMple MaterLal Means. ThLs Ls coMpatLble wLth or even favourable towards rLchness of goals. 'Increase the sensLtLvLty to and apprecLatLon of what there Ls suffLcLent of for all!' The educatLonal slogan fLghts agaLnst the confusLon of value wLth Market value and prLce. A way to MaxLMLze our abLlLty to derLve deep satLsfactLon froM the goods of whLch there stLll, Ls, or coul.d be, enough. The present lLfe style of average people Ln LndustrLal socLetLes cannot be a global lLfe style wLthout LrreversLble, colossal destructLon of condLtLons of LLfe on Earth. (Hotes on PolLtLcs, p.2) It ' s a shLft froM beLng doMLnated by Means, LnstruMents, gadgets, all the Many thLngs we thLnk wLLl gLve us pleasure or Make us happy or perfect. The shLft coMes about when we serLously ask ourselves, In what sLtuatLons do I experLence the MaxLMUM satLsfactLon of MY whole beLng? and fLnd that we need practLcally nothLng of what we are supposed to need for a rLght and fuLfLlLLng LLfe. And Lf we Make that shLft toward a LLfe sLMple Ln Means but rLch Ln goals, we are not threatened by the plans elaborated by envLronMentalL sts. For Lnstance, we can see that, Lnstead of an ene~gy cr~s~s, we have a crLsLs of consuMptLon - we have More than enough energy. There Ls no reason to contLnue LncreasLng our consuMptLon of energy or of any of the other MaterLaL aspects of lLfe. In countrLes lLke the UnLted States the crLsLs Ls rather one of LLfestyle, of our tradLtLons of thoughtlessness and confusLon, or our LnabLLLty to questLon what Ls and Ls not worthwhLLe Ln l,Lfe. ULthLn fLfty years, eLther we wLl,l, need a dLctatorshLp to save what Ls Left of the dLversLty of LLfe forMs, or we wLLl have a shLft of values, a shLft of our total vLew such that no dLctatorshLp wLLL -23- �be . needed. It Ls thoroughly natural to stop doMLnatLng and expLoLtLng and destroyLng the planet. A "sMooth" ~ay, LnvoLvLng harMonLous LLvLng wLth nature, or a "rough" way, LnvoLvLng dLctatorshLp and coercion - those are the optLdns. I tell people that, Lf they Make clear theLr fundaMentaL assuMptLons about what Ls needed for a LLfe sLMpLe Ln Means and rLch Ln ends, they wLLL necessarLLy coMe to the conctusLon that Lt Ls not tack of energy consuMptLon that Makes theM unhappy. They can then oppose nuclear power wLthout havLng read thLck books and wLthout knowLng the MyrLad facts that are used Ln newspapers and perLodLcaLs. And they Must also fLnd others who feel the saMe and forM cLrcLes of frLends who gLve one another confidence and support Ln lLvLng Ln a way that the MajorLty fLnds rLdLcuLous, naLve, stupLd, and sLMpt~stLc. But Ln order to do that, one Must already have enough seLf-confLdenc e to follow one's LntuLtLon - a quaLLty very Much LackLng Ln broad sectLons of the populace. Most people follow the trends and advertLseMents and becoMe phLLosophLcaL and ethLcaL crLpples. I thLnk that, Ln the long run, Ln order to joyfully and wholeheartedly partLcLpate Ln the deep ecology MoveMent you have to take your own LLfe very seriously. People who successfully MaLntaLn a Low MaterLaL standard of lLvLng and successfully cultLvate a deep, Lntense Lnner lLfe are Much better able to consLstentLy MaLntaLn a deep ecoLogLcat vLew and to act on behalf of Lt. As 1· sLt down and breathe deeply and just feel where I aM, I can ask Myself where and when I really enjoy MY LLfe and what would be the MLnLMuM Means necessary to MaLntaLn those enjoyable feelLngs and sLtuatLons. For exaMpLe, I Myself have too eager to go cLLMbLng Ln the HLMaLayas, whereas the pecutLar been satLsfactLon I have as a MountaLneer could be had Ln Norway . If you concentrate on what gLves you satLsfactLon, you wLLL fLnd that Lt can be obtaLned Much More easLly and sLMply than we are educated to belLeve Ln our socLety, where bL99er, More elaborate and More expensLve are always consLdered better. The deveLopMent of sensLtLvLty toward the good thLngs whLch we already have Ln suffLcLent quantLty Ls the true goal of educatLon. Not that we need to LLMLt our desLres. I'M not for the sLMple lLfe, except Ln the sense of a tLfe sLMpLe Ln Means but rLch Ln goals and values. I have treMendous aMbLtLon. Only the best Ls good enough for Me. I LLke rLchness, and I feel rLcher than the rLchest person when I'M Ln MY cottage Ln the country wLth water I've carrLed froM a certaLn well and wood I've gathered froM the forest. Uhen you take a heLLcopter to the SUMMLt of a MountaLn,° the vLew Looks LLke a postcard, and, Lf there ' s a restaurant on the top, you wLll coMplaLn that the food Ls not properly Made. ~hereas Lf you struggle up froM the bottoM, you have thLs deep feeLLng of satLsfactLon, and even sandwLches MLxed wLth skL wax and sand taste fantastLc. (SLMple Ln Means, pp . 11-12) (1) Use of s LMple Means, avoidance of unnecessary coMplLcated LnstruMents and other sorts of Means. (2) ChoLce of actLvLtLes Most dLrectLy servLng values Ln theMselves and havLng LntrLnsLc value. AvoLdance of actLvLtLes whLch are Merely auxLlLary, havLng no LntrLnsLc value , or beLng Many stages away froM fundaMentaL goals. (3) AntL-consuMerLs M . ThLs negatLve attLtude follows froM (1) and (2). (~) Endeavour to MaLntaLn and Lncrease the sensLtLvLty and apprecLatLon of goods of whLch there Ls enough for all to enjoy. ' (5) Absence or low degree of novophLLL - the love of what Ls new Merely because Lt Ls new. (6) Effort to dwell Ln sLtuatLons of LntrLnsLc value and to act rather than beLng busy . (7) ApprecLatLon of ethnLc and cultural differences aMon9 people, not feelLn9 theM as threats . (8) Concern about the sLtuatLon of the thLrd and fourth world and atteMpt to -24- �avoLd a standard of LLvLng too Much dLfferent froM and hLgher than the needy. (Global soLLdarLt y of LLfe style). (9) ApprecLat Lon of LLfe styles whLch are unLversaL LzabLe, whLch are not blatantly LMpossLbLe to sustaLn wLthout LnjustLce toward fellow huMans or other specLes. (10) To go for depth and rLchness of experLenc e rather than LntensLty . (11) To apprecLat e and choose, when possLbLe, MeanLngfuL work rather than just MakLng a LLvLng. (12) To Lead a coMpLex, not a coMpLLca ted LLfe, tryLn9 to reaLLze as Many aspects of posLtLve experLenc es as possLbLe wLthLn each tLMe-Lnte rvaL. (13) CuLtLvatL ng LLfe Ln coMMunLty (GeMeLns chaft) rather than Ln socLety (OeseLLs chaft}. sMaLL scale Ln prLMary productLo n (14) ApprecLat Lon of or partLcLpa tLon agrLcuLtu re, forestry, fLshLng. (15) Effort to satLsfy vLtaL needs rather than desLres. (Paradox, pp.57-8) In soMe Eastern tradLtLon s, the student Ls presented wLth a koan, a sLMpLe story or stateMent whLch May sound paradoxLc aL or nonsensLc aL on the surface but as the student turns and turns Lt Ln hLs or her MLnd, authentLc understan dLng eMerges. ThLs dLrect actLon · of turnLng and turnLn9, seeLn9 froM dLfferent perspectL ves and froM dLfferent depths, Ls requLred for the cuLtLvatL on of conscLou sness. The koan-LLke phrase for deep ecology, suggested by proMLnen t NorwegLan phLLosoph er Arne Naess Ls: ·sLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends.· (Deep Ecology, p.10) The LdeoLogLcaL change Ls MaLnLy that of apprecLat Lng LLfe quaLLty Ln sLtuatLon s of Lnherent value) rather than adherLng to an (dweLLLng LncreasLn gLy hLgher standard of LLvLng. There wLLL be a profound awareness of the dLfferenc e between bLg and great. SoMe econoMLs ts crLtLcLze the terM "quaLLty of LLfe" because Lt Ls supposed to be vague. But on closer LnspectLo n, what they consLder to be vague Ls actuaLLy the non-quan tLtatLve nature of the terM. One cannot quantLfy adequatel y what Ls LMportant for the quaLLty of LLfe as dLscussed here, and there Ls no need to do so. There Ls aMple rooM for dLfferent op~n~ons about prLorLtLe s: what should be done fLrst, what next? What Cs Most urgent? What Ls necessary as opposed to what Ls hL9hLy desLrabLe ? But the dLfferenc es do not exclude vLgorous cooperatL on. ~hat Ls gaLned froM tentatLve Ly forMuLatL ng basLc vLews shared today by Most or all supporter s of the deep ecology MoveMent? Hopefully Lt Makes Lt a LLttLe easLer to LocaLLze the MoveMent aMong the Many 'aLternat Lve' MoveMents. Hopefully thLs does not Lead to LsoLatLon but rather to even better cooperatL on wLth Many other aLternatL ve MoveMents. It MLght also Make soMe of us More clear about where we stand, and More clear about whLch dLsagreeM ents MLght profLtabL y be reduced and whLch ones MLght profLtabL y be sharpened . After aLL dLversLt y!' Ls a hLgh Level norM! (BasLc, p.6,9) 0 A set of platforM forMulatL on should be vague and aMbLguous enough to be capable or rather dLfferen t phLLosoph LcalLy relevant Lnterpret atLons. The prLncLpLe s of Lnterpret atLon of pLatforMs of MoveMents reseMbLe those of Lnterpret atLon of Laws. Vagueness Ls here essentLaL prLMarLLy because those appLyLng the Laws Must have soMe freedoM Ln adaptLng theM to ever changLng cLrcuMst ances, but also because the forMuLatL on Must slur over, or abstract froM MLnor dLfferenc es of relevant opLnLon aMon9 those who have supported the Lssue of the Law. On the other hand, the Lnterpret atLon of the text of a phLLosop her reseMbLes that of a testaMent ( 'wLLL' ). Exactly what the testator Lntends Ls the -25- �sole crLterLon of correctness of the LnterpretatLon . Uhether hLs or her terMLnology Ls abhorent or crazy Ls Lrrelevant. (Hates on Sylvan, pp.10-11) 7: ON BIOREGIOHALISM The central eleMent of bLoregLon Ls the LMportance gLven to natural systeMs "both as the source of physLcal nutrLtLon and as the body of Metaphors froM whLch our spLrLts draw sustenance. To understand natural systeMs Ls to begLn an understandLng of the self." A second eleMent of bLoregLon Ls setf-regulatLo n: •anarchy doesn't Mean out Lt Means out of theLr control.• Local coMMunLtLes LnspLred by a control; of shared concern for the bLoregLon, for "tettLng be• the plants and natLve anLMals of that place, ~an Make decLsLons concernLng LndLvLduat and coMMunat actLons whLc respect the LntegrLty of natural processes Ln that place. CarLng for a place Means avoLdLng exptoLtatLon. thLrd eleMent coMposLng the bLoregLonal notLon Ls spLrLt. • There Ls no sLngle relLgLous practLce for thLs sense of bLoregLonat spLrLt. It can be ChrLstLan, BuddhLst, NatLve AMerLcan or others; based on deep ecologLcal LnsLghts, Lt can be expressed Ln nuMerous ways. (Deep Ecology, pp.21-22) ·A UhLte the bLoregLonal, MLnorLty tradLtLon seeMs approprLate to us for cuttLvatLng ecotogLcal conscLousness, atlowLng for bLologLcat dLversLty wLth sLMplLcLty of Means, there are tough, practLcat decLsLons to Make. ConsLstent wLth our uttLMate norMs, Lt seeMs that one prLncLple Ls protectLon of endangered specLes of plants and anLMals as part of the general norM of unLty Ln dLversLty. Another norM Ls bLoregLonal responsLbLlLty . The local coMMunLty Ls the place for decLsLons. However, what happens when a local COMMunLty's needs conflLct wLth the norM of protectLng specLes dLversLty? Such a sLtuatLon occurred on the north slope of Alaska where natLve EskLMos were huntLng bowhead whales Ln the 1970s. The InternatLonat UhatLng Co~MLssLon ruled that thLs was an endangered specLes of whale and consLdered a total ban on the kLttLng of bowhead. However, the natLve EskLMos pleaded that Lt was part of theLr tradLtLon to kLtt whales. TheLr Myths and tLfestyle were dependent on Lt. It they dLdn't kLll whales they would be More dependent on canned Meat froM the "tower forty-eLght": gLven theM by welfare departMents. ThLs soMewhat sptLt the envLronMentalL sts . Many groups supported a total ban on the kLllLng of bowheads untLl ecologLsts deterMLned that theLr poputatLon had "suffLcLently Lncreased, • but FrLends of the Earth took the posLtLon that EskLMos be allowed to take a regulated nuMber of bowheads usLng theLr tradLtLonal Methods (no advanced technology for kLtlLng theM was allowed). Arne Haess provLdes an exaMple froM the bLoregLon ·of northern Horway where farMers and herders, through expansLon of farMs and nuMber of sheep , were rapLdty encroachLng on habLtat of wolves and bears. SoMe suggested kLllLng all bears sLnce a few bears seeMed to be eatLng soMe sheep. But others suggested LdentLfyLng the probleM More carefully. Uas a specLfLc bear becoMLng More and More Lnterested Ln sheep? Could that bear be entLced to refraLn froM eatLng sheep? Could Lt be reMoved to another tocat(on? Could the farMers agree to keep theLr sheep out of areas where bears were known to have dens or graze? Only as a last resort would the coMMunLty consLder the optLon of kLllLng that bear. ThLs approach Ls Ln great contrast wLth that favoured by soMe ranchers and such as wolves, farMers Ln the AMerLcan Uest . Uhen a •predator" Ls defLned to elLMLnate Lt, undertaken are efforts systeMLc then etc. coyotes, eagles, poLson •1oso", of spreadLng LncludLng aerLal huntLng of wolves (Ln Alaska), -26- �shootLn g eagles wLth hLgh-po wered rLfles and destroyL ng habLtat (dennLng areas, rLparLan habLtat of rats, etc.). (Deep Ecology , pp.148- 9) DasMann wrLtes about "bLoregL onalLsM " and •ecodeve lopMent " for the peoples of of AfrLca and the South PacLfLc , and refers approvL ngly to the concept Ln are ("~e House Lynn and e 6orslLn "future prLMLtL ve• develop ed by Jerry another to ve prLMLtL transLtL on froM one condLtL on of syMbLot Lc balance - the a whLch we wLll call future prLMLtLve ... a condLtL on havLng the attrLbu tes of Mature ecosyste M: stable, dLverse , Ln syMbLot Lc balance agaLn") . OasMann dLstLng uLshes between what he calls ecosyste M people and bLosphe re people: "Ecosyst eM people lLve wLthLn a sLngle ecosyste M, or at Most two or three M adjacen t and closely related ecosyste Ms. They are depende nt upon that ecosyste BLosphe re people draw theLr support , not froM the for theLr survLva l resource s of any one ecosyste M, but froM the entLre bLosphe re. BLosphe re people can exert LncredL ble pressure upon an ecosyste M they wLsh to exploLt , and create great devastat Lon - soMethL ng that would be LMpossLble or unthLnk able for people who were depende nt upon that partLcu lar ecosyste M ... BLosphe re people create a natLona l parks. Ecosyste M people have always lLved Ln the equLval ent of at natLona l park ... I propose that the future belongs to those who can regaLn, a hLgher level, the old sense of balance and belon9Ln 9 between Man and nature (ecosyst eM people) .· (SessLo ns, pp-~18- 19) A bLoregL on Ls a part of earth's surface whose rough boundar Les are deterML ned by natural rather than huMan dLctate s, dLstLng uLshable froM other and areas by attrLbu tes of flora, fauna, water, clLMate , soLls, and land-for Ms, The to. rLse the huMan settleM ents and culture s those attrLbu tes have gLven borders between such areas are usually not rLgLd - Nature works wLth More flexLbL lLty and fluLdLty than that - but the general contour s of the regLons theMselv es are not hard to LdentLfy , and Lndeed wLll probabl y be felt, and understo od, sensed, or Ln soMe way known to Many of the LnhabLt ants, , partLcu larly those rooted Ln the land, farMers , rancher s, hunters and fLshers n, AMerlca of face the across foreste rs and botanLs ts, and Most especLa lly, the trlbal Indlans, those stLll Ln touch wLth a culture that for centurl es knew earth as sacred and Lts well-beL ng as LMperat Lve. The wLdest regLon, takLng Lts charact er froM the broades t Measure s of natLve vegetatL on and soLl contour s, May be called the ecore9Lo n and wLll general ly cover several hundred thousand s of square Mlles. But wlthln these ecoregL ons Lt Ls easy to dLstLngu Lsh other coheren t terrLtor Les that defLne a theMselv es prLMarL ly by theLr surface feature s - a watersh ed, or rLver basLn, the valley, a desert, a plateau , a MountaLn range - and whLch we May all call stLll locate often can one turn, Ln 9eore9L on. And wLthLn these 9eore9L ons, sMaller areas, of perhaps several thousand square MLles dLscret e and Ldentof LfLable wLth theLr own topograp hLes and LnhabLt ants, theLr own varLatLo ns huMan culture and agrLcul ture, to whLch we May gLve the · naMe vLtaregL on. Uhether we speak of ecoregL on or 9eore9Lo n or vLtaregL on, after all, we speak of bLoregLons , and Lt Ls that essentL al archetyp e that Ls Most LMporta nt to coMprehend. For once that Ls done on any sLgnLfL cant scale then the Matter of MakLng to dLstLnc tLons and creatLn g huMan LnstLtut Lons to Match theM can be safely left best. theM the LnhabLt ants, the dweller s on the land, who wLll always know The econoMy that coMes lnto belng wlthln a charact er froM the condLtL ons, the laws of Nature. what we can be sald to know wLth soMe surety llvlng on the soLl has been cogently SUMMarLsed as be dLstLng uLshed, froM the laws of TherMod ynaMLcs . The flrst law ls that conserv atlon, bloreglo n also derlves lts Our Lgnoranc e Ls LMMense, but after these Many centurL es of the laws of EcodynaMLcs - to preserv atlon, -27- sustena nce, ls the �central goat of the natural world, hence Lts fundaMentat resLstance to largescale structural change; the second law Ls that, far froM beLng entropLc Nature Ls Lnherently stable, workLng Ln all tLMes and places toward that ecology calls a ctLMax, that Ls, a balanced, harMonLous, LntegratLve state of MaturLty whLch, once reached, Ls MaLntaLned for prolonged perLods. FroM thLs Lt follows that a bLoregLonal econoMy would seek to MaLntaLn rather than exploLt the natural world, accoMModate to the envLronMent, rather than resLst Lt; Lt would atteMpt to create condLtLons for a clLMax, a balance, for what soMe econoMLsts have recently taken to callLng a "steady state," rather than for perpetual change and contLnuat growth, Ln servLce to "progress", a false and delusory goddess Lf ever there was one. It would, Ln practLcat terMs, MLnLMLse resource use, eMphasLse conservatLon and recyclLng, avoLd poltutLon and waste. It would adopt Lts systeMs to the gLven bLoregLonal resources - energy based on wLnd, for exaMple, where Nature catted for that, or wood where that was approprLate, and food based on what the regLon Ltself - partLcularly Ln Lts natLve, pre-agrLcutturat state could grow. And thus Lt would be based, above all, on the Most eleMentat and Most elegant prLncLpte of the natural world, that of setf-suffLcLency. Just as Nature does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate networks of contLnentat for the dependency, so the bLoregLon would fLnd all Lts needed resources Lts own wLthLn luxury Manufacture, craft, energy, food, shelter, clothLng, thus beLng envLronMent. And far froM Lt beLng deprLved, far froM Lt LMpoverLshed, Lt would gaLn Ln every Measure of econoMLc health. It would be More stable, free froM booM-and-bust cycles and dLstant potLtLcat crLses; Lt would be able to plan, to allocate at the safest pace, Ln the Most ecotogLcal Manner_ It would not be at the Mercy of dLstant and uncontrollable natLonal bureaucracLes and transnatLonal governMents, and thus More self regardLng, More cohesLve, developLng a sense of place, of COMMunLty of coMradeshLp, and the prLde that coMes froM stabLlLty, control, coMpetence, and Lndependence. In one of hLs More prescLent perceptLons FrLtz SchuMacher reatLsed that the Market econoMy of twentLeth century capLtatLsM erred fundaMentatty, because Lt erred repeatedly, agaLnst Nature. "It Ls Lnherent Ln the Methodology of econoMLcs to Lgnore Man's dependence on the natural world," he wrote. "The Market represents only the surface of socLety and Lts sLgnLfLcance relates to the MOMentary sLtuatLon as Lt exLsts there and then. There Ls no probLng Lnto the depths of thLngs, Lnlo the natural or socLat facts that lLe behLnd theM. • And thLs Ls why, as he poLnts out, conventLonal econoMLcs Makes no dLstLnctLons at all between prLMary goods, "whLch Man has to wLn froM nature," and secondary goods Manufactured froM theM, or between renewable or nonrenewable resources, or the envLronMental and socLal costs of developLng one agaLnst the other. A bLothese regLonal econoMy, Ln sharpest contrast, Makes - Ln fact Ls grounded Ln vLtal dLstLnctLons. PolLtLcal prLncLples on a bLoregLonal scale are also grounded Ln the dLctates presented by Nature, Ln whLch what Ls forever valued are not the LMperatLves of gLgantLsM, centralLzatLon, hLerarchy, and MonolLthLcLty, but rather, Ln starkest contraposLtLon, those of scale, decentralLsatLon, dLvLsLon, and dLversLty. The lessons are obvLous, and suggest LMMedLately the desLgn for a bLoregLon as for a contLnent of bLoregLons. Each unLt, of the sL2e that the natural settLngs proMote, May be unLfLed and cohesLve - startLng froM the base up wLth a neLghbourhood, a coMMUnLty, a sMatl town, att tLvLng sLde-by-sLde wLth others Ln settled and Mutual pattern, together wLth coMprLsLng a vLtare9Lon; and that a vLtaregLon May have Lts own unLfLcatLon and cohesLveness, Lts own Method of governance, and yet lLve sLde-by-sLde wLth other regLons, organLsed as they May -28- �see fLt; and so on, outward, Ln selfsuffLcLent collaboratLon, unLt upon unLt, for so long as the natural boundarLes May perMLt and the natural affLnLtLes be kept Lntact. SLMLlar lessons May be derLved froM the patterns of huHan nature. Thus throughout all huMan hLstory people have tended to lLve Ln separate and Lndependent groups, a "fragMentatLon of huMan socLety· that Harold Isaccs has descrLbed as soMethLng akLn to •a pervasLve force Ln huMan affaLrs and always has been.• Even when natLons and eMpLres have arLsen, he notes, they have no stayLng power agaLnst the Lnnate huMan drLve to fragMentatLon. In a bLoregLonal socLety, the dLvLsLon between urban and rural, LndustrLal and agrLcuttural, populatLon and resources, would be replaced by an equLLLbrLuM, a syMbLosLs. On the one hand, the cLty would be necessary as a producer of certaLn kLnds of goods, as a centre of artLstLc culture, as a source of the asseMbled cLvLc vLrtues, though the cLty need not be of LMMense sLze - Lndeed, no larger than 50,000 or 100,000 people - and Ln fact Ldeally would replLcate rather than grow so that Lnstead of a sLngle MetropolLs there would be a MultLplLcLty of cLtLes of Modest sLzes scattered throughout the bLoregLon. On the other hand, the country would be necessary as the prLMe source of food and water and the HaterLals of shelter and clothLng and artLsanshLp and trade, and especLatty as the eMbodLHent of the bLoregLonal spLrLt of Gaea, whose presence should be felt daLly by the LnhabLtants of every settleMent, of whatever sLze. BLoregLonalLsM Ls no More than the Modern versLon of a very old perceptLon of the world held not Merely by the Greeks but by vLrtually every prelLterate socLety of whLch we have knowledge. (Sate, 167-72) 8: TECHNOLOGY The qualLty of huMan exLstence and huMan welfare should not be Measured of products. Technology Ls returned to Lts ancLent place as an quantLty by only approprLate tool for huMan welfare, not an end Ln Ltself. There should be a rapLd MoveMent toward "soft• energy paths and "approprLate technology~ and toward lLfestytes whLch wLll result Ln drastLc decrease Ln per capLta energy consuMptLon Ln advanced LnductrLal socLetLes whLcl LncreasLng approprLate energy Ln decentralLzed vLllages Ln so-called "thLrd world" natLons. Deep ecologLst5 are coMMLtted to rapLd MOVeMent to a •steady-state• or •conservor socLety· both froH ethLcal prLncLples of har~onLous LntegratLon of huMans wLth nature and froM apprecLatLon of ecologLcal realLtLes. IntegratLon of sophLstLcated, elegant, unobtrusLve, ecologLcalty sound, approprLate technology wLth greatly scaled down, dLversLfLed, organLc, labor-LntensLve agrLculture, huntLng, and gatherLng Ls another goal. (Deep Ecology pp.311-12) QuestLonLng technology Ls a process of dLrect actLon that anyone can develop. It Ls one of the Host serLous act Lons that can ·be taken Ln a technocratLc socLety where the assuMptLon that •technology wLll solve all probleMs• Ls so deeply held. as a systeM or as a specLfLc devLce such as a To questLon technology coMputer - can often arouse hostLlLty, defena certaLn type of vehLcle or sLveness, LrrLtatLon, and resentMent Ln lLsteners. Anyone who questLons technology can be branded a "LuddLte" or antLModernLst. A person who says ·no to any technologLcal devLce Ls often charged as beLng antLprogressLve. Yet Ls crucLat to questLon technology, Ln spLte of these crLtLcLsMs. ~e need technology whLch Ls coMpatLble wLth the growth of autonoMous, selfdeterMLnLng LndLvLduats Ln nonhLerarchLcal coMHunLtLes. ~e need prLncLples that wLll help us escape the trap of technocratLc socLety, where technology Ls the -29- �central LnstLtutLon. Technology can be crLtLcLzed and evaluated based on general prLncLples, scale or structure. The followLng questLons can be asked of any technologLcal devLce or systeM: I. Does thLs technologLcal devLce serve vLtal needs? 2. ls thLs devLce or systeM of the sort that can be LMMedLately understood by nonexperts? 3. Does Lt have a hLgh degree of flexLbLlLty and MutabLlLty or does Lt LMpose a perManent, rLgLd, LrreversLble LMprLnt on the lLves of cLtLzens? local ~- Does thLs technologLcal devLce or systeM foster greater autonoMy of coMMunLtLes or greater dependency on soMe centralLzed "authorLty"? 5. ls thLs devLce or systeM ecologLcally destructLve or conducLve to a deep ecology way of lLfe? 6. Does thLs devLce or systeM enhance the LndLvLdualLty of persons or does Lt lead to bureaucratLc hLerarchLes? 7. Does thLs devLce or systeM encourage people to behave and thLnk lLke MachLnes? A fully LnforMed, approprLate technology Ls a MeetLng ground of ethLcs , polLtLcs, MechanLcal understandLng and deep ecologLcal conscLousness. As Langdon WLnner concludes Ln AutonoMous Technology, "If one lacks a clear and knowledgeable sense of what Means are approprLate lo the cLrcuMstances at hand, one's These Means do not choLce of Means can easLly lead to excesses and danger. Lnvolve just narrow utLlLty or effLcLency of productLon or profLt Ln soMe short-terM calculatLon. Indeed, the narrow eMphasLs upon effLcLency of Means drLves us away froM the larger Lssues of envLronMental ethLcs asnd LndLvLdual responsLbLlLty for the consequences of our actLons. (Deep Ecology, pp.35-6) Shallow approach: AcceptLng LndustrLalLzatLon of the kLnd ManLfested Ln the West as the natural goal for developLng countrLes. Low estLNatLon of deep cultural dLfferences wLth sLgnLfLcant devLatLons froM Western standards. Deep approach: SocLal and cultural dLversLty of dLfferent specLes Ls an essentLal IntensLfLed Measures to part of general rLchness and varLatLon of lLfe forMs. exLstLng non-LndustrLal stLll lLMLt the LMpact of Western technology upon cultures . Defence of the fourth world agaLnst cultural foreLgn doMLnatLon. PolLtLcal and econoMLc polLcLes Ln favour of subcultures and MLnorLtLes Ln LndustrLalLzed socLetLes. Support of local and soft technologLes as a Means to MaLntaLn baste cultural assessMent of technLcal LnnovatLon. Due regard to anLMal socLetLes and cultures. SurvLval of populatLons does not ensure survLval of socLal LnstLtutLons . QuestLonLng whether so-called advanced, Modern technologLes are approprLate relatLve to levels of pollutLon, resources, populatLon and as subordLnate part of general culture. (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, pp.12-13) Technology Ls More helpless than ever because the technology beLng produced doesn ' t fulfLll baste huNan needs, such as MeanLngful work Ln a MeanLngful envLronMent . TechnLcal progress Ls shaM progress because the terM technLcal progress Ls a cultural, not a technLcal, terM . Our culture Ls the only one Ln the hLstory of MankLnd Ln whLch the culture has adjusted Ltself to the technology, rather than vLce versa. (SLMple ' Ln Means, p.11) Once the scLentLfLc probleMs have been solved, once Lt Ls understood how a partLcular forM of pollutLon arLses and Ln what Lts danger consLsts, the next probleM Ls technologLcal : to dLscover a Method of reducLng thLs LncLdence. That Lnvolves decLdLng, Ln the fLrst place, whLch of the causatLve factors Lt wLll be easLest to control . KnowLng, for exaMple, that the Los Angeles sMog Ls a joLnt product of the sLtLng of Los Angeles, Lts hours of sunlLght and the exhaust -30- �fuMes froM the LnternaL coMbustLon engLne, Lt Ls at once apparent that onLy the thLrd of these Lf controLLabLe at a toLerabLe cost. So what has to be Lnvented Ls a devLce whLch wLLL reduce the output of hydrocarbons Ln exhaust fuMes. ThLs constLtutes a technoLogLcaL probLeM, the soLutLon to whLch LLes Ln the LnventLon of a devLce whLch wouLd satLsfy partLcuLar technLcaL specLfLcatLons . (The word devLce' Ls h~re beLng used Ln a very broad sense; an LnsectLcLde Ls a devLce and so Ls the sterLLLsLng of Lnsects as a Means of bLoLogLcaL control.) 0 The Ldea of a 'technoLogLcaL soLutLon' Ls, however, a good deaL Less straLghtforward than Lt at fLrst appears to be, as the phrase I used above 'at a toLerabLe cost' aLready hLnts. It Ls very easy to thLnk up technLcaL soLutLons of ecoLogLcaL probLeMs Lf we consLder theM Ln LsoLatLon~ and Lf we defLne a technLcaL soLutLon, wLthout any reference to costs, as one whLch descrLbes a way of freeLng ourselves froM the ecoLogLcaL condLtLon whLch concerns us. Such a soLutLon Ls soMetLMes saLd to be 'practLcaL' but not 'operatLonal'. So Los AngeLes sMog could be reduced Ln LntensLty by roofLng over the entLre cLty, or by MakLng everybody use pubLLc transport, or by substLtutLng fuel-ceLls, Ln theLr present state of developMent, for Lnternal coHbustLon engLnes. But few wouLd serLousLy advance these proposals as 'solutLons', as satLsfactory ways of deaLLng wLth the sMog probleM. ~hy not? SLMply because the costs, or so Lt Ls w~deLy beLLeved, wouLd be too great, costs of varLous sorts, socLal, ecologLcal, econoMLc and poLLtLcaL. In so far as ecologLcaL probleMs can be solved only wLth the help of scLentLfLc dLscovery and technoLogLcaL LnventLon, they can be soLved only wLthLn the ~estern ratLonal tradLtLons. That Much Ls obvLous. MystLcaL conteMplatLon wLlL not reveal to the cheMLst the orLgLns of the Los Angeles sMog or enabLe the engLneer to desLgn an effectLve devLce for reducLng Lts LntensLty. But Lt Ls a enthusLasM proper crLtLcLsM of ~estern socLety that, Ln Lts - often chLldLsh for technoLogLcaL 'advance', Lt has faLled adequateLy to consLder the costs of LntroducLng new devLces and has defLned 'costs' far too narrowly. ThLs objectLon can be dLrected, even, agaLnst antL-pollutLon devLces. The Manufacture of such devLces wLLL norMaLLy create · More polLutLon. It May, by ModLfyLng the character of the poLlutant, Lntroduce new dangers - reducLng the percentage of carbon MonoxLde Ln exhaust fuMes whLle LncreasLng the percentage of the no Less dangerous nLtrogen dLoxLde. Or Lt May shLft the LncLdence of the poLLutLon froM a weaLthLer to a poorer coMMunLty - ManufacturLng sMokeless fueLs Ln an LndustrLaL town to Make the London aLr cLeaner - wLthout reducLng Lts total voLuMe. Any technoLogLcal LnnovatLon, furtherMore, LnvoLves an eleMent of ecoLoe LcaL rLsk; Lt Ls LMpossLbLe to calculate all Lts consequences Ln every possLbLe cLrcuMstance. The best the technologLst can do Ls to exclude effects whLch are already known to be dangerous and to LnvestLgate further effects whLch are suspect . That Ls why, as I saLd earLLer, caLlLng upon the technologLst to save us Ls so often equated wLth caLLLng Ln the devLL as an exorcLst. But Lt wouLd be quLte wrong to conclude that for the reasons just advanced the technologLcaL Method of overcoMLng ecoLogLcaL probleMs would be abandoned, that what ~estern socLetLes should do Ls to shut down factorLes, Let us say, rather than LnsLst on theLr reducLng, by technoLogLcal Means, theLr eMLssLon of pollutants. For econoMLc and socLaL rLsks ~ and, Ln the end, greater ecoLogLcal rLsks Lf the socLaL resentMent engendered by the closure Ls dLrected agaLnst the whoLe systeM of ecoLogLcaL controls. It, too, May do no More than shLft the LncLdence of poLLutLon froM rLcher to poorer regLons, as the factory-owner takes hLs capLtal elsewhere. To gLve up takLng any rLsks would be to gLve up actLng . Every actLon costs soMethLng, rLsks soMethLng. Uhat can properLy be deManded Ls not that Men should cease to act Ln ways whLch LnvoLve ecologLcal rLsks - there are no such ways, as Matters now stand, whatever the sLtuatLon Ln the Garden of -31- �Eden - but rather that they shouLd take More account of the ecoLogLcaL costs and benefLts of theLr actLon. And thLs Means, once agaLn, that they wLLL hav~ to Make fuLLer use of ratLonaL Western-type Methods, cost benefLt anaLyses or decLsLon-procedures. (PassMore, pp.~8-50) EcoLogLcaL resLsters do not accept that there are onLy narrow technLcaL soLutLons to narrowLy defLned socLal probLeMs (such as aLr poLLutLon). These probLeMs are seen onLy as syMptoMs of the Larger Lssues. There are three MaLn dangers to technocratLc soLutLons. FLrst Ls the danger Ln beLLevLng there Ls a coMpLete or acceptabLe soLutLon usLng Modern doMLnant LdeoLogLes and technoLogy. The second danger Ls the presentatLon of an LMpressLon that soMethLng Ls beLng done when Ln fact the reaL probLeM contLnues. reaL work". FLnaLLy, there Ls the danger of TLnkerLng dLstracts froM the assuMLng there wLLL be new experts - such as professLonaL ecoLogLsts - who wLLL provLde the soLutLon but who May Ln fact be constraLned to be pubLLc reLatLons spokespersons for the agenda of profLt or power of soMe corporatLon or agency. EcoLogLcaL resLstance Ls actLon froM centraL prLncLpLes of doLng what Ls necessary, of wLtnessLng nonvLoLentLy. It arLses froM a shLft Ln conscLouness. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng Ls deeper, soMe wouLd say More radLcaL,. than just reforMLsM. SoMe of the reforMLst actLons to MLtLgate soMe of the worse forMs of aLr and water poLLutLon (due to auto exhaust, for exaMpLe) are MotLvated by concern onLy for huMan heaLth and safety and not by the LntrLnsLc vaLues of the bLosphere. But th LLMLts of reforMLSM are by now weLL known. (Deep EcoLog~, pp.195-6) In tryLng to exaMLne technoLogy and productLon, we encounter a curLous paradox. ~e are deepLy rLven by a great sense of proMLse about technLcaL LnnovatLon, on the one hand, and by a thorough sense of dLsenchantMent wLth Lts resuLts, on the other. ThLs duaL attLtude not onLy refLects a confLLct Ln the popuLar LdeologLes concernLng technoLogy but aLso expresses strong doubts about the nature of the Modern technologLcaL LMagLnatLon LtseLf. We are puzzLed that the very LnstruMents our MLnds have conceLved and our hands have created can be so easLly turned agaLnst us, wLth dLsastrous resuLts for our weLL-beLng Lndeed, for our very survLval as a specLes. Techne, Moreover, covered a wLder scope of experLence than the Modern word technLcs. The goaL of techne Ls not restrLcted to MereLy "LLvLng weLL. or lLvLng wLthLn the lLMLt. Techne LncLudes LLvLng an ethLcaL LLfe accordLng to an orLgLnatLve and orderLng prLncLple conceLved as "potency". VLewed even Ln an LnstruMental sense, techne thus encoMpasses not MereLy raw MaterLaLs, tooLs, MachLnes, and products but aLso the producer - Ln short, a hLghly sophLstLcated subject froM whLch aLL eLse orLgLnates. To ArLstotle, the "Master-craftsMan" Ls dLstLnguLshed subjectLveLy froM hLs apprentLces or assLstants by vLrtue of honor, a sense of "why" products are created, and generaLLy a wLsdoM of thLngs ArLstotLe subject, and phenoMena. By startLng wLth the ratLonaLLty of productLon the to estabLLshes a poLnt of departure for brLngLng ratLonaLLzatLon of the object. Modern LndustrLaL productLon functLons Ln precLseLy the opposLte way. Not only Ls the Modern LMage of techne LLMLted to Mere technLcs Ln the LnstruMentaL sense of the terM, but aLso Lts goaLs are LnextrLcabLy tLed to unLLMLted Ls conceLved as LLMLtLess consuMptLon wLthLn the productLon. "LLvLng weLL fraMework of a totaLLy unethLcaL, prLvatLzed LeveL of seLf-Lnterest. TechnLcs, not the producer and hLs or her ethLcaL standards LncLudes Moreover, (proLetarLans, after aLL, servLce the Modern LndustrLal apparatus Ln totaL anonyMLty) but the product and Lts constLtuLnts. The technLcaL focus shLfts froM -32- �the subject to the object, froM the producer to the product, froM the creator to the created. Honor, a sense of •why," and any generaL wLsdoM of thLngs and phenoMena have no pLace Ln the worLd requLred by Modern Lndustry. ~hat reaLLy counts Ln technLcs Ls effLcLency, quantLty, and an LntensLfLcatLon of the Labor process. The specLous ratLonaLLty LnvoLved Ln producLng the object Ls foLsted on the ratLonaLLzatLon of the subject to a poLnt where producer's subjectLvLty Ls totally atrophLed and reduced to an object aMong objects. (BookchLn, pp.219-22) 9: ON ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS Deep ecoLogy Ls eMergLng as a way of developLng a new balance and harMony between LndLvLduaLs, coMMunLtLes and aLl of Nature. It can potentLaLLy satsLfy our deepest yearnLngs: faLth and trust Ln our Most basLc LntuLtLons; courage to take dLrect actLon; joyous confLdence to dance wLth the sensuous harMonLes dLscovered through spontaneous, playfuL Lntercourse wLth the rhythMs of our bodLes, the rhythMs of fLowLng water, changes Ln the weather and seasons, and the overaLL processes of LLfe on Earth. The deep ecology MoveMent Lnvolves workLng on ourselves, what poetphLLosopher Gary Snyder caLls "the reaL work,• the work of reaLLy LookLng at ourselves, of becoMLng More real. ThLs Ls the work we call cultLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. ThLs process LnvoLves becoMLng More aware of the actuaLLty of rocks, wolves, trees, and rLvers - the cultLvatLon of the LnsLght that everythLng Ls connected. CultLvatLng ecologLcal conscLousness Ls a process of learnLng apprecLate sLLence and solLtude and redLscoverLng how to lLsten. It Ls learnLng how to be More receptLve, trustLng, holLstLc Ln perceptLon, and Ls grounded Ln a vLsLon of nonexploLtLve scLence and technology. ThLs process Lnvolves beLng honest wLth ourselves and seekLng clarLty Ln our LntuLtLons, then actLng froM cLear prLncLpLes, practLcLng seLf-dLscLpLLne and workLng honestLy wLthLn our coMMunLty. It Ls sLMpLe but not easy work. Henry DavLd Thoreau, nLneteenth-century naturalLst and wrLter, adMonLshes us, ·Let your lLfe be a frLctLon agaLnst the MachLne. • CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcal conscLousness Ls correlated wLth the cultLvatLon of conscLence. CuLtural hLstorLan Theordore Roszak suggests Ln Person/PLanet conscLousness, how LnstructLve the overLappLng and "conscLence (1978), sLMLLarLty of those two words Ls. FroM the new conscLousness we are gaLnLng of ourseLves as persons perhaps we wLLL yet create a new conscLence, one whose ethLcaL sensLtLvLty Ls at Least tuned to a sLgnLfLcant good, a sLgnLfLcant evLL. We beLLeve that huMans have a vLtaL need to cuLtLvate ecologLcaL conscLousness and that thLs need Ls related to the needs of the planet. At the saMe tLMe, huMans need dLrect contact wLth untraMMeLed wLLderness, places undoMestLcated for narrow huMan purposes. Many people sense the needs of the pLanet and the need for wLLderness preservatLon. But we need not be technLcal experts Ln order to cultLvate ecotogLcal conscLousness, as Thoreau saLd, cuLtLvatLng ecotogLcaL conscLousness requLres that "we front up to the facts and deterMLne to lLve our lLves delLberately, or not at all." We belLeve that people can clarLfy theLr own LntuLtLons, and act froM deep prLncLpLes. Deep ecology Ls a process of even-deeper questLonLng of ourselves, the assuMptLons of the doMLnant worLdvLew Ln our culture, and the MeanLng and truth Ln our realLty. We cannot change conscLousness by only lLstenLng to others, we Must Lnvolve ourselves. We Mu~t take dLrect actLon. -33- �One hopeful poLLtLcaL MoveMent wLth deep ecology as a base Ls the Uest GerMan Green poLLtLcaL party. They have as theLr slogan, "ue are neLther Left nor rLght, we are Ln front.· Green poLLtLcs Ln Uest GerMany, and to soMe extent Ln Great BrLtaLn, BeLgLuM and AustraLLa Ln the 1980s, goes beyond the conventLonaL, tLberaL defLnLtLon of a party, coMbLnLng personal work (that Ls, work on cLarLfyLng one's own character) and polLtLcal actLvLsM. The Greens present a proMLsLng poLLtLcaL strategy because they encourage the cultLvatLon of personal ecoLogLcaL conscLousness as well as address Lssues of pubLLc polLcy. If the Greens propogate the bLocentrLc perspectLve - the Lnherent worth of other specLes besLdes huMans - then they can help change the current vLew whLch says we should use Nature only to serve narrow huMan Lnterests. CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Ln conteMporary socLetLes, however, Ls a two-edged sword. Ue Must not be MLsLed by our zeaL for change so that we are concerned only wLth the narrow self or ego. If we seek only personal redeMptLon we could becoMe soLLtary ecologLcal saLnts aMong the Masses of those we MLght cLassLfy as "sLnners" who contLnue to pollute. Change Ln persons requLres a change Ln culture and vLce versa. We cannot Lgnore the personal arena nor the socLaL, for our project Ls to enhance harMony wLth each other, the planet and ourselves. (Deep Ecology, pp.7-1~) ~e began by suggestLng a varLety of specLfLc actLons whLch people can take dLrected at reforMLng publLc polLcy, developLng bLoregLonal coMMunLtLes, and cuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. Ue return to the theMe of dLrect actLon. ~e have deMonstrated that deep ecology Ls not just a gaMe of ~bstract theorLzLng. As a perspectLve Lt Ls lLved, danced, celebrated. It has resonance. Ln part, cuLtLvatLng what CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Means, Ls engaged Ln the LnteLLect RhapsodLc Theodore Roszak caLLs rhapsodLc LntelLect. process of LntegratLng LntelLect, body, and joyous eMotLon. Based on the LnsLghts, uLtLMate norMs, prLncLples and theorLes of deep ecology, the central practLcaL questLon Ls how do we becoMe More Mature persons, gLven the constraLnts of th~s culture? Ue suggest there Ls an LnterpLay between outward dLrect actLon and Lnward dLrect actLon, between actLng on one's self and actLng Ln the world, wLth the result of further and deeper MaturLty Ln the deep ecologLcaL sense of LdentLfLcatLon wLth alL LLfe. There Ls no sharp break between Lnward and outward. People take dLrectLon actLon froM dLrect ecoLogLcal prLncLpLes and they becoMe More Mature through dLrect actLon. The Label we use for the type of dLrect actLon Ln Lts outward forM Ls ecoLogLcaL resLstLng. (Deep Ecology, p.19~) 'Deep ecology', an envLronMental scLence broadsheet tells us, Ls Naess's expressLon for an ecologLcaL awareness or conscLousness' . SpeLLLng deep ecology out then becoMes a Matter of settLng down the types of conscLousness and awareness and recognLtLon LnvoLved, SOMethLns that Ls done Ln a thoroughly anthropocentrL c way, begLnnLng as foLLows: 'a conscLousness of the LMplLcatLons of ecology for huMan beLng'. It Ls all Ln fact done Ln terMs of huMan responses, fundaMentaLLy Ls approach the AccordLn9Ly capacLtLes and psychology. MLsconceLved. For deep ecology Ls not so anthropocentrL c, and Ls no More a Matter of envLronMentaL psychology than Ls the value theory or MetaphysLcs whLch are part of Lt. The psychoL09LcaL conversLon Ls LLke cLaLMLng that 'MarxLsM' Ls an expressLon for socLaLLst conscLousness, or 'MusLc' for MusLco-LogLcal awareness. -34- �The conversLon of deep ecology Lnto awareness psychology, Lnto a certaLn sort of exercLse Ln self-realLsatLon or 'lLberatLng ecologLcal conscLousness, or conscLousness raLsLng', Ls open to sLMLlar objectLons. Ecology, deep or shallow or systeMatLc, Ls not ego-trLppLng or a personal thLng. Granted those who do have and share certaLn attLtudes and feelLngs to natural envLronMents are "uch More lLkely to becoMe actLve supporters or followers of deep ecology or to adopt a deeper ecologLcal stance. Even so such states as self-realLsatLon or ecologLcal conscLousness are neLther necessary nor suffLcLent for thLs. Such subjectLve states are not necessary because soMeone can beco"e a supporter of deep ecology wLthout havLng attaLned, or Made any effort to attaLn, these states. Thus consLder soMeone, a dedLcated naturalLst for Lnstance, who has no deep Lnterest Ln or understandLng of huMan psychology or socLology so far as these bear on the envLronMent. Such a person Ls a deep ecologLst, but lacks ecologLcal conscLousness as Lt Ls explaLned. The case of Peter SLnger Ln the anLMal lLberatLon "oveMent Ls LnstructLve; for SLnger goes out of hLs way to explaLn hLs dLsLnterest, hLs coMparatLve lack of zoologLcal conscLousness, that he does not LdentLfy wLth anLMals and so on, yet hLs LMpact for anLMal lLberatLon has been Most sLgnLfLcant. Analogously, a Deeper SLnger need not be Ln love wLth the Earth but feel rather Lsolated froM Lt and feel rLghtly that Most of Lts LnhabLtants dLslLke hLM or are frLghtened by hLM. He May have lLttle Ldea what Lt Ls lLke to be one of theM or a MountaLn, ... ; but he "ay have the rLght values, adhere to the rLght phLlosophy and undertake the rLght sorts of actLon and lLfestyle. GenuLnely and specLfLcally deep ecologLcal conscLousness has not been well descrLbed and Ls not partLcularly well defLned. And soMe of the requLreMents LMposed upon Lt, whatever Lt aMounts to, render Lt LMpossLble. Thus Fox, echoLng others, claLMs that 'to the extent that we perceLve boundarLes, we fall short of a deep ecologLcal conscLousness'. Then we all fall short, sLnce we are regularly confronted by, and perceLve, terrLtorLal boundarLes and a wLde range of other deMarcatLon lLnes and contrasts. Indeed fallLng short Ls LnevLtable; for hence and perceptLon necessarLly Lnvolves selectLon and dLscrLMLnatLon, separatLon and boundarLes. Deep conscLousness Ls also rendered LMpossLble by soMe of the LdentLfLcatLon requLreMents, drawn froM nature MystLcLsM, whLch are LMposed upon Lt. It Ls one thLng to be Ln tune wLth the unLverse (a Metaphor that can be spelled out), quLte another, and LMpossLble, feat to be LdentLcal wLth Lt, sLnce then a proper part would be LdentLcal wLth a whole contaLnLng Lt. SoMe explLcatLon of LdentLfLcatLon (trans-specLes and other) Ls LMportant for the elaboratLon of deep ecology, but the relatLon Lnvolved (though Lt concerns shared features, such as perhaps experLences) Ls not one of LdentLty or MakLng LdentLcal, as sLMplLstLc etyMology May suggest. Other requLreMents coMMonly placed on deep conscLousness, whLle they do not exclude Lt, render Lt unduly anthropocentrLc. (CrLtLque, pp.30-2) Deep ecologLsts agree wLth BLrch and Cobb's LnsLght that "huMan beLngs are More deeply Moved by the way they experLence theLr ~orld than by the claLMs ethLcs Makes on theM." Thus, where conteMporary envLronMental phLlosophy Ls doMLna~ed by the questLon "How do we construct an adequate envLron"ental ethLc? , deep ecology asks the questLon "How do we cultLvate a deep ecologLcal conscLousness?" The forMer questLon looks to conceptual answers, the latter to experLentLal answers. In seekLng to change the way Ln whLch we experLence the world, deep ecologLsts place theLr prLMary eMphasLs upon changLng our ·underlyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are" (L.e. changLng our ontology) rather than upon what we MLght terM the "conceptual fLx• approach of "bL99er and better" ethLcs. ThLs atteMpt to shLft the prLMary focus of envLronMental phLlosophLcal concern froM ethLcs to ontology clearly constLtutes a fundaMental or revolutLon- -35- �ary chaLLenge to norMaL envLronMentaL phLLosophy. It Ls (and should be) deep ecology's guLdLng star. (GuLdLng Stars, p.204) 10: ON HOLISM AccordLng to deep ecology: A new cosMLc/ecoLogLcaL MetaphysLcs whLch stresses the LdentLty (I/thou) of huMans wLth non-huMan nature Ls a necessary condLLons for a vLabLe approach to buLLdLng an eco-phLLosophy. In deep ecology, the wholeness and LntegrLty of a person/planet together wLth the prLncLpLe of what Arne Naess caLLs "bLoLogLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM" are the Most LMportant Ldeas. Man Ls an LntegraL part of nature, not over or apart froM nature. Man Ls a "pLaLn cLtLzen· of the bLosphere, not Lts conqueror or Manager .. There should be a "deMocracy of aLL God's creatures" accordLng to St. FrancLs; or as SpLnoza saLd, Man Ls a "teMporary and dependent Mode of the whole of God/Nature.· Man flows wLth the systeM of nature rather than atteMptLng to control aLL of the rest of nature. The hand of Man LLes LLghtLy on the Land. Man does not perfect nature, nor Ls Man's prLMary duty to Make nature More effLcLent. A new psychology Ls needed to Lntegrate the MetaphysLcs Ln the MLnd fLeLd of post-LndurtrLaL socLety. A Major paradLgM shLft results froM psychoLogLcaL changes of perceptLon. The new paradLgM requLres rejectLon of subject/object, Man/nature duaLLsMs and wLLL requLre a pervasLve awareness of total LnterMLngLLng of the planet earth. Psychotherapy seen as adjustMent to eco-orLented socLety Ls replaced by a new LdeaL of psychotherapy as spLrLtuaL deveLopMent. The new MetaphysLcs and psychology Leads LogLcaLLy to a posture of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM and LLberatLon Ln the sense of autonoMy, physoLogLcaL/eMotLona L freedoM of the LndLvLduaL, spLrLtuaL deveLopMent of HoMo sapLens, and the rLght of other specLes to pursue theLr own evoLutLonary destLnLes. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.310-11) RejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favour of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs as knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. As LntrLnsLc reLatLon between two thLngs ~ and B Ls such that the reLatLon belongs to the defLnLtLons or basLc constLtutLons of A and ~• so that wLthout a reLatLon, ~and~ are no Longer the saMe thLngs. The totaLfLeLd Model dLssoLves not only the Man-Ln-envLronMent concept, but every coMpact thLng-Ln-MLLLeu concept - except when taLkLng at a superfLcLaL or preLLMLnary Level of coMMunLcatLon. (Shallow and Deep, p.95) Shallow envLronMentaLLsM atteMpts to curb soMe of the Most gLarLng envLronMentaL abuse such as poLLutLon and resource depLetLon whLLe caLLLng for no basLc change Ln the anthropocentrLc urban-LndustrLaL socLaL paradLgM. Naess descrLbes Lts central objectLve as "the health and affluence of people Ln the developed countrLes." The Deep Ecology MoveMent, on the other hand, gathers LnspLratLon froM the fLeLd ecoLogLst and Ls a rejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favor of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs are knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. w (SessLons, p . 398) 0 Because they cannot conceLve Man apart' they experLence no dLffLcuLty Ln attrLbutLng LntrLnsLc value to nature. In so far as they conceLve theMseLves as havLng such value, the LnabLLLty to separate theLr selves froM nature, LnescapabLy Leads to thLnkLng of "Man" and ·envLronMent' as a whole. (Gestalt thLnkLng.) In thLs century the reactLon agaLnst conceLvLng the LndLvLduaL self as soMethLng separable froM the socLaL settLng has been Largely successful, but not the paraLLeL reactLon agaLnst the separabLLLty froM the natural settLng. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, p.35) By subtractLng your own self-centred and seLf-servLng -36- thoughts froM the �world you coMe to reaLLze that "the other Ls none other than yourself: that the fundaMentaL deLusLon of huManlty ls to suppose I aM here and you are out there_· ThLs understandLng perMeates the MystLcaL tradLtLons and Ls exeMpLLfLed Ln the TaoLst advLce to "LdentLfy yourself wLth non-dLstLnctLon_ • It ls now becoMlng coMMonpLace to polnt to the fundaMentaLLy slMlLar cosMoLogLes eMobdLed Ln the MystLcaL tradLtLons on the one hand and the 'new physlcs' on the other_ What Ls structurally sLMllar about these cosMoLogLes Ls that they reveal a 'seaMLess web' vLew of the unLverse_ Both the MystLcaL tradLtLons and the new physLcs' serve to generate Lnter aLLa, what we MLght now caLL 'ecoLoglcaL awareness', .that Ls, awareness of the fundaMentaL LnterreLatedne~s of aLL thLngs or, More accurately, aLL events_ The theoretlcaL physLclst Frltjof Capra has been quLte expLlcLt about thls: "1 thLnk what physLcs can do Ls help to generate ecoLogLcaL awareness_ You see, Ln MY vLew now Ln the Western versLon of MystLcaL awareness, our versLon of BuddhLsM or TaoLsM, wLLl be ecologLcal awareness_" Where the physLcLst, the Mystlc, and the deep ecologLst (as phLlosopher) dLffer Ls Ln theLr Means of arrLvLng at 'ecologLcal awareness ' ___ _ The deep ecologLst's conceptLon of unLty Ln process' need not LMpLy that, at any gLven MOMent, all 'knots' (L_e_ organLsMs) Ln the 'bLospherLcal net' are constLtuted of equally coMpLex reLatLons_ To the extent that value Lnheres Ln coMplexLty of relatLons, and to the extent that coMplexLty of reLatLons Ls evLdenced Ln the degree of an organLsM's central organLzatLon (and therefore capacLty for rLchness of experLence), then organLsMs are entLtLed to Moral consLderatLon coMMensurate wLth theLr degree of central organLzatLon (or capaclty for rlchness of experlence) for the duratlon of thelr exlstence - as transLent as that May be Ln terMs of evolutLonary tLMe_ In pursulng theLr central LntuLtLon of 'unLty' (L_e_ of no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcal fLeLd), deep ecoLogLsts have possLbly Lost sLght of the sLgnLfaspect of theLr 'unLty Ln process' MetaphysLcs_ Lcance of the 'Ln process AttentLon to thLs Latter aspect suggests that any process contLnuousLy produces LMperManent, uneven dLstrLbutLons (L_e_, dLfferent values) of varLous attrLbutes (and Ln the process of the world these attrLbutes May be Money, LnforMatLon, coMplexLty of relatLons, and so on)_ If thLs were not so then we would have no process but a perfectly unLforM, hoMogenous and, therefore, LLfeless fLeld_ The only unLverse where value Ls spread evenly across the fLeLd Ls a dead unLverse _ RecognLsLng thLs, we should be clear that the central LntuLtLon of deep ecology does not entaLl the vLew that LntrLnsLc value Ls spread evenly across the MeMbershLp of the bLotLc coMMunLty_ Moreover, Ln sLtuatLons of genuLne value conflLct, justLce Ls better served by not subscrLbLng to the vLew of ecoLogLcal -egaLLtarLanLsM_ (Fox, pp-196-200) An arctLc Landscape May superfLcLaLly Look rather dead Ln wLnter. In sprLng Lt May Look overwheLMLngLy aLLve_ It would take a Long traLnLng to force perceptLon to dLstLnguLsh organLsM froM non-organLsMs Ln such a LLve Landscape_ Even Ln wLnter the Lover of the Landscape sees abundance of LndLvLduaL LLfe forMs and also hLgher order gestaLts_ Why Ls the gestalt ontology not MentLoned Ln the platforN forMulatLon_ A Landscape wLth organLsMs - and aLL Landscapes have organLsMs Ln MLcro-organLsMs are counted - Ls a hLgh order, natural gestalt_ The separatLon of organLsMs and non-organLsMs Ls very unnatural Ln gestalt thLnkLng and apperceptLon. But the concepts of 9estaLt-thlnkln9 are too specLaL for pLatforM forMuLatLons- Only a MLnorLty of supporters of deed ecology are acadeMLcs_ (Notes on Sylvan, p-7) -37- �BIBLIOGRAPHY Sources used 0 S. BodLan, S LMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends: A conversatLon wLth Arne Naess', Ten DLrectLons, SuMMer/Fall, 1982, 7,10-12; referred to as SLMple Ln Means. M. BookchLn, The Ecology of FreedoM, CheshLre, Londong, 1982; referred to as F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green PolLtLcs, HutchLnson, London, 198~; referred as Green PolLtLcs. to Bookch i,n. B. Devall, 'The Deep Ecology MoveMent', Natural Resources Journal 20, 1980, 299-322; referred to as Deep Ecology MoveMent. B. Devall, 'stone/Sky: ReflectLons on the 'Real ~ork' of Deep Ecology', paper delLvered at EnvLronMent, EthLcs and Ecology Conference, Canberra, August 1983, 20ff.; referred to as Stone/Sky . 8. Devall and G. SessLons, Deep Ecology, PeregrLne SMLth, Layton, Utah, 1985; referred to as Deep Ecology. U. Fox, Deep Ecology: A new phLlosophy 194-200; referred to as Fox. of our tLMe', EcologLst 1~, 1984, U. Fox, 'on guLdLng stars to Deep Ecology', EcologLst 14, 1984, 203-4; to as GuLdLng Stars. A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology MoveMent. InquLry 18, 1973, 95-100; referred to as Shallow and Deep. A. Naess, 'PhLlosophLcal Aspects of Deep Ecology ' , unpublLshed 1983, 35ff.; referred to as PhLlosophLcal Aspects. A. N.3 ess, • IntuLtLon, LntrLnsLc value and Deep 201-3; referred to as IntuLtLon. Ecology', referred A SUMMary. paper, EcologLst 14, Oslo, 1984, A. Naess, Notes on the PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent ' , unpublLshed paper, Canberra, 1984, 17ff.; referred to as PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent. A. Naess, 'What Ls basLc to Deep Ecology?', unpublLshed paper, 12ff . ; referred to as BasLc. A. Naess, A defence of the Deep Ecology 1984, 265-70; referred to as Defence. MoveMent', Canberra, 1984, EnvLronMental EthLcs A. Naess, 'The paradox of envLronMentalLsM' SyMposLuM ProceedLngs, (ed.), York UnLversLty, 1984, 57-60; referred to as Paradox. N. S, Everden A. Naess, 'IdentLfLcatLon as a source of Deep EcologLcal attLtudes', Deep Ecology, M. TobLas (ed.), Avant Books, San DLego, 1985, s256-70; referred to as ldentLfLcatLon. A. Naess, Notes on Professor Sylvan's crLtLque of the Deep Ecology MoveMent, unpublLshed paper, Olso, 1985, 19ff.; referred to as Notes on Sylvan. J. PassMore, Man's ResponsLb~lLty For Nature, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London, 1980; -38- �referred to as PassMore. A new way to treat the Land', EcoLogLst 14, 1984, BLoregLonaLLsM K. Sale, 167-73; referred to as Sale. the ph~Losoph~cal and Deep Ecology: A rev~ew of 'shallow G. Sess~ons, EcoLogLcaL (eds.), Hughes J.D. and Ln R.C. Schultz unfortune', UnLvers~ty Press of AMer~ca, ~ash~ngton, D.C., 1981, Consc~ousness, 391- 4 62; referred to as Sess~ons. R. Sylvan, A Cr~t~que of Deep Ecology, Research School of SocLaL AustraLLan Hat~onaL Un~vers~ty, 1985; referred to as Cr~t~que. ScLences, Further Read~ngs R.F. OasMann, Env~ronMentaL Conservat~on, 5th ed., ~LLey, New York, 1984. A. Leopold, A Sand Country ALManac, CheshLre, New York, 1966. E. PapadukLs, The Green MoveMent Ln ~est GerMany, Croon HeLM, London, 1984. -39- �DEEP ECOLOGY AHO GREEN POLITICS Deep Ecology Ls an envLronMe~tal theory or platforM wLth polLtLcal sLgnLfLcant wLth pLatforM i..MplLcatLons. Breen PoLLtLcs Ls a poLi..tLcaL envLronMentaL LMpLLcatLons. Both arose Ln Large part Ln reactLon to prevaLLLng envi..ronMentaL practLces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theoretLcal reflectLon, Green PolLtLcs on practLcaL actLon . Deep and LnvestLgatLon questLoni..ng of the underlyLng doMi,nant attLtudes, seen as the Major source of ecoL09Lcal and other probLeMs, Led to artLcuLatLon of the Deep EcoLogy pLatforM, partLy outLi..ned Ln ·slogan" forM Ln the foLLowi..ng tabLe. ). TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH DOMINANT ATT ITIJOES DOMINANT ATTITUDES [OOMIHAHT PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EHVIRONMEHTAL PARADIGM] OoMi..nati..on over Nature Nature a Resource; IntrLnsLc VaLue confi..ned to HuMans NaturaL EnvLronMent VaLued for Itself; Bi..ocentri..c EgaLi..tari..ani..sM AMp Le Reso1J rces/Subs t i.. tu tes Earth SuppLLes Li..MLted MaterLaL EconoMLc Growth a predoMLnant goaL Non-MaterLaL GoaLs, especLaLLy SeLf-ReaLi..zati..on ConsuMer i,sM DoLng wLth Enough/RecycLLng CoMpetLti..ve Li..festyLe Cooperati..ve Li..feway CentraLLzed/ Urban Centred/ Hati..onaL focus Decentral.i..zed/ Bi..oregi..onaL/ Nei..ghbourhood focus Power structure Hi..erarchLcaL Non-h i,erarch Lea L/ Grass roots DeMocrac!::I HLgh TechnoL09y Appropri..ate Technology Whi..Le Deep Ecol.og!::j grew froM the work of one envLronMentaL phi..Losopher (Naess Ln 1872), Green PolLtLcs arose (Ln West GerMany sLnce 1876) froM the synthesLs of several. MoveMents - ecol.09!::j, cLtLzens, aLternatLve, peace and other MoveMents. The pLatforM of Green PoLLtLcs, whLch Ls buLLt around four pLLLars socLaL responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy , and non-vLoLence ecology, refLects these orLgLns. The fLrst of these pLLLars, ecoLog!::j, Ls based on the sLMpLe theMe that LLMLted ecoLogi..caL systeMs cannot sustai..n unLi..MLted econoMi..c growth, or such questi..onabLe types of growth as nucLear power, wi..thout serLous rLsk of daMage and degeneratLon. The Green aLM Ls to Move to S!::jsteMs of producti..on and consuMptLon whLch MaLntai..n and restore natural processes and C!::fCLes rather than doMLnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wLth nature. The second pi..LLar of Green PoLLtLcs, socLaL responsLbLLLt!::j, LMpLLes opposi..tLon to the LnequaLLti..es i..n power and doMLnati..on reLati..onshi..ps of present soci..ety, and reMovaL of di..scri..Mi..nati..on, econoMLc hardshi..p and exploi..tati..on, both regi..onally and as regards the ThLrd ~orLd. The Green aLM - to be achi..eved pri..Mari..Ly froM below, Ls to bui..ld stable and just soci..al through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wLth coMprehensLve deMocrati..c rLghts and freedoMs (both i..n 6erMan~ -1- �and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd WorLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (Local, COMMunLty and dLstrLct) whi..ch are gLven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of : referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpli..es the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not Merely by More powerful people, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and also, More posLtLveLy, acti..ve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLal protest, resLstance and defence . The coMpatLbLlLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underlyLng prLncLple: that a just, non-vLolent, huMane end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vi..oLent, LnhuMane Means . • l Gr een PolLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLal change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecologLcalLy focussed Deep Ecology platforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of The strand. LMportant MoveMents of whLch Deep Ecology represents one Lnter-relatLons are shown pLctorLaLly at the second level of the foLlowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM 1. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IM PLACE p B \ '\ I 2C ] ~ Oer Lva ti..on Di,recti,on 2+ ExpLanatLon Oi,recti..on 2. Deep Ecology pLatforM 2C. ReforMLst envLronMentaL 2 p1Jsi.. t i.,Qn 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green pLatforM -/ //' ;/ e.g. Buddhi..st (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-PhLLosophLc (P) ultLMate bases j / -\,r - [ 1. Deep Ecology fundaMentaLs; C \ \ \ 3. s \ General norMs and theMes , substanti,ally derLved froM pl,atforM PartLcuLar norMs and concrete decLsLons , appLyLng to reLevant practLcal sLtuatLons. The ecologLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not go very deep; Lt May on l y be based upon reforM envLronMentalLsM (or shallow ecology as i,t used to be I Starred notes LndLcate poi..nts at wh i..ch readLngs wi..th the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken . -2- �caLLed), whLch aLM3 to reforM 30Me of the wor3t abuse3 and exces3e3 of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross poLLutLon, extensLve despoLLatLon of Land and Lakes and oceans, LLttLe thought for the future, MLstreatMent of anLMals, etc_ On shaLlow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltself, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMentalLy, for what Lt can be used for by huMans_ By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e_g_ froM preMLsses of Level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcaLLy valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, furtherMore, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted_ ThLs projectLon of egsLLtarLan or LMpartLalLty prLncLpLes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of lLfe Ln the natural worLd, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtle, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM_ The prLncLple, not part of Green PoLLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversLal of the central prLncLpLes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to expLaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted_ Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLon through what Ls . . presented as a core deMocracy ~n the bLosphere . _•3 Deep Ecology grew out of a phLlosophLcal deepenLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLst scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the suM of theLr atoMLstLc parts; eMergent eleMents, lLke lLfe, organLsatLon, etc_ )_ Deep Ecology quLckLy aLLLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcuLar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLlure of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy_ WLth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surprLsLng that there Ls lLttle dLrectLy about such MaLn pLllars of Green PolLtLcs as socLaL responsLbLLLty and non-vLoLence Ln the pLatforM of Deep Ecology- However Deep Ecology Ls coMpatLbLe wLth these Green pLlLar prLncLpLes, and Lndeed perMLts theLr derLvatLon_ ~hat Ls supposed to resuLt are generaL norMs, LLke No exploLtatLon, No subjectLon, No vLoLence, at leveL 3_ (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLoLence prLncLpLe froM tne Deep Ecology prLncLpLe of MaxLMLzLng Self-reaLLsatLon Ls atteMpted by Naess Ln the fraMework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLLosophy)_•l A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan reLatLons wLth the natural envLronMent, away froM doMLnant expLoLtatLve practLces_ The naturaL envLronMent coMprLses LteMs of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng huMans (who are not above or separate froM Lt), and accordLn9ly Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable LteMs warrant, and not LrresponsLbLy_ Thus Lt would be contrary to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued LteMs vLolently whLch however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do (consLder such wLdespread phenoMena as "rape of the envLronMent", "of the Land", "of the forestsu)_ SLnce huMans are not apart froM or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology pLatforM that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLoLence towards other huMans or classes of huMans_ Because Lt covers a pluraLLty of posLt~ons, LncludLng shaLLow ecoLogLcaL posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More aMelLoratLve and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further reMoved froM doMLnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and More radLcaL_ ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMentaLs, and focusses on Ldeals and theory, Green PolLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal polLtLcal probleMs of an envLronMental or socLal kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pollutLon or MLssLle deplo8Ment, and (lLke the Peace MoveMent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLpLes or wor~Lng out an env~ronMentaL (or peace) ph~Losophy_ Because of Lts envLronMentaL depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural envLronMent Lssues, such as wLlderness, rare specLes, and the radLcal -3- �transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMa9Ln9 LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLolence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcal actLon, LncLudLn9 typLcal protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLolence also LMplLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary pra~tLces, socLal defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLolent Methods and socLal defence, other Lesser factLons hold that force Ls necessary to brLn9 about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy platforM Lncludes severaL prLncLpLes that would be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLples (whLch however, unlLke BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM, would not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLMLzLng SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of self-realLsatLon of varLous relLgLous posLtLons, of the full unfoldLng and developMent of the person, Ls vastly expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to Lnclude brLngLng to fuLl fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but all that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded Self, whLch Ls taken to be not Merely one's faMLLy or feLlows or fellow natLonals, nor Merely ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whole huMan race, but the whole naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-realLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personal self-Lnterest prLncLple, has an excellent phLlosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as applLed to huMans or neL9hbourLn9 classes of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcult Matter Ln the case of ultLMate prLncLples, SeLfrealLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLlosophLcal or reLLgLous posLtLons at Level 1 of the double pyraMLd, froM those that help sustaLn Deep Ecology. However the expansLon Lnvolved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow self to coMprehensLve Self, severs the usual justLfLcatory lLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's self-Lnterests wLth those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan Self, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcal and spLrLtual ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the slogan slogan, USLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln endsn. are those concernLng what kLnd of technology one uses and where one lLves (the Matter of dwellLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent value and the lLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLMLzatLon eMphasLsed both MaterLal goals and MaterLal Means, partLcuLarly personal consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyles are approprLate? Deep Ecology, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLal and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasLzes the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLlabLe. The result, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, do~ng wLth enough, and, More 9enerall8, practLces whLch lLe lLght on the Land and the naturaL world. In way of d0Ln9 thLngs, these wLLL be Lnte9rated (Ln ~ properly ecoLogLcaL syMbLotLc and other naturaL styles) wLth the natural systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the natural fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLl accordLngly be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, 17 to be caLLed. coMe have they as bLore9LonaL, ecoL09LcaL 9roupLn9s - or -4- �ApproprLate Means LncLude, Ln turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory of Deep Ecology- HLgh technoL09Les such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLaL socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMentaL and socLaL costs and rLsks such technoLogLcaL forMs LMpose_ On both deep and green percept i,ons, wh-3 t Ls requ Lred a re re LLab Le c-:1 ref u L technoLogLes whLch are not ecoLogLcaLLy daMa9Ln9 or socLaLLy rLsky or otherwLse undesLrabLe; but the technoLogi,es adl"li,tted wLLl dLffer accordLng to the prLncLpLes of the posLtLons they answer back to (e_g_ farMLng technLques wLLL need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLLLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLpLes as bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM )_ In each case the practLcaL use of approprLate technoLogy faLLs at the bottoM, actLon Level, of the doubLe pyral"I ,,"d _•8 WhLLe Deep Ecology suppLLes an appeaLLng bLueprLnt for dLfferent socLaL and LLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed Land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLaL feature of Deep Ecology: EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other oLder LdeoLogLes (e_g_ of reLL9Lous, or of revoLutLonary, conscLousness)_ What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtuaL or LdeoLogLcaL conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personaL and socLaL to coMprehend the fuLL envLronMentaL predLcaMent_ In thLs expLanatLon, of how peopLe get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLpLes_ A thorough conversLon process LnvoLves eLevatLon to the top LiveL, spLrLtuaL transcendence of the daLLy econoMLc and poLLtLcaL actLon LeveL. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLLL be put Ln place, LLke Green PoLLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures_ LLke the fundaMentaL sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness_ SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMpLatLon, are derLved frol"I the fundaMentaL sources_ But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecoLogLcaL experLence, LncLude value seeLng thLngs dLfferentLy, and reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon of other thLngs - Connected wLth weLL-beLng and worth the coMLng to apprecLate goes a hoLLstLc shLft Ln theM, these wLdened experLentLaL bases, and LnforMLng vaLues and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon , affordLng dLrect LLnkage wLth parts and whoLes of the natural worLd_•IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the reaL world, a convert to Deep Ecology, a feLLow and advocate of Lts Messages and LLfe-ways. ESSAY QUESTIONS }_ To what extent do Green PoLLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the sal"le probLel"ls? CrLtLcaLLy coMpare and contrast theLr proposals, especLaLLy as regards the naturaL and the buLLt envLronMent_ 2_ Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four Levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to expLaLn carefuLLy the LnterreLatLons aMong PoLLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probLeMatLc scheMe? these Levels. Where does Green Ln prLncLpLe" appears as a key theMe of Deep Eco~ogy. Cri.tLcaLLy assess Lts adequacy_ Shouldn't Green PoLLtLcs LncLude such a pri.nci.pLe? 3_ ·sLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM - Non-vLo~ence an unstated pr~nc~p~e of Deep Ecoiog~? Expia~n why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLoLence to the degree i.t Ls? In your answers take account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLcti.ons between the use of I+- 1:5 -5- �vLolence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vLolence Ln nature; LLL. the need for coercLve Methods to preserve the natural envLronMent. 5. What justLfLes expandLng self-realLsatLo n to Self-realLsatLo n? ExpLaLn the MeanLng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLLsatL on for Deep EcoLogy and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Why does Lt not feature Ln Green PolLtLcs? 6. ExplaLn the MeanLng of the delLberateLy vague slogan °SLMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends", or of soMe other hLgh-LMpact sLogan of Deep EcoLogy. IndLcate how the vagueness MLght work for and a9aLnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLon s, and LndLcate soMe of the suggest applLed, aLternatLves. these of raMLfLcatLons 7. OutLLne bLoregLonalLsM , LndLcatLng what practLcaL envLronMentaL probLeMs bLoregLonalLsM Lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bLoregLonalLsM derLved froM Deep EcoLogy? ConsLder to what extent bLoregLonalLsM fLts wLth the sLogan, ·rhLnk globally, act locally·. 8. Is More hLgh technology an unprobLeMatLc solutLon to deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vLews of Deep Ecology and Green PoLLtLcs on the role of varLous types of technoLogy. 9. What Ls Ecolo9Lcal ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ec0Lo9y? If Lt Ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLLtLcs? A reLatLonaL, total-fLeLd LMa9e of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quLetLy oMLtted froM the orLgLnaL pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? 10. -6- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DEEP ECOLOOY AHO OREEH POLITICS Deep Ecology ts an envtronMentaL theory or pLatforM wtth poLtttcaL stgntftcant wtth pLatforM LMpLtcattons. Green PoLtttcs ts a poLtttcaL envtronMentaL LMpLtcattons. Both arose tn Large part tn reactton to prevatLtng envtronMentaL practtces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theorettcaL refLectton, Green PoLtttcs on practtcaL actton. Deep and tnvesttgatton questtontng of the underLytng doMtnant attttudes, seen as the Major source of ecoLogtcaL and other probLeMs, Led to arttcuLatton of the Deep Ecology pLatforM, partly outLtned tn "slogan" forM tn the foLLowtng table. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED ~ITH OOMIHAHT ATTITUDES OOMrnAtn ATT HUDES (OOMrnAtH PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EttV IROHMEHTAL PARADIGM] Hature a Resource; Intrtnstc Value conftned to HuMans Natural EnvtronMent Valued for ltseLt; Btocentrtc E9aLttartantsM MatertaL EconoMtc Growth a predoMtnant goaL Hon-MatertaL Goals, espectaLLy ConsuMertsM Dotng wtth Enough/RecycLtng CoMpettttve LtfestyLe Cooperattve Ltfeway CentraLtzed/ Urban Centred/ DecentraLtzed/ Btoregtonat/ · Hetghbourhood focus tia t Lona L focus SeLf-ReaLtzatton Power structure HterarchtcaL Hon-hterarchtcaL/ Grassroots DeMocracy Htgh Technology Approprtate Technology ~htLe Deep Ecology grew froM the work of one envtronMentaL phtLosopher (Haess tn 1972), Green PoLtttcs arose (tn ~est GerMany stnce 1976) froM the synthests of several MoveMents - ecology, ctttzens, aLternattve, peace and other MoveMents. The platforM of Green PoLtttcs, whtch ts butlt around four ptllars soctaL responstbtltty, grassroots deMocracy, and non-vtoLence ecology, reflects these ortgtns. The ftrst of these ptLLars, ecology, ts based on the stMpLe theMe that LtMtted ecoLogtcaL systeMs cannot sustatn unltMtted econoMtc growth, or such questtonabLe types of growth as nuclear power, wtthout sertous rtsk of daMage and degeneratton. The Green atM ts to Move to systeMs of productlon and consuMptton whtch Matntatn and restore natural processes and cycles rather than doMtnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wtth nature. The second ptllar of Green Poltttcs, soctal responstbtltty, tMpLtes opposttton to the tnequaltttes tn power and doMtnatton relattonshtps of present soctety, and reMovaL of dtscrtMtnatton, econoMtc hardshtp and explottatton, both regtonaLly and as regards the Thtrd ~orld. The Green atM - to be achteved prtMartly froM below, ts to butLd stable and just soctaL through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wtth coMprehenstve deMocrattc rtghts and freedoMs (both tn GerMany -1- and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd ~orLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon .of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (LocaL, coMMunLty and dLstrLct) whLch are 9Lven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpLLes the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not MereLy by More powerfuL peopLe, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and aLso, More posLtLveLy, actLve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLaL protest, resLstance and defence. The coMpatLbLLLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underLyLng prLncLpLe: that a just, non-vLoLent, huMane• end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vLoLent, LnhuMane Means. 1 Green PoLLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLaL change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecoLogLcaLLy focussed Deep EcoLogy pLatforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of MoveMents of whLch Deep EcoLogy represents one LMportant strand. The Lnter-reLatLons are shown pLctorLaLLy at the second LeveL of the foLLowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM l. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IN PLACE B p 1. Deep EcoLogy fundaMentaLs; e.g. BuddhLst (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-Phi.LosophLc (P) uLtLMate bases C I 2 Exp Lana.t Lon DLrecti.on 2. Deep Ecology platforM 2C . ReforMi.st envLronMental posi.ti.on 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green platforM Der Lvat Lon Di.recti.on j 3 . . General norMs and theMes, substantLaLLy derLved froM pLatforM ~- PartLcular norMs and concrete decLsLons, applyi.ng to relevant practLcaL sLtuatLons . The ecoLogLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not 90 very deep; Lt May onLy be based upon reforM envLronMentaLLsM (or shaLLow ecoLogy as Lt used to be • Starred notes LndLcate poLnts at whLch readLngs wLth the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken. -2- catted), whLch aLMs to reforM soMe of the worst abuses and excesses of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross pottutLon, extensLve despotLatLo n of land and takes and oceans, tLttte thought for the future, MLstreatMen t of anLMals, etc. On shallow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltsetf, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMent atty, for what Lt can be used for by huMans. By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e.g. froM preMLsses of level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcat ty valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted . ThLs projectLon of furtherr,ore , egatLtarLan or Lr,partLatLt y prLncLptes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of tLfe Ln the natural world, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtte, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanL sM. The prLncLple, not part of Green PolLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversL al of the central prLncLptes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to explaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted . Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLo n through what Ls ' •3 . presented as a ' core der,ocracy Ln the b~osphere . Deep Ecology grew out of a phLtosophL cal dP~penLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLs t scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the sur, of theLr ator,LstLc parts; eMergent eler,ents, tLke lLfe, organLsatLo n, etc.). Deep Ecology quLckly allLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcutar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLture of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy. ~Lth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surpr~s~ng that there Ls lLttle dLrectty about such r,aLn pLllars of Green PotLtLcs as socLal responsLbLl Lty and non-vLotenc e Ln the platforM of Deep Ecology. However Deep Ecology Ls cor,patLble wLth these Green pLllar prLncLptes, and Lndeed perr,Lts theLr derLvatLon. ~hat Ls supposed to result are general norMs, lLke Ho exploLtatLo n, Ho subjectLon, Ho vLolence, at level 3. (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLolenc e prLncLple froM the Deep Ecology prLncLple of r,axLMLzLng Self-realLs atLon Ls atter,pted by Haess Ln the frar,ework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLloso phy).•~ A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan relatLons wLth the natural envLronMen t, away froM doMLnant exploLtatLv e practLces. The natural envLronr,ent coMprLses Lter,s of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng hur,ans (who are not above or separate fror, Lt), and accordLngty Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable Lter,s warrant, and not LrresponsLb ly. Thus Lt would be contrary whLch to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued Lter,s vLolently such (consLder however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do wLdespread phenor,ena as "rape of the envLronMen t", ·of the land", •of the forests"). SLnce hur,ans are not apart fror, or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology platforr, that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLolence towards other hur,ans or classes of huMans. Because Lt covers a pluralLty of posLtLons, LncludLng shallow ecologLcal posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More ar,elLoratLv e and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further rer,oved froM dor,Lnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and r,ore radLcat. ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMenta ts, and focusses on Ldeats and theory, Green PotLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal poLLtLcat probler,s of an envLronr,en tat or socLat kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pottutLon or MLssLte deptoyMent, and (LLke the Peace Mover,ent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLples or workLng out an envLronMen tat (or peace) phLtosophy. Because of Lts envLronMen tal depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural -3- radLcaL the envLronMent Lssues, such as wLLderness, rare specLes, and transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMagLng LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLoLence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcaL actLon, LncLudLng typLcaL protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLoLence aLso LMpLLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary practLces, socLaL defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLoLent Methods and socLaL defence, other Lesser factLons hoLd that force Ls necessary to brLng about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy pLatforM LncLudes severaL prLncLpLes that wouLd be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLpLes (whLch however, unLLke BLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM, wouLd not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLML2Ln9 SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of seLf-reaLLsatLon of varLous reLLgLous posLtLons, of the fuLL unfoLdLng and deveLopMent of the person, Ls vastLy expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to LncLude brLngLng to fuLL fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but aLL that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded SeLf, whLch Ls taken to be not MereLy one's faMLLy or feLLows or feLLow natLonaLs, nor MereLy ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whoLe huMan race, but the whoLe naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-reaLLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personaL seLf-Lnterest prLncLpLe, has an exceLLent phLLosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as appLLed to huMans or neLghbourLng cLasses of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcuLt Matter Ln the case of uLtLMate prLncLpLes, SeLfreaLLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLLosophLcaL or reLLgLous posLtLons at LeveL I of the doubLe pyraMLd, froM those that heLp sustaLn Deep EcoLogy. However the expansLon LnvoLved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow seLf to coMprehensLve SeLf, severs the usuaL justLfLcatory LLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's seLf-Lnterests wLth · those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan SeLf, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcaL and spLrLtuaL ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the sLogan sLogan, "SLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends". one uses and where one LLves technoLogy of are those concernLng what kLnd (the Matter of dweLLLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent vaLue and the LLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLML2atLon eMphasLsed both MaterLaL goaLs and MaterLaL Means, partLcuLarLy personaL consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyLes are approprLate? Deep EcoLogy, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLaL and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasL2es the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLLabLe. The resuLt, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, doLng wLth enough, and, More generaLLy, practLces whLch LLe LLght on the Land and the naturaL worLd. In a properLy ecoLogLcaL way of doLng thLngs, these wLLL be Lntegrated (Ln syMbLotLc and other naturaL styLes) wLth the naturaL systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the naturaL fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLL accordLngLy be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, -4- ecologtcal grouptngs - or btoregtonal, as they have coNe to be called. • 7 Approprtate Means tnclude, tn turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory .of Deep Ecology. HLgh technologLes such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLal socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMental and socLal costs and rLsks such technologLcal forMs LMpose. On both deep and green perceptLons, what Ls requLred are relLable careful technologLes whLch are not ecologLcally daMagLng or socLally rLsky or otherwLse undesLrable; but the technologLes adMLtted wLll dLffer accordLng to the prLncLples of the posLtLons they answer back to (e.g . farMLng technLques wLlt need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLtLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLptes as bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM). In each case the practLcat use of approprLate technology falls at the bottoM, actLon level, of the double . •a pyraN~d. WhLle Deep Ecology supplLes an appeatLng blueprLnt for dLfferent socLal and lLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLal feature of Deep Ecology: EcologLcal ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other older LdeologLes (e.g. of relLgLous, or of revolutLonary, conscLousness). What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtual or LdeologLcal conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personal and socLat to coMprehend the full envLronMental predLcaMent. In thLs explanatLon, of how people get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLples. A thorough conversLon process Lnvolves elevatLon to the top livet, spLrLtuat transcendence of the daLly econoMLc and polLtLcat actLon level. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLlt be put Ln place, lLke Green PolLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures. LLke the fundaMental sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcologLcal ConscLousness. SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMptatLon, are derLved froM the fundaMental sources. But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecologLcat experLence, Lnclude value reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon seeLng thLngs dLfferently, and coMLng to apprecLate the worth and well-beLng of other thLngs. Connected wLth these wLdened experLentLal bases, and LnforMLng theM, goes a holLstLc shLft Ln values and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon, affordLng dLrect lLnkage wLth parts and wholes of the natural world. •IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the real world, a convert to Deep Ecology , a fellow and advocate of Lts Messages and lLfe-ways . ESSAY QUESTIOHS I. To what extent do Green PolLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the saMe probleMs? CrLtLcally coMpare and contrast theLr proposa l s, especLally as regards the natural and the buLlt envLronMent. 2. Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four, levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to explaLn carefully the LnterrelatLons aMong these levels. Uhere does Green PolLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probleMatLc scheMe? 3 . "BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM - Ln prLncLple appears as a key theMe of Deep Ecology. CrLtLcally assess Lts adequacy. Shouldn't Green PolLtLcs Lnctude such a prLncLpte? 4. Is Non-vLolence an unstated prLncLple of Deep Ecology? ExplaLn why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLolence to the degree Lt Ls? In your answers . take -5- \ account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLctLons between the use of vLoLence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vloLence Ln nature; ttt. the need for coerclve Methods to preserve the natural envtronMent. 5. Uhat justlfLes expandLng _seLf-reallsatLon to SeLf-reaLlsatlon? ExpLaLn the Meanlng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLlsatLon for Deep Ecology and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Uhy does lt not feature ln Green PolLtlcs? 6. ExpLaLn the MeanLng of the deLLberateLy vague slogan ·slMple ln Means, rlch ln ends·, or of soMe other hlgh-lMpact slogan of Deep Ecology. Indlcate how the vagueness Mlght work for and agalnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLons, and lndlcate soMe of the suggest applled, alternattves. these of raMLflcatlons 7. OutLlne btoregtonaLL3M, lndlcatlng what practlcaL envlronMental probleMs bloreglonallsM lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bloreglonallsM derlved froM Deep Ecology? Conslder to what extent bloregLonallsM fLts wLth the slogan, •Thlnk globally, act LocaLly". deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vlews of Deep Ecology and Green PolLtLcs on the role of varlous types of technology. 8~ Is More hLgh technology an unprobleMatLc soLutLon to 9. Uhat Ls EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ecology? If Lt ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLltlcs? 10. A reLatlonaL, total-fLeLd LMage of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quletLy oMLtted froM the orLglnal pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? READINGS 1: DEEP ECOLOGY AND GREEN POLITICS The Greens consLder theMseLves the poLltLcal voLce of the cLtLzens' MoveMents, that Ls, ecology, antl-nuclear-power, peace, feMLnLst, and others. Most MeMbers of the Green party are also actLvLsts Ln one or More of those MoveMents, and thLs dLverse orLentatLon Ls reflected Ln the wLngs, or factLons, of the party: the vLslonary/hollstlc Greens, the Eco-Greens, the peace-MoveMent Greens, and the radlcal-Left Greens. A great deaL of overlapplng occurs wlth any categor~z~ng of Green LdentltLes and soMe people say there are no actual factlons, but clearly there are dtfferent prtorltLes aMong the four clusters. The More that people perceLved the LnterconnectLons aMong prLncLpLes of ecologLcaL wlsdoM, a truly secure peace, an econoMy wLth a future, and a partLcLpatory deMocracy wLth power channeled dLrectly froM the grassroots Level, the More they notLces the absence of such LdeaLs aMong the exLsttng poLLtlcaL partles. [Green] pollcLes are gutded by long-terM v~s~ons for the future and are founded on four basLc prLncLples: ecology, socLal responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy, and nonvLoLence. The fLrst of the ·four pLLlars, • ecology, has several MeanLngs Ln Green poLLtLcs. Green poLLtLcs, Ls Lnherently hoLLstLc Ln theory and practLce. It Ls based on ecoLogLcal, or ·network·, thLnkLng, a terM used frequently by the Greens. EcoLogLcaL thLnkLng also Lncludes the realLzatLon that the seeMLngLy -6- rtgtd structures we percetve Ln our envLronMent are actually ManLfestatLons of underlytng processes, of nature's contLnual dynaMLc flux. Interrelatedness and ongoLng process are the lessons the Greens take froM and apply to the ecosysteMs surroundLng us. They support •soft" energy productLon (such as solar power) that works wLth the cycles of the sun, the water, and the wLnd, and the flow of the rLvers. They call for the developMent of approprLate technology that reflects our Lnterdependence wLth the Earth. They advocate regeneratLve agrLculture that replenLshes the soLl and Lncorporates natural Means of pest control. Above all, the Greens deMand a halt to our ravagLng of natural "resources" and our poLsonLng of the bLosphere through the duMpLng of toxLc wastes, the accuMulatLon of so-called acceptable levels of radLatLon exposure, and the pollutLon of the aLr. The broader applLcatLons of ecologLcal thLnkLng lead to ·socLal ecology, the perceptton of soctetal structures and huMan Lnteracttons as an Lntrtcate web of dynaMLc systeMs that are sLMultaneously Lnterrelated parts and coMplete Ln theMselves. That eMphasLs on relatLonshLps and Lnterconnecttons Ls the basts of the Greens' ecologtcal work that focuses specLfLcally on envLronMental protectLon. TheLr prograMs Ln thts area call for huMans to ftnd our place Ln the ecosysteMs: ~e defLne ecologLcal polLtLcs as those Measures that understand huMan betngs and our envLronMent as beLng part of nature. HuMan lLfe, too, Ls eMbedded Ln the lLfe cycles of the ecosysteMs; we Lnterfere wLth our actLons and thLs, Ln turn, acts back on us. ~e Must not destroy the stabLlLty of the ecosysteMs. In partLcular, ecologtcal polLtLcs presents an all-encoMpassLng rejectLon of an econoMy of exploLtatLon and plunderLng of natural resources and raw MaterLals, as well as the destructLve LnterventLon Lnto the cycles of nature's household. The second of the four pLllars, ·soctal responsLbLlLty, • Ls understood by Most Greens to Mean socLal justLce and assurance that the poor and the workLng class wLll not get hurt by prograMs to restructure the econoMy and our consuMer socLety ecologtcally. The radLcal-left Greens, however, read sozLal as a codeword for socLalLsM, that Ls, deMocratLc MarxLsM~ SLnce that polLtLcal Model Ls specLfLcally not what the vLsLonary, lLberal and conservatLve Greens have Ln MLnd, a battle developed over establLshLng the basLc prLncLples. The MajorLty wanted the new party to stand for possLbLlLtLes other than etther socLalLsM or the capLtalLst status quo. The radLcal-left contLngent, on the other hand, LnsLsted on not only Lncludtng socLalLsM but also on excludLng nonvLolence as a guLdLng prLncLple. So one of the four pLllars, lLke so Much else Ln the Green party, has a paradoxLcal character: Lt Means soMethLng dLfferent Ln dLfferent parts of the party. All factLons of the party concur that socLal, econoMLc and ecologLcal Lssues are Lnherently lLnked. The ecologLcal and socLal spheres belong Lnseparably together: the econoMy of nature Ls ltnked to the econoMy of huMans for better or worse . The thLrd pLllar, grassroots deMocracy, was LnspLred by the ~est GerMan cLtLzens' MoveMents throughout the 1970s, whLch Ln turn were Lnfluenced by the cLvLl rLghts, ecology, consuMer, and other MoveMents ~n the Un~ted States. OLrect, or partLcLpatory, deMocracy locates a greater aMount of power and control wLth the local groups, the grassroots. ThLs orLentatLon ~nforMs the structure of the Green party. An organLzatLon structured wtth partLcLpatory deMocracy sets Lts basLc polLcy accordLng to the votLng at large asseMblLes. It allows LndLvLduals access to all party offLcLals, and Lt eschews hLerarchLcal structure. Instead of allowtng power to be concentrated Ln a few people who -7- reMaLn at the top of a hLerarchy for years, such groups generally elect steerLng coMMLttees. The fourth pLllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and •structural vLolence, • that Ls, vLolence and oppress Lon LMposed by the state and by LnstLtutLons. (See ReadLng 4; Green PolLtLcs, pp.3-4, 29-43) The tenets of [the Deep Ecology] MoveMent Nay perhaps be roughly forNulated as follows: (1) The well-beLng of nonhuMan lLfe on Earth has value Ln Ltself. ThLs value Ls Lndependent of any LnstruNental usefulness for LLMLted huNan purposes. (2) RLchness and dLversLty Ln lLfe forMs contrLbute to thLs value and Lnterfere Ls a further value Ln Ltself. (3) HuMans have no rLght to destructLvely wLth nonhuMan lLfe except for purposes of satLsfyLng vLtal needs. (4) Present Lnterference Ls excessLve and detrLMental. (5) Present polLcLes Must therefore be changed. (6) The necessary polLcy changes affect basLc econoMLc and LdeologLcal structures and wLll be the More drastLc the longer Lt takes before sLgnLfLcant change Ls started. (7) The LdeologLcal change Ls MaLnly that of apprecLatLng lLfe qualLty (focusLng on sLtuatLons LnvolvLng Lnherent. value). (8) Those who subscrLbe to the foregoLng poLnts have an oblLgatLon dLrectly or LndLrectly to try to LMpleMent the necessary changes. (Defence, p.266) It should be fully apprecLated that the sLgnLfLcant tenets of the Deep Ecology MoveMent are clearly and forcefully norMatLve. They express a value prLorLty systeM only Ln part based on results (or lack of results) of scLentLfLc research. Today, ecologLsts try to Lnfluence polLcy-MakLng bodLes largely resource and through threats, through predLctLons concernLng pollutants depletLon, knowLng that polLcy-Makers accept at least certaLn MLnLMUM norMs concernLng health and just dLstrLbutLon. There are polLtLcal potentLals Ln thLs MoveNent whLch should not be overlooked and whLch have lLttle to do wLth pollutLon and resource depletLon. In plottLng possLble futures, the norMs should be freely used and elaborated. (Shallow and Oeep 1 p.99) A Major dLfference between the theorLes lLes Ln the dLstrLbutLon of values. Deep ecology, lLke sLMpler utLlLtarLanLsM, offers a unLque LnLtLal dLstrLbutLon: each lLvLng thLng Ls assLgned equal value and nothLng else has LntrLnsLc value. Value Ls assessed through soMe MLx of value-NakLng characterLstLcs, LncludLng such defeasLble ecologLcal unLversals as stabLlLty, resLlLence, naturalness, rLchness, scarcLty and so forth . But there are consLderable dLversLty, constraLnts on how thLs Ls done . . . . One constraLnt, that of LMpartLalLty whLch excludes certaLn types of class chauvLnLsM, a thLng cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another sLMply by vLrtue of belongLng to soNe specLes (e.g. beLng huNan) or favoured bLologLcal class; such class features are not Ln theMselves value-MakLng characterLstLcs. Such an account of how value Ls assessed reNaLn however far froM specLfLc, and soMetLMes of lLttle use Ln practLce. (CrLtLque, pp.59- 60) POINTS OF UNITY 1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. Ue base our phLlosophy on a proper understandLng of the purposes and workLngs of nature and do not try to LNpose an Ldeology upon Lt . Ue seek to transforM socLety based upon thLs understandLng. 2. CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY. Ue conduct all our MeetLngs accordLng to the prLncLples of consensus deNocracy, eNphasLzLng unanLMous or near-unanLMous agreeMent on all decLsLons. No representatLve May Make decLsLons on behalf of the Greens wLthout the approval of the entLre NeMbershLp. Ue encourage the use of consensus deMocracy Ln all socLal, econoMLc and polLtLcal LnstLtutLons. -8- 3. NONVIOLENCE AND FREEDOM. ~e oppose the threat or use of phystcal vtolence to resolve tnternatlonat, clvll, polltlcal and personal confllcts. ~e encourage the nonvlolent enforceMent of all prlvate and publlc rules and Laws. ~e recognlEe that a nonvlolent soclety would be a very free soclety and encourage tolerance of others' vlews and actlons. ~- SOCIAL ECOLOGY. ~e eMphaslze the connectton of doMlnatlon and vlolence toward the envlronMent and toward our fellow huMans. ~e seek a nonvlolent soclety ln whlch the needs of lndlvlduals, coMMunltles and bloreglons are balanced and lntegrated and ln whlch econoMtc resources are used consclousty, deMocratlcaLLy and approprlatety to further thls end. 5. STRATEGY. ~e wlLL oppose ecologlcatty and soclatty destructlve pollcles and dlsobedlence clvll and protest practlces through nonvlolent polltlcal actlvltles. ~e wlLL proMote alternatlve projects and lnstltutlons conslstent wlth our Green phllosophy. ~e wlLL cooperate ln solldarlty wlth all groups ln substantlal agreeMent wlth these polnts of unlty as partlclpants ln the lnternatlonal Green MoveMent. (Deep Ecology, pp.36-7). 2: DEEP ECOLOGY LEVELS In dlscusslng the relatlonshlp between deep ecology and Major tradltlons such as BuddhlsM and Chrlstlanlty, Naess stresses that people can agree broadly on a set of prlnctptes and dlsagree greatly on other aspects of ldeology and other tradttlons thusly: In order to factlttate dlscusslon lt May be helpful to dlsttngutsh a coMMon platforM (baste prlnclples) of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phllosophles and rellglons froM whlch that platforM (baste prlnctples) ls derlved, lf the platforM ls forMulated as a set of norMs and hypotheses lf . verballEed, are Buddhlst, (factual assuMptlons). The fundaMentals, or phllosophlc wlth persuaslons, rettgtous other Taolst, Chrtsttan or of afftnltles to the baste vlews of Splnoza, Uhltehead, Hetdegger, or others. The fundaMentals are Mutually More or Less lncoMpattble or at Least dtfflcult to coMpare l~ terMs of cognltlve contents. The tncoMpattblltty does not affect the deep ecology prlnclples adversely. The baste prlnclples wlthln the deep ecology MoveMent are grounded ln retlglon or phllosophy. In a Loose sense, tt May be sald to be dertved froM the fundaMentals. Because these are dtfferent, the sltuatlon only reMlnds us that very slMllar or even tdenttcal conclustons May be drawn froM dlvergent preMlses. The prlnclples (or platforM) are the . saMe, the fundaMentaL preMlses dtffer. In order to clartfy the dtscusston one Must avold Looktng for one deftntte phllosophy or rellgton aMong the supporters of the deep ecologlcal MoveMent. Fortunately there ls a rlch Manlfold of klnds of consequences dertved froM the prlnclples. The dtscusston has four Levels to take lnto account: verballzed fundaMentaL phllosophlcal and rellglous ldeas and lntultlons, the deep ecology baste prlnclples, the More or Less general consequences dertved froM the platforM Llfestytes and general pollcles of every klnd - and Lastly, descrlpttons of concrete sltuatlons and declstons Made ln theM. (See DlagraM 1) Arne Naess has atteMpted to provlde a Loglcal dlagraM or systeMatlzatlon of hls own verslon of deep ecology or ecosophy whtch he calls •Ecosophy r·. He -9- caLLs thts a norMattve systeM whtch tncLudes both norMs (or baste values) and factual hypotheses_ The Lower norMs or actton stateMents are dertved froM the top norMs tn a Loosely LogtcaL sense_ The top or Most baste norMs are arrtved at by the deep questtontng Lntutttve process_ Naess stresses that Ecosophy T Ls onLy hts verston of deep ecology, and that Many versLons need to be worked out_ SoMe people NLght be crLtLcaL that Many of the norMs of deep ecology are heLd on an tntutttve basts, but Naess potnts out aLL theortes begtn soMewhere beyond LogtcaL constructtons_ (DEEP ECOLOGY, pp-225-7) In order to factLttate dtscusston about deep ecology aMong phtLosophers tt May be heLpfuL to dtsttngutsh a coMMon pLatforM of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of phtLosophtes and reLtgtons froM whtch that pLatforM Ls derLved, tf tt ts forMuLated as a set of norMs and hypotheses (factual assuMpttons)_ The terM 'pLatforM' ts preferred to 'prtncLpLe' because the Latter May be NLsunderstood to refer to the uLtLMate fundaMentaLs_ FurtherMore, the forMuLatton of a pLatforM should be short and conctse (as a synopsts), whereas the fundaMentaLs, tf verbaLtzed, are Buddhtst, Taotst, ChrLstLan or of other reLtgtous ktnds, or they are phtLosophLc wtth afftntttes to the baste vtews of SpLnoza, ~hLtehead, HeLdegger, or others_ The fundaMentaLs are MutuaLLy More or Less LncoMpatLbLe or at Least dtffLcuLt to coMpare tn terMs of cognLttve contents_ Supporters of deep ecology May have great dLfftcuLttes understandtng each other's uLtLMate vLews_ The pLatforM of the deep ecology MoveMent Ls grounded tn reLtgLon or phLLosophy tncLudtng ethLcs_ It May be saLd to be derLved froM these fundaMentaLs_ As used here the terM 'dertved' ts open to a vartety of LnterpretatLons_ If the vaLLdLty of a norM or a hypothesLs Ls justLfLed by reference to one defLnLte set of assuMptLons of a phtLosophtcaL or reLLgtous ktnd, the norM or hypothests ts Ln a sense dertved froM those assuMpttons_ The set acquLres a character of preMLses for parttcuLar concLusLons_ But cLoseLy · sLMLLar or even tdenttcaL concLustons May be drawn froM sets of LncoMpatLbLe preMLses_ ThLs expLaLns the coMbLnatLon of 'bewLLderLng' dLverstty of vLews at the deepest LeveL wtth agreeMent of vtews at the next LeveL_ In assesstng constructLve crttLctsM of deep ecology Lt Ls useful to try to ftnd out whLch LeveL Ls LnvoLved_ An exaMpLe: In the tntroductLon to hLs The EthLcs of EnvtronMentaL Concern, (Oxford: BLackweLL 1983), Robtn AttfLeLd says: Yet I do not accept, wLth the so-caLLed 'deep, Long-range ecology MoveMent', the vtew that our prLncLpaL Loyalty should be focussed not on feLLow-huMans or feLLow creatures but on the bLosphere as an organtc whole, __ _ I suppose there are soMe supporters of the deep ecology MOVeMent who propose focusstng Loyalty on the bLosphere as an organLc whole Ln the sense suggested by AttfteLd_ The conceptLon of the bLosphere as an organLc whole and of such a kLnd of Loyalty belongs to the reaLM of fundaMentaLs, that Ls LeveL one, rather than to the other Levels_ Therefore that AttfLeLd does not accept the vtew he descrtbes ts not relevant tn arguMentatton for or agatnst deep ecology- One Matn potnt tn deep ecology ts tts deep arguMentatton, that ts, arguMentatton froM uLttMate (phLLosophLcaL, reLtgtous) preMtsses, but there Ls rooM for very dLfferent sets of such preMLsses_ A supporter of deep ecology May or May not have any conceptton of a prLMary Loyalty focussed on the bLosphere as an organtc whole_ [The] dtsttnctLon of Levels Ls useful when tryLng to ptn down exactly what a crttLcLsM Ls focusstng on_ The dLagraM furnLshes onLy a ktnd of stattc ModeL_ -10- A supporter of deep ecology wLLL norMaLLy ModLfy the sentences at the dLfferent Levels froM tLMe to tLMe. Hew LnforMatLon May change any hypotheses and therefore also change norMs whLch Ln part have been justLfLed on the basLs of the hypotheses beLng changed. Renewed ethLcaL consLderatLon or new LnforMatLon May Make the supporter change a norM. If a norM Ls changed norMally new sets of hypotheses are Lnvolved, and old ones are dLscarded. ThLs agaLn wLLl cause reverberatLons Ln a sMaLLer or greater part of the fLeld. F roM a po Ln t of v Lew of no rMa t Lve sys teMa t t·~a t Lons what goes on when changes are Made at one or More Levels Ls rather coMpLLcated. But part of Lt Ls processes of derLvatLon. OLagraM l pretends only to Lllustrate LMportant dLfferences of the Levels of derLvatLon and the specLfLc character of Level 2. It represents a condensed forMulatLon of the deepest-Level norMs and hypotheses whLch supporters of the deep ecology MoveMent can agree upon. ThLs Level Ls LLLustrated as the penultLMate (next to ultLMate) Level of arguMentatLon characterLstLc of those supporters of deep ecology who try to artLculate theLr baste vLews. At the thLrd and fourth Level dLsagreeMents May arLse. At the fLrst Level supporters May dLsagree, or fLnd each others vLews' LncoMprehensLb le, or LncoMparable as to valLdLty. Ls not a Measure of value prLorLtLes or of A 'dLrectLon of derLvatLon ethLcaL prLorLtLes. And Lt does not LMply that what Ls derLved Ls a Means Ln relatLon to what Lt Ls derLved froM. A sLMple exaMple Ls enough to clarLfy thLs. FroM 'do not kLlL huMans! ·, follows, Lf you concede 'all Mothers are huMans' the conclusLon 'do not kLLL your Mother!'. ThLs rather concrete norM Ls here derLved froM the More general and abstract one. But thLs does not LMply that huMans Ln general have a hLgher value or a kLnd of prLorLty Ln relatLon to Mothers. It does not say that Ln a norM confLLct you should be More careful not to kLLL huMans than not to kLLL your Mother. An absurd posLtLon! And Lastly, Lt Ls rather strange to refraLn froM kLllLng your Mother as a Means to a goal, · naMely not to kLLL huMans. The forMulatLons of Level 2 have the character of proposals. It May turn out that proposals wLLL dLffer substantLaLLy or show a natural dLversLty of terMLnologLcal and conceptual LdLosyncracLes . UnhappLLy Lt Ls quLte coMMon to MLx the, Ln a broad sense, LogLcal relatLon of derLvatLon wLth other relatLons. These are at Least as LMportant, but nevertheless are dLfferent. (BASIC, pp.1-5) ScheMatLcally we May represent the total vLews LMpLLed Ln the MoveMent by and norMs streaMs of derLvatLon f roM 'h Lghest', L.e. Most fundaMentaL sLtuatLons. lLfe partLcular Ln descrLptLve assuMptLon, to partLcular decLsLons Answers to the deepest questLon, L.e. hLghest norMatLve prLncLples and basLc assuMptLons about the world MLddle range answers. Lower derLvatLonaL Level derLvatLons towards decLsLons Ln partLcular LLfe sLtuatLons. Level of actLon Ln concrete partLcular sLtuatLons. The LLLustratLon reseMbles those of hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeMs. One MaLn dLfference Ls that soMe sentences at the top Level are norMatLve, expressed by LMperatLves. ThLs Makes Lt possLble to furnLsh preferably LMperatLves at the Lowest derLvatLonaL Level, sentences such as ·Turn to the Left!" ·voteforN.N. !. Just as Ln hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeM, Let us say Ln physLcs, only the two upper Levels of the pyraMLd Ls thought of as part of physLcs as a systeM, only those parts are Ln norMatLve systeMs characterLstLc of the total systeM. -11- The sentences change. Ln the Lowest part change froM day to day as LLfe sLtuatLons The above kLnd of presentLng the derLvatLonaL structure of a totaL vLew Must not be taken too serLousLy. SoMe wLLL absoLuteLy refuse even to consLder such a way of exposLtLon. And Lt does not Ln any Manner characterLze thLnkLng wLthLn the deep ecoLogLcaL MoveMents. SoMe of us wLth a professLonaL background of scLence and anaLytLcaL phLLosophy fLnd Lt heLpfuL, however. Arne Naess's systeMatLEatLon LLLustrates the reLatLonshLp of deep ecoLogy's basLc prLncLpLes or Lts "platforM" (LeveL 2), to varLous · possLbLe and relLgLous "fundaMentaL preMLsses on the one hand (LeveL 1) and varLous possLbLe theoretLcaL and practLcaL "consequences" on the other (LeveLs 3 and~). Althou~h thLs systeMatLzatLon Ls presented Ln terMs of "fundaMentaL preMLsses, consequences", and a dLrectLon of "derLvatLon• froM LeveLs (1) to(~), thLs should not be taken to Mean that a sentence at one Level Ls held to follow by vLrtue of necessLty or probabLLLty froN sentences at a prevLous Level L.e~, Naess Ls not proposLng a deductLve or an LnductLve systeM. As he coMMents hLMself, Lt Ls only Ln a "Loose sense• that the deep ecology pLatforM "May be saLd to be derLved froM fundaMentaLs·. In other words, derLvatLon or precLseness Ls a Matter of deLLMLtLng a range of possLble LnterpretatLons. For exaNpLe, we MLght proceed froN a fundaMentaL (L.e. Level 1) reLLgLous or phLLosophLcal preMLss such as "ALL Ls One" or the SpLnozLst Ldea that "there Ls onLy one 'substance• • and, Ln the sense descrLbed, "derLve" the (More precLse) central "plank" Ln the deep ecology "pLatforM" that "there are no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcaL fLeld", or that "aLl entLtLes are constLtuted by theLr relatLonshLps" (LeveL 2). Further precLsatLon MLght express the realLsatLon that "the sense of oneself as a skLn encapsulated ego Ls not Ln accord wLth thLs ' seaMLess web' ontoLogy• (Level 3). None of the steps Ln the above exaMpLe Ls held to foLLow by necessLty (deductLve Lnference) or probabLLLty (LnductLve Lnference) froM sentences at a prevLous LeveL. ALL we have (Ln logLcaL terMs) Ls a chaLn of precLsatLons fLowLng Ln one or Many possLble dLrectLons of LnterpretatLon. Ue could have easLLy started froM the saMe vague, general fundaMentaL preMLss and proceeded to deveLop a chaLn of precLsatLons Ln a very dLfferent dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. Thus, the "dLrectLon of derLvatLon· shown Ln the dLagraMMatLc LLlustratLon of Naess's systeMatLsatLon shouLd be understood as referrLng to both the leveL of precLsatLon and the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. The greater the Level of precLsatLon the More evLdent the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon (or what Naess has prevLousLy referred to as the "defLnLteness of LntentLon")_ Uhat Ls the vaLue of tryLng to provLde a systeMatLsatLon of deep ecology (or any other faLrLy coMprehensLve vLew) when the connectLve LLnks between fundaMentaL preMLsses (LeveL I) and practLcaL consequences (Level~) are as weak as that of "possLbLe LnterpretatLon"? An LMportant answer Must be that such a systeNatLsatLon eMphasLses the contLnuaLLy-beLng-forgotten fact that our Most sophLstLcated and precLse, non-trLvLaL (L ~e. nontautoLogLcaL) reasonLngs are aLways eMbedded or grounded Ln a very generaL "underLyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are." ThLs eMphasLs, thLs contLnual reMLndLng, constLtutes the Most sLgnLfLcant and dLstLnctLve structural feature of deep ecologLcaL thought. (GUIDING STARS, pp.203-4) OnLy LeveL one contaLns phLLosophLes (LncLudLng MetaphysLcs, of course) and expLLcLt reLLgLous foundations. There Ls, and hopefuLLy wLLL never be, Many sLgnLfLcant COMMon characterLstLcs on Level 1. The cLeanLng of 'rubbLsh' on thLs Level Ls a hazardous undertakLng froN MY poLnt of vLew. -12- In a coMprehensLve phLLosophy of Level l, for lnstance ln an 'ecosophy' ln MY terMlnoLogy, every key terM of the pLatforM forMuLatlon, (Level 2), would have to be .coM"ented upon and elucLdated. ThLs "ay be seen as a clearLng up operatlon. A hlgher level of preclseness Ls achLeved and eLLMLnatlon of ph~Losoph~caLLy unsuLtable rhetorLcs. (HOTES ON SYLVAN, pp.8-9) 3: ON BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM The Lntultlon of blocentrlc equaLlty ls that aLL thlngs Ln the blosphere have an equal rlght to Llve and bLossoM and to reach thelr own LndLvlduaL forMs of unfoLdLng and self-reaLlzatlon wlthln the Larger SeLf-reallzatlon. Thls basLc Lntultlon Ls that aLL organLsMs and entltles Ln the ecosphere, as parts of the lnterreLated whole, are equal Ln LntrlnsLc worth. Naess suggests that bLocentrlc equaLLty as an LntuLtlon Ls true ln prLncLpLe, although ln the process of LLvLng, aLL specLes use each other as food, shelter, etc. Mutual predatlon ls a b~ologLcal fact of lLfe, and "any of the world's relLgLons have struggled wLth the spLrltuaL lMpllcatlons of thts. SoMe anlMaL llberatlonLsts who atteMpted to sLde-step thLs probLeM by advocatlng vegetarLanlsM are forced to say that the entLre plant ktngdo" LncLudLng raLn forests have no rLght to thelr own exlstence. ThLs evaslon fLles ln the face of the basLc LntuLtlon of equalLty. Aldo Leopold expressed thLs Lntultlon when sald huMans are •pLaLn cLtlzens• of the btotlc coMMunlty, not Lord and Master over all other specLes. BlocentrLc equaLlty ls lntlMateLy related to the aLL-LnclusLve SeLfreaLlzatLon ln the sense that Lf we harM the rest of Nature then we are harMLng ourselves. There are no boundarles and everythlng ls lnterreLated. But Lnsofar as we percelve thlngs as LndLvLduaL organlsMs or entLtLes, the LnsLght draws us to respect aLL huMan and nonhuMan lndLvLduals ln theLr own rLght as parts of the whole wLthout feeLLng the need to set up hlerarchLes of specles wlth huMans at the top. The practlcaL LMpLlcatlons of thLs lntultlon or norM suggest that we should LLve wlthLn MlnLMuM rather than MaxlMUM lMpact on other specLes and on the Earth ln general. Thus we see another aspect of our guldlng prLnclpLe: ·slMpLe ln Means, rLch ln ends.• (Deep EcoLog~, pp.167-9) blospherLcaL egaLltarlanlsM Ln prlnclpLe' and certaln The abstract terM slMlLar terMs whlch I have used, do perhaps More harM than good. They suggest a posLtLve doctrLne, and that ls too Much. The LMportance of the LntultLon ls but MOMentary, only perhaps the rather lts capaclty to counteract, Less seeMs what towards attltude Lordly and consequentlaL, self-congratulatory developed, Less coMplex, Less MlracuLous. A rlch varLety of acceptable Motlves can be forMuLated for belng More reluctant to Lnjure of klLL a LLvLng beLng of klnd A than a beLng of klnd B. The cultural settlng ls dLfferent for each belng Ln each culture, furtherMore there are few general norMs, only vague guLdeLLnes. One factor: felt nearness, deterMlnes Largely our capactty to ldentLfy ourselves wlth a sort of beLng, to suffer when they suffer. One cannot put forth ethLcaL rules of conduct wlthout takLng such feeltngs and our lLMlted capacLtLes serLously. If Lt Ls dLffLcuLt to avotd klLLLng A because of Lts sMalLness, whereas klLLlng B ls easlLy avolded, we tend to protect B rather than A. Indeed we Llve wLth an obvLous dLversLty of obLlgatlons. Ue have speclaL oblLgatlons towards our own chLldren: Ln Most cultures any anlMaL May be kLLLed ln order to feed one's starvLng chlLd. ObLlgatLons toward specLes that have been MeMbers of our llfe coMMunLty for Long perLods are greater than toward accldentaL vlsltors. FurtherMore, we have the -13- relevance of sufferLng: capacLty of sufferLng? Is the sufferLng of A less than that of B? Has A the The sLMpLe thLng I try to convey here L3 that an ethLcs concernLng dLfferences between non-huMan LLvLng beLngs Ls of a coMparable level of coMpLexLty to ethLcs concernLng dLfferent people and groups wLth whoM we have to do. (lntuLtLon, p.202) Those of us who procLaLM the rLght of all LLfe forMs to LLve and bLossoM thLnk of thLs rLght as an aspect of the 'value Ln LtseLf' whLch we attrLbute to the bLosphere wLth Lts closely Lnterconnected LLfe forMs. The procLaMatLon seeMs to steM froM an LntuLtLon for whLch a graduatLon Ls soMethLng foreLgn. If there Ls such a basLc rLght, Lf Lt can be gLven a faLrly precLse MeanLng, Lt Ls the naMe for all lLfe forMs. It Ls LMportant enough to be terMed bLospherLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM. But Lt Ls perhaps the best to abstaLn froM such Labels. They LnvLte a varLety of LnterpretatLons Most of whLch May be MLsLeadLng. As to the consequences of a posLtLve answer, I thLnk we can learn froM certaLn cultures of hunters and gatherers where bLg anLMaLs are only kLLled after elaborate cereMonLes and excuses'. There Ls acknowLedgeMent of equal rLght, but also of a rLght to kLlL Ln order to Meet vLtaL needs. There Ls a 'norM conflLct' whLch Ls solved through addLtLonal norMs: the perforMance of certaLn rLtes and behavLors of other kLnds. What I thLnk we need not proclaLM Ls that we as huMans are Most or More valuable, or have a hLgher rLght. ~e need not say '1 have a hLgher rLght to LLve and bLossoM than you have, obnoxLus MosquLto, so I kLLL you!' or 'BeLng Much More valuable than you are, I kLlL you and your offsprLng, dLrty rat!' In so far as we have vLtal needs to kLlL, and Ln so far as Lt Ls LnevLtabLe Ln practLce, we May justLfy thLs through varLous norMs whLch are Ln harMony wLth general ecoLogLcal thLnkLng. Do these words solve the relevant probLeMs? Of course not. ~hat I aM drLvLng at Ls the prLorLty of MaLntaLnLng a sort of egalLtarLanLsM Ln p~LncLple. How we can LLve thLs that prLncLpLe Ls a questLon of ethLcs Ln a very general sense, proceedLng froM Many prLncLples whLch LnevLtably Lead to norM confLLcts requLrLng adjustMents froM day to day. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, pp.27-9) AccordLng to Naess, a bLospherLc egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe, of equal value of to the all LLfe, Ls an LntuLtLveLy clear and obvLous value axLoM', at least aLMost ecoLogLcaL fLeLd-worker' (73, p96)!. But eMpLrLcaL surveys would certaLnLy not sustaLn Haess's claLMs. The prLncLpLe seeMs generally neLther LntuLtLve nor obvLous, and Ln several ways Lt appears LncoMpatLbLe wLth the wLder deep ecology pLatforM. It Ls not even obvLous that soMethLng has value by vLrtue of havLng LLfe. On the contrary, value seeMs, lLke yellowness, to be Much More patchLLy dLstrLbuted across the unLverse. SpecLal places, for Lnstance, are especLaLLy valuable. Hor Ls value always dLstrLbuted on LLvLng thLngs, but colours toMbs of the dead; and soMetLMes Lt flakes off consteLlatLons of LLvLng thLngs, for exaMpLe thLngs Ln excess, such as Locusts or rats Ln a plague. But even Lf every LLvLng thLng were assLgned value, Lt would not follow (Ln the way soMetLMes LnvaLLdLy argued) that every thLng has Lt equally. ~hLLe Lt could be saLd that thLngs are equal Ln havLng Lt, thLs Ls rather LLke pretendLng that people are equal Ln an LnegaLLtarLan socLety where all have soMe Money - a subterfuge. Indeed proposed prLncLpLes of deep ecology LnforM us, correctly, that soMe ecoLogLcaL LteMS are More valuable than others. For Lnstance, a certaLn sort of coMpLexLty Ls a vLrtue (Naess 73, prLncLpLe (6)), so presuMabLy an LteM wLth that coMpLexLty Ls More valuable than a sLMple bLoLogLcal LteM. SLMLLarLy, dLversLty of systeM Ls a vLrtue, a prLMe ground of value (prLncLpLe (2)). The upshot appears to be that a hLghly dLverse ecosysteM Ls More valuable -14- than a sLMpLLfLed and LMpoverLshed one_ FurtherMore, bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM Ls LnconsLstent wLth the hoLLstLc, antL-reducLLonL3tLc, antL-LndLvLduaLL3tLc ethos whLch deep ecoLogy LMports froM hoLLstLc ecotogy. AnaLogous concLu3Lons can be reached for •equaL rLghts• forMuLatLons_ For one thLng, equaL rLghts are characterLstLcally based on equal MerLt or equal worth_ For another, arguMents lLke those gLven can be rerun wLth rLghts suppLantLng values_ As a theoretLcaL prLncLpLe, bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM has to be scrapped_ The LMMense dLffLcuLtLes of such a prLncLpLe Ln practLce Naess had already partLally recognLsed, qualLfyLng egalLtarLanLsM to equalLty Ln prLncLple 'because any realLstLc praxLs necessLtates soMe kLllLng, exploLtatLon, and suppressLon' (p_95). The extent of erosLon Ln equalLty thLs affords reMaLns obscure; but Lt couLd be close to total, wLth theoretLcaL equaLLty LapsLng whenever confLLct of rLghts or values LooMed_ Such egaLLtarLanLsM would be LLke a MaxLM of honesty Ln prLncLpLe, whLch appLLed Ln practLce only when Lt was not LnconvenLent; that Ls, but an eMpty MaxLM_ ~hatever Naess's Lntended qualLfLcatLon, Lt stLLL seeMs to people wLth Much practLcaL experLence on the Land or Ln gardenLng, especLaLLy Ln places where the surroundLng natural envLronMent has not been totally transforMed, that he has consLderabLy underestLMated the extent of quaLLfLcatLon needed, and that the prLncLpLe. BLospherLc strangle to begLn does quaLLfLcatLon due theLr own shelter or supply not do who egaLLtarLanLsM Ln practLce Ls for people sustenance, but pass the busLness of ecosysteM Lnterference and ModLfLcatLon on to others (as they typLcaLLy pass the butchery of theLr Meat and the LLke on to others)_ Even were Lt desLrabLe, unLversaL hunter-gatherLng Ls no Longer possLbLe or feasLbLe, wLth so Many Mostly unsuLted and LLL-adapted huMans; and a substantLaL even hunter-gatherers terMLnate the LLves of Many creatures Lnterference wLth theLr rLghts to LLve and bLossoM - and, More LMportant, and dLrectty LnterferLng substantLaLLy ModLfy theLr envLronMents, thus LndLrectly wLth enorMous nuMbers of LLvLng thLngs_ ~hatever rLghts sLMpLer LLvLng organLsMs, especLaLLy ones such as bacterLa and vLruses, have to LLve and bLossoM, they have decLdedLy quaLLfLed and Much attentuated ones. ULth bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM (Ln prLncLpLe) the deep ecology MoveMent has Latched onto a prLncLple whLch Ls both too powerful, and yet, Lf the ·Ln prLncLpLe" quaLLfLcatLon Ls appLLed so as to cover typLcaL LLfestyLes of deep ecoLogLsts, a prLncLpLe so rLddLed wLth exceptLons as to barely hang together. But wLthout soMe of the Lntended force of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM, deep ecology Ls Ln danger of coLLapsLng (LLke Many of Lts followers) Lnto an LnterMedLate posLtLon, as no other part of the pLatforM adequately sustaLns Lts LLMLted separatLon_ Part of what Ls sought wLth the egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe Lnterference, huMan Lnterference to an extent and on a scale far below that of theMe the Ls already afforded a basLs Ln presently prevaLLLng Ls what wLth values-Ln-nature and outsLde the huMan sphere, sLnce Lnterference of value Ls (Lpso facto) LLMLted. Such a prLncLpLe of LLMLted Interference deserves, Ln any case, separate forMuLatLon (whLch Lt usually gaLns Ln deep ecology pLatforMs)_ But even so Lt hardly achLeves the requLsLte separatLon, sLnce LnterMedLate posLtLons can, and do, grant or MaLntaLn soMe such prLncLpLe of lLMLted or reduced Lnterference (thus e-g- BLrch, AttfLeLd, SLnger)_ ~hat Ls requLred Ls a posLtLve equLvaLent of the separatLng feature, of the rejectLon of the greater vaLue assuMptLon, and therewLth of the rejectLon of huMan supreMacy, of the value pLcture of huMans as always nuMber one_ What Ls needed, More generaLLy, Ls a prLncLpLe teLLLng agaLnst the favourLng of one over others sLMpLy on the basLs of specLes, a specLes - huMans Ln partLcuLar -15- prLncLple of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty, to gLve Lt a sLMLlar grandLose tLtle. There Ls soMe reason to suspect that, as elsewhere, a requLreMent of LMparttalLty has been hardened Lnto one of egalLtarLanLsM, that faLrness, because often dLfftcult to assess, has been MLstakenly taken to Lnvolve equaltty. BLospecLes LMpartLalLty LMplLes the avoLdance of specLes chauvLnLsM, that Ls the avotdance of unfaLr treatMent of LteMs outstde the gLven specLes. Because unfaLr, the treatMent concerned lacks any sufftctent justLfLcatLon. Hence, the avotdance of spectes chauvtnLsM Lnvolved Ls effectLvely that prevLously explaLned as a specLal case of class chauvLnLsM. SLMLlarly, the requLreMent of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty Ls a specLal case of the requlreMent of class (or natural group) LMpartlallty, for whlch the arguMents are the saMe as those for the avoldance of class chauvLnLsM. The danger of specLes partLalLty, of favourLng soMe specLes, Ls Much encouraged by a specles fallacy, whLch Ls coMMonly lnvoked ln favourlng huMans. ThLs Ls the error of concludLng that because a few MeMbers of the specles have accoMplLshed soMethtng of (LMMense) value, all MeMbers of the spectes therefore are (hlghly) valuable; all MeMbers of the specles Manage to free-load for the rtde, obtatned by a few MeMbers, so to say. The arguMent, once challenged, usually falls back on an arguMent that goes by way of capacltLes: the reMaLnLng MeMbers of the specles have the capactty to achleve these sorts of thlngs also. But, fLrstly, that Ls not true: LntellLgence, skLlls, and the lLke, vary soMewhat wtthLn specLes, and froM our narrow perspectLve, vary consLderably aMong huMans, soMe of whoM have no capacLty for advanced MatheMatLcs or MusLc. a Secondly, Lt requLres More than capacLty: Lt requLres cLrcuMstances, favourable envlronMent to exercLse theM (hence, ln part, the folly of More huMans ln conspLcuously suboptLMal cLtLes), together wLth a wlll and drlve actually to follow through approprLately on capacLtLes. (CrLtLque, pp.12-16) 4. NON-VIOLENCE The fourth plllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both personal vLolence and -structural vlolence·, that Ls, vLolence and oppresslon LMposed by the state and by Lnstltutlons. For these reasons the Greens support the concept of self-deterMlnatLon for lndLvLduals and groups. They also advocate peace educatLon Ln the schools, whLch would teach nonvLolent Means of conflLct resolutLon and show chLldren that the cult of the soldLer Ls a cultural, not a natural condltLon. The Greens also call for an end to the vLolence and oppressLon toward woMen, chLldren, and MLnorLty groups so coMMon Ln patrLarchal socLetLes. They want to develop a nonexploLtatlve econoMlc systeM Ln whLch eMployee-owned and -controlled busLnesses replace huge operatlons dLctated by or corporate lnterests. They want to transforM our vlolent state the relatLonshLp wlth nature lnto one of balance and respect. Petra Kelly expresses the centralLty of thLs prLncLple when she says, ·NonvLolence Ls the essentLal Lngredtent ln an ecologLcal socLety. • Most of the Greens eMphatLcally eMbrace the prLncLple of Although nonvLolence, they also realLze that Lts appllcatLon Ls often probleMatLc. Roland Vogt polnted out one of the areas of confll~tlng values: What we have not yet accoMplLshed Ls to say how we show ourselves to be nonvLolent at the MOMent when we partLcLpate Ln governMental functLons, because the state Ls Ltself an LnstLtutLon of vLolence. For exaMple, how wlll a Green cLty counctl act agalnst people who don't pay thelr rent, although they really could because they recelve welfare or because they earn enough. The norMal course Ls warnLng, warnLng, evLctLon notLce, and then evLctLon by force and by polLce. We haven't solved thLs. That Ls, there are stLll no thought-out concepts of how we can reconcLle the deMands of socLal -16- responsLbLL Lty wLth the deMands of non vLoLence. The Greens extend theLr prLncLpLe of nonvLoLence to theLr actLve resLstance agaLnst the Most MassLve and potentLaLLy deadly "anLfestatL on of structural vLoLence: the nuclear arMs race proMoted by the MLLLtary-L ndustrLaL coMpLex and the governMent. In theLr natLonaL headquarter s Ln Bonn the Greens have a poster of OandhL s adage "there Ls no way to peace; peace Ls the way• and one of Thoreau 0 Those who eMbrace nonvLoLent cLvLL dLsobedLenc e, coMMLttLng breaches of Law on the grounds of conscLence, are prepared to suffer · vLoLence or punLshMent theMseLves rather than LnfLLct vLoLence or LnjustLce on others or share responsLbLL Lty for such acts by reMaLnLng passLve. •1,, however, the Law Ls so proMuLgated that Lt of necessLty Makes you an agent of LnjustLce agaLnst another, then I say to you: Break the Law." The MajorLty of Greens strongly endorse - and lLve - the concept of actLve, nonvLoLence resLstance. However, the MarxLst-orL ented MeMbers of the party have never been fully supportLve of that prLncLpLe. They vLew Lt "ereLy as a ·MoralLstLc " tactLc that should be abandoned Ln favor of escaLatLng resLstance Lf Lt does not prove suffLcLentL y effectLve. Petra Kelly's account of the LeftLsts' attLtude on thLs Lssue was sLMLlar to what we had heard froM Many other Greens: They do not understand that nonvLolent actLon Ls an extre"ely subversLve force. They thLnk Lt's harMLess, Ls a for" of obedLence, and changes nothLng, that Lt's LLke beggLng froM the state. ·1t's just a tactLc, a toot," they say. To theM everythLng Ls to be used. But there are soMe thLngs you should never "Lsuse - or even use. They are sLMpLy LntegraL. NonvLoLence cannot be coMproMLsed. Although Many of the advocates of nonvLoLent . resLstance argued that ·such a course cannot be dLsMLssed as "Merely MoraLLstLc" sLnce Lt Ls also absolutely ratLonaL (that Ls, hLstory shows that vLoLence breeds vLolence - structural as welt as personal - so we "ust fLnd another way to effect change, especLaLLy Ln the nuclear age). For Most MeMbers of the greens the choLce was clear, as expressed wLth a cLtatLon froM MartLn Luther KLng: •~e no Longer have a choLce or nonvLoLence between vLoLence and nonvLoLence . The choLce Ls eLther nonexLsten ce." (Green PoLLtLcs, pp.~3-7) Deeply coMMLtted persons Ln the ecology Move"ent sense the vuLnerabLLL ty of natural processes to huMan LnterventLo n, and the fundaMentaL necessLty of MaLntaLnLng bLologLcal dLversLty. AffLrMatLon of the LntegrLty of ecosysteMs frequently LnvoLves a caMpaLgn to save froM developMent soMe rLver of canyon or wLLderness area. In a real sense, ecologLcaL resLstance LnvoLves beco"Lng frLends wLth another specLes or a rLver or a MountaLn, for exaMpLe. In general, the resLster takes up the burden of responsLbLl Lty, the burden of wLtnessLng for the other as Self. ThLs process of befrLendLng "ay be based on ArLstotle's crLterLa for frLendshLp: the proMotLon of the other's good for the other's own sake. Or frLendshLp can be the extensLon of self. When OandhL was asked Lf hLs good deeds Ln a vLLLage expressed hLs huManLtarLa nLsM, he repLLed he worked "to serve no • GandhL s stateMent defLned MaturLty. ALtruLsM was one else but Myself unnecessary because hLs self eMbraced the whole vLLLage. 0 There are Many dLfferent tactLcs of LndLvLduaLs and organL2atLo ns Ln save the Earth•, but or poLLtLcaL caMpaLgns whLch seek to ·save the rLver -17- there Ls one overrLdLng or baste norM of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng: non-vLoLence. Ecology teaches us that MankLnd Ls not the center of LLfe on the planet. Ecology has taught us that the whole earth Ls part of our "body" and that we Must Learn to respect Lt as we respect ourselves. As we feel for ourselves, we Must feel for aLL forMs of LLfe - the whales, the seals, the forests, the seas. The treMendous beauty of ecoLogLcaL thought Ls that Lt shows us a pathway back to an understandLng and an apprecLatLon of LLfe LtseLf - an understandLng and apprecLatLon that Lt Ls LMperatLve to that very way or LLfe. As wLth the whales and the seals, LLfe Must be saved by nonvLoLent confrontatLons, by what the Quakers caLL "bearLng wLtness•. A person bearLng wLtness Must accept responsLbLLLty for beLng aware of an LnjustLce. The person May then choose to do soMethLng or stand by, but he May not turn away Ln Lgnorance. The Greenpeace ethLc Ls not onty to personally bear wLtness to atrocLtLes agaLnst lLfe; Lt Ls to take dLrect actLon to prevent theM. ~hLLe actLon Must be dLrect, Lt Must also be non-vLoLent. Ue Must obstruct a wrong wLthout offerLng personal vLoLence to Lts perpetrators. Ue Must know that our greatest strength Ls LLfe LtseLf, and the coMMLtMent to dLrect our lLves to prbtect others. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng could be defLned as keepLng the peace of the neLghborhood. Rarely are vandals or vLolent neLghbors welcoMe Ln the neLghborhood. Uhen the neLghbors Lnclude rLvers and MountaLns, seashores and prarLes, then the LntegrLty of the ecosysteM Ls MaLntaLned. In hLs explLcatLon of GandhL's theory of nonvLoLence, Arne several norMs of nonvLoLent potLtLcat caMpaLgns. These Lnctude: Naess lLsts l. Announce your case and the goal of your caMpaLgn explLcLtty and clearly, dLstLnguLshLng essentLaLs froM nonessentLats. 2. Seek personal contact wLth your opponent and be avaLLable to hLM. · BrLng confLLctLng groups Lnto personal contact. 3. Turn your opponent Lnto a beLLever Ln and supporter of your case, but do not coerce or expLoLt hLM. ~- You provoke your opponent Lf you deLLberateLy or carelessly destroy hLs property. of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng denounce theorLsts LeadLng nonvLoLence as tactLcs. But as Rober ALtken RoshL wrote: vLoLence versus Non-vLoLence Ls not just a tactLc for people who Make Lt a practLce ... The end Ls the Means, Ln other words. Look at poLLtLcaL hLstory or at the hLstory of any MoveMents. Uhen we work for certaLn goals, those goals tend to betray us. Ue defeated L.B. Johnson only to get RLchard NLxon. Ue got rLd of the B-1 BoMber (teMporarLLy) and the CruLse MLssLle appeared. Ue have to Make our actLon the goal. Our actLon Must LtseLf be the truth. Our actLon Must be Lts own defense, Lts own procLaMatLon, Lts own purpose. (Letter to the author, June 1982) Both on practLcaL and ethLcaL grounds, vLoLence Ls rejected as a Mode of ecotogLcal resLstance. TerrorLst attacks on nuclear plants or MLssLle sLtes could cause ·red" alerts and vLolent responses froM governMent agencLes. PLacLng one's own LLfe at rLsk, such as sLttLng Ln front of bulldozers or polLce cars at a deMonstratLon to protest destructLon of the raLn forest, May be LLLegaL but not vLoLent. And spontaneous acts such as the decoMMLssLonLng of a power generator or bulldozer May draMatLze the contLnuLng destructLon of a -18- spectal ecosysteM. Ecologtcal reststance also Means defendtng natural dtverstty through educatLon, publLc speakLng, and use of lawsuLts; tryLng to convert publtc opLnton to the cause; and tnforMLng poltttctans and dectsLon Makers. ResLstance Ls another naMe for afftrMatLon - joyful affLrMatton of the tntegrLty of Nature, natural dLversLty, and MLnLMuM huMan LMpact on place. (Deep Ecolo9H, pp.16-17) The Deep Ecology MOVeMent and peace MoveMent. Ftfteen years ago close cooperatton between supporters of deep ecology and actLvtsts Ln the peace MoveMent was out of reach. Rather suddenly thts sttuatton Ls totally changed. SoMe of us, ltke Myself, favour unLlateral dtsarMaMent and establtshMent of MtlLtant, but unherotc, non-vtolent defence. At thts potnt Lt ts tMportant for actLvtsts to stress the dtstLnctLon between actLon, caMpaLgn and MOVeMent. They May be tllustrated by three concentrLc cLrcles. The LnnerMost coMprLse the dLrect actLons wLthLn a caMpatgn, for Lnstance, a dated deMonstratLon at a parttcular locatLon agatnst the butldtng of a daM, or the non-vtolent obstructton of the transport of the MachLnery on the way to the daM sLte. ThLs May be part of a ten year old caMpaLgn to save a rtver (LncludLng of course tts ecosysteM) froM developMent of soMe sort. Ten dLrect acttons May be fatlure, but nevertheless theLr LMpact May conflLct, contrtbute to vLctory of the caMpaLgn. (Or May polarLze the antt-actLvtsts Many what Ls That contrLbutLng to the faLlure of the caMpatgn? MaLntaLn.) The rLver caMpaLgn together wLth other analogous caMpaLgns May be seen as part of a MoveMent of greater or lesser generaltty. A MoveMent to save rtvers, or More generally a conservatton MoveMent. Many caMpatgns May be fatlures, but the MOVeMent goes on. (Hates on Poltttcs, pp.l~-JS) Gandhtan and other forMs of non-vtolence are wtdely found wLthtn the deep ecologLcal MoVeMent. There Ls a reluctance to accept destructLon of MachLnery Ln efforts to stop destructton even of holy places. There Ls soMe dtsagreeMent on thts and related subjects. I do not thtnk that the coMpletely general norMs of care and consLderatLon should be looked upon as part of the specLftc platforM of the deep ecology MoveMent . . (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, p.31) In suM, the paradtgM of deep ecology Ls revolutLonary tn tts MetaphysLcs, epLsteMology, and cosMology, but deep ecologLsts do not seek to overthrow governMents by force of arMs or to Lssue anythLng lLke a coMprehensLve, alleMbracLng polLtLcal prograM for brLngLng about the new order. The conteMporary deep ecology MoveMent seeMs to be what Robert NLsbet has called a "wLthdrawal and renewal" MoveMent such as has perLodLcally arLsen .Ln ~estern socLety sLnce the fall of the RoMan EMpLre. There ts no poltttcal party of "deep ecology,· no cadre of poltttcal revoluttonarte s. Thts ts not an approprtate approach for deep ecologtsts. No frontal confrontatLons wLth reforMLst envLronMental tsts or wLth the doMLnant socLal/polttLc al order Ls destred. It would be counter-product Lve by Maktng people More defensLve of thetr LdeologLcal posLtLon. Deep ecology Ls not an atteMpt to add one More tdeology Ln the crowded fLeld of Modern LdeologLes. Deep ecologLsts are questLng for ways to lLberate and cultLvate the ecologLcal conscLousness. FroM ecologtcal conscLousness wtll naturally flow an ecologtcal reststance. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.316-17) 5: ON SELF-REALIZATION Naess: Self-realtzatLo n ts the realtzatLon of -19- the potentLaltttes of ltfe. OrganLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln three ways gLve us Less dLversLty than organLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln one hundred ways. Therefore, the selfreaLLzatLon we experLence when we LdentLfy wLth the unLverse Ls heLghtened by an Lncrease Ln the nuMber of ways Ln whLch LndLvLduals, socLetLes, and even specLes and lLfe forMs realLze theMselves. The greater the dLversLty, the, the greater the self-realLzatLon. ThLs seeMLng duaLLty between LndLvLduaLs and the totalLty Ls encoMpassed by what I call the Self and the ChLnese call the Tao. Most people Ln deep ecology have had the feelLng - usually, but not always, Ln nature - that they are connected wLth soMethLng greater than theLr ego, greater than theLr naMe, theLr faMLLy, theLr specLaL attrLbutes as an LndLvLdual - a feelLng that Ls often called oceanLc because Many have Lt on the ocean. ULthout that LdentLfLcatLon, one Ls not easLLy drawn to becoMe LnvoLved Ln deep ecology. Many people have thLs feeLLng when they see a death struggle - for Lnstance tLny anLMaLs LLke fLtes or Mosquttoes fLghtLng for thetr ltves. Uhen they see anLMals sufferLng, they May LdentLfy wLth LLfe forMs they usually don't LdentLfy wLth. Such sLtuatLons offer us an opportunLty to develop a More Mature poLnt of vLew. Insofar as thLs conversLon, these deep feelLngs are reLLgLous, deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, and those people who have done the Most to Make socLetLes aware of the destructLve way Ln whLch we LLve Ln reLatLon to natural settLngs have had such relLgLous feeLLngs. Rachel Carson, for exaMpLe, says that we cannot do what we do, we have no reLLgLous or ethLcaL justLfLcatLon for behavLng as we do toward nature. Her arguMent Ls not calculated or reasonable Ln the usual sense, sayLng that, Lf we contLnue poLsonLng nature, we wLLl be Less healthy, or wLLL have fewer resources, and so on. She Ls sayLng that we are sLMply not perMLtted to behave Ln that way. SoMe wLll say that nature Ls not Man's property, Lt's the property of God; others wLLL say Lt Ln other ways. The MaLn poLnt Ls that deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, fundaMental LntuLtLons that everyone Must cuLtLvate Lf he or she Ls to have a LLfe based on values and not functLon LLke a coMputer. Uhereas shallow ecology, Lf taken to Lts logLcaL extreMe, Ls lLke a coMputerLzed, cost-benefLt anaLysLs for huMans. (SLMpLe tn Means, p.11) If the terM seLf-reaLLzatLon Ls applLed, Lt should be kept Ln MLnd that Me", "ego , and self have shLftLng denotatLons. NothLng Ls evLdent and •1·, LndLsputabLe. Even that we are Ls debatable Lf we Make the questLon dependent upon answertng what we are. Self-realLzatLon Ln Lts absolute MaxLMUM Ls, as I see Lt, the Mature experLence of oneness Ln dLversLty as depLcted Ln the above verse. The MLnLMUM Ls the seLf-reaLL2atLon by More of Less consLstent egotLsM - by the narrowest experLence of what constLtutes one's self and a MaxLMUM of alLentatLon. As eMpLrLcaL beLngs we dweLL soMewhere Ln between, but Lncreased MaturLty LnvoLves tncrease of the wLdeness of the self. The seLf-reaLtzatton MaxLMuM should not necessarLLy be conceLved as a MystLcal or MedLtattonaL state. ·ey MedLtatLon soMe perceLve the Self tn the self by the self; others by the path of knowledge and stLLl others by the path of work (karMa-yoga) [Gtta: Chapter 13,, verse 2~]. GandhL was a karMa-yoga, reaLLzLng hLMseLf through socLaL and poLLtLcaL actLon. The terMs MystLcal unLon and MystLcLsM are avoLded here for three reasons: Ftrst, strong Mysttcal tradLtLons stress the dtssolutLon of Lndtvtdual selves Lnto a nondLversLfLed supreMe whole. Both froM cultural and ecoLogLcaL poLnt of vtew dLversLty and LndLvtdualLty are essentLaL. Second, there Ls a strong terMLnoLogtcaL trend wtthtn sctenttftc coMMuntttes to assoctate MysttcLsM wtth MystLcs tend to agree that MysttcaL ThLrd, confuston. and vagueness conscLousness Ls rarely sustatned under norMal, everyday condLttons. But strong, -20- w~de LdentLfLcatLon can color experLence under such condLtLons. GandhL was only MargLnally concerned wLth 'nature'. In hLs ashraM poLsonous snakes were perMLtted to tLve LnsLde and outsLde huMan dwettLngs. AntL-poLson MedLcLnes were frowned upon~ GandhL LnsLsted that trust awakens trust, and that snakes have the saMe rLght to tLve land btossoM as the huMans. (IdentLfLcatLon, pp.259-6) In keepLng wLth the spLrLtual tradLtLons of Many of the worlds s retLgLons, the deep ecology norM of setf-reatL2atLon goes beyond the Modern western self hedonLstLc whLch Ls defLned as an Lsotated ego strLvLng prLMarLly for gratLfLcatLon or for a narrow sense of LndLvLduat satvatLon Ln thLs tLfe or the next. ThLs socLatty prograMMed sense of the narrow self or socLat self dLslocates us, and leaves us prey to whatever fad or fashLon Ls prevalent Ln our socLety or socLat reference group. Ue are thus robbed of be9LnnLn9 the search for our unLque spLrLtuat/b.LologLcal personhood. SpLrLtual growth, or unfotdLng, begLns when we cease to understand or see ourselves as Lsolated and narrow coMpetLng egos and begLn to LdentLfy wLth other huMans forM our faMLly and frLends to, eventually, our specLes. But the deep ecology sense of self requLres a further MaturLty and growth, an LdentLfLcatLon whLch goes beyond huManLty to Lnclude the nonhuMan world. Ue Must see beyond our narrow conteMporary cultural assuMptLons and values, and the conventLonat wLsdoM of our tLMe and place, and thLs Ls best achLeved by the MedLtatLve deep questLonLng process. Only Ln thLs way can we hope to attaLn full Mature personhood and unLqueness. A nurturLng nondoMLnatLng socLety can help Ln the "real work" of becoMLng a whole person. The ·real work• can be suMMarLzed syMbolLcally as the realLzatLon of "self-Ln-Self- where ·setf· stands for organLc wholeness. ThLs process of the full unfoldLng of the self can also be SUMMarLzed by the phrase, •No one Ls saved untLt we are all saved,· where the phrase •one• Lncludes not only Me, an LndLvLduat huMan, but all huMans, whales, grLzzly bears, whole raLn forest ecosysteMs, MountaLns and rLvers, the tLnLest MLcrobes Ln the soLt, and so on. (Deep Ecology, pp.66-7) of norM SubscrLbLng to these prLncLples, Naess asserts, coMes froM the self-realLzatLon, that ·.~. wLth MaturLty, huMan beLngs wLtl experLence joy and sorrow when other tLfe forMs experLence sorrow. Not only wLll we feet sad when our brother or the dog or cat feels sad, but we wLll grLeve when lLvLng beLngs, LncludLng landscapes, are destroyed. In our cLvLlLzatLon, we have vast Means' of destructLon at our dLsposal but extreMely lLttle MaturLty Ln our feelLngs. Only a very narrow range of feetLngs have Lnterested Most huMan beLngs untLt now.• ThLs deepenLng of feetLngs seeMs to run counter . to the trend Ln Modern socLety toward superfLcLat relatLonshLps . . . . Arne Naess asserts that ·setfrealLzatLon cannot develop far wLthout sharLng joys and sorrows wLth others, or More fundaMentalty, wLthout the developMent of the narrow ego of the sMall chLld Lnto the coMprehensLve structure of a Self that coMprLses all huMan beLngs. The ecologLcal MoveMent -- as Many earlLer phLlosophLcat MoveMents -- takes a step further and asks for developMent such that, there Ls a deep LdentLfLcatLon of LndLvLduals wLth all lLfe." I suggest that the leaders of the ecology MoveMent devetopMent theLr ethLcs after they had Moved along thLs path of Self-reatLzatLon. (Stone/Sky, pp.6-7) But what Ls wrong wLth the wLdely applauded atteMpt, runnLng through Much LdeatLstLc and Eastern thLnkLng, to explLcate value through self-realLsatLon? FLrstly, lLke utLlLtarLan explLcatLons, such as those through happLness and satLsfactLon, Lt Ls Much too experLentLal. It renders value a feature of those -21- who exper~ence value - roughly of valuers - rather than of what ~s valued, and bears value. It Ls lLke sayLng that colour Ls a Matter of those (huMans) who perceLve colour, not of the (coMposLtLon of) thLngs that are coloured. And reMove the experLences, those undertakLng self-realLsatLon, as Ln the days before lLfe appears and value dLsappears. And that too Ls wrong. Secondly, even Lf self-realLsatLon were always worthwhLle and never tLed to by contrast wLth lLfe - there are exaMpLes of value whLch fall beyond evLl (Ln presented often seLf-reaLLsatLon. A certaLn sort of dLrectLon Ls bLocheMLstry texts Lnterested Ln explaLnLng lLfe) as a MLnLMal condLtLon of lLfe of an organLsr1 or syster1: caLL that dLrectLon, s·eLf-dLrecti.on. Thus, deep ecology, Lnsofar as Lt values (just) LLfe, values (just) self-dLrectLon. In these terMs, the contractLon froM seLf-dLrectLon to self-realLsatLon, as Ln Ecosophy T, Looks LLke a M~stake. A s~r1LLar M~stake appears to underLLe contractLons to ecologLcal conscLousness (as Ln Devall); for self-realLsatLon Looks rer1arkabLy L~ke consc~ous seLf-d~rectLon, roughly an LntersectLon of seLf-dLrectLon wLth conscLousness. The argur1ents asser1bLed thus underMLne both of what Devall presents as the uLtLMate norMs of deep ecology', nar1eL~eLf-reaLLsatLon and bLocentrLsM. 'These are not proved but "felt"' (83, p.5). But they are not felt, at least by those who perceLve value beyond what lLves; rather they are dLsproved, by a serLes of counterexar1ples to each as uLtLr1ate norr1s. (CrLtLque, pp.2~-5) In partLcular presentatLons of a partLcular phLLosophy froM whLch the Naess-SessLon platforM Ls derLved, naMely Ecosophy r' I use a Model where 'Self-realLzaHon!' and sLr1LLar short forr1uLatLons are taken to express a top norr1 of a norr1atLve systeM. ~e r1ay artLcuLate 'r1odeLs' of a very cor1prehensLve norr1atLve syster1, and use Lt to explore the LnterrelatLons of our own vLews and those of others. I have extensLvely used a Model of a cor1prehensLve yLew I call 'Ecosophy r ·' and I use only one top norM whLch on the Most crude ser1antLcaL Level Ls expressed by a one word sentence 'seLf-realLzatLon! '. A r1aLn LnspLratLon for - the choLce cor1es froM the use of the terN by GandhL. Another MaLn LnspLratLon Ls the strong trend Ln Uestern LndustrLaL states towards an LndLvLdualLsM favourLng lLfe as a Long ego-trLp full of 'happenLngs' . In France there Ls a group of 'egologLsts' , the nar1e beLng chosen as a contrast to 'ecologLsts ' : ~hatever the reLatLons between LndLvLdual beLngs, huMan nature Ls such that the egocentred Lnterests of each of us Ls stronger than any other. To foster the kLnds of soLLdar~ty the pol~t~cal left ~s taLkLng about, or the soLLdarLty wLth other lLfe forMs wh~ch . ecologLsts (the greens) preach, w~ll therefore never succeed and ~s apt to hurt the LndLvLduaL . ' seLf-reaL~zatLon!' Ls a norM that LnLtLaLLy arLses vLvLd Lnterest aMong those who are LnfLuenced by the ego-trLp trend, but are then astonLshed and bewLLdered by the d~stLnctLons between ego, self and Self. Th~s ~s new to Most of theM and they are often Led to recons~der theLr LndLvLduaL~st posLtLon. ThLs reconsLderLng Ls for Me a confLrMatLon of the SocratLc value of the choLce of forr1ulatLon. The r1aLn poLnt Ln thLs connectLon Ls that huMans undergo a r1aturLn9 process, and only Lf thLs process coMes to a 'prer1ature' halt, LndentLfLcatLon wLth others and solLdarLty faLL to develop. If we, as I do, add the SpLnozLst (courageous) hypothes~s that the joy and equLMLndedness you exper~ence as a Mature person ~s deeper and rLcher than that you exper~ence as an ~r1r1ature grown 'reaLLzaHon of the (wLde) Self!' gets to be an ~nstructi.ve and ~nsp~rLng up, -22- forMu l,a. The Self-realLzatLo n norM proposed by Me has been taken too serLously as Lf one, two or three world expressLons were adequate phLLosophLcaL expressLons of a hL9hest' norM. An adequate expressLon LMplLes that the LntrLcate subject ego, se Lf, Se Lf ', that Ls, b Lo Log Lea L, soe La L and Hetaphys Lea L se Lf ar·e dLstLnguLshed. Only Ln relatLon to a faLrly Large body of phLlosophLcaL analysLs we can forMulate adequate phLlosophLcal prLncLples. It has always been that way. (Notes on Sylvan, pp.17-19) HY 0 6: OH LIFESTYLE The deep ecologLcal MoveMent Ls recruLted froM people who do not look upon natural surroundLngs as a Means for recreatLon and repaLr. LLfe and work Ln natural surroundLngs Ls a vLtal concern. The rLchness of that LLfe Ls so vast, and the Means are so sLMple, that they have dLffLculty understandLng why others seeM to need Means on a level of coMplLcatLon and sophLstLcatLon that Ls unLque Ln the hLstory of [huMan]kLnd. They cannot but fLght agaLnst the acceleratLng destructLon of nature due to the MaLntaLnLng and expandLng the productLon of such Means. They do not thLnk people who serLousLy reflect upon the reLatLon between Means and ultLMate LntrLnsLc values can justLfy the present polLcLes. As an LllustratLon of dLfferent Means/end ratLos, coMpare the dLrect and LndLrect technologLcal requLreMent of a faMLly wLth MeMbers froM 8 to 80 years old lLvLng Ln a natural surroundLng and goLng cross-country skLLng together, wLth that of a faMLly doLng slaloM at a bLg fashLonable skL resort. (PhLlosophLcal. Aspects, pp.35-6) 0 RLch Ln ends, sLMple Ln Means!.' HuMan Lnterference Ln the ecosphere can only be reduced to tolerable levels Lf people, and especLally the average (or econoMLcally above average) people of the LndustrLal states adopt lLfe styles requLrLng sLMple MaterLal Means. ThLs Ls coMpatLble wLth or even favourable towards rLchness of goals. 'Increase the sensLtLvLty to and apprecLatLon of what there Ls suffLcLent of for all!' The educatLonal slogan fLghts agaLnst the confusLon of value wLth Market value and prLce. A way to MaxLMLze our abLlLty to derLve deep satLsfactLon froM the goods of whLch there stLll, Ls, or coul.d be, enough. The present lLfe style of average people Ln LndustrLal socLetLes cannot be a global lLfe style wLthout LrreversLble, colossal destructLon of condLtLons of LLfe on Earth. (Hotes on PolLtLcs, p.2) It ' s a shLft froM beLng doMLnated by Means, LnstruMents, gadgets, all the Many thLngs we thLnk wLLl gLve us pleasure or Make us happy or perfect. The shLft coMes about when we serLously ask ourselves, In what sLtuatLons do I experLence the MaxLMUM satLsfactLon of MY whole beLng? and fLnd that we need practLcally nothLng of what we are supposed to need for a rLght and fuLfLlLLng LLfe. And Lf we Make that shLft toward a LLfe sLMple Ln Means but rLch Ln goals, we are not threatened by the plans elaborated by envLronMentalL sts. For Lnstance, we can see that, Lnstead of an ene~gy cr~s~s, we have a crLsLs of consuMptLon - we have More than enough energy. There Ls no reason to contLnue LncreasLng our consuMptLon of energy or of any of the other MaterLaL aspects of lLfe. In countrLes lLke the UnLted States the crLsLs Ls rather one of LLfestyle, of our tradLtLons of thoughtlessness and confusLon, or our LnabLLLty to questLon what Ls and Ls not worthwhLLe Ln l,Lfe. ULthLn fLfty years, eLther we wLl,l, need a dLctatorshLp to save what Ls Left of the dLversLty of LLfe forMs, or we wLLl have a shLft of values, a shLft of our total vLew such that no dLctatorshLp wLLL -23- be . needed. It Ls thoroughly natural to stop doMLnatLng and expLoLtLng and destroyLng the planet. A "sMooth" ~ay, LnvoLvLng harMonLous LLvLng wLth nature, or a "rough" way, LnvoLvLng dLctatorshLp and coercion - those are the optLdns. I tell people that, Lf they Make clear theLr fundaMentaL assuMptLons about what Ls needed for a LLfe sLMpLe Ln Means and rLch Ln ends, they wLLL necessarLLy coMe to the conctusLon that Lt Ls not tack of energy consuMptLon that Makes theM unhappy. They can then oppose nuclear power wLthout havLng read thLck books and wLthout knowLng the MyrLad facts that are used Ln newspapers and perLodLcaLs. And they Must also fLnd others who feel the saMe and forM cLrcLes of frLends who gLve one another confidence and support Ln lLvLng Ln a way that the MajorLty fLnds rLdLcuLous, naLve, stupLd, and sLMpt~stLc. But Ln order to do that, one Must already have enough seLf-confLdenc e to follow one's LntuLtLon - a quaLLty very Much LackLng Ln broad sectLons of the populace. Most people follow the trends and advertLseMents and becoMe phLLosophLcaL and ethLcaL crLpples. I thLnk that, Ln the long run, Ln order to joyfully and wholeheartedly partLcLpate Ln the deep ecology MoveMent you have to take your own LLfe very seriously. People who successfully MaLntaLn a Low MaterLaL standard of lLvLng and successfully cultLvate a deep, Lntense Lnner lLfe are Much better able to consLstentLy MaLntaLn a deep ecoLogLcat vLew and to act on behalf of Lt. As 1· sLt down and breathe deeply and just feel where I aM, I can ask Myself where and when I really enjoy MY LLfe and what would be the MLnLMuM Means necessary to MaLntaLn those enjoyable feelLngs and sLtuatLons. For exaMpLe, I Myself have too eager to go cLLMbLng Ln the HLMaLayas, whereas the pecutLar been satLsfactLon I have as a MountaLneer could be had Ln Norway . If you concentrate on what gLves you satLsfactLon, you wLLL fLnd that Lt can be obtaLned Much More easLly and sLMply than we are educated to belLeve Ln our socLety, where bL99er, More elaborate and More expensLve are always consLdered better. The deveLopMent of sensLtLvLty toward the good thLngs whLch we already have Ln suffLcLent quantLty Ls the true goal of educatLon. Not that we need to LLMLt our desLres. I'M not for the sLMple lLfe, except Ln the sense of a tLfe sLMpLe Ln Means but rLch Ln goals and values. I have treMendous aMbLtLon. Only the best Ls good enough for Me. I LLke rLchness, and I feel rLcher than the rLchest person when I'M Ln MY cottage Ln the country wLth water I've carrLed froM a certaLn well and wood I've gathered froM the forest. Uhen you take a heLLcopter to the SUMMLt of a MountaLn,° the vLew Looks LLke a postcard, and, Lf there ' s a restaurant on the top, you wLll coMplaLn that the food Ls not properly Made. ~hereas Lf you struggle up froM the bottoM, you have thLs deep feeLLng of satLsfactLon, and even sandwLches MLxed wLth skL wax and sand taste fantastLc. (SLMple Ln Means, pp . 11-12) (1) Use of s LMple Means, avoidance of unnecessary coMplLcated LnstruMents and other sorts of Means. (2) ChoLce of actLvLtLes Most dLrectLy servLng values Ln theMselves and havLng LntrLnsLc value. AvoLdance of actLvLtLes whLch are Merely auxLlLary, havLng no LntrLnsLc value , or beLng Many stages away froM fundaMentaL goals. (3) AntL-consuMerLs M . ThLs negatLve attLtude follows froM (1) and (2). (~) Endeavour to MaLntaLn and Lncrease the sensLtLvLty and apprecLatLon of goods of whLch there Ls enough for all to enjoy. ' (5) Absence or low degree of novophLLL - the love of what Ls new Merely because Lt Ls new. (6) Effort to dwell Ln sLtuatLons of LntrLnsLc value and to act rather than beLng busy . (7) ApprecLatLon of ethnLc and cultural differences aMon9 people, not feelLn9 theM as threats . (8) Concern about the sLtuatLon of the thLrd and fourth world and atteMpt to -24- avoLd a standard of LLvLng too Much dLfferent froM and hLgher than the needy. (Global soLLdarLt y of LLfe style). (9) ApprecLat Lon of LLfe styles whLch are unLversaL LzabLe, whLch are not blatantly LMpossLbLe to sustaLn wLthout LnjustLce toward fellow huMans or other specLes. (10) To go for depth and rLchness of experLenc e rather than LntensLty . (11) To apprecLat e and choose, when possLbLe, MeanLngfuL work rather than just MakLng a LLvLng. (12) To Lead a coMpLex, not a coMpLLca ted LLfe, tryLn9 to reaLLze as Many aspects of posLtLve experLenc es as possLbLe wLthLn each tLMe-Lnte rvaL. (13) CuLtLvatL ng LLfe Ln coMMunLty (GeMeLns chaft) rather than Ln socLety (OeseLLs chaft}. sMaLL scale Ln prLMary productLo n (14) ApprecLat Lon of or partLcLpa tLon agrLcuLtu re, forestry, fLshLng. (15) Effort to satLsfy vLtaL needs rather than desLres. (Paradox, pp.57-8) In soMe Eastern tradLtLon s, the student Ls presented wLth a koan, a sLMpLe story or stateMent whLch May sound paradoxLc aL or nonsensLc aL on the surface but as the student turns and turns Lt Ln hLs or her MLnd, authentLc understan dLng eMerges. ThLs dLrect actLon · of turnLng and turnLn9, seeLn9 froM dLfferent perspectL ves and froM dLfferent depths, Ls requLred for the cuLtLvatL on of conscLou sness. The koan-LLke phrase for deep ecology, suggested by proMLnen t NorwegLan phLLosoph er Arne Naess Ls: ·sLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends.· (Deep Ecology, p.10) The LdeoLogLcaL change Ls MaLnLy that of apprecLat Lng LLfe quaLLty Ln sLtuatLon s of Lnherent value) rather than adherLng to an (dweLLLng LncreasLn gLy hLgher standard of LLvLng. There wLLL be a profound awareness of the dLfferenc e between bLg and great. SoMe econoMLs ts crLtLcLze the terM "quaLLty of LLfe" because Lt Ls supposed to be vague. But on closer LnspectLo n, what they consLder to be vague Ls actuaLLy the non-quan tLtatLve nature of the terM. One cannot quantLfy adequatel y what Ls LMportant for the quaLLty of LLfe as dLscussed here, and there Ls no need to do so. There Ls aMple rooM for dLfferent op~n~ons about prLorLtLe s: what should be done fLrst, what next? What Cs Most urgent? What Ls necessary as opposed to what Ls hL9hLy desLrabLe ? But the dLfferenc es do not exclude vLgorous cooperatL on. ~hat Ls gaLned froM tentatLve Ly forMuLatL ng basLc vLews shared today by Most or all supporter s of the deep ecology MoveMent? Hopefully Lt Makes Lt a LLttLe easLer to LocaLLze the MoveMent aMong the Many 'aLternat Lve' MoveMents. Hopefully thLs does not Lead to LsoLatLon but rather to even better cooperatL on wLth Many other aLternatL ve MoveMents. It MLght also Make soMe of us More clear about where we stand, and More clear about whLch dLsagreeM ents MLght profLtabL y be reduced and whLch ones MLght profLtabL y be sharpened . After aLL dLversLt y!' Ls a hLgh Level norM! (BasLc, p.6,9) 0 A set of platforM forMulatL on should be vague and aMbLguous enough to be capable or rather dLfferen t phLLosoph LcalLy relevant Lnterpret atLons. The prLncLpLe s of Lnterpret atLon of pLatforMs of MoveMents reseMbLe those of Lnterpret atLon of Laws. Vagueness Ls here essentLaL prLMarLLy because those appLyLng the Laws Must have soMe freedoM Ln adaptLng theM to ever changLng cLrcuMst ances, but also because the forMuLatL on Must slur over, or abstract froM MLnor dLfferenc es of relevant opLnLon aMon9 those who have supported the Lssue of the Law. On the other hand, the Lnterpret atLon of the text of a phLLosop her reseMbLes that of a testaMent ( 'wLLL' ). Exactly what the testator Lntends Ls the -25- sole crLterLon of correctness of the LnterpretatLon . Uhether hLs or her terMLnology Ls abhorent or crazy Ls Lrrelevant. (Hates on Sylvan, pp.10-11) 7: ON BIOREGIOHALISM The central eleMent of bLoregLon Ls the LMportance gLven to natural systeMs "both as the source of physLcal nutrLtLon and as the body of Metaphors froM whLch our spLrLts draw sustenance. To understand natural systeMs Ls to begLn an understandLng of the self." A second eleMent of bLoregLon Ls setf-regulatLo n: •anarchy doesn't Mean out Lt Means out of theLr control.• Local coMMunLtLes LnspLred by a control; of shared concern for the bLoregLon, for "tettLng be• the plants and natLve anLMals of that place, ~an Make decLsLons concernLng LndLvLduat and coMMunat actLons whLc respect the LntegrLty of natural processes Ln that place. CarLng for a place Means avoLdLng exptoLtatLon. thLrd eleMent coMposLng the bLoregLonal notLon Ls spLrLt. • There Ls no sLngle relLgLous practLce for thLs sense of bLoregLonat spLrLt. It can be ChrLstLan, BuddhLst, NatLve AMerLcan or others; based on deep ecologLcal LnsLghts, Lt can be expressed Ln nuMerous ways. (Deep Ecology, pp.21-22) ·A UhLte the bLoregLonal, MLnorLty tradLtLon seeMs approprLate to us for cuttLvatLng ecotogLcal conscLousness, atlowLng for bLologLcat dLversLty wLth sLMplLcLty of Means, there are tough, practLcat decLsLons to Make. ConsLstent wLth our uttLMate norMs, Lt seeMs that one prLncLple Ls protectLon of endangered specLes of plants and anLMals as part of the general norM of unLty Ln dLversLty. Another norM Ls bLoregLonal responsLbLlLty . The local coMMunLty Ls the place for decLsLons. However, what happens when a local COMMunLty's needs conflLct wLth the norM of protectLng specLes dLversLty? Such a sLtuatLon occurred on the north slope of Alaska where natLve EskLMos were huntLng bowhead whales Ln the 1970s. The InternatLonat UhatLng Co~MLssLon ruled that thLs was an endangered specLes of whale and consLdered a total ban on the kLttLng of bowhead. However, the natLve EskLMos pleaded that Lt was part of theLr tradLtLon to kLtt whales. TheLr Myths and tLfestyle were dependent on Lt. It they dLdn't kLll whales they would be More dependent on canned Meat froM the "tower forty-eLght": gLven theM by welfare departMents. ThLs soMewhat sptLt the envLronMentalL sts . Many groups supported a total ban on the kLllLng of bowheads untLl ecologLsts deterMLned that theLr poputatLon had "suffLcLently Lncreased, • but FrLends of the Earth took the posLtLon that EskLMos be allowed to take a regulated nuMber of bowheads usLng theLr tradLtLonal Methods (no advanced technology for kLtlLng theM was allowed). Arne Haess provLdes an exaMple froM the bLoregLon ·of northern Horway where farMers and herders, through expansLon of farMs and nuMber of sheep , were rapLdty encroachLng on habLtat of wolves and bears. SoMe suggested kLllLng all bears sLnce a few bears seeMed to be eatLng soMe sheep. But others suggested LdentLfyLng the probleM More carefully. Uas a specLfLc bear becoMLng More and More Lnterested Ln sheep? Could that bear be entLced to refraLn froM eatLng sheep? Could Lt be reMoved to another tocat(on? Could the farMers agree to keep theLr sheep out of areas where bears were known to have dens or graze? Only as a last resort would the coMMunLty consLder the optLon of kLllLng that bear. ThLs approach Ls Ln great contrast wLth that favoured by soMe ranchers and such as wolves, farMers Ln the AMerLcan Uest . Uhen a •predator" Ls defLned to elLMLnate Lt, undertaken are efforts systeMLc then etc. coyotes, eagles, poLson •1oso", of spreadLng LncludLng aerLal huntLng of wolves (Ln Alaska), -26- shootLn g eagles wLth hLgh-po wered rLfles and destroyL ng habLtat (dennLng areas, rLparLan habLtat of rats, etc.). (Deep Ecology , pp.148- 9) DasMann wrLtes about "bLoregL onalLsM " and •ecodeve lopMent " for the peoples of of AfrLca and the South PacLfLc , and refers approvL ngly to the concept Ln are ("~e House Lynn and e 6orslLn "future prLMLtL ve• develop ed by Jerry another to ve prLMLtL transLtL on froM one condLtL on of syMbLot Lc balance - the a whLch we wLll call future prLMLtLve ... a condLtL on havLng the attrLbu tes of Mature ecosyste M: stable, dLverse , Ln syMbLot Lc balance agaLn") . OasMann dLstLng uLshes between what he calls ecosyste M people and bLosphe re people: "Ecosyst eM people lLve wLthLn a sLngle ecosyste M, or at Most two or three M adjacen t and closely related ecosyste Ms. They are depende nt upon that ecosyste BLosphe re people draw theLr support , not froM the for theLr survLva l resource s of any one ecosyste M, but froM the entLre bLosphe re. BLosphe re people can exert LncredL ble pressure upon an ecosyste M they wLsh to exploLt , and create great devastat Lon - soMethL ng that would be LMpossLble or unthLnk able for people who were depende nt upon that partLcu lar ecosyste M ... BLosphe re people create a natLona l parks. Ecosyste M people have always lLved Ln the equLval ent of at natLona l park ... I propose that the future belongs to those who can regaLn, a hLgher level, the old sense of balance and belon9Ln 9 between Man and nature (ecosyst eM people) .· (SessLo ns, pp-~18- 19) A bLoregL on Ls a part of earth's surface whose rough boundar Les are deterML ned by natural rather than huMan dLctate s, dLstLng uLshable froM other and areas by attrLbu tes of flora, fauna, water, clLMate , soLls, and land-for Ms, The to. rLse the huMan settleM ents and culture s those attrLbu tes have gLven borders between such areas are usually not rLgLd - Nature works wLth More flexLbL lLty and fluLdLty than that - but the general contour s of the regLons theMselv es are not hard to LdentLfy , and Lndeed wLll probabl y be felt, and understo od, sensed, or Ln soMe way known to Many of the LnhabLt ants, , partLcu larly those rooted Ln the land, farMers , rancher s, hunters and fLshers n, AMerlca of face the across foreste rs and botanLs ts, and Most especLa lly, the trlbal Indlans, those stLll Ln touch wLth a culture that for centurl es knew earth as sacred and Lts well-beL ng as LMperat Lve. The wLdest regLon, takLng Lts charact er froM the broades t Measure s of natLve vegetatL on and soLl contour s, May be called the ecore9Lo n and wLll general ly cover several hundred thousand s of square Mlles. But wlthln these ecoregL ons Lt Ls easy to dLstLngu Lsh other coheren t terrLtor Les that defLne a theMselv es prLMarL ly by theLr surface feature s - a watersh ed, or rLver basLn, the valley, a desert, a plateau , a MountaLn range - and whLch we May all call stLll locate often can one turn, Ln 9eore9L on. And wLthLn these 9eore9L ons, sMaller areas, of perhaps several thousand square MLles dLscret e and Ldentof LfLable wLth theLr own topograp hLes and LnhabLt ants, theLr own varLatLo ns huMan culture and agrLcul ture, to whLch we May gLve the · naMe vLtaregL on. Uhether we speak of ecoregL on or 9eore9Lo n or vLtaregL on, after all, we speak of bLoregLons , and Lt Ls that essentL al archetyp e that Ls Most LMporta nt to coMprehend. For once that Ls done on any sLgnLfL cant scale then the Matter of MakLng to dLstLnc tLons and creatLn g huMan LnstLtut Lons to Match theM can be safely left best. theM the LnhabLt ants, the dweller s on the land, who wLll always know The econoMy that coMes lnto belng wlthln a charact er froM the condLtL ons, the laws of Nature. what we can be sald to know wLth soMe surety llvlng on the soLl has been cogently SUMMarLsed as be dLstLng uLshed, froM the laws of TherMod ynaMLcs . The flrst law ls that conserv atlon, bloreglo n also derlves lts Our Lgnoranc e Ls LMMense, but after these Many centurL es of the laws of EcodynaMLcs - to preserv atlon, -27- sustena nce, ls the central goat of the natural world, hence Lts fundaMentat resLstance to largescale structural change; the second law Ls that, far froM beLng entropLc Nature Ls Lnherently stable, workLng Ln all tLMes and places toward that ecology calls a ctLMax, that Ls, a balanced, harMonLous, LntegratLve state of MaturLty whLch, once reached, Ls MaLntaLned for prolonged perLods. FroM thLs Lt follows that a bLoregLonal econoMy would seek to MaLntaLn rather than exploLt the natural world, accoMModate to the envLronMent, rather than resLst Lt; Lt would atteMpt to create condLtLons for a clLMax, a balance, for what soMe econoMLsts have recently taken to callLng a "steady state," rather than for perpetual change and contLnuat growth, Ln servLce to "progress", a false and delusory goddess Lf ever there was one. It would, Ln practLcat terMs, MLnLMLse resource use, eMphasLse conservatLon and recyclLng, avoLd poltutLon and waste. It would adopt Lts systeMs to the gLven bLoregLonal resources - energy based on wLnd, for exaMple, where Nature catted for that, or wood where that was approprLate, and food based on what the regLon Ltself - partLcularly Ln Lts natLve, pre-agrLcutturat state could grow. And thus Lt would be based, above all, on the Most eleMentat and Most elegant prLncLpte of the natural world, that of setf-suffLcLency. Just as Nature does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate networks of contLnentat for the dependency, so the bLoregLon would fLnd all Lts needed resources Lts own wLthLn luxury Manufacture, craft, energy, food, shelter, clothLng, thus beLng envLronMent. And far froM Lt beLng deprLved, far froM Lt LMpoverLshed, Lt would gaLn Ln every Measure of econoMLc health. It would be More stable, free froM booM-and-bust cycles and dLstant potLtLcat crLses; Lt would be able to plan, to allocate at the safest pace, Ln the Most ecotogLcal Manner_ It would not be at the Mercy of dLstant and uncontrollable natLonal bureaucracLes and transnatLonal governMents, and thus More self regardLng, More cohesLve, developLng a sense of place, of COMMunLty of coMradeshLp, and the prLde that coMes froM stabLlLty, control, coMpetence, and Lndependence. In one of hLs More prescLent perceptLons FrLtz SchuMacher reatLsed that the Market econoMy of twentLeth century capLtatLsM erred fundaMentatty, because Lt erred repeatedly, agaLnst Nature. "It Ls Lnherent Ln the Methodology of econoMLcs to Lgnore Man's dependence on the natural world," he wrote. "The Market represents only the surface of socLety and Lts sLgnLfLcance relates to the MOMentary sLtuatLon as Lt exLsts there and then. There Ls no probLng Lnto the depths of thLngs, Lnlo the natural or socLat facts that lLe behLnd theM. • And thLs Ls why, as he poLnts out, conventLonal econoMLcs Makes no dLstLnctLons at all between prLMary goods, "whLch Man has to wLn froM nature," and secondary goods Manufactured froM theM, or between renewable or nonrenewable resources, or the envLronMental and socLal costs of developLng one agaLnst the other. A bLothese regLonal econoMy, Ln sharpest contrast, Makes - Ln fact Ls grounded Ln vLtal dLstLnctLons. PolLtLcal prLncLples on a bLoregLonal scale are also grounded Ln the dLctates presented by Nature, Ln whLch what Ls forever valued are not the LMperatLves of gLgantLsM, centralLzatLon, hLerarchy, and MonolLthLcLty, but rather, Ln starkest contraposLtLon, those of scale, decentralLsatLon, dLvLsLon, and dLversLty. The lessons are obvLous, and suggest LMMedLately the desLgn for a bLoregLon as for a contLnent of bLoregLons. Each unLt, of the sL2e that the natural settLngs proMote, May be unLfLed and cohesLve - startLng froM the base up wLth a neLghbourhood, a coMMUnLty, a sMatl town, att tLvLng sLde-by-sLde wLth others Ln settled and Mutual pattern, together wLth coMprLsLng a vLtare9Lon; and that a vLtaregLon May have Lts own unLfLcatLon and cohesLveness, Lts own Method of governance, and yet lLve sLde-by-sLde wLth other regLons, organLsed as they May -28- see fLt; and so on, outward, Ln selfsuffLcLent collaboratLon, unLt upon unLt, for so long as the natural boundarLes May perMLt and the natural affLnLtLes be kept Lntact. SLMLlar lessons May be derLved froM the patterns of huHan nature. Thus throughout all huMan hLstory people have tended to lLve Ln separate and Lndependent groups, a "fragMentatLon of huMan socLety· that Harold Isaccs has descrLbed as soMethLng akLn to •a pervasLve force Ln huMan affaLrs and always has been.• Even when natLons and eMpLres have arLsen, he notes, they have no stayLng power agaLnst the Lnnate huMan drLve to fragMentatLon. In a bLoregLonal socLety, the dLvLsLon between urban and rural, LndustrLal and agrLcuttural, populatLon and resources, would be replaced by an equLLLbrLuM, a syMbLosLs. On the one hand, the cLty would be necessary as a producer of certaLn kLnds of goods, as a centre of artLstLc culture, as a source of the asseMbled cLvLc vLrtues, though the cLty need not be of LMMense sLze - Lndeed, no larger than 50,000 or 100,000 people - and Ln fact Ldeally would replLcate rather than grow so that Lnstead of a sLngle MetropolLs there would be a MultLplLcLty of cLtLes of Modest sLzes scattered throughout the bLoregLon. On the other hand, the country would be necessary as the prLMe source of food and water and the HaterLals of shelter and clothLng and artLsanshLp and trade, and especLatty as the eMbodLHent of the bLoregLonal spLrLt of Gaea, whose presence should be felt daLly by the LnhabLtants of every settleMent, of whatever sLze. BLoregLonalLsM Ls no More than the Modern versLon of a very old perceptLon of the world held not Merely by the Greeks but by vLrtually every prelLterate socLety of whLch we have knowledge. (Sate, 167-72) 8: TECHNOLOGY The qualLty of huMan exLstence and huMan welfare should not be Measured of products. Technology Ls returned to Lts ancLent place as an quantLty by only approprLate tool for huMan welfare, not an end Ln Ltself. There should be a rapLd MoveMent toward "soft• energy paths and "approprLate technology~ and toward lLfestytes whLch wLll result Ln drastLc decrease Ln per capLta energy consuMptLon Ln advanced LnductrLal socLetLes whLcl LncreasLng approprLate energy Ln decentralLzed vLllages Ln so-called "thLrd world" natLons. Deep ecologLst5 are coMMLtted to rapLd MOVeMent to a •steady-state• or •conservor socLety· both froH ethLcal prLncLples of har~onLous LntegratLon of huMans wLth nature and froM apprecLatLon of ecologLcal realLtLes. IntegratLon of sophLstLcated, elegant, unobtrusLve, ecologLcalty sound, approprLate technology wLth greatly scaled down, dLversLfLed, organLc, labor-LntensLve agrLculture, huntLng, and gatherLng Ls another goal. (Deep Ecology pp.311-12) QuestLonLng technology Ls a process of dLrect actLon that anyone can develop. It Ls one of the Host serLous act Lons that can ·be taken Ln a technocratLc socLety where the assuMptLon that •technology wLll solve all probleMs• Ls so deeply held. as a systeM or as a specLfLc devLce such as a To questLon technology coMputer - can often arouse hostLlLty, defena certaLn type of vehLcle or sLveness, LrrLtatLon, and resentMent Ln lLsteners. Anyone who questLons technology can be branded a "LuddLte" or antLModernLst. A person who says ·no to any technologLcal devLce Ls often charged as beLng antLprogressLve. Yet Ls crucLat to questLon technology, Ln spLte of these crLtLcLsMs. ~e need technology whLch Ls coMpatLble wLth the growth of autonoMous, selfdeterMLnLng LndLvLduats Ln nonhLerarchLcal coMHunLtLes. ~e need prLncLples that wLll help us escape the trap of technocratLc socLety, where technology Ls the -29- central LnstLtutLon. Technology can be crLtLcLzed and evaluated based on general prLncLples, scale or structure. The followLng questLons can be asked of any technologLcal devLce or systeM: I. Does thLs technologLcal devLce serve vLtal needs? 2. ls thLs devLce or systeM of the sort that can be LMMedLately understood by nonexperts? 3. Does Lt have a hLgh degree of flexLbLlLty and MutabLlLty or does Lt LMpose a perManent, rLgLd, LrreversLble LMprLnt on the lLves of cLtLzens? local ~- Does thLs technologLcal devLce or systeM foster greater autonoMy of coMMunLtLes or greater dependency on soMe centralLzed "authorLty"? 5. ls thLs devLce or systeM ecologLcally destructLve or conducLve to a deep ecology way of lLfe? 6. Does thLs devLce or systeM enhance the LndLvLdualLty of persons or does Lt lead to bureaucratLc hLerarchLes? 7. Does thLs devLce or systeM encourage people to behave and thLnk lLke MachLnes? A fully LnforMed, approprLate technology Ls a MeetLng ground of ethLcs , polLtLcs, MechanLcal understandLng and deep ecologLcal conscLousness. As Langdon WLnner concludes Ln AutonoMous Technology, "If one lacks a clear and knowledgeable sense of what Means are approprLate lo the cLrcuMstances at hand, one's These Means do not choLce of Means can easLly lead to excesses and danger. Lnvolve just narrow utLlLty or effLcLency of productLon or profLt Ln soMe short-terM calculatLon. Indeed, the narrow eMphasLs upon effLcLency of Means drLves us away froM the larger Lssues of envLronMental ethLcs asnd LndLvLdual responsLbLlLty for the consequences of our actLons. (Deep Ecology, pp.35-6) Shallow approach: AcceptLng LndustrLalLzatLon of the kLnd ManLfested Ln the West as the natural goal for developLng countrLes. Low estLNatLon of deep cultural dLfferences wLth sLgnLfLcant devLatLons froM Western standards. Deep approach: SocLal and cultural dLversLty of dLfferent specLes Ls an essentLal IntensLfLed Measures to part of general rLchness and varLatLon of lLfe forMs. exLstLng non-LndustrLal stLll lLMLt the LMpact of Western technology upon cultures . Defence of the fourth world agaLnst cultural foreLgn doMLnatLon. PolLtLcal and econoMLc polLcLes Ln favour of subcultures and MLnorLtLes Ln LndustrLalLzed socLetLes. Support of local and soft technologLes as a Means to MaLntaLn baste cultural assessMent of technLcal LnnovatLon. Due regard to anLMal socLetLes and cultures. SurvLval of populatLons does not ensure survLval of socLal LnstLtutLons . QuestLonLng whether so-called advanced, Modern technologLes are approprLate relatLve to levels of pollutLon, resources, populatLon and as subordLnate part of general culture. (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, pp.12-13) Technology Ls More helpless than ever because the technology beLng produced doesn ' t fulfLll baste huNan needs, such as MeanLngful work Ln a MeanLngful envLronMent . TechnLcal progress Ls shaM progress because the terM technLcal progress Ls a cultural, not a technLcal, terM . Our culture Ls the only one Ln the hLstory of MankLnd Ln whLch the culture has adjusted Ltself to the technology, rather than vLce versa. (SLMple ' Ln Means, p.11) Once the scLentLfLc probleMs have been solved, once Lt Ls understood how a partLcular forM of pollutLon arLses and Ln what Lts danger consLsts, the next probleM Ls technologLcal : to dLscover a Method of reducLng thLs LncLdence. That Lnvolves decLdLng, Ln the fLrst place, whLch of the causatLve factors Lt wLll be easLest to control . KnowLng, for exaMple, that the Los Angeles sMog Ls a joLnt product of the sLtLng of Los Angeles, Lts hours of sunlLght and the exhaust -30- fuMes froM the LnternaL coMbustLon engLne, Lt Ls at once apparent that onLy the thLrd of these Lf controLLabLe at a toLerabLe cost. So what has to be Lnvented Ls a devLce whLch wLLL reduce the output of hydrocarbons Ln exhaust fuMes. ThLs constLtutes a technoLogLcaL probLeM, the soLutLon to whLch LLes Ln the LnventLon of a devLce whLch wouLd satLsfy partLcuLar technLcaL specLfLcatLons . (The word devLce' Ls h~re beLng used Ln a very broad sense; an LnsectLcLde Ls a devLce and so Ls the sterLLLsLng of Lnsects as a Means of bLoLogLcaL control.) 0 The Ldea of a 'technoLogLcaL soLutLon' Ls, however, a good deaL Less straLghtforward than Lt at fLrst appears to be, as the phrase I used above 'at a toLerabLe cost' aLready hLnts. It Ls very easy to thLnk up technLcaL soLutLons of ecoLogLcaL probLeMs Lf we consLder theM Ln LsoLatLon~ and Lf we defLne a technLcaL soLutLon, wLthout any reference to costs, as one whLch descrLbes a way of freeLng ourselves froM the ecoLogLcaL condLtLon whLch concerns us. Such a soLutLon Ls soMetLMes saLd to be 'practLcaL' but not 'operatLonal'. So Los AngeLes sMog could be reduced Ln LntensLty by roofLng over the entLre cLty, or by MakLng everybody use pubLLc transport, or by substLtutLng fuel-ceLls, Ln theLr present state of developMent, for Lnternal coHbustLon engLnes. But few wouLd serLousLy advance these proposals as 'solutLons', as satLsfactory ways of deaLLng wLth the sMog probleM. ~hy not? SLMply because the costs, or so Lt Ls w~deLy beLLeved, wouLd be too great, costs of varLous sorts, socLal, ecologLcal, econoMLc and poLLtLcaL. In so far as ecologLcaL probleMs can be solved only wLth the help of scLentLfLc dLscovery and technoLogLcaL LnventLon, they can be soLved only wLthLn the ~estern ratLonal tradLtLons. That Much Ls obvLous. MystLcaL conteMplatLon wLlL not reveal to the cheMLst the orLgLns of the Los Angeles sMog or enabLe the engLneer to desLgn an effectLve devLce for reducLng Lts LntensLty. But Lt Ls a enthusLasM proper crLtLcLsM of ~estern socLety that, Ln Lts - often chLldLsh for technoLogLcaL 'advance', Lt has faLled adequateLy to consLder the costs of LntroducLng new devLces and has defLned 'costs' far too narrowly. ThLs objectLon can be dLrected, even, agaLnst antL-pollutLon devLces. The Manufacture of such devLces wLLL norMaLLy create · More polLutLon. It May, by ModLfyLng the character of the poLlutant, Lntroduce new dangers - reducLng the percentage of carbon MonoxLde Ln exhaust fuMes whLle LncreasLng the percentage of the no Less dangerous nLtrogen dLoxLde. Or Lt May shLft the LncLdence of the poLLutLon froM a weaLthLer to a poorer coMMunLty - ManufacturLng sMokeless fueLs Ln an LndustrLaL town to Make the London aLr cLeaner - wLthout reducLng Lts total voLuMe. Any technoLogLcal LnnovatLon, furtherMore, LnvoLves an eleMent of ecoLoe LcaL rLsk; Lt Ls LMpossLbLe to calculate all Lts consequences Ln every possLbLe cLrcuMstance. The best the technologLst can do Ls to exclude effects whLch are already known to be dangerous and to LnvestLgate further effects whLch are suspect . That Ls why, as I saLd earLLer, caLlLng upon the technologLst to save us Ls so often equated wLth caLLLng Ln the devLL as an exorcLst. But Lt wouLd be quLte wrong to conclude that for the reasons just advanced the technologLcaL Method of overcoMLng ecoLogLcaL probleMs would be abandoned, that what ~estern socLetLes should do Ls to shut down factorLes, Let us say, rather than LnsLst on theLr reducLng, by technoLogLcal Means, theLr eMLssLon of pollutants. For econoMLc and socLaL rLsks ~ and, Ln the end, greater ecoLogLcal rLsks Lf the socLaL resentMent engendered by the closure Ls dLrected agaLnst the whoLe systeM of ecoLogLcaL controls. It, too, May do no More than shLft the LncLdence of poLLutLon froM rLcher to poorer regLons, as the factory-owner takes hLs capLtal elsewhere. To gLve up takLng any rLsks would be to gLve up actLng . Every actLon costs soMethLng, rLsks soMethLng. Uhat can properLy be deManded Ls not that Men should cease to act Ln ways whLch LnvoLve ecologLcal rLsks - there are no such ways, as Matters now stand, whatever the sLtuatLon Ln the Garden of -31- Eden - but rather that they shouLd take More account of the ecoLogLcaL costs and benefLts of theLr actLon. And thLs Means, once agaLn, that they wLLL hav~ to Make fuLLer use of ratLonaL Western-type Methods, cost benefLt anaLyses or decLsLon-procedures. (PassMore, pp.~8-50) EcoLogLcaL resLsters do not accept that there are onLy narrow technLcaL soLutLons to narrowLy defLned socLal probLeMs (such as aLr poLLutLon). These probLeMs are seen onLy as syMptoMs of the Larger Lssues. There are three MaLn dangers to technocratLc soLutLons. FLrst Ls the danger Ln beLLevLng there Ls a coMpLete or acceptabLe soLutLon usLng Modern doMLnant LdeoLogLes and technoLogy. The second danger Ls the presentatLon of an LMpressLon that soMethLng Ls beLng done when Ln fact the reaL probLeM contLnues. reaL work". FLnaLLy, there Ls the danger of TLnkerLng dLstracts froM the assuMLng there wLLL be new experts - such as professLonaL ecoLogLsts - who wLLL provLde the soLutLon but who May Ln fact be constraLned to be pubLLc reLatLons spokespersons for the agenda of profLt or power of soMe corporatLon or agency. EcoLogLcaL resLstance Ls actLon froM centraL prLncLpLes of doLng what Ls necessary, of wLtnessLng nonvLoLentLy. It arLses froM a shLft Ln conscLouness. EcoLogLcaL resLstLng Ls deeper, soMe wouLd say More radLcaL,. than just reforMLsM. SoMe of the reforMLst actLons to MLtLgate soMe of the worse forMs of aLr and water poLLutLon (due to auto exhaust, for exaMpLe) are MotLvated by concern onLy for huMan heaLth and safety and not by the LntrLnsLc vaLues of the bLosphere. But th LLMLts of reforMLSM are by now weLL known. (Deep EcoLog~, pp.195-6) In tryLng to exaMLne technoLogy and productLon, we encounter a curLous paradox. ~e are deepLy rLven by a great sense of proMLse about technLcaL LnnovatLon, on the one hand, and by a thorough sense of dLsenchantMent wLth Lts resuLts, on the other. ThLs duaL attLtude not onLy refLects a confLLct Ln the popuLar LdeologLes concernLng technoLogy but aLso expresses strong doubts about the nature of the Modern technologLcaL LMagLnatLon LtseLf. We are puzzLed that the very LnstruMents our MLnds have conceLved and our hands have created can be so easLly turned agaLnst us, wLth dLsastrous resuLts for our weLL-beLng Lndeed, for our very survLval as a specLes. Techne, Moreover, covered a wLder scope of experLence than the Modern word technLcs. The goaL of techne Ls not restrLcted to MereLy "LLvLng weLL. or lLvLng wLthLn the lLMLt. Techne LncLudes LLvLng an ethLcaL LLfe accordLng to an orLgLnatLve and orderLng prLncLple conceLved as "potency". VLewed even Ln an LnstruMental sense, techne thus encoMpasses not MereLy raw MaterLaLs, tooLs, MachLnes, and products but aLso the producer - Ln short, a hLghly sophLstLcated subject froM whLch aLL eLse orLgLnates. To ArLstotle, the "Master-craftsMan" Ls dLstLnguLshed subjectLveLy froM hLs apprentLces or assLstants by vLrtue of honor, a sense of "why" products are created, and generaLLy a wLsdoM of thLngs ArLstotLe subject, and phenoMena. By startLng wLth the ratLonaLLty of productLon the to estabLLshes a poLnt of departure for brLngLng ratLonaLLzatLon of the object. Modern LndustrLaL productLon functLons Ln precLseLy the opposLte way. Not only Ls the Modern LMage of techne LLMLted to Mere technLcs Ln the LnstruMentaL sense of the terM, but aLso Lts goaLs are LnextrLcabLy tLed to unLLMLted Ls conceLved as LLMLtLess consuMptLon wLthLn the productLon. "LLvLng weLL fraMework of a totaLLy unethLcaL, prLvatLzed LeveL of seLf-Lnterest. TechnLcs, not the producer and hLs or her ethLcaL standards LncLudes Moreover, (proLetarLans, after aLL, servLce the Modern LndustrLal apparatus Ln totaL anonyMLty) but the product and Lts constLtuLnts. The technLcaL focus shLfts froM -32- the subject to the object, froM the producer to the product, froM the creator to the created. Honor, a sense of •why," and any generaL wLsdoM of thLngs and phenoMena have no pLace Ln the worLd requLred by Modern Lndustry. ~hat reaLLy counts Ln technLcs Ls effLcLency, quantLty, and an LntensLfLcatLon of the Labor process. The specLous ratLonaLLty LnvoLved Ln producLng the object Ls foLsted on the ratLonaLLzatLon of the subject to a poLnt where producer's subjectLvLty Ls totally atrophLed and reduced to an object aMong objects. (BookchLn, pp.219-22) 9: ON ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS Deep ecoLogy Ls eMergLng as a way of developLng a new balance and harMony between LndLvLduaLs, coMMunLtLes and aLl of Nature. It can potentLaLLy satsLfy our deepest yearnLngs: faLth and trust Ln our Most basLc LntuLtLons; courage to take dLrect actLon; joyous confLdence to dance wLth the sensuous harMonLes dLscovered through spontaneous, playfuL Lntercourse wLth the rhythMs of our bodLes, the rhythMs of fLowLng water, changes Ln the weather and seasons, and the overaLL processes of LLfe on Earth. The deep ecology MoveMent Lnvolves workLng on ourselves, what poetphLLosopher Gary Snyder caLls "the reaL work,• the work of reaLLy LookLng at ourselves, of becoMLng More real. ThLs Ls the work we call cultLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. ThLs process LnvoLves becoMLng More aware of the actuaLLty of rocks, wolves, trees, and rLvers - the cultLvatLon of the LnsLght that everythLng Ls connected. CultLvatLng ecologLcal conscLousness Ls a process of learnLng apprecLate sLLence and solLtude and redLscoverLng how to lLsten. It Ls learnLng how to be More receptLve, trustLng, holLstLc Ln perceptLon, and Ls grounded Ln a vLsLon of nonexploLtLve scLence and technology. ThLs process Lnvolves beLng honest wLth ourselves and seekLng clarLty Ln our LntuLtLons, then actLng froM cLear prLncLpLes, practLcLng seLf-dLscLpLLne and workLng honestLy wLthLn our coMMunLty. It Ls sLMpLe but not easy work. Henry DavLd Thoreau, nLneteenth-century naturalLst and wrLter, adMonLshes us, ·Let your lLfe be a frLctLon agaLnst the MachLne. • CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcal conscLousness Ls correlated wLth the cultLvatLon of conscLence. CuLtural hLstorLan Theordore Roszak suggests Ln Person/PLanet conscLousness, how LnstructLve the overLappLng and "conscLence (1978), sLMLLarLty of those two words Ls. FroM the new conscLousness we are gaLnLng of ourseLves as persons perhaps we wLLL yet create a new conscLence, one whose ethLcaL sensLtLvLty Ls at Least tuned to a sLgnLfLcant good, a sLgnLfLcant evLL. We beLLeve that huMans have a vLtaL need to cuLtLvate ecologLcaL conscLousness and that thLs need Ls related to the needs of the planet. At the saMe tLMe, huMans need dLrect contact wLth untraMMeLed wLLderness, places undoMestLcated for narrow huMan purposes. Many people sense the needs of the pLanet and the need for wLLderness preservatLon. But we need not be technLcal experts Ln order to cultLvate ecotogLcal conscLousness, as Thoreau saLd, cuLtLvatLng ecotogLcaL conscLousness requLres that "we front up to the facts and deterMLne to lLve our lLves delLberately, or not at all." We belLeve that people can clarLfy theLr own LntuLtLons, and act froM deep prLncLpLes. Deep ecology Ls a process of even-deeper questLonLng of ourselves, the assuMptLons of the doMLnant worLdvLew Ln our culture, and the MeanLng and truth Ln our realLty. We cannot change conscLousness by only lLstenLng to others, we Must Lnvolve ourselves. We Mu~t take dLrect actLon. -33- One hopeful poLLtLcaL MoveMent wLth deep ecology as a base Ls the Uest GerMan Green poLLtLcaL party. They have as theLr slogan, "ue are neLther Left nor rLght, we are Ln front.· Green poLLtLcs Ln Uest GerMany, and to soMe extent Ln Great BrLtaLn, BeLgLuM and AustraLLa Ln the 1980s, goes beyond the conventLonaL, tLberaL defLnLtLon of a party, coMbLnLng personal work (that Ls, work on cLarLfyLng one's own character) and polLtLcal actLvLsM. The Greens present a proMLsLng poLLtLcaL strategy because they encourage the cultLvatLon of personal ecoLogLcaL conscLousness as well as address Lssues of pubLLc polLcy. If the Greens propogate the bLocentrLc perspectLve - the Lnherent worth of other specLes besLdes huMans - then they can help change the current vLew whLch says we should use Nature only to serve narrow huMan Lnterests. CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Ln conteMporary socLetLes, however, Ls a two-edged sword. Ue Must not be MLsLed by our zeaL for change so that we are concerned only wLth the narrow self or ego. If we seek only personal redeMptLon we could becoMe soLLtary ecologLcal saLnts aMong the Masses of those we MLght cLassLfy as "sLnners" who contLnue to pollute. Change Ln persons requLres a change Ln culture and vLce versa. We cannot Lgnore the personal arena nor the socLaL, for our project Ls to enhance harMony wLth each other, the planet and ourselves. (Deep Ecology, pp.7-1~) ~e began by suggestLng a varLety of specLfLc actLons whLch people can take dLrected at reforMLng publLc polLcy, developLng bLoregLonal coMMunLtLes, and cuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. Ue return to the theMe of dLrect actLon. ~e have deMonstrated that deep ecology Ls not just a gaMe of ~bstract theorLzLng. As a perspectLve Lt Ls lLved, danced, celebrated. It has resonance. Ln part, cuLtLvatLng what CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Means, Ls engaged Ln the LnteLLect RhapsodLc Theodore Roszak caLLs rhapsodLc LntelLect. process of LntegratLng LntelLect, body, and joyous eMotLon. Based on the LnsLghts, uLtLMate norMs, prLncLples and theorLes of deep ecology, the central practLcaL questLon Ls how do we becoMe More Mature persons, gLven the constraLnts of th~s culture? Ue suggest there Ls an LnterpLay between outward dLrect actLon and Lnward dLrect actLon, between actLng on one's self and actLng Ln the world, wLth the result of further and deeper MaturLty Ln the deep ecologLcaL sense of LdentLfLcatLon wLth alL LLfe. There Ls no sharp break between Lnward and outward. People take dLrectLon actLon froM dLrect ecoLogLcal prLncLpLes and they becoMe More Mature through dLrect actLon. The Label we use for the type of dLrect actLon Ln Lts outward forM Ls ecoLogLcaL resLstLng. (Deep Ecology, p.19~) 'Deep ecology', an envLronMental scLence broadsheet tells us, Ls Naess's expressLon for an ecologLcaL awareness or conscLousness' . SpeLLLng deep ecology out then becoMes a Matter of settLng down the types of conscLousness and awareness and recognLtLon LnvoLved, SOMethLns that Ls done Ln a thoroughly anthropocentrL c way, begLnnLng as foLLows: 'a conscLousness of the LMplLcatLons of ecology for huMan beLng'. It Ls all Ln fact done Ln terMs of huMan responses, fundaMentaLLy Ls approach the AccordLn9Ly capacLtLes and psychology. MLsconceLved. For deep ecology Ls not so anthropocentrL c, and Ls no More a Matter of envLronMentaL psychology than Ls the value theory or MetaphysLcs whLch are part of Lt. The psychoL09LcaL conversLon Ls LLke cLaLMLng that 'MarxLsM' Ls an expressLon for socLaLLst conscLousness, or 'MusLc' for MusLco-LogLcal awareness. -34- The conversLon of deep ecology Lnto awareness psychology, Lnto a certaLn sort of exercLse Ln self-realLsatLon or 'lLberatLng ecologLcal conscLousness, or conscLousness raLsLng', Ls open to sLMLlar objectLons. Ecology, deep or shallow or systeMatLc, Ls not ego-trLppLng or a personal thLng. Granted those who do have and share certaLn attLtudes and feelLngs to natural envLronMents are "uch More lLkely to becoMe actLve supporters or followers of deep ecology or to adopt a deeper ecologLcal stance. Even so such states as self-realLsatLon or ecologLcal conscLousness are neLther necessary nor suffLcLent for thLs. Such subjectLve states are not necessary because soMeone can beco"e a supporter of deep ecology wLthout havLng attaLned, or Made any effort to attaLn, these states. Thus consLder soMeone, a dedLcated naturalLst for Lnstance, who has no deep Lnterest Ln or understandLng of huMan psychology or socLology so far as these bear on the envLronMent. Such a person Ls a deep ecologLst, but lacks ecologLcal conscLousness as Lt Ls explaLned. The case of Peter SLnger Ln the anLMal lLberatLon "oveMent Ls LnstructLve; for SLnger goes out of hLs way to explaLn hLs dLsLnterest, hLs coMparatLve lack of zoologLcal conscLousness, that he does not LdentLfy wLth anLMals and so on, yet hLs LMpact for anLMal lLberatLon has been Most sLgnLfLcant. Analogously, a Deeper SLnger need not be Ln love wLth the Earth but feel rather Lsolated froM Lt and feel rLghtly that Most of Lts LnhabLtants dLslLke hLM or are frLghtened by hLM. He May have lLttle Ldea what Lt Ls lLke to be one of theM or a MountaLn, ... ; but he "ay have the rLght values, adhere to the rLght phLlosophy and undertake the rLght sorts of actLon and lLfestyle. GenuLnely and specLfLcally deep ecologLcal conscLousness has not been well descrLbed and Ls not partLcularly well defLned. And soMe of the requLreMents LMposed upon Lt, whatever Lt aMounts to, render Lt LMpossLble. Thus Fox, echoLng others, claLMs that 'to the extent that we perceLve boundarLes, we fall short of a deep ecologLcal conscLousness'. Then we all fall short, sLnce we are regularly confronted by, and perceLve, terrLtorLal boundarLes and a wLde range of other deMarcatLon lLnes and contrasts. Indeed fallLng short Ls LnevLtable; for hence and perceptLon necessarLly Lnvolves selectLon and dLscrLMLnatLon, separatLon and boundarLes. Deep conscLousness Ls also rendered LMpossLble by soMe of the LdentLfLcatLon requLreMents, drawn froM nature MystLcLsM, whLch are LMposed upon Lt. It Ls one thLng to be Ln tune wLth the unLverse (a Metaphor that can be spelled out), quLte another, and LMpossLble, feat to be LdentLcal wLth Lt, sLnce then a proper part would be LdentLcal wLth a whole contaLnLng Lt. SoMe explLcatLon of LdentLfLcatLon (trans-specLes and other) Ls LMportant for the elaboratLon of deep ecology, but the relatLon Lnvolved (though Lt concerns shared features, such as perhaps experLences) Ls not one of LdentLty or MakLng LdentLcal, as sLMplLstLc etyMology May suggest. Other requLreMents coMMonly placed on deep conscLousness, whLle they do not exclude Lt, render Lt unduly anthropocentrLc. (CrLtLque, pp.30-2) Deep ecologLsts agree wLth BLrch and Cobb's LnsLght that "huMan beLngs are More deeply Moved by the way they experLence theLr ~orld than by the claLMs ethLcs Makes on theM." Thus, where conteMporary envLronMental phLlosophy Ls doMLna~ed by the questLon "How do we construct an adequate envLron"ental ethLc? , deep ecology asks the questLon "How do we cultLvate a deep ecologLcal conscLousness?" The forMer questLon looks to conceptual answers, the latter to experLentLal answers. In seekLng to change the way Ln whLch we experLence the world, deep ecologLsts place theLr prLMary eMphasLs upon changLng our ·underlyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are" (L.e. changLng our ontology) rather than upon what we MLght terM the "conceptual fLx• approach of "bL99er and better" ethLcs. ThLs atteMpt to shLft the prLMary focus of envLronMental phLlosophLcal concern froM ethLcs to ontology clearly constLtutes a fundaMental or revolutLon- -35- ary chaLLenge to norMaL envLronMentaL phLLosophy. It Ls (and should be) deep ecology's guLdLng star. (GuLdLng Stars, p.204) 10: ON HOLISM AccordLng to deep ecology: A new cosMLc/ecoLogLcaL MetaphysLcs whLch stresses the LdentLty (I/thou) of huMans wLth non-huMan nature Ls a necessary condLLons for a vLabLe approach to buLLdLng an eco-phLLosophy. In deep ecology, the wholeness and LntegrLty of a person/planet together wLth the prLncLpLe of what Arne Naess caLLs "bLoLogLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM" are the Most LMportant Ldeas. Man Ls an LntegraL part of nature, not over or apart froM nature. Man Ls a "pLaLn cLtLzen· of the bLosphere, not Lts conqueror or Manager .. There should be a "deMocracy of aLL God's creatures" accordLng to St. FrancLs; or as SpLnoza saLd, Man Ls a "teMporary and dependent Mode of the whole of God/Nature.· Man flows wLth the systeM of nature rather than atteMptLng to control aLL of the rest of nature. The hand of Man LLes LLghtLy on the Land. Man does not perfect nature, nor Ls Man's prLMary duty to Make nature More effLcLent. A new psychology Ls needed to Lntegrate the MetaphysLcs Ln the MLnd fLeLd of post-LndurtrLaL socLety. A Major paradLgM shLft results froM psychoLogLcaL changes of perceptLon. The new paradLgM requLres rejectLon of subject/object, Man/nature duaLLsMs and wLLL requLre a pervasLve awareness of total LnterMLngLLng of the planet earth. Psychotherapy seen as adjustMent to eco-orLented socLety Ls replaced by a new LdeaL of psychotherapy as spLrLtuaL deveLopMent. The new MetaphysLcs and psychology Leads LogLcaLLy to a posture of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM and LLberatLon Ln the sense of autonoMy, physoLogLcaL/eMotLona L freedoM of the LndLvLduaL, spLrLtuaL deveLopMent of HoMo sapLens, and the rLght of other specLes to pursue theLr own evoLutLonary destLnLes. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.310-11) RejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favour of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs as knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. As LntrLnsLc reLatLon between two thLngs ~ and B Ls such that the reLatLon belongs to the defLnLtLons or basLc constLtutLons of A and ~• so that wLthout a reLatLon, ~and~ are no Longer the saMe thLngs. The totaLfLeLd Model dLssoLves not only the Man-Ln-envLronMent concept, but every coMpact thLng-Ln-MLLLeu concept - except when taLkLng at a superfLcLaL or preLLMLnary Level of coMMunLcatLon. (Shallow and Deep, p.95) Shallow envLronMentaLLsM atteMpts to curb soMe of the Most gLarLng envLronMentaL abuse such as poLLutLon and resource depLetLon whLLe caLLLng for no basLc change Ln the anthropocentrLc urban-LndustrLaL socLaL paradLgM. Naess descrLbes Lts central objectLve as "the health and affluence of people Ln the developed countrLes." The Deep Ecology MoveMent, on the other hand, gathers LnspLratLon froM the fLeLd ecoLogLst and Ls a rejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favor of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs are knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. w (SessLons, p . 398) 0 Because they cannot conceLve Man apart' they experLence no dLffLcuLty Ln attrLbutLng LntrLnsLc value to nature. In so far as they conceLve theMseLves as havLng such value, the LnabLLLty to separate theLr selves froM nature, LnescapabLy Leads to thLnkLng of "Man" and ·envLronMent' as a whole. (Gestalt thLnkLng.) In thLs century the reactLon agaLnst conceLvLng the LndLvLduaL self as soMethLng separable froM the socLaL settLng has been Largely successful, but not the paraLLeL reactLon agaLnst the separabLLLty froM the natural settLng. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, p.35) By subtractLng your own self-centred and seLf-servLng -36- thoughts froM the world you coMe to reaLLze that "the other Ls none other than yourself: that the fundaMentaL deLusLon of huManlty ls to suppose I aM here and you are out there_· ThLs understandLng perMeates the MystLcaL tradLtLons and Ls exeMpLLfLed Ln the TaoLst advLce to "LdentLfy yourself wLth non-dLstLnctLon_ • It ls now becoMlng coMMonpLace to polnt to the fundaMentaLLy slMlLar cosMoLogLes eMobdLed Ln the MystLcaL tradLtLons on the one hand and the 'new physlcs' on the other_ What Ls structurally sLMllar about these cosMoLogLes Ls that they reveal a 'seaMLess web' vLew of the unLverse_ Both the MystLcaL tradLtLons and the new physLcs' serve to generate Lnter aLLa, what we MLght now caLL 'ecoLoglcaL awareness', .that Ls, awareness of the fundaMentaL LnterreLatedne~s of aLL thLngs or, More accurately, aLL events_ The theoretlcaL physLclst Frltjof Capra has been quLte expLlcLt about thls: "1 thLnk what physLcs can do Ls help to generate ecoLogLcaL awareness_ You see, Ln MY vLew now Ln the Western versLon of MystLcaL awareness, our versLon of BuddhLsM or TaoLsM, wLLl be ecologLcal awareness_" Where the physLcLst, the Mystlc, and the deep ecologLst (as phLlosopher) dLffer Ls Ln theLr Means of arrLvLng at 'ecologLcal awareness ' ___ _ The deep ecologLst's conceptLon of unLty Ln process' need not LMpLy that, at any gLven MOMent, all 'knots' (L_e_ organLsMs) Ln the 'bLospherLcal net' are constLtuted of equally coMpLex reLatLons_ To the extent that value Lnheres Ln coMplexLty of relatLons, and to the extent that coMplexLty of reLatLons Ls evLdenced Ln the degree of an organLsM's central organLzatLon (and therefore capacLty for rLchness of experLence), then organLsMs are entLtLed to Moral consLderatLon coMMensurate wLth theLr degree of central organLzatLon (or capaclty for rlchness of experlence) for the duratlon of thelr exlstence - as transLent as that May be Ln terMs of evolutLonary tLMe_ In pursulng theLr central LntuLtLon of 'unLty' (L_e_ of no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcal fLeLd), deep ecoLogLsts have possLbly Lost sLght of the sLgnLfaspect of theLr 'unLty Ln process' MetaphysLcs_ Lcance of the 'Ln process AttentLon to thLs Latter aspect suggests that any process contLnuousLy produces LMperManent, uneven dLstrLbutLons (L_e_, dLfferent values) of varLous attrLbutes (and Ln the process of the world these attrLbutes May be Money, LnforMatLon, coMplexLty of relatLons, and so on)_ If thLs were not so then we would have no process but a perfectly unLforM, hoMogenous and, therefore, LLfeless fLeld_ The only unLverse where value Ls spread evenly across the fLeLd Ls a dead unLverse _ RecognLsLng thLs, we should be clear that the central LntuLtLon of deep ecology does not entaLl the vLew that LntrLnsLc value Ls spread evenly across the MeMbershLp of the bLotLc coMMunLty_ Moreover, Ln sLtuatLons of genuLne value conflLct, justLce Ls better served by not subscrLbLng to the vLew of ecoLogLcal -egaLLtarLanLsM_ (Fox, pp-196-200) An arctLc Landscape May superfLcLaLly Look rather dead Ln wLnter. In sprLng Lt May Look overwheLMLngLy aLLve_ It would take a Long traLnLng to force perceptLon to dLstLnguLsh organLsM froM non-organLsMs Ln such a LLve Landscape_ Even Ln wLnter the Lover of the Landscape sees abundance of LndLvLduaL LLfe forMs and also hLgher order gestaLts_ Why Ls the gestalt ontology not MentLoned Ln the platforN forMulatLon_ A Landscape wLth organLsMs - and aLL Landscapes have organLsMs Ln MLcro-organLsMs are counted - Ls a hLgh order, natural gestalt_ The separatLon of organLsMs and non-organLsMs Ls very unnatural Ln gestalt thLnkLng and apperceptLon. But the concepts of 9estaLt-thlnkln9 are too specLaL for pLatforM forMuLatLons- Only a MLnorLty of supporters of deed ecology are acadeMLcs_ (Notes on Sylvan, p-7) -37- BIBLIOGRAPHY Sources used 0 S. BodLan, S LMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends: A conversatLon wLth Arne Naess', Ten DLrectLons, SuMMer/Fall, 1982, 7,10-12; referred to as SLMple Ln Means. M. BookchLn, The Ecology of FreedoM, CheshLre, Londong, 1982; referred to as F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green PolLtLcs, HutchLnson, London, 198~; referred as Green PolLtLcs. to Bookch i,n. B. Devall, 'The Deep Ecology MoveMent', Natural Resources Journal 20, 1980, 299-322; referred to as Deep Ecology MoveMent. B. Devall, 'stone/Sky: ReflectLons on the 'Real ~ork' of Deep Ecology', paper delLvered at EnvLronMent, EthLcs and Ecology Conference, Canberra, August 1983, 20ff.; referred to as Stone/Sky . 8. Devall and G. SessLons, Deep Ecology, PeregrLne SMLth, Layton, Utah, 1985; referred to as Deep Ecology. U. Fox, Deep Ecology: A new phLlosophy 194-200; referred to as Fox. of our tLMe', EcologLst 1~, 1984, U. Fox, 'on guLdLng stars to Deep Ecology', EcologLst 14, 1984, 203-4; to as GuLdLng Stars. A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology MoveMent. InquLry 18, 1973, 95-100; referred to as Shallow and Deep. A. Naess, 'PhLlosophLcal Aspects of Deep Ecology ' , unpublLshed 1983, 35ff.; referred to as PhLlosophLcal Aspects. A. N.3 ess, • IntuLtLon, LntrLnsLc value and Deep 201-3; referred to as IntuLtLon. Ecology', referred A SUMMary. paper, EcologLst 14, Oslo, 1984, A. Naess, Notes on the PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent ' , unpublLshed paper, Canberra, 1984, 17ff.; referred to as PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent. A. Naess, 'What Ls basLc to Deep Ecology?', unpublLshed paper, 12ff . ; referred to as BasLc. A. Naess, A defence of the Deep Ecology 1984, 265-70; referred to as Defence. MoveMent', Canberra, 1984, EnvLronMental EthLcs A. Naess, 'The paradox of envLronMentalLsM' SyMposLuM ProceedLngs, (ed.), York UnLversLty, 1984, 57-60; referred to as Paradox. N. S, Everden A. Naess, 'IdentLfLcatLon as a source of Deep EcologLcal attLtudes', Deep Ecology, M. TobLas (ed.), Avant Books, San DLego, 1985, s256-70; referred to as ldentLfLcatLon. A. Naess, Notes on Professor Sylvan's crLtLque of the Deep Ecology MoveMent, unpublLshed paper, Olso, 1985, 19ff.; referred to as Notes on Sylvan. J. PassMore, Man's ResponsLb~lLty For Nature, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London, 1980; -38- referred to as PassMore. A new way to treat the Land', EcoLogLst 14, 1984, BLoregLonaLLsM K. Sale, 167-73; referred to as Sale. the ph~Losoph~cal and Deep Ecology: A rev~ew of 'shallow G. Sess~ons, EcoLogLcaL (eds.), Hughes J.D. and Ln R.C. Schultz unfortune', UnLvers~ty Press of AMer~ca, ~ash~ngton, D.C., 1981, Consc~ousness, 391- 4 62; referred to as Sess~ons. R. Sylvan, A Cr~t~que of Deep Ecology, Research School of SocLaL AustraLLan Hat~onaL Un~vers~ty, 1985; referred to as Cr~t~que. ScLences, Further Read~ngs R.F. OasMann, Env~ronMentaL Conservat~on, 5th ed., ~LLey, New York, 1984. A. Leopold, A Sand Country ALManac, CheshLre, New York, 1966. E. PapadukLs, The Green MoveMent Ln ~est GerMany, Croon HeLM, London, 1984. -39- DEEP ECOLOGY AHO GREEN POLITICS Deep Ecology Ls an envLronMe~tal theory or platforM wLth polLtLcal sLgnLfLcant wLth pLatforM i..MplLcatLons. Breen PoLLtLcs Ls a poLi..tLcaL envLronMentaL LMpLLcatLons. Both arose Ln Large part Ln reactLon to prevaLLLng envi..ronMentaL practLces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theoretLcal reflectLon, Green PolLtLcs on practLcaL actLon . Deep and LnvestLgatLon questLoni..ng of the underlyLng doMi,nant attLtudes, seen as the Major source of ecoL09Lcal and other probLeMs, Led to artLcuLatLon of the Deep EcoLogy pLatforM, partLy outLi..ned Ln ·slogan" forM Ln the foLLowi..ng tabLe. ). TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH DOMINANT ATT ITIJOES DOMINANT ATTITUDES [OOMIHAHT PARADIGM] DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EHVIRONMEHTAL PARADIGM] OoMi..nati..on over Nature Nature a Resource; IntrLnsLc VaLue confi..ned to HuMans NaturaL EnvLronMent VaLued for Itself; Bi..ocentri..c EgaLi..tari..ani..sM AMp Le Reso1J rces/Subs t i.. tu tes Earth SuppLLes Li..MLted MaterLaL EconoMLc Growth a predoMLnant goaL Non-MaterLaL GoaLs, especLaLLy SeLf-ReaLi..zati..on ConsuMer i,sM DoLng wLth Enough/RecycLLng CoMpetLti..ve Li..festyLe Cooperati..ve Li..feway CentraLLzed/ Urban Centred/ Hati..onaL focus Decentral.i..zed/ Bi..oregi..onaL/ Nei..ghbourhood focus Power structure Hi..erarchLcaL Non-h i,erarch Lea L/ Grass roots DeMocrac!::I HLgh TechnoL09y Appropri..ate Technology Whi..Le Deep Ecol.og!::j grew froM the work of one envLronMentaL phi..Losopher (Naess Ln 1872), Green PolLtLcs arose (Ln West GerMany sLnce 1876) froM the synthesLs of several. MoveMents - ecol.09!::j, cLtLzens, aLternatLve, peace and other MoveMents. The pLatforM of Green PoLLtLcs, whLch Ls buLLt around four pLLLars socLaL responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy , and non-vLoLence ecology, refLects these orLgLns. The fLrst of these pLLLars, ecoLog!::j, Ls based on the sLMpLe theMe that LLMLted ecoLogi..caL systeMs cannot sustai..n unLi..MLted econoMi..c growth, or such questi..onabLe types of growth as nucLear power, wi..thout serLous rLsk of daMage and degeneratLon. The Green aLM Ls to Move to S!::jsteMs of producti..on and consuMptLon whLch MaLntai..n and restore natural processes and C!::fCLes rather than doMLnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wLth nature. The second pi..LLar of Green PoLLtLcs, socLaL responsLbLLLt!::j, LMpLLes opposi..tLon to the LnequaLLti..es i..n power and doMLnati..on reLati..onshi..ps of present soci..ety, and reMovaL of di..scri..Mi..nati..on, econoMLc hardshi..p and exploi..tati..on, both regi..onally and as regards the ThLrd ~orLd. The Green aLM - to be achi..eved pri..Mari..Ly froM below, Ls to bui..ld stable and just soci..al through those adversely affected arrangeMents, wLth coMprehensLve deMocrati..c rLghts and freedoMs (both i..n 6erMan~ -1- and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd WorLd). These changes are to be brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and coordLnatLon of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (Local, COMMunLty and dLstrLct) whi..ch are gLven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of : referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpli..es the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve practLces, not Merely by More powerful people, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups and states, and also, More posLtLveLy, acti..ve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of socLal protest, resLstance and defence . The coMpatLbLlLty of Means wLth ends serves here as an LMportant underlyLng prLncLple: that a just, non-vLolent, huMane end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vi..oLent, LnhuMane Means . • l Gr een PolLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLal change, whLch LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecologLcalLy focussed Deep Ecology platforM as a quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of The strand. LMportant MoveMents of whLch Deep Ecology represents one Lnter-relatLons are shown pLctorLaLly at the second level of the foLlowLng 12 dLagraM: DIAGRAM 1. DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IM PLACE p B \ '\ I 2C ] ~ Oer Lva ti..on Di,recti,on 2+ ExpLanatLon Oi,recti..on 2. Deep Ecology pLatforM 2C. ReforMLst envLronMentaL 2 p1Jsi.. t i.,Qn 2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of Green pLatforM -/ //' ;/ e.g. Buddhi..st (B), ChrLstLan (C) and (Eco)-PhLLosophLc (P) ultLMate bases j / -\,r - [ 1. Deep Ecology fundaMentaLs; C \ \ \ 3. s \ General norMs and theMes , substanti,ally derLved froM pl,atforM PartLcuLar norMs and concrete decLsLons , appLyLng to reLevant practLcal sLtuatLons. The ecologLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not go very deep; Lt May on l y be based upon reforM envLronMentalLsM (or shallow ecology as i,t used to be I Starred notes LndLcate poi..nts at wh i..ch readLngs wi..th the correspondLng nuMbers May be Lnserted or undertaken . -2- caLLed), whLch aLM3 to reforM 30Me of the wor3t abuse3 and exces3e3 of the doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross poLLutLon, extensLve despoLLatLon of Land and Lakes and oceans, LLttLe thought for the future, MLstreatMent of anLMals, etc_ On shaLlow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltself, but as a resource, that Ls LnstruMentalLy, for what Lt can be used for by huMans_ By contrast, Deep Ecology argues (e_g_ froM preMLsses of Level I) that the envLronMent Ls LntrLnsLcaLLy valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that, furtherMore, LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted_ ThLs projectLon of egsLLtarLan or LMpartLalLty prLncLpLes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the whole of lLfe Ln the natural worLd, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtle, BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM_ The prLncLple, not part of Green PoLLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most controversLal of the central prLncLpLes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to expLaLn how value Ls dLstrLbuted_ Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLon through what Ls . . presented as a core deMocracy ~n the bLosphere . _•3 Deep Ecology grew out of a phLlosophLcal deepenLng of the new features of the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run of reductLonLst scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes; systeMs whLch are More than the suM of theLr atoMLstLc parts; eMergent eleMents, lLke lLfe, organLsatLon, etc_ )_ Deep Ecology quLckLy aLLLed Ltself wLth the subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcuLar, the eMphasLs on the lLMLts, and ultLMate faLlure of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and phLlosophy_ WLth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surprLsLng that there Ls lLttle dLrectLy about such MaLn pLllars of Green PolLtLcs as socLaL responsLbLLLty and non-vLoLence Ln the pLatforM of Deep Ecology- However Deep Ecology Ls coMpatLbLe wLth these Green pLlLar prLncLpLes, and Lndeed perMLts theLr derLvatLon_ ~hat Ls supposed to resuLt are generaL norMs, LLke No exploLtatLon, No subjectLon, No vLoLence, at leveL 3_ (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLoLence prLncLpLe froM tne Deep Ecology prLncLpLe of MaxLMLzLng Self-reaLLsatLon Ls atteMpted by Naess Ln the fraMework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLLosophy)_•l A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan reLatLons wLth the natural envLronMent, away froM doMLnant expLoLtatLve practLces_ The naturaL envLronMent coMprLses LteMs of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng huMans (who are not above or separate froM Lt), and accordLn9ly Ls to be treated wLth the care and respect valuable LteMs warrant, and not LrresponsLbLy_ Thus Lt would be contrary to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued LteMs vLolently whLch however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do (consLder such wLdespread phenoMena as "rape of the envLronMent", "of the Land", "of the forestsu)_ SLnce huMans are not apart froM or superLor to nature, Lt follows froM the Deep Ecology pLatforM that natural and proper relatLons also exclude vLoLence towards other huMans or classes of huMans_ Because Lt covers a pluraLLty of posLt~ons, LncludLng shaLLow ecoLogLcaL posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More aMelLoratLve and reforMLst Ln character than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further reMoved froM doMLnant attLtudes, More hardLLne, and More radLcaL_ ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMentaLs, and focusses on Ldeals and theory, Green PolLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal polLtLcal probleMs of an envLronMental or socLal kLnd, such as acLd raLn or rLver pollutLon or MLssLle deplo8Ment, and (lLke the Peace MoveMent Ln AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLpLes or wor~Lng out an env~ronMentaL (or peace) ph~Losophy_ Because of Lts envLronMentaL depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural envLronMent Lssues, such as wLlderness, rare specLes, and the radLcal -3- transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach. Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMa9Ln9 LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLolence and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcal actLon, LncLudLn9 typLcal protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLolence also LMplLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary pra~tLces, socLal defence. WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLolent Methods and socLal defence, other Lesser factLons hold that force Ls necessary to brLn9 about varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes. The Deep EcoLogy platforM Lncludes severaL prLncLpLes that would be recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLples (whLch however, unlLke BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM, would not be wLdeLy opposed by reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of MaxLMLzLng SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of self-realLsatLon of varLous relLgLous posLtLons, of the full unfoldLng and developMent of the person, Ls vastly expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to Lnclude brLngLng to fuLl fruLtLon not MereLy one's own person, but all that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded Self, whLch Ls taken to be not Merely one's faMLLy or feLlows or fellow natLonals, nor Merely ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whole huMan race, but the whole naturaL 1 systeM. The SeLf-realLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened personal self-Lnterest prLncLple, has an excellent phLlosophLcaL pedLgree (at Least as applLed to huMans or neL9hbourLn9 classes of huMans). Thus rather than beLng argued for, a dLffLcult Matter Ln the case of ultLMate prLncLples, SeLfrealLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLlosophLcal or reLLgLous posLtLons at Level 1 of the double pyraMLd, froM those that help sustaLn Deep Ecology. However the expansLon Lnvolved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow self to coMprehensLve Self, severs the usual justLfLcatory lLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy one's self-Lnterests wLth those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan Self, Nature personLfLed prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc. Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcal and spLrLtual ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the 16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the slogan slogan, USLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln endsn. are those concernLng what kLnd of technology one uses and where one lLves (the Matter of dwellLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent value and the lLke), what and how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have MaxLMLzatLon eMphasLsed both MaterLal goals and MaterLal Means, partLcuLarly personal consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyles are approprLate? Deep Ecology, LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLal and spLrLtuaL ends and eMphasLzes the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLlabLe. The result, of course, Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, do~ng wLth enough, and, More 9enerall8, practLces whLch lLe lLght on the Land and the naturaL world. In way of d0Ln9 thLngs, these wLLL be Lnte9rated (Ln ~ properly ecoLogLcaL syMbLotLc and other naturaL styles) wLth the natural systeMs LnvoLved, workLng wLth rather than agaLnst the natural fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL approprLate to regLonaL wLLl accordLngly be ecoregLonaL arrangeMents, 17 to be caLLed. coMe have they as bLore9LonaL, ecoL09LcaL 9roupLn9s - or -4- ApproprLate Means LncLude, Ln turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce and theory of Deep Ecology- HLgh technoL09Les such as nuclear power are not approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLaL socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of the envLronMentaL and socLaL costs and rLsks such technoLogLcaL forMs LMpose_ On both deep and green percept i,ons, wh-3 t Ls requ Lred a re re LLab Le c-:1 ref u L technoLogLes whLch are not ecoLogLcaLLy daMa9Ln9 or socLaLLy rLsky or otherwLse undesLrabLe; but the technoLogi,es adl"li,tted wLLl dLffer accordLng to the prLncLpLes of the posLtLons they answer back to (e_g_ farMLng technLques wLLL need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLLLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such prLncLpLes as bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM )_ In each case the practLcaL use of approprLate technoLogy faLLs at the bottoM, actLon Level, of the doubLe pyral"I ,,"d _•8 WhLLe Deep Ecology suppLLes an appeaLLng bLueprLnt for dLfferent socLaL and LLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed Land reached? A MaLn part of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLaL feature of Deep Ecology: EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of other oLder LdeoLogLes (e_g_ of reLL9Lous, or of revoLutLonary, conscLousness)_ What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtuaL or LdeoLogLcaL conversLon Ls agaLn broadened froM the personaL and socLaL to coMprehend the fuLL envLronMentaL predLcaMent_ In thLs expLanatLon, of how peopLe get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper explanatory prLncLpLes_ A thorough conversLon process LnvoLves eLevatLon to the top LiveL, spLrLtuaL transcendence of the daLLy econoMLc and poLLtLcaL actLon LeveL. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology wLLL be put Ln place, LLke Green PoLLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures_ LLke the fundaMentaL sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness_ SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and conteMpLatLon, are derLved frol"I the fundaMentaL sources_ But other Methods whLch extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecoLogLcaL experLence, LncLude value seeLng thLngs dLfferentLy, and reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon of other thLngs - Connected wLth weLL-beLng and worth the coMLng to apprecLate goes a hoLLstLc shLft Ln theM, these wLdened experLentLaL bases, and LnforMLng vaLues and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon , affordLng dLrect LLnkage wLth parts and whoLes of the natural worLd_•IO By these Methods, a person May coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the reaL world, a convert to Deep Ecology, a feLLow and advocate of Lts Messages and LLfe-ways. ESSAY QUESTIONS }_ To what extent do Green PoLLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and address the sal"le probLel"ls? CrLtLcaLLy coMpare and contrast theLr proposals, especLaLLy as regards the naturaL and the buLLt envLronMent_ 2_ Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four Levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to expLaLn carefuLLy the LnterreLatLons aMong PoLLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probLeMatLc scheMe? these Levels. Where does Green Ln prLncLpLe" appears as a key theMe of Deep Eco~ogy. Cri.tLcaLLy assess Lts adequacy_ Shouldn't Green PoLLtLcs LncLude such a pri.nci.pLe? 3_ ·sLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM - Non-vLo~ence an unstated pr~nc~p~e of Deep Ecoiog~? Expia~n why Deep Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLoLence to the degree i.t Ls? In your answers take account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLcti.ons between the use of I+- 1:5 -5- vLolence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vLolence Ln nature; LLL. the need for coercLve Methods to preserve the natural envLronMent. 5. What justLfLes expandLng self-realLsatLo n to Self-realLsatLo n? ExpLaLn the MeanLng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLLsatL on for Deep EcoLogy and dLscuss Lts adequacy. Why does Lt not feature Ln Green PolLtLcs? 6. ExplaLn the MeanLng of the delLberateLy vague slogan °SLMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends", or of soMe other hLgh-LMpact sLogan of Deep EcoLogy. IndLcate how the vagueness MLght work for and a9aLnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be alternatLve LnterpretatLon s, and LndLcate soMe of the suggest applLed, aLternatLves. these of raMLfLcatLons 7. OutLLne bLoregLonalLsM , LndLcatLng what practLcaL envLronMentaL probLeMs bLoregLonalLsM Lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bLoregLonalLsM derLved froM Deep EcoLogy? ConsLder to what extent bLoregLonalLsM fLts wLth the sLogan, ·rhLnk globally, act locally·. 8. Is More hLgh technology an unprobLeMatLc solutLon to deeper, or to any, envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vLews of Deep Ecology and Green PoLLtLcs on the role of varLous types of technoLogy. 9. What Ls Ecolo9Lcal ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for Deep Ec0Lo9y? If Lt Ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green PoLLtLcs? A reLatLonaL, total-fLeLd LMa9e of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been quLetLy oMLtted froM the orLgLnaL pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated? 10. -6-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 24, Item 1697 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:476be48">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:476be48</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Filing Cabinet 1 - Top Drawer Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Filing Cabinet 1 > Top Drawer Box 24: Files on Articles https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/979159be0f3d1109bd5b22759db1f0fd.pdf 249a2a5345757b3734cdd80aed300e08 PDF Text Text WORKING DRAFT 1'l}l' T1 1,,i··) CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know that Canberra was originally designed by Walter Burley 'lO Griffin. This talk is dedicated to him. You may not know that Griffin, an c111,d l,ee,tJ>,, I! a ,~cJ/2...ru/.1t-l/ '";~1/n,-,l,c1... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and A lantlscape designer_, but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere .eco~osic-.w, city; but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * *3 * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this part, is to gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them r ,i,v~c~ntL..:f- [.<-ol"l,-" hd<--t r7' <-.~ .::.. P,r~t- f tl. /~J 1 or J I C-IJll·A-r~u... ) ~ tn "S. �those as far from satisfactory, or very far from the of best to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to worlds, increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has the especially hope, damage, environment There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for attainable of somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. the towards practices, and attitudes different approaches, different 1 Indeed appreciation of, environment. have cultures different Without doubt practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - nonimperial cultures had much exploitative less whose North, industrial exploitation approaches to practices not vandalism and the environment merely environmental but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. control" their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained the of those than gross permit Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most American Jews and American Indians. instance, for compare, sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster certain both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have �not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and the and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation. the need for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some It semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that there is, in is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a less in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a concern different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy as careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 �environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ Natural Environment People (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you �will. ~ {dC"' CULTURE l (--.__ APPROACH ~ ____,___.- ·'--- So with approaches. different ------- ----- - cultures, different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in �the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components each and the steps can, and have, been be made, consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and �maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the "emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady state position; involve would However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient ~simplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates it so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their �rABLI J. COMPLll NG SOC IAL l'ARAD IGMS <ENVIRONMENTALLY - OR I [ifl [D REPRESEIITAT IONJ .... RIGHT - LEFT POLITICAL ORIENTAT!Otl DOMINANT (XJ WESTERN PARADIGM CORE THEMES ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONAL POLITICAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL MATERIAL (ECONOMIC) GROWTH DOMINANCE OVER NATURE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A RESOURCE MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEANS I ND IV I DUALI ST I c/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS ELITIST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMMODITY/CULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED : URBAN CENTRED LARGE-SCALE: ORDERED (POWER-) HIERARCHICAL HUMAN RELATIONS SECONDARY /OLD 1LEFT /NEW LEFT 1 I X 1X<R) X X I X IX 1X<RRl I y IX<R) I X ➔ Y 1X<Rl I X(RR) !COMMAND SYSTEM I I I I y y I y :X(Q) I y I X I X(Q) I X I X xrn> 1 IX :x-v I X X<R) I X-'>Y NATIONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS AND EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X X 1X<Q> IX(Q) i X I ly(R) FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, SCIENTIFIC/UTILITARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC y ly(Q) I AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) [NVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE! y IXCQ) I X->Y I I Y<Q> I y I I v Y X<R) y /HUMAN RELATIONS !PRIMARY 'v<Q> I X X·->Y y y 'xrn> 'x<R> y X I 1X<R) X I X X X I X IX X :x<R> y X I X y X I X I RATIONALITY I I I /REJECTED I IDEEP ECOLOGY 1DISTINGU!Sfl[D I I !GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTIOt-j /REJECTED (FOR BIOSPECIES /IMPART I ALI TY) /TRADITIONAL MARKETS WITHIN PUBLIC INTEREST / FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF / PRODUCTIVE MEANS jDECENTRALISED: I I I Y/NON OWNERSHIP COMMUNAL I I /SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NON-(POWER)HIERARCHJCAL /HUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN / ECO-COMMUN I TY REGIONAL/NEIGHBOURHOOD I FOCUS; SOCIAL (NON- /VIOLENT) DEFENCE / PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES l(cJTIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) /LIBERATION; SOCIAL /REGULATION /EARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED y /NATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN /OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL X➔Y I /COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ ,soCJAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED I RELATED / CAREFUL USE/RECYCLING ' /Y(ES SENT IAL) LOCALIS~LF-MANAGEMENT /PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS/ y y ? !ALTERNATIVE (Y) ENVIRONMENTAL PAR.4DIGM 1 / LE SS MATERIAL GOALS (E,G, SELF- REALISATION) /HARMON Y WITH NATURE /NATURAL ENVIRONMENT VALUED FOR ITSELF I y I y I I ICOUNTER 1CULTURE I I I STATE lowNERSHIP X X X NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NONHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN I ST! C EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC DOMINANT ISTATE I SOCIALIST ... I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: IAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ! INTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , I~/J DER RATIONALITY (OR) REJECTION OF NARROWER; /HOLi ST IC IV /NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I ..• • I �entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. competing individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional show. cultures, Nor do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. certain introduces human The relations. chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms and cultures such as those the of models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many of against the In traditional the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, �assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the manag~rial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave out There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be icing. discerned, features. sure, This does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of are the as aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative new environmentalism: (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; • 9 and, unlike Australia, a �substantial do proportion act response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of socially that with accordance in conflict precepts the was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which ••• carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of Both aspects were a direct contradiction enlightened self-interest. of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the While the Christian religion was widely minds of the people. compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. and individualism of religion It ran also contrary to the self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved Northern There is it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a compartmentalisation. partial answer: Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not the upset standard penetrate deep. business to Thus for most believers religion does not week. Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). �Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. Religion in America has lost out to with any depth to it appears most unlikely. the There existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no But nor is the so-called scientific front-end-in. cannot account for; it is that this perspective, a paradigm, a richer more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). such great the incorporates There are it is far from uniquely determined. So paradigm. social dominant in view world is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or It shape. is view with these sorts of weaknesses the to return to trying in virtue rival Consider, for instance, the matter of the view could explain. scientific much for world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more the case for its In part it failed deservedly: view". world scientific "the In any case such a reversal intensional scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. character quasi-religious reasons of set second There is a of some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, strongly These on turn the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much as understood a (the Australia, success. first) post-Christian it has been irreligious character the of understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. 'best is said, society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally a Pantheistic or Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. impose to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentalism excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness �of the culture - what alternatives are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps applied be much quasi-religious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists �TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 �Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Another Australia. weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for �Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-industrial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmental alternative. furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmental encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisations. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavouring to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change than has thus far been two be despoilation and the like, primarily industrial organisations and drives and environmental education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmental activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-American It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northern activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should �not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well other regional environmental with aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence policies. • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternative paradigms. ambassadors, Australian It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly are, of course, those Lawrence). like nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, appreciation Northern intellectuals of local natural the The features to be egalitarian, along environments. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-authoritarian, rapidly increasing Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the cultural characters are held (e.g. adapted commonly taken to things, egalitarian methods as encapsulated in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics, in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restriction in practice to extension male relationships: to communities (including nonhumans). is there for deep cultural transformation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approaches' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 16 practice, �4. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. is well-illustrated by the main approach in *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitarian than American. The hard data underlying the claim---ri assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence'. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, (,0· cc,,/' «.,PL'0"1 d I (on and Reality in Indian America, · __ ,.,.,, ja,n;~, Australian Wild Life J_ (f9Jt-f/), ty ·-J, W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmentalism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousness, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Qlre, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Gare, Environmental Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. or- aae Cornucopia, Wiley, 17 ~~J~rh , of 1982. in environmental thought A Collection and of �Job No. ................................................................................. . 7/J>/JVh SOCPAC PRINTERY Received ........................................................................... REQUEST FOR PRINTING 05471 No Research Schools of Social Sciences & Pacific Studies (/. I L tJC,;c_ )1 -1 Department ............................................................................................................................................ . rl Person Requiring Work ......... ?. 1-......... e.. . .<..t ... ./.. . . . ':l.............................. 5. . . .... . . . . ... ..... .... . . .... . . .. . .. . . .. . ... ... .. c c School ............................................................................................................................................................. . 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Please print name of Requisitioner here - .................................................. Signature ..................................................................................................................................... (REQUISITIONER/ DEPT: SECRETARY) NOTE: If papers submitted tor offset printing/photocopying contain copyright material other than Australian National University copyright Form COP-1 must accompany this request In lieu of the Declaration as above. �r r" WORKING DRAFT ·. , ' I · CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know tha~ Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is (, ,~ ,/ h (: (tJ m, , . designed by Walter Burley 'i.C to him. You may not know that Griffin, an dedicated / 1,• <, , ' ' ! I ·,/ .• r : , J,,--.T~- l, c :.... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and ,1 lantlscape designe ~ but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, ,.,i/f . ,:i:. for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere ~~l-0gical city; * to * * * * * gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. -,/ /h ,1 ;1 ~11._r talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested aeeper *3 The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is a but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. part, to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: f) ' r ,nt 1 or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them t__ ri __f. _________ ---1 n__ {- ,-; ,:_... --1 (. "'I n,l ._ 1 ,. (•✓ L / ~• • } ' <: l7' 1 •-rt,,,_ c, , /---5-0-J. i +- I~.,, )• I �as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, those of the best attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and the environment hope, damage, like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for of especially the give grounds remarkable level of environmental activism that has somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes and different practices, cultures towards have the different environment. approaches, 1 different Indeed appreciation of, practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: compare, for nonimperial cultures had much less North, exploitation and American Jews and American Indians. whose approaches to practices not vandalism the environment merely permit those of the environmental gross control" of their local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. But occasionally, notably retained than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - exploitative industrial instance, sufficient in autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both certain sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have �not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation . the need for change, at least there is, in It is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of if the natural environment is to retain some semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a concern in different less some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a disaster, such largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the as Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy the careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 �environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ People Natural Environment (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you �will. \ \ \ \ ) (......._ APPROACH _ .,__ _. So with approaches. different '-- --------- ---~ cultures, __,.;::;f --- different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in �the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components be made, consider The dominant objective such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject each and the steps can, and have, been is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and �maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the ''emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves But themes. a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady position; state it would involve However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient oversimplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their �T/\HLI 1. rnr·Al INCi SUC l/\L 1'/IRi\UIC,MS <lNVIRUNMINli\LLY-ORILiilrlJ REl'RESUH/\TION) "··· RIGllf - LEFT POLI T!Ci\L OHIUH/\l 10,J uo•;1NAtll m ~[STERN P/\RAD!GM LORE TII EM[ S Mr.TERIAL (ECONOMI C) GROWTH LJOMI NAN CE OVER NATURE NATUR,\L ENVIR ONM ENT A RESOURCE DOM! N/\N l ISTATE SOCI/\LI ST 1 IOLD INEW I COUNTE.R- I LffT I LEFT I CULTURE I ,X<Rl X 1 ' I X I X X X I ECONOMIC ORG.l\N[S/\T[ON/\L POLIT l CAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODU CT IVITY AN D PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNER SHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEA NS [NDIVIDUALISTJC/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS EL IT IST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL co~~ODITYICULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED: URBAN CE:;TRED Lr.RGE-SC ALE: ORDERED (POWER -) HIERARCHICAL HUMAr1 RE LAT I ONS SECONDARY I I y !COMMAND SYSTEM IX<Rl X<R) 1 I X<RR) y y y y y xrnJ ly(QJ X->Y X IX(Ql I I Y I Y I 1X<Q) X(Ql I 1 I I X(Q) 1X<QJ I X I X I X X I I X X<Rl X X X ly(R) NAT IONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERN ATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS ANO EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X : X·➔Y I I X ➔Y X<R) X ➔Y I I Y<Q) y Y Y V IHUMAN RELATIONS jPRIMARY IY(Q) X X·->Y y y I y ITRADITIONAL MARKETS WITH IN PUBLIC INTEREST I FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF IPRODUCTIVE MEANS !DECENTRAL ISED: I COMMUNAL i 0 1REGIONALINEIGHBOURHOOD FOCUS; SOCIAL (NONIV IOLENT) DEFENCE I PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES J(c ITIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) 1LIBERAT!O N; SOCIAL I IREGULATION I I X 1X<Rl I y JEARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED X I X y NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NoNHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN l ST IC X X I X I X FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, , , , ScIENTIF!C/UT!L!TARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC X :x(R) iNATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN !OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL y X IX y X IX I IRATIONALITY I REJECTED y X➔ Y ! 1SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NoN-(POWER)H!ERARCHJC,\L IHUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN IECO - COMMUN I TY 1 ? I o . ,:, ,u <r 4l1 n 1 lx<Rl AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE I I ''' ' I Y/NON OWNERSHIP I !COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ !SOCIAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED IRELATED l(AREFUL USE/RECYCLING , 1Y(ESSENTIAL) LOCAL/SELF-MANAGEMENT !PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS! X x<R> IDEEP ECOLOGY , orsT[NGU[SIIED 1LE SS MATERIAL GOALS ' (E.G. SE LF-REALISATION) ! lir.RMONY WI TH NATURE ,NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IGREATER VALUE ' VALUED FOR ITSELF ASSUMPTIOrj !REJECTED (FOR I BIOSPEC I ES I IMPARTIALITY) X--"Y I I iALTERN/\TlVE (Y) !ENVIRONMENTAL P/\R.l\D!GM y x<RR) I STATE !OWNERSHIP " I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: !APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY JINTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , !HIDER RATIONALITY (OR REJECTION OF NARROWER); IHOLISTIC IV/NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I �entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or picture. competing Individuals individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional cultures, Nor do these archtypal show. only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they The do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms cultures such as those and of the models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many against the In traditional of the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, �assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave There are out cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be sure, does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern features. This icing. discerned, precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of the as are aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the new environmentalis m: virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; 9 and, unlike Australia, a �substantial proportion do act in accordance with that response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of conflict socially the precepts was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-int-erest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the standard penetrate deep. business week. escape to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: There is touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser relig ious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). �Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. "the scientific world view". In any case such a reversal Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more scientific view could explain. the case for its for much the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no virtue in front-end-in. shape. It trying return to the is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). There view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so-called scientific cannot account for; dominant to rival a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. There is a second quasi-religious set character of of reasons some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly impose a Pantheistic or These turn on the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much understood as a (the success. first) Australia, post-Christian it has been irreligious character of the understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. said, is 'best society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentali sm excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness �of the culture what alternative s are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps be much applied quasi-relig ious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displac ement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists �TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism AUSTRALIA USA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 �Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically ). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Australia. Another weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-fig ures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographer s to do. 14 important There is much for �Throughout, · as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-indus trial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmen tal alternative . furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmen tal philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincin gly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmen tal encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisatio ns. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavourin g to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerabl y greater change than has thus far been two be despoilatio n and the like, primarily industrial organisatio ns and drives and environmen tal education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmen tal activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-Americ an It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northe rn activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should �. . not of course reduce merely to personall y directed antagonism ) fit in well other regional environm ental with aims, such as independe nt and nonaligne d defence policies. • More positivel y, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternati ve paradigms . ambassado rs, Australia n It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly Northern intellect uals Lawrence ). adapted like are, of course, those nonmaxim izing making-do socialist ic ones, of local natural the The features to be egalitari an, along environm ents. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-auth oritarian , rapidly increasin g Nonmaxim izing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsib le for the low repute in which some of the cultural character s are held (e.g. appreciat ion commonly taken to things, egalitari an methods as encapsula ted in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics , in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restrictio n in practice to extension male relations hips: to communit ies (includin g nonhuman s). is there for deep cultural transform ation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approach es' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour . 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellect ual positions . At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculou s than those of Christian ity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelm ed by new technolog y often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining represent ative samples of this and that system or species; not represent ative southern sassafras , parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders , but sufficien tly many. 16 practice, �4. Another past philosophic al basis for environmen tal philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitari an than American. The hard data underlying the claim--rs assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence '. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. is well-illust rated by the main approach in O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, -. ) , '\ and ,• Reality in Indian America, Australian Wild Life W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmen talism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousne ss, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe and Cornucopia, Wiley, ,\,'. ~· , ,, R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Gare, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Ga:re, Environmen tal Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. of c- r- 17 , 1982. in environmen tal A thought Collection and of � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WORKING DRAFT 1'l}l' T1 1,,i··) CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know that Canberra was originally designed by Walter Burley 'lO Griffin. This talk is dedicated to him. You may not know that Griffin, an c111,d l,ee,tJ>,, I! a ,~cJ/2...ru/.1t-l/ '";~1/n,-,l,c1... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and A lantlscape designer_, but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere .eco~osic-.w, city; but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. * * *3 * * * * The objective of the larger investigation, of which this part, is to gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them r ,i,v~c~ntL..:f- [.<-ol"l,-" hd<--t r7' <-.~ .::.. P,r~t- f tl. /~J 1 or J I C-IJll·A-r~u... ) ~ tn "S. those as far from satisfactory, or very far from the of best to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to worlds, increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. the grounds give remarkable level of environmental activism that has the especially hope, damage, environment There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for attainable of somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. the towards practices, and attitudes different approaches, different 1 Indeed appreciation of, environment. have cultures different Without doubt practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - nonimperial cultures had much exploitative less whose North, industrial exploitation approaches to practices not vandalism and the environment merely environmental but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. control" their of local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. in But occasionally, notably retained the of those than gross permit Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most American Jews and American Indians. instance, for compare, sufficient autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster certain both sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and the and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation. the need for change, at least if the natural environment is to retain some It semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that there is, in is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a less in some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a concern different disaster, such Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy as careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ Natural Environment People (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you will. ~ {dC"' CULTURE l (--.__ APPROACH ~ ____,___.- ·'--- So with approaches. different ------- ----- - cultures, different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components each and the steps can, and have, been be made, consider The dominant objective is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the "emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves themes. But a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady state position; involve would However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient ~simplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates it so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their rABLI J. COMPLll NG SOC IAL l'ARAD IGMS <ENVIRONMENTALLY - OR I [ifl [D REPRESEIITAT IONJ .... RIGHT - LEFT POLITICAL ORIENTAT!Otl DOMINANT (XJ WESTERN PARADIGM CORE THEMES ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONAL POLITICAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL MATERIAL (ECONOMIC) GROWTH DOMINANCE OVER NATURE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A RESOURCE MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEANS I ND IV I DUALI ST I c/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS ELITIST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMMODITY/CULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED : URBAN CENTRED LARGE-SCALE: ORDERED (POWER-) HIERARCHICAL HUMAN RELATIONS SECONDARY /OLD 1LEFT /NEW LEFT 1 I X 1X<R) X X I X IX 1X<RRl I y IX<R) I X ➔ Y 1X<Rl I X(RR) !COMMAND SYSTEM I I I I y y I y :X(Q) I y I X I X(Q) I X I X xrn> 1 IX :x-v I X X<R) I X-'>Y NATIONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS AND EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X X 1X<Q> IX(Q) i X I ly(R) FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, SCIENTIFIC/UTILITARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC y ly(Q) I AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) [NVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE! y IXCQ) I X->Y I I Y<Q> I y I I v Y X<R) y /HUMAN RELATIONS !PRIMARY 'v<Q> I X X·->Y y y 'xrn> 'x<R> y X I 1X<R) X I X X X I X IX X :x<R> y X I X y X I X I RATIONALITY I I I /REJECTED I IDEEP ECOLOGY 1DISTINGU!Sfl[D I I !GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTIOt-j /REJECTED (FOR BIOSPECIES /IMPART I ALI TY) /TRADITIONAL MARKETS WITHIN PUBLIC INTEREST / FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF / PRODUCTIVE MEANS jDECENTRALISED: I I I Y/NON OWNERSHIP COMMUNAL I I /SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NON-(POWER)HIERARCHJCAL /HUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN / ECO-COMMUN I TY REGIONAL/NEIGHBOURHOOD I FOCUS; SOCIAL (NON- /VIOLENT) DEFENCE / PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES l(cJTIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) /LIBERATION; SOCIAL /REGULATION /EARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED y /NATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN /OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL X➔Y I /COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ ,soCJAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED I RELATED / CAREFUL USE/RECYCLING ' /Y(ES SENT IAL) LOCALIS~LF-MANAGEMENT /PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS/ y y ? !ALTERNATIVE (Y) ENVIRONMENTAL PAR.4DIGM 1 / LE SS MATERIAL GOALS (E,G, SELF- REALISATION) /HARMON Y WITH NATURE /NATURAL ENVIRONMENT VALUED FOR ITSELF I y I y I I ICOUNTER 1CULTURE I I I STATE lowNERSHIP X X X NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NONHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN I ST! C EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC DOMINANT ISTATE I SOCIALIST ... I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: IAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY ! INTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , I~/J DER RATIONALITY (OR) REJECTION OF NARROWER; /HOLi ST IC IV /NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I ..• • I entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or Individuals picture. competing individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional show. cultures, Nor do these archtypal only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. certain introduces human The relations. chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms and cultures such as those the of models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many of against the In traditional the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the manag~rial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave out There are cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be icing. discerned, features. sure, This does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of are the as aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative new environmentalism: (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; • 9 and, unlike Australia, a substantial do proportion act response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of socially that with accordance in conflict precepts the was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which ••• carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of Both aspects were a direct contradiction enlightened self-interest. of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the While the Christian religion was widely minds of the people. compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. and individualism of religion It ran also contrary to the self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved Northern There is it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a compartmentalisation. partial answer: Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not the upset standard penetrate deep. business to Thus for most believers religion does not week. Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: escape touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. Religion in America has lost out to with any depth to it appears most unlikely. the There existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no But nor is the so-called scientific front-end-in. cannot account for; it is that this perspective, a paradigm, a richer more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). such great the incorporates There are it is far from uniquely determined. So paradigm. social dominant in view world is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or It shape. is view with these sorts of weaknesses the to return to trying in virtue rival Consider, for instance, the matter of the view could explain. scientific much for world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more the case for its In part it failed deservedly: view". world scientific "the In any case such a reversal intensional scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. character quasi-religious reasons of set second There is a of some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, strongly These on turn the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much as understood a (the Australia, success. first) post-Christian it has been irreligious character the of understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. 'best is said, society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally a Pantheistic or Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. impose to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentalism excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness of the culture - what alternatives are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps applied be much quasi-religious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displacement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism USA AUSTRALIA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Another Australia. weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-figures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographers to do. 14 important There is much for Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-industrial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmental alternative. furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmental philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincingly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmental encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisations. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavouring to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerably greater change than has thus far been two be despoilation and the like, primarily industrial organisations and drives and environmental education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmental activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-American It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northern activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well other regional environmental with aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence policies. • More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternative paradigms. ambassadors, Australian It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly are, of course, those Lawrence). like nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones, appreciation Northern intellectuals of local natural the The features to be egalitarian, along environments. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-authoritarian, rapidly increasing Nonmaximizing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the cultural characters are held (e.g. adapted commonly taken to things, egalitarian methods as encapsulated in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics, in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restriction in practice to extension male relationships: to communities (including nonhumans). is there for deep cultural transformation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approaches' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour. 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual positions. At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples of this and that system or species; not representative southern sassafras, parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders, but sufficiently many. 16 practice, 4. Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. is well-illustrated by the main approach in *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitarian than American. The hard data underlying the claim---ri assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence'. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, (,0· cc,,/' «.,PL'0"1 d I (on and Reality in Indian America, · __ ,.,.,, ja,n;~, Australian Wild Life J_ (f9Jt-f/), ty ·-J, W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmentalism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousness, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Qlre, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Gare, Environmental Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. or- aae Cornucopia, Wiley, 17 ~~J~rh , of 1982. in environmental thought A Collection and of Job No. ................................................................................. . 7/J>/JVh SOCPAC PRINTERY Received ........................................................................... REQUEST FOR PRINTING 05471 No Research Schools of Social Sciences & Pacific Studies (/. I L tJC,;c_ )1 -1 Department ............................................................................................................................................ . rl Person Requiring Work ......... ?. 1-......... e.. . .<..t ... ./.. . . . ':l.............................. 5. . . .... . . . . ... ..... .... . . .... . . .. . .. . . .. . ... ... .. c c School ............................................................................................................................................................. . 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Please print name of Requisitioner here - .................................................. Signature ..................................................................................................................................... (REQUISITIONER/ DEPT: SECRETARY) NOTE: If papers submitted tor offset printing/photocopying contain copyright material other than Australian National University copyright Form COP-1 must accompany this request In lieu of the Declaration as above. r r" WORKING DRAFT ·. , ' I · CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE Many of you know tha~ Canberra was originally Griffin. This talk is (, ,~ ,/ h (: (tJ m, , . designed by Walter Burley 'i.C to him. You may not know that Griffin, an dedicated / 1,• <, , ' ' ! I ·,/ .• r : , J,,--.T~- l, c :.... American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was not simply an architect and ,1 lantlscape designe ~ but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists. key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially on making nature the servant of man', 'land to be accorded the 'concentration and discerned instead elements of a different 'consciousness' (the word is his). took the He rejected His approach was holistic, and respect he due to a highly developed and perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or as a mere section of a map'. Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still, ,.,i/f . ,:i:. for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere ~~l-0gical city; * to * * * * * gauge the extent to which Australian contrasted with American culture, contains developable will underpin a under which many suffers. -,/ /h ,1 ;1 ~11._r talk sketches a culture, especially as elements (seeds) which different political framework from the bastardised capitalism people presently labour and local environment frequently It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the political course interested aeeper *3 The objective of the larger investigation, of which this is a but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception but far from deep ecological ideals. part, to in charted as environmentally alternative structures: f) ' r ,nt 1 or socially disastrous to be it is enough, for example, to view them t__ ri __f. _________ ---1 n__ {- ,-; ,:_... --1 (. "'I n,l ._ 1 ,. (•✓ L / ~• • } ' <: l7' 1 •-rt,,,_ c, , /---5-0-J. i +- I~.,, )• I as far from satisfactory, or very far from worlds, those of the best attainable to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against vandalism and the environment hope, damage, like, and ecological construction [direct positive action]. There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that for of especially the give grounds remarkable level of environmental activism that has somehow emerged among the people. It is worth trying to pull together some of these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts, and increasing the level of concern and activism. Without doubt attitudes and different practices, cultures towards have the different environment. approaches, 1 different Indeed appreciation of, practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally dependent: compare, for nonimperial cultures had much less North, exploitation and American Jews and American Indians. whose approaches to practices not vandalism the environment merely permit those of the environmental gross control" of their local typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination. But occasionally, notably retained than but to a marked extent depend upon such practices. Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost environments, Most and where they still survive uncorrupted still have - exploitative industrial instance, sufficient in autonomy the to adjacent Pacific, regional cultures 2 have slow or even halt environmental destruction. Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked in Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land. One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially in the South, is to foster both certain sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy; socialism and indigenous for cultural instance land rights movements. 2 differences to support and, more Melanesian For, where the cultures have not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is rapid way of paradigms. in the a cultural differences can also serve Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in transition to different Such comparatively activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social The question arises whether elsewhere a less environmentally exploitative social paradigms. transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture. Can features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite differences? In the case of Australia, a basis culture, is there both in the land and and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation . the need for change, at least there is, in It is becoming platitudinous the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many local natural environments and ecosystems loose Of if the natural environment is to retain some semblance of integrity, there is little doubt. that 3 unless we in the Antipodes break from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised North and work destructive towards establishment of a concern in different less some parts, rising tide war. of For despite environmental the industrialised North still appears in the grip of established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of nuclear environmentally culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy. elements of regionalism in the North, despite a disaster, such largely alone. Nor is the Australia because as well as the location, the as Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go advantage of the ground and its southern seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing. cultivation. Such a it task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and speedy the careful But if task is rendered urgent also by other matters of 3 environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs but colossal biological losses through of nuclear rapid destruction of, e.g. war, tropical rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere humans now establish. How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to alter approaches to the environment? As in the title of the talk it operates in the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like and design culture. principles A working picture that the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like most images of the more abstract distorts across organising of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the environmental way on the ropes of regional links the is that of a suspension the gap often separating people from the natural environment. bridge There are people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment, like so:- approach ➔ People Natural Environment (Of course people may be part of the natural environment: the picture doesn't exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot traffic, through the monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans. of But it is the structure all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly. The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if 4 you will. \ \ \ \ ) (......._ APPROACH _ .,__ _. So with approaches. different '-- --------- ---~ cultures, __,.;::;f --- different carrying bridges different It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy, but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and rivets of the structures. types, bridges, but rather It has its analytical computing the loads and as parts, the design looking stresses at on them; and engineering of the the components, and it also has its more holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and of them their - the social paradigms embedded in the cultures. select substructures Philosophy, the link subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business. Less figuratively, assumptions of a philosophy replacement, or marxist philosophies. deep ecology, asks deeper assumptions of all and and assumptions paradigms. the operative for example of free Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not deeper questions, extracting the fundamental other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e. social assembles culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions, that is, to be considered for enterprise isolates In what are sometimes called the this respect philosophy - which includes much more than conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects, as logic, the science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of arguments and methodology of all other sciences. philosophical investigation extracts, 5 The deeper assumptions such when put together yield a philosophy in the more popular sense (as e.g. enterprise philosophy): in philosophy of life or again the free in any case the result will be a philosophical theory or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done. By largely philosophical investigation then, assumptions of the techniques we try contrasted base. with operative to test apparent we trace and Northern social paradigms; the adequacy social of the organise the and by sociological assemblage, especially as alternatives with some environmental support So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some results are illustrated in diagram 1. Details of other positions, the old culture (as positions typically offer environmental a projected), transition alternative. are from And and new left and the counter included in the diagram because these the while the dominant it may Western appear paradigm to indeed is - a long political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative, of the intermediate taken one at a time. details steps is not so great; To illustrate the way transitions can of the first line (row) in macro-economic form. construed as representing package typically includes environment, so the in components be made, consider The dominant objective such as GDP, a rough way standard of living. minimal to quality of life this But the and and pollution, and perhaps with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness. this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective to considerable reservations, X(RR). of material goes back to Greek philosophy; 6 In growth The real break however comes with members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example, idea the objective function to be maximized gets much complicated, with subtractions for externalities such as noise subject each and the steps can, and have, been is to maximize some economic package of goods and services being the though the namely, the abandonment of growth and maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing the macroeconomic steady-state objective or will level, for economy, something economists have so far sketched. which Daly for At the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a sustainable be goals. example though the alternative environmental much less inflexible and nationalistic than In fact the ''emerging steady-state advocates, paradigm", affords only a shallow alternative to the dominant paradigm, differing only as to growth and reserves But themes. a fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate capitalism the higher-dimensional steady position; state it would involve However, the higher dimensional how a better argued transition can be made; diagram essentially by combining steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions the Left-socialist combination, which framework would a diagram, and remove the convenient oversimplification of the two dimensional left-right transition. indicates so case does not against microeconomic themes. touch human relations, a with Even so, even with the narrower anthropocentric have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would have only began to enter. Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying social model takes us towards the following familiar picture: society consists of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g. they are not genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have (e.g. a certain ability to calculate). but few of these At bottom, these individuals have utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize; and so they are competitive (by virtue of scarcity). that they are possessive, and possess capital. The distinctive the feature means of Their other feature is production, e.g. land, of the American model is of course is that individuals can separately accumulate the means of production. 7 To ensure their T/\HLI 1. rnr·Al INCi SUC l/\L 1'/IRi\UIC,MS <lNVIRUNMINli\LLY-ORILiilrlJ REl'RESUH/\TION) "··· RIGllf - LEFT POLI T!Ci\L OHIUH/\l 10,J uo•;1NAtll m ~[STERN P/\RAD!GM LORE TII EM[ S Mr.TERIAL (ECONOMI C) GROWTH LJOMI NAN CE OVER NATURE NATUR,\L ENVIR ONM ENT A RESOURCE DOM! N/\N l ISTATE SOCI/\LI ST 1 IOLD INEW I COUNTE.R- I LffT I LEFT I CULTURE I ,X<Rl X 1 ' I X I X X X I ECONOMIC ORG.l\N[S/\T[ON/\L POLIT l CAL FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL EPISTEMIC/ PHILOSOPHIC MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY REGULATED, PRODU CT IVITY AN D PROFIT MAXIMIZING) PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE OWNER SHIP OF PRODUCTIVE MEA NS [NDIVIDUALISTJC/ COMPETITIVE ETHOS EL IT IST/REWARDS FOR APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED URBAN-INDUSTRIAL co~~ODITYICULTURAL PACKAGING CENTRALISED: URBAN CE:;TRED Lr.RGE-SC ALE: ORDERED (POWER -) HIERARCHICAL HUMAr1 RE LAT I ONS SECONDARY I I y !COMMAND SYSTEM IX<Rl X<R) 1 I X<RR) y y y y y xrnJ ly(QJ X->Y X IX(Ql I I Y I Y I 1X<Q) X(Ql I 1 I I X(Q) 1X<QJ I X I X I X X I I X X<Rl X X X ly(R) NAT IONAL FOCUS; MILITARY DEFENCE X I I X ALTERN ATIVE STRUCTURES (POWER-BROKERS ANO EXPERTS PROMINENT) LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL REGULATION, POLICE BACKED X : X·➔Y I I X ➔Y X<R) X ➔Y I I Y<Q) y Y Y V IHUMAN RELATIONS jPRIMARY IY(Q) X X·->Y y y I y ITRADITIONAL MARKETS WITH IN PUBLIC INTEREST I FRAMEWORK LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF IPRODUCTIVE MEANS !DECENTRAL ISED: I COMMUNAL i 0 1REGIONALINEIGHBOURHOOD FOCUS; SOCIAL (NONIV IOLENT) DEFENCE I PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES J(c ITIZEN-WORKER I INVOLVEMENT) 1LIBERAT!O N; SOCIAL I IREGULATION I I X 1X<Rl I y JEARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED X I X y NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL NoNHUMANS ESSENTIALLY ME CHAN l ST IC X X I X I X FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS SEPARATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, , , , ScIENTIF!C/UT!L!TARIAN RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC REDUCTIONISTIC X :x(R) iNATURE DELICATELY BALANCED 1NATURE BENIGN !OTHER ANIMALS ALSO INTENTIONAL y X IX y X IX I IRATIONALITY I REJECTED y X➔ Y ! 1SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE NoN-(POWER)H!ERARCHJC,\L IHUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN IECO - COMMUN I TY 1 ? I o . ,:, ,u <r 4l1 n 1 lx<Rl AMPLE RESERV~S (OR (SUBSTITUTES) ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE I I ''' ' I Y/NON OWNERSHIP I !COLLECTIVE ETHOS/ !SOCIAL PROVISION EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED IRELATED l(AREFUL USE/RECYCLING , 1Y(ESSENTIAL) LOCAL/SELF-MANAGEMENT !PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS! X x<R> IDEEP ECOLOGY , orsT[NGU[SIIED 1LE SS MATERIAL GOALS ' (E.G. SE LF-REALISATION) ! lir.RMONY WI TH NATURE ,NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IGREATER VALUE ' VALUED FOR ITSELF ASSUMPTIOrj !REJECTED (FOR I BIOSPEC I ES I IMPARTIALITY) X--"Y I I iALTERN/\TlVE (Y) !ENVIRONMENTAL P/\R.l\D!GM y x<RR) I STATE !OWNERSHIP " I LIMITS TO SCIENCE: !APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY JINTEGRATION OF REASON/ EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , , !HIDER RATIONALITY (OR REJECTION OF NARROWER); IHOLISTIC IV/NATURAL AS TELEOLOGICAL I I entitlement to this is the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive apparatus of the (minimal) state. natural, this about self-interested Features There is nothing compulsory, or picture. competing Individuals individuals are matter of these nurture, abstract not nature. of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of training, not human nature, as a comparison where approximating particularly individuals are not like this, individuals embody rationality either: with helps other traditional cultures, Nor do these archtypal show. only a question-begging argument leads to the American model as something naturally required. The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model. introduces certain relations. human chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they The do left not models omit are social The left still human relations: the further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to full community relations, independent value. recognising That is a creatures and nonhuman things as of bigger step, a step that no Western political institutions make requisite allowance for, and that mainstream underpinning Western value theories do not accommodate. The arguments from traditional cultures can also be illustrated paradigms cultures such as those and of the models Melanesia that and directed underlie Polynesia, them. many against the In traditional of the operative assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted. Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there is good prospect of thwarting more environmentally destructive practices. Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed. But much of the inhabited and there are already New governed and by environmentally less unscathed World peoples of predominantly European stock. distinctive features 8 observable in New World is now Although cultures, assumptions of the dominant Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial other, or even lesser, features of surprisingly leave There are out cultures significant as artistic and intellectual usually cultural industrial culture, though economically dominated accompanying other conspicuous The incomplete social paradigms outlined do not exhaust features of the accompanying rather to be sure, does affords European culture. This alternatives. a discrepancies. established have an somewhat as that in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian gives *l but Northern features. This icing. discerned, precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such evidenced So the cultures will have to be invoked if change in approach is to be hastened in this way. cultural features to be considered. classes. But the basis there of the as are aesthetic well more route to important environmental omissions and In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to religion; also neglected are many of the connected older and formerly more prominent values of American culture. The American search for environmentally acceptable alternatives has regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 • establish "the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way. and Indeed the primary attempts to representative (For example, Nash provides a sample list of the books he considers important in the rise of the new environmentalis m: virtually all that proceed beyond ecology depend on an appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.) In the context of American culture the appeal something to be said for it. to religious features has For, firstly, a high proportion of the American population profess some active religious commitment; 9 and, unlike Australia, a substantial proportion do act in accordance with that response. And, secondly, religious values do clash with dominant Northern paradigm. This sort of conflict socially the precepts was approved of perceived, considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the case the with of Melanesian society (p.9): The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of enlightened self-int-erest. Both aspects were a direct contradiction of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the minds of the people. While the Christian religion was widely compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another, it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow. It ran also contrary to the religion of individualism and self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was followed by the majority of Europeans ••• It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant Northern paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans. a partial answer: compartmentalisation. Religion for most is a separate thing fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not upset the standard penetrate deep. business week. escape to Thus for most believers religion does not Only for a minority does it directly such as human poverty: There is touch immediate matters why should we expect it to work for the Environment? Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious perceptions within the American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter things. But even if some of the effects of a religious return would beneficial, and to nature domination highly be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable. of be were Unless moreover the position abandoned in favour of one of the lesser relig ious traditions the environmental effects would 10 be negative (as Watt testifies). Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset. with any depth to it appears most unlikely. "the scientific world view". In any case such a reversal Religion in America has lost out to In part it failed deservedly: world view was seriously deficient and it did not account more scientific view could explain. the case for its for much the Consider, for instance, the matter of the existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc. no virtue in front-end-in. shape. It trying return to the is world view in such great is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or social it is that this perspective, a paradigm, paradigm. So incorporates it is far from uniquely determined. more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g. view). There view with these sorts of weaknesses But nor is the so-called scientific cannot account for; dominant to rival a richer intensional the There are scientific These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking a theological way. There is a second quasi-religious set character of of reasons some sort, for not endeavouring Christian, Jewish, whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia. strongly impose a Pantheistic or These turn on the irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion is unlikely to have much understood as a (the success. first) Australia, post-Christian it has been irreligious character of the understanding much else about the culture, society e.g. said, is 'best society, in which religion (is) barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an generally to exaggeration the is a fact and is the key to the curious extent of the state's protrusion into Australian social life. If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach to hastened paradigm transition - and a related approach through mysticism or transcendentali sm excluded for analogous reasons and because of 11 the earthiness of the culture what alternative s are open? There are other significant features of the culture running against major elements of the dominant paradigm, effectively which can perhaps be much applied quasi-relig ious approaches to turn matters around. more Western than To indicate the prospects of applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how Australian culture contrasts with American. Australian mainstream culture transition from the dominant is already American political left has much stronger support in difficult to some culture. Australia way It along the leftward is not merely that the than USA. It is not indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show its left-displac ement from the dominant Western paradigm. some elements of the contrast:- 12 The next table lists TABLE 2. CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE SCALE OF INCREASE *2 individualistic ethos inacceptability of socialist institutions inegalitarian attitudes POSITIVE inegalitarian practices ITEMS (PER level of consumerism CAPITA maximization quest WHERE imperialist drive RELEVANT) extent of violence police and military commitment high technology involvement functional rationality environmental inactivism AUSTRALIA USA SCALE OF INCREASE level of urbanisation legal obstacles to environmental action NEGATIVE official opposition to environmental practices, such as dedication of ITEMS wilderness administrative delays in implementing environmental practices, such as pollution requirements, recycling, etc. 13 Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items in the in the contrast. Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on first diagram of rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as opposed to American, it appears that prospects indeed better. themes for applying the culture are This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation. The task can profitably be combined with others: there is much work here both for environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists. A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires and what ought to be done (ideologically ). and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly theses: A weak confirmation, Let us focus on transition theses, factual and normative transition factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is undergoing a transition away from the dominant confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g. better results could be obtained in Australia; social Marsh). paradigm, has been Presumably similar or but appropriate samplings of the community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being a neglected undoubtedly field also in Australia. Another weak factual transition thesis holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia have come to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm. But again comparative-fig ures sociological work are entirely of data to Though impressionistic tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia than USA - indeed more intensive than piece lacking. anywhere else, an immensely build upon - we lack solid confirmation. sociogeographer s to do. 14 important There is much for Throughout, · as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been taken largely for granted, that Australian culture, indeed Western culture generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm Western paradigms and their away from dominant variations (such as those of advocated corporate capitalism and of the post-indus trial society), transiting shift, and towards an environmen tal alternative . furthermore ought the arguments. It is also be That complex normative thesis is argued for in environmen tal philosophy, and fortunately there isn't repeat to time to argued against there, but, to sum up the opposition case cavalierly, unconvincin gly. Given then that the transition is going on, indeed emerging are are clear doing environmen tal encourage enough. for it in Australia? example, directing action going be aiming swing major Preliminary against the to organisatio ns. on, answers sources of They should increase their support bases, but not merely by membership They should be endeavourin g to influence the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there for a considerabl y greater change than has thus far been two be despoilatio n and the like, primarily industrial organisatio ns and drives and environmen tal education. and to Not only should activists be continuing with what those supposed to regulate them, further (public) also ought ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how do environmen tal activists they and parts to this further practice which achieved. There are can run in tandem, a more negative and a more positive part: • More negatively, it involves cutting down and countering the flow of propaganda in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from the North. That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option. includes gently a range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as lopping anti-Americ an It off the tall poppies pedalling and anti-Northe rn activities. 15 the stuff, and careful The latter practices (which should . . not of course reduce merely to personall y directed antagonism ) fit in well other regional environm ental with aims, such as independe nt and nonaligne d defence policies. • More positivel y, it consists in promoting and adapting other also despised features of alternati ve paradigms . ambassado rs, Australia n It is culture that work directly towards themes of commonly Northern intellect uals Lawrence ). adapted like are, of course, those nonmaxim izing making-do socialist ic ones, of local natural the The features to be egalitari an, along environm ents. with the combines enough: cultural with promoted or anti-auth oritarian , rapidly increasin g Nonmaxim izing, for example, is reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often and and note, that are responsib le for the low repute in which some of the cultural character s are held (e.g. appreciat ion commonly taken to things, egalitari an methods as encapsula ted in Fair go and Enough's consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics , in local markets. As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its restrictio n in practice to extension male relations hips: to communit ies (includin g nonhuman s). is there for deep cultural transform ation: but why not encourage its So, to conclude, the potential we must help to realise it. FOOTNOTES 1. The term 'approach es' is intended to include both theory and both espoused ideology and behaviour . 2. They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellect ual positions . At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no more ridiculou s than those of Christian ity. Typically they were much weakened by new diseases, and overwhelm ed by new technolog y often applied in violent fashion. 3. By integrity is meant much more than retaining represent ative samples of this and that system or species; not represent ative southern sassafras , parma wallabies and Torres Strait Islanders , but sufficien tly many. 16 practice, 4. Another past philosophic al basis for environmen tal philosophy, American naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise some have seen in it. *1 The aesthetic route Highwater. *2 Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less inegalitari an than American. The hard data underlying the claim--rs assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence '. *3 For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in Birrell, p.178; the second is from Griffin's article in Australian Wild Life. *4 P. is well-illust rated by the main approach in O'Farrell. REFERENCES J. Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision Harper & Row, New York, 1981. J. Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964. W.B. Griffin, -. ) , '\ and ,• Reality in Indian America, Australian Wild Life W. Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982. P. O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1 (1982) Canberra. R. Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the new environmen talism', typescript, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1982. A. Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousne ss, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977. s. Cotgrove, Catastrophe and Cornucopia, Wiley, ,\,'. ~· , ,, R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms action', in Elliot and Gare, 260-293. R. Elliot and A. Ga:re, Environmen tal Philosophy. Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983. of c- r- 17 , 1982. in environmen tal A thought Collection and of  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 24, Item 1699: Working draft of Culture, philosophy and approaches to the natural environment - an Australian perspective Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of draft, with emendations and annotation, undated. Includes photocopy of draft. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3f9764">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3f9764</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Filing Cabinet 1 - Top Drawer Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Filing Cabinet 1 > Top Drawer Box 24: Files on Articles https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/48e20123bb1a0afc4c75d56b9df2ed2b.pdf 3a5b14ed1024ae543ea015e4c65d7a7e PDF Text Text (SECTIC;. i'v'j 174 /al Plumwood 1 and Richard Rout ley Peter like Singer, so-e basic wish Philosophic to question, assumptions underpinning estern can's attitudes loaros nis role in the moral universe ana his relationship to nonhunan animals. 1 *vai •Plumwood has done most of ner work under ner married name: • v a 1 “Routley. *ln deference, however, to her wish tc establish herself under •Plur »ooi that name ■ill oe used throughout this work. In a passage reiininscent of Singer's call for examination of unguestioneo assumptions, they state: ..nodern moral philosophers -- fulfilling tneir now established function of providing a theoretical superstructure to explain and justify contemporary rather than .oral sensibilities questioning fundamental asumptions -- tend to argue tnat tne bias toward human interests, which is an integral part of going ethical theories, is not just hich is both possible and aesiraole tc eliminate, out another form of class cnauvinism is ratner a restriction nctated by tne logic of evaluative an- .oral concepts, ana tnat the �Page 2 coherent, possible, or viable alternative to the "human chauvinism" of. standard etnical theories. 2 there is no “Richard “Routley “sand\& “Vai “Routley. '‘Against the “inevitability of “Human 2 “Cnauvinisr . “>ln\a “Goodpaster, “r.,“E. "&ar At *K.“ . “Sayre, "o.eds\&. “ttric s ano “Problems of tne 21st “Century. “ one “Lame, “.-Diversity of "-otre “Dame “t ress, If class cnauvinism Jo-7. differential, "is discriminatory and inferior treatnent (oy sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not suiXiciect chauvinism is tne form of justification"3, class chauvinism in then which human the species, uaao Sapleur., substantially morally discriminates against everything nonhuman by an insufficiently justified assumption of human rnoral uniqueness. “R, “Routley “4<and\i. *v, “Routley, “Hunan "Chauvinisi? and “Environmental “Ethics. “kln\& “ annison, “D.“S., c“Ror>bie, “m.“A., “aand\& “R. “Routley, “Environmental “Philosophy. “Canberra, “A“ "u, 1980; 96. *&eds\&. The contention that man is tne sole subject of value and �Page J morality fallacy. by definition This runs contention aground takes the the seif-validating ana unchallengeable; consideration oeing exclusive to on a definitional definition ot moral human realm to be The fallacy of the definitional move is that of believing that by converting the substantive evaluative theses of nu<an chauvinism to matters of definition they become somehow exempt from challenge or need for justification, iris is comparable to justifying discriminatory menbership for a club by referring to the rules, similarly conceived as self-validating and exempt from question or need of justification. 4 v v r'r sr °Ut3sy "&andX& "v • *Routiey. 'Against the 'Inevitability of 'Human In this case the club rules define the Moral Club. These definitions can upon either Physical characteristics or a set of properties that are logically connected with qualification for moral consideration, it is onvious that the physical characteristics are not morally relevant: * x It is impossible to restrict moral terms to particular species, when species distinctions are defined in terms of physical characteristics which are not morally relevant, •ore generally, an attempt to derive a logically necessary connection net eet humanity itself and the applicability of morality is bound to fail, for creatures anatomically ana zoologically aistinct fro hurans >hicii arc identical with humans in terms ot morally relevant features arc logically possible, upsetting any logical linkage. 5 5• and Houtley. W Koutley ■■ Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism; 39. X rnerefore , the characteristics neeoed to support the defintional move have to be other than physical characteristics. However, if properties logically tiea „itn moral considerations are examined closely, it is fauna that they do not support the exclusive eligibility of hur ans to tne Moral Clue. Three conditions or adequacy ore set down for making tne Clue exclusive to humans: �Page 4 1. The set of characteristics must he possessed oy at least all properly functioning humans, since tc omit any si unit leant aroup usually considered subject to iroral consiceratin, suer as infants, young children, prinitive tribesmen, etc., ano to allow that it was ierrissiole to treat these groups in the ay it is considered permissible to treat non-humans, that is, as mere instruments, would certainly lc repugnant to modern moral sensibilities and would offend common intuitions as to the orotherhood of mar., the vie- that all humans are possessors of inalienable rights, Thus human chauvinism , if it is to produce a coherent theory which does not unacceptably rule out some groups of humans, must find so e set cf features cc on to the rust diverse ' en ters of hu" anKiriu.... (luu loiax Auclusloa 2. in order tor nu an chauvinis; to be justified, this sec ot characteristics ust not be possessed by any non-nuran. Uiie ioXai i-xclusiau 3. The set of characteristics must oe not merely norally relevant but sufficient to justify, in a ncn-circuiar way, the cut-oil of moral consideration at exactly tne right point. If human chauvinism is to avoio the charge of arbitrariness and unjustifiability and to demonstrate its inevitability ana tne impossibility of alternatives, it rust erneroe from tne characteristics why items not having tne f ay oe used as i: ere instruments to serve tne interests of those which do possess tne . b (lac Xb^Xxxi&euXai Ju&xxxXcaXXQa liS&UuaXlbU ) b “Routley and "Routley. 39-40. "Against tne "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism J But tne properties usually assumed to give humans exclusive entry into tne moral Cluo when tested against these conditions of adequacy either admit nonhumans or exclude humans. Thirty-two such properties are tested oy Plumwood and Routely XuXb£ alia, using tools, using language, self-awareness, ceing a■are of the Inevitability ot one s own death, being aoie to answer questions about moral issues sucn as human chauvinism, having interests, having projects, belonging to a social community, being morally responsible tor one's actions, etc., and all are found anting on at least one count. �Page 5 However, the conditions of adequacy night oe challenged as too stmgent. Yet, if tne '<oral Club is to be exclusive to humans and neither arbitrary nor unjustified, then condition 1 - tnat all functioning humans possess the property - must apply, etherise tne requirerents for Club member snip are drawn too narrowly and some humans are excludes. against this condition it might be argued tnat numan is too __ _____ _ _ and it is only persons (where oread________ in scope , . re j_eVdnt_ "para parametre) person is defined by some morally relevant e’tre) who should De considered, this would mean that those humans buran , ,---- -— -no did not qualify as persons aouIo net oe eligible for treatment as oncers of tne oral Clue or if they tie treated as members that eligibiility was arbitrary and unjust. it it is the case that’all humans (persons) must possess this property, then it must also be the case tnat no nonhuman possesses it, otherwise an Argument From Analogy and Anoiiioiy applies. if some nonhumans possess the property or properties then the requirements for Club membership are ara^n too broadly ana some nonnumans are eligible _J. Finally, it is not enough to separate the eligible - ’ J ~ ' •- from the ineligible (or pernaps the edible from tne inediblej, it must oe snown why the ineiigiole are not only ineligible for membership, but why tney cannot even oe consldereo for membership, otherwise tne difference in treatment is not justified. To carry tne Club metaphor .. a little farther, pernaps too far, while remoers n.a, ay h-.nave certain privileges, this aoes not necessarily mean tnat that in addition to not enjoying these special privileges, nonrnembers can also oe un*arrantly deprived of benefits common to memoers and non-memoers. why should membership devalue nonmenoers ano put tneTi at the disposal of members? it is o y this condition that human chauvinism must show why humans are the exclusive subjects of intrinsic value and the value of nonhumans can be handled in terms of instrun.enr.al value to humans. If these conditions of adequacy stand, then tne definitional necessity of exclusiveness fails. Yet another approach at making the realms of value ano morality exclusive to humans is to examine no.< values are thougnt to operate. . prototype argument tor this is laio out as follows: A. values are determined through tne preference rankings of valuers (tne aa dfixacuafiie Karnes , Valuers' preference rankings are determined through valuer s interests (tne preXcifiace £aauci.ioa thesis). C. valuers are humans (persons) (tne saecsas assaaplioa). I. Therefore, values are determines tnrouqn human interests (tnrough tne interests ot persons). 8 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of human Chauvinism: The use of persons in this quotation is a reference to agru.rents aimed at �Page 6 saving tne exclusiveness of the doral Club by limiting membership to humans with some given capacity, characteristic or excellence or combination of these. while this argument may succeed in preventing non- u.ans tror consideration, it is at the cost of non-paradigr atic i,.<ins. From this argument It is sometimes concluded that "not only is it perfectly accceptatie for humans to reduce matters of value and morality to natters of human interest, but oreover there is no rational or possible alternative to going so; any alternative is simply incoherent." 9 ithever, it this argument is disrantled it is snown to rest on a set of false assumptions that even Charitable tanipulation cannot save. 9 43. Routley and Routley. Against me Inevitability of Human Chauvinism; an ambiguity resides in the use of 'determined through' in precise I, if 'determined through' means 'have to ce determined*, men Plumwood and Routley feel, mat it is ’Odaliy upgraded "to reveal the sneer necessity of conclusion J." 10 10 “Routley and “Routley. Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism: no-ever, this involves a similar modificiition of p r e tn i s e C or eise a nodal fallacy is involved. The C._ stronger ci­ necessary sense is preferable in forcing tne conclusion, J -- as shall be seen snortly when premise C is considered, but tne more cnaritaoie move for tne argument is to weaken the use of 'determined mrougn' to something like 'reflect ' or 'are a ratter of'. Despite either modification to resolve the ambiguity of 'determined through' premise A is still susceptide to the charge: value rankings cannot however ce cashed in for preference rankings since, as 1 s well-known, preference rankings and value rankings car diverge; a valuer can prefer wnat has less value and can value what is not , referred. 11 Premise a is , therefore ( modified to read: Al Values are determined through the value rankings of (appropriate) valuers, 12 11 "Routley and “Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism 44. 12 Ro tley and Routley, Against me inevitability of num Chauvinism: 44. Bypassing premise B for a moment, premise C, the St-ficieb aSiuuiptAob, can be seen as a "circular way of reintroducing tne logical version of human chauvinism by restricting tne class of valuers a priori to humans" and at �Page 7 Snr1 ^'?2Hy2enriy*-^rae' 13 11 is essential to the argument lse1 c to oe a necessary condition that humans are the only valuers. ithout that the argument ooes not human chauvinsitic conclusion. if persons is usea instead of humans, tnen it becomes -ore defensible, since not all humans are valuers, but not all valuers are human, if not all valuers are numar' or persons, tnen to sustain the human chauvinistic conclusion it becomes necessary either to reject ail non-human (person) values or i? i‘,’o e«- a "'ove m premise a such that 'interests' are United to human (person) interests. 43-4. Routley and Houtley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism! , „ It is just such a move at premise B , that ma k e s it, tor them, tne most objectionable of the premises, Premise 6 is a group selfisnness To eirrsnness argument. io show tn at the that conclusion and particularly premise ‘ pre ise “B is little more than an argument for group oup egoism in an environmental setting, they oisplay it against ainst an argument baldly for egoism. if pre ise A is recast replacing 'preferences' ith 'values' as ov°'v-i^2'preTn!ern ?rS0 0ds.to have 'preferences' replaced attention in is no- shifted to interests . interests can oe usea either in a weax and - , -se so tnat anything tne valuer values is in tne Ya|uer s interest ,ln stronger, but false sense tnat is intended to support interests as ceing in the valuer's advantage: to sum. up tne dilemma for the argument then: when. "interests" is usea in its weaker sense premise u may be accepted out tne argument does not establish its inter, oea conclusion or in any way sucpoert human chauvinism. For tne intended effect of the argument in the cruae form is this; in determining values it is enough to look at human advantage; nothing else counts. If tne argument -ere correct, tnen one could assess values bv cneckmq out tne local (selfish) advantage of hu ans, or, more generally, tne aavanta ,e of tne case class someho* assembled. it, on thP otner hano, "interests": is usea in its strong sense, tne conclusion would license a form of human crauvinis , but premise no, false. 14 Rout ley ano Routley. “Against the “Inevitability of “Human "Chauvinism: �Page 8 This argument has a second , aspect to it which they explore. if tne argument is not acceptable as it stands, then supposelv, neither is tne alternative of rejecting its conclusion. Precise A is opposed to the conclusion D (~a or D / D-> A) to shod either one accepts the conclusion, ith its consequent instru entalist account of value, or one is committed to an intrinsic or cetacned value theory wnich takes values to oe completely independent of valuers, no ------------ , ano and r.c ay determined oy tneit, out, it is assumed, the latter theory is a ell Known as untenable, and rr.ay even _. ____ as involving mysticism be seen or as oeing irrational inus, it may te conduced, there is no real alternative to hu-an chauvinism. lb #15 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human Chauvinism; but this choice is rejectee « as a x false «js>c one: u < < c. To reject the instrumentalist conclusion D is bv no means to be commited tc a, or to the view that tne valuers . _____ __ ,____ and their preference rankings play no role in determining values and tnat values are a_ further 'set„ o — __ ___ . of items mysterious independent iters in the world somehow perceived by valuers through a special (even mystical and nonr ational) moral sense. 16 Against, the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Parallel to this dichotomy between A and u is the dichotomy Detween instrumental and intrinsic values so central in tne division and treatment of members from nonmembers in tne hor a1 Club; Tne dicnotomy frequently presentea between instrumentalist accounts of. value, on tie one hand, ana detached tneories (or what die mistakenly taken to 0e the same, intrinsic tneories) is, for the same reason, a false one. Instrumental theories ore those men attempt to reduce value to what is instrumental to or contributes to a stated goal. Typically such theories taxe tne goal to oe tne furtherance of the interest of a privileged class; tor example, tne goal may oe taken to be determined in terms of the interests, concerns, advantage, or welfare of tne .class of humans, or of persons, or of sentient creatures, cej ending on t>e type of cnauvinism. In particular, human chauvinist tneories are, characteristically, instrumentalist theories. in contrast, an item is valued intrinsically where it is 16 Routley and Routley. 47. 47. �Page 9 valued for its own sake, and not merely as a means to something further; and an intrinsic-value theory allo is that some items are intrinsically valuable. valuable, . intrinsic theories tnen, then, contrast with - it n ___ instr urn on cal theories,, and *hat vhat "intrinsic" tells us is no more tnan that tne the iter taken as intrinsically valuable is not valued merely as a means tc some goal, i.e., is, not merely - - is instrumentally valued. Accordingly - 117 detached value theories, since < disjoint 1 from instrumental theories, are a suo-ciass of intrinsic value theories; and they are a proper suoclass since intrinsic values need not be detached, lSomething may __ ______ _ be valuaole in itself without its ceing detached frott all valuing experience. 17 17 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability 01 ■ uman •Chauvinism Because detacned value theories are only a subclass of intrinsic value theories the dichotomies bet een A and b and between instrumental and instrinsic theories are false. Since detached theories cannot be maintained and totally instrumental value theories leao to an infinite regress, which is manifest if, consistent witn tne theory, the goals of a valuer are taken as instrumental, then neither of tnese extremes is acceptable, but values do exist, so some other vie-, besides those offered in the dichotomy must be advanced, Plumwood ana Routley advance one vie* tnat denies the dichotomy, yet does not limit valuers to humans and does not li it tne value of objects to human instrumental values; A person is the source of value-judgments and values .in one sense, i.e. s/he is tne valuer; out not in another, namely s/ne is not responsible for a valued item having its valued properties. or is there any licence for reducing tne values assignee to those tnat serve tne interests of tne valuer. 18 18 Routley and Routley. Hunan chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: This solution seems to do little more than shift the detached value argument back one step. -hy snould tne qualities of an item be valued except that a valuer places some value on them? Tnat is to say, all items (objects of moral concern) have qualities, out tnat some of these Qualities are valued ana some are not inaicates tne (instrumental) choices of a valuer (unless a theory of detacher values, *hich has just teen rejected, is adopted.) me intent behind this value theory is to avoid positing detacned values, yet to maintain sone basis for intrinsic values tnat cannot be cashed in tor instrumental values. io 158 47’8. �Page 10 do this requires that the intrinsic value of the qualities not be seen also as instrumental values. it is not, tneretorej a natter of assigning intrinsic values to tne goals of instrumental value tneories, it is a matter of finding a way in which a particular goal or item or being is capable of possessing value that is neither detached from, the notion of a valuer nor , if connected in some manner to a valuer, merely a means to another end. Asserting the valued qualities are resident in the iter; is intended to separate it from the valuer's evaluation and denying the reauction of values to the interests of tne valuer is intended to provide for an intrinsic worth in items and separate intrinsic values from purely instrumental values, if tne intrinsic value of an object is conceptually different from its instrumental value, then tne intrinsic value must be taken into consideration separate from its instrumental uses and instrumental judgments about the item. Therefore, the item (object of moral concern) is granted respect in, of ana tor itself and this is the ultimate goal of the P1U' .-ood/Koutley position. An item can have an Intrinsic and an instrumental worth, but this does not in and of itself remove the humans bias to arcs intrunentai values or towards the properties valued. For this the aerial that humans (persons) are tne only valuers is needed: It is simply a (common) mistake to think mat values and rights do not have a meaning, or an application, outsice tne human context or situation: to establish tnis point (on which i-oore rightly insisted) it is enough to point out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not necessarily nun an or persons, can assign values with respect to situations and worlds devoid of hunans ano of persons altogether. 19 houtley ano "Routley. “Human Chauvinisr and “Environmental “mthics: 19 it can now be asserted tnat items in the environment have a value beyond those assignee to then by humans (persons)) ana that ceings other than humans can be valuers,, but what is left to do is to establish tne relative ranks or 'pecking In this regari tne greater value order' of valuers. things may nave assumption "that ever, trough other instrinsic value, people <or humans are more valuable than anything else, and rank more highlyi (no matter how large their numoer) ' must be denied. 20 Houtley and Pout ley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: The greater value assumption, a weaker form, ot human chauvinism, is open to most of objections made against numao chauvinisr. and to examples contrasting morally repugnant humans ith norally non-repugnant nonhumans illustrating t.ne 171. 157-b. �Page 11 • • unacceptable outcomes of this assumption, such as: if tnere is only roc in one's life boat for one ano one fust cnccse oet-.een saving Adolf Hitler and a combat ^hicn nas lived a decent life and never narirea a living creature, one is morally obliged to choose the former. 21 21 Routley and Routley. Against tne Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: 5 7. Having set aside tne arguments for value being exclusive to humans tney no focus on arguments for morality being exclusive to humans. One such argument is tne contractual argument: J. K. L. M. N. 22 fne only justification of moral principles (only X) is a contractual one, i.e., the entry into contracts of agents (Zry). Agents only enter into contracts (only Z) it it serves tneir. o*n interests. (The Ciaisl. ifiii J Humans (persons) are the only agents that enter into contracts (tout Zj, therefore, oy K ano i; Humans (persons) only enter into contracts (only Z) if it serves tneir own interests. Tnerefore, from J and : Tne only justification for moral principles (only X) is the (selfisn) interests of humans (persons). 22 "Routley ano "Routley. "Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinisms This entire contract argument can oe faulted as a strawman, out tne general effect of the argument ano tne conclusion still carry tne intention of human chauvinistic arguments oased on the exclusiveness of morality to numans. Thus tnis prototype is illustrative ana descriptive of the sorts of conclusions in force and the sorts of premises usea to support then. Therefore, the counterarguments usea against trie contractual argument and its close relatives oesignate the sorts of attacxs that can be launched against arguments for human cnauvlnis ano moral exclusiveness. It is assumed tnat conditions other tnan contractual ones , e.g. community based, can be substituted into pre ■ ise J and with appropriate modifications to the rest of tne argu ent tne same conclusion can be reached. Premise d proports to set tne parameters of tne argument oy selecting an activity with moral relevance that does not violate tne second condition of adequacy previously set down. In an 52. �Page 12 attempt to describe an exclusively hui<<an i oral context, premise J's use o£ the ^oro 'only' to support entry into contracts, a purely hu.an (person's) endeavour, makes it obviously raise. turtnernore, in supporting the contract -hdicinq as a purely human (person s) endeavour, however, "premise J imports the very chauvinism that is at issue in tne conclusion." 2J 23 “Routley ana “Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human “Chauvinism: 53. premise J is found to be faulty on several points. If moral obligation is tasen to ce a moral principle then premise J is not sufficient to include all moral obligations. "There is no actual contract underlying tne principle that one ought not to be cruel to animals, children, and otners not in a position to contract." 24 Ii this too narrow scope »ere not enough to condemn tne theory, then; The social contract account of moral obligation is defective because it implies tnat moral obligations can really only hold between responsible moral agents and attempts to account for all. moral ooliqation as based on contract. but of course tne account is correct as an account of the origin of some tyr.es of moral ooligatlon; there are moral ooli ,ations of type that can only hold oetween free and responsible agents and others which only apply within a social and political context. let other types of ooligatlon, such as the obligation not to cause suffering, can arise only with respect to sentient or prefercnce-naving creatures -.•no are not necessarily morally responsible -- ana could not significantly arise itn res.ect to a nonsentient such as a tree or a rock. 25 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Routley ano Routley. Against tne Ir.evitablility of human Chauvinism: 24 25 A moral agent could have a moral obligation to a being incapable of being or becoming a moral agent. Even when precise J is amended to something besiaes a contractual, foundation, it still comes to grief on tne sticking point of obiigations. Premise K, the egoist assumption; is faulted on the same grounds as egoism itself. For agents sometimes enter into contacts that are not in their awn interests but are in tne interests of other persons or 54. 5b. �Page 13 creatures, or are undertaken on behalf of, tor instance to protect, other items tr at do not nave interests at all, e.g., rivers, ouildings, forests. Against the Inevitability of u an Chauvinism: what is not pellucid nere, is that entering into a contract on oenalf of another is not, or cannot, be in the interests of the contracting agentand therefore a denial of premise K, Entering into acontract that protects something that is itself incapable of interests nay indirectly oe in the interests of tne contracting agent even though tne agent's interests are not directly recognized by tne contract. by example, an agent may enter into a contact that proctects a virgin forest and the river that flos through it, in order to protect the agent's access to water downstream of tne forest. Or pernaps even more indirectly, an agent ray sign over his land as a wildflower sanctuary because his neighbour, *no he nates, is allergic to wildflowers. It would seer that wnat has to oe snown is that an agent would enter a contract on behalf gf anotner -nen tne interests of the other are directly opposed to tne interests of tne conrtracting agent, Opposition to tne contracting agent's interests may oe, however, too strinqent a condition. If breaking the premise rests in showing tnat an agent will act outside nis selfish interests, tnen it is only necessary to snow tnat an agent vould enter into a contract when his selfish interests -ere not involved. In sucn a case, entering a contract tc protect a river, building, or forest could ce sufficlent. 26 -^outley and Routiey. 53. Premise K can be amended to reflect the ability to enter into contracts for beings or things other tnan tne contracting agent: 27 However even if premise . K were amended to ad-iiit that agents may enter into contracts on oenalt of nonhuman items, it would still result in a form of numan chauvinis given familiar -assumptions, since nonhun-an items will still ce unable to create moral obligaions except through a human sponsor or patron, who will presumably aole to choose -hetner or not to protect them. 27 "Routley and "Routiey. "Against the "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism: but if tnis modification is made and nonhuman items are unable to create a moral, obligation on the agents (agents ceing under moral obligations only where they cnoose to De), then tnis premise assumes tne conclusion ■. It is only the interests of the humans Involved tnat justify the moral obligation imposed by tne contract. 53. �Page 14 Premise L is strengthened by trie use of person* "tor otherwise premises suer, as e and its variations are suspect, since tnere is nothing, legally or morally, to prevent consortia, organizations, and other nonhumans from entering into contracts (and tnese items are appropriately counted as persons in the larger ieg.,1 sense)." 2t 28 -? 3 • Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Hunan Chauvinism: ■<hile premise L may be the better by this move premises j and k are both tne worse. J remains false and K is either false or assumes the conclusion if modified to allow for conditions tnat would save tne human chauvinistic elements of it. thus contractual arguments land alter natives of the same form as this prototype) for the substantiation of a human cnauvinistic-oased environmental ethics are lost. ine assumptions underlying tne premises are simply not. equal to the task of supporting the conclusion. Further modification of the premises is at the expense oi violating the conditions of adequacy for exclusive human membership in the .'oral Clue. if the restrictions (such as 'only') on oremdses ltxe J (or variations of it) are removed, then leeway is left for including soie npnhumans oi excluding some humans. Cn the other hand, restrictions may oe retained and tne contractual portion is modified put the result is tne sane. ire -ore vital premise for establishing tne human cnauvinistic conelusion, premises like K tnat 1ink t?e exclusive numan justification ot moral actions to human interests, either assume the conclusion or may re countered by examples that snow them to be false. Plum-ood and Routley conclude; it is not possible to provide criteria hich would jusill* distinguishing, lr the sharp way standard western ethics do, between numans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularily those creatures which have preferences or ^referred states. For sucn criteria appear to depend upon tne mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some ratner axaltbai.ll4=u£.t.££aifi£d and JLaauea tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for tne preferences of other creatures. Accordingly tne sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics bv philosophers and ethers alike, all bureaus aea all olb££ aniial ^pbclax*. lac&£ a Sall^laClQty; Cobfitbul 29 �Page 15 29 103. “Koutley ana “Routley. “Chauvinisi ar.) “•.nviron : ental “£tnicss Having broken the exclusiveness of value and morality to humans and naving disconnected the link of values and morals to solely human interests, ■ nat alternatives are there to human chauvinistic systens? Given tne analysis just made of value and morality, Plumwood ano Routley maintain: what emerges ____ __ _ is ________ ____ of __ types of __ ____ a picture oral obligation as associated with a nest of rings or annular bounaary classes, with the innermost class, consisting of highly _ creatures, intelligent, social, sentient having tne full range of moral obligations applicable to them, ana outer classes of sucn nonsentient items as trees and rocks having only a much more restricted range of moral obligations significantly applicable to them, In in some cases there is no sharp division between tne rings, 'but there is no single uniform privileged class of items, no one base class, to which all ano only moral principles directly apply, and moreover the zoological ■class of humans is not one or tne really significant boundary classes. Tne recognition tnat sone types of moral ooiiqation only apply -<ithin tne context of a particular sort of society, or through contract, does nothing to support the case of human cnauvinlsfi . 3 30 55. Routley and “Routley. -gainst tne inevitability of human Chauvinism This notion of nested zones or an annular classes ; ay be diagramed as in Diagram i. 31 picture of �Page lb 31 "Routley, "Richard. "Canberra, 1981: 2. "In "defense of "Cannibalise, "Unpublished paper. The laoels for the rings or zones represent; 32 respectively different soils of objects such as, objects of moral concern, /.elf are-having objects, preference-havers (and cnoice-na<ers), right-nolders, obligation-holders and responsibilitybearers, trose contractually- co<ni!'ittea- and tne different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. ot all the tyoes of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. for strictly the laoels given should oe expanded, as the distinctions are categorical ones, so tnat what matters is net whether an object is, tor instance, contractually committed in sore fasnion out whether it is tne sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual xina, 32 Routley and Routley. human Cnauvinlsin and Environmental Ethics: oreover, tne categorical distinctions that demarcate the various rings or zones are morally relevent categories. ine annular picture does not. reject traditional ethical categories, tut does reject the limitation of categories to one snecies or case class. .Also it rejects unjustified distinctions tnat are not "...categorical distinctions .hich tie analytically -itn ethical notions...." 33 107-8. �Page 17 Routley ana "Routley. "Human "cnauvinis and "Environmental "Ethics: inis celng tne case: it is certainly in no «ay species chauvinist or nuian chauvinist. For none of tne zones of tne annular picture couprises the class o£ humans (or its jincr variant tne class of persons); for tnis class is not of moral relevance. 34 _Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism ana Environmental Ethics: Returning again to tne metaphor of tne oral Club, under tr.e annular ring picture membership in tne Club is automatic to all objects of moral concern, out tne privileges within tne Club are limited by moral capacities to use the facilities ot me Club. Tne obligations and the extent of those ooligations of human members to nonhuman members rest upon tne type of moral object . tne nonhuman is and on its capacities (illustrated by its overlay on the annular rings) not upon a comparison of tne nonhuman to tne human. For example a being capaole of contractual obligation could justifiaoly discriminate against a being unaole to make contracts with reference to contractual ooligations, regardless of the species of tne t/o beings. dy tie same token, it would be unjust of a preference-haver to discriminate against another preference-haver solely because tne two preference-havers were of uifferent species. loo it snould be notes tnat Diagram 1 illustrates tne position of humans as a species ano not tnat ot a particular human. Any given nuran, as ith any given object of noral concern plotted on tne annular rings, .»ould not necessarily mater? in each detail the plot of tne species to «nicn it oelonjs: Just as tnere are relevant divisions beyond tne class of perference-havers , so tnere are ithir. the class. Tnus tne suggestion tnat tne class to.-a rds which noral obligations (ano a corresponding Sait ot moral concern which ta<es account ot creatures* states) ay oe neld is bounded by tne class of preference-havers, does not ot course imply tnat oo disxiUGXicas can be nade -iiwl- the class of preference-navers with respect to tne kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, contractual obligations -- wnicn Dy no means exnaust obligation -- can only be nela directly (as distinct from by way of representative) with respect to a n.ucn narrower class of creatures, from which many • 108. �P a g e 1« humans are excluded. 35 10 7. 3b “Routley and “Routley. “Human “Chauvinis and “Environmental “Ethics; The shift from determining moral regard by a comparison o£ nonnumans to humans to a determination oy an examination ot categorical distinctions expands tf.e range of nonhuman objects of moral concern. ay rejecting tne base class assumption, value as determined oy use or production by the base class is also rejected. inis does not mean tnat human values *111 be rejected, but tnat values will no longer oe judged solely in human terms and that human values -ill no longer automatically taxe precedent over all other values, inus a particular ecosystem, e.g. a swamp, is recognized a., having value other tnan the possible location of an oil­ bearing geosyncline or a salt dome. It is seen to nave value as the home of a number of various flora and fauna species with a complex set of inter-relationships and as a system in itself that is not reducible to the interests of one species or even group of species within it. Inis last point tnat the value of an ecosystem, or any similar complex of values, interests, preferences, etc,, is not reducible to the values, interests, or preferences of either the individual components or toe whole, ignoring tne individual components, is called by them tne "no-reduction position". Inis position permits a middle ground between tne extremes of particularistic and holistic views and thereby provides a loc is for what they term "the ecological outlook": in a closely related -ay, the no-reduction position can provide a suitable metaphysical base for an ecological outloox vor* i ax vuuxuurs worldview, in which man is seen : as .part _ of a natural community, part of natural systems seen as integrated wholes and with .welfare and interests bound whole, ...... ano not __________ ____ __ up with the ..................... as, in tne typical .estern view, a separate, self-contained actor standing outsue tne syster and manipulating it in the pursuit of self-contained interests, 36 36 Routley, Vai and Richard Routley. Social rneories, oelf management, and Environmental Problems. “&“ln\s annison, .s., iCRobbie, .a. “ .anoX* R. Routley, “&edsX&. Environmental Philosophy. Canberra, am), I960: 319. One of the offsooots ot this no-reductior position is a policy of respect for the systei , its parts, and for the inter-relationships between parts and the parts and the h ole; �Page 19 Tne no-reduction position can thus provide a natural foundation for a genuinely environmental ethic, one *nicn allows human actions to be guided oy respect, cure and concern for the natural world and rejects tne "human Egoist" tnesis that tne only constraints on nunan action concerning nature arise from tne interests of other numans. For sucn relations of interdependence between man and nature must give rise to constraints on numan action in the same *ay tnat appropriate relations of. interdependence between en do, so tne thesis that action can and must oe unconstrained by any concerns other than human ones fails, as does tne thesis tnat nature is no more than a means to hu an ends, a mere tool. 37 37 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self management, and Environmentaifroblems: Tne respect position .is cased on one or general ooligation principles: 1. ore of three Ine general principle cf respect . .. .. _ _ i for preference-navers (.formerly applied only to human preferences) is transferred to the larger arena of all oeinys or items that can be placed in a disprefer red state> • ..the requisite, important and non-ar.itrary distinction is to ce ora*n which narKS out the class of creatures to.-,arcs -hicn obligations may ce held; tnat is, the usually recognisec principles oi consideration towards others (of tne privileged class) properly extend or should be generalized to consideration for other creatures having preferences, and xgg geaaxal aeXeriSiCle GGliGaiiaa -iu.cci„14i is fiat Lii put aXfaets XoXuui PitfiXetfiaGfisfiaAzexsl iuia a dis^raXaxxfia state 1CC GQ GQGU reuses, 38 Routley and Routley, 2. 39 Hunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: Preferences alone, ho-.ever, are still too narro to develop an environmental ethic or ecological outlooK. So tne second principle applies to beings or iters <itn an interest' or 'welfare', v-nere rf...an 'interest' or welfare in tne broaa sense is a Xclus or life-goal, as possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system goal, as possessed oy living ecosystems." 39 Routley and Routley, 104. ' Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 106, 319. �Page 20 iherefore, tne second principle is: that the -altaic or of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can ce affected in one way oi another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset. Foi instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can ce reduced to zero oy sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping vaste detergent into trie nearoy ocean. Tnere is a general ocligaiton principle corresponding likewise to tnis more comprehensive class of ,»elf are-bearers, namely, dpX to jaopafoxse ttfi ..ulijeiiju ui aaiuxai oPJecxs uc -J.4--UU1 JiCu ±£aiGU. 4<) 40 3. Routiey and Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; lOu- /. Beyond preference-havers and beings or systems ith interests or welfares, the environment contains items, sucn as rocKS, soils and «:ater*ays tnat nave value, out no preferences or interests; unlike higher animals sucn items cannot literally be put into dispreferred states (and In obvious sense, as opposed to the ider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), out they can be damaged or destroyeo or nave their Maiue eroded or impaired. 41 41 Routiey ana Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; Tne three generalizable obligation principles are parallel in their structure and application and vary omv in /.hat rings of the annular Picture that they cover. Exclusiveness of the principles to a particuair ring, however, snould not ce assumed. ine principle of not damaging or destroying the value of an object of in oral concern could extend across the entire annular picture. Thus tne overlay of a ^articular ouject of moral concern will indicate which principle(s) of obligation may be applied to a particular case. An object of moral concern, e.g. a wornoat, may very veil be capdole of being placed in a dispreferred state, its wellbeing or interests jeopardizej, or devalued at one ana tne same time. in tne other hand, another object of moral concern, e.g. Ayers Rock, may, perhaps, only be disvalued. 109. �Page 21 Further tne respect position not only gives generalized principi.es of od! igat ion , but it also reverses tne common notion of when tnese principles are applied: Cn tne alternative thoroughgoing respect vie.'., whi.cn is illustrated o y various nonexploitive non- estern ethics, one starts from a restricted position, a position of no interference and no exploitation, a position at peace witn tne natural world so to say, and allots interference -- not as on ■estern tninxlng, restricts i terference -- for aooa reasons. ine onus of ,-roof is tnus entirely inverted: good reasons are required lax interference, not xa siax interference. 42 _____ Routley and Routley. nunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 174. <*?verLi? ’ onus 01 proof leads to shifts and inversions in otner areas as well. Requiring good reasons for interfering crings about a shift in tne notion of property ownership. Operating under a respect position, it can no longer oe assumed that tne environment or pieces of lii?an QofSrivate Property t0 De done with or disposed of at ■'•ill. Before a s-amp can ce drained, or a forest" cut, or a steam polluted seme jooa reason must be given, Human convenience and economic gain would not count as good Respect does not preclude use, nut it does preclude certain sorts of use. it is inco catioie aoove all -itn property vie ano >.itn regarding something as no lore than a eans to tne user's eras. 43 Routley* Social theories, Self management, and Environmental Problems: The respect position is not only incompatible witn the property view, it is also incompatible 1th tne strong dichotomy between use and nonuse: me conventional wisdom of western Society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice wnicn cones out especially clearly again in tne treat ent of animals. Here the choice presented in -estern thought is typically one of exxoex use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways cnaracteristic of largescare mass-production farming and a market economic systep wnich are inconpatiole with respect, ox on the otner nand of not making any use of animals at all, for e x ampie, never making use 322 . �Page 22 of animals for food or for farming purposes, •hat is left out in unis choice is trie alternative tne Indians and other non--.estern teople have recognizee, the alternative oi li 'ited and respectful use, which enaoles use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to oe used in an unconstrained way or merely as means tc human ends. 44 44 Routley and Routley, human Chauvinism aid Environmental Ethics: 179. bt^taKerVup tr^a^a ter °cn^t er*™ pe0fie' sever’di groups of Australian Aborigines, will ^either, then, is tne respect position a reverence position tnat also arises from the use/nonuse oicnotoi y. the lives, preferences, choices, and considerations of otner species or objects of oral concern are not to be taken as sacred and inviolable. out as has been pointed out before a good reason must be given before interference can oe orooKe . interference is acceptable, as in tne case of ’essential predation... nlch is essential to the normal livelihood of the predator, and where tne predator takes tor itself no more than it requires for its livelihood," 45 Routley, Richard. in Defense of Cannibalism•; 32. thus an alternative to tne western dichotomy of use versus nonuse is to mitigate, if possible, tne user's considerations with the considerations of the item: io so ise somethin i itnout treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use tor numan ends is characteristic of x;esfcicci.XuX use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the Iten as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and tne user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare ano so forth of otner humans. 4b Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: For there to be a respectful position that denies tne dichotomy of unconstrained use versus respectful nonuse and tnat allows tor the relationsnip Detween tne user and tne item and the considerations of the item to be taken into account, one fundamental change in tne present relationship between humans and tne environment tnat must eventuate is for individual users to take direct responsibility for their impact: Respect positions can only be generally 179. �Page 23 realized in a society in whicn tne basic social structure and economy enables people to take direct responsibility for tne impact on tne natural world their needs and tneir statisfaction create , such as in tne economy of cooperative, involvement, 47 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self "anagement, and Environmental Problems: Human users taking direct responsibility tor tneir impact snould lover tneir impact. If users bear tne responsibility tor producing and managing what they need, then they should produce, in a manner like unto tne 'taking' of essential oreaation only wnat they neeo and should 'qo lighter' on tne world: 323 . ..self-management can offer the alternative of a social^ in wnich nothing is produced wnich uoes not correspond to genuine needs an .i in which production is designed to satisfy tnose needs «itn a minimum of aste. Tne possiclity of production of material *nicn does not correspono to genuine neeos is eliminated oy two factores in the ecomony of cooperative exchange ano involvement; first, a direct relationsnip between tne possiblity of use of an iter and direct expenditure of labour on tne part of tne user, and second, direct cooperative involvment bet een producers and users. 48 48 Routley and Routley. social Theories, Self anagement, and Environmental Problems: Tne respect position, tnerefore, is intended to lower the impact of human users on the entire environment, -nile extending tne position's own impact goes far beyond tne interrelations of human and other species. It is intended, when applied to «estern cultures, to face among other issues tne econonic/etnicai conflicts tnat nave been at tne core of many of tne practical ethical problems concerning humans ana nonhumans and that nave given rise to much of tne current debate over inter-specific ethics. ine respect position is a strong repalcement to the Dominion Thesis that has been tne ruleing and guiding principle of western though on etnical relationsnips between numans and nonhumans. bike the Dominion Thesis, tne respect position is a oasic set of principles from whicn a wnoie range of problems, situations, ' and questions can oe approached. Tne alterations to the cut of -estern societies tnat would result from its adoption as tne pattern of etmcal progress would oe more drastic tnan that of either a Stewardship Principle (or some other weakened form of the Dominion Thesis) or an extension principle, sucn as the Utilitarian extension proposed by Singer. fet these seeniniy drastic alterations, or some 313. �Page 24 otnef equally drastic set, r^ay be no more tnan *nat is ■■eeje.; to restyle current practices as a more just ano less ar o i t rary . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document (SECTIC;. i'v'j 174 /al Plumwood 1 and Richard Rout ley Peter like Singer, so-e basic wish Philosophic to question, assumptions underpinning estern can's attitudes loaros nis role in the moral universe ana his relationship to nonhunan animals. 1 *vai •Plumwood has done most of ner work under ner married name: • v a 1 “Routley. *ln deference, however, to her wish tc establish herself under •Plur »ooi that name ■ill oe used throughout this work. In a passage reiininscent of Singer's call for examination of unguestioneo assumptions, they state: ..nodern moral philosophers -- fulfilling tneir now established function of providing a theoretical superstructure to explain and justify contemporary rather than .oral sensibilities questioning fundamental asumptions -- tend to argue tnat tne bias toward human interests, which is an integral part of going ethical theories, is not just hich is both possible and aesiraole tc eliminate, out another form of class cnauvinism is ratner a restriction nctated by tne logic of evaluative an- .oral concepts, ana tnat the Page 2 coherent, possible, or viable alternative to the "human chauvinism" of. standard etnical theories. 2 there is no “Richard “Routley “sand\& “Vai “Routley. '‘Against the “inevitability of “Human 2 “Cnauvinisr . “>ln\a “Goodpaster, “r.,“E. "&ar At *K.“ . “Sayre, "o.eds\&. “ttric s ano “Problems of tne 21st “Century. “ one “Lame, “.-Diversity of "-otre “Dame “t ress, If class cnauvinism Jo-7. differential, "is discriminatory and inferior treatnent (oy sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not suiXiciect chauvinism is tne form of justification"3, class chauvinism in then which human the species, uaao Sapleur., substantially morally discriminates against everything nonhuman by an insufficiently justified assumption of human rnoral uniqueness. “R, “Routley “4<and\i. *v, “Routley, “Hunan "Chauvinisi? and “Environmental “Ethics. “kln\& “ annison, “D.“S., c“Ror>bie, “m.“A., “aand\& “R. “Routley, “Environmental “Philosophy. “Canberra, “A“ "u, 1980; 96. *&eds\&. The contention that man is tne sole subject of value and Page J morality fallacy. by definition This runs contention aground takes the the seif-validating ana unchallengeable; consideration oeing exclusive to on a definitional definition ot moral human realm to be The fallacy of the definitional move is that of believing that by converting the substantive evaluative theses of nu<an chauvinism to matters of definition they become somehow exempt from challenge or need for justification, iris is comparable to justifying discriminatory menbership for a club by referring to the rules, similarly conceived as self-validating and exempt from question or need of justification. 4 v v r'r sr °Ut3sy "&andX& "v • *Routiey. 'Against the 'Inevitability of 'Human In this case the club rules define the Moral Club. These definitions can upon either Physical characteristics or a set of properties that are logically connected with qualification for moral consideration, it is onvious that the physical characteristics are not morally relevant: * x It is impossible to restrict moral terms to particular species, when species distinctions are defined in terms of physical characteristics which are not morally relevant, •ore generally, an attempt to derive a logically necessary connection net eet humanity itself and the applicability of morality is bound to fail, for creatures anatomically ana zoologically aistinct fro hurans >hicii arc identical with humans in terms ot morally relevant features arc logically possible, upsetting any logical linkage. 5 5• and Houtley. W Koutley ■■ Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism; 39. X rnerefore , the characteristics neeoed to support the defintional move have to be other than physical characteristics. However, if properties logically tiea „itn moral considerations are examined closely, it is fauna that they do not support the exclusive eligibility of hur ans to tne Moral Clue. Three conditions or adequacy ore set down for making tne Clue exclusive to humans: Page 4 1. The set of characteristics must he possessed oy at least all properly functioning humans, since tc omit any si unit leant aroup usually considered subject to iroral consiceratin, suer as infants, young children, prinitive tribesmen, etc., ano to allow that it was ierrissiole to treat these groups in the ay it is considered permissible to treat non-humans, that is, as mere instruments, would certainly lc repugnant to modern moral sensibilities and would offend common intuitions as to the orotherhood of mar., the vie- that all humans are possessors of inalienable rights, Thus human chauvinism , if it is to produce a coherent theory which does not unacceptably rule out some groups of humans, must find so e set cf features cc on to the rust diverse ' en ters of hu" anKiriu.... (luu loiax Auclusloa 2. in order tor nu an chauvinis; to be justified, this sec ot characteristics ust not be possessed by any non-nuran. Uiie ioXai i-xclusiau 3. The set of characteristics must oe not merely norally relevant but sufficient to justify, in a ncn-circuiar way, the cut-oil of moral consideration at exactly tne right point. If human chauvinism is to avoio the charge of arbitrariness and unjustifiability and to demonstrate its inevitability ana tne impossibility of alternatives, it rust erneroe from tne characteristics why items not having tne f ay oe used as i: ere instruments to serve tne interests of those which do possess tne . b (lac Xb^Xxxi&euXai Ju&xxxXcaXXQa liS&UuaXlbU ) b “Routley and "Routley. 39-40. "Against tne "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism J But tne properties usually assumed to give humans exclusive entry into tne moral Cluo when tested against these conditions of adequacy either admit nonhumans or exclude humans. Thirty-two such properties are tested oy Plumwood and Routely XuXb£ alia, using tools, using language, self-awareness, ceing a■are of the Inevitability ot one s own death, being aoie to answer questions about moral issues sucn as human chauvinism, having interests, having projects, belonging to a social community, being morally responsible tor one's actions, etc., and all are found anting on at least one count. Page 5 However, the conditions of adequacy night oe challenged as too stmgent. Yet, if tne '<oral Club is to be exclusive to humans and neither arbitrary nor unjustified, then condition 1 - tnat all functioning humans possess the property - must apply, etherise tne requirerents for Club member snip are drawn too narrowly and some humans are excludes. against this condition it might be argued tnat numan is too __ _____ _ _ and it is only persons (where oread________ in scope , . re j_eVdnt_ "para parametre) person is defined by some morally relevant e’tre) who should De considered, this would mean that those humans buran , ,---- -— -no did not qualify as persons aouIo net oe eligible for treatment as oncers of tne oral Clue or if they tie treated as members that eligibiility was arbitrary and unjust. it it is the case that’all humans (persons) must possess this property, then it must also be the case tnat no nonhuman possesses it, otherwise an Argument From Analogy and Anoiiioiy applies. if some nonhumans possess the property or properties then the requirements for Club membership are ara^n too broadly ana some nonnumans are eligible _J. Finally, it is not enough to separate the eligible - ’ J ~ ' •- from the ineligible (or pernaps the edible from tne inediblej, it must oe snown why the ineiigiole are not only ineligible for membership, but why tney cannot even oe consldereo for membership, otherwise tne difference in treatment is not justified. To carry tne Club metaphor .. a little farther, pernaps too far, while remoers n.a, ay h-.nave certain privileges, this aoes not necessarily mean tnat that in addition to not enjoying these special privileges, nonrnembers can also oe un*arrantly deprived of benefits common to memoers and non-memoers. why should membership devalue nonmenoers ano put tneTi at the disposal of members? it is o y this condition that human chauvinism must show why humans are the exclusive subjects of intrinsic value and the value of nonhumans can be handled in terms of instrun.enr.al value to humans. If these conditions of adequacy stand, then tne definitional necessity of exclusiveness fails. Yet another approach at making the realms of value ano morality exclusive to humans is to examine no.< values are thougnt to operate. . prototype argument tor this is laio out as follows: A. values are determined through tne preference rankings of valuers (tne aa dfixacuafiie Karnes , Valuers' preference rankings are determined through valuer s interests (tne preXcifiace £aauci.ioa thesis). C. valuers are humans (persons) (tne saecsas assaaplioa). I. Therefore, values are determines tnrouqn human interests (tnrough tne interests ot persons). 8 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of human Chauvinism: The use of persons in this quotation is a reference to agru.rents aimed at Page 6 saving tne exclusiveness of the doral Club by limiting membership to humans with some given capacity, characteristic or excellence or combination of these. while this argument may succeed in preventing non- u.ans tror consideration, it is at the cost of non-paradigr atic i,.<ins. From this argument It is sometimes concluded that "not only is it perfectly accceptatie for humans to reduce matters of value and morality to natters of human interest, but oreover there is no rational or possible alternative to going so; any alternative is simply incoherent." 9 ithever, it this argument is disrantled it is snown to rest on a set of false assumptions that even Charitable tanipulation cannot save. 9 43. Routley and Routley. Against me Inevitability of Human Chauvinism; an ambiguity resides in the use of 'determined through' in precise I, if 'determined through' means 'have to ce determined*, men Plumwood and Routley feel, mat it is ’Odaliy upgraded "to reveal the sneer necessity of conclusion J." 10 10 “Routley and “Routley. Against the inevitability of Human Chauvinism: no-ever, this involves a similar modificiition of p r e tn i s e C or eise a nodal fallacy is involved. The C._ stronger ci­ necessary sense is preferable in forcing tne conclusion, J -- as shall be seen snortly when premise C is considered, but tne more cnaritaoie move for tne argument is to weaken the use of 'determined mrougn' to something like 'reflect ' or 'are a ratter of'. Despite either modification to resolve the ambiguity of 'determined through' premise A is still susceptide to the charge: value rankings cannot however ce cashed in for preference rankings since, as 1 s well-known, preference rankings and value rankings car diverge; a valuer can prefer wnat has less value and can value what is not , referred. 11 Premise a is , therefore ( modified to read: Al Values are determined through the value rankings of (appropriate) valuers, 12 11 "Routley and “Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism 44. 12 Ro tley and Routley, Against me inevitability of num Chauvinism: 44. Bypassing premise B for a moment, premise C, the St-ficieb aSiuuiptAob, can be seen as a "circular way of reintroducing tne logical version of human chauvinism by restricting tne class of valuers a priori to humans" and at Page 7 Snr1 ^'?2Hy2enriy*-^rae' 13 11 is essential to the argument lse1 c to oe a necessary condition that humans are the only valuers. ithout that the argument ooes not human chauvinsitic conclusion. if persons is usea instead of humans, tnen it becomes -ore defensible, since not all humans are valuers, but not all valuers are human, if not all valuers are numar' or persons, tnen to sustain the human chauvinistic conclusion it becomes necessary either to reject ail non-human (person) values or i? i‘,’o e«- a "'ove m premise a such that 'interests' are United to human (person) interests. 43-4. Routley and Houtley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism! , „ It is just such a move at premise B , that ma k e s it, tor them, tne most objectionable of the premises, Premise 6 is a group selfisnness To eirrsnness argument. io show tn at the that conclusion and particularly premise ‘ pre ise “B is little more than an argument for group oup egoism in an environmental setting, they oisplay it against ainst an argument baldly for egoism. if pre ise A is recast replacing 'preferences' ith 'values' as ov°'v-i^2'preTn!ern ?rS0 0ds.to have 'preferences' replaced attention in is no- shifted to interests . interests can oe usea either in a weax and - , -se so tnat anything tne valuer values is in tne Ya|uer s interest ,ln stronger, but false sense tnat is intended to support interests as ceing in the valuer's advantage: to sum. up tne dilemma for the argument then: when. "interests" is usea in its weaker sense premise u may be accepted out tne argument does not establish its inter, oea conclusion or in any way sucpoert human chauvinism. For tne intended effect of the argument in the cruae form is this; in determining values it is enough to look at human advantage; nothing else counts. If tne argument -ere correct, tnen one could assess values bv cneckmq out tne local (selfish) advantage of hu ans, or, more generally, tne aavanta ,e of tne case class someho* assembled. it, on thP otner hano, "interests": is usea in its strong sense, tne conclusion would license a form of human crauvinis , but premise no, false. 14 Rout ley ano Routley. “Against the “Inevitability of “Human "Chauvinism: Page 8 This argument has a second , aspect to it which they explore. if tne argument is not acceptable as it stands, then supposelv, neither is tne alternative of rejecting its conclusion. Precise A is opposed to the conclusion D (~a or D / D-> A) to shod either one accepts the conclusion, ith its consequent instru entalist account of value, or one is committed to an intrinsic or cetacned value theory wnich takes values to oe completely independent of valuers, no ------------ , ano and r.c ay determined oy tneit, out, it is assumed, the latter theory is a ell Known as untenable, and rr.ay even _. ____ as involving mysticism be seen or as oeing irrational inus, it may te conduced, there is no real alternative to hu-an chauvinism. lb #15 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human Chauvinism; but this choice is rejectee « as a x false «js>c one: u < < c. To reject the instrumentalist conclusion D is bv no means to be commited tc a, or to the view that tne valuers . _____ __ ,____ and their preference rankings play no role in determining values and tnat values are a_ further 'set„ o — __ ___ . of items mysterious independent iters in the world somehow perceived by valuers through a special (even mystical and nonr ational) moral sense. 16 Against, the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Parallel to this dichotomy between A and u is the dichotomy Detween instrumental and intrinsic values so central in tne division and treatment of members from nonmembers in tne hor a1 Club; Tne dicnotomy frequently presentea between instrumentalist accounts of. value, on tie one hand, ana detached tneories (or what die mistakenly taken to 0e the same, intrinsic tneories) is, for the same reason, a false one. Instrumental theories ore those men attempt to reduce value to what is instrumental to or contributes to a stated goal. Typically such theories taxe tne goal to oe tne furtherance of the interest of a privileged class; tor example, tne goal may oe taken to be determined in terms of the interests, concerns, advantage, or welfare of tne .class of humans, or of persons, or of sentient creatures, cej ending on t>e type of cnauvinism. In particular, human chauvinist tneories are, characteristically, instrumentalist theories. in contrast, an item is valued intrinsically where it is 16 Routley and Routley. 47. 47. Page 9 valued for its own sake, and not merely as a means to something further; and an intrinsic-value theory allo is that some items are intrinsically valuable. valuable, . intrinsic theories tnen, then, contrast with - it n ___ instr urn on cal theories,, and *hat vhat "intrinsic" tells us is no more tnan that tne the iter taken as intrinsically valuable is not valued merely as a means tc some goal, i.e., is, not merely - - is instrumentally valued. Accordingly - 117 detached value theories, since < disjoint 1 from instrumental theories, are a suo-ciass of intrinsic value theories; and they are a proper suoclass since intrinsic values need not be detached, lSomething may __ ______ _ be valuaole in itself without its ceing detached frott all valuing experience. 17 17 Routley and Routley. Against tne inevitability 01 ■ uman •Chauvinism Because detacned value theories are only a subclass of intrinsic value theories the dichotomies bet een A and b and between instrumental and instrinsic theories are false. Since detached theories cannot be maintained and totally instrumental value theories leao to an infinite regress, which is manifest if, consistent witn tne theory, the goals of a valuer are taken as instrumental, then neither of tnese extremes is acceptable, but values do exist, so some other vie-, besides those offered in the dichotomy must be advanced, Plumwood ana Routley advance one vie* tnat denies the dichotomy, yet does not limit valuers to humans and does not li it tne value of objects to human instrumental values; A person is the source of value-judgments and values .in one sense, i.e. s/he is tne valuer; out not in another, namely s/ne is not responsible for a valued item having its valued properties. or is there any licence for reducing tne values assignee to those tnat serve tne interests of tne valuer. 18 18 Routley and Routley. Hunan chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: This solution seems to do little more than shift the detached value argument back one step. -hy snould tne qualities of an item be valued except that a valuer places some value on them? Tnat is to say, all items (objects of moral concern) have qualities, out tnat some of these Qualities are valued ana some are not inaicates tne (instrumental) choices of a valuer (unless a theory of detacher values, *hich has just teen rejected, is adopted.) me intent behind this value theory is to avoid positing detacned values, yet to maintain sone basis for intrinsic values tnat cannot be cashed in tor instrumental values. io 158 47’8. Page 10 do this requires that the intrinsic value of the qualities not be seen also as instrumental values. it is not, tneretorej a natter of assigning intrinsic values to tne goals of instrumental value tneories, it is a matter of finding a way in which a particular goal or item or being is capable of possessing value that is neither detached from, the notion of a valuer nor , if connected in some manner to a valuer, merely a means to another end. Asserting the valued qualities are resident in the iter; is intended to separate it from the valuer's evaluation and denying the reauction of values to the interests of tne valuer is intended to provide for an intrinsic worth in items and separate intrinsic values from purely instrumental values, if tne intrinsic value of an object is conceptually different from its instrumental value, then tne intrinsic value must be taken into consideration separate from its instrumental uses and instrumental judgments about the item. Therefore, the item (object of moral concern) is granted respect in, of ana tor itself and this is the ultimate goal of the P1U' .-ood/Koutley position. An item can have an Intrinsic and an instrumental worth, but this does not in and of itself remove the humans bias to arcs intrunentai values or towards the properties valued. For this the aerial that humans (persons) are tne only valuers is needed: It is simply a (common) mistake to think mat values and rights do not have a meaning, or an application, outsice tne human context or situation: to establish tnis point (on which i-oore rightly insisted) it is enough to point out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not necessarily nun an or persons, can assign values with respect to situations and worlds devoid of hunans ano of persons altogether. 19 houtley ano "Routley. “Human Chauvinisr and “Environmental “mthics: 19 it can now be asserted tnat items in the environment have a value beyond those assignee to then by humans (persons)) ana that ceings other than humans can be valuers,, but what is left to do is to establish tne relative ranks or 'pecking In this regari tne greater value order' of valuers. things may nave assumption "that ever, trough other instrinsic value, people <or humans are more valuable than anything else, and rank more highlyi (no matter how large their numoer) ' must be denied. 20 Houtley and Pout ley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: The greater value assumption, a weaker form, ot human chauvinism, is open to most of objections made against numao chauvinisr. and to examples contrasting morally repugnant humans ith norally non-repugnant nonhumans illustrating t.ne 171. 157-b. Page 11 • • unacceptable outcomes of this assumption, such as: if tnere is only roc in one's life boat for one ano one fust cnccse oet-.een saving Adolf Hitler and a combat ^hicn nas lived a decent life and never narirea a living creature, one is morally obliged to choose the former. 21 21 Routley and Routley. Against tne Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: 5 7. Having set aside tne arguments for value being exclusive to humans tney no focus on arguments for morality being exclusive to humans. One such argument is tne contractual argument: J. K. L. M. N. 22 fne only justification of moral principles (only X) is a contractual one, i.e., the entry into contracts of agents (Zry). Agents only enter into contracts (only Z) it it serves tneir. o*n interests. (The Ciaisl. ifiii J Humans (persons) are the only agents that enter into contracts (tout Zj, therefore, oy K ano i; Humans (persons) only enter into contracts (only Z) if it serves tneir own interests. Tnerefore, from J and : Tne only justification for moral principles (only X) is the (selfisn) interests of humans (persons). 22 "Routley ano "Routley. "Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinisms This entire contract argument can oe faulted as a strawman, out tne general effect of the argument ano tne conclusion still carry tne intention of human chauvinistic arguments oased on the exclusiveness of morality to numans. Thus tnis prototype is illustrative ana descriptive of the sorts of conclusions in force and the sorts of premises usea to support then. Therefore, the counterarguments usea against trie contractual argument and its close relatives oesignate the sorts of attacxs that can be launched against arguments for human cnauvlnis ano moral exclusiveness. It is assumed tnat conditions other tnan contractual ones , e.g. community based, can be substituted into pre ■ ise J and with appropriate modifications to the rest of tne argu ent tne same conclusion can be reached. Premise d proports to set tne parameters of tne argument oy selecting an activity with moral relevance that does not violate tne second condition of adequacy previously set down. In an 52. Page 12 attempt to describe an exclusively hui<<an i oral context, premise J's use o£ the ^oro 'only' to support entry into contracts, a purely hu.an (person's) endeavour, makes it obviously raise. turtnernore, in supporting the contract -hdicinq as a purely human (person s) endeavour, however, "premise J imports the very chauvinism that is at issue in tne conclusion." 2J 23 “Routley ana “Routley. Against tne inevitability of Human “Chauvinism: 53. premise J is found to be faulty on several points. If moral obligation is tasen to ce a moral principle then premise J is not sufficient to include all moral obligations. "There is no actual contract underlying tne principle that one ought not to be cruel to animals, children, and otners not in a position to contract." 24 Ii this too narrow scope »ere not enough to condemn tne theory, then; The social contract account of moral obligation is defective because it implies tnat moral obligations can really only hold between responsible moral agents and attempts to account for all. moral ooliqation as based on contract. but of course tne account is correct as an account of the origin of some tyr.es of moral ooligatlon; there are moral ooli ,ations of type that can only hold oetween free and responsible agents and others which only apply within a social and political context. let other types of ooligatlon, such as the obligation not to cause suffering, can arise only with respect to sentient or prefercnce-naving creatures -.•no are not necessarily morally responsible -- ana could not significantly arise itn res.ect to a nonsentient such as a tree or a rock. 25 Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism: Routley ano Routley. Against tne Ir.evitablility of human Chauvinism: 24 25 A moral agent could have a moral obligation to a being incapable of being or becoming a moral agent. Even when precise J is amended to something besiaes a contractual, foundation, it still comes to grief on tne sticking point of obiigations. Premise K, the egoist assumption; is faulted on the same grounds as egoism itself. For agents sometimes enter into contacts that are not in their awn interests but are in tne interests of other persons or 54. 5b. Page 13 creatures, or are undertaken on behalf of, tor instance to protect, other items tr at do not nave interests at all, e.g., rivers, ouildings, forests. Against the Inevitability of u an Chauvinism: what is not pellucid nere, is that entering into a contract on oenalf of another is not, or cannot, be in the interests of the contracting agentand therefore a denial of premise K, Entering into acontract that protects something that is itself incapable of interests nay indirectly oe in the interests of tne contracting agent even though tne agent's interests are not directly recognized by tne contract. by example, an agent may enter into a contact that proctects a virgin forest and the river that flos through it, in order to protect the agent's access to water downstream of tne forest. Or pernaps even more indirectly, an agent ray sign over his land as a wildflower sanctuary because his neighbour, *no he nates, is allergic to wildflowers. It would seer that wnat has to oe snown is that an agent would enter a contract on behalf gf anotner -nen tne interests of the other are directly opposed to tne interests of tne conrtracting agent, Opposition to tne contracting agent's interests may oe, however, too strinqent a condition. If breaking the premise rests in showing tnat an agent will act outside nis selfish interests, tnen it is only necessary to snow tnat an agent vould enter into a contract when his selfish interests -ere not involved. In sucn a case, entering a contract tc protect a river, building, or forest could ce sufficlent. 26 -^outley and Routiey. 53. Premise K can be amended to reflect the ability to enter into contracts for beings or things other tnan tne contracting agent: 27 However even if premise . K were amended to ad-iiit that agents may enter into contracts on oenalt of nonhuman items, it would still result in a form of numan chauvinis given familiar -assumptions, since nonhun-an items will still ce unable to create moral obligaions except through a human sponsor or patron, who will presumably aole to choose -hetner or not to protect them. 27 "Routley and "Routiey. "Against the "Inevitability of "Human "Chauvinism: but if tnis modification is made and nonhuman items are unable to create a moral, obligation on the agents (agents ceing under moral obligations only where they cnoose to De), then tnis premise assumes tne conclusion ■. It is only the interests of the humans Involved tnat justify the moral obligation imposed by tne contract. 53. Page 14 Premise L is strengthened by trie use of person* "tor otherwise premises suer, as e and its variations are suspect, since tnere is nothing, legally or morally, to prevent consortia, organizations, and other nonhumans from entering into contracts (and tnese items are appropriately counted as persons in the larger ieg.,1 sense)." 2t 28 -? 3 • Routley and Routley. Against the Inevitability of Hunan Chauvinism: ■<hile premise L may be the better by this move premises j and k are both tne worse. J remains false and K is either false or assumes the conclusion if modified to allow for conditions tnat would save tne human chauvinistic elements of it. thus contractual arguments land alter natives of the same form as this prototype) for the substantiation of a human cnauvinistic-oased environmental ethics are lost. ine assumptions underlying tne premises are simply not. equal to the task of supporting the conclusion. Further modification of the premises is at the expense oi violating the conditions of adequacy for exclusive human membership in the .'oral Clue. if the restrictions (such as 'only') on oremdses ltxe J (or variations of it) are removed, then leeway is left for including soie npnhumans oi excluding some humans. Cn the other hand, restrictions may oe retained and tne contractual portion is modified put the result is tne sane. ire -ore vital premise for establishing tne human cnauvinistic conelusion, premises like K tnat 1ink t?e exclusive numan justification ot moral actions to human interests, either assume the conclusion or may re countered by examples that snow them to be false. Plum-ood and Routley conclude; it is not possible to provide criteria hich would jusill* distinguishing, lr the sharp way standard western ethics do, between numans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularily those creatures which have preferences or ^referred states. For sucn criteria appear to depend upon tne mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some ratner axaltbai.ll4=u£.t.££aifi£d and JLaauea tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for tne preferences of other creatures. Accordingly tne sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics bv philosophers and ethers alike, all bureaus aea all olb££ aniial ^pbclax*. lac&£ a Sall^laClQty; Cobfitbul 29 Page 15 29 103. “Koutley ana “Routley. “Chauvinisi ar.) “•.nviron : ental “£tnicss Having broken the exclusiveness of value and morality to humans and naving disconnected the link of values and morals to solely human interests, ■ nat alternatives are there to human chauvinistic systens? Given tne analysis just made of value and morality, Plumwood ano Routley maintain: what emerges ____ __ _ is ________ ____ of __ types of __ ____ a picture oral obligation as associated with a nest of rings or annular bounaary classes, with the innermost class, consisting of highly _ creatures, intelligent, social, sentient having tne full range of moral obligations applicable to them, ana outer classes of sucn nonsentient items as trees and rocks having only a much more restricted range of moral obligations significantly applicable to them, In in some cases there is no sharp division between tne rings, 'but there is no single uniform privileged class of items, no one base class, to which all ano only moral principles directly apply, and moreover the zoological ■class of humans is not one or tne really significant boundary classes. Tne recognition tnat sone types of moral ooiiqation only apply -<ithin tne context of a particular sort of society, or through contract, does nothing to support the case of human cnauvinlsfi . 3 30 55. Routley and “Routley. -gainst tne inevitability of human Chauvinism This notion of nested zones or an annular classes ; ay be diagramed as in Diagram i. 31 picture of Page lb 31 "Routley, "Richard. "Canberra, 1981: 2. "In "defense of "Cannibalise, "Unpublished paper. The laoels for the rings or zones represent; 32 respectively different soils of objects such as, objects of moral concern, /.elf are-having objects, preference-havers (and cnoice-na<ers), right-nolders, obligation-holders and responsibilitybearers, trose contractually- co<ni!'ittea- and tne different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. ot all the tyoes of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. for strictly the laoels given should oe expanded, as the distinctions are categorical ones, so tnat what matters is net whether an object is, tor instance, contractually committed in sore fasnion out whether it is tne sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual xina, 32 Routley and Routley. human Cnauvinlsin and Environmental Ethics: oreover, tne categorical distinctions that demarcate the various rings or zones are morally relevent categories. ine annular picture does not. reject traditional ethical categories, tut does reject the limitation of categories to one snecies or case class. .Also it rejects unjustified distinctions tnat are not "...categorical distinctions .hich tie analytically -itn ethical notions...." 33 107-8. Page 17 Routley ana "Routley. "Human "cnauvinis and "Environmental "Ethics: inis celng tne case: it is certainly in no «ay species chauvinist or nuian chauvinist. For none of tne zones of tne annular picture couprises the class o£ humans (or its jincr variant tne class of persons); for tnis class is not of moral relevance. 34 _Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism ana Environmental Ethics: Returning again to tne metaphor of tne oral Club, under tr.e annular ring picture membership in tne Club is automatic to all objects of moral concern, out tne privileges within tne Club are limited by moral capacities to use the facilities ot me Club. Tne obligations and the extent of those ooligations of human members to nonhuman members rest upon tne type of moral object . tne nonhuman is and on its capacities (illustrated by its overlay on the annular rings) not upon a comparison of tne nonhuman to tne human. For example a being capaole of contractual obligation could justifiaoly discriminate against a being unaole to make contracts with reference to contractual ooligations, regardless of the species of tne t/o beings. dy tie same token, it would be unjust of a preference-haver to discriminate against another preference-haver solely because tne two preference-havers were of uifferent species. loo it snould be notes tnat Diagram 1 illustrates tne position of humans as a species ano not tnat ot a particular human. Any given nuran, as ith any given object of noral concern plotted on tne annular rings, .»ould not necessarily mater? in each detail the plot of tne species to «nicn it oelonjs: Just as tnere are relevant divisions beyond tne class of perference-havers , so tnere are ithir. the class. Tnus tne suggestion tnat tne class to.-a rds which noral obligations (ano a corresponding Sait ot moral concern which ta<es account ot creatures* states) ay oe neld is bounded by tne class of preference-havers, does not ot course imply tnat oo disxiUGXicas can be nade -iiwl- the class of preference-navers with respect to tne kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, contractual obligations -- wnicn Dy no means exnaust obligation -- can only be nela directly (as distinct from by way of representative) with respect to a n.ucn narrower class of creatures, from which many • 108. P a g e 1« humans are excluded. 35 10 7. 3b “Routley and “Routley. “Human “Chauvinis and “Environmental “Ethics; The shift from determining moral regard by a comparison o£ nonnumans to humans to a determination oy an examination ot categorical distinctions expands tf.e range of nonhuman objects of moral concern. ay rejecting tne base class assumption, value as determined oy use or production by the base class is also rejected. inis does not mean tnat human values *111 be rejected, but tnat values will no longer oe judged solely in human terms and that human values -ill no longer automatically taxe precedent over all other values, inus a particular ecosystem, e.g. a swamp, is recognized a., having value other tnan the possible location of an oil­ bearing geosyncline or a salt dome. It is seen to nave value as the home of a number of various flora and fauna species with a complex set of inter-relationships and as a system in itself that is not reducible to the interests of one species or even group of species within it. Inis last point tnat the value of an ecosystem, or any similar complex of values, interests, preferences, etc,, is not reducible to the values, interests, or preferences of either the individual components or toe whole, ignoring tne individual components, is called by them tne "no-reduction position". Inis position permits a middle ground between tne extremes of particularistic and holistic views and thereby provides a loc is for what they term "the ecological outlook": in a closely related -ay, the no-reduction position can provide a suitable metaphysical base for an ecological outloox vor* i ax vuuxuurs worldview, in which man is seen : as .part _ of a natural community, part of natural systems seen as integrated wholes and with .welfare and interests bound whole, ...... ano not __________ ____ __ up with the ..................... as, in tne typical .estern view, a separate, self-contained actor standing outsue tne syster and manipulating it in the pursuit of self-contained interests, 36 36 Routley, Vai and Richard Routley. Social rneories, oelf management, and Environmental Problems. “&“ln\s annison, .s., iCRobbie, .a. “ .anoX* R. Routley, “&edsX&. Environmental Philosophy. Canberra, am), I960: 319. One of the offsooots ot this no-reductior position is a policy of respect for the systei , its parts, and for the inter-relationships between parts and the parts and the h ole; Page 19 Tne no-reduction position can thus provide a natural foundation for a genuinely environmental ethic, one *nicn allows human actions to be guided oy respect, cure and concern for the natural world and rejects tne "human Egoist" tnesis that tne only constraints on nunan action concerning nature arise from tne interests of other numans. For sucn relations of interdependence between man and nature must give rise to constraints on numan action in the same *ay tnat appropriate relations of. interdependence between en do, so tne thesis that action can and must oe unconstrained by any concerns other than human ones fails, as does tne thesis tnat nature is no more than a means to hu an ends, a mere tool. 37 37 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self management, and Environmentaifroblems: Tne respect position .is cased on one or general ooligation principles: 1. ore of three Ine general principle cf respect . .. .. _ _ i for preference-navers (.formerly applied only to human preferences) is transferred to the larger arena of all oeinys or items that can be placed in a disprefer red state> • ..the requisite, important and non-ar.itrary distinction is to ce ora*n which narKS out the class of creatures to.-,arcs -hicn obligations may ce held; tnat is, the usually recognisec principles oi consideration towards others (of tne privileged class) properly extend or should be generalized to consideration for other creatures having preferences, and xgg geaaxal aeXeriSiCle GGliGaiiaa -iu.cci„14i is fiat Lii put aXfaets XoXuui PitfiXetfiaGfisfiaAzexsl iuia a dis^raXaxxfia state 1CC GQ GQGU reuses, 38 Routley and Routley, 2. 39 Hunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: Preferences alone, ho-.ever, are still too narro to develop an environmental ethic or ecological outlooK. So tne second principle applies to beings or iters <itn an interest' or 'welfare', v-nere rf...an 'interest' or welfare in tne broaa sense is a Xclus or life-goal, as possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system goal, as possessed oy living ecosystems." 39 Routley and Routley, 104. ' Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 106, 319. Page 20 iherefore, tne second principle is: that the -altaic or of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can ce affected in one way oi another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset. Foi instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can ce reduced to zero oy sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping vaste detergent into trie nearoy ocean. Tnere is a general ocligaiton principle corresponding likewise to tnis more comprehensive class of ,»elf are-bearers, namely, dpX to jaopafoxse ttfi ..ulijeiiju ui aaiuxai oPJecxs uc -J.4--UU1 JiCu ±£aiGU. 4<) 40 3. Routiey and Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; lOu- /. Beyond preference-havers and beings or systems ith interests or welfares, the environment contains items, sucn as rocKS, soils and «:ater*ays tnat nave value, out no preferences or interests; unlike higher animals sucn items cannot literally be put into dispreferred states (and In obvious sense, as opposed to the ider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), out they can be damaged or destroyeo or nave their Maiue eroded or impaired. 41 41 Routiey ana Routiey. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics; Tne three generalizable obligation principles are parallel in their structure and application and vary omv in /.hat rings of the annular Picture that they cover. Exclusiveness of the principles to a particuair ring, however, snould not ce assumed. ine principle of not damaging or destroying the value of an object of in oral concern could extend across the entire annular picture. Thus tne overlay of a ^articular ouject of moral concern will indicate which principle(s) of obligation may be applied to a particular case. An object of moral concern, e.g. a wornoat, may very veil be capdole of being placed in a dispreferred state, its wellbeing or interests jeopardizej, or devalued at one ana tne same time. in tne other hand, another object of moral concern, e.g. Ayers Rock, may, perhaps, only be disvalued. 109. Page 21 Further tne respect position not only gives generalized principi.es of od! igat ion , but it also reverses tne common notion of when tnese principles are applied: Cn tne alternative thoroughgoing respect vie.'., whi.cn is illustrated o y various nonexploitive non- estern ethics, one starts from a restricted position, a position of no interference and no exploitation, a position at peace witn tne natural world so to say, and allots interference -- not as on ■estern tninxlng, restricts i terference -- for aooa reasons. ine onus of ,-roof is tnus entirely inverted: good reasons are required lax interference, not xa siax interference. 42 _____ Routley and Routley. nunan Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: 174. <*?verLi? ’ onus 01 proof leads to shifts and inversions in otner areas as well. Requiring good reasons for interfering crings about a shift in tne notion of property ownership. Operating under a respect position, it can no longer oe assumed that tne environment or pieces of lii?an QofSrivate Property t0 De done with or disposed of at ■'•ill. Before a s-amp can ce drained, or a forest" cut, or a steam polluted seme jooa reason must be given, Human convenience and economic gain would not count as good Respect does not preclude use, nut it does preclude certain sorts of use. it is inco catioie aoove all -itn property vie ano >.itn regarding something as no lore than a eans to tne user's eras. 43 Routley* Social theories, Self management, and Environmental Problems: The respect position is not only incompatible witn the property view, it is also incompatible 1th tne strong dichotomy between use and nonuse: me conventional wisdom of western Society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice wnicn cones out especially clearly again in tne treat ent of animals. Here the choice presented in -estern thought is typically one of exxoex use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways cnaracteristic of largescare mass-production farming and a market economic systep wnich are inconpatiole with respect, ox on the otner nand of not making any use of animals at all, for e x ampie, never making use 322 . Page 22 of animals for food or for farming purposes, •hat is left out in unis choice is trie alternative tne Indians and other non--.estern teople have recognizee, the alternative oi li 'ited and respectful use, which enaoles use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to oe used in an unconstrained way or merely as means tc human ends. 44 44 Routley and Routley, human Chauvinism aid Environmental Ethics: 179. bt^taKerVup tr^a^a ter °cn^t er*™ pe0fie' sever’di groups of Australian Aborigines, will ^either, then, is tne respect position a reverence position tnat also arises from the use/nonuse oicnotoi y. the lives, preferences, choices, and considerations of otner species or objects of oral concern are not to be taken as sacred and inviolable. out as has been pointed out before a good reason must be given before interference can oe orooKe . interference is acceptable, as in tne case of ’essential predation... nlch is essential to the normal livelihood of the predator, and where tne predator takes tor itself no more than it requires for its livelihood," 45 Routley, Richard. in Defense of Cannibalism•; 32. thus an alternative to tne western dichotomy of use versus nonuse is to mitigate, if possible, tne user's considerations with the considerations of the item: io so ise somethin i itnout treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use tor numan ends is characteristic of x;esfcicci.XuX use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the Iten as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and tne user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare ano so forth of otner humans. 4b Routley and Routley. Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics: For there to be a respectful position that denies tne dichotomy of unconstrained use versus respectful nonuse and tnat allows tor the relationsnip Detween tne user and tne item and the considerations of the item to be taken into account, one fundamental change in tne present relationship between humans and tne environment tnat must eventuate is for individual users to take direct responsibility for their impact: Respect positions can only be generally 179. Page 23 realized in a society in whicn tne basic social structure and economy enables people to take direct responsibility for tne impact on tne natural world their needs and tneir statisfaction create , such as in tne economy of cooperative, involvement, 47 Routley and Routley. Social theories, Self "anagement, and Environmental Problems: Human users taking direct responsibility tor tneir impact snould lover tneir impact. If users bear tne responsibility tor producing and managing what they need, then they should produce, in a manner like unto tne 'taking' of essential oreaation only wnat they neeo and should 'qo lighter' on tne world: 323 . ..self-management can offer the alternative of a social^ in wnich nothing is produced wnich uoes not correspond to genuine needs an .i in which production is designed to satisfy tnose needs «itn a minimum of aste. Tne possiclity of production of material *nicn does not correspono to genuine neeos is eliminated oy two factores in the ecomony of cooperative exchange ano involvement; first, a direct relationsnip between tne possiblity of use of an iter and direct expenditure of labour on tne part of tne user, and second, direct cooperative involvment bet een producers and users. 48 48 Routley and Routley. social Theories, Self anagement, and Environmental Problems: Tne respect position, tnerefore, is intended to lower the impact of human users on the entire environment, -nile extending tne position's own impact goes far beyond tne interrelations of human and other species. It is intended, when applied to «estern cultures, to face among other issues tne econonic/etnicai conflicts tnat nave been at tne core of many of tne practical ethical problems concerning humans ana nonhumans and that nave given rise to much of tne current debate over inter-specific ethics. ine respect position is a strong repalcement to the Dominion Thesis that has been tne ruleing and guiding principle of western though on etnical relationsnips between numans and nonhumans. bike the Dominion Thesis, tne respect position is a oasic set of principles from whicn a wnoie range of problems, situations, ' and questions can oe approached. Tne alterations to the cut of -estern societies tnat would result from its adoption as tne pattern of etmcal progress would oe more drastic tnan that of either a Stewardship Principle (or some other weakened form of the Dominion Thesis) or an extension principle, sucn as the Utilitarian extension proposed by Singer. fet these seeniniy drastic alterations, or some 313. Page 24 otnef equally drastic set, r^ay be no more tnan *nat is ■■eeje.; to restyle current practices as a more just ano less ar o i t rary .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 3, Item 1744: (Section IV) Subject The topic of the resource Computer print out on Val Plumwood (Val Routley) and Richard Routley's (Richard Sylvan) environmental philosophy, includes 48 literature summaries of their works. Author not identified. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: ?: computer print out on Routleys’ environmental phil. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Plumwood&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Plumwood</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 3, Item 1744 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [24] leaves. 19.2 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4f13573">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4f13573</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Second Bookcase - Fourth Shelf - Pile 2 Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Fourth Shelf > Pile 2 Box 3: Environmental Ethics https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/55fb7770f181791e005281a8636a1abd.pdf 1ed72ad17f186317bccf30e6630b50d8 PDF Text Text RBSTRRCT The proposed syntheses Ls set Mithin generat object-theorg. tde3 The undertging the sgnthesis ts that the 3tternative Mortds sewantics - arrived 3t tn of pursuit of a tnctudtng senanttes universat ones) retevant and, semantics generat (a as connectedLg, part for of att a Languages, comprehensive object-theorg - be apptted atso tn fundamentat phgstcs, Most importanttg to the natter of the ortgtn, htstorg, 3nd phgstcat features of the cosmos, but as Mett, agatn connectedtg, theorg. etseMhere, Ln particutar Ln the LnterpretatLon of quantum a The unLversat semantics Ls a mang Mortds - theorg. The poLnt of such apptgLng an mang nonexistent Mortds - LnterpretatLon Ln cosmotogg atso Ls exptained bg Mag of examp Les, concernLng the understandLng of the contLngencg of exLstence and of present arrangements. improbabititg the R resotutton of the basLc question, sketched, a as Marm-up exerctse 'Nhg does angthLng at for exLst?' att questions as to Mhg various other the prominent features of the universe are as theg are, notabtg Mhg the constants of phgstcs appear to have. have the fundamentat parttcutar surprtstngtg senstttve vatues theg Chauvinistic ansMers through anthroptc prLnctptes are crLttcattg Ln favour of resotutLon bg Mag of Mortd sgntactLcattg, status quo arguments, MhLch use setection^ and gross rejected, correspondLng features geophgsLcat thLs and neLghbourLng unLverses to exp La Ln the surprLsLng vatues of The character of the Mortd—sgnthests resotutton - reaLLg a resotutton Ls ts of constants. frameMork fLLLed out Ln the course of countering a Mide SMeep of objections, and of exp La LnLng Mhg the resotutton frameMork invotving seLeet ion satisfactorg of the main tgpes LLLustrated in the four-fotd: is the most �IMPROVED CO3MO-LOCICRL 3YMTHE3I3 TOWRRD RH There Logicai is a foundations tradition persistent - impiging simpLe and get undiscovered - for the whoLe of cosmoLogg. The as tradition, which peaked in modern rationaiism, continues strong in cosmoLogicai specuLation. unassaiiabLe Thus, contemporarg for exampLe, recent rationaiistic theories of the universe, ambitiousLg aimed at mathematico-iogicai expression and capture of nature. Thus, of MheeLer: for exampLe, the bottom Line to the mang theoreticaL enterprises LittLe astonishment shouLd there be, therefore, if the description of nature carries one in the end to Logic, the ethereat egrie at the center of mathematics. If, as one beiieves, aLL mathematics reduces to the mathematics of Logic, and aLL phgsics reduces to mathematics, what aLtemative is there but for aLL phgsics to reduce to the mathematics of Log ic ? Logic is the ontg branch of mathematics that can think about itse Lf'. Logic reassumes its ancient roLe 3S the fundamentaL science; the Mord expresses a LogicaL recipe. Even white abandoning some of the it Lus ions of grand reduct ion istic schemes, and undermining the EnLightenment power guest for the LogicaL the theoreticaL capture and can The sgnthesis outiined in setting. contribute what foLLows LiberaLised bg are semantics and to the organisation of a unified fits into this more modest It is achieved bg suitabig reLocating cosmoLogg as a part of semantics (generousig construed, for exampie, to admit contextuaL eLements). then, to controt of the universe, there is much of a more modest character that recent LogicaL theorg, as nonstandard sgstematisation, worid picture. kegs universaL So unified, semantics, re Levant semantics and cosmoLogg, as suggested in a preLiminarg wag in diagram 1. �RCTURL X L ORLD(S) GEOPHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE PHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE RELEVRHT SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE MORLD SPRCE Comment. The subspaces are Marked out by ctosure and other requirements, that of by cLosure of each worLd under deducibiLity (reLevant deriva— systems reLevant biLity), that of physicaL systems by cLosure aLso under physicaL Laws formuLated terMS Ln (suitabLy of condLtLonaLs) and perhaps factuaL constraints as weLL. actuaL (or better t3ctuai) worLd Ls a seLect coMMon worLd the to nested spaces. The underLytng Lde3 of the synthesis is siMpiy this: a subspace of is aLso a suitabLe framework for cosmoLogy, for an interpret— semantics worids neutrai *3 L Lon of the Log iceL theory of the universe as a whoLe. In Less condensed form, the ide3 is that the aLternative worids semantics arrived at in the pursuit of a semantics universaL part connectedLy, as semantics comprehensive (a theory the of aLL of for aLL be objects, Languages) and, aLso appLied physics - most importantiy to the matter of the origin, history and fundamentaL physicaL features of this cosmos, but 3S weLL eLsewhere, in interpretation theory. quantum of particuLar Ln That stripping. ontoLogicai of Load MorLd-ensembLe terms of nonexistent Mortds. Hot surprisingiy, in the recasting the in theory j^s for is, the theory can be recast in existentiaLLy neutraL terms, wcthout the originaL object ionabLe theory, the Rnd in the case of quantum theory there is aLready, most convenientiy, a many-universe or worLd-ensembLe theory, ready neutrai in (e.g. changed unobservabLe the spiitting worLd of the Everett other worids interpretation gives way to future— directed worLd branching). The setting in terms of do which objects not exist, especiaLLy, is essentiaL. For one reason, the idea grew out of investigation (with Griffin for the provisionaL but so far nonexistent book UQ) of what is normaLLy taken to be a phiLosophicaL question, indeed by some such as as the fundamentaL question of metaphysics, nameLy exist? . Reset in worLd terms this becomes a question worLd such Mhy does anything at aLL of seiection the - a contains be to taken exist. For then the oLd circLe is simpiy reentered, expiaining existence in terms of more existents. Here the circLe is metaphysics: 3 much more tractabLe question. But the recasting Loses expLanatory merit shouLd aLL the worids invoived objectionabie of that we find ourseLves in which contains something existent (us as among other existent things) as opposed to an aLternative worLd, which nothing Heidegger cf. JB broken, as it is eLsewhere (particuLarLy in chapter 2), by expiaining what exists by way of what does not. It is the faiLure to duty aLLow for and -2- acknowLedge this pattern of �expLsnatLons, though Lt represents coMMon practLce Ln the theoretLcaL sciences, that has wade Lssues LLke the Lntractab Le. In fact quest Lons Lihg Hetdeggerean the concernLng does angthLng quest Lon onLg Ls exLst? question LLke Lt so ftrst of a LattLce of the the character and nature of the cosMos Ln whLch Me happen to be, that are LLabLe to be asked , questLons ascendLng to (Just) seen Ls? ; questLons Uhg Ls thLs cosMos Mhtch MorLd ModeLLLngs wag fruLtfuLLg be to appLLed, as an Lwportant fLrst step Ln eLLcLtLng sone ansMers. (Bounded) LattLce of questLons. DIRGRRM 2. 7 Uhg does Mhg does angthLng evergthLng at aLL exLst? exLst as Lt Uhg do 7 Hhg do eLectrons Lihg does Lnte L L Lgent ex Lst? (Ln LLf e LLfe forns the nunbers exLst? (Ln the ex Lst? theg do?) forM Lt does?) In the reorLentatLon of MorLds senantLcs fron Languages to cosnoLog Les, f row Language to the MorLd, there are certaLn features that shouLd be kept fLrriLg Ln vLeM - apart fron such notorLous features as that anong the MorLds of the node L L Lngs are a range of bLzarre, absurd, LncoMpLete and MaverLck MorLds, and that each (nonexLstent) MorLd has a LncLudes donaLn of objects though Lt a subdoMatn (perhaps nuLL) of ent Lt Les, tgpLcaLLg contaLns nonexLstent objects, both posstbLe and not, phgsLcaLLg reaLLsabLe and the MhLch, feature of not. In partLcuLar, MorLd seLectLon shouLd not be Lost sLght of. For Lnstance, Ln assessing truth, a factuaL MorLd T Ls seLected - Ln one Mag or' another, but tgpLcaLLg bg a choLce functLon on a cLrcunscrLbed evaLuatLons are Morked out (recursLveLg) at I. cLass NaturaLLg and ho LdLng the assessnent of truth MLLL generaLLg Lead begond MorLd T LtseLf. For (reLevant) <deducLbLLLtg a subsgstew of dertvatLonaLLg cLosed MorLds Ls defLned; for poss Lb L L Ltg a subsgsteM coMprLsLng consLstent MorLds Ls Marked out; for naturaL LaMLLkeness a subsgsteM of phgsLcaL MorLds Ls dLstLnguLshed^; and so on for other cases of subsgstew and group seLectLon. $I- The Mang MorLds approach to the "Uhg does angthLng at aLL exLst?" quest Lon. -3- �There ere Many canvassed answers to thts questton, and stLLL More Mays of trytng to dtsMtss Lt. RLL dtsposat the atteMpts are defective, 3nd Most of the canvassed answers are unsattsfytng (so Grtfftn and I devote a good deat of space tn UQ to showtng). One approach that ts not inadequate — but perMtts however devetopMent tn severat dtfferent dtrecttons - ts the Many wortds approach. It ts true (and argued eLsewhere, e.g. JB) that R) SoMe thtngs extst. Thts truth enjoys a Modat status, that of conttngency tn fact. weaker ctatM sufftees, naMety But, to begtn, a C) It ts conttngentty true that sone thtngs extst. For the extstence that Most thtngs enjoy or regret ts conttngent. The obvious truth of the More controverstat ctatM that nothtng necessartty Left open for the present. extsts, can be NeutraL wortds ModeLLtng of theMe C) yteLds dtreetty a Many wortds picture, wtth soMe wortds, tnctudtng the actuat wortd T, contatntng extstents, and wtth soMe posstbte wortds contatntng no extstents (but perhaps soMe nonextstents). Likened to a dtsp Lay of baLLoons: DIRGRRH 3. Static pteture of a 0 : 0 : 0 Object doMatns contatn 0 ____ _________ extstents 0 0 : 0 0 worLds ModeLLtng for theMe 0). 0 : 0 0 It can be 0 00 DoMatns contatn no 0 extstents posstbte worLds Such a neutraL nodeLLLng begs no sertous onto Log teat questions, invotves no ontoLogtcaL prodtgaLLty. For tt ts not assuMed that any of these Ln worLds extst, any way. (It ts not dtfftcuLt to represent what does not extst.) Nor need Lt prejudtee Matters unduty agatnst necesstty theMes such even were Lt Lf Lnterpretatton MistakenLy Lnststed, as as agatnst God-hypotheses. the For stratghtforward of C), whtch aLLows Lt ts necessartty true (under soMe necesstty deterMtnabLe) that soMe thtngs extst, a retated Many worLds pteture woutd resuLt; the dashed LLne woutd stMpty Move down the diagraM). But Let us st Lek wtth what ts rtght, C. It ts More reveattng to take theMe C) as tensed - after aLL extstence ts existence now (JB chapter 2) - and to tntroduce, what further Lnvesttgatton wLLL require, dynaMtcat ModeLLLngs. Then, wtth soMe evtdent eMbrotdery, the foLLowtng sort of pteture eMerges: -4- �Dgnantc ptcture untverses. DIRGRRfl t*. MorLds of nodeLLLng of thene C), ML th sanpLe t 3 EXI5TEHTS (FULL CONSERVRTION) RLse and faLL of HD ] A Lt SOMET IME EXISTENTS^ R NULL LJORLD f* ExternaL ttne scats (tsLgnLfLes the Locat present) Consents. r-bjch Ls presupposed Ln the wag the pLcture Ls draMn (e.g. that sone Measure of exLstents C3n be obtained, bg Mag of partLcLe nunbers)^ but these presupposLtLons can be nodLfLed or renoved. The such as sane sort nodeLLLng serves aLso to vaLLdate thenes LLnked to C), of D) There mag have been a tLne Mhen nothLng exLsted. ConsLder seLectLon, noM (or done Ln terns of of the cructat wetter of T-seLectLon, L.e. factuat Mortd 6-seLectLon, L.e. referentLaL sub-Mortd seLectLon). ThLs Ls certaLn features these Mortds have, such as contaLnLng entttLes, LncLudLng observers, exhLbLtLng LLfe, nanLfestLng LnteLLLgence or wLnd - to antLcLpate features conLng up and sonetLnes proposed for MorLd seLectLon. Such seLectLon pLcks out thts MorLd fron the ensenbLe of MorLds (our Mortd aLso, as Lt happens). Rnd the Mortd thus seLected LncLudes exLstents. Mhg does angthLng at aLL exLst? Because thts MorLd, T, LncLudes, happens to LncLude, extstent objects. To thts extent Lt Ls -5- a natter of fortune - qood �it night be hazarded, since the worLd exhibits enough that is good 3nd fortune, enough potentiaL for good. Rs a contingent Matter, this worLd contains (in its object donain) '.tens that exist. So T-setection deLivers a worLd n3king it true objectiveLg that sone things exist.^ The answer Mag seeM trite; that but is in Measure Large because the and answer are taken in isoLation, apart froM issues as to the detaiLs question of the process, the how questions, such as H) How does it happen that soMething exists? The issue can be considered in uLtinateLg exists is question terns this of of nass-energg, since evergthing that kind (so it is argued in JB chapter 9). To the H ) How does it happen that sone Mass-energg exists? tMo sorts of answer are possibte. FirstLg, there is the conservative answer: sone atwags existed. There is an end Less ongoing sea of Mass-energg, which sinpLg fLuctuates, Moves, recgcLes, etc. There are pLentg of probLens with this answer; for instance, phgsicaL prob Lens, such as how did the Big Bang of standard cosMOLogg occur, what was happening before it? But there are aLternative MatheMaticai stories now being toLd, for instance, of a Massive singuLaritg Located in space (rather than at phgsic3t tine t = 0 as with the Big Bang), which trg to offer a phgsicaL account of a continuous universe (see e.g. G. ELLis). Rnd the singuLaritg stories offered can be enriched (aiong Lines rather Like what wiLL be ventured in the case of the second answer). RLnost aLL traditionaL phiiosophicai and theoLogicat accounts, aLL v^rtuaLLg honage paging to ontoLogicaL assunptions, shouLd be inciuded aMong the conservative, existence-aiwags answers. But the nonnateriaLLst accounts anong these characteristicaLLg invoLve LeveL shifts^^Thei is back to the existence of God or the (uLtinate) One, who, on a higher LeveL, serves as eternaL sustainer, and perhaps fashioner, of the MateriaL universe. The conceptual and other probtens of such answers are sufficientLg notorious. SecondLg, there is stage nothcng existed. The energg. the Rt More appeaiing and siMpLe radicaL answer: at sone that difficuLtg before tiMe, the that anccent Long-received probLeM orthodox of how prejudice, sonething that nchLi fct, is invariabLg reinforced bg again Bang, there was no for this picture is how Mass-energg ever appeared froM the MacroscopicaLLg tranquiL sea of nothingness. past Big can It is no great feat to get coMe froM nothing. The froM nothing nothing cones, ex nihiLo Mistaken ontoLogicaL assunptions (see JB chapter 2). Yet even when these ontoLogicaL assunptions are set aside, there is the awkward natter of C3usai nechanisn. But an unLikeig storg can be toLd, a ngth retated, expLaining how sonething -6- �a may (suddenly) emerge from nothing, jet of mass-energy the from sea of nothingness. The story borrows from the quantum theory of the vacuum (or rather, ot suitabie vacuums). There is suddeniy an avaianche of energy borrowing , 3nd mass creation of particies in a concentrated area.& This is the beginning of the Big Bang (at internaL time zero). It is unigue (in experience) because such a singuiarity is very improbabte. (Even a SmaLL Bang wouid be rather improbabie.) The net energy "borrowed" is borrowed on a very Long term (at high interest?), with a gradu3i repLayment pLan. This ties concerning the run-down eventuaL eventuaLLy (though perhaps over this of very a with principLes universe. protracted of thermodynamics, On this story, it wiLL time) subside back into From nothing everything existent originaLLy came; into nothingness everything existent wiLL uitimateLy process. nothingness. It is one thing to such devise 3 story, or rather the (or outLine scaffoLding) of a story; it is another to condense it into science. before But scorn is poured on such a story, Let it be noted that the story is Less bizarre, more and informative, than other extant phiiosophicaL stories. For exampLe, it appears more piausibie than the ideaList story of the construction of the physicaL worid from idea, or than the set-theoreticaL myth of the construction of the entire universe from the nuLL set - undoubtedLy a it as earLy encompasses existent individuaLs, construction, insofar of something existent from nothing, not since, despite orthodox cLaims to the contrary, the nuLL set certainty does exist (JB 9.9). There are reasons for much preferring the second styLe of story to the first - though it may appear to some to viotate conservation principLes such that mass-energy: of as in fact it need not. One is that the end Less mass-energy story faits to account for the presence of mass-energy. By contrast, nothingness does not reguire expLanation: it is, so to speak, the rest position. In terms of the range of possibiiities here, existence is what is unusuaL, what is atypicaL, what especiaLLy caLLs for expLanation, not nonexistence.? Hence the expLanatory superiority of the radicaL answer. Rs one might expect in varying such an obvious and ancient story, and as is easity discovered, scientific condensation and assessment has begun, especiaLLy in the Last decade. The idea that the totaL energy of the universe is zero was considered a human generation ago by Mhitrow&, refLecting on Flach s phiLosophy of motion. More recentLy, Tryon has argued the zero totaL energy theme, assuming a cLcsed universe and appeaLing the standard treatment of gravitationai to If the universe contains just enough potentiaL energy as negative energy. mass to cLose it, then the negative energy must more or Less exactLy canceL the energy (mc^) invoLved in the existence of that mass. Hence, the argument runs, even a a cosmos as impressiveLy Large and ancient as this universe couLd exist as deveLopment quantum vacuum through in borrowing fLuctuation on a a zero-energy vacuum, that is, through grand scaLe in a reiativistic setting. Such vacuum fLuctuations can occur by dispensation of the AE.At --h; when the mass-energy AE of a physicaL object -7- uncertainty principLe approaches zero, its �LLfe,tLMe At can becoMe verg targe. OnLg the Merest begLnnLng on reMOvtng certaLn object Lons and to wore scLenttfLc storg MtLL be atteMpted. FLrstLg, there are, LnevLtabLg a such obstacLes Lt seews, onto Log LeaL and verLfteat Lontst object Lons. Hang of these turn hoMever on assuMtng that a vacuuM and ewptg space Must soMehoM exLst, at Least bg Mag of sort of exLstLng contaLner or structure. Such assuMpttons are wtstaken: no (pre-) exLstence need be assuwed. Such objects 3s vacuuws and unoccupLed space sone nonexLstent are and dLstLnctLve Mtth objects assessLbLe MatheMatLcaLLg propertLes. Though theg nag not be access LbLe to observatton, and Ln thLs narroM respect are outsLde the range of experLence, then concernLng tnvesttgattons exactLng for there to LnfornatLon Ls suffLcLent be Made of theLr features. SLnLLar potnts teLL agaLnst the objection that Lt Ls Mrong to Lwpose an externat spatLaL or tewporaL Measure on (Mass-energg) cLosed space-tLMe; for exawpLe, Mhat happened before the BLg Bang, or to ewbed the curved space-ttMe of LnquLre the unLverse Ln a Larger spatLaL or tenporaL settLng. Rs a Matter of fact, cosMOLogLsts wang exh Lb Lt no unease Ln ashLng Mhat happened before the BLg Bang even Mhen assuwLng no Matter before that, though verLftcattonLsM MouLd no doubt such to ruLe guesttons out as weanLngLess or otherMtse out of order. More to the potnt, bounded Metrtcs can atMags be extended (HubbLe ttMe Ls just wtstahe though fruLtfuLLg, soMettnes bounds vertfLcatLontst one are exaMpte), exceeded. and Rnother has been to assuwe that NothLng, stnee nonexLstent, Ls entLreLg Mtthout structure or organLsatton and ungoverned. Indeed tMo dtaMetrtcaLLg opposed poLar v,eMS of Lt have prevented, and even been run together: of NothLng chaottc, as and so excessLveLg rtch, and of Nothing as entLreLg bLank, and so excessLveLg tMpovertshed. Both are Lnadequate. R More tnteresttng ontoLogtcaL objeetton (ratsed bg Rrwstrong) Ls that such an account of the ortgtn of the unLverse takes granted for exLstence the naturaL LaMS, and so does not expLaLn hoM sowethLng ex Latent cane frow objecttons Such confuse truth neo-PLaton Law. LaMS hoLd, but do not vteMs, Mhere LaMS Mtth exLstence, exLst - bg after contrast Mtth nothLng. fashLon the of of neo-PLatonLc reLatLons of unLversaLs, MhLch exLst. On object-theorg are (such as that of JB), hoMever, unLversaLs do not exLst, and so LaMS are not thus extstentLaLLg Loaded. Once truth Ls duLg separated frow exLstence, there Ls of course the further questton of Mhg the LaMS that hoLd or evoLve do hoLd. But thts Ls a separate, and vextng, questton of uLttMate expLanatton.^ SecondLg, are there More technLcaL adwLttedLg shakg phgstcaL account; for quantuM nuwbers of objeettons, instance, that dtrected But Lt the Mtth the the vacuuw MtLL constst equaLLg of Matter and antt-Matter, and qutckLg vantsh agatn, Mhereas features of the unLverse perstst tMbaLance. agaLnst fLuctuattons and suggest noM seeMs that a verg sLLght (and, so Lt Ls satd, deLLcate) tMbaLance earLg Ln the evoLutton of the unLverse after the BLg Bang Ls just Mhat Ls required for present perMLtted features of the unLverse; and such an LMbaLance, on recent (GUT) theorLes, catastrophtc fLuctuatton hardLg excLudes. R thLrd connected obstacLe used to be sertous: Lt -8- has been presupposed that a �state can be assigned to the whoLe universe.^ But that is now aLright; quantuM according for neutraL to of) (adaptation the Everett Many-universe interpretation of quantuM theory, a state function i covers the behaviour of the P worLds phgsicaL I (with P c K), which presuMabig evoLve according to a e reLativised Schrodinger equation of the fom SE(T). To soMe expLain of the recent appeaL of this sort of wortd-ensewbLe interpretation, it is worth turning to the interesting and curious business of the phgsicaL constants. The §2. of constants of phgsics and sone of their neat interreLations. natter The interesting cLaiM is that the setting or adjustMent of certain constants surprisingLg deLicate, and if the constants (and soMe of their constant that ratios) were different bg ontg sMaLL Margins, then the actuaL universe woutd very is be with the resuLt, aMong Mang other things, that we shoutdn't be different, here to observe ang of its LocaL passing show. Now the possibiLity of exp Lanation of the specific vaLues of these the in terMS of phgsicaL theory itseLf is not so far exciuded. Perhaps no constants constants in physics are uLtiMateLy fundaMentai, Various ways eiiMinating of constants though seeMS that unLikeLy. are now faMitiar, e.g. soMe represent new scaie factors and are eiiMinated by re-scaLing or choice of coordinates. Others are reMoved by More radicaL ways of reLooking at things, as in Einstein s treatMent of gravitation. But sone resist eiiMination - so far. in For, phgsicaL any theory, what case, fundaMentai is depends and soMe previousLg fundaMentat constants (such as Rvogadro s nuMber) have turned out to be derivative as theory constants on the given shape of advanced new and (deeper) were introduced. There is the reMote possibiLity, obviousLy cherished that bg soMe scientists, that in the end aLL phgsicaL constants can be reMoved, a constant-free (very grand unified) theorg in which aLL constants can be reMoved wiLL resuLt. This is not obviousLg iMpossibLe in the wag that a coMpLete eiiMination of LogicaL constants froM Log teat theorg is, that a finat triuMphant reMovat of the Scheffer stroke froM cLassicaL propositionaL Logic is iMpossibLe. However, it is too Much to expect that a "deep MatheM3tic3i anaLgsis" aLways do the job. For one thing, exp Lanations of this sort do give is an arguMent for this out. can There froM the backward proceeding character of deductive expLanations to More generaL preMisses (appLging the content-incLusion character of deduction proper). There are no MatheMaticaL anaigses without assuMptions, without a systeM of postutates. The hope (expressed by MatheMaticat Carter and others), that generaLLy deeper underlying theories can be found, wiLL not 3iwags be fuLfiLLed, of necessity. Since transforMations, such as seating, aLter or reMove constants, can transfer the Big Bang back to Minus-infinity, and so on, there is no soLid to expLain, underLying the ELLis, for one, aLLegedLy probLeMatic nuMericaL features (so data B. contends). UhiLe it is true that which constants feature, and what their vaLues are, wiLL depend on initiaL choice of units, whatever that �at Least some of the constants wiLL emerge. Thus there wiLL be features choice, and vatues which require expianation, and exptanation of the however transforming the done. is For S3me broad tgpe, the present, 3nd immediate future at Least, there is no getting rid of the constants, and white theg to continue figure their numericaL vatues and ratios set some trickg prob Lems. There is the probtem, first of aLL, of describing the reLevant phgsicat data neutraL non—prejudiciaL fashion. The facts of the matter are more or Less a Ln as foLLows:- Present phgsicat theories incLude mang (phgsicaL) constants, which occur in the formutation of Laws and principtes. R number of these constants are fundamentsL, in that theg are not derived from other constants (or deduced from deeper phgsicat theorg). Two things have been noticed concerning fundamentat constants of present phgsicat theorg, both of which caLL for expLanation:If 1) the of certain constants Lag outside a rather narrow band (sur­ vatues rounding their perhaps universe wouLd be ascertained vatue), gross features of the geophgsicaL different. this - hopefuttg without CaLL prejudice, since its contra­ position represents the substantiat core of the anthropic poss ib Le principte - the sens i t iv i tg numer teat f eature. va Lues For record, the the geophgsicaL principte resuLting from contraposition takes the foLLowing form: certain gross features of the geophgsicaL universe are onLg possibie in present form if the numericaL vatues of certain constants Lie within a narrow sensitivitg band. Examptes of such gross features are isLand gataxies, Long-Lived stars, ptanets, recognised ittustrate, water, hgdrogen, heavg carbon, metats. RLL the forces, for instance, exhibit the sensitivitg features. To phgsicat the strong nuctear force were marginattg stronger, nuctei coutd if grow much begond the present Limits and att hgdrogen woutd Long have ago been converted to heLium, with the resutt that there wouLd be no Long-Lived stars (of present tgpe) and no water. On the other side, a decrease in the strong force wouLd prevent the formation of nucLei of heavg metaLs. R dozen further and more of simitar phgsics Literature. sensitivitg mag be assembLed from the re Levant easiLg 2) The Pgthagorean feature. Large numbers arrived at in ions famous turn of Eddington s out these to coincide Large reLation, exampLes astronomicaL computat­ (to within order of magnitudes). Perhaps the most number stating coincidences', the universe is the inverse square of the number as theg are mostLg caLLed, of gravitationaL other exampLes are assembLed in Bondi.) -10- particLes coupLing in the constant. is visibLe (Mang �These two nunericaL features sensitivitg features co inc idences. are are (or can be) These nunericaL features are cited LaMs) conservation of inportanttg that in Large exptain to used nunber as evidence Justifging the introduction of various exotic theories (e.g. invoLving phgsicaL Most interconnected, departures exaMpies earLg Mhich froM accepted norMaLLg Mere the "verging G theories of Dirac and Jordan . So Mrites Carter, Mho appeais to soMe differentig exotic principies, anthropic principtes, Mithin features in order froM far opposite the phgsics Bang) thesis: (GeneraL cosMoLogg and Mhich couLd in principLe have been used to unsurprisingLg, the order of the dag in Mag and be great fun. It cosnoLogg. course Of that the is distiLLation specuLation is is Mith the conversion of this stuff to in received MisdoM, or even knoMLedge, that caveats shouLd be Mhen cLaiM froM evidentLg estabLished. But Large cLains on fLinsg foundations are, far fine, i.e. ReLativistic predict theM 3LL in advance of their observation' (p.291) - 3 Large is nuMericat evidence in favour of exotic theories these coincidences being shouLd rather be considered as confirMing "conventionat" Big the noM received cosMoiogicai setting. Mith the heLp of these the anthropic principies he canvasses, as he puts it, that expLain to prejudiciaL, in e.g. that entered, especiaLLg it points to favoured cone Lus ions such as priviLege or design (for huMans) in the universe. Much capitaL has aireadg been Made of the nuMericat features, of Mhat is referred to - gou C3n see the Loading straightaMag - as a cataLogue of extra­ ordinarg phgsicaL coincidence and apparentig accidentsL co-operation' (0 p.110). Here is a tgpicaL beat-up, bg Davies: The structure of the phgsicaL MorLd is deiicsteig dependent on a varietg of apparent nunericaL accidents. hang of the rather basic features of the universe are deternined in essence bg the vaLues that are assigned to the fundanentaL constants of nature, such as G, a, Mp and so on, and these features MouLd be drasticsLLg aLtered if the constants assuned even noderateig different vaLues. ... for nature to produce a cosnos even renoteLg resenbLing our own, Mang apparentLg unconnected branches of phgsics have to co-operate to a renarkabLe degree (D p.lll; sone of the prejudiciaL terninoLogg is under L ined). The part Last is particuiarig Meak: so our ignorance of interconnections is disclosed, ignorance Me Might have forestaLLed froM arguMent theorg integrated resist apparentLg fitting of unreLated phgsics: together. the topics' present if Carter serves is right. RLL the to reveaL is Lack of an theorg is bits and pieces, Mhich Nor do Large nunber coincidences point to ang hidden co-operation, but rather to over Looked connections Mhich can be argued toHards (as bg Dicke, Carter and others) using fairLg conventionaL phgsicaL equations.^ Rs for the hidden purpose terMinotogg, for nature to produce ...', MeLL, the Justificatorg case for its use is not Mereig not evident, but entireLg The sane appLies to other Lacking. terns Mhich Davies and others infiLtrate, such as -11- �* 'conspire' (Dp.Ill), 'fine-tuned', deiicateiy baianced', 3ii of which suggests agents with certain purposes. Re Lated happening not objections te rm ino Logy, be some against Lodged accident , it accidentaL; be shouLd of the improbab Le coincidence , etc. R contingent worLd need is not accidentaL that Griffin Lives in Troy, Ontario, though it is contingent certainty. Rn improbabLe worLd need not be accidentaL either. RccidentaL means, according to the Concise EngLish Dictionary (CED), Occurring by chance, unexpectedLy, not according to the usuaL order of non-essentiaL'. The misp Laced for the actuaL worLd; and adventitious, th ings; generaL thrust of the notion is decidedLy accidentaL universe is a misdescription.^ To be sure, there is some considerabLe sLackness in terms Like accidentaL', wh Lch can come cLose aLso, when appLied as in schoLastic theory, to meaning contingent. The term vac i L La t ion, as its of condition dictionary coinciding; concurrence nicety coincidence' a definition remarkabLe iLLustrates makes instance the The pLain: of we L L-known act, fact or apparentLy fortu itous Large-number The coincidences are of the first type; there is LittLe case for making them out as of the second type. argue, To however, that the actuaL worLd is not mereLy contingent, but improbabLe, Lt is hardLy necessary to go so far afieLd as advanced physics. Some more homeiy exampies have managed ho Les wiLL do, such as the matter of aLL the Lucky goLfers who in one. consider Or foLLowing the from argument contingencies, to the improbabiLity of the actuaL worLd. Take some contingency, e.g. that person 1 in some ordering of the audience <^s wearing a green top. She might have been wearing any other cotour. Say there are 100 shades to choose from in the cLothing coLour cards. Then the probabiLity that she is in green is no more than 1 in 100. eut the same sort of probabiLity hoids for every other person on the earth presentLy wearing 3 top, and these probabiLities are LargeLy independent, say in I(US) bit Lion cases, i.e. 10^ cases. That is, the probabiLity of the present array of tops is no more than 1 in loH. That aLready makes present arrangements exceedingiy unLikeLy, before we go into the coLours of other bits of appareL peopie are customariLy bedecked in, the coLours towards 16 improbabLe. Lead of the NonetheLess, of motor cars and so on. So even surface contingencies books, cone Lus ion that the worLd actuaL is astronomicaLLu the situation with the fundamentaL constants does differ. Rn important difference between these day-to-day improbabilities, such as have the spouses we do, and those the constants induce is things these this:- Even that if aLL (coLours, e.g.) had been different, the worLd wouLd not be a very different pLace. Contrast the constants: their significant variation wouLd the we make worLd a very different pLace. Is there a difference in kind, with 3 radicaL improbabiLity appearing as regards the constants, degree? OnLy in degree, picture wiLL serve for the bridging range exampies of cases, or tend for -12- mereLy a difference in to suggest. The same broad everyday and cosmoLogicaL �contingencg. §3- Back to mang worLds: improbabiLities and the universaL quantum theorg. Mhere that broad - Leads picture so sgnthesis sought the suggests, as does an increasing amount of cosmoLogicaL theorg - is to the mang-worLds of interpretation Quite evidentLg, worLds semantics are not the onLg semantics improbabiLitg. that can be offered for probabiLitg. few But other offer semantics simitar universaLLtg and informativeness, and some of the aLLeged competitors (not to be taken too serioustg as face damaging circuLaritg in this area, e.g. rivaLs) probabiListic semantics, urn semantics. The idea of the modeLLing naturaLLg It is improbabLe that gou have the spouse gou have , is true bg virtue of this: fact the is that in onLg a few worLds of the modeLLing, incLuding the actuaL one, do gou have gour current spouse; mostLg (insofar as gou occur) gou do not. In preciseLg the same improbabiLities, cosmic wag such particuLar as numericaL vaLues for phgsicaL constants, Lead to mang universe modeLLings. is argument to mang-universes from improbabiLities . The description of the the situation phgsicaL coincidence of probabiListic requires remarkabLe constants, notions, features', e.g. etc. extraordinarg semantics But probabiListic notions caLLs for aLternative worLds. (Thus Davies archerg Les Lie s and This goLf exampLe Of course Davies tends to see worLds used for exampLe). probabiLities as a conceptuaL device (D p.128); Everett invariabLg sees them That reaL. is, what we have emerging is repLag then do improbabiLities the as of universaLs issue! But universaLs do not exist, and nor do these expLanatorg worLds (cf. JB onLg of 8.8). Not Lead to a mang-nonexistent-worLds picture; converseLg the muLti-universe theorg expLains the improbabiLities. envisaged modeL contains ref Leet a huge coLLection of certain intervaL of accuracg); thus worLds the range of (naturaL) vaLues of the fundamentaL constants. RLL initiaL arrangements of matter and motion are refLected in worLds is The worLds. the chances of the present smaLL, exceedingig which expLains (at Least within universe a resuLting various improbabiLities. Does it than matter that we can t normaLLg quantifg these improbabiLities? Rng more we can quantifg the (Large) probabiLitg of nucLear war? No; there is something offensive about the repeated demand for quantification.^ Quantum theorg circumscribed affords situations, a the aLternative phgsicaL situations. actuaL worLd - is seLected, simiLar state mang worLds function is On measurement, one apparentLg at random picture. Least Rt for a superposition of severaL particuLar worLd - the (D p.12!*). This approach enab Les immediate resoLution of an important prob Lem in orthodox quantum theorg. R standing probLem with a compLete universe state function is that sgstem we must have some measuring apparatus that is sgstem. ... Mhen the not itseLf to measure a part of the sgstem is the entire universe, the notion of a piece of externaL measuring apparatus is meaningLess (D p.I2t+). So emerges the famiLiar conundrum for quantum theorg presented aLong orthodox (von Neumann) Lines: If there is nothing Left with which to measure [or otherwise interfere with] the -13- �state the of how universe, universe the can transition from a the make superposition of many possibLe worids to one, concrete, actu3t wortd?' (D p.12^) is, There asserts, Davies interpretation many-universes one oniy - which comprehensive however a resoLution 'accept[s] simuitaneous the reaiity of aLL the possibte atternative universes' (D p.I2i+). But, given the route we have come, it is easy to ontccaLLy atternative neutrai this, to direct that see from there an is object-theory. atternative assumes many universes atso, but onty some at any stage are This actuat. It is obvious enough is that the probabilistic spread of quantum states does not require existent states, any more than the range of atternative dress states for someone probabty attired in requires green, the existence of the person in different ctothes. Measurement now shows which wortd/state an object such as etectron or person in. actuatty is an In these terms it does not cotLapse the probabiLity wave packet, or set of worLds, but marks one out. Lihat isn't known measurement is which worLd (or narrower set of worLds) is actuaL (or the before actuat etectron is in). quantum description, Uhen nothing the entire cosmos encompassed is the within Left to coLLapse the wave' (D p,12S). Rather is nothing in the way of externat measurements is avaiLabLe to determine which is the actuaL worLd; however internaL information can be made use of in the usuaL experimentaL ways. To set interpretations many-worids Everett the quantum of theory and in the contrasting neutrai worLds perspective, here (adapting OeLJitt and Graham) are some Leading features: i) R separate cLassicaL sphere externaL to any and every is not required; quantum set-up it makes sense to consider and investigate a state vector for the whoLe universe. ii) The state vector covering the totaL system never universes) (of coLLapses, and so the totatity it describes can be deterministic. iii) LJhat is described through variabLes dynamicaL the jointLy, comprehensive is not aLL equaLLy reaL; vector and the the actuaL worLd but a system comprising many worLds. (On the Everett are state interpretation on the neutraL worLds these interpretation they are not, other worLds than actuaL ones Lacking of any sort of reaLity.) iv) Through chronoLogicaL deveLopment of the dynamicaL the state vector decomposes naturaLLy ref Leeting a progressing branching of the into system orthogonaL universe worLds) into a set of mutuaLLy unobservabLe worLds. variabLes, (and (On account this is described as a continuaL spLitting into vectors system the of Everett equaLLy reaL worLds; but not in neutraL theory which disposes of this reLativism.) v) In each worLd good" measurements yieLd definite resuLts, and in many -14- �worLds, incLuding the actuaL, famiLiar statisticaL quantum Laws hoLd, indeed C3n be derived or approximated. *- -^ince the neutraL version directLg avoids mang of the to theorg, what is the case for the Everett form? In main part it consists Everett simptg of mistaken ontoLogicaL assumptions, as such objections the what that ReaLitg overactive an principte, has phgsicaL properties must exist.The further argument that aLL branches must be equaLLg reaL, is not compeLLing. Thus DeMitt contends: Because there exists neither a mechanism within the framework of the formaiism nor, bg definition, an entitg outside of the universe that can designate which branch of the grand superposition is the reaL worLd, aLL branches must be regarded as equaLLg reaL (p.178). But we can easiLg incLude actuaL worLd seLection (as group worLd seLection) within cone Lus ion does not foLLow. the weLL and framework; other as given difficuLties the Everett specific, there is, Ln the first pLace, reaList theories such Everett's. as permissive regarding such worLds. In reaList-reLativist a demarcation SecondLg, fact, the however, interpretation theorg avoids. To be faced prob Lem not neutraL theorg the of this the intended It has been objected (e.g. bg Lewis) that the neutraL worLd encounters kinds neutraL bg is too theorg is restrictive about worLds; and few or none of worLds of contemporarg reaLists (^uch as Lewis) get into the picture, since aLL such worLds incLude as existents certain universaLs. OnLg neutraLised anaLogues of such worLds appear fn case, the theorg can be as restrictive as is appropriate about ang In 7). aLso (see which worLds are phgsLeaL, or phgsicaLLg possible. Requisite subcLasses such worLds phgsicaL can marked be out conform tig to phgsicaL Laws and through framework requirements (e.g. that the ensembLe forms a HLLbert space). it is an iLLusion that reaLism as Moreover soLves the reLevant demarcation probLem. It simpLg covers it up, in an unsatisfactorg wag. highLight To us varg a in stock of coupLe pertations, some of what is different in a neutraL iLLustrations of reaListic interpretation, the ontic mang-worLds Let inter- the famiLLar two sLit interfer­ wag. Consider first ence affair. On a straightforward the neutraL approach, we appear forced to concLude that each eLectron traverses both sLits in a wave Like form' (Les Lie LI, p.I!+6), is to the dcaLectic interpretation that the eLectron goes through that both sLits. The mang- worLds approach avoids such contradiction^, aLLowing eLectron to traverse just one sLit in the actuaL worLd - onLg in another branching from this, the the worLd, eLectron traverses the other sLit, therebg inducing probabiListic interference with the actuaL-case eLectron. The wave function provides a superposition of two such possibLe cases, not two actuaL cases. In the transition other worLds are not mang-worLds theorg). from phgsicaL (or potentiaL) worLds to the actuaL one, 'destroged' (as LesLie suggests in his criticism of Nor is the interaction of worLds causaL. There are few or -15- �no causaL effects even on the Everett reaLity version; is spiitting thus not not actuaity observed (cf. virtuai worLds, reLations, etc.). Though there seen, are transworLd interreLations on object-theory these do further criticaL point is that physicaL worLds are not probabiListicaLLy The entities. as exist not independent. But that s aLright; since probabiLity is an natter, intensionaL probabiListic interference is unprobLenatic (cf. "possibiLity" interference). scattering exanpLe where an eLectron is Consider next Davies at fired a proton. The probabiLity wave in such scattering represents a set of worLds for the eLectron. 'The quantun wave provides a Measure of the probabiLity of finding the eLectron 3t the Location: where the eLectron is Most LikeLy to be found ation, and disturbance is greatest there the wave (D p.l2i*). Fleasurenent deterMines the Loc­ so aLters the probabiLities, thus on the orthodox view reducing the wave. Recording to the Everett on however, interpretation, neasurenent the universe divides into two, ... one containing a right Moving eLectron ... Each worLd is equaLLy rest inhabiting each since it is not The observer conscious upon that MeasureMent down-right is spiitting so thus, by occurs; the for there certain a is so near­ probabiLities, anending scattering, that, possibie the because of the uncertainties physicaL states of universe, corres­ ponding to the probabiLity wave, are increased. Lihere there was one for the actuaL possibLities). worLd in possibiLity regard, now there are N Many (N Mirroring the this R nany-worids interpretation of physicaL theory provides a naturaL for neutraL a new state function resuits, appearing to coLLapse 'the wave. since RLL that happens wuth worLd branching is guaranteed copy worLds. But onLy one worLd is actuaL, and represents the (reaL) of universe. Heasurenent can deterMine which this is, and one spLits, MisLeading. There is no spiitting; rather in quantuM processes worLd-branching takes pLace, rep Licat ion atso wortd . Even on the Everett interpretation this is inaccurate, it interpretation ... principLes which aMong seLect detinit or wortds, as setting what are caLLed anthropic principLes, and aLso non-chauvinistic reptaceMents for then such as geophysicaL principLes, can serve to do.^ Rnd in this setting expLanations, of a sort and of varying adequacy, The of aLL the nunericaL features can be furnished. under Lying reason is not (siMpty) that there wiLL aLways be sone universes, which are duty seLected, where the nuMbers coMe out right, but that sone and universes conditions (for of the right sort are aLso decent physicaL universes (a Much More difficuLt requirenent to satisfy). sone such coincidences) It is as these, furtherMore, that are observed (by us), contain universes carbon and water LocaLLy, and so forth. It is then no surprise that we perceive a universe to which so Many speciaL conditions pertain, for we have seLected fron the enseMbLe onLy by our very existence' (0 p.126). But it again, taLk of our seLecting is MisLeading (though taLk of seLection, or naturaL seLection, is not). It is rather that, as a contingent natter, we happen to inhabit such universes^. Rnd such taLk negLects the iMportant point that further work is required, for satisfactory expianation - that piausibte argunents, not invoLving us, but connecting gross geophysicaL features with nuMericaL features, have aLso -16- �to be suppLLed. In thts Mag, ustng the MorLd-ensembLe hgpothests ... [but] MLth[out] the Meak anthropLc prLncLpLe, Lt Ls possLbte to discover pLausLbLe arguments to pLn doMn the vaLues of aLmost aLL of the fundamentaL parameters p.129, a centraL part of hLs cLatm). Indeed DavLes hotds out the negatLng but (D prospect of beLng abte to do much more, constraLnLng the dtmensLonaLttg of space and ttme, the number of quarks and Leptons, numbers of fundamentaL forces, That reaLLg MouLd a sgnthesLs of consLderabLe poMer. It Ls a sgnthesLs, gtve moreover, MhLch can be absorbed or sLmuLated MLth Ln a upon mang-MorLds neutraLLsLng prLncLpLes MorLd bg etc. quantum seLectLon theorg prLncLpLes. and cosmo-Log LeaL repLacLng NonetheLess sgnthesLs, the anthropLc DavLes, the LLke maLnstream phgsLcLsts he artLcuLateLg represents, Ls uncomfortabLe MLth ang such that he LndLcates, ang such grand pLcture, and rLghtLg so, as the 3S sgnthesLs anthropLc expLanattons LnvoLved are far from entLreLg satLsfactorg. HostLg he seems to hope Lnstead that contLngencLes MLLL aLL be expLaLned as necessLtLes of (proposLtLons phgsLcs grand a pLcture, necessarg grand at Least Ln foLLoMLng Log LeaLLg from another theorg). But the hope Ls mLspLaced; Ln Large unLfLed measure Lt represents 17thC ratLonaLLsm over agatn. SometLmes, hoMever, he seems to feet desLgn Ln the untverse. - Ls Mhat features: to supposed emerge, and does emerge, from the numerLcaL Mhat anthropLc prLncLpLes vs. MorLd seLectLon prLncLpLes. Uhat Ls supposed to emerge depends upon hoM the matter Ls set up, hoM the pLcture emphasLaed. Ls Mhat presented, For exampLe, DavLes and LesLLe both set thtngs up so onLg tMo optLons are supposed to be open. In hLs Preface to Da^Le^ Ls The RcctdentaL UnLverse, suggests the sgstematLc aLternatLves are eLther reLLgLon or an anthropLc prLncLpLe. R sLmLLar cLaLm appears Ln LesLLe, Mho puts the aLternatLves as (ethtcaL) necessttg or anthropLc assumptLons. Thus hLs concLusLon (to L2, p.81) The cosmotogLcaL evidence can suppLg __ forcefut grounds for vLeMLng at Least one of these thtngs ss true. (1) God Ls reaL, though presumabLg as a creattve ethtcaLrequtrement rather than as a dtvtne person Mho LLteraLLg destgned our LLfe-contaLntng cosmos. [So the unLverse extsts because Lt shouLd.J (2) There extsts a Mortd EnsembLe [so the condtttons LeadLng to Ltfe are bound to occur someMhere (L2, p.55)J - and the attempt to dertve aLL the fundamentaL charactertstLcs of our cosmos from some untfted FLeLd Theorg Ls tn error. DavLes LnsLnuates that the obvtous Lnference from the cat3Logue of numerLcaL features Ls thts: a htdden prLncLpLe seems to be at Mork, organLstng the cosmos Ln a coherent Mag (p.110). Thts runs paraLLeL to argument from desLgn, hardLg an Lmprovement. One of the prLncLpLes htdden Ls hgpothests; but another Mhtch DavLes (unLtke LesLLe) generaLLg anthropLc prLncLpLe, to LncredLbLe accuracg 3nd Ls some sort of God favours Ls the a gutdtng prLncLpLe Mhtch serves to fLne-tune the cosmos for us (humans) - or Ltfe, or Ltfe-supportLng sgstems, or __ ? Or for observers,or LnteLLLgence, or not for angthtng. The chotce offered Ls reaLLg then an oLd famLLLar one, faced bg thtnkers at Least stnee the (so-caLLed) EnLtghtenment: God or Han, or after a recent ftrst correctton and Mtth a different emphasts, Humans -17- or God. In fact burted under �duaLitg, this is aLreadg as (Science) or Hunans or God. However the a nang tenpts favoured which option, Phgsics excLuded, in error . Rnd it is we as seen: have (coMprehensive) phgsics without netaphgsics, no scientific theorg no is Much scientist and phiLosopher, is increasinqLg seen as excLuded, as forbidden fruit or even as there at Least a three-wag choice: Phgsics giinpsed, without Large assunptions - which stands on its own. But further afieLd there is get is which option, another not excLuded: option here canvassed. The ciain to be eLaborated is this: no (deep-ecoLogicaL) principies of a tgpe not aLreadg required for Low LeveL senanticaL purposes worLd seLection principies) are caLLed for in expiaining the nunericaL (naMeig, features at Least as satisfactoriig as nor huMans Neither principies, gods such be upon popuiarig aLreadg foreshadowed, doing. in More in reMoving huMans features god-Like (and, universe. the principLe cones in a varietg of anthropic verg precise (incLuding Barrow's biocentric reforMutations). SoMe exaMptes give the inpression:- The existence as observers seLection bioLogicaL (D to the own used be can existence a as constants' (ibid). This presents severaL for renoving underiging ngsterg is verg different fron nunericat of expLanation, our p.viii); effect, ... to expLain the otherwise Mgsterious nuMericat disentangie; expLat,ning wiLL idea is to reiate basic worLd features to our own vaLues of the fundanentaL phgsicaL issues as such coLourfuL for nainstreaM phgsicists, atMost none of then prettg MostLg the upon hunans, associated inteLLigence) fron a new speciaL pLace Rs succeed options other the are essenti3t. Since gods do not figure in anthropic wiLL focus the incidentaLLg, forMS, object-theoru far-out the features. sorts, various or Rnd nag these turn in have further theg Mag be siMpig contingent, refLecting seLection without specific purpose. Sone phgsicists go so far as to ciain: our existence constrains the structure of the universe, indeed it even it (0 p-112), for to us , quote froM Hawking and CoLLins. connection in this sweeping context h3s been dubbed this j^s Davies the does, have nothing specificaLLg to do inteLLigence, or with Life, etc. The Dicke argunent, for Eddington-Dirac expLain coincidence, is based of principLe : anthropic the show with what work the or hunans, with designed exanpLe, to onig on the presence of heavg eieMents, and so gives but a hint of bioLogg, if that. So reversaL Invoking the huMan forMuLaticn of the principLe (D p.112)! But quite generaLLg the argunents advanced, which do principLe seLects reaLLg there is no spirit of the Copernican revoLution' in this fashion (pace D p.115, barter, and others). The conditionaL principLe estabLished bg the Dicke arguMent is essentiaLLg J) If [because, g^ven] there exist heavg eieMents, then the universe is such that the Eddington-Dirac coincidence ho ids. The fuLL expLanatorg argunent conprises, as weLL as the detaiLed phgsics that goes toward J), the nodus ponens inference: -18- �The Eddington-Dirac coincidence hotds. There exist heavy eLements, J) More generaLiy, the anthropic way gives principie to physicatiy a argued conditionai scheme of the enthymematic form K) if F then T, or its contrapositive K ) if not-F then not-T, where F is a hard factuai ciaim or more commoniy its existentiat reiativety generaiisation , and T is a more theoretic3i ciaim concerning typicaity features of the worLd, such as numericai features. The short form of anthropic exp Lanation, or better status quo expLanation, is then the argument form F, if F then T L) . .T. famiLiar ontoLogicaL proofs, for instance of an externaL worLd from the Moore s fact that exist, hands arguments. such omit typicaLLy proofs phiLosophers just are difference The is that the soLid argumentation that goes into estabLishing the conditionai schemes of status quo expianations; for instance, makes LittLe effort in this direction, and the required entaiLment rather Moore evidentLy faiLs to hoLd (see fn 30). Other formutations of the anthropic principie in the Literature are than better those hardLy 3tready exhibited. LesLie, who at Least (Like Barrow) moves humans a LittLe off centre stage, puts it in this counterfactuaL way: if our universe had been [everywhere] hostiie to Life then nobody wouLd be observing it (L2, p.66). If the consequent simpiy contextuaLLy impiies that something a Live is doing the observing, then the principie is ana Lytic, and scarceLy up to the intended expLanatory tasks (without requisite information that the the universe contains Life, and much eLse being separateLy pumped in). MhiLe if does not require this, it appears fatse; the Latest seeing-eye robot consequent did survive the hoLocaust, or did just happen as a resuLt of the quantum fLuctuation. In such as Dicke's most purported argument. offers faces reLated difficuLties: worLd appLications of the anthropic The other version of the principie LesLie NecessariLy we conscious beings observe a which is Life-containing (LI, p.lt+1). Rs it stands, this is faLse; for we mightn t exist. Nor wiLL appropriate deLetion consciousness retain we' of fix things. the worLd is, Me might but not be observers, aLL being in vats. But repaired the version is pretty use Less. It bears onLy tangentiaLLy (through that vacuum any case the formuiation Lacks sufficient generaLity; it faiLs to connect appropriateLy with scheme, the but contingency, Life its consequent, containing) on what is at issue concerning numericaL features. The materiaL on us, on observers and the Like, is strictLy irreLevant, a hang-over again presumabLy constructions of quantum theory. -1?- from bad ideaList �* The that the Copernican principte has suffered some sort of set-b3ck idea because of the essentiai rote of anthropic principies in explaining Large-number can be traced back through Carter, who heLped popuLarise the rote coincidences, between of anthropic principies and made the (rather obscure) distinction strong weak has been exaggerated subservience to the 'Copernican principte' [which is] that we must and not assume principies. anthropic gratuitoustg that we Recording to Carter, there occupg a priviLeged centraL position in the (C p.231). The regrettabLe tendency, he sags, has been to universe extend the to a most questionable dogma to the effect that our situation cannot principte be priviLeged in ang sense ... (in extreme form ... the 'perfect cosmoLogicaL principLe ...)'. The Latter assumption is certaintg untenabLe (as Dicke pointed because the universe is bg no means spatiaLLg homogeneous on a LocaL scaLe out) and speciaL conditions (of terrestrial temperature, chemicaL environment) do prevaiL on Earth. But its removaL does nothing to undercut Life the Copernican principLe, or to boost the anthropic principLe in the wag thinks Lt For does. is Carter his bracketed comment after his first formuiation of the anthropcc principle is that Lt for requisite aLthough our situation is not necessaritg centraL, inevitabLg priviLeged to some extent' (C p.291). It is doubtfuL that our position is centraL; whether it is so priviLeged depends on the intended contrast, but whatever the privilege is, it hardlg seems inevitabLe. Carter gives severaL non-equivaLent formuLations of the anthropic principLe, the first of which takes the quasi-anaLgtic but ambiguous form, LJhat we C3n expect to observe must be restricted bg the conditions necessarg for our presence as observers' (C p.291; repeated D p.119). This is certs inLg not the same as Davies condensation of it, what he caLLs the weak principLe, that observers construaL, restrict the observed'. On the obvious (but Less charitabLe) this is but rampant verificationism, of a tgpe verg familiar however from interpretations of quantum theorg. Uhat exists is independent of observers; and observers, especiaLLg remote ones, mag have no significant impact on what iL5 observed. The condensation is accordingLg false. So also, for different reasons, is what it condenses. For one thing, our expectations mag run astrag. True, what we observe is restricted bg the conditions for our doing just that, nameLg being as observers. But this tautologg imposes no phgsical constraints, being equaLLg true for Xing as observing; and no such connection is appeaied to in ang of the derivations of coincidences that Carter sketches. Once again aqain the present arguments never have angthing in detail to do with humans, or even "observers 4-c? -20- .2-1 �(and surety animats observe). Fit best the arguments are directed to the presence of water or carbon 12 or some such - things sometimes erroneousiy equated Life, and often, rather dubiousty, said to be necessary for Life.^S The situation is of this sort with Carter's "iiiustration" of the weak better Locat) anthropic principte, which he formutates as foitows: 'we must (or be prepared to take account of the fact that our Location in observers universe is existence as the necessariLy priviLeged to the extent of being compatibLe with our p.233). In order to get to grips with this recondite formuiation (C Let us remove the initiaL intensionaL functors (which my empiricist friends to with assure are me not essentiaL in physics, despite ubiquity, and their physicists procLivities to modaLs). Now our position can hardLy be priviLeged (despite Carter s tru necessariLy since human-types just might be itaLicization), uniformLy distributed through the universe or again might not exist at aLL. LJhat necessity there is enters in a different way. LJhat we are Left de Let ion, with since misLeading, probabiListic arguments suitabLe for Life in the universe (some detaiLs justified is Like more something unique (though principte this need require of Hh3t may be met. In this humans we are Long-Lived stars Rnd stiLL much more than a weak is dragged in. It is enough, for seLeet ion, universe contains Locations, neighbourhood Sag3n). we're working at it); even on Terra much of the rest of the animat kingdom is simitarLy favoured. seLeet ion in priviLege of habitats miLLions suggest are to this: we are favoured in that the physicaL conditions for our existence, as observers, are hardLy due Our Location in the universe is priviLeged to the extent of is then: be',ng compatibLe with our existence as observers'. But this ciaim cs after in where fact heavy Like the earth, in the metaLs occur, and so on (for certain other pureLy geotogicaL features). BoLtzmann s expLanation of the present high degree of which Ls extremety improbabLe cosmic organisation (in a thermodynamicaL setting) is aiso said to appLy a weak anthropic principte ; witness this the onLy reason that we are priviLeged to exceedingLy untikeiy occurrence is that our very existence [etc.J -21- O.2.2.. �* depends upon the condition which atone can be bg estabiished remarkabte that (D p.123). But again onLg gross phgsicaL organisationat principLes fLuctuation are seLected for; and no more than a weak seLection principte is required. beveraL expLained , so Carter and Davies ci3im, be cannot coincidences simpig bg a weak principte (at Least in the muLti-universes). of is made to the strong (or better gLobaL) principte: appeaL these absence The universe ... must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some in barter s (p.120). formuLation exist is for manifesttg faLse. So, Cartesian paraphrase Carter gives of the strong different cogito ergo mundus taLis est . The worLd wouLd presumabtg not be principte, verg theg is this appaLLing the necessarg; the universe does. Rnd since observers mag verg easiLg never given have evotved in the universe, reasons, stage R coroLLarg of the strong principte in this heaviLg necessitated guise is that observers are conditionaLLg must For so different were the contingent premiss faLse; and certainLg the premiss mag Least be true but the cone Lus ion faLse. But at Loading, necessitg gets and principte the appropriate conctusion. For, propertg ideaLLg this the inferentiaL form, with the into formuLated, abandons paraphrase scheme the as is before, Law Like conditionaL of basic form, if F then T, where however T is a a genuinetg gLobaL cLaim that the universe is such 3nd such (e.g. the universe now contains more matter than radiation). The scheme, so then, recast is feature distinctive some theoreticaL LocaL strong the that T is hoListic assertion 3bout the universe, incLuding essentiaL reference to it, not, as it mag be on about of the weak principte, of the universe, which can readiLg be features stated or restated without reference to the universe. But the distinction is not particuiarLg important. The robust, troubie is it from 3 worLd-seLection gives Lt a misLeading most LawLike Mag requisite within consequent. For exampLe, there is stiLL no (egocentric) thought matter; to phgsicaLLg without Descartes God to puLL him out. universe the taiLor-made is for framework of idea - in essence it cLaims a wag Living organisms are subsequentig assured of existence. [So it is]... akin mankind to inhabit. products secuLar expLanations. teteoLogicaL R duLg cLaims anthropic worLd for (D p.121). Such erroneous presentations have done much to encourage both a new anthropocentrism and the idea that are unLike habitation, 3nd that both the Laws of to traditionaL retigious expLanation of the worLd: that God made the are from Hard as it is to credit, Carter is phgsics and the initiaL conditions obLigingLg arrange themseLves in such that an procLivitg to ideaiism exceLLed bg Davies, who sags of the strong principte that that in route respectabLe Carter's (exhibited in C2)), he mag weLL get stuck in the argue to bounds to the intended phgsicaL given and of satisfactorg impression antecedents for the scheme, and makes it presentLg impossibLe appropriateLg verg perspective Carter's extravagant Cartesian paraphrase of the strong with that is principte nor on a par reformuLated Davies with, strong and in schema expLanations anthropic competition supports design with, none of the makes regarding the universe. Nor, as wiLL appear, expLanations, when made presentabLe, -22- akin to retigious �features of the worLd. The expLanations take different LogicaL of explanations forms and LnvoLve quite different ingredients. To see what is reaLLy required for the strong schema to operate, it pays to Look at Then appLications. it becomes evident observercentric that considerations are strictLy irreLevant. Once again far stronger, and biocentric more dubious, conditions than are required for the estimates actuaLLy made been For introduced. instance, (BoLtamann) K, is a good exampLe of a prediction based on what strong' anthropic principLe' (C p.23^); (8) is as foLLows: K aLL f < that is 2 " Tl_ 5 have according to Carter, his condition (8), which imposes an order of magnitude upper bound on cosmoLogicaL But and constant may be termed the 3 ' "P , P invoLved in obtaining this bound, retevance, is the of assumption that ' the un iverse is not radiation dominated aLL its [finite] Life (i.e. that the matter contribution ... to the mean mass density ... becomes greater at some stage Insofar this as is than the necessary radiation (C ...)' contribution pp.233-^.). at aLL - since the estimates concern onLy very broad features, and not LocaL variations - it is 3s necessary for Lichen as for Larkspurs. DLL that is required is a sLightLy stronger worLd seLection principLe than mereLy that worLd contain heavier eLements at some stage; but stiLL the onLy a gLobaL geophysicaL principLe. Rnd this is aLL that here. The same set of points amounts to appLies to Carter's further use of the strong principLe, to estimate the Lower bound on K, which appLies the conventionaL that gaLax Les ... are formed by condensation, starting as reLativeLy hypothesis smaLL density fLuctuations in an otherwise homogeneous further The strength tendentious assumption in background (C p.2St+). this appiication is that gaiaxies are necessary for the formation of stars and hence of Life (C p.23!*). NonetheLess there are arguments for the strong anthropic principLe, though faLLacious ones obviousLy. They come firstLy from positivism. It is cLaimed that if the universe exists then it must be observabLe; so there must be observers - a modaL faLLacy. Davies (in his exposition of Barrow and not argues universe which from the faLse premiss that onLy what is observed exists, that a did then others) admit observers is meaningLess' (D p.I21). This is ideaListic garbage. They come secondLy from an aLLeged expianatory rote, in expLaining coincidences. But it is unnecessary for this purpose as initiaL worLd seLection wiLL serve. They come thirdLy from human chauvinism; thus, too human existence is said to be responsibLe for the very speciaL structure of the universe' (D p.121)! The connection is not however causaL; so what is it supposed There is be: teLeoLogicaL? thus a serious probLem as to how this responsibitity, hardLy evident, is exercised. FinaLLy a strong principLe might uniformity to - one principLe to cover be argued for on grounds of aLL cases. But better a weaker correct -23- �principLe than a strong faLse or geophgsicaL principLe wouLd suffice Rnd principLe. dubious doubt no a weaker aLL phgsicaL constants. (Of course, for there reMains the natter of this worLd seLection. This worLd does exhibit Life, incLude hunans, and so on. But these features, Like the present species of does eucaLgpts expLanations, or reLevant, cLasses of worids.)"^ and are RnusingLg, astroLogicaL and More converses hunan affairs; white under gerMane not the to extravagant anthropic principies are to astroLogg, ceiestiaL events infLuence anthropic hunan anaLogue, affairs infLuence CeiestiaL events and processes incLude those of the sun. Moon events ceiestiaL its are abstracted fron in seLecting expLanatorg Recording other. each of wonbats, grazing of whereabouts and and other pLanets (especiaLLg). Rnd these certaintg appear to have an (indirect) weak infLuence, especiaLLg through the soLar atMosphere and pLanetarg Large pLasMas, on terrestriaL phenoMena (Fegerabend, p.93). The anthropic converse, in this forM danagingtg anthropocentric and exhibiting an excess of hubris, is Much further froM the truth. Not just the anthropocentric, but the eMphasis of nuMericat features. Rnd despite the bioLogicaL anaLogies, just Lt,ke explanation seLection without vaLues, so even Rs are there there is seLection without seLectors. More, RLthough seLection is sonetiMes accoMpiished through seLectors, often takes not is naturaL seLection. It is not seLection for, for fitness, survivaL, or whatever. Nor, More iMportant is it seLection bg, bg soMe agent. vaLues MispLaced. is insistence, Life is not essent-iaL in Mang worids Le^Lie Despite biocentric seLection without seLecters, randonig or otherwise - this tiMe as in naturaL pLace seLection, which does not require a personified Nature to do the have evoLutionarg theories as/oid ageneg. In avoiding ageneg, seLection is Like that seLecting, as enphasised. Such expLanation can straightforwardig of Darwinian evoLut- ionarg theorg; and seLection contrasts with direction as incLuded in aLternative evoLutionarg Though accounts (cf. DarLington, p.l^ff). anthropic principies coMe in a varietg of forMs, depending upon how the conditionaL scheMa ^nvoLved is fitted out, none of theM, then, does what is saud, none depends essentiaLLg on the presence of huMans, or of Life. SgntacticaLLg, theg etaborate usuaLLg status quo arguMents, of forM L), with factuaL fir^t preMis^ F concerning the state of the worLd LocaLLg (weak forM) whoLe (strong seLection forM). SenanticaLLg, or as a the factuaL preMisses function as worLd principies; theg serve to Mark out the cLass of phgsicaL wortds or to narrow then down to these or those, e.g. to those where heavier eieMents such as carbon occur, those where Long-Lived stars, such as the sun, appear. It is that carbon is sonetiMes taken to provide an "order-of-Magnitude" approxiMation for Life (that is the nearest Long-Lived star is supposed to to hunans provide that the the "approxinations" get); Life as the arguMents a steadg warMth required for the evoLution of Life (but Long-Lived stars, water, and heavier objects are as to true near need get). But these additionaL, and nore dubious, detaiis are unnecessarg for the Main thrust of status quo arguMents, as distinct -24- �from their anthropic 3nd biocentric augmentations. meet Given that the worids seiected are of this and that cast - in generai geophgsicai gross Less, up the to constraints — other features of them can be derived (more or standards rough accepted in and physics) in expLained, particuLar, how and that it is that certain (fundamentaL) physicaL constants Lie in restricted ranges, narrow and unexpected ranges. These arguments, duty fitted out, do provide exp Lanations, non-causat exp Lanations, of physicaL features of a contingent, mereLy LmprobabLe universe. Much there is, however, in these most ctaims, that has been contested, from the psycho LogicaL such of inadequacy a universe to the worth of such expLanations, if expLanations they are at aLL. objections to the cosmo-LogicaL synthesis; and finding unLikety, an in comfort and with Prob Lems mereLy universe. contingent, Somehow contingent universes have acquired the reputation of being coLd, remote and uncaring - a not habitat for sensitive creatures. But the reputation is undeserved, since fit contingency does not bear on any of these things. Mhat is contingent can be just as weLL as coLd or neither; caring or not, so far as the appLication sense aLL; at and hot makes so on. One can be warm and comfortabLe in bed on a wet and wintry night. One can be at home, comfortabLe in, in tune with, a tiny part of an improbabLe universe, as some tribaL peopLes are. None of these virtues are Ln any way undermined by contingency, matter of a necessary universe. or aLways assured by the quite separate a degree of harmony between us Furthermore, there can be, or have evoLved, and our surroundings , without principLes, as that our worse, that the universe is universe such exaggerated cLaims, on based anthropic are very speciaL and tuned to us' or, surroundings made for us'. Me humans can be in with tune the without having the universe tuned to us, as we can foLLow and ornament a song on the wind or in the woods. But so far, especiaLLy recentLy, we humans coLLectiveLy are not doing too weLL in attuning oursetves to the worLd. Rs this iLLustration begins to metaphysicaL and psychoLogicaL reveaL, predeLiction^ may pLay a not inconsiderabte rote in choice of, and ornamentation of, physicaL theory, especiaLLy of controvers LaL theories such as quantum theory and cosmoLogicaL theory. In the case of such theories there is a certain bag technicaL so to say tricks, tricks, equations and so on, which are de rigeur - a theory-skeLeton - and beyond that both an interpretation and setting for the bag integrating of theM and suppLying of with some sort of meaning, and them usuaLLy aLso some further formaLism connecting the tricks together or to a wider theoreticaL background. For exampLe, even in accounts of too much in the way of interpretation theory where is commonLy frowned upon, extensive correspondence ruLes Linking the formaLism with upon quantum cLassicaL physics are retied heaviLy. Rt Least for everything beyond the theory-skeLeton, which is what is appLied in most concrete day-to-day appLications of the theory, there is much room for rivaL fLeshing out of the skeLeton - Latitude -25- such as there is in �archeological reconstructions of peoples from some scattered bones. Recasting quantum theorg, as in the mang-worlds interpretation, offers not as merelg a basis for fleshing out the theorg non-idealisticallg, but for combining it with general to subject much of the criticism, much of it directed more broadlg at most Happilg as However such recasting, when not reLativitg. largelg ignored (the common fate of nonstandard theories), is criticism. well plural world theories in general, misses the neutral modification. There are firstlg a batch of aesthetic and ontological objections. These commonlg take off from the of unattractiveness duplication or replication of profligate such worLds. LJeLL, tastes and vaLues, Like intuitions, do varg with sub-cuLture. Some of us, who escaped over-exposure to worlds the ReaLitg do PrincipLe, stories illuminating and attractive, indeed verg inviting. So, next, the whole thing is said to be unbelievable: no one can reasonabLg existence believe worLds nonetheless, especiaLLg in explanation. these in (the these unlimited numbers of universes. Granted, we do not believe of) in this either. These other worLds do not exist; but we can make of neutral find heavg Load of objections carrging on about excess use extensive In this wag we avoid a baqgage. ontic also Ue main criticisms based on Occam s razor. (RLL these objections are short-circuit met, in much detail, in JB.) Linked to such Occamist protests are a batch of objections that are pictures worlds effect the to over-engineered, both too complex 3nd including too much baggage. Thus in thermodgnamics a smalt fluctuation producing some order is more LikeLg than one producing Lots of order, one galaxg more LikeLg than Lihg do similarlg we not find ourselves in a one galaxg universe, which is far more LikeLg? The answer is in part: because Less LikeLg contingencies hold. Is the ubiquitg No, (D p.123)? mgsterg instance, the on the commenting of of numbers approaches reasons. in these unwarranted presuppositions. The that the universe was set others Like be explained. For Dicke Thus and Peebles remark, in of the universe for a few conscious individuals, overdesign revealed well one of a thing is itself verg unlikelg. Find just special can, that a single galaxg cosmos might be ruled out bg the can observed galaxies in our universe ... therefore a such evolution further there mag be mang. up Mach's Moreover, principle. questions and remarks are based on various overdesign" for idea, for example, presupposes some individuals; but the worlds picture correctLg avoids thLS assumption. The things in this world that exist happen to be there, probable or not, and often, for reasons we can sometimes explain, not. But there is tittle solid evidence that theg are arranged, for us or others. In its original form the unfocussed "overdesign" objection was mainlg directed at cruder anthropic principles, as were unverifiabilitg and unfalsifiabilitg. a batch of objections The well-worn criticism, that notorious psgchoanalgtic and Marxist principles did too much, being so designed that covered everg protested that case, was redirected from against anthropic principles. it is hard to see how the anthropic principLe can be It used theg was to make testable predictions, because ang theorg inconsistent with our existence is �4 M3nLfestLg Not faLse . such protests been weakened bg avant garde have onLg phLLosophg of science, but, as Carter has poLnted out, anthropLc arguments couLd varLous Ln prLncLpLe have been used to predLct theg Rnd notLced. were faLsLfLcatLon, e.g. where erroneous that unLLkeLg assumptLons prLncLpLes, regards Rs fLrst). under but Ls worLd-sgnthesLs, aLL that worLds the whether Ln wLth cosmoLog Les and of verLfLcatLonLst seLectLon whLch semantLcs, or phgsLcs exLst, LnvoLved of themes objectLons do have some verLfLabLLLtg vLrtue of what Ls meant bg bg bg neutraLLsed ex Lsttng. But the force of these objectLons Ls theorg. as conversLon, object-theorg Granted LnterpretatLon. of Often, Lt (though of weaker forms wouLd be abandoned, other surrendered force agaLnst mang-worLds theories, assume derLved object Lons are LargeLg mLsdLrected, because what are at Lssue are phgsLcaL semantLcs, are coLncLdences premLss factuaL be wouLd verLfLabLLLtg not the anthropLc arguments do admLt of of 3ssumptLons the before coLncLdences numerLcaL neutraL worLds objectLons, the crLtLcLsms of mang-worLd such prLncLpLes anthropLc as geophgsLcaL or prLncLpLes are LntertwLned, and dLsentangLLng the crLtLcLsms Ls enough to partLg So them. def Late aLso wLth the reLated charge th3t the neutraL worLd- Ls Lt sgnthesLs theorg Ls unscLentLfLc or at much turns Least dubLousLg scLentLfLc.PLaLnLg on what Ls admLtted Lnto that esteemed categorg, scLentLfLc. But on most accounts, use of seLectLon prLncLpLes succeeds Ln gettLng LncLuded. Rnd so, pLaLnLg enough, does mang-worLds quantum theorg. Rfter 3LL, Lt has 3pproxLmateLg as the same sorts of predLcatLve and test capabLLLtLes more That fact of narrow empLrLcaL LndLstLnguLshabLLLtg mag be the source of theorg. other compLaLnts, but Lt gtves no ground for the charge worLd Ls seLectLon prLncLpLes excLuded! are It at hand. of scLentLfLc and theorLsLng experLmentLng true that some theoretLcaL and wouLd (per prefer LmpossLbLe) and wantLng to st Lek to a uLtLmate and unLfLed expLanatLons. No doubt such semantLcaL apparatus does faLL fouL of the the substance of the charge, consLder some of the crLterLa often beLng theLr theorg narrower sLmpLg reveaLs further serLous defects Ln such vLews. But to reach that vLews: fuLLer the narrower (hgpothetLco-deducttve) methodoLogg, are uneasg wLth worLds seLectLon, sureLg But phgsLcLsts, and mang phLLosophers, LosLng sLght of what enters Lnto range quantum orthodox scLentLfLc. UnfaLsLfLabLe? SureLg set down for Ln areas where the framework Ls not pLnned down bg phgsLcaL theorg. OvercompLLcated and LnsuffLcLentLg gLven what the worLds theorg Ls Lntended to accompLLsh sLmpLe? Not (e.g. the semantLcaLLg theoretLcaL work Lt Ls aLso put to Ln areas such 3s LLnguLstLcs). Etc., etc. Perhaps the most teLLLng theorLes LLke worLd—sgntheses objectLons whLch agaLnst LncLude status quo arguments, and them, concern theLr expLsnatorg capacLtg. StrangeLg theg have been condemned both as expLaLntng too much - ang thLng at aLL can be brought out Ln some worLd - and as expLaLnLng too LLttLe and beLng trLvLaL. Not both these objectLons are LLkeLg to succeed, as theg tend to undercut one another. IndependentLg, Lt seems cLear that the arguments do provLde expLanatLons, for LnvoLved Lnstance, of the strength of the strong nucLear force. It aLso seems cLear that the expLanatLons afforded are of vargLng -27- depth, �+ depending in part on the depth of the underlying physicaL theory invoLved, this and the pLausibiLity of the further assumptions made in the arguments. Better exempiific3tions of status quo arguments in physics satisfy not oniy more ordinary requirements for expLanation; they aLso meet assembLed conditions considerable time, by HempeL, mainstream the which conditions on position demanding for represented, some what counted as a scientific expLanation. Furthermore, the chief objections to have more the HempeLian the account that emerged have been to the effect that it is too rigorous, not that it faiLs to provide jointLy sufficient conditions for expLanation. To make a prima facie case that better status quo arguments do provide exp Lanations, it is enough then show to expLanation LogicaL HempeL s that conditions on the (p.2t+7ff) have been met. By contrast conditions design with scientific of the arguments, 3re satisfied. The expLanandum T is a LogicaL adequacy of pattern basic consequence of the physicaL argument eLaborating the schemas F, if F then T; the expLanans has empiricaL content, at Least in the shape of expLanans F; which connection if F then T, provides expLanans are true, Uere a foLLows from arguments using physicaL Laws. FinaLLy, the demanding empiricaL condition of adequacy, that the premisses used in the is satisfied in better status quo arguments. the basic pattern aLso necessary for scientific expLanation, it wouLd be an easy coroLLary that many poorer status quo arguments fait to provide expianations (beginning with Carter s and Descartes is there the and contains general, Laws which are actuaLLy used in the derivation. For, in better status quo arguments, the conditionaL schema, Law Like premiss much quo status that such Cogito arguments), and that arguments cannot presentLy expLain decentLy, '^ncLuding such major puzzLes as Life and inteLLigence in the LocaL worLd. It can be independentLy argued, moreover, that poorer status quo arguments, which patentLy (or short meeting HempeLian conditions, fait to generate satisfactory of satisfying) expianations. TriviaL, dogmatic, forms, such as that things 3re the way they are because that is how they are, represent a virtuaLLy worse of sort. this But possibie. weakening to principte, that what The universe is inhabitabie, because we are here, because ask Forrest so is aLso humans inhabit The universe is suited to inteLLigent Life because there are peopLe such questions upon). focusses inferences, is sLightLy embroidered, are arguments with connecting principLes Such, the earth , case better, or more informative, are those arguments scarceLy which appLy the possibility Like faLL (exampies adapted from the sorts of anthropic arguments These short; patentLy faLL arguments, which they LnvoLve offer no aimost immediate further appropriate basic (HempeLian) argumentation making use of generaL Laws. Given that better status quo arguments do afford scientific expianations, and given further that the arguments do serve to remove and not without predictive force, why have they been genuine puzzLement fauLted as expianations, and sometimes criticised 3S not providing expianations are at aLL (e.g. Forrest)? The main reason offered, that back-to-front , these "expianations" are appears to rest on the assumption that aLL genuine expLanation -28- �shouLd be broadLg causaL, and accordingLg exhibit (time-) the direction or controi. Status quo expLanations are certainLg not causaL, and mag causation weLL run counter to causaL direction, expLaining features of the earig the through of distribution present universe of eLements. That is, however, perfectLg in order. For satisfactorg expLanation is not causaLLg restricted either ordinariLg or scientificaLLg. HempeL suppLies severaL different sorts of pattern basic of causaLLg or controL directed (pp.352-3). EspeciaLLg striking in this exampLe opticaL straightforward his of his which are not causaL expLanation or expLanation scientific exampLes regard is a particuLar event...satisfactoriLg of expLained bg reference to subsequent occurrences'; but his exampLe of two-wag where the period of a penduLum serves to expLain the Length of the expLanation, penduLum as weLL as converseLg, is aLso highLg re Levant. For it is too expiaining commonLg assumed numericaL that shouLd coincidences be the presence of water, carbon and the Like in the universe, not vice versa. But there is no iLLuminating reason quo status whg direction shouLd expLanation the instead not in run the as weLL as, vice versa. That of, iLLuminating direction is after aLL from the famiLiar to the much Less famiLiar, and more in need of expLanation. such It is true of course that more simpig means that status quo expLanations ad hominem stgLe of status quo expLanation, for are. Like expLanations, most further unreasonabLg stop deeper expLanation. The expLanation-stopping forms are and form: contraposed inquirers verg for expLanation if it weren t so gou woutdn t be here to ask the question. However such put-downs (in the envisaged persistent Legitimate the those (which Forrest discusses) where the response to a request for the Long. wouLd contexts) not more charge, damaging feature of the universe, Then PF. seLecting worLds where PF hoLds. But the theorg. the then, is that worLd-sgnthesis can expLain too much. The charge is backed up bg the foLLowing sort of consideration. puzzLing deter Theg wouLd be awag in search of further expLanations, such as better status quo arguments mag furnish (at Least for t ime be ing). The not begin in the middLe wag. Nor do theg, except in speciaL, rather theg uLtimate: takes famiLiar, the presence of water and carbon, aLso caLLs for expLanation; but that as quest the charge it Take ang can be expLained simpig bg misrepresents worLd-sgnthesis There is more to it than this. There is a cruciaL argumentative Linkage aLso invoLved, between PF and gross geophgsicaL features of the worLds (near factuaL worLd T) which are seLected. Or, put differentig, the seLection does not take pLace on basis the of PF, but (mereLg) under the constraint of gross geophgsicaL features; accordingLg if the argumentative Linkage from satisfactorg status quo arguments worLd-sgnthesis. is missing, PF is not to be expLained through In short, then, worLd-sgnthesis theorg offers expLanations when bg and then the expLanations mag varg greatLg in quaLitg depending on the depth of the phgsicaL the framework is suitabLg fLeshed out phgsicaL theorg; information invoLved in the argumentative Linkage. EssentiaLLg the same points undermine Forrest's further objection to such -2?- �many-worLds explanation, truths; contingent have we aLL do to coaches easiLy as the pumpkins of turning numericsL coincidences. But there is no such free as seLection of phusicaL worLds - which do not incLude worLds vaLidating magicaL as faiL, can schema connecting arbitrary and practices. Status quo expianations may not be easy transformations at aLL, but physicaLLy comp Lex, they are not atways and they as is to posit suitabLy many and varied (p.9). Thus the theory is aLLeged to expLain worLds into that it "expLains" contingent faLsehoods as easiiy an when assumption invoLved easiLy avaiLabte, and the eLaboration of the in , and the argumentative schema issues in a contingent faiLs faLsehood. For a necessary condition that a status quo expianation be successfuL is that the argument be correct; but then given that the argument form is vaiid, the cone Lus ion cannot be simpiy f aLse. is It that satisfactory expianations, with conforming to such conditions of adequacy as deductive vaiidity in and quo status expianations winning in expianations differ from decisiveLy design which are sometimes seen as on an expianatory LeveL competition with status quo and expianations their piuraL-worLds setting (thus e.g. LesLie), and sometimes even confused with them. Design arguments characteristicaLLy take the deductiveLy invaLid abductive modus toLLens form: Things are (surprisingLy) so and so F If a design hypothesis heLd (e.g. the universe anticipated observers, a design-force operated), things woutd be (unsurprisingLy) so and so. If H then F Therefore, a design hypothesis (probabLy) hoLds. .. H Nor in design arguments is the connecting schema normaLLy eLaborated by appropriate scientific argument; nor, where God is invoked, i§; there any way of suitabLy confining the argument scientificaLLy. Thus support first the LesLie's of Larger cLaims is faLse:- the LiorLd EnsembLe hypothesis rather than the God hypothesis. !^e do not have...strong evidence of an EnsembLe' (LI, p.150). for Science does not their existence No branch of physics in a way commanding wide acceptance (LI, p.S3). The main reason is that the Bod hypothesis is not part of a physicaL theory that many-worLd theory is caLLs in the way of quantum theory (thus, e.g., there is no physics text corresponding to DeLiitt and Graham for the God hypothesis), [^hiie the Last cLaim is true, it does not teLL against the truth of neutraL many-worLds theory. Uhat science supports is science, not the the metaphysics it presupposes. Physics is not however aLL of science by any means, and even science doesn't do everything, onLy a rather narrow seLection of things. Richard SyLvan -30- 11 �RPPENDIX 1. Some Rncient Rntecedents The Non-Limited is the originaL materiaL of existing things; further the source] from which existing things derive their existence is a iso that to which they' return at their destruction, according to necessity [for reparation]... —----- So, in the 6th Century B.C., said Rnaximander, perhaps among the first aLso to set down a story of the evoLution of humankind.Something the same was said in text, though on the favoured taLe a Heideggerean and Taoist touch was Lent, the with Nothingness repLacing the Non-Limited. In the on beginning, there was nothing; and uLtimateLy, too, there wiLL be nothing. have been paid. The p3raLLeL with Rnaximander can be pressed further. In account origins, of of worLd the contemporary charged pairs of particLes are created in the oppositeLy 'the order, wiLL Reparation process of pair formation from the vacuum; white in Rnaximander's story formation story, this opposites the of which are present Ln the one [the Non-Limited], are separated out from it' (but 'the "opposites" are the hot, coLd, the dry the , the moist, and the rest : see Robinson p.25). There is aLso a phenomenon which corresponds to some Limited extent to the Big Bang, nameLy Vortex. the It seems cLear, however, from the materiaL Burnet assembLes, that Rnaximander's position amounted to the first Less satisfactory resoiution, matter or substance aLways. For the BoundLess or Infinite was a materiaL cause, -^*-*dstance (p. 5k<); it is eternaL and ageLess is brought about the origin of the worids. did — Further, according to SimpLicius, not ascribe the origin of things to any aLteration of matter, but said that the oppositions separated encompasses aLL worids substance". RLso there is in it eternaL motion, in which which makes it a queer he and out . If in that the substratum was which a boundLess body, were is right — and it may not be, especiaLLy given Later ontotogicaL infLuences (cf. p.61) - then the matter is cLear. Rnaximander beiieved there were innumerabLe worids (p.58). These worids were concurrent, not successive. coex istent remains uncLear, but Later in the Whether Bound Less" they tradition (biassed) took them exist, making Rnaximander's position a many-existent-wortds theory. The to Law of compensation, under which for borrowing or variation reparation must be made, becomes the Law of repayment aLL were of conservation. The reparation paraLLeLs the borrowed" mass-energy. The more generaL steering of aLL things - overarching order in naturaL processes - becomes the Laws of nature which govern (reguLate) the processes. 'The orderLiness ... is grounded in the nature of things as such . Rnaximander's account represents an immenseLy -31- important stage in the �transition from world-order is myth from science. to first to ... Last 'Hesiod's account of the origin of the anthropomorphic. account Rnaximanders represents, in principLe, a complete break with this mode of thought (Robinson p.27). From this angle the anthropic and idealistic fixes of contemporary science show marked regression. That transition, beyond anthropic creation stories, is also accomplished in the main philosophical essentials of the favoured resolution can where Taoism, be found. Something flowed from nothing, in a seemingly paradoxical way? but not through ang creation or agency. There was a the before time when beginning nothing at aLL existed. The problem of Laws (of nature) was also recognised, and resolved. did Laws not exist (independently at least of things that did) but were exhibited in in things that did exist. So it seems to follow that, stage at restricted property to duty what separated, and was mainly Lacking ascriptions Taoism Such nothing. a and deep in cosmogonic tales, then, from the ^.th C. B.C. until the 20th C., was a plausible explanatory story as to how come from together. of does exist. (Fuller details of Taoist cosmology, under this type of interpretation, are ventured in ecology', written with D. Bennett.) Mhat the which nothing existed, the taws could hold without having 3ny sort of existence, i.e. truth and existence were existence at story a few something could humans are Just beginning to piece NOTES Thi^ passage from Misner, Thorne and Uheeter, p.1212, is given an appropriately grander setting Ln the text. The passage Ls also quoted by DavLes, G p.222, who Lt to Wheeler. In Davies the idea of ascribes foundations for cosmology simple and unassailable Logical is given a different exposure, and is then linked with restrictions, to zero, on God s range of choice of universe to make. 2 Especially by those whose inquisitiveness and sense of blunted or destroyed by the mainstream culture and its wonder h3s educational not been practices, practices much mainstream philosophy reinforces and tries to justify. 3 Indolent philosophers tend to assign those of these questions that they write off (e.g. as semantically defective or as betraying philosophical uonfuslon or hang—upz?) to science. But they are not Just a matter for and scientists tend to come up with philosophically loaded, naive, theories scientists remain, insofar as they address the cannot questions and at often science; enough all. Too many Like too many RustraLian phiLosophers, in the grips of awfuL metaphysics, such as narrow empiricism and/or physicaiism. -32- �^The anaLysis semantical It of naturaL a is Law is that' Law-constrained worLds, naturaL worids. The interpretation ruLe for necessity. Terra, appLy but to Like is It shouLd be noted that geophysicaL features, appLied in seLecting worLds, are not of course confined to systems. in terns of geophysicaL pLanetary other "Rn eLaboration of this type of answer can be further expLoited to heLp why actuaL the standard ot worLd is science expLain comparativeLy so that simpLe, mathematicaLLy tractabLe, etc. HameLy, it is convenientLy so because the actuaL worLd seLection invoLved impLicitLy to render it so, by choice of a serves worLd with the compLexity of richer worLds removed and onLy tractabLe ideaL etements (such as scientific universaLs) adjoined. &RLtern3tiveLy, through quantum and borrowing positive feedback, a massive firebaLL forms. The story admits of much variation. ? The prob Lems, as the questions of the Lattice in diagram 2 indicate, what expLaining phiLosophers does exist, Lie with what does not. In a reLated way, 3LL those not papers on the prob Lems nonexistence of and nonexistents have misjudged the prob Lernatic, and misconceived the onus of proof. For commonLy the probLems concern existents and their behaviour; nonexistents, especiaLLy those functioning in expLanatory rotes as regards existentiai often behaviour, are very weLL behaved by comparison with existents. It has been suggested, by D. Lewis, that the underLying theory of items (of JB) renders everything exists. But it nonexistent, is and makes it 3 reaL probLem, how anything patentiy faLse that the theory of items render everything nonexistent. There are criteria for existence, which are often JB, chapter 9). Every thing nominaLists normaLLy take to satisfied (cf. exist satisfies the to be justified; it cannot (with any pretension to satisfactoriness) just be cLaimed, in the fashion of so many phiLosophers. In any case, Lewis can be simuLated: whatever ind iv idua Ls exist criteria. Beyond that existence has in Lewis worLds wiLL exist in worids-seLection theory. Rnd it is. a genuine phiLosophicaL probLem how anything exists. g in 19t+6; see his cosmoLogicaL text. Llhitrow aLso appLied, more than RpparentLy a quarter of a century ago, PrincipLe , in his what has now been eLevated to the Rnthropic answer to why the dimensions of space are three; nameLy, th3t this atone permits the evoLution of Nan, the formuiator of the probLem'. However 'Uhitrow's reasons concern not mankind but stabLe pLanetary orbits and compLex neurai networks' (LI, p.!^). g Compare the binding energy which keeps etectrons bound to a nucLeus, where correiativeiy energy stored up in overcoming forces of repuLsion is positive. -33- �e a story couLd be totd to bring Laws within the expLanation framework. However It wouid teLLing invoLve Laws first evoLved or happened to hoLd, the how before vacuum fLuctuations. (For some interesting specuLation, from which the ontic and anthropic commitment can be removed without totaL Loss, see Barrow pp. 151-2, where "chaotic gauge theory" is considered.) The issue of uLtimate is expLanation again up taken seLf-justifying postulate as serving refLexive, expLanation. Note that in UQ, to the resoLve the matter the especiaLLy of probLem uLtimate, PostuLate Characterisation a of of object-theory is an initiaLLy promising candidate for such a principte. issue is that, on the story as toLd, quantum phenomena assume Another serious decidedLy they course Of macro-dimensions. may, Schrodinger s cat iLLustrates, but perhaps not in the parabLe the as supposed of catastrophic form. In the absence of any approved quantization of general, reLativity, there onLy are Lax physicaL controis on what is in and what is out in specuLation here. Rnd, of course, the second story couid There are other mechanisms for the sudden be rise in eLaborsted other ways. e.g. white mass-energy, of ho Les in geometrodynamics. In his second paper, Tryon makes a rather casuaL beginning on meeting some of difficuLties the with the vacuum fLuctuation theory the cosmos, and of expLains the advantages of combining the theory with that of a (stiLL probLematic) "infLationary" universe, to boost the fLuctuation. But the theory stiLL awaits aporopriateLy detaiLed deveiopment and modeLLing. 12 There are various other issues concerning the physicaL constants, incLuding the question of the (sLow) evoLution of "constants" over time. LJeLL, do evoLve, the they if same sort of probLems arise for the parameters which repLace them (L.e. at each time t, for c(t)). There are putative arguments to the effect that there can be no very grand unified theory, and no finaL eLimination of constants, because any such theory wouid do too much in determ in ing the worLd (and things). But it is unctear at present how such an argument gets duty eLaborated. R tight argument uneLiminabiLity of some physicaL constants from physicaL principLes for the wouLd be of much interest. 13 Th',s is what is reaLLy accompLLshed in Carter. To some extent we have emerging in this area a contemporary scientific numeroLogy. 1L Convergence arguments, e.g. for such things as the Church-Turing thesis, underLying connections, but not co-operation. l^Even Less, seemingLy, is the universe an accident, 'an event proceeding from an unknown cause; something unexpected; a casuaLty, a mishap, l&If however the worLd reaLLy were necessary, such improbabiLity must be grossLy -34- �reduced. How can that be: how can these contingencies be not what theg seem? 1? How M3ng worLds? ContinuousLg mang worLds? There is no reason whg not. But the answer is: as mang at Least as required. In object-theorg numbers don t short matter though much, so difficuLties technccaL controL Ls advantage. an are There as to measures, e.g. of fewness, in infinite modeLLings. Yet the notions are Ln order, e.g. among the naturaL numbers primes are few. 18 point, ThL^, and the inestimabLLitg specific of probabLLLties Ln (e.g. Ls argued, though in insufficient detaiL, bg TouLmLn among others meteoroLogg) Bg the wag, sureLg a creator wouLd have increased probabLLitLes bg seeing to a unLverse for fit decent habitation; a variation upon the argument from evLL infiltrates itseLf Ln probabiLitg guise here. 13 worked There are in fact mang proposed soLutions, most of them not theg (because far verg out have onLg few proponents), most of them not comprehensive certainLg (but it couLd be argued that this is a faLse ideaL), severaL of them discussed bg Everett, DeMLtt, Lande and others. 20 MheeLer s sequentiaL modeL another, so satisfgLng the theorg (Like certain offers a simitar range of worLds, but one after 'reaLLtg principLe". EarLLer MheeLer had adopted cosmoLogies) Eastern with in muLtLpLLcitg a both sequent La LLg and Lnto the possibLe; but recent Lg he has abandoned dimen^Lon^,, the Latter, partig on erroneous ontoLogLcaL grounds. 21 It Ls of course not the onLg reaLLstLc-stgie LnterpretatLon whLch does thLs: envisage everu Lande s LnterpretatLon is another. 22 From a neutraL viewpoint, Lt ts entLreLg taLse that atom ... as Me must constantLg engaging in this tgpe of scattering sctLvitg, therebg spLLtting the worLd again and again Lnto a stupendous number carbon-copLes of of LtseLf. The unLverse must therefore be LLkened to a tree, whLch branches 3nd (D p.I25). Nor Ls rebranches universe. 23 To anticipate, schemas of what the form, happens "if the tree-structured sgstern of universes the is as foLLows:- The antecedents of "anthropic" there exist so and so [e.g. observers] then ang phgsLcaL worLds must be such and such", are appLLed to phgsLcaL worLds. Rs there certainLg do exist so and so, narrow ctass the phgsLcaL worLds of are restricted to those that are such and such. gL It cs stLLL reasonabLe to 3sk whg - indeed to e.g. whg do we inhabit it?, whence a Long pose' severaL whg questions, evoLutionarg storg. Mhg are the constants those theg are?, then aLternative answers, LncLudLng brute fact, are among the possibiLities. -35- �roundLg defeated Shapiro. 26 bg the sorts considerations advanced bg Feinberg and of Davies aLso suggests that mang-worLds theorg can provide a pLausibLe phgsicaL (as opposed to phiLosophicaL) justification for the strong principte (D p.122 middLe). In fact he never reaLLg shows this satisfactoriig (nor can it be so shown), and in pointing to the power of the m3ng—universe theorg he undermines the strong principte, showing it otiose. 2? arguments are presented in modat form, with the connecting quo status Often scheme set in either necessitated form, if F that) (e.g. T if exist there necessaritg then (it if possibLe modaLities are de dicto and and that invoLved cLaims the It such). if F then T. The modaLitg invoLved is not one of LogicaL contingent nomic of that strength, but can be adequateLg NecessariLg, necessitg, an The error. argument guarantee the concLusion, NecessariLg T, nor does it pretend form these or even in Lowest common denominator form. To attach the (reLative) modaLitg simpig to consequent T wouLd be second is 'it is more than mereLg rather reads that seems represented, as usuaL, through a necessitated connecting schema, one F form, (e.g. what is the case LocaLLg (what observers observe, T etc.) is onLg possibLe if phgsics is such aLwags be and so, then the universe must have, or so conform to, such and such features), or, in quasi-transcendentaL onLg must to do does not so. The is a LittLe more probLematic; but it appears to assert that F is inconsistent with not-T, and so, through obvious connections, the same as the rectified first form. 28 Mhat we have are devices, that fragments of theories, ruLes thumb, of appear to work in a range of cases. and caLcuLating It is these parts that mag generate successfuL technoiogg. The picture is Like engineering. 29 R main charge made bg LesLie against mang-worid cosmoLogies, e.g. LI, p.l^Sff. It is a surprising turn, given the popuLaritg of hgpothetico-deductive methodoLogg, to have it aLso objected that mang-worLd theorg voids induction. Putting chance in controL of inter-worLd differences erodes confidence in our sampLe of ReaLitg, on which our inductions are based' (LI, p.1^.3). this objection gets off the ground (it is transparentLg Insofar cLear as that it does), it depends on assuming the reaLitg of the entire worLd ensembLe. So Lt not Lapses against a neutraL theorg. 30 R reLated phitosophicaLLg important exampLe where the schema does so far is in Moore s proof of an externaL worLd, noted above. The reason is that the existence of arbitrarg materiaL objects, such as hands or does f3it not guarantee that the requirements (order, isoLated unitg, cabbages, coherence, mcnd-cndependence, etc.) for an externaL worLd are satisfied. 31 Rn earLier version of this paper was presented at the RustraLasian Rssociation of PhiLosophg Conference, Rugust 138^. The -36- heLpfuL comments bg David �Rrmstrong, Brian Ellis and David Lewis, unreferenced above, were the discussion. commentaries; Both several made during John Leslie and Jack Smart supplied me with worthwhile their points have been incorporated, but some have of been resisted. The initial Univerity preprint series. version W3S published in an Rustralian National 32^ See Freeman, p.IS. for fuller discussion of need for reparation, see Burnet. Rnaximander's on position; the REFERENCES J.D. Barrow, Rnthropic definitions', Quarterly Journal of Royal the Rstroncmical Society 21^ ( 1983) lt+6-153 H. Bondi, Cosmology, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, I960. R, Brout, F. Englert and F. Gunzig, The creation of the universe as a quantum phenomenon' RnnaIs of Physics 115 (1978) 78-106. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, Fourth edition, Rdam & Charles Black, London, 1930. B. Carter, Large number coincidence and the anthropcc principle is in Longair, 291-98. B. Carter, The anthropic principle and its implications cosmology', biological for evolution , Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London (1983) St* 7-363. C.B. Collins and S.U. Hawk eng, Uhy is the universe isotrophic?', 19310 Rstrophqsics Journal 180 (1973) 317. C.D. Darlington, Darwin's Place in History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1959. P. Davies, The Rccidental Universe, Cambridge Universitu Press, Cambridge, 1982; referred to as D. P. Davies, God and the New Physics, Dent, London,1983; B.S. DeUitt referred to as G. and N. Graham, The Many-Uorlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1973. R.H. Dicke and P.J.E. Peebles, in S.U. Hawking and U. The big bang cosmology - enigmas and nostrums , Israel, eds, Genera 1 relativity: an Einstein centenary survey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 501^-517. -37- �G.F.R. ELLis, 'is the universe expanding?', GeneraL Reiativitg and Gravitation 9(2) (L973) 87-9L. G. Feinberg and R. Shapiro, Life Beyond Earth, Morrow, New York, 1980. P. Feyerabend, Science Ln a Free Society, New Left Books, London, 1978. 'RnthropLc answers and the existence of P. Forrest, Proceedings God', of the Russet Lan Society, University of Sydney, 7 (1982) 1-13. K. Freeman, RncLLLa to the Pre-Socratic Phitosophers, BLackweLL, Oxford, 1971. N. Griffin and R. SyLvan, Provisionai Rnswers to ULtimate Questions, typescript, Canberra, 1981}.; referred to as UQ. S. Hawking and G.F. ELiis, The Large-Scaie Structure of Space-time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, (trans. R. Mannheim), YaLe University Press, New Haven, 1959. C.G. HempeL, Rspects of Scientific Exp LanatLon, Free Press, New York, 1965. Lande, The Laws behLnd the quantum Laws , BrLtLsh JournaL for the PhiLosophu of Science 27 (1976) 27-^3. J. L^sLLe, RnthropLc prLncLpLe, worLd ensembLe, desLgn , RmerLcan PhLLosophLcaL QuarterLy, 19 (1982) l^l-lSl; referred to as LI. J. LesLLe, Cosmo Logy, probabLLity and the need to exp La Ln LLfe', Ln ScLentLfLc ExpLanatLon and UnderstandLng (ed. N. Rescher), UnLversLty Press of RmerLea, MaryLand, M.S. LongaLr 1983, 53-82; referred to as L2. (ed.), Confrontat Lon of Cosmo Log LeaL Theories wLth ObsservatLonaL Data, ReLdeL, Dordrecht, 1971}.. C.U. MLsner, K.S. Thorne and J.R. UheeLer, GravLtatLon, Freeman, San 1973. G.E. Moore, PhLLosophLcaL Papers, RLLen and UnwLn, London, FrancLsco, 1959. R. RobLnson, Essays Ln Greek PhLLosophg, CLarendon Press, Oxford, 1969. R. RoutLey, ExpLorLng MeLnong's JungLe and Beyond, Research SchooL ScLences, RustraLLan NatLonaL UnLversity, 1980; referred to as JB. -38- of SociaL �Sagan Broca's Brain: Ref Leet ions on the Romance of Science, New York, Random House, 1973. S.Tou Lm in, The Return to CosmoLogy: Postmodern Nature, University of CaLifornia Press, BerkeLey Ca., 1982. Is the universe a vacuum fLuctuation?', Nature 2^6 (1973) 396-7 E.P. Tryon, E.P. Tryon, Science and the Theo Logy of *Mhat made the worLd?', New Scientist 101 (198!+) It+00, 1!+-16 FLN. Mhitehead, Process and ReaLity, Cambridge University Press, 1929. 6.H. Uhitrow, The Structure and Evo Lution of the Universe, Harper, New York, 1959. Second edition, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document RBSTRRCT The proposed syntheses Ls set Mithin generat object-theorg. tde3 The undertging the sgnthesis ts that the 3tternative Mortds sewantics - arrived 3t tn of pursuit of a tnctudtng senanttes universat ones) retevant and, semantics generat (a as connectedLg, part for of att a Languages, comprehensive object-theorg - be apptted atso tn fundamentat phgstcs, Most importanttg to the natter of the ortgtn, htstorg, 3nd phgstcat features of the cosmos, but as Mett, agatn connectedtg, theorg. etseMhere, Ln particutar Ln the LnterpretatLon of quantum a The unLversat semantics Ls a mang Mortds - theorg. The poLnt of such apptgLng an mang nonexistent Mortds - LnterpretatLon Ln cosmotogg atso Ls exptained bg Mag of examp Les, concernLng the understandLng of the contLngencg of exLstence and of present arrangements. improbabititg the R resotutton of the basLc question, sketched, a as Marm-up exerctse 'Nhg does angthLng at for exLst?' att questions as to Mhg various other the prominent features of the universe are as theg are, notabtg Mhg the constants of phgstcs appear to have. have the fundamentat parttcutar surprtstngtg senstttve vatues theg Chauvinistic ansMers through anthroptc prLnctptes are crLttcattg Ln favour of resotutLon bg Mag of Mortd sgntactLcattg, status quo arguments, MhLch use setection^ and gross rejected, correspondLng features geophgsLcat thLs and neLghbourLng unLverses to exp La Ln the surprLsLng vatues of The character of the Mortd—sgnthests resotutton - reaLLg a resotutton Ls ts of constants. frameMork fLLLed out Ln the course of countering a Mide SMeep of objections, and of exp La LnLng Mhg the resotutton frameMork invotving seLeet ion satisfactorg of the main tgpes LLLustrated in the four-fotd: is the most IMPROVED CO3MO-LOCICRL 3YMTHE3I3 TOWRRD RH There Logicai is a foundations tradition persistent - impiging simpLe and get undiscovered - for the whoLe of cosmoLogg. The as tradition, which peaked in modern rationaiism, continues strong in cosmoLogicai specuLation. unassaiiabLe Thus, contemporarg for exampLe, recent rationaiistic theories of the universe, ambitiousLg aimed at mathematico-iogicai expression and capture of nature. Thus, of MheeLer: for exampLe, the bottom Line to the mang theoreticaL enterprises LittLe astonishment shouLd there be, therefore, if the description of nature carries one in the end to Logic, the ethereat egrie at the center of mathematics. If, as one beiieves, aLL mathematics reduces to the mathematics of Logic, and aLL phgsics reduces to mathematics, what aLtemative is there but for aLL phgsics to reduce to the mathematics of Log ic ? Logic is the ontg branch of mathematics that can think about itse Lf'. Logic reassumes its ancient roLe 3S the fundamentaL science; the Mord expresses a LogicaL recipe. Even white abandoning some of the it Lus ions of grand reduct ion istic schemes, and undermining the EnLightenment power guest for the LogicaL the theoreticaL capture and can The sgnthesis outiined in setting. contribute what foLLows LiberaLised bg are semantics and to the organisation of a unified fits into this more modest It is achieved bg suitabig reLocating cosmoLogg as a part of semantics (generousig construed, for exampie, to admit contextuaL eLements). then, to controt of the universe, there is much of a more modest character that recent LogicaL theorg, as nonstandard sgstematisation, worid picture. kegs universaL So unified, semantics, re Levant semantics and cosmoLogg, as suggested in a preLiminarg wag in diagram 1. RCTURL X L ORLD(S) GEOPHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE PHYSICRL SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE RELEVRHT SYSTEMS SUBSPRCE MORLD SPRCE Comment. The subspaces are Marked out by ctosure and other requirements, that of by cLosure of each worLd under deducibiLity (reLevant deriva— systems reLevant biLity), that of physicaL systems by cLosure aLso under physicaL Laws formuLated terMS Ln (suitabLy of condLtLonaLs) and perhaps factuaL constraints as weLL. actuaL (or better t3ctuai) worLd Ls a seLect coMMon worLd the to nested spaces. The underLytng Lde3 of the synthesis is siMpiy this: a subspace of is aLso a suitabLe framework for cosmoLogy, for an interpret— semantics worids neutrai *3 L Lon of the Log iceL theory of the universe as a whoLe. In Less condensed form, the ide3 is that the aLternative worids semantics arrived at in the pursuit of a semantics universaL part connectedLy, as semantics comprehensive (a theory the of aLL of for aLL be objects, Languages) and, aLso appLied physics - most importantiy to the matter of the origin, history and fundamentaL physicaL features of this cosmos, but 3S weLL eLsewhere, in interpretation theory. quantum of particuLar Ln That stripping. ontoLogicai of Load MorLd-ensembLe terms of nonexistent Mortds. Hot surprisingiy, in the recasting the in theory j^s for is, the theory can be recast in existentiaLLy neutraL terms, wcthout the originaL object ionabLe theory, the Rnd in the case of quantum theory there is aLready, most convenientiy, a many-universe or worLd-ensembLe theory, ready neutrai in (e.g. changed unobservabLe the spiitting worLd of the Everett other worids interpretation gives way to future— directed worLd branching). The setting in terms of do which objects not exist, especiaLLy, is essentiaL. For one reason, the idea grew out of investigation (with Griffin for the provisionaL but so far nonexistent book UQ) of what is normaLLy taken to be a phiLosophicaL question, indeed by some such as as the fundamentaL question of metaphysics, nameLy exist? . Reset in worLd terms this becomes a question worLd such Mhy does anything at aLL of seiection the - a contains be to taken exist. For then the oLd circLe is simpiy reentered, expiaining existence in terms of more existents. Here the circLe is metaphysics: 3 much more tractabLe question. But the recasting Loses expLanatory merit shouLd aLL the worids invoived objectionabie of that we find ourseLves in which contains something existent (us as among other existent things) as opposed to an aLternative worLd, which nothing Heidegger cf. JB broken, as it is eLsewhere (particuLarLy in chapter 2), by expiaining what exists by way of what does not. It is the faiLure to duty aLLow for and -2- acknowLedge this pattern of expLsnatLons, though Lt represents coMMon practLce Ln the theoretLcaL sciences, that has wade Lssues LLke the Lntractab Le. In fact quest Lons Lihg Hetdeggerean the concernLng does angthLng quest Lon onLg Ls exLst? question LLke Lt so ftrst of a LattLce of the the character and nature of the cosMos Ln whLch Me happen to be, that are LLabLe to be asked , questLons ascendLng to (Just) seen Ls? ; questLons Uhg Ls thLs cosMos Mhtch MorLd ModeLLLngs wag fruLtfuLLg be to appLLed, as an Lwportant fLrst step Ln eLLcLtLng sone ansMers. (Bounded) LattLce of questLons. DIRGRRM 2. 7 Uhg does Mhg does angthLng evergthLng at aLL exLst? exLst as Lt Uhg do 7 Hhg do eLectrons Lihg does Lnte L L Lgent ex Lst? (Ln LLf e LLfe forns the nunbers exLst? (Ln the ex Lst? theg do?) forM Lt does?) In the reorLentatLon of MorLds senantLcs fron Languages to cosnoLog Les, f row Language to the MorLd, there are certaLn features that shouLd be kept fLrriLg Ln vLeM - apart fron such notorLous features as that anong the MorLds of the node L L Lngs are a range of bLzarre, absurd, LncoMpLete and MaverLck MorLds, and that each (nonexLstent) MorLd has a LncLudes donaLn of objects though Lt a subdoMatn (perhaps nuLL) of ent Lt Les, tgpLcaLLg contaLns nonexLstent objects, both posstbLe and not, phgsLcaLLg reaLLsabLe and the MhLch, feature of not. In partLcuLar, MorLd seLectLon shouLd not be Lost sLght of. For Lnstance, Ln assessing truth, a factuaL MorLd T Ls seLected - Ln one Mag or' another, but tgpLcaLLg bg a choLce functLon on a cLrcunscrLbed evaLuatLons are Morked out (recursLveLg) at I. cLass NaturaLLg and ho LdLng the assessnent of truth MLLL generaLLg Lead begond MorLd T LtseLf. For (reLevant) <deducLbLLLtg a subsgstew of dertvatLonaLLg cLosed MorLds Ls defLned; for poss Lb L L Ltg a subsgsteM coMprLsLng consLstent MorLds Ls Marked out; for naturaL LaMLLkeness a subsgsteM of phgsLcaL MorLds Ls dLstLnguLshed^; and so on for other cases of subsgstew and group seLectLon. $I- The Mang MorLds approach to the "Uhg does angthLng at aLL exLst?" quest Lon. -3- There ere Many canvassed answers to thts questton, and stLLL More Mays of trytng to dtsMtss Lt. RLL dtsposat the atteMpts are defective, 3nd Most of the canvassed answers are unsattsfytng (so Grtfftn and I devote a good deat of space tn UQ to showtng). One approach that ts not inadequate — but perMtts however devetopMent tn severat dtfferent dtrecttons - ts the Many wortds approach. It ts true (and argued eLsewhere, e.g. JB) that R) SoMe thtngs extst. Thts truth enjoys a Modat status, that of conttngency tn fact. weaker ctatM sufftees, naMety But, to begtn, a C) It ts conttngentty true that sone thtngs extst. For the extstence that Most thtngs enjoy or regret ts conttngent. The obvious truth of the More controverstat ctatM that nothtng necessartty Left open for the present. extsts, can be NeutraL wortds ModeLLtng of theMe C) yteLds dtreetty a Many wortds picture, wtth soMe wortds, tnctudtng the actuat wortd T, contatntng extstents, and wtth soMe posstbte wortds contatntng no extstents (but perhaps soMe nonextstents). Likened to a dtsp Lay of baLLoons: DIRGRRH 3. Static pteture of a 0 : 0 : 0 Object doMatns contatn 0 ____ _________ extstents 0 0 : 0 0 worLds ModeLLtng for theMe 0). 0 : 0 0 It can be 0 00 DoMatns contatn no 0 extstents posstbte worLds Such a neutraL nodeLLLng begs no sertous onto Log teat questions, invotves no ontoLogtcaL prodtgaLLty. For tt ts not assuMed that any of these Ln worLds extst, any way. (It ts not dtfftcuLt to represent what does not extst.) Nor need Lt prejudtee Matters unduty agatnst necesstty theMes such even were Lt Lf Lnterpretatton MistakenLy Lnststed, as as agatnst God-hypotheses. the For stratghtforward of C), whtch aLLows Lt ts necessartty true (under soMe necesstty deterMtnabLe) that soMe thtngs extst, a retated Many worLds pteture woutd resuLt; the dashed LLne woutd stMpty Move down the diagraM). But Let us st Lek wtth what ts rtght, C. It ts More reveattng to take theMe C) as tensed - after aLL extstence ts existence now (JB chapter 2) - and to tntroduce, what further Lnvesttgatton wLLL require, dynaMtcat ModeLLLngs. Then, wtth soMe evtdent eMbrotdery, the foLLowtng sort of pteture eMerges: -4- Dgnantc ptcture untverses. DIRGRRfl t*. MorLds of nodeLLLng of thene C), ML th sanpLe t 3 EXI5TEHTS (FULL CONSERVRTION) RLse and faLL of HD ] A Lt SOMET IME EXISTENTS^ R NULL LJORLD f* ExternaL ttne scats (tsLgnLfLes the Locat present) Consents. r-bjch Ls presupposed Ln the wag the pLcture Ls draMn (e.g. that sone Measure of exLstents C3n be obtained, bg Mag of partLcLe nunbers)^ but these presupposLtLons can be nodLfLed or renoved. The such as sane sort nodeLLLng serves aLso to vaLLdate thenes LLnked to C), of D) There mag have been a tLne Mhen nothLng exLsted. ConsLder seLectLon, noM (or done Ln terns of of the cructat wetter of T-seLectLon, L.e. factuat Mortd 6-seLectLon, L.e. referentLaL sub-Mortd seLectLon). ThLs Ls certaLn features these Mortds have, such as contaLnLng entttLes, LncLudLng observers, exhLbLtLng LLfe, nanLfestLng LnteLLLgence or wLnd - to antLcLpate features conLng up and sonetLnes proposed for MorLd seLectLon. Such seLectLon pLcks out thts MorLd fron the ensenbLe of MorLds (our Mortd aLso, as Lt happens). Rnd the Mortd thus seLected LncLudes exLstents. Mhg does angthLng at aLL exLst? Because thts MorLd, T, LncLudes, happens to LncLude, extstent objects. To thts extent Lt Ls -5- a natter of fortune - qood it night be hazarded, since the worLd exhibits enough that is good 3nd fortune, enough potentiaL for good. Rs a contingent Matter, this worLd contains (in its object donain) '.tens that exist. So T-setection deLivers a worLd n3king it true objectiveLg that sone things exist.^ The answer Mag seeM trite; that but is in Measure Large because the and answer are taken in isoLation, apart froM issues as to the detaiLs question of the process, the how questions, such as H) How does it happen that soMething exists? The issue can be considered in uLtinateLg exists is question terns this of of nass-energg, since evergthing that kind (so it is argued in JB chapter 9). To the H ) How does it happen that sone Mass-energg exists? tMo sorts of answer are possibte. FirstLg, there is the conservative answer: sone atwags existed. There is an end Less ongoing sea of Mass-energg, which sinpLg fLuctuates, Moves, recgcLes, etc. There are pLentg of probLens with this answer; for instance, phgsicaL prob Lens, such as how did the Big Bang of standard cosMOLogg occur, what was happening before it? But there are aLternative MatheMaticai stories now being toLd, for instance, of a Massive singuLaritg Located in space (rather than at phgsic3t tine t = 0 as with the Big Bang), which trg to offer a phgsicaL account of a continuous universe (see e.g. G. ELLis). Rnd the singuLaritg stories offered can be enriched (aiong Lines rather Like what wiLL be ventured in the case of the second answer). RLnost aLL traditionaL phiiosophicai and theoLogicat accounts, aLL v^rtuaLLg honage paging to ontoLogicaL assunptions, shouLd be inciuded aMong the conservative, existence-aiwags answers. But the nonnateriaLLst accounts anong these characteristicaLLg invoLve LeveL shifts^^Thei is back to the existence of God or the (uLtinate) One, who, on a higher LeveL, serves as eternaL sustainer, and perhaps fashioner, of the MateriaL universe. The conceptual and other probtens of such answers are sufficientLg notorious. SecondLg, there is stage nothcng existed. The energg. the Rt More appeaiing and siMpLe radicaL answer: at sone that difficuLtg before tiMe, the that anccent Long-received probLeM orthodox of how prejudice, sonething that nchLi fct, is invariabLg reinforced bg again Bang, there was no for this picture is how Mass-energg ever appeared froM the MacroscopicaLLg tranquiL sea of nothingness. past Big can It is no great feat to get coMe froM nothing. The froM nothing nothing cones, ex nihiLo Mistaken ontoLogicaL assunptions (see JB chapter 2). Yet even when these ontoLogicaL assunptions are set aside, there is the awkward natter of C3usai nechanisn. But an unLikeig storg can be toLd, a ngth retated, expLaining how sonething -6- a may (suddenly) emerge from nothing, jet of mass-energy the from sea of nothingness. The story borrows from the quantum theory of the vacuum (or rather, ot suitabie vacuums). There is suddeniy an avaianche of energy borrowing , 3nd mass creation of particies in a concentrated area.& This is the beginning of the Big Bang (at internaL time zero). It is unigue (in experience) because such a singuiarity is very improbabte. (Even a SmaLL Bang wouid be rather improbabie.) The net energy "borrowed" is borrowed on a very Long term (at high interest?), with a gradu3i repLayment pLan. This ties concerning the run-down eventuaL eventuaLLy (though perhaps over this of very a with principLes universe. protracted of thermodynamics, On this story, it wiLL time) subside back into From nothing everything existent originaLLy came; into nothingness everything existent wiLL uitimateLy process. nothingness. It is one thing to such devise 3 story, or rather the (or outLine scaffoLding) of a story; it is another to condense it into science. before But scorn is poured on such a story, Let it be noted that the story is Less bizarre, more and informative, than other extant phiiosophicaL stories. For exampLe, it appears more piausibie than the ideaList story of the construction of the physicaL worid from idea, or than the set-theoreticaL myth of the construction of the entire universe from the nuLL set - undoubtedLy a it as earLy encompasses existent individuaLs, construction, insofar of something existent from nothing, not since, despite orthodox cLaims to the contrary, the nuLL set certainty does exist (JB 9.9). There are reasons for much preferring the second styLe of story to the first - though it may appear to some to viotate conservation principLes such that mass-energy: of as in fact it need not. One is that the end Less mass-energy story faits to account for the presence of mass-energy. By contrast, nothingness does not reguire expLanation: it is, so to speak, the rest position. In terms of the range of possibiiities here, existence is what is unusuaL, what is atypicaL, what especiaLLy caLLs for expLanation, not nonexistence.? Hence the expLanatory superiority of the radicaL answer. Rs one might expect in varying such an obvious and ancient story, and as is easity discovered, scientific condensation and assessment has begun, especiaLLy in the Last decade. The idea that the totaL energy of the universe is zero was considered a human generation ago by Mhitrow&, refLecting on Flach s phiLosophy of motion. More recentLy, Tryon has argued the zero totaL energy theme, assuming a cLcsed universe and appeaLing the standard treatment of gravitationai to If the universe contains just enough potentiaL energy as negative energy. mass to cLose it, then the negative energy must more or Less exactLy canceL the energy (mc^) invoLved in the existence of that mass. Hence, the argument runs, even a a cosmos as impressiveLy Large and ancient as this universe couLd exist as deveLopment quantum vacuum through in borrowing fLuctuation on a a zero-energy vacuum, that is, through grand scaLe in a reiativistic setting. Such vacuum fLuctuations can occur by dispensation of the AE.At --h; when the mass-energy AE of a physicaL object -7- uncertainty principLe approaches zero, its LLfe,tLMe At can becoMe verg targe. OnLg the Merest begLnnLng on reMOvtng certaLn object Lons and to wore scLenttfLc storg MtLL be atteMpted. FLrstLg, there are, LnevLtabLg a such obstacLes Lt seews, onto Log LeaL and verLfteat Lontst object Lons. Hang of these turn hoMever on assuMtng that a vacuuM and ewptg space Must soMehoM exLst, at Least bg Mag of sort of exLstLng contaLner or structure. Such assuMpttons are wtstaken: no (pre-) exLstence need be assuwed. Such objects 3s vacuuws and unoccupLed space sone nonexLstent are and dLstLnctLve Mtth objects assessLbLe MatheMatLcaLLg propertLes. Though theg nag not be access LbLe to observatton, and Ln thLs narroM respect are outsLde the range of experLence, then concernLng tnvesttgattons exactLng for there to LnfornatLon Ls suffLcLent be Made of theLr features. SLnLLar potnts teLL agaLnst the objection that Lt Ls Mrong to Lwpose an externat spatLaL or tewporaL Measure on (Mass-energg) cLosed space-tLMe; for exawpLe, Mhat happened before the BLg Bang, or to ewbed the curved space-ttMe of LnquLre the unLverse Ln a Larger spatLaL or tenporaL settLng. Rs a Matter of fact, cosMOLogLsts wang exh Lb Lt no unease Ln ashLng Mhat happened before the BLg Bang even Mhen assuwLng no Matter before that, though verLftcattonLsM MouLd no doubt such to ruLe guesttons out as weanLngLess or otherMtse out of order. More to the potnt, bounded Metrtcs can atMags be extended (HubbLe ttMe Ls just wtstahe though fruLtfuLLg, soMettnes bounds vertfLcatLontst one are exaMpte), exceeded. and Rnother has been to assuwe that NothLng, stnee nonexLstent, Ls entLreLg Mtthout structure or organLsatton and ungoverned. Indeed tMo dtaMetrtcaLLg opposed poLar v,eMS of Lt have prevented, and even been run together: of NothLng chaottc, as and so excessLveLg rtch, and of Nothing as entLreLg bLank, and so excessLveLg tMpovertshed. Both are Lnadequate. R More tnteresttng ontoLogtcaL objeetton (ratsed bg Rrwstrong) Ls that such an account of the ortgtn of the unLverse takes granted for exLstence the naturaL LaMS, and so does not expLaLn hoM sowethLng ex Latent cane frow objecttons Such confuse truth neo-PLaton Law. LaMS hoLd, but do not vteMs, Mhere LaMS Mtth exLstence, exLst - bg after contrast Mtth nothLng. fashLon the of of neo-PLatonLc reLatLons of unLversaLs, MhLch exLst. On object-theorg are (such as that of JB), hoMever, unLversaLs do not exLst, and so LaMS are not thus extstentLaLLg Loaded. Once truth Ls duLg separated frow exLstence, there Ls of course the further questton of Mhg the LaMS that hoLd or evoLve do hoLd. But thts Ls a separate, and vextng, questton of uLttMate expLanatton.^ SecondLg, are there More technLcaL adwLttedLg shakg phgstcaL account; for quantuM nuwbers of objeettons, instance, that dtrected But Lt the Mtth the the vacuuw MtLL constst equaLLg of Matter and antt-Matter, and qutckLg vantsh agatn, Mhereas features of the unLverse perstst tMbaLance. agaLnst fLuctuattons and suggest noM seeMs that a verg sLLght (and, so Lt Ls satd, deLLcate) tMbaLance earLg Ln the evoLutton of the unLverse after the BLg Bang Ls just Mhat Ls required for present perMLtted features of the unLverse; and such an LMbaLance, on recent (GUT) theorLes, catastrophtc fLuctuatton hardLg excLudes. R thLrd connected obstacLe used to be sertous: Lt -8- has been presupposed that a state can be assigned to the whoLe universe.^ But that is now aLright; quantuM according for neutraL to of) (adaptation the Everett Many-universe interpretation of quantuM theory, a state function i covers the behaviour of the P worLds phgsicaL I (with P c K), which presuMabig evoLve according to a e reLativised Schrodinger equation of the fom SE(T). To soMe expLain of the recent appeaL of this sort of wortd-ensewbLe interpretation, it is worth turning to the interesting and curious business of the phgsicaL constants. The §2. of constants of phgsics and sone of their neat interreLations. natter The interesting cLaiM is that the setting or adjustMent of certain constants surprisingLg deLicate, and if the constants (and soMe of their constant that ratios) were different bg ontg sMaLL Margins, then the actuaL universe woutd very is be with the resuLt, aMong Mang other things, that we shoutdn't be different, here to observe ang of its LocaL passing show. Now the possibiLity of exp Lanation of the specific vaLues of these the in terMS of phgsicaL theory itseLf is not so far exciuded. Perhaps no constants constants in physics are uLtiMateLy fundaMentai, Various ways eiiMinating of constants though seeMS that unLikeLy. are now faMitiar, e.g. soMe represent new scaie factors and are eiiMinated by re-scaLing or choice of coordinates. Others are reMoved by More radicaL ways of reLooking at things, as in Einstein s treatMent of gravitation. But sone resist eiiMination - so far. in For, phgsicaL any theory, what case, fundaMentai is depends and soMe previousLg fundaMentat constants (such as Rvogadro s nuMber) have turned out to be derivative as theory constants on the given shape of advanced new and (deeper) were introduced. There is the reMote possibiLity, obviousLy cherished that bg soMe scientists, that in the end aLL phgsicaL constants can be reMoved, a constant-free (very grand unified) theorg in which aLL constants can be reMoved wiLL resuLt. This is not obviousLg iMpossibLe in the wag that a coMpLete eiiMination of LogicaL constants froM Log teat theorg is, that a finat triuMphant reMovat of the Scheffer stroke froM cLassicaL propositionaL Logic is iMpossibLe. However, it is too Much to expect that a "deep MatheM3tic3i anaLgsis" aLways do the job. For one thing, exp Lanations of this sort do give is an arguMent for this out. can There froM the backward proceeding character of deductive expLanations to More generaL preMisses (appLging the content-incLusion character of deduction proper). There are no MatheMaticaL anaigses without assuMptions, without a systeM of postutates. The hope (expressed by MatheMaticat Carter and others), that generaLLy deeper underlying theories can be found, wiLL not 3iwags be fuLfiLLed, of necessity. Since transforMations, such as seating, aLter or reMove constants, can transfer the Big Bang back to Minus-infinity, and so on, there is no soLid to expLain, underLying the ELLis, for one, aLLegedLy probLeMatic nuMericaL features (so data B. contends). UhiLe it is true that which constants feature, and what their vaLues are, wiLL depend on initiaL choice of units, whatever that at Least some of the constants wiLL emerge. Thus there wiLL be features choice, and vatues which require expianation, and exptanation of the however transforming the done. is For S3me broad tgpe, the present, 3nd immediate future at Least, there is no getting rid of the constants, and white theg to continue figure their numericaL vatues and ratios set some trickg prob Lems. There is the probtem, first of aLL, of describing the reLevant phgsicat data neutraL non—prejudiciaL fashion. The facts of the matter are more or Less a Ln as foLLows:- Present phgsicat theories incLude mang (phgsicaL) constants, which occur in the formutation of Laws and principtes. R number of these constants are fundamentsL, in that theg are not derived from other constants (or deduced from deeper phgsicat theorg). Two things have been noticed concerning fundamentat constants of present phgsicat theorg, both of which caLL for expLanation:If 1) the of certain constants Lag outside a rather narrow band (sur­ vatues rounding their perhaps universe wouLd be ascertained vatue), gross features of the geophgsicaL different. this - hopefuttg without CaLL prejudice, since its contra­ position represents the substantiat core of the anthropic poss ib Le principte - the sens i t iv i tg numer teat f eature. va Lues For record, the the geophgsicaL principte resuLting from contraposition takes the foLLowing form: certain gross features of the geophgsicaL universe are onLg possibie in present form if the numericaL vatues of certain constants Lie within a narrow sensitivitg band. Examptes of such gross features are isLand gataxies, Long-Lived stars, ptanets, recognised ittustrate, water, hgdrogen, heavg carbon, metats. RLL the forces, for instance, exhibit the sensitivitg features. To phgsicat the strong nuctear force were marginattg stronger, nuctei coutd if grow much begond the present Limits and att hgdrogen woutd Long have ago been converted to heLium, with the resutt that there wouLd be no Long-Lived stars (of present tgpe) and no water. On the other side, a decrease in the strong force wouLd prevent the formation of nucLei of heavg metaLs. R dozen further and more of simitar phgsics Literature. sensitivitg mag be assembLed from the re Levant easiLg 2) The Pgthagorean feature. Large numbers arrived at in ions famous turn of Eddington s out these to coincide Large reLation, exampLes astronomicaL computat­ (to within order of magnitudes). Perhaps the most number stating coincidences', the universe is the inverse square of the number as theg are mostLg caLLed, of gravitationaL other exampLes are assembLed in Bondi.) -10- particLes coupLing in the constant. is visibLe (Mang These two nunericaL features sensitivitg features co inc idences. are are (or can be) These nunericaL features are cited LaMs) conservation of inportanttg that in Large exptain to used nunber as evidence Justifging the introduction of various exotic theories (e.g. invoLving phgsicaL Most interconnected, departures exaMpies earLg Mhich froM accepted norMaLLg Mere the "verging G theories of Dirac and Jordan . So Mrites Carter, Mho appeais to soMe differentig exotic principies, anthropic principtes, Mithin features in order froM far opposite the phgsics Bang) thesis: (GeneraL cosMoLogg and Mhich couLd in principLe have been used to unsurprisingLg, the order of the dag in Mag and be great fun. It cosnoLogg. course Of that the is distiLLation specuLation is is Mith the conversion of this stuff to in received MisdoM, or even knoMLedge, that caveats shouLd be Mhen cLaiM froM evidentLg estabLished. But Large cLains on fLinsg foundations are, far fine, i.e. ReLativistic predict theM 3LL in advance of their observation' (p.291) - 3 Large is nuMericat evidence in favour of exotic theories these coincidences being shouLd rather be considered as confirMing "conventionat" Big the noM received cosMoiogicai setting. Mith the heLp of these the anthropic principies he canvasses, as he puts it, that expLain to prejudiciaL, in e.g. that entered, especiaLLg it points to favoured cone Lus ions such as priviLege or design (for huMans) in the universe. Much capitaL has aireadg been Made of the nuMericat features, of Mhat is referred to - gou C3n see the Loading straightaMag - as a cataLogue of extra­ ordinarg phgsicaL coincidence and apparentig accidentsL co-operation' (0 p.110). Here is a tgpicaL beat-up, bg Davies: The structure of the phgsicaL MorLd is deiicsteig dependent on a varietg of apparent nunericaL accidents. hang of the rather basic features of the universe are deternined in essence bg the vaLues that are assigned to the fundanentaL constants of nature, such as G, a, Mp and so on, and these features MouLd be drasticsLLg aLtered if the constants assuned even noderateig different vaLues. ... for nature to produce a cosnos even renoteLg resenbLing our own, Mang apparentLg unconnected branches of phgsics have to co-operate to a renarkabLe degree (D p.lll; sone of the prejudiciaL terninoLogg is under L ined). The part Last is particuiarig Meak: so our ignorance of interconnections is disclosed, ignorance Me Might have forestaLLed froM arguMent theorg integrated resist apparentLg fitting of unreLated phgsics: together. the topics' present if Carter serves is right. RLL the to reveaL is Lack of an theorg is bits and pieces, Mhich Nor do Large nunber coincidences point to ang hidden co-operation, but rather to over Looked connections Mhich can be argued toHards (as bg Dicke, Carter and others) using fairLg conventionaL phgsicaL equations.^ Rs for the hidden purpose terMinotogg, for nature to produce ...', MeLL, the Justificatorg case for its use is not Mereig not evident, but entireLg The sane appLies to other Lacking. terns Mhich Davies and others infiLtrate, such as -11- * 'conspire' (Dp.Ill), 'fine-tuned', deiicateiy baianced', 3ii of which suggests agents with certain purposes. Re Lated happening not objections te rm ino Logy, be some against Lodged accident , it accidentaL; be shouLd of the improbab Le coincidence , etc. R contingent worLd need is not accidentaL that Griffin Lives in Troy, Ontario, though it is contingent certainty. Rn improbabLe worLd need not be accidentaL either. RccidentaL means, according to the Concise EngLish Dictionary (CED), Occurring by chance, unexpectedLy, not according to the usuaL order of non-essentiaL'. The misp Laced for the actuaL worLd; and adventitious, th ings; generaL thrust of the notion is decidedLy accidentaL universe is a misdescription.^ To be sure, there is some considerabLe sLackness in terms Like accidentaL', wh Lch can come cLose aLso, when appLied as in schoLastic theory, to meaning contingent. The term vac i L La t ion, as its of condition dictionary coinciding; concurrence nicety coincidence' a definition remarkabLe iLLustrates makes instance the The pLain: of we L L-known act, fact or apparentLy fortu itous Large-number The coincidences are of the first type; there is LittLe case for making them out as of the second type. argue, To however, that the actuaL worLd is not mereLy contingent, but improbabLe, Lt is hardLy necessary to go so far afieLd as advanced physics. Some more homeiy exampies have managed ho Les wiLL do, such as the matter of aLL the Lucky goLfers who in one. consider Or foLLowing the from argument contingencies, to the improbabiLity of the actuaL worLd. Take some contingency, e.g. that person 1 in some ordering of the audience <^s wearing a green top. She might have been wearing any other cotour. Say there are 100 shades to choose from in the cLothing coLour cards. Then the probabiLity that she is in green is no more than 1 in 100. eut the same sort of probabiLity hoids for every other person on the earth presentLy wearing 3 top, and these probabiLities are LargeLy independent, say in I(US) bit Lion cases, i.e. 10^ cases. That is, the probabiLity of the present array of tops is no more than 1 in loH. That aLready makes present arrangements exceedingiy unLikeLy, before we go into the coLours of other bits of appareL peopie are customariLy bedecked in, the coLours towards 16 improbabLe. Lead of the NonetheLess, of motor cars and so on. So even surface contingencies books, cone Lus ion that the worLd actuaL is astronomicaLLu the situation with the fundamentaL constants does differ. Rn important difference between these day-to-day improbabilities, such as have the spouses we do, and those the constants induce is things these this:- Even that if aLL (coLours, e.g.) had been different, the worLd wouLd not be a very different pLace. Contrast the constants: their significant variation wouLd the we make worLd a very different pLace. Is there a difference in kind, with 3 radicaL improbabiLity appearing as regards the constants, degree? OnLy in degree, picture wiLL serve for the bridging range exampies of cases, or tend for -12- mereLy a difference in to suggest. The same broad everyday and cosmoLogicaL contingencg. §3- Back to mang worLds: improbabiLities and the universaL quantum theorg. Mhere that broad - Leads picture so sgnthesis sought the suggests, as does an increasing amount of cosmoLogicaL theorg - is to the mang-worLds of interpretation Quite evidentLg, worLds semantics are not the onLg semantics improbabiLitg. that can be offered for probabiLitg. few But other offer semantics simitar universaLLtg and informativeness, and some of the aLLeged competitors (not to be taken too serioustg as face damaging circuLaritg in this area, e.g. rivaLs) probabiListic semantics, urn semantics. The idea of the modeLLing naturaLLg It is improbabLe that gou have the spouse gou have , is true bg virtue of this: fact the is that in onLg a few worLds of the modeLLing, incLuding the actuaL one, do gou have gour current spouse; mostLg (insofar as gou occur) gou do not. In preciseLg the same improbabiLities, cosmic wag such particuLar as numericaL vaLues for phgsicaL constants, Lead to mang universe modeLLings. is argument to mang-universes from improbabiLities . The description of the the situation phgsicaL coincidence of probabiListic requires remarkabLe constants, notions, features', e.g. etc. extraordinarg semantics But probabiListic notions caLLs for aLternative worLds. (Thus Davies archerg Les Lie s and This goLf exampLe Of course Davies tends to see worLds used for exampLe). probabiLities as a conceptuaL device (D p.128); Everett invariabLg sees them That reaL. is, what we have emerging is repLag then do improbabiLities the as of universaLs issue! But universaLs do not exist, and nor do these expLanatorg worLds (cf. JB onLg of 8.8). Not Lead to a mang-nonexistent-worLds picture; converseLg the muLti-universe theorg expLains the improbabiLities. envisaged modeL contains ref Leet a huge coLLection of certain intervaL of accuracg); thus worLds the range of (naturaL) vaLues of the fundamentaL constants. RLL initiaL arrangements of matter and motion are refLected in worLds is The worLds. the chances of the present smaLL, exceedingig which expLains (at Least within universe a resuLting various improbabiLities. Does it than matter that we can t normaLLg quantifg these improbabiLities? Rng more we can quantifg the (Large) probabiLitg of nucLear war? No; there is something offensive about the repeated demand for quantification.^ Quantum theorg circumscribed affords situations, a the aLternative phgsicaL situations. actuaL worLd - is seLected, simiLar state mang worLds function is On measurement, one apparentLg at random picture. Least Rt for a superposition of severaL particuLar worLd - the (D p.12!*). This approach enab Les immediate resoLution of an important prob Lem in orthodox quantum theorg. R standing probLem with a compLete universe state function is that sgstem we must have some measuring apparatus that is sgstem. ... Mhen the not itseLf to measure a part of the sgstem is the entire universe, the notion of a piece of externaL measuring apparatus is meaningLess (D p.I2t+). So emerges the famiLiar conundrum for quantum theorg presented aLong orthodox (von Neumann) Lines: If there is nothing Left with which to measure [or otherwise interfere with] the -13- state the of how universe, universe the can transition from a the make superposition of many possibLe worids to one, concrete, actu3t wortd?' (D p.12^) is, There asserts, Davies interpretation many-universes one oniy - which comprehensive however a resoLution 'accept[s] simuitaneous the reaiity of aLL the possibte atternative universes' (D p.I2i+). But, given the route we have come, it is easy to ontccaLLy atternative neutrai this, to direct that see from there an is object-theory. atternative assumes many universes atso, but onty some at any stage are This actuat. It is obvious enough is that the probabilistic spread of quantum states does not require existent states, any more than the range of atternative dress states for someone probabty attired in requires green, the existence of the person in different ctothes. Measurement now shows which wortd/state an object such as etectron or person in. actuatty is an In these terms it does not cotLapse the probabiLity wave packet, or set of worLds, but marks one out. Lihat isn't known measurement is which worLd (or narrower set of worLds) is actuaL (or the before actuat etectron is in). quantum description, Uhen nothing the entire cosmos encompassed is the within Left to coLLapse the wave' (D p,12S). Rather is nothing in the way of externat measurements is avaiLabLe to determine which is the actuaL worLd; however internaL information can be made use of in the usuaL experimentaL ways. To set interpretations many-worids Everett the quantum of theory and in the contrasting neutrai worLds perspective, here (adapting OeLJitt and Graham) are some Leading features: i) R separate cLassicaL sphere externaL to any and every is not required; quantum set-up it makes sense to consider and investigate a state vector for the whoLe universe. ii) The state vector covering the totaL system never universes) (of coLLapses, and so the totatity it describes can be deterministic. iii) LJhat is described through variabLes dynamicaL the jointLy, comprehensive is not aLL equaLLy reaL; vector and the the actuaL worLd but a system comprising many worLds. (On the Everett are state interpretation on the neutraL worLds these interpretation they are not, other worLds than actuaL ones Lacking of any sort of reaLity.) iv) Through chronoLogicaL deveLopment of the dynamicaL the state vector decomposes naturaLLy ref Leeting a progressing branching of the into system orthogonaL universe worLds) into a set of mutuaLLy unobservabLe worLds. variabLes, (and (On account this is described as a continuaL spLitting into vectors system the of Everett equaLLy reaL worLds; but not in neutraL theory which disposes of this reLativism.) v) In each worLd good" measurements yieLd definite resuLts, and in many -14- worLds, incLuding the actuaL, famiLiar statisticaL quantum Laws hoLd, indeed C3n be derived or approximated. *- -^ince the neutraL version directLg avoids mang of the to theorg, what is the case for the Everett form? In main part it consists Everett simptg of mistaken ontoLogicaL assumptions, as such objections the what that ReaLitg overactive an principte, has phgsicaL properties must exist.The further argument that aLL branches must be equaLLg reaL, is not compeLLing. Thus DeMitt contends: Because there exists neither a mechanism within the framework of the formaiism nor, bg definition, an entitg outside of the universe that can designate which branch of the grand superposition is the reaL worLd, aLL branches must be regarded as equaLLg reaL (p.178). But we can easiLg incLude actuaL worLd seLection (as group worLd seLection) within cone Lus ion does not foLLow. the weLL and framework; other as given difficuLties the Everett specific, there is, Ln the first pLace, reaList theories such Everett's. as permissive regarding such worLds. In reaList-reLativist a demarcation SecondLg, fact, the however, interpretation theorg avoids. To be faced prob Lem not neutraL theorg the of this the intended It has been objected (e.g. bg Lewis) that the neutraL worLd encounters kinds neutraL bg is too theorg is restrictive about worLds; and few or none of worLds of contemporarg reaLists (^uch as Lewis) get into the picture, since aLL such worLds incLude as existents certain universaLs. OnLg neutraLised anaLogues of such worLds appear fn case, the theorg can be as restrictive as is appropriate about ang In 7). aLso (see which worLds are phgsLeaL, or phgsicaLLg possible. Requisite subcLasses such worLds phgsicaL can marked be out conform tig to phgsicaL Laws and through framework requirements (e.g. that the ensembLe forms a HLLbert space). it is an iLLusion that reaLism as Moreover soLves the reLevant demarcation probLem. It simpLg covers it up, in an unsatisfactorg wag. highLight To us varg a in stock of coupLe pertations, some of what is different in a neutraL iLLustrations of reaListic interpretation, the ontic mang-worLds Let inter- the famiLLar two sLit interfer­ wag. Consider first ence affair. On a straightforward the neutraL approach, we appear forced to concLude that each eLectron traverses both sLits in a wave Like form' (Les Lie LI, p.I!+6), is to the dcaLectic interpretation that the eLectron goes through that both sLits. The mang- worLds approach avoids such contradiction^, aLLowing eLectron to traverse just one sLit in the actuaL worLd - onLg in another branching from this, the the worLd, eLectron traverses the other sLit, therebg inducing probabiListic interference with the actuaL-case eLectron. The wave function provides a superposition of two such possibLe cases, not two actuaL cases. In the transition other worLds are not mang-worLds theorg). from phgsicaL (or potentiaL) worLds to the actuaL one, 'destroged' (as LesLie suggests in his criticism of Nor is the interaction of worLds causaL. There are few or -15- no causaL effects even on the Everett reaLity version; is spiitting thus not not actuaity observed (cf. virtuai worLds, reLations, etc.). Though there seen, are transworLd interreLations on object-theory these do further criticaL point is that physicaL worLds are not probabiListicaLLy The entities. as exist not independent. But that s aLright; since probabiLity is an natter, intensionaL probabiListic interference is unprobLenatic (cf. "possibiLity" interference). scattering exanpLe where an eLectron is Consider next Davies at fired a proton. The probabiLity wave in such scattering represents a set of worLds for the eLectron. 'The quantun wave provides a Measure of the probabiLity of finding the eLectron 3t the Location: where the eLectron is Most LikeLy to be found ation, and disturbance is greatest there the wave (D p.l2i*). Fleasurenent deterMines the Loc­ so aLters the probabiLities, thus on the orthodox view reducing the wave. Recording to the Everett on however, interpretation, neasurenent the universe divides into two, ... one containing a right Moving eLectron ... Each worLd is equaLLy rest inhabiting each since it is not The observer conscious upon that MeasureMent down-right is spiitting so thus, by occurs; the for there certain a is so near­ probabiLities, anending scattering, that, possibie the because of the uncertainties physicaL states of universe, corres­ ponding to the probabiLity wave, are increased. Lihere there was one for the actuaL possibLities). worLd in possibiLity regard, now there are N Many (N Mirroring the this R nany-worids interpretation of physicaL theory provides a naturaL for neutraL a new state function resuits, appearing to coLLapse 'the wave. since RLL that happens wuth worLd branching is guaranteed copy worLds. But onLy one worLd is actuaL, and represents the (reaL) of universe. Heasurenent can deterMine which this is, and one spLits, MisLeading. There is no spiitting; rather in quantuM processes worLd-branching takes pLace, rep Licat ion atso wortd . Even on the Everett interpretation this is inaccurate, it interpretation ... principLes which aMong seLect detinit or wortds, as setting what are caLLed anthropic principLes, and aLso non-chauvinistic reptaceMents for then such as geophysicaL principLes, can serve to do.^ Rnd in this setting expLanations, of a sort and of varying adequacy, The of aLL the nunericaL features can be furnished. under Lying reason is not (siMpty) that there wiLL aLways be sone universes, which are duty seLected, where the nuMbers coMe out right, but that sone and universes conditions (for of the right sort are aLso decent physicaL universes (a Much More difficuLt requirenent to satisfy). sone such coincidences) It is as these, furtherMore, that are observed (by us), contain universes carbon and water LocaLLy, and so forth. It is then no surprise that we perceive a universe to which so Many speciaL conditions pertain, for we have seLected fron the enseMbLe onLy by our very existence' (0 p.126). But it again, taLk of our seLecting is MisLeading (though taLk of seLection, or naturaL seLection, is not). It is rather that, as a contingent natter, we happen to inhabit such universes^. Rnd such taLk negLects the iMportant point that further work is required, for satisfactory expianation - that piausibte argunents, not invoLving us, but connecting gross geophysicaL features with nuMericaL features, have aLso -16- to be suppLLed. In thts Mag, ustng the MorLd-ensembLe hgpothests ... [but] MLth[out] the Meak anthropLc prLncLpLe, Lt Ls possLbte to discover pLausLbLe arguments to pLn doMn the vaLues of aLmost aLL of the fundamentaL parameters p.129, a centraL part of hLs cLatm). Indeed DavLes hotds out the negatLng but (D prospect of beLng abte to do much more, constraLnLng the dtmensLonaLttg of space and ttme, the number of quarks and Leptons, numbers of fundamentaL forces, That reaLLg MouLd a sgnthesLs of consLderabLe poMer. It Ls a sgnthesLs, gtve moreover, MhLch can be absorbed or sLmuLated MLth Ln a upon mang-MorLds neutraLLsLng prLncLpLes MorLd bg etc. quantum seLectLon theorg prLncLpLes. and cosmo-Log LeaL repLacLng NonetheLess sgnthesLs, the anthropLc DavLes, the LLke maLnstream phgsLcLsts he artLcuLateLg represents, Ls uncomfortabLe MLth ang such that he LndLcates, ang such grand pLcture, and rLghtLg so, as the 3S sgnthesLs anthropLc expLanattons LnvoLved are far from entLreLg satLsfactorg. HostLg he seems to hope Lnstead that contLngencLes MLLL aLL be expLaLned as necessLtLes of (proposLtLons phgsLcs grand a pLcture, necessarg grand at Least Ln foLLoMLng Log LeaLLg from another theorg). But the hope Ls mLspLaced; Ln Large unLfLed measure Lt represents 17thC ratLonaLLsm over agatn. SometLmes, hoMever, he seems to feet desLgn Ln the untverse. - Ls Mhat features: to supposed emerge, and does emerge, from the numerLcaL Mhat anthropLc prLncLpLes vs. MorLd seLectLon prLncLpLes. Uhat Ls supposed to emerge depends upon hoM the matter Ls set up, hoM the pLcture emphasLaed. Ls Mhat presented, For exampLe, DavLes and LesLLe both set thtngs up so onLg tMo optLons are supposed to be open. In hLs Preface to Da^Le^ Ls The RcctdentaL UnLverse, suggests the sgstematLc aLternatLves are eLther reLLgLon or an anthropLc prLncLpLe. R sLmLLar cLaLm appears Ln LesLLe, Mho puts the aLternatLves as (ethtcaL) necessttg or anthropLc assumptLons. Thus hLs concLusLon (to L2, p.81) The cosmotogLcaL evidence can suppLg __ forcefut grounds for vLeMLng at Least one of these thtngs ss true. (1) God Ls reaL, though presumabLg as a creattve ethtcaLrequtrement rather than as a dtvtne person Mho LLteraLLg destgned our LLfe-contaLntng cosmos. [So the unLverse extsts because Lt shouLd.J (2) There extsts a Mortd EnsembLe [so the condtttons LeadLng to Ltfe are bound to occur someMhere (L2, p.55)J - and the attempt to dertve aLL the fundamentaL charactertstLcs of our cosmos from some untfted FLeLd Theorg Ls tn error. DavLes LnsLnuates that the obvtous Lnference from the cat3Logue of numerLcaL features Ls thts: a htdden prLncLpLe seems to be at Mork, organLstng the cosmos Ln a coherent Mag (p.110). Thts runs paraLLeL to argument from desLgn, hardLg an Lmprovement. One of the prLncLpLes htdden Ls hgpothests; but another Mhtch DavLes (unLtke LesLLe) generaLLg anthropLc prLncLpLe, to LncredLbLe accuracg 3nd Ls some sort of God favours Ls the a gutdtng prLncLpLe Mhtch serves to fLne-tune the cosmos for us (humans) - or Ltfe, or Ltfe-supportLng sgstems, or __ ? Or for observers,or LnteLLLgence, or not for angthtng. The chotce offered Ls reaLLg then an oLd famLLLar one, faced bg thtnkers at Least stnee the (so-caLLed) EnLtghtenment: God or Han, or after a recent ftrst correctton and Mtth a different emphasts, Humans -17- or God. In fact burted under duaLitg, this is aLreadg as (Science) or Hunans or God. However the a nang tenpts favoured which option, Phgsics excLuded, in error . Rnd it is we as seen: have (coMprehensive) phgsics without netaphgsics, no scientific theorg no is Much scientist and phiLosopher, is increasinqLg seen as excLuded, as forbidden fruit or even as there at Least a three-wag choice: Phgsics giinpsed, without Large assunptions - which stands on its own. But further afieLd there is get is which option, another not excLuded: option here canvassed. The ciain to be eLaborated is this: no (deep-ecoLogicaL) principies of a tgpe not aLreadg required for Low LeveL senanticaL purposes worLd seLection principies) are caLLed for in expiaining the nunericaL (naMeig, features at Least as satisfactoriig as nor huMans Neither principies, gods such be upon popuiarig aLreadg foreshadowed, doing. in More in reMoving huMans features god-Like (and, universe. the principLe cones in a varietg of anthropic verg precise (incLuding Barrow's biocentric reforMutations). SoMe exaMptes give the inpression:- The existence as observers seLection bioLogicaL (D to the own used be can existence a as constants' (ibid). This presents severaL for renoving underiging ngsterg is verg different fron nunericat of expLanation, our p.viii); effect, ... to expLain the otherwise Mgsterious nuMericat disentangie; expLat,ning wiLL idea is to reiate basic worLd features to our own vaLues of the fundanentaL phgsicaL issues as such coLourfuL for nainstreaM phgsicists, atMost none of then prettg MostLg the upon hunans, associated inteLLigence) fron a new speciaL pLace Rs succeed options other the are essenti3t. Since gods do not figure in anthropic wiLL focus the incidentaLLg, forMS, object-theoru far-out the features. sorts, various or Rnd nag these turn in have further theg Mag be siMpig contingent, refLecting seLection without specific purpose. Sone phgsicists go so far as to ciain: our existence constrains the structure of the universe, indeed it even it (0 p-112), for to us , quote froM Hawking and CoLLins. connection in this sweeping context h3s been dubbed this j^s Davies the does, have nothing specificaLLg to do inteLLigence, or with Life, etc. The Dicke argunent, for Eddington-Dirac expLain coincidence, is based of principLe : anthropic the show with what work the or hunans, with designed exanpLe, to onig on the presence of heavg eieMents, and so gives but a hint of bioLogg, if that. So reversaL Invoking the huMan forMuLaticn of the principLe (D p.112)! But quite generaLLg the argunents advanced, which do principLe seLects reaLLg there is no spirit of the Copernican revoLution' in this fashion (pace D p.115, barter, and others). The conditionaL principLe estabLished bg the Dicke arguMent is essentiaLLg J) If [because, g^ven] there exist heavg eieMents, then the universe is such that the Eddington-Dirac coincidence ho ids. The fuLL expLanatorg argunent conprises, as weLL as the detaiLed phgsics that goes toward J), the nodus ponens inference: -18- The Eddington-Dirac coincidence hotds. There exist heavy eLements, J) More generaLiy, the anthropic way gives principie to physicatiy a argued conditionai scheme of the enthymematic form K) if F then T, or its contrapositive K ) if not-F then not-T, where F is a hard factuai ciaim or more commoniy its existentiat reiativety generaiisation , and T is a more theoretic3i ciaim concerning typicaity features of the worLd, such as numericai features. The short form of anthropic exp Lanation, or better status quo expLanation, is then the argument form F, if F then T L) . .T. famiLiar ontoLogicaL proofs, for instance of an externaL worLd from the Moore s fact that exist, hands arguments. such omit typicaLLy proofs phiLosophers just are difference The is that the soLid argumentation that goes into estabLishing the conditionai schemes of status quo expianations; for instance, makes LittLe effort in this direction, and the required entaiLment rather Moore evidentLy faiLs to hoLd (see fn 30). Other formutations of the anthropic principie in the Literature are than better those hardLy 3tready exhibited. LesLie, who at Least (Like Barrow) moves humans a LittLe off centre stage, puts it in this counterfactuaL way: if our universe had been [everywhere] hostiie to Life then nobody wouLd be observing it (L2, p.66). If the consequent simpiy contextuaLLy impiies that something a Live is doing the observing, then the principie is ana Lytic, and scarceLy up to the intended expLanatory tasks (without requisite information that the the universe contains Life, and much eLse being separateLy pumped in). MhiLe if does not require this, it appears fatse; the Latest seeing-eye robot consequent did survive the hoLocaust, or did just happen as a resuLt of the quantum fLuctuation. In such as Dicke's most purported argument. offers faces reLated difficuLties: worLd appLications of the anthropic The other version of the principie LesLie NecessariLy we conscious beings observe a which is Life-containing (LI, p.lt+1). Rs it stands, this is faLse; for we mightn t exist. Nor wiLL appropriate deLetion consciousness retain we' of fix things. the worLd is, Me might but not be observers, aLL being in vats. But repaired the version is pretty use Less. It bears onLy tangentiaLLy (through that vacuum any case the formuiation Lacks sufficient generaLity; it faiLs to connect appropriateLy with scheme, the but contingency, Life its consequent, containing) on what is at issue concerning numericaL features. The materiaL on us, on observers and the Like, is strictLy irreLevant, a hang-over again presumabLy constructions of quantum theory. -1?- from bad ideaList * The that the Copernican principte has suffered some sort of set-b3ck idea because of the essentiai rote of anthropic principies in explaining Large-number can be traced back through Carter, who heLped popuLarise the rote coincidences, between of anthropic principies and made the (rather obscure) distinction strong weak has been exaggerated subservience to the 'Copernican principte' [which is] that we must and not assume principies. anthropic gratuitoustg that we Recording to Carter, there occupg a priviLeged centraL position in the (C p.231). The regrettabLe tendency, he sags, has been to universe extend the to a most questionable dogma to the effect that our situation cannot principte be priviLeged in ang sense ... (in extreme form ... the 'perfect cosmoLogicaL principLe ...)'. The Latter assumption is certaintg untenabLe (as Dicke pointed because the universe is bg no means spatiaLLg homogeneous on a LocaL scaLe out) and speciaL conditions (of terrestrial temperature, chemicaL environment) do prevaiL on Earth. But its removaL does nothing to undercut Life the Copernican principLe, or to boost the anthropic principLe in the wag thinks Lt For does. is Carter his bracketed comment after his first formuiation of the anthropcc principle is that Lt for requisite aLthough our situation is not necessaritg centraL, inevitabLg priviLeged to some extent' (C p.291). It is doubtfuL that our position is centraL; whether it is so priviLeged depends on the intended contrast, but whatever the privilege is, it hardlg seems inevitabLe. Carter gives severaL non-equivaLent formuLations of the anthropic principLe, the first of which takes the quasi-anaLgtic but ambiguous form, LJhat we C3n expect to observe must be restricted bg the conditions necessarg for our presence as observers' (C p.291; repeated D p.119). This is certs inLg not the same as Davies condensation of it, what he caLLs the weak principLe, that observers construaL, restrict the observed'. On the obvious (but Less charitabLe) this is but rampant verificationism, of a tgpe verg familiar however from interpretations of quantum theorg. Uhat exists is independent of observers; and observers, especiaLLg remote ones, mag have no significant impact on what iL5 observed. The condensation is accordingLg false. So also, for different reasons, is what it condenses. For one thing, our expectations mag run astrag. True, what we observe is restricted bg the conditions for our doing just that, nameLg being as observers. But this tautologg imposes no phgsical constraints, being equaLLg true for Xing as observing; and no such connection is appeaied to in ang of the derivations of coincidences that Carter sketches. Once again aqain the present arguments never have angthing in detail to do with humans, or even "observers 4-c? -20- .2-1 (and surety animats observe). Fit best the arguments are directed to the presence of water or carbon 12 or some such - things sometimes erroneousiy equated Life, and often, rather dubiousty, said to be necessary for Life.^S The situation is of this sort with Carter's "iiiustration" of the weak better Locat) anthropic principte, which he formutates as foitows: 'we must (or be prepared to take account of the fact that our Location in observers universe is existence as the necessariLy priviLeged to the extent of being compatibLe with our p.233). In order to get to grips with this recondite formuiation (C Let us remove the initiaL intensionaL functors (which my empiricist friends to with assure are me not essentiaL in physics, despite ubiquity, and their physicists procLivities to modaLs). Now our position can hardLy be priviLeged (despite Carter s tru necessariLy since human-types just might be itaLicization), uniformLy distributed through the universe or again might not exist at aLL. LJhat necessity there is enters in a different way. LJhat we are Left de Let ion, with since misLeading, probabiListic arguments suitabLe for Life in the universe (some detaiLs justified is Like more something unique (though principte this need require of Hh3t may be met. In this humans we are Long-Lived stars Rnd stiLL much more than a weak is dragged in. It is enough, for seLeet ion, universe contains Locations, neighbourhood Sag3n). we're working at it); even on Terra much of the rest of the animat kingdom is simitarLy favoured. seLeet ion in priviLege of habitats miLLions suggest are to this: we are favoured in that the physicaL conditions for our existence, as observers, are hardLy due Our Location in the universe is priviLeged to the extent of is then: be',ng compatibLe with our existence as observers'. But this ciaim cs after in where fact heavy Like the earth, in the metaLs occur, and so on (for certain other pureLy geotogicaL features). BoLtzmann s expLanation of the present high degree of which Ls extremety improbabLe cosmic organisation (in a thermodynamicaL setting) is aiso said to appLy a weak anthropic principte ; witness this the onLy reason that we are priviLeged to exceedingLy untikeiy occurrence is that our very existence [etc.J -21- O.2.2.. * depends upon the condition which atone can be bg estabiished remarkabte that (D p.123). But again onLg gross phgsicaL organisationat principLes fLuctuation are seLected for; and no more than a weak seLection principte is required. beveraL expLained , so Carter and Davies ci3im, be cannot coincidences simpig bg a weak principte (at Least in the muLti-universes). of is made to the strong (or better gLobaL) principte: appeaL these absence The universe ... must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at some in barter s (p.120). formuLation exist is for manifesttg faLse. So, Cartesian paraphrase Carter gives of the strong different cogito ergo mundus taLis est . The worLd wouLd presumabtg not be principte, verg theg is this appaLLing the necessarg; the universe does. Rnd since observers mag verg easiLg never given have evotved in the universe, reasons, stage R coroLLarg of the strong principte in this heaviLg necessitated guise is that observers are conditionaLLg must For so different were the contingent premiss faLse; and certainLg the premiss mag Least be true but the cone Lus ion faLse. But at Loading, necessitg gets and principte the appropriate conctusion. For, propertg ideaLLg this the inferentiaL form, with the into formuLated, abandons paraphrase scheme the as is before, Law Like conditionaL of basic form, if F then T, where however T is a a genuinetg gLobaL cLaim that the universe is such 3nd such (e.g. the universe now contains more matter than radiation). The scheme, so then, recast is feature distinctive some theoreticaL LocaL strong the that T is hoListic assertion 3bout the universe, incLuding essentiaL reference to it, not, as it mag be on about of the weak principte, of the universe, which can readiLg be features stated or restated without reference to the universe. But the distinction is not particuiarLg important. The robust, troubie is it from 3 worLd-seLection gives Lt a misLeading most LawLike Mag requisite within consequent. For exampLe, there is stiLL no (egocentric) thought matter; to phgsicaLLg without Descartes God to puLL him out. universe the taiLor-made is for framework of idea - in essence it cLaims a wag Living organisms are subsequentig assured of existence. [So it is]... akin mankind to inhabit. products secuLar expLanations. teteoLogicaL R duLg cLaims anthropic worLd for (D p.121). Such erroneous presentations have done much to encourage both a new anthropocentrism and the idea that are unLike habitation, 3nd that both the Laws of to traditionaL retigious expLanation of the worLd: that God made the are from Hard as it is to credit, Carter is phgsics and the initiaL conditions obLigingLg arrange themseLves in such that an procLivitg to ideaiism exceLLed bg Davies, who sags of the strong principte that that in route respectabLe Carter's (exhibited in C2)), he mag weLL get stuck in the argue to bounds to the intended phgsicaL given and of satisfactorg impression antecedents for the scheme, and makes it presentLg impossibLe appropriateLg verg perspective Carter's extravagant Cartesian paraphrase of the strong with that is principte nor on a par reformuLated Davies with, strong and in schema expLanations anthropic competition supports design with, none of the makes regarding the universe. Nor, as wiLL appear, expLanations, when made presentabLe, -22- akin to retigious features of the worLd. The expLanations take different LogicaL of explanations forms and LnvoLve quite different ingredients. To see what is reaLLy required for the strong schema to operate, it pays to Look at Then appLications. it becomes evident observercentric that considerations are strictLy irreLevant. Once again far stronger, and biocentric more dubious, conditions than are required for the estimates actuaLLy made been For introduced. instance, (BoLtamann) K, is a good exampLe of a prediction based on what strong' anthropic principLe' (C p.23^); (8) is as foLLows: K aLL f < that is 2 " Tl_ 5 have according to Carter, his condition (8), which imposes an order of magnitude upper bound on cosmoLogicaL But and constant may be termed the 3 ' "P , P invoLved in obtaining this bound, retevance, is the of assumption that ' the un iverse is not radiation dominated aLL its [finite] Life (i.e. that the matter contribution ... to the mean mass density ... becomes greater at some stage Insofar this as is than the necessary radiation (C ...)' contribution pp.233-^.). at aLL - since the estimates concern onLy very broad features, and not LocaL variations - it is 3s necessary for Lichen as for Larkspurs. DLL that is required is a sLightLy stronger worLd seLection principLe than mereLy that worLd contain heavier eLements at some stage; but stiLL the onLy a gLobaL geophysicaL principLe. Rnd this is aLL that here. The same set of points amounts to appLies to Carter's further use of the strong principLe, to estimate the Lower bound on K, which appLies the conventionaL that gaLax Les ... are formed by condensation, starting as reLativeLy hypothesis smaLL density fLuctuations in an otherwise homogeneous further The strength tendentious assumption in background (C p.2St+). this appiication is that gaiaxies are necessary for the formation of stars and hence of Life (C p.23!*). NonetheLess there are arguments for the strong anthropic principLe, though faLLacious ones obviousLy. They come firstLy from positivism. It is cLaimed that if the universe exists then it must be observabLe; so there must be observers - a modaL faLLacy. Davies (in his exposition of Barrow and not argues universe which from the faLse premiss that onLy what is observed exists, that a did then others) admit observers is meaningLess' (D p.I21). This is ideaListic garbage. They come secondLy from an aLLeged expianatory rote, in expLaining coincidences. But it is unnecessary for this purpose as initiaL worLd seLection wiLL serve. They come thirdLy from human chauvinism; thus, too human existence is said to be responsibLe for the very speciaL structure of the universe' (D p.121)! The connection is not however causaL; so what is it supposed There is be: teLeoLogicaL? thus a serious probLem as to how this responsibitity, hardLy evident, is exercised. FinaLLy a strong principLe might uniformity to - one principLe to cover be argued for on grounds of aLL cases. But better a weaker correct -23- principLe than a strong faLse or geophgsicaL principLe wouLd suffice Rnd principLe. dubious doubt no a weaker aLL phgsicaL constants. (Of course, for there reMains the natter of this worLd seLection. This worLd does exhibit Life, incLude hunans, and so on. But these features, Like the present species of does eucaLgpts expLanations, or reLevant, cLasses of worids.)"^ and are RnusingLg, astroLogicaL and More converses hunan affairs; white under gerMane not the to extravagant anthropic principies are to astroLogg, ceiestiaL events infLuence anthropic hunan anaLogue, affairs infLuence CeiestiaL events and processes incLude those of the sun. Moon events ceiestiaL its are abstracted fron in seLecting expLanatorg Recording other. each of wonbats, grazing of whereabouts and and other pLanets (especiaLLg). Rnd these certaintg appear to have an (indirect) weak infLuence, especiaLLg through the soLar atMosphere and pLanetarg Large pLasMas, on terrestriaL phenoMena (Fegerabend, p.93). The anthropic converse, in this forM danagingtg anthropocentric and exhibiting an excess of hubris, is Much further froM the truth. Not just the anthropocentric, but the eMphasis of nuMericat features. Rnd despite the bioLogicaL anaLogies, just Lt,ke explanation seLection without vaLues, so even Rs are there there is seLection without seLectors. More, RLthough seLection is sonetiMes accoMpiished through seLectors, often takes not is naturaL seLection. It is not seLection for, for fitness, survivaL, or whatever. Nor, More iMportant is it seLection bg, bg soMe agent. vaLues MispLaced. is insistence, Life is not essent-iaL in Mang worids Le^Lie Despite biocentric seLection without seLecters, randonig or otherwise - this tiMe as in naturaL pLace seLection, which does not require a personified Nature to do the have evoLutionarg theories as/oid ageneg. In avoiding ageneg, seLection is Like that seLecting, as enphasised. Such expLanation can straightforwardig of Darwinian evoLut- ionarg theorg; and seLection contrasts with direction as incLuded in aLternative evoLutionarg Though accounts (cf. DarLington, p.l^ff). anthropic principies coMe in a varietg of forMs, depending upon how the conditionaL scheMa ^nvoLved is fitted out, none of theM, then, does what is saud, none depends essentiaLLg on the presence of huMans, or of Life. SgntacticaLLg, theg etaborate usuaLLg status quo arguMents, of forM L), with factuaL fir^t preMis^ F concerning the state of the worLd LocaLLg (weak forM) whoLe (strong seLection forM). SenanticaLLg, or as a the factuaL preMisses function as worLd principies; theg serve to Mark out the cLass of phgsicaL wortds or to narrow then down to these or those, e.g. to those where heavier eieMents such as carbon occur, those where Long-Lived stars, such as the sun, appear. It is that carbon is sonetiMes taken to provide an "order-of-Magnitude" approxiMation for Life (that is the nearest Long-Lived star is supposed to to hunans provide that the the "approxinations" get); Life as the arguMents a steadg warMth required for the evoLution of Life (but Long-Lived stars, water, and heavier objects are as to true near need get). But these additionaL, and nore dubious, detaiis are unnecessarg for the Main thrust of status quo arguMents, as distinct -24- from their anthropic 3nd biocentric augmentations. meet Given that the worids seiected are of this and that cast - in generai geophgsicai gross Less, up the to constraints — other features of them can be derived (more or standards rough accepted in and physics) in expLained, particuLar, how and that it is that certain (fundamentaL) physicaL constants Lie in restricted ranges, narrow and unexpected ranges. These arguments, duty fitted out, do provide exp Lanations, non-causat exp Lanations, of physicaL features of a contingent, mereLy LmprobabLe universe. Much there is, however, in these most ctaims, that has been contested, from the psycho LogicaL such of inadequacy a universe to the worth of such expLanations, if expLanations they are at aLL. objections to the cosmo-LogicaL synthesis; and finding unLikety, an in comfort and with Prob Lems mereLy universe. contingent, Somehow contingent universes have acquired the reputation of being coLd, remote and uncaring - a not habitat for sensitive creatures. But the reputation is undeserved, since fit contingency does not bear on any of these things. Mhat is contingent can be just as weLL as coLd or neither; caring or not, so far as the appLication sense aLL; at and hot makes so on. One can be warm and comfortabLe in bed on a wet and wintry night. One can be at home, comfortabLe in, in tune with, a tiny part of an improbabLe universe, as some tribaL peopLes are. None of these virtues are Ln any way undermined by contingency, matter of a necessary universe. or aLways assured by the quite separate a degree of harmony between us Furthermore, there can be, or have evoLved, and our surroundings , without principLes, as that our worse, that the universe is universe such exaggerated cLaims, on based anthropic are very speciaL and tuned to us' or, surroundings made for us'. Me humans can be in with tune the without having the universe tuned to us, as we can foLLow and ornament a song on the wind or in the woods. But so far, especiaLLy recentLy, we humans coLLectiveLy are not doing too weLL in attuning oursetves to the worLd. Rs this iLLustration begins to metaphysicaL and psychoLogicaL reveaL, predeLiction^ may pLay a not inconsiderabte rote in choice of, and ornamentation of, physicaL theory, especiaLLy of controvers LaL theories such as quantum theory and cosmoLogicaL theory. In the case of such theories there is a certain bag technicaL so to say tricks, tricks, equations and so on, which are de rigeur - a theory-skeLeton - and beyond that both an interpretation and setting for the bag integrating of theM and suppLying of with some sort of meaning, and them usuaLLy aLso some further formaLism connecting the tricks together or to a wider theoreticaL background. For exampLe, even in accounts of too much in the way of interpretation theory where is commonLy frowned upon, extensive correspondence ruLes Linking the formaLism with upon quantum cLassicaL physics are retied heaviLy. Rt Least for everything beyond the theory-skeLeton, which is what is appLied in most concrete day-to-day appLications of the theory, there is much room for rivaL fLeshing out of the skeLeton - Latitude -25- such as there is in archeological reconstructions of peoples from some scattered bones. Recasting quantum theorg, as in the mang-worlds interpretation, offers not as merelg a basis for fleshing out the theorg non-idealisticallg, but for combining it with general to subject much of the criticism, much of it directed more broadlg at most Happilg as However such recasting, when not reLativitg. largelg ignored (the common fate of nonstandard theories), is criticism. well plural world theories in general, misses the neutral modification. There are firstlg a batch of aesthetic and ontological objections. These commonlg take off from the of unattractiveness duplication or replication of profligate such worLds. LJeLL, tastes and vaLues, Like intuitions, do varg with sub-cuLture. Some of us, who escaped over-exposure to worlds the ReaLitg do PrincipLe, stories illuminating and attractive, indeed verg inviting. So, next, the whole thing is said to be unbelievable: no one can reasonabLg existence believe worLds nonetheless, especiaLLg in explanation. these in (the these unlimited numbers of universes. Granted, we do not believe of) in this either. These other worLds do not exist; but we can make of neutral find heavg Load of objections carrging on about excess use extensive In this wag we avoid a baqgage. ontic also Ue main criticisms based on Occam s razor. (RLL these objections are short-circuit met, in much detail, in JB.) Linked to such Occamist protests are a batch of objections that are pictures worlds effect the to over-engineered, both too complex 3nd including too much baggage. Thus in thermodgnamics a smalt fluctuation producing some order is more LikeLg than one producing Lots of order, one galaxg more LikeLg than Lihg do similarlg we not find ourselves in a one galaxg universe, which is far more LikeLg? The answer is in part: because Less LikeLg contingencies hold. Is the ubiquitg No, (D p.123)? mgsterg instance, the on the commenting of of numbers approaches reasons. in these unwarranted presuppositions. The that the universe was set others Like be explained. For Dicke Thus and Peebles remark, in of the universe for a few conscious individuals, overdesign revealed well one of a thing is itself verg unlikelg. Find just special can, that a single galaxg cosmos might be ruled out bg the can observed galaxies in our universe ... therefore a such evolution further there mag be mang. up Mach's Moreover, principle. questions and remarks are based on various overdesign" for idea, for example, presupposes some individuals; but the worlds picture correctLg avoids thLS assumption. The things in this world that exist happen to be there, probable or not, and often, for reasons we can sometimes explain, not. But there is tittle solid evidence that theg are arranged, for us or others. In its original form the unfocussed "overdesign" objection was mainlg directed at cruder anthropic principles, as were unverifiabilitg and unfalsifiabilitg. a batch of objections The well-worn criticism, that notorious psgchoanalgtic and Marxist principles did too much, being so designed that covered everg protested that case, was redirected from against anthropic principles. it is hard to see how the anthropic principLe can be It used theg was to make testable predictions, because ang theorg inconsistent with our existence is 4 M3nLfestLg Not faLse . such protests been weakened bg avant garde have onLg phLLosophg of science, but, as Carter has poLnted out, anthropLc arguments couLd varLous Ln prLncLpLe have been used to predLct theg Rnd notLced. were faLsLfLcatLon, e.g. where erroneous that unLLkeLg assumptLons prLncLpLes, regards Rs fLrst). under but Ls worLd-sgnthesLs, aLL that worLds the whether Ln wLth cosmoLog Les and of verLfLcatLonLst seLectLon whLch semantLcs, or phgsLcs exLst, LnvoLved of themes objectLons do have some verLfLabLLLtg vLrtue of what Ls meant bg bg bg neutraLLsed ex Lsttng. But the force of these objectLons Ls theorg. as conversLon, object-theorg Granted LnterpretatLon. of Often, Lt (though of weaker forms wouLd be abandoned, other surrendered force agaLnst mang-worLds theories, assume derLved object Lons are LargeLg mLsdLrected, because what are at Lssue are phgsLcaL semantLcs, are coLncLdences premLss factuaL be wouLd verLfLabLLLtg not the anthropLc arguments do admLt of of 3ssumptLons the before coLncLdences numerLcaL neutraL worLds objectLons, the crLtLcLsms of mang-worLd such prLncLpLes anthropLc as geophgsLcaL or prLncLpLes are LntertwLned, and dLsentangLLng the crLtLcLsms Ls enough to partLg So them. def Late aLso wLth the reLated charge th3t the neutraL worLd- Ls Lt sgnthesLs theorg Ls unscLentLfLc or at much turns Least dubLousLg scLentLfLc.PLaLnLg on what Ls admLtted Lnto that esteemed categorg, scLentLfLc. But on most accounts, use of seLectLon prLncLpLes succeeds Ln gettLng LncLuded. Rnd so, pLaLnLg enough, does mang-worLds quantum theorg. Rfter 3LL, Lt has 3pproxLmateLg as the same sorts of predLcatLve and test capabLLLtLes more That fact of narrow empLrLcaL LndLstLnguLshabLLLtg mag be the source of theorg. other compLaLnts, but Lt gtves no ground for the charge worLd Ls seLectLon prLncLpLes excLuded! are It at hand. of scLentLfLc and theorLsLng experLmentLng true that some theoretLcaL and wouLd (per prefer LmpossLbLe) and wantLng to st Lek to a uLtLmate and unLfLed expLanatLons. No doubt such semantLcaL apparatus does faLL fouL of the the substance of the charge, consLder some of the crLterLa often beLng theLr theorg narrower sLmpLg reveaLs further serLous defects Ln such vLews. But to reach that vLews: fuLLer the narrower (hgpothetLco-deducttve) methodoLogg, are uneasg wLth worLds seLectLon, sureLg But phgsLcLsts, and mang phLLosophers, LosLng sLght of what enters Lnto range quantum orthodox scLentLfLc. UnfaLsLfLabLe? SureLg set down for Ln areas where the framework Ls not pLnned down bg phgsLcaL theorg. OvercompLLcated and LnsuffLcLentLg gLven what the worLds theorg Ls Lntended to accompLLsh sLmpLe? Not (e.g. the semantLcaLLg theoretLcaL work Lt Ls aLso put to Ln areas such 3s LLnguLstLcs). Etc., etc. Perhaps the most teLLLng theorLes LLke worLd—sgntheses objectLons whLch agaLnst LncLude status quo arguments, and them, concern theLr expLsnatorg capacLtg. StrangeLg theg have been condemned both as expLaLntng too much - ang thLng at aLL can be brought out Ln some worLd - and as expLaLnLng too LLttLe and beLng trLvLaL. Not both these objectLons are LLkeLg to succeed, as theg tend to undercut one another. IndependentLg, Lt seems cLear that the arguments do provLde expLanatLons, for LnvoLved Lnstance, of the strength of the strong nucLear force. It aLso seems cLear that the expLanatLons afforded are of vargLng -27- depth, + depending in part on the depth of the underlying physicaL theory invoLved, this and the pLausibiLity of the further assumptions made in the arguments. Better exempiific3tions of status quo arguments in physics satisfy not oniy more ordinary requirements for expLanation; they aLso meet assembLed conditions considerable time, by HempeL, mainstream the which conditions on position demanding for represented, some what counted as a scientific expLanation. Furthermore, the chief objections to have more the HempeLian the account that emerged have been to the effect that it is too rigorous, not that it faiLs to provide jointLy sufficient conditions for expLanation. To make a prima facie case that better status quo arguments do provide exp Lanations, it is enough then show to expLanation LogicaL HempeL s that conditions on the (p.2t+7ff) have been met. By contrast conditions design with scientific of the arguments, 3re satisfied. The expLanandum T is a LogicaL adequacy of pattern basic consequence of the physicaL argument eLaborating the schemas F, if F then T; the expLanans has empiricaL content, at Least in the shape of expLanans F; which connection if F then T, provides expLanans are true, Uere a foLLows from arguments using physicaL Laws. FinaLLy, the demanding empiricaL condition of adequacy, that the premisses used in the is satisfied in better status quo arguments. the basic pattern aLso necessary for scientific expLanation, it wouLd be an easy coroLLary that many poorer status quo arguments fait to provide expianations (beginning with Carter s and Descartes is there the and contains general, Laws which are actuaLLy used in the derivation. For, in better status quo arguments, the conditionaL schema, Law Like premiss much quo status that such Cogito arguments), and that arguments cannot presentLy expLain decentLy, '^ncLuding such major puzzLes as Life and inteLLigence in the LocaL worLd. It can be independentLy argued, moreover, that poorer status quo arguments, which patentLy (or short meeting HempeLian conditions, fait to generate satisfactory of satisfying) expianations. TriviaL, dogmatic, forms, such as that things 3re the way they are because that is how they are, represent a virtuaLLy worse of sort. this But possibie. weakening to principte, that what The universe is inhabitabie, because we are here, because ask Forrest so is aLso humans inhabit The universe is suited to inteLLigent Life because there are peopLe such questions upon). focusses inferences, is sLightLy embroidered, are arguments with connecting principLes Such, the earth , case better, or more informative, are those arguments scarceLy which appLy the possibility Like faLL (exampies adapted from the sorts of anthropic arguments These short; patentLy faLL arguments, which they LnvoLve offer no aimost immediate further appropriate basic (HempeLian) argumentation making use of generaL Laws. Given that better status quo arguments do afford scientific expianations, and given further that the arguments do serve to remove and not without predictive force, why have they been genuine puzzLement fauLted as expianations, and sometimes criticised 3S not providing expianations are at aLL (e.g. Forrest)? The main reason offered, that back-to-front , these "expianations" are appears to rest on the assumption that aLL genuine expLanation -28- shouLd be broadLg causaL, and accordingLg exhibit (time-) the direction or controi. Status quo expLanations are certainLg not causaL, and mag causation weLL run counter to causaL direction, expLaining features of the earig the through of distribution present universe of eLements. That is, however, perfectLg in order. For satisfactorg expLanation is not causaLLg restricted either ordinariLg or scientificaLLg. HempeL suppLies severaL different sorts of pattern basic of causaLLg or controL directed (pp.352-3). EspeciaLLg striking in this exampLe opticaL straightforward his of his which are not causaL expLanation or expLanation scientific exampLes regard is a particuLar event...satisfactoriLg of expLained bg reference to subsequent occurrences'; but his exampLe of two-wag where the period of a penduLum serves to expLain the Length of the expLanation, penduLum as weLL as converseLg, is aLso highLg re Levant. For it is too expiaining commonLg assumed numericaL that shouLd coincidences be the presence of water, carbon and the Like in the universe, not vice versa. But there is no iLLuminating reason quo status whg direction shouLd expLanation the instead not in run the as weLL as, vice versa. That of, iLLuminating direction is after aLL from the famiLiar to the much Less famiLiar, and more in need of expLanation. such It is true of course that more simpig means that status quo expLanations ad hominem stgLe of status quo expLanation, for are. Like expLanations, most further unreasonabLg stop deeper expLanation. The expLanation-stopping forms are and form: contraposed inquirers verg for expLanation if it weren t so gou woutdn t be here to ask the question. However such put-downs (in the envisaged persistent Legitimate the those (which Forrest discusses) where the response to a request for the Long. wouLd contexts) not more charge, damaging feature of the universe, Then PF. seLecting worLds where PF hoLds. But the theorg. the then, is that worLd-sgnthesis can expLain too much. The charge is backed up bg the foLLowing sort of consideration. puzzLing deter Theg wouLd be awag in search of further expLanations, such as better status quo arguments mag furnish (at Least for t ime be ing). The not begin in the middLe wag. Nor do theg, except in speciaL, rather theg uLtimate: takes famiLiar, the presence of water and carbon, aLso caLLs for expLanation; but that as quest the charge it Take ang can be expLained simpig bg misrepresents worLd-sgnthesis There is more to it than this. There is a cruciaL argumentative Linkage aLso invoLved, between PF and gross geophgsicaL features of the worLds (near factuaL worLd T) which are seLected. Or, put differentig, the seLection does not take pLace on basis the of PF, but (mereLg) under the constraint of gross geophgsicaL features; accordingLg if the argumentative Linkage from satisfactorg status quo arguments worLd-sgnthesis. is missing, PF is not to be expLained through In short, then, worLd-sgnthesis theorg offers expLanations when bg and then the expLanations mag varg greatLg in quaLitg depending on the depth of the phgsicaL the framework is suitabLg fLeshed out phgsicaL theorg; information invoLved in the argumentative Linkage. EssentiaLLg the same points undermine Forrest's further objection to such -2?- many-worLds explanation, truths; contingent have we aLL do to coaches easiLy as the pumpkins of turning numericsL coincidences. But there is no such free as seLection of phusicaL worLds - which do not incLude worLds vaLidating magicaL as faiL, can schema connecting arbitrary and practices. Status quo expianations may not be easy transformations at aLL, but physicaLLy comp Lex, they are not atways and they as is to posit suitabLy many and varied (p.9). Thus the theory is aLLeged to expLain worLds into that it "expLains" contingent faLsehoods as easiiy an when assumption invoLved easiLy avaiLabte, and the eLaboration of the in , and the argumentative schema issues in a contingent faiLs faLsehood. For a necessary condition that a status quo expianation be successfuL is that the argument be correct; but then given that the argument form is vaiid, the cone Lus ion cannot be simpiy f aLse. is It that satisfactory expianations, with conforming to such conditions of adequacy as deductive vaiidity in and quo status expianations winning in expianations differ from decisiveLy design which are sometimes seen as on an expianatory LeveL competition with status quo and expianations their piuraL-worLds setting (thus e.g. LesLie), and sometimes even confused with them. Design arguments characteristicaLLy take the deductiveLy invaLid abductive modus toLLens form: Things are (surprisingLy) so and so F If a design hypothesis heLd (e.g. the universe anticipated observers, a design-force operated), things woutd be (unsurprisingLy) so and so. If H then F Therefore, a design hypothesis (probabLy) hoLds. .. H Nor in design arguments is the connecting schema normaLLy eLaborated by appropriate scientific argument; nor, where God is invoked, i§; there any way of suitabLy confining the argument scientificaLLy. Thus support first the LesLie's of Larger cLaims is faLse:- the LiorLd EnsembLe hypothesis rather than the God hypothesis. !^e do not have...strong evidence of an EnsembLe' (LI, p.150). for Science does not their existence No branch of physics in a way commanding wide acceptance (LI, p.S3). The main reason is that the Bod hypothesis is not part of a physicaL theory that many-worLd theory is caLLs in the way of quantum theory (thus, e.g., there is no physics text corresponding to DeLiitt and Graham for the God hypothesis), [^hiie the Last cLaim is true, it does not teLL against the truth of neutraL many-worLds theory. Uhat science supports is science, not the the metaphysics it presupposes. Physics is not however aLL of science by any means, and even science doesn't do everything, onLy a rather narrow seLection of things. Richard SyLvan -30- 11 RPPENDIX 1. Some Rncient Rntecedents The Non-Limited is the originaL materiaL of existing things; further the source] from which existing things derive their existence is a iso that to which they' return at their destruction, according to necessity [for reparation]... —----- So, in the 6th Century B.C., said Rnaximander, perhaps among the first aLso to set down a story of the evoLution of humankind.Something the same was said in text, though on the favoured taLe a Heideggerean and Taoist touch was Lent, the with Nothingness repLacing the Non-Limited. In the on beginning, there was nothing; and uLtimateLy, too, there wiLL be nothing. have been paid. The p3raLLeL with Rnaximander can be pressed further. In account origins, of of worLd the contemporary charged pairs of particLes are created in the oppositeLy 'the order, wiLL Reparation process of pair formation from the vacuum; white in Rnaximander's story formation story, this opposites the of which are present Ln the one [the Non-Limited], are separated out from it' (but 'the "opposites" are the hot, coLd, the dry the , the moist, and the rest : see Robinson p.25). There is aLso a phenomenon which corresponds to some Limited extent to the Big Bang, nameLy Vortex. the It seems cLear, however, from the materiaL Burnet assembLes, that Rnaximander's position amounted to the first Less satisfactory resoiution, matter or substance aLways. For the BoundLess or Infinite was a materiaL cause, -^*-*dstance (p. 5k<); it is eternaL and ageLess is brought about the origin of the worids. did — Further, according to SimpLicius, not ascribe the origin of things to any aLteration of matter, but said that the oppositions separated encompasses aLL worids substance". RLso there is in it eternaL motion, in which which makes it a queer he and out . If in that the substratum was which a boundLess body, were is right — and it may not be, especiaLLy given Later ontotogicaL infLuences (cf. p.61) - then the matter is cLear. Rnaximander beiieved there were innumerabLe worids (p.58). These worids were concurrent, not successive. coex istent remains uncLear, but Later in the Whether Bound Less" they tradition (biassed) took them exist, making Rnaximander's position a many-existent-wortds theory. The to Law of compensation, under which for borrowing or variation reparation must be made, becomes the Law of repayment aLL were of conservation. The reparation paraLLeLs the borrowed" mass-energy. The more generaL steering of aLL things - overarching order in naturaL processes - becomes the Laws of nature which govern (reguLate) the processes. 'The orderLiness ... is grounded in the nature of things as such . Rnaximander's account represents an immenseLy -31- important stage in the transition from world-order is myth from science. to first to ... Last 'Hesiod's account of the origin of the anthropomorphic. account Rnaximanders represents, in principLe, a complete break with this mode of thought (Robinson p.27). From this angle the anthropic and idealistic fixes of contemporary science show marked regression. That transition, beyond anthropic creation stories, is also accomplished in the main philosophical essentials of the favoured resolution can where Taoism, be found. Something flowed from nothing, in a seemingly paradoxical way? but not through ang creation or agency. There was a the before time when beginning nothing at aLL existed. The problem of Laws (of nature) was also recognised, and resolved. did Laws not exist (independently at least of things that did) but were exhibited in in things that did exist. So it seems to follow that, stage at restricted property to duty what separated, and was mainly Lacking ascriptions Taoism Such nothing. a and deep in cosmogonic tales, then, from the ^.th C. B.C. until the 20th C., was a plausible explanatory story as to how come from together. of does exist. (Fuller details of Taoist cosmology, under this type of interpretation, are ventured in ecology', written with D. Bennett.) Mhat the which nothing existed, the taws could hold without having 3ny sort of existence, i.e. truth and existence were existence at story a few something could humans are Just beginning to piece NOTES Thi^ passage from Misner, Thorne and Uheeter, p.1212, is given an appropriately grander setting Ln the text. The passage Ls also quoted by DavLes, G p.222, who Lt to Wheeler. In Davies the idea of ascribes foundations for cosmology simple and unassailable Logical is given a different exposure, and is then linked with restrictions, to zero, on God s range of choice of universe to make. 2 Especially by those whose inquisitiveness and sense of blunted or destroyed by the mainstream culture and its wonder h3s educational not been practices, practices much mainstream philosophy reinforces and tries to justify. 3 Indolent philosophers tend to assign those of these questions that they write off (e.g. as semantically defective or as betraying philosophical uonfuslon or hang—upz?) to science. But they are not Just a matter for and scientists tend to come up with philosophically loaded, naive, theories scientists remain, insofar as they address the cannot questions and at often science; enough all. Too many Like too many RustraLian phiLosophers, in the grips of awfuL metaphysics, such as narrow empiricism and/or physicaiism. -32- ^The anaLysis semantical It of naturaL a is Law is that' Law-constrained worLds, naturaL worids. The interpretation ruLe for necessity. Terra, appLy but to Like is It shouLd be noted that geophysicaL features, appLied in seLecting worLds, are not of course confined to systems. in terns of geophysicaL pLanetary other "Rn eLaboration of this type of answer can be further expLoited to heLp why actuaL the standard ot worLd is science expLain comparativeLy so that simpLe, mathematicaLLy tractabLe, etc. HameLy, it is convenientLy so because the actuaL worLd seLection invoLved impLicitLy to render it so, by choice of a serves worLd with the compLexity of richer worLds removed and onLy tractabLe ideaL etements (such as scientific universaLs) adjoined. &RLtern3tiveLy, through quantum and borrowing positive feedback, a massive firebaLL forms. The story admits of much variation. ? The prob Lems, as the questions of the Lattice in diagram 2 indicate, what expLaining phiLosophers does exist, Lie with what does not. In a reLated way, 3LL those not papers on the prob Lems nonexistence of and nonexistents have misjudged the prob Lernatic, and misconceived the onus of proof. For commonLy the probLems concern existents and their behaviour; nonexistents, especiaLLy those functioning in expLanatory rotes as regards existentiai often behaviour, are very weLL behaved by comparison with existents. It has been suggested, by D. Lewis, that the underLying theory of items (of JB) renders everything exists. But it nonexistent, is and makes it 3 reaL probLem, how anything patentiy faLse that the theory of items render everything nonexistent. There are criteria for existence, which are often JB, chapter 9). Every thing nominaLists normaLLy take to satisfied (cf. exist satisfies the to be justified; it cannot (with any pretension to satisfactoriness) just be cLaimed, in the fashion of so many phiLosophers. In any case, Lewis can be simuLated: whatever ind iv idua Ls exist criteria. Beyond that existence has in Lewis worLds wiLL exist in worids-seLection theory. Rnd it is. a genuine phiLosophicaL probLem how anything exists. g in 19t+6; see his cosmoLogicaL text. Llhitrow aLso appLied, more than RpparentLy a quarter of a century ago, PrincipLe , in his what has now been eLevated to the Rnthropic answer to why the dimensions of space are three; nameLy, th3t this atone permits the evoLution of Nan, the formuiator of the probLem'. However 'Uhitrow's reasons concern not mankind but stabLe pLanetary orbits and compLex neurai networks' (LI, p.!^). g Compare the binding energy which keeps etectrons bound to a nucLeus, where correiativeiy energy stored up in overcoming forces of repuLsion is positive. -33- e a story couLd be totd to bring Laws within the expLanation framework. However It wouid teLLing invoLve Laws first evoLved or happened to hoLd, the how before vacuum fLuctuations. (For some interesting specuLation, from which the ontic and anthropic commitment can be removed without totaL Loss, see Barrow pp. 151-2, where "chaotic gauge theory" is considered.) The issue of uLtimate is expLanation again up taken seLf-justifying postulate as serving refLexive, expLanation. Note that in UQ, to the resoLve the matter the especiaLLy of probLem uLtimate, PostuLate Characterisation a of of object-theory is an initiaLLy promising candidate for such a principte. issue is that, on the story as toLd, quantum phenomena assume Another serious decidedLy they course Of macro-dimensions. may, Schrodinger s cat iLLustrates, but perhaps not in the parabLe the as supposed of catastrophic form. In the absence of any approved quantization of general, reLativity, there onLy are Lax physicaL controis on what is in and what is out in specuLation here. Rnd, of course, the second story couid There are other mechanisms for the sudden be rise in eLaborsted other ways. e.g. white mass-energy, of ho Les in geometrodynamics. In his second paper, Tryon makes a rather casuaL beginning on meeting some of difficuLties the with the vacuum fLuctuation theory the cosmos, and of expLains the advantages of combining the theory with that of a (stiLL probLematic) "infLationary" universe, to boost the fLuctuation. But the theory stiLL awaits aporopriateLy detaiLed deveiopment and modeLLing. 12 There are various other issues concerning the physicaL constants, incLuding the question of the (sLow) evoLution of "constants" over time. LJeLL, do evoLve, the they if same sort of probLems arise for the parameters which repLace them (L.e. at each time t, for c(t)). There are putative arguments to the effect that there can be no very grand unified theory, and no finaL eLimination of constants, because any such theory wouid do too much in determ in ing the worLd (and things). But it is unctear at present how such an argument gets duty eLaborated. R tight argument uneLiminabiLity of some physicaL constants from physicaL principLes for the wouLd be of much interest. 13 Th',s is what is reaLLy accompLLshed in Carter. To some extent we have emerging in this area a contemporary scientific numeroLogy. 1L Convergence arguments, e.g. for such things as the Church-Turing thesis, underLying connections, but not co-operation. l^Even Less, seemingLy, is the universe an accident, 'an event proceeding from an unknown cause; something unexpected; a casuaLty, a mishap, l&If however the worLd reaLLy were necessary, such improbabiLity must be grossLy -34- reduced. How can that be: how can these contingencies be not what theg seem? 1? How M3ng worLds? ContinuousLg mang worLds? There is no reason whg not. But the answer is: as mang at Least as required. In object-theorg numbers don t short matter though much, so difficuLties technccaL controL Ls advantage. an are There as to measures, e.g. of fewness, in infinite modeLLings. Yet the notions are Ln order, e.g. among the naturaL numbers primes are few. 18 point, ThL^, and the inestimabLLitg specific of probabLLLties Ln (e.g. Ls argued, though in insufficient detaiL, bg TouLmLn among others meteoroLogg) Bg the wag, sureLg a creator wouLd have increased probabLLitLes bg seeing to a unLverse for fit decent habitation; a variation upon the argument from evLL infiltrates itseLf Ln probabiLitg guise here. 13 worked There are in fact mang proposed soLutions, most of them not theg (because far verg out have onLg few proponents), most of them not comprehensive certainLg (but it couLd be argued that this is a faLse ideaL), severaL of them discussed bg Everett, DeMLtt, Lande and others. 20 MheeLer s sequentiaL modeL another, so satisfgLng the theorg (Like certain offers a simitar range of worLds, but one after 'reaLLtg principLe". EarLLer MheeLer had adopted cosmoLogies) Eastern with in muLtLpLLcitg a both sequent La LLg and Lnto the possibLe; but recent Lg he has abandoned dimen^Lon^,, the Latter, partig on erroneous ontoLogLcaL grounds. 21 It Ls of course not the onLg reaLLstLc-stgie LnterpretatLon whLch does thLs: envisage everu Lande s LnterpretatLon is another. 22 From a neutraL viewpoint, Lt ts entLreLg taLse that atom ... as Me must constantLg engaging in this tgpe of scattering sctLvitg, therebg spLLtting the worLd again and again Lnto a stupendous number carbon-copLes of of LtseLf. The unLverse must therefore be LLkened to a tree, whLch branches 3nd (D p.I25). Nor Ls rebranches universe. 23 To anticipate, schemas of what the form, happens "if the tree-structured sgstern of universes the is as foLLows:- The antecedents of "anthropic" there exist so and so [e.g. observers] then ang phgsLcaL worLds must be such and such", are appLLed to phgsLcaL worLds. Rs there certainLg do exist so and so, narrow ctass the phgsLcaL worLds of are restricted to those that are such and such. gL It cs stLLL reasonabLe to 3sk whg - indeed to e.g. whg do we inhabit it?, whence a Long pose' severaL whg questions, evoLutionarg storg. Mhg are the constants those theg are?, then aLternative answers, LncLudLng brute fact, are among the possibiLities. -35- roundLg defeated Shapiro. 26 bg the sorts considerations advanced bg Feinberg and of Davies aLso suggests that mang-worLds theorg can provide a pLausibLe phgsicaL (as opposed to phiLosophicaL) justification for the strong principte (D p.122 middLe). In fact he never reaLLg shows this satisfactoriig (nor can it be so shown), and in pointing to the power of the m3ng—universe theorg he undermines the strong principte, showing it otiose. 2? arguments are presented in modat form, with the connecting quo status Often scheme set in either necessitated form, if F that) (e.g. T if exist there necessaritg then (it if possibLe modaLities are de dicto and and that invoLved cLaims the It such). if F then T. The modaLitg invoLved is not one of LogicaL contingent nomic of that strength, but can be adequateLg NecessariLg, necessitg, an The error. argument guarantee the concLusion, NecessariLg T, nor does it pretend form these or even in Lowest common denominator form. To attach the (reLative) modaLitg simpig to consequent T wouLd be second is 'it is more than mereLg rather reads that seems represented, as usuaL, through a necessitated connecting schema, one F form, (e.g. what is the case LocaLLg (what observers observe, T etc.) is onLg possibLe if phgsics is such aLwags be and so, then the universe must have, or so conform to, such and such features), or, in quasi-transcendentaL onLg must to do does not so. The is a LittLe more probLematic; but it appears to assert that F is inconsistent with not-T, and so, through obvious connections, the same as the rectified first form. 28 Mhat we have are devices, that fragments of theories, ruLes thumb, of appear to work in a range of cases. and caLcuLating It is these parts that mag generate successfuL technoiogg. The picture is Like engineering. 29 R main charge made bg LesLie against mang-worid cosmoLogies, e.g. LI, p.l^Sff. It is a surprising turn, given the popuLaritg of hgpothetico-deductive methodoLogg, to have it aLso objected that mang-worLd theorg voids induction. Putting chance in controL of inter-worLd differences erodes confidence in our sampLe of ReaLitg, on which our inductions are based' (LI, p.1^.3). this objection gets off the ground (it is transparentLg Insofar cLear as that it does), it depends on assuming the reaLitg of the entire worLd ensembLe. So Lt not Lapses against a neutraL theorg. 30 R reLated phitosophicaLLg important exampLe where the schema does so far is in Moore s proof of an externaL worLd, noted above. The reason is that the existence of arbitrarg materiaL objects, such as hands or does f3it not guarantee that the requirements (order, isoLated unitg, cabbages, coherence, mcnd-cndependence, etc.) for an externaL worLd are satisfied. 31 Rn earLier version of this paper was presented at the RustraLasian Rssociation of PhiLosophg Conference, Rugust 138^. The -36- heLpfuL comments bg David Rrmstrong, Brian Ellis and David Lewis, unreferenced above, were the discussion. commentaries; Both several made during John Leslie and Jack Smart supplied me with worthwhile their points have been incorporated, but some have of been resisted. The initial Univerity preprint series. version W3S published in an Rustralian National 32^ See Freeman, p.IS. for fuller discussion of need for reparation, see Burnet. Rnaximander's on position; the REFERENCES J.D. Barrow, Rnthropic definitions', Quarterly Journal of Royal the Rstroncmical Society 21^ ( 1983) lt+6-153 H. Bondi, Cosmology, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, I960. R, Brout, F. Englert and F. Gunzig, The creation of the universe as a quantum phenomenon' RnnaIs of Physics 115 (1978) 78-106. J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, Fourth edition, Rdam & Charles Black, London, 1930. B. Carter, Large number coincidence and the anthropcc principle is in Longair, 291-98. B. Carter, The anthropic principle and its implications cosmology', biological for evolution , Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London (1983) St* 7-363. C.B. Collins and S.U. Hawk eng, Uhy is the universe isotrophic?', 19310 Rstrophqsics Journal 180 (1973) 317. C.D. Darlington, Darwin's Place in History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1959. P. Davies, The Rccidental Universe, Cambridge Universitu Press, Cambridge, 1982; referred to as D. P. Davies, God and the New Physics, Dent, London,1983; B.S. DeUitt referred to as G. and N. Graham, The Many-Uorlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1973. R.H. Dicke and P.J.E. Peebles, in S.U. Hawking and U. The big bang cosmology - enigmas and nostrums , Israel, eds, Genera 1 relativity: an Einstein centenary survey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 501^-517. -37- G.F.R. ELLis, 'is the universe expanding?', GeneraL Reiativitg and Gravitation 9(2) (L973) 87-9L. G. Feinberg and R. Shapiro, Life Beyond Earth, Morrow, New York, 1980. P. Feyerabend, Science Ln a Free Society, New Left Books, London, 1978. 'RnthropLc answers and the existence of P. Forrest, Proceedings God', of the Russet Lan Society, University of Sydney, 7 (1982) 1-13. K. Freeman, RncLLLa to the Pre-Socratic Phitosophers, BLackweLL, Oxford, 1971. N. Griffin and R. SyLvan, Provisionai Rnswers to ULtimate Questions, typescript, Canberra, 1981}.; referred to as UQ. S. Hawking and G.F. ELiis, The Large-Scaie Structure of Space-time, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, (trans. R. Mannheim), YaLe University Press, New Haven, 1959. C.G. HempeL, Rspects of Scientific Exp LanatLon, Free Press, New York, 1965. Lande, The Laws behLnd the quantum Laws , BrLtLsh JournaL for the PhiLosophu of Science 27 (1976) 27-^3. J. L^sLLe, RnthropLc prLncLpLe, worLd ensembLe, desLgn , RmerLcan PhLLosophLcaL QuarterLy, 19 (1982) l^l-lSl; referred to as LI. J. LesLLe, Cosmo Logy, probabLLity and the need to exp La Ln LLfe', Ln ScLentLfLc ExpLanatLon and UnderstandLng (ed. N. Rescher), UnLversLty Press of RmerLea, MaryLand, M.S. LongaLr 1983, 53-82; referred to as L2. (ed.), Confrontat Lon of Cosmo Log LeaL Theories wLth ObsservatLonaL Data, ReLdeL, Dordrecht, 1971}.. C.U. MLsner, K.S. Thorne and J.R. UheeLer, GravLtatLon, Freeman, San 1973. G.E. Moore, PhLLosophLcaL Papers, RLLen and UnwLn, London, FrancLsco, 1959. R. RobLnson, Essays Ln Greek PhLLosophg, CLarendon Press, Oxford, 1969. R. RoutLey, ExpLorLng MeLnong's JungLe and Beyond, Research SchooL ScLences, RustraLLan NatLonaL UnLversity, 1980; referred to as JB. -38- of SociaL Sagan Broca's Brain: Ref Leet ions on the Romance of Science, New York, Random House, 1973. S.Tou Lm in, The Return to CosmoLogy: Postmodern Nature, University of CaLifornia Press, BerkeLey Ca., 1982. Is the universe a vacuum fLuctuation?', Nature 2^6 (1973) 396-7 E.P. Tryon, E.P. Tryon, Science and the Theo Logy of *Mhat made the worLd?', New Scientist 101 (198!+) It+00, 1!+-16 FLN. Mhitehead, Process and ReaLity, Cambridge University Press, 1929. 6.H. Uhitrow, The Structure and Evo Lution of the Universe, Harper, New York, 1959. Second edition,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 57, Item 2: Draft of Toward an improved cosmo-logical synthesis Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, correction version. Paper published, Sylvan R (1985) 'Toward an improved cosmo-logical synthesis', Grazer philosophische Studien, 25:135-179. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 57, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:991d123">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:991d123</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - location not listed in manuscript finding aid Box 57: Miscellaneous Logic https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/f51dc99ef93d040908b142ebb835179a.pdf d210fbed6580d80dafbf3af881e514fc PDF Text Text Elaboration of *Nuclear energy and obligations to the future*: A note on expertise and methodology. Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about nuclear physics, should be dealing with this area, which surely should be left to the province of the real experts in the area, nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority in the area of nuclear power. One of the most irritating things in this area for a philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by themselves and others, as experts and authorities whose pronounce­ ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen (see e.g. articles [15] and [16]), when in fact the issues involve quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^ matters concerning which the so-called ’’authorities" and "experts" commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy. Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly they are just as important. Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be "experts" or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non ­ philosophers. Rejection of the argument from authority is basic in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond, and forming a basic position without which the subject, as critical inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and traditionally has. Indeed rejection of the argument from authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper from closely related areas such as theology, casuistry, some �2. areas of legal thought and various types of apology. But a form /of the argument from authority*—the claim to entitlement to have one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says and how sound it is,!^ but of who one is - appears however to be an important element in the modern cult of the ''scientific expert" which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian discussion of the neclear issue. While most philosophers would reject the view that they were "experts" in this sense on values or moral issues, philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions about values or morality, and expose defects in arguments. Most philosophers also have moral view’s, that is, they believe some things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable, although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without use of explicit moral terminology. In writing this paper then we don’t hope to be accepted as ’authorities’ or ’experts’ on moral questions, but only to have skills which may throw light on some areas. We have tried to bring out value and moral assumptions, expose logical defects and inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in certain sorts of argumentsconcerning the future, and to argue that if one accepts a certain moral judgment (which we accept and which we believe would be widely agreed on*), one should, if one is going to be consistent, non-arbitrary, and follow through one’s principles, accept a certain other one. This seems to us a propei area for philosophical work. The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in substance only those of the Fox Report (p.110, in particular)• * We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree wit! virtually every statement we make. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Elaboration of *Nuclear energy and obligations to the future*: A note on expertise and methodology. Some people may ask why philosophers, who know nothing about nuclear physics, should be dealing with this area, which surely should be left to the province of the real experts in the area, nuclear physicists and those with direct experience and authority in the area of nuclear power. One of the most irritating things in this area for a philosopher is the sight of such people constantly presented, by themselves and others, as experts and authorities whose pronounce­ ments on the issue should be accepted without question by laymen (see e.g. articles [15] and [16]), when in fact the issues involve quite crucially issues of and assumptions about values and morality^ matters concerning which the so-called ’’authorities" and "experts" commonly know less than the average first year student in philosophy. Value issues and moral issues and issues of social and political theory are probably more crucially concerned in the nuclear issues than are issues of fact concerning nuclear power, and certainly they are just as important. Few philosophers nowadays would want to claim to be "experts" or "authorities" on matters of value or morality in the way nuclear experts claim to be authorities on matters of nuclear power, who can tell people what to do in way which is authoritative or which must be uncritically accepted by the non-experts/non ­ philosophers. Rejection of the argument from authority is basic in proper philosophical method, going back to Plato and beyond, and forming a basic position without which the subject, as critical inquiry into basic assumptions, could not operate as it does and traditionally has. Indeed rejection of the argument from authority is one feature which distinguishes philosophy proper from closely related areas such as theology, casuistry, some 2. areas of legal thought and various types of apology. But a form /of the argument from authority*—the claim to entitlement to have one’s word or views accepted, not on the basis of what one says and how sound it is,!^ but of who one is - appears however to be an important element in the modern cult of the ''scientific expert" which has played such a large part in the contempory Australian discussion of the neclear issue. While most philosophers would reject the view that they were "experts" in this sense on values or moral issues, philosophers can fairly lay claim to a number of special skills which enable them to bring out explicit assumptions about values or morality, and expose defects in arguments. Most philosophers also have moral view’s, that is, they believe some things to be morally acceptable and others morally unacceptable, although some might prefer to express similar attitudes without use of explicit moral terminology. In writing this paper then we don’t hope to be accepted as ’authorities’ or ’experts’ on moral questions, but only to have skills which may throw light on some areas. We have tried to bring out value and moral assumptions, expose logical defects and inconsistencies in the structure of some of the arguments and in certain sorts of argumentsconcerning the future, and to argue that if one accepts a certain moral judgment (which we accept and which we believe would be widely agreed on*), one should, if one is going to be consistent, non-arbitrary, and follow through one’s principles, accept a certain other one. This seems to us a propei area for philosophical work. The non-philosophical or background factual assumptions which are essential for discussing the issue are not large, and are in substance only those of the Fox Report (p.110, in particular)• * We are sure that philosophers can be found who will disagree wit! virtually every statement we make.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 1: Draft of Elaboration of 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future': a note on expertise and methodology Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of draft, with handwritten emendations, undated. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.56 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:536f5c3">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:536f5c3</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - location unidentified in manuscript finding aid Box 59: Nuclear https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/a2d897c3f43419ae04104b4b7a0919b7.pdf 0ec140abbbef068d6ca7a2d80321fb03 PDF Text Text NUCLE AR POWER - I. ETHIC AL, SOC I AL AND POLltt AAL DI MiN S I ONS COMPETING PARADIGMS AN D THE NU CLEAR DEBAT E. 1870 One ha rdly needs initia t i on i nt o the dark my s te ri e s of nucl ear ph ys i cs to contribu te use f ully t o t he debat e no w wid e l y r anging ov e r nuc lear powe r . While ma ny i mpo r tan t empi rica l que stions ar e s t i ll unr e s olved, t hese do not r e a lly l i e a t th e ce nt r e of t he con t r ove rsy. In st e ad, it is a de ba t e about val ue s . .. ma ny of the que s tions ~hi ch a ri s e are s oc i al an d et hica l one s . 1 Socio logical inves tigation s have conf i rme d that th e n ucl ea r deba t e is primaril y one ove r what is wor th having or pursuing and over what we a re ent i t l ed to do to o th e rs . They ha ve also confirme d tha t t he debate i s polaris ed a lon g t he li nes o f compe ting paradigm s. 2 Accordin g to the entre nc he d parad i gm dis ce rn e d, that conste llation of value s , attitude s and be liefs o fte n ca ll e d t he Domi nan t So ci a l Pa radigm (hereaft er the Old Paradigm ), economic criteria be come the be nchmark by whi ch a wi de ran ge of individu al and social action is judged and e va luat e d . And be li e f in the market and marke t mechan isms is quit e ce ntral . Clust e rin g around this core belief is the convicti on th a t e nt e r p r i s e flou r is hes bes t i n a system of r isks and rewards, that di ffe r e nti als a r e neces sary ..• , and in the nece ssity for some fo r m o f di vis i on of labour, and a hi e rarchy of skills and exper t is e . In pa rt i cul a r, t here i s a be li e f in th e comp e t e nce o f e xperts i n gener a l and of sci entis t s in pa r ticular . the re is an empha s i s on q uantif i ca t ion . 3 The ri v a l world view , sometime s c all e d t he Alte rnative Environm e ntal Par ad igm (the New Paradi gm) dif f ers on almos t e ve ry pcint , and, acco rdin g t o so ciologi sts , in ways summari sed i n th e fo llowing t a bl e 4 Domi nant Socia l Para digm CORE VALUES Ma te r i a l (e conomic growth , progress an d dev elopmen t ) Na tu ra l env ironment va lu e d as resourc e Dom i nat i on over na t ur e Al t e rn a tive Env ir onme nt al Pa rad igm Non-ma terial (se l f -r eali sa t io n) Na t ural e nvir onm e nt i ntrin s i cally valu ed Ha r mo ny with na tu r e ECONOMY* Ma rket forces Ri s k a nd rewa r d Rewa r ds for ach i evemen t Diff e rent i a l s Individ ua l se lf-help Public i nte r es t Sa fety Incomes r elat ed t o nee d Egali t a r ian Co ll ective/soc i al provi s i on PO LITY Authori t at iv e s t ru c t ures (e xp e r t s in flue ntia l) Hi e r a r ch1.c a l Law and order Ac t io n through o ffi c ia l i nst it ut io ns Pa rtic ip a tive s t ruc t ur e s ( ci ti zen/ wo r ke r invo lveme n t ) No n- hi era r chical Liberation Di r ec t a c ti o n SOCIETY Ce ntr a lised La r ge-s ca le As socia tional Or der ed Dece ntr a l ised Small - s ca l e Communa l Flexib l e NATURE Ampl e rese r ves Nature host il e/ ne u t r a l Envi r onmen t cont roll a ble Earth ' s r esou r c e s lim i ted Nature be nign Na t ure de l i ca t el y ba l a nc ed KNOWLEDGE Co nf idence in sc i ence and t ec hnology Ra t i onal i t y of mea ns (only) Li mit s t o sc i e nce Rati ona lit y of en ds *Stat e socia l ism , as pr a ctised i n mo s t of t he " Eastern b l oc" , di ffers as to eco nomi c o r ganisation , t he ma r ket i n pa r ticula r be i ng rep l ac ed sys tem hy ~ comma nd sy st e m) . Bu t sin c e t he r e i s v irt ual l y no debate r·o ni i nes 'l l s r a t <! ., ociali sm , 5 that mJnnr va riant on th e Old Para digm from t he Ol d Pa rad i gm r eall y on ly by cen t ral planning (a ma r ke t over o nu c lea r futu r e within t he ne ed no t be de lineat ed he r e . �2 No doubt the competing paradigm picture is a trifle simple (and subs equently it is important to disentangle a Modified Old Paradigm, which softens the old econ omic assumptions with social welfa r e requirements : really and instead of a New Paradigm there are rather count erpa radigms, a cluster of not very well worked out positions that diverge from the cluster marked out as the Old Paradigm) . Nonetheless it is empi rically investigable, and, most important, it enables the nuclear debate to be focuss ed . Large - scale nuclear development, of the sort now occurring in much of the world , runs counter to leading tenets (such as societal features) of the New Pa radigm. Indeed to introduce ethical and social dimensions into the assessment of nucl ear power, instead of or in addition to merely economic factors such as cost and efficiency, is already to move somewhat beyond the recei ved paradigm. For under the Old Paradigm, strictly construed, th e nuclear debate is confined to the tenns of the narrow utilitarianism up on which contemporary economic practice is p r emisse d, the issues to questions of economic means (to assumed economistic ends) along with technological, social engineering and other instrumental details : whatever falls outside these terms is ( dismissed as) . . 1.6 irrationa Furthermore, nuclear development rece ive s its support from adherents of the Old Paradigm. Virtually all the arguments in favour of it are set within the assumption frame.work of the Old Paradigm, and without these assumptions the case for the nuclear future the world is presently committed to fails . But in fact the argument for a nuclear future from the Old Paradigm is itself broken-backed and ultimat ely fails, unless the free enterprise economic assumptions are replaced by th e ethically unacceptable assumptions of advanced (corporate) capitalism . The two paradigm picture also enables our case against a nuclear future (a case written from outside the Old Paradigm) to be structured. . 7 main parts : - There are two It is argue d, firstl y , from without the Old Paradigm, that nuclear development is ethically unjustifiable; but that, secondly, even from within the framework of the ethically dubious Old Paradigm, such development is unacceptable, since significant features of nuclear development conflict with indispensible features of the Paradigm (e . g . co sts of project development and state subsidization with market independence and crite ria for project selection) . It has appeared acceptable from within the dominant paradigm only because ideals do not square with practice, only because the assumptions of th e Old Paradigm are but very rarely applied in contemporary political practice, �3 th e place of pure (or mixed) capitalism having been usurped by corporate capitalism. It is because the nuclear debate can be carried on within th e framework of the Old Paradigm that the debate - although it is a debate about values, because of the conflicting values of the competing paradigms - is not just a debate about values; it is also a debate within a paradigm as to means to already assumed (economistic) ends, and of rational choice as to energy options within a predetermined framework of values. (In this corner belong, as explained in section VIII, most decision theory argume nts, arguments often considered as encompassing all the nuclear debate is ethically about, best utilitarian me ans to predetermined ends . ) For another leading characteristic of the nuclear deb a te is the attempt, under the dominant paradigm to remove it from the ethical and social sphere, and to divert it into specialist issues whe th e r over minutiae and contingenci es of present techno l ogy o r ove r medical or legal or mathematical details. 8 The double approach can be applied as regards each of t he main problems nuclear development poses. There are many i nte rr ela t ed problems, and the argument is further structured in terms of these. For in the advancement and promotion of nucle ar power we encounter a remarkable combination of factors, never befo re assembled : establishment, on a massive scale , of an industry which involves at each stage of its processing serious risks and at some stages of p roduction possible catastrophe , which delivers as a by-product rad ioactive wastes which require up to a million years' storage but for which no sound and e conomic storage methods are known, which grew up as part of the war industry and which is easily subverted to deliver nuclear weapons, which r equires for i t s operation considerable secrecy, limitations on the flow of informa tion and r es trictions on civil liberties, which depends for its economics, and in orde r to generate expected profits, on substantial state subsidization, supper½ and intervention. with problems. It is, in short, a very high techological develo pmen t, beset A first important problem, which serves also to exemplify e thical issues and principles involved in other nuclear power que st i on s , is th e unreso l ved matter of disposal of nuclear wastes. II . THE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM, AND THE TRAIN PARABLE . A long distance country train has just pulled out. crowded carries both pass e ngers and fr e i gh t. The train which is At an early stop in the journey someon e con signs as freight, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a high ly toxic and exp losive gas. This is packaged in a very thin container which, as the consigner is aware, may not contain th e gas for the �4 full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if th e train should strike any real trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the train becomes very hot, if the train should be derailed or involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interefere inadvertently o r deliberately with the freight, perhaps trying to steal some of it. these sorts of contingencies have occurred on some previous journeys. All of If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while othe r s could be maimed or incur serious diseases. Most of us would roundly condemn such an action. consigner of the parcel say to try to justify it? What might the He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will , that the world needs his pr~uct and it is his duty to supply it , and that in a ny case he is not responsible for th e train or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however wo uld norrrally be seen as ludicrous when set in this context . What is worth remarking is that similar excuses are not always so seen I when the consigner, again a "responsible" b usin essman , puts his workers ' health or other peoples ' welf are at risk. Suppose he ways that it is hi s own and otherd press ing needs which justify his action. The company he controls,which produces the material as a by-product , is in bad financia l straits, and could not afford to produce a better container even if it knew how to make one. If the company fails , he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and th e whole company town, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effe ct, will be worse off. The poor and unemployed of the town, whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer espe cially. Few people would accept such a story, even if correct, as justification . Even where there are serious risks and costs to ones e lf or some group for whom one is concerned one is usually considered not t o be entitled to simply transfer the heavy burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they a ri se from one's own, or one's group 's, chosen life-style. The matter of nuclear waste disposal has many moral features which resemble the train case . How fitting the analogy is will become apparent as th e argument progresses . There is no known proven safe way to package th e highly toxic wastes generated by the nuclear plants that will be spread around th e world as large- scale nuclear development goes ahead. 9 The waste problem will be much more serious than that generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, with �5. each one of the 2000 or so reactors envisaged by the end of the century producing, on average , annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb . Much of this waste is extremely t oxic . For example, a millionth of a gramme of plutonium is enough to induce a lung cancer . Wastes will include the reactors themselves, which will have to be abandoned after the ir expected life times of perhaps 40 years , and which, some have estimated, may require l½ million years to reach saf e levels of radioactivity. Nuclear wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environ ment fo r th e ir entire active lifetime. For fission products the required storage period a ve rages a thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include plutonium, there is a half to a million yea r storage problem . Serious problems have aris en with both short-term and proposed long-t erm methods of storage, e ven with th e comparatively small quantities of waste produced ove r th e last 10 twenty years. Short-term methods of storage require continued human in t e rven tion, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human i nterference and risk of leakage through non-human factors . No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period whose flu ctua tion s in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice Ages , could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be provided for the vast period of time involved. Nor does the history of human affa irs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years . Proposed long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formations or in salt mines, are largely speculative and relatively untested, and have already pro ved to involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice. Even as regards expensive recent proposals for first embedding concentrated wastes in glass and encapsulating the r e sult in multilayered metal containe rs before rock deposit , simulation mo dels reveal that radioactive material may not rema in suitably is ola ted from human environment . 11 In short, the best pres ent storage proposals carry very real possibilities of irradiating future people and . h . . lla d amaging t eir environment. Given the heavy costs which could be involve d fo r the future, and given the known limits of technology, it is methodological ly unsound to bet, as nuclear nations have, on the discovery of safe procedures for storage of wastes. Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on present proposals, and subject to the same inadequacies. For instance , none of the proposed methods for safe storage has been properly test e d, and they may �6. well prove to involve unforeseen difficultie s and risks when an attemp t is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guaran t ee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological or future µuman factors . But even if an economicall y viable, rigorously safe long t e rm storage method could be devised , there is the problem of gua rantee ing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be (especially if, as appears likely, such a method proved expensive economicall y and politically ) seems to p r esuppose a level of efficiency, pe rfection and concern for the f u ture which has not previously been e ncountere d in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nucl ea r industry. 12 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long t e rm storage sites through pe rhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weaponsgrade radioactive material will be accessible , over much of the million year storage peri od, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it. Th e assumption that a way will nonetheless be found , before 2000, which gets around the wastestorag e problem (no longer a nere disposal problem) is accordingly not rationally based, but is rather like many assumpti ons of way s , an article of faith . It is an assunption supplied by the Old Par adigm, a no limitations ass ump tion , that there are really no (developmen t) problems that cannot be solved technologic ally (if not in a fash i on that is always immediately economi cally feasible). The assumption has played an important part in development plans and pra ctic e. It has not only encouraged an unwarrant e d technolog ical optimism (not to say hubris 13 ), that there are no limits to what humans can accomplish , es pe cially through science ; it has led t o the embarcation on projects before crucial problems have been satisfactor ily solved or a solution is even in sight , and it has led to th e idea that technology can always be suitably controlled . It has also led, not surprisingl y, to disasters . There are severe limits on what technology can achieve (some of which a r e becoming known in the form of limitation theorems 14 ); and in addition there are human limitations which modern technologic al development s often fail to take due account of (risk a nalysis of the likelihood of reactor accidents is a relevant example, discuss e d below) . The original nuclear technology dream was that nuclear fissi on would provide unlimi t ed energy (a 'clean unlimited supply of power '). That dr e am soon shattered. The nu clear industry apparently remains a net consume r of power, and nuclear fission will be but a quite shor t-t erm supplier of power. 15 �) 7. The risks imposed on the future by proceeding with nuclea r development are , then, significant. Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the (suspect) breeder r eactor it could be an energy source for only perhaps 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be se riously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 40,000 generations of futur e people could be fo rced to bear significant risks resulting from the provision of the (extravagant) energy use of only a small proportion of the people o f 10 generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials th e only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the fu ture . Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem , that of making a transition t o renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably , again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it . For they may well have to face the change to renewable res ources in an over- populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dreams of global industrialisation are realised , more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associat ed technology and heavy resource use and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it . It will , moreover, probably be a world which is larg ely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which su ch r enewable r eso urces as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life , 15a are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against th e idea th a t future people mGst be , if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy , at least indirect beneficiaries . It is for such reasons th at the train pa rabl e cannot be turned around to work in favour of nuclear power, with for exampl e , the nuclear train bringing relief as well as wastes to a remote town powered (onl y) by nuclear power. The 'solution" then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems . Like the consigner in the train parable, contemporary industrial society proposes, in order to ge t itself out of a mess arising from its chosen life style - the creation of e conomies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding benefits . The " solution" may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes �8. in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties, whose opportunity to lead decent lives may be seriously jeopardised. Industrial society has - under each paradigm, so it will be argued - cl e ar alternatives to · this action, which is taken essentially to avoid changing corporately-controlled patterns of consumption and protect the interest of those comparatively few who benefit from them . If we apply to the nuclear situation, so perceived , the standards of behaviour and moral principles generally acknowledged (in principle if perhaps of t en not in fact ) in the contemporary wo rld, it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that nuclear development involves gross injustice with respect to 15a th e future . There appear to be only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of the nuclear pa rcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances, for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to imply that there are no circumstances in which such an action might be justifiable, or at least whe re the matter is less clearcut. It is the same with the nuclear case . Just as in the cas e of the consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in th e present case. We consider these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development in turn, beginning with the ques tion of our obligations to the future. Resolution of this question casts light on other ethical questions concerning nuclear development. It is only when these have been considered that the matter of whether there are overriding circumstances is taken up again (in section VII). III OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE. The especially problematic area is that of the distant (i.e . non-immediat e) fut ure, the futur e with which people alive today will have no direct contact: by comparison, the immediate future gives fewer problems for most ethical theories. In fact the question of obliga tions to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass , and also has serious repercussions in political philosophy as regards the adequacy of accepted (democra ti c and other) institutions which do not take due account of the interests of future creatures. �9. Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on the issue. A good many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same considerations being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them a lesser weight, those who deny or who are committed by their general moral position to denying that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those who come down with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that th ere are no moral obligations to the future beyond perhaps those to the next gene ration . According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained, there are no moral restrictions on a ct ing or failing to act deriving from the ef fect of our actions on future people . Of those philosophers who say , or whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, who have opted for the unconstrained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some temporal or spatial contiguity . Th us moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time ( o r sometimes in space) . Fo r example, obligation is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also non-transitive . Among su ch suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or r eq uirements on moral obligation , which would rule out obligations to the nonimmediate future are these :- Firstly there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his r ights or en titlement . People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing effective to e nforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly , there a re those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement . But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders, and there couid be no guarantee that any contemporary institutions would do it for them . �10. Both the view that moral obligation requires the cont ex t of a moral community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rul e out th e distant future as a field of moral obligation as they not only require a commonality or some sort of common basis which cannot be guaranteed in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive r ela tions of short duration such as sympathy and love. As well there are difficulties about love and sympathy for (non-existent ) people in the far distant futu r e about whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who may well be committed to a life-style for which one has l ittle or no sympa th y . On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future peop l e ; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary people had no obligations concerning future people and could damage them as it suited them. What all these views have in common is a picture of obligation as some thing acquired, either individually or institutionally , something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. pa rticipatin g in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can fail to have (e . g . love, sympathy, empathy). 16 Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually (and correctly) thought to characterise obligation such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features) are lost, especially where there is a choice wh e ther or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so as to whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. The view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act however one likes with respect to them, is not however sustainable. Consider, for example , a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch . No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of ... �11. the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictab le result of the action. The unconstra ined position clearly implies that this is an acceptabl e moral enterpris e, that whatever else we might legitimat ely criticize in the scientis ts' experimen t, perhaps its being ove r-e xpensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to futu re people . The unconstra ined position also endorses as morally acceptabl e the following sort of policy: - A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining , processin g and manufactu ring a new type of material which, although it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendan ts, will over a pe ri od of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous ep idemi c of cancer among the inhabitan ts of the earth at that time . According to the unconstra ined view the firm is free to act in its own interests , without any considera tion for the harm it does r emote future people. Such counterex amples to the unconstra ined view, which are easily vari e d and multiplie d , might seem childii>hl y obvious. Yet the unconstra ined position concernin g the future f rom which they follow is far from being a straw man ; not only have several philosoph ers endorsed this position, but it is a cl e ar implicati on of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligatio n, as well as of prevailin g e conomic theory. It seems that those who opt for the unconstra ined position have not considere d such examples , despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that - we would certainly hope that - when it is brought out that the unconstra ined position admits such counterex amples , that being free to act implies among other thin gs being free to inflict pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for the unconstra ined position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What many of those who have put forward the unconstra ined position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligatio n is rather that · future people can look after themselve s, that we are not responsib le for their lives. The popular view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causal l y independe nt of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in the counterexample cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself . Present people are influenci ng it , and in doing so thereby acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsi bilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future, namely the obli gation to tak e accoun t i n what they do of people affected and their interests , to be care ful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probabili ty of their actions causing harm, and to see that th ey do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life. �12. Furth e rmore, to say that we are not respon s ible f o r th e lives o f future people does not amount to th e same thing as sayin g t hat we are fr ee to do as we like with r es pe ct to them , that there are no moral constraints on our act io n involving th e m. In just th e same way , th e fact that on e does no t hav e o r ha s not acquired an obliga tion to some stran ge r with whom one has ne ver been i nvolved , that on e has no responsibil ity for his life, does not imply that on e is fr ee t o do what on e like s with respect to him, for e xample to r ob him or to pursue some course of action of advantage to on e self which could s e riously ha rm him. These difficultie s for the uncons trained position arise in part from the (sometime s deliberate) failure to make an important distinction betwe e n acquired or assume d obligation toward somebody , for which some act of acquisition or a s sumption is required as a qualifying condition , and moral constraints , which require, for example, that one should not act so as t o damage or harm someone , a n d for which no act of acquisition is required. There i s a conside rable di ffer ence in the level and kind of responsibil ity involved. In the first cas e on e must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e . g. have loves, sy!ll)athy, be contracted. In the second case responsibil it y arises as a r e sult of being a causal agent who is aware of the cons eque nces o r probable consequence s of his action, and thus does not have to be es pecially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latt e r class , moral c onstra ints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult o r i mpossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfi e d . They appl y a s a result o f th e abil i t y to produce causal effects on the distant future of a r eas onably pr e dict a ble nature . Thus also moral constraints can apply to what do e s not (ye t) e xist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist . Wh ile it may pe rhaps be the case that there would need to be an acquired or a ssume d ob liga tion in order for it to be claimed that contemporar y people mus t make special sacrifices f or future people of an heroic kind, or even to he lp them e s pe cially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrain e d from harming them . Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigne r cannot argue in justificatio n of his action that he has never assumed or acquired re s ponsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no l ove or sympathy for th em and that t hey are not part of his moral community , in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one ne eds to argue concerning the train, and the nuclear case , is that there are mo ral constrain ts against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibil ity for the live s of people involved . There has been an attempt to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self- sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinction s between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogat ion this is just �13 . to misrep resent the positio n of these obliga tions. For exampl e, one is no more engagin g in heroic self-sa crifice by not forcing future people into an unviab le life positio n or by refrain ing from causing then direct harm than the consign er is resorti ng to heroic self-sa crifice in re frainin g from placing his dangero us package on the train. The conflat ion of moral restrai nts with acquire d obliga tion, and the attemp t there~ ith to view all constra ints as acquire d and to write off nonacq uired constr aints, is facilit ated through the use of the term ' moral obligat ion ' both to signify any type of deontic constra ints and also to indicat e r athe r someth ing which has to be assumed or require d . The conflat ion is encoura ged by reduct ionist positio ns which, in attemp ting to accoun t for obligat ion in genera l, mistake nly endeavo ur to collaps e all obligat ions . Hence the equa ti on , and some main roots of the uncons trained positio n, of the erron eous belief that there are no moral constr aint s concern ing the distant future. The uncons trained view tends to give way , under the weight of counte rexampl es , to more qualifi ed, and sometim es ambiva lent, positio ns , for example the positio n that our obliga tions are to immedi ate poster ity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immedi ate succes sors in a better conditi on, and that is all; 17 there are in practic e no obliga tions to the distan t futur e . A main argume nt in favour of the latter theme is that such obliga tions would in practic e be otiose . Everyth ing that needs to be accoun ted for can be en compass ed through the chain picture of obliga tion as linking succes sive genera tions, under which each genera tion has obliga tions, based on loves or sympath y , only to the succeed ing genera tion . The re are at least three objecti ons to this chain accoun t. First, it is inadeq uate to treat constr aints concern ing the future as if they applied only between genera tions, as if there were no questio n of constr aints on individ uals as opposed to whole genera tions, since individ uals can create causal effects , e . e. harm, on the future in a way which may create individ ual respon sibility , and which often cannot be sheeted home to an e ntire genera tion . Nuclea r power and its wastes , for exampl e, are strictl y the respon sibility of small groups of power- hol ders, not a genera tional respon sibility . Second ly, such chains, since non-tr ansitiv e, cannot yield direct obligat ions to the distan t future . But for this very r eason the chain pict ure cannot be adeq uate, as exampl es again show. For the pic ture is unable to explain severa l of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the exampl es already discuss ed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distan t future withou t affecti ng the next genera tion, who may not even be able to influen ce matters . �14. Thirdly, improvement s fo r immediate successors may be achieved at th e expense of disadvantag es to people of the more distant future . Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstanc es be most easily achieved by , ruining it for less immediate successors . Such cases can hardly be written off as "ne ver- never land" examples since many cases of environment al exploitatio n might be seen as of just this type. e . g . not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewab le resources and the long- term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overus e . If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from th e fa vouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed ove r time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests . IV . ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUTURE: ECONOMISTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS. While there are grave difficultie s for the unconstrain ed position, qualificatio n leads to a more defensible position. According to the main qualified position we a r e not entirely unconstrain ed with respe ct to the distant future , there are obligations , but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the pres ent and immediate future . The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, coun t for very much l ess than the interests of present people. Hence such thin gs as nuclear development and various exploitativ e activities which benefi t present people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewha t) disadvantag ed by them . The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in prevailing economic theories , where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of a discount rate , so dis counting costs and risks to future people. a t tempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingl y common , can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionab le in such an approach is that The economics should operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints , just as in practice it operates within legal constraints , not detennine what those constraints are. There are moreover alternative economic theories and simply to adopt, without further ado, one which discounts the future is to beg many questions at issue. �15. Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting the future, the most threadbare is based on the assumption that future generations will be better off than present ones, and so better placed to handle th e waste problem. 18 Since there is mounting evidence that future ge ne rations may well not be better off than present ones, especially in things that matter, no argume nt for discounting the interest s of future gcncrntionfl on thi s can carry much weight. Nor is that all that is wrong with the argument. biH:1i. B For it depends at base on the assumption that poorer contemporar ies would be making sacrifices to richer successors in foregoing such (allegedly beneficial) development s as nuclear power . That is, it depends on the already scotched sacrifice argument . In any case, for the waste disposal problem to be legitimatel y bequeathed to the future gene rations, it would have to be shown, what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will be , not just better off , but so much better off and more capable that they can duly absorb the nuclear waste burden. A more plausible argument for discounting is directly in terms of opportunity costs. It is argued , from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth much more than a dollar received in the non-immedia te future (because the first dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is required to obtain equivalent monetary values, and so for efficient allocation of resources . Similarly it is argued, by virtue again of equalizatio n of monetary value, that compensatio n - which is what the waste problem is taken to come to economica lly - costs much less now th an later . Thus a few pennies set aside (e.g . in a trust fund) now or in the future, if need be, will suffice to compensate eventually for any victims of remote radioactive waste leakage. There are, presently at least , insurmounta ble practical difficultie s about applying such discounting , e . g . how to de t ermine appropriate future discount rates . A more serious objection is that applied generally, the argument presupposes , what is false, that compensatio n, like value, can always be converted into monetary e quivalents , that peo ple (including those outside market frameworks) can be monetarily compensated for a variety of damages, i n cluding cancer and loss of life . There is no compensatin g a dead man, or for a lost species. In fact the argument presupposes a do uble reduction neither part of which can succeed : it is not just that value cannot in general be represented at all adequately monetarily , 19 but (as against utilitariani sm, for example) that constraints and obligations can not be somehow reduced to mat t ers of value . It is also presupposed that all decision me thods, suitable for requisite nuclear choices, �16. are bound to apply discounti ng . This is far from so : indeed Goodin argues that, on the contrary, more appropria te decision rules do not allow discounti ng, and discounti ng only works in practice with expected utility rules (such as underlie cost-bene fit and benefit-r isk analyses) , which are, he contends strictly inapplica ble for nuclear choices (since no t all outcomes can be duly determine d and assigned probabil ities, in the way that applicatio n of the rules requires. ). 20 As the preceding arguments reveal, the discounti ng move often has the same result as the unconstra ined position . If, for instance, we consider the cancer example and reduce costs to payable compensa tion, it is evident that over a sufficien tly long period of time discounti ng at curren t prices would lead to the conclusio n that there are no recoverab le damages and so , in economic terms, no constrain ts . In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the applicatio n of discoun t rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no more than about 15 years, 21 and applicati on of such rates would simply beg the question against the i.nterests and rights of future pe ople . Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type, for example , the whole method of discounti ng is simply inapplica ble, and its use would violate moral constrain ts . Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids th e objection s from cases of certain damage, comes from probabili ty considera tions. The distant future, it is argued , is much more uncertain than t he present and itillue diate fut ure, so that probabili ties are consequen tly lower, perhaps even approachi ng or coincidin g with zero for any hypothesi s concernin g the distant future. But then if we take ac count of probabil iti es in the obvious way , by simply multiplyi ng th e m against costs and benefits , it is evident that the interests of future people , except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty , must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbour ing people where (much ) high~r probabil ities are attached. So in the case of confl ict between the present and the future where it i s a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediat e future against a much lower probabili ty of indetenni nate costs to an indetermi nate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved . But of course it cannot be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nucle ar case, especial ly if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years , with consequen t risk of serious harm to thousands of ge nerations of future people, in order to obtain doubtful benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportuni ty to maintain corporati on profitabi lity or to continue unnecess arily high energy use. And even if the costs an d benefits were comparabl e or evenly weighted, �" 17. such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was s ufficiently large. Such a cost-benefi t or risk-benefi t approach to moral and decision problems , with o r without the probability frills , is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned or to deal with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintu itive results. For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large ga in from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferabl e in any simple or general way from one party to another . Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly rais e moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs on y - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefi t approach of the sort adopted in promotion of nuclear energy, where costs to future people are sometimes dismissed with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The limitations of tran sfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptabili ty of the nuclea r risk, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel or cigarette smoking . In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelmin g extent, those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved . In contrast the users and supposed beneficiari es of nuclear energy will be r isking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also that of others who may be non-benefic iaries and who may be spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any dire ct way related to a person ' s extent of use . The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian ' s (happiness) sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties, and the introductio n of p r obability consideratio ns - as in utilita r ian de cision methods such as expected utility rules - does not change the principles involved but merely complicates the analysis . One might further object to the probability argument that probabiliti es involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes , and that the outcomes of some morai prob l ems do not depend on a high level of probability anyway . In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the train parable reveals , that a significant risk is created ; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments . �18 . Uncerta inty argumen ts in various forms are the most common and importan t ones used by philo s ophers, economi sts and others to argue f or the position that we cannot be expe cted to distant future . take serious ac count of the effects of our actions on th e There are two strands to the uncertai nty argumen t, capable of s eparatio n , but frequen tly tangled up. Both argumen ts are mistaken , the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posterio ri grounds. The first argumen t is a gene ralised uncerta inty argumen t which runs as fol lows :- In contras t to the exa ct informa tion we can obtain about the present, the informa tion we can obtain about the effects of our a-ctions on the di s tant future is unreliab le, fuzzy and highly specula tive. But we cannot base assessm ents of how we shoul d act on informa tion of this kind, especia lly when accurate informa tion is obtainable about the present which would indicate differen t act ion. Therefo re we must r eg retfully ignore the uncertai n effects of our actions on the distant fut ure. More formally and crudely: One only has obligati ons to the futur e if t hese obliga tions are based on reliable in forma tion at present as regards th e distant future. Therefo re one has no obligati ons to the distant future. This first argumen t is essentia lly a variant on a sceptica l argwnen t in epistemo logy concerni ng our knowledg e of the future (formall y, replace 'obligat ions ' by 'knowled ge' in the crude stateme nt of the argumen t above). The main ploy is to conside rably overesti mate and oversta te the degree of certaint y availabl e with r es pect to the present and immedia t e future, and the degree of certaint y which is required as the basis fo r moral conside ration with r espect to the present and with respect to the f uture. Associa ted with thi s is the attempt to sugges t a sharp division as regards certaint y between the present and immedia te future on the one hand and the distant future on the other . We shall not find, we suggest , that there is any such sharp or simple divi sion between the distant future and the adjacen t future and the present, at l east with re spect to those things in th e pres e nt which are normally subject to moral constra ints. We can and constan tly do act on the basis of such "unrelia ble " informa tion, as the sceptic as regards the future conveni ently labels "unce rta i nty"; for scepticproof certaint y is rarely, or never, availab le with respect to much of the present and immedia te future . In moral situatio ns in the pres e nt, action often takes acco unt of risk and probabi lity , even quite low probab iliti es . Conside r again the train example. We do not need to know for certain that the containe r will break and the lethal gas escape . In fact it does not even have to be probable , in the relevan t sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consign er's action. It is enough that there is a signific ant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decrease d wellb eing of the consigne r is certain and that the prospec ts of the passeng ers quite uncertai n, the resoluti on of the problem is neverth eless clearly in fa vour of the so-calle d "specul ative" and "unrelia ble". But if we do not require certaint y of action to apply moral constra ints in cont emporary affairs, why �19. should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require for the future, ep istemic standards which the more familiar sphere of moral act ion concerning the present and adjacent futur e does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consi deration ca n be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an eipstemic double standard. But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining th e difference between the present and the future a nd to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to e ach class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical unc e rtainty argument, that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account becaus e uncertainty about the distant future is so gross th a t we canmot determine what the lik ely cons equences of actions on it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rati onal ground for ch oosing between them. this way : - The seco!ld uncertainty argume nt can be put alternatively If moral principles are. like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as "if x has character h then x is wrong, for eve r y (action) x", then what the argument claims is that we cannot ever obtain the info rmation about future actions which would enable us to detach the an tecedent of the implication . So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain cl ear conclusions or dire ctions concerning contemporary action action of th e "It is wrong to do x" type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument can be conceded. If th e distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what th e effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to th e future, will in practice not be applicable to obtain an y clea r conclusions about how to act. on action . Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints However the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate . Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future , but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the �" 20 . argument has to assume . There are some areas where un certainty is not so grea t as to ex clude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point , which was noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certain ty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncerta inty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally r e levant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance t o moral is sues . For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in names or footwear, or what flavour s of ice cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, espe cially if we consider 3000 years of history, that what peop le there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unli ke our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or ge netic defec ts, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the ear th of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place . For this sort of r eason , the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we can ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of orde r as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. In particular there is not gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as is evident from the train example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probable or possible harm to future people as outside the scope of prope r consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncer taint y arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves . For example, we may be told that we cannot r eally take account of future people because we cannot be sure that th ey will exis t or that their tast es and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the �21. things that would affect us. But this is to insist upon compl e t e ce r taint y of a sort be yond what is required for the pre sent and imme diate future, whe r e there i s also commonly no guarantee that some disast e r will not overtake t hose we are mo rally cowmi tted to. Again we may be told that th e r e i s no guarant ee that future peopl e will be worthy of any e fforts on our part, because th ey may be mo rons or for ever plugged into enjoyme nt or other machin es . Even if on e is prepare d t o accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or int e ll e ctual standards a r e e ligible for moral consideration - what we are being han de d in such ar guments as a serious defeating consideration is a gain a mere outside possibility li ke the sceptic who says that solid-looking desk in front of us is pe rhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular r e ason for doing so, but bec ause he hasn't looked around the back , drilled holes in it, etc. etc . Ne ith e r the cont emporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleas ure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast with th e se me re logical possibilities the very real historically supportab l e risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilisation through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty argume n t s of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succee d in showing th a t it is a c ce ptab l e to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future , people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste cas e . This is the argument that future p eople may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage me thod for nuclear was tes before they are damaged by escaped waste material . Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not) . This still does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible . In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer : that this appears to be a live possibility, and not merely a logi cal possibility, does not make the action of the firm earlier discussed, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible . The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these s orts were admissible only j_f what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it . In such cases before such actions could �22. be conside r e d admissible what would be required is far more than a possibility, 22 real or not - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect th emselves . The strategy of these and other uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, and may be brought out by looking yet again at the train example wh ere the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of th e effec t of his actions on the passengers b ec ause they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g . the train may break down and they may all change to a different transport leaving the parcel behind, or the train may crash killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities of course, but there is no positi ve r eason to believe that they are any more than that, that is they are not live possibilities. The strategy is to stress such remote possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigner's taking account of the passengers' welf are and th e real possibility of harm from his parcel and thereby to excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints. This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty of harm, or at least a very high probability of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the re al possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly r eq uired high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strate gy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat th e application of moral constraints . But, as we have seen, this is often not so. Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the indeterminacy of the future . In particular it is argued that the indeterminacy, for example , with respect to the number and exact character of people at future times, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present . Since th e ir numbers are ind eterminate and their interests unknown how, it is asked, can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is rais ed particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, for example oil, when the numbers of the latte r are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by �23, ignoring such factors. Nor are distributio nal problems as large and representat ive of a class of moral prob lems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It can be conceded that there will be cases where the indetermina cy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult to resolve or indeed irresoluble - a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be othe r conflict cases where the level of indetermina cy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e . g . the train example which is a conflict case of a t ype . In particular, th e re will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numb ers , n umbers of interests, or whatever , cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteris tics of future people . The crucial question which emerges is then : are there any features of futu re people which would disqualify them from full moral consideratio n o r r e duce thei r claims to such below those of present people? The answe r is: in principle None . Prima facie, moral principles are universalis able , and lawlike, in that they ap ply independent ly of position in space or in time, for examp le. But universalis ability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories whi ch are capable of dealing satisfactor ily with the pres ent : in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards th e present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e .g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup, such as (whit e skinned) humans , etc . The only candidates for characteris tics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, such as uncertainty and indetermina cy; but, as we have argued, it would be far too sweeping to see thes e features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determinatio n of best probable of practical course of action given only present information ) . In particular, they do not affect cases of th e so~t be ing considered, nuclear development , where highly determinate or certain infonnation about the numbers and characteris tics of the class likely to be harmed is not required, nor is certainty of damage. To establish obligations to the future a full universaliz ability principle is not required: it is enough that the temporal position of a person cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideratio n; 24 inversely, that it is without basis to discriminat e morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position . As a result of this �. 23a. universalizabi lity, there are the same general obligations to future peo ple as to the present; and thus there i s the same obligation to take account of them and thei r interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing harm or damage , and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life . Uncertainty and inde t e rminacy do not relieve us of these obligations. If in a closely comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of �24. harm in the future case under conside ration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceed ing with the action, thus discri mina ting against future people. Accordin gly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity , the conclusi on already tentativ ely reached, that proposa ls for nuclear developm ent in the present and likely future state of technolo gy and practice s for future waste disposa l are immoral. Before we conside r (in section VII) the remainin g escape route from this conclusi on, through appeal to overridi ng circumst ances , it is importan t to pick up th e further case (which heavily r einforce s the tentativ e conclusi on) against nuclear developm ent, since much of it relies on ethical princip les similar to those that underlie obligati ons to the future, and since it too is commonly met by similar appeal to extenua ting ci rc umstanc es. V. PROBLEMS OF SAFE NUCLEAR OPERATION: REACTOR EMISSIONS, AND CORE MELTDOWN . The eth ical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to futur e creature s. Just as remoten ess in time does not erode obligati ons or enti tl emen ts t o just treatmen t, neither does location in spac e , or a particu lar geograp hical position . First of all, the problem of nuclear waste disposa l rais es serious question s of distribu tive justice not only across time, across generat i ons, but also across space. Is one state or region entitled to dump its radioac tive polluti on in another state's or region's yard or water s? When that region receives no due compens ation (whateve r that would amount to, in such a case), and the people do not agree (though the leaders imposed upon them might)? The answer, and the argumen ts underpin ning the answer, are both like those already given in arguing to the tentativ e conclusi on concerni ng the injustic e of imposing radioac tive wastes upon future people. But the cases are not exactly the same: USA and Japan cannot endeavo ur to discoun t peoples of the Pacific in whose regions they propose to drop some of their radioac tive pollutio n in quite the same way the y can discoun t people of two centurie s hence . (But what this conside ration really reveals is yet another flaw in the idea that entitl ement to just treatmen t can be discoun ted over time.) Ethical issues of distribu tive justice, as to equity , concen1 not only the spatio-t emporal location of nuclear waste, but also arise elsewher e in the assessm ent of nuclear developm ent; in particu lar, a s regards the treatmen t of those in the neighbou rhood of reactors , and, dif fe rently, as regards the • distribu tion of (alleged ) benefits and costs from nuclear power across nations. 25 People living or working in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor are subject to special costs and risks : firstly, radioac tive pollutio n, due to the fact that reactors discharg e radioac tive materia ls into the air and water near the plant, �25 . and secondly catast rop hic accidents, such as (steam) explosion of a reactor . immediate question is whether such costs an d risks can be imposed, with any An eth ical legitimacy, on these people, who frequently have little or no say in their imposition, and who have mostly not been informed of any choices regarding the "risk/benefit tradeoffs" of nuclear technology. That they are so imposed, without local participation, indeed often without local input or awareness as with local opposition, reveals one part of the antidemocratic face of nuclear development, a part that nuclear development shares however with otl1er largescale polluting industry, where local participation and que stions, fundamental to a genuine democracy of regional det ermination and popular sovereignty , are commonly ignored or avoided. The "normal" emission, during plant operation, of low level radiation car ri es carcinogenic and mutagenic costs . While the re are undoubtedly costs, there remains, however, substantial disagreement over the likely numbe r of cancers and precise ex tent of genetic damage induced by exp os ure to such rad iation , over the local health costs involved. Under t he Old Paradigm, whi ch (ill egi timately) permits free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the e thical issue directly raised is said to be: what extent of cancer and genetic damage, if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nucl ear power, and under what conditions? Under the Old Paradigm the issue is th en translat e d into decision-theor etic questions, such as to 'how to employ risk/benefit analysis as a prelude to government regulation' and ' how to determine what is an acceptab le level of risk/safe ty for the public. 26 The Old Paradigm attitude, reflected in the public policy of some countries that have such policies, is that the economic benefits conferred by allowing radiation emissions outweigh the costs of an increase in cancer and genetic damage . An example will reveal that such evaluations, which rely for what appeal th ey have on a dubious utilitarianism, will not pass muster. It is a pity about Aunt Ethyl getting cancer, but it's nice to have this air con ditioner working in summer . Such frequently trivial and rather inessential benefits, which may be obtained alternatively, e.g. by modification of houses, in no way comp ensate for the agony of cancer . 27 The point is that the costs to one party a r e not justified, especially when such benefits to other parties can be alte rnatively obtained without such awful costs , and morally indef ensible , being imposed . People, minorities, whose position is particularly compromised are those who live within 50 miles of a nuclear plant . (Children , for example, are in a �26. particularl y vulnerable position, since they are severa l times more likely to contract cancer through exposure than normal adults). In USA, such people bear a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the population at large. A non-negligi ble percentage (in excess of 3% of those exposed for 30 years) of people in the area will die, all egedly for the sake of the majority who are benefitted by nuclear powe r production (allegedly, for th e real reasons for nucl e ar development do not concern this silent majority) . Whatever charm the argument from overriding benefits had, e ve n unde r the Old Paradigm, vanishes once it is seen that t he re are alternative , and in several respects less expensive, ways of deliveri ng the r eal benefi ts involved. There are several other tricks used in showing that the imposition of r adia tion on minorities, most of whom have little or no genuine voice in the location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serio us losses, is quite (morally) acceptable. One ch eape r trick, deployed by the US Atomic Energy Commission, 28 is to suppose that it is permissible to double, through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) radiation that a pop ulation has received with apparently negligible consequence s, th e argument being that the additional amount (being equivalent to the "natural" level) is also likely to have negligible consequence s. The increased amounts of radiation - with their large man-made component - are then accounted no rmal, and, of course, so it is th en claimed, what is normal is morally acceptable. None of the steps in this argument is sound. Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no illeffects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affe ct a person's well-being; and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger one will, unde r such conditions, not be. Finally, what is or has become normal, e . g. two murde rs or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptabl e . In fact, even the USA, which has strict standards by comparison with most other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits ra diation emissions very sub s tantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is worse than me re consideratio n of the standards would disclose. Furthermore , the monitoring of the standards "imposed" is entrusted to th e nuclear op erators themselves, scarcely disintereste d parties . Public policy is determin ed no t so as to guarantee public he alth, but rather to serve as a ' public pacifier' wh ile private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered . 29 �2 7. While radioacti ve emissions are nn ordinary feature of react o r op e ration, breakdown is, hopefully , not: an accident of magnitude is accounted , by official definitio n, an 'extraord inary nuclear occurrenc e'. But such accidents can happen, and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island). 30 If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water) 30a r e actors , then the core melts and 'containm ent failure' is likely, with the r e sult that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioacti vely contamina ted . I n the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident , prope rt y da mages would exceed $1 7 billion and an area the size of Pennsylva nia would be destroyed . Mod e rn nuclear reactors are about five times the size of the reactor for which . . 31 t h ese conservat ive Us governmen t f'igures are given t he con s equences of a s imilar accident with a modern reactor would according l y be much great e r still. Th e consigner in risking the lives, we ll-being and property of the passenger s on the train has acted inadmissi bly. Does a governme nt-sponsor ed private utility act in a way that is anything other th an much less responsib le in siting a nuclear reactor in a community , in planting such a dangerous package on the community train. The answer will be No, if the analogy holds good and the consigner s ' action is , as we would ordinaril y ·suppo se , inadmissi ble and i rrespon- sible. The proponent s of nuclear power have in effect argued to the cont rary, while at the same time endeavour ing to shift the dispute out of the ethical arena and into a technolog ical dispute as to means (in accordanc e with the Old Paradigm) . It has been contended , firstly, what con trasts with the train example, that there is no real possibili ty of a catas trophic nuclear accident . Indeed in the influenti al Rassmusse n report 32 - which was extensive ly used to support public confidenc e in US nuc lear fission technolog y - an even stronger, an incredibl y strong , improbab ility claim was stated: n amely , the likelihoo d of a catastrop hic nucle ar accident is so remote as to be '3.lmost) impossi.bl e. The main argument for this claim de rives from the assumptio ns and estimates of the report i.tself . These assumptio ns like the claim are undercut by nuclear incidents that came very close to accidents , incidents which reflect what happens in a reactor rather better than mathemat ical models. As with the storage of nuclear wastes, so with the operation of nuclear reactors, it is important to look at what happens in the actual world of technolog ical limitatiom s and human error, of waste leakage and r eactor inciden t s and quite possibly accidents , not in an ideal world far removed from the actual , a technolog ical dream world whe re there is no real possibili ty of a nuclear �28, catastrophe. In such an ideal nuclea r world, wh e re wa s t e disposal we r e fool-proof and reactors we re accident-proof, thin gs would no doubt be morally different. But we do no t live in s u ch a world . According to the Rasmuss en r e port its calc ulat ion of extremely low accident probabilities is based upon reasonable mathematical and technological a ssumptions and is methodo logically sound. This is ve ry far from being the cas e . The under- ly ing mathematical methods, variousl y called "fault tree analysis " and "reliability estimating techniques", a r e unsound, because they exclude as "not credible" po s sibilities or as "not significant" branches that are re a l possibilities, which may well be realised in the real world. It is the eliminations that are othe rworldly . In fact the me thodology and dat a of the report · · 1 y cr1.t1.c1.ze h as b een soun dl y an d d ec1.s1.ve . · · d . JJ And 1.t . h as b een s h own t1at I t he r e is a real possibili t y, a non-negligible probability, of a serious accident . It is contended, secondly, that even if there is a non-negli gib l e prob abi li ty of a reactor accident, still it is acceptable, be ing of no greater orde r than risks of accidents t hat ar e already socially accepted. Here we enco unt e r agai n that insidious e ngin e ering approach to morality built into mod e ls of an e conomic cast, e.g. benefit - cost balance s heets , risk assessment mode ls, et c. Risk assessment, a sophistica ti on of trans ac tion or tr ade -off mode ls, pur.-ports to p ro vide a compari s on between th e relative ri sks at tach ed to different options, e . g . e nergy options, which settl es th e ir ethical status . The fo llowing lines of argume nt are encountered in a risk assessme nt as applied to energy options: (i) if option a imposes costs on fewer people than option b then option a is preferable to option b; (ii ) option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths, injuries , etc .) which is less than th at of option b, which is already accepted; there for e op tion a is acceptable . 34 For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations is less than the likely number killed by cigarette smoking or in road accident s , which a r e accepted: so nuclear power stations are acceptable . A little reflection reveals that this sort of risk assessment argt.mlent involves the same kind of fallacy as transaction models. I t is far too simple -minded, and it ignores distrib ut ional and other r e l e vant aspect s of the context. In o rde r to ob tain an ethical assessment we s hould need a much fuller pi cture and we sho uld nee d to know at least t he s e thin gs :- do the costs and benef it s go to th e same parti es ; and is the person who undertakes the risks also t he person who receives the benefits or �29. primar ily, as in driving or cigare tte smokin g, or are the costs impos e d on other parties who do not benefi t? It is only if the parties are the same in the case of th e options compar ed, and there are no such distrib utiona l problem s, that a compar ison on such a basis would be val.id. 35 This is rarely the cas e , and it is not so in the case of risk assessm ents of energy options . Second ly, does the person incur the risk as a result of an activit y which he knowin gly underta kes in a situati on where he has a r easona ble choice, knowing it entails the risk, etc ., and is the level of risk in propor tion to the le~el of the rel evant ac tivity, e.g. as in smoking ? Thirdly , for what reason is the risk imposed : is it for a s e rious or a relativ ely trivial reason? A risk that is e thica lly accepta ble for a serious reason may not be ethica lly accepta ble for a trivial reason. Both the argume nts (i) and (ii) are often employe d in trying to justify nuclea r power. The second argume nt (ii) involve s the fallaci es of th e firs t (i) and an additio nal set , namely that of forgett ing that the health risks in the 36 nuclea r s e nse are cumula tive , and already high if not , some say , too high. The maxim "If you want the benefi ts you have to accept th e costs " is one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefi ts then you have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is anothe r and very differe nt thin g . It is a widely accepte d moral princip le, already argued for by way of exampl es and already invoked , that one is not, in genera l, entitle d to simply transfe r cos ts of a signifi cant kind arising fron an activit y which benefi ts onesel f onto other parties who are not involve d in the activit y and are not benefi ciaries 37 . This transfe r princip le is especi ally clear in cases where the signifi cant costs include an effect on life or health or a risk thereof , and where the benefi t to the benefi tting par ty :is of a noncru cial or dispen sible nature , becaus e, e . g. it can be substit uted for or done withou t. Thus, for instanc e , one is not usually entitle d to harm , or risk harmin g, anot her in the process of be nefitti ng onesel f . Suppose , for anothe r example , we consid er a village which produc es, as a result of an indust rial process by which it lives, a noxious waste materi al which is expens ive and difficu lt to dispose of and yet creates a risk to life and health if undispo sed of. Instead of giving up thei r i.ndus trial process and turning to some other way of making a living such as farming the surroun ding country side, they persis t with this way of life but ship their problem on a one-way deliver y service , on the train, to the next village . The inhabi tants of this village are then forced to face the problem either of under taking the expens ive and difficu lt dispos al process oor of sustain ing risks to thei r own lives and health or else leaving the village and their livelih oods. Most of us would see this kind of transfe r of co s ts as morally unacce ptable . �JO. From this arises a necessary condition for ene rgy options: that to be morally acceptable they should not involve the trans fer of significant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, do not use the energy source or do not benefit correspondingly from its us e . Included in the scope of this condition are not only future people and future generations (those of the next vil lages) but neighbours of nuclear reactors , especially, as in third world co untries, neighbours who are not nuclear powe r users. The distribution of costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. on to non-beneficiaries is a characteristic of certain wide spread and serious forms of pollution, a nd is one of its most obje ctionable moral features. It is a corollary of the condition that we sho ul d not hand the world on t o our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it - t he tramsmission principle. For if we did then that would be a signi ficant transfe r of costs . (The corollary can be independerltly argued for on the basis of certain e t hic al theories) . VI . OTHER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND COSTS OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR. The problems already discuss ed by no means exhaus t the envi ronme ntal, health and safety risks and costs in or arising from th e nuclea r fuel cycle. The full fuel cycle include s man y sta ges both before and after r eacto r operation , apart from waste disposal, namely mining , milling, conversion, enrichment and preparation, reprocessing spent fuel, and trans po rtati on of materials. Seve ral of these stages involve hazards. Unlike the special risks in the nuclear cycle - of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionab le material, and of the further prolife ration of nuclear armaments - thes e hazard s have parallels, if not exact equival ents, in other very polluting method s of generating power, e . g. "workers in the uranium mining industry sustain 'the same risk' of 38 fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry". Furth ermo re, the various (often serious) hazards encountered in working in some sectors of uranium fabrication should be differently viewed from those resultin g from location, for instance from already living where a reactor is built or wastes are dumped. For an occupation is, in principle at any rate, chosen (as is occupational relocation), and many types of hazards incurred in workin g with radio a ctive material are now known in advance of choice of such a n occupation: with where one al re ady lives things are very different. The uranium mine r's choice of occup ation can be compared with the airline pilot's choice, whe r eas t he Pacific Islander ' s "fact" of location cannot be. The social issue o f arrangements that contract occupational choices and opportuni ti es and often a t l east ease peo ple into hazardous occupations such as uranium or tin or coal mining (where the risks, in contrast to airline piloting, are mostly not duly compensated), while very important, i s not an i ssue newly produced by nuclear associated occupa tions . �31. Other social and environm ental problems - though endemic where large-sca le industry operates in societies that are highly inegalita rian and include sectors that are far from affluent - are more imtimatel y linked with the nucle ar power cycle. Though pollu tion is a common and generally undesirab le component of large-sca le industria l operation , radioacti ve pollution , such as uranium mining for instance produces, is especiall y a legacy of nuclear developme nt, and a specially undesirab le one , as enormous rectifica tion estimates for de ad radioactive lands and waterways reveal . Though sabotage is a threat t o many large industrie s , so that modern factory complexes are often guarded like concentra tion camps (but from us on the outside), sabotage of a nuclear reactor can have dire consequen ces, of a different order of magnitude from most industria l sabotage (consider again the effects of core meltdown) . Though theft of material from more dubious enterpris es such as munitions works can pose threa ts to populatio ns at large and can assist terrorism , no thefts for allegedly peaceful enterp rises pose problems of the same order as theft of fissionab le material . No other industry produces materials which so readily permit of fabricatio n into such massive explosive s. No other industry is, to sum it up, so vulnerabl e on so many fronts. In part to reduce it, vulnerab ility, in part because of its long and continuin g associati on with military activitie s, the nuclear industry is subject to, and encourage s, several practices which (certainly given their scale) run counter to basic features of free and open societies , crucial features such as personal liberty, freedom of associati on and of expressio n, and free access to informati on . These practices include secrecy , restricti on of infonnati on, formation of speci al police and guard forces, espionage , curtailme nt of civil lib e rties. Already operators of nuclear installat ions are given extraordi nary powers, in vetting employees , to investiga t e the backgroun d and activitie s not only of employees but also of their families and sometimes even of their friends. The installati ons themselve s become armed camps, which especiall y offends British sensibili ties. The U.K. Atomic Energy (Special Constable s) Act of 1976 created a special armed force to guard nuclear installat ions and made it answerabl e ..• to the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority . 39 These developme nts in the United Kingdom, and worse in West Germany, presage along with nuclear developme nt increasin gly authorita rian and anti-demo cratic societies . That nuclear developme nt a ppears to force such political consequen ces tells heavily against it. �32. Nuclear developme nt is further indicted political ly by the dire ct connectio n of nuclear power with nuclear war. It is fortunate ly true that e thical questions concernin g nuclear war - for example, whether a nucle ar war is justified , or just, under any circumsta nces , and if so what circums tances are distingui shable from those concernin g nuclear power. Undoubted ly , however, t he spread of nuclear powe r is substanti ally increasin g the technical me ans for engaging in nuclear war and so, to that extent, the opportuni ty for , and chances of, nuclear engagemen t. Since nuclear wars are neve r account able positive goods , but are at best the lesser of major evils, nuclear wars are always highly ethically undesirab le . The spread of nuclear power according ly expands the opportuni ty for, and chances of, highly undesirab le consequen ces. Finally the la tt e r, so increasin g thes e chances and opportun ities, is itself undesirab le, and therefore what leads to it, nuclear developme n t, is also undesirab le . The details and considera tions that fill out this argume nt, from nuclea r war against nuclear developme n t, are many. They are fir stly technical , that it is a relativel y straightfo rward and inexpensi ve matte r to make nuclear explosive s given access to a nuclear powe r plant, secondly political , that nuclear engagemen ts once institute d likely to escalate and that those who control (or different ly are likely to force access to) nuclear power plant s do not shrink from nuclear confronta tion and are certainly prepared to toy with nuclear engagemen t (up to "strategi c nuclear strikes" at least) , and thirdly ethical, that wars invariabl y have immoral consequen ces, such as mas sive damage to involved parties, however high sounding their justifica tion is. Nucl ea r wars are certain to be considera bly worse as regards damage inflicted than any pr e vious wars (they are likely to be much worse than all previous wars p ut together) , because of th e enormous destructi ve power of nuclear weapons, and the extent of spread of their radioacti ve effec ts, and because of the expected rapidity and irreversi bility of any such confronta tions . The supportin g considera tions are, fourthly, drawn from decision theory, and a r e designed to show that the chances of such undesirab l e out comes is itself und e sirable . The core argument is in brief this (the argument will be elaborate d in section VIII):- Energy choice between alternativ e options is a case of de ci sion making under uncertain ty , because in particula r of th e gross uncertain ties involved in nuclear developme nt. In cases of this type the ap propriate rational procedure is to compare worst cons equences of each alternati ve, to reject those alternati ves with th e wor s t of these worst consequen ces (this is a pretty uncontrov ersial part of th e maximin rule which enjoins selection of the alternati ve with the best worst consequen ces) . The nuclear alternati ve has, in particula r because of the r e al possibili ty of a nuclear war, the worst worst consequen ce~ and is according ly a particula rly undesirab le alternati ve. �33. VII. CONFLICT ARGUMENTS,AND UNCOVERING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. As with nuclear war, so given the cumulative case against nuclear development , only one justificatory route r emains open, that of app e al to important overriding circumstances. That appeal, to be ethically acceptable, must go far beyond merely economic considerations. For, as already observed , the consigne r's action cannot be justifi ed by purely economistic argume nts, such as that his profits would ris e , the firm or the village would be more prosperous , or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. The transfer principle on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitl ed to cre ate a serious risk to othe rs for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in parti cular, applied to the nuclear case. For this r eason the economistic arguments which are those most commonly advanced under th e Old Paradi gm to promote nuclear development - e .g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electri city utilities, and the need otherwise fo r uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment, investment and consumption - do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these econornistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct - it will be contended that most of them are not - the arguments would fail because economics (like the utilitarianism from which it characteristica lly derives) has to operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vic e versa . What do have to be considered are however moral confli ct arguments, that is arguments to the effe ct that, unless the prima facie unacceptable (nuclear) alt e rnative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only possible outcome, and will ensue . For example, in the train parable, the consigner may a rgue that his action is justified becaus e unless it is take n his village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcu t, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral confl i ct are based on competin f commitments to present people, and others on competing obligatio ns to future people . both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impos e on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and e xhaustive set of alternatives (or a t ].east practical alternatives ) and upon showing that the only alterna tives to admittedly mo rally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in th e argument - for example, if in the village case it turns out that the villagers have another option �to starvi ng or to the sendin g off of the parce l, name l y ea rning a liv ing in some other way - then the argum ent is defect ive and cannot r eadily be patche d . Just s uch a suppre ssion of practi cable altern atives has occurr ed in the argum ent design ed to show that the altern atives to the nuclea r option are even worse than the option itself , and that there are other factua l defect s in thes e argum ents as well. .In short, the argum ents depend essen tially on the presen tation of false dichot omies . A first argum ent, the povert y argum ent , is that there is an ove rridin g ob li gation to the poor , both the poor of the third world and the poor of indus trialis ed countr ies . Failur e to develo p nuclea r energy , it is often claime d, would amoun t to denyin g them the oppor tunity to reach the standa rd of afflue nce we curren tly enjoy and would create unemp loymen t and povert y in th e indus triali s e d n a tions. The unemp loymen t and povert y argume nt does not stand up to exami nati on eithe r for t he poor of th e indus trial countr ies or for thos e of th e thir d world. The re is good eviden ce that large- scale nuclea r energy will help to increa se unemp loymen t and povert y in the indus trial world, throug h the divers i on of very much availa ble capita l into an indust ry which is not only an excep tional ly poo r provi der of di rect employ ment , but also helps to reduce availa bl e jobs throug h encour aging substi tution o f energy use for labour use. 40 The argume n t that nuclea r ene rgy is needed for the third world is even less convin cing. Nuclea r energy is both politi cally and econom ically inapp ropria te for th e third world, since it requir es massiv e amoun ts of capita l , requir es numbe rs of import ed sci en tists and engine ers, but create s neglig ible local employ ment, and depend s for its feasib ility upon, what is largel y lackin g , establ ished electr icity transm ission system s and back-u p facili ties and suffic ient electr ical applia nce s to plug into the system . Politi cally it increa ses foreig n depend ence, adds to ce ntrali sed entren ched power and reduc es the chance for change in the oppres sive politi cal struct ures which are a large part of the proble m . 41 The fa c t that nuclea r energy is not in the intere sts of the people of t he third world does not of course mean that it is not in the intere sts of, and wanted by, their rulers , the wester nised and often milita ry elites in whose intere sts the econom ies of thes e countr ies are usuall y organi sed, and wanted often for milita ry purpos es . It is not patern alistic to examin e critic ally the demand s these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. �35 . The po verty argume nt is then a fraud. Nuclear ene r gy will not be used t o help th e poor. Both for the third world and for the industr ialised co untrie s there are well-kno wn energy-c onservin g alternat ives and the practi cal option of developi ng oth e r energy sources, alternat ives some of which offer f a r bette r prospec ts for helping the poor . It can no longer be pretende d that there is no alt e rnative to nuclear de velopme nt: indeed nuclear de velopme nt is itself but a bridging , or stop-gap , procedu re on route to solar or perhap s fusion deve lopment . And there a r e various alternat ives : coal and other fossil fuels, geotherm al, and a range of solar op tions (includi ng as well as narrowly solar, wind, water, tidal and plant power), each po ss ibly in combina tion with cons e rvation measures ~ 2 Despit e the availab ility of alterna tives, it may still be pre t e nde d that nuclea r deve lopment is ne cess ary fo r affluenc e (what will emerge is that it is advantag eous for the power and aff luence of ce rtain select groups ) . Such an assumpt ion really und erlies part o f t he pover ty argumen t, which thus amounts to an elabora tion of th e trickledown argumen t (much f avoured within the Old Paradigm se tting) . For the a rgument runs : - Nuc l ea r developm ent is necessar y for (continu ing an d in c r eas in g) affluenc e. Affluenc e inevitab ly tr i ckl es down to th e poor. Th e r e for e nuclear developm ent benefits the poor . First, the argumen t does not on i ts own sh ow a nything specific about nuclear power : for it works equally well if ' ene r gy ' is substitu ted f or ' nuclear ' . It has also to be shown , what the next major argumen t will try to claim, that nuclear developm ent is unique among e ne rgy alternat ives in increasi ng affluenc e . The second assumpt ion , that affluenc e inevitab ly trickles down, has now been roundly refuted , both by r ecent historic al da ta, which show increasi ng affluenc e ( e .g. in terms of GNP averaged per capita) co upled with increasi ng poverty in several countrie s, both developi ng and de veloped , and th r ough economic models which reveal how "affluen ce" can increase withou t r e dist ribution occur ring . Another maj o r argumen t a dvanced to show moral conflic t app eals to a set of suppos e dly ove rr iding and competin g obligati ons to future people . We have, it is said , a du ty to pass on the immense ly valuable things and institut ions which our culture has develope d . Unless our high-tec hnology , high ene r gy industr ial society is continue d and fo s tered, our valuab l e institut ion s and tra ditions will fall into de cay or be swept away. The ar gument is essentia lly th a t without nuclear powe r, withou t th e conti n ued level of materia l wealth 43 it alone is assumed to make possible , the li gh ts of our civiliza ti on wil l go out. Fut ure people will be th e los e rs. �36, The lights-goin g-out argument doe s rais e quest ions as to what is valuable in o ur society, and of what characteris tics are necess ary for a good society . But for the most part th ese large questions, which deserve much full e r ex amination , can be avoided . The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely un critical position with re spe ct to present high-techno logy societi es , apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable . It assumes that technologi c society is unmodifiabl e , that it cannot be changed in the direction of energy conse rvation or alternative (perhaps high technology) energy sources without collapse. It has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of ene rgy - such as nuclear and only nuclear power is a ll eged t o furnish ar e essential to maintain this whole. These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technologic al so c ie ty's energy patterns are unmodifiabl e is especially so - after all it has survived events such as world wars which have r equired major social and technologic a r es tructuring and consumption modificatio n. If western society ' s demands for energy a re totally unmodifiabl e without collapse, not only would it be committed to a program of increasing destruction , but one might ask what use its culture co uld be to future people who would very likely , as a consequence of this destruction , lack the resource base which th e argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporar y society. There is also difficulty with th e assumption of uniform valuablene ss; but if this is rejected the question be comes not: what is necessary to maintain exis ting high-techno logical society and its political institution s, but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and th e political institution s which are needed to maintain those valuable things . While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption centrally controlled is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to a rgu e that it is e ssential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably that we have a du ty to pass .on to the fut ure. The evidence, for instan ce from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. The re is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But e ve n if a radical change in these di rec tions is independent ly desirable, as we should arg ue, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-goin g-out a rgument a re wrong. No enormous reduction of well-b e ing is required to consume less energy than at �37. present , and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is assumed in the usu al economic case for nucl ear energy . 44 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to preven t the lights going out in west e rn civilisation , but to enable th e lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of th e Energy Extravaganza. In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high e nergy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, es pecially if e nergy is obtained by nuclear fission means , be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an ext remely high centralised, controlled and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susce ptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source , whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Such a society would, almost inevitably t e nd to become autho ritarian and increasingly anti-democratic, as an outcome, among other things, of its response to the threat pos ed by dissident groups in the nuclea r . . situation. 45 Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations some of th e worst aspects of our society - the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature, and latent authoritarianism - while many valua ble asp e cts, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for p ersonal and collective autonomy which exist , would be lost or diminish e d: political freedom , for example, is a high price to pay for consume ri sm and energy extravagance. But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumably, that we have some obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives, alternative social, economic and political choices, which do not involve such unacceptable consequences, are available. The alternative to the high technologynuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but either the adoption of an available alternative such as coal for power or, rath e r, the development of alternative technologies and lifestyles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralised nuclear option. The lights- going-out argumen t, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false dichotomy. �38 . Thus the further escape route, the appeal to moral conflict, is, like the appeal to fut urity, closed. If then we apply - as we have argued we should - the same standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the present, the conclusion that large-scal e nuclear developmen t i s a crime agains t the future is inevitable . Closed also, in the same way, are the escape routes to other ar_guments - from reactor melt-down, radiation emissions, and so on for rejecting nuclear development as morally unacceptable, for saying that it is not only a moral crime against the distant future but also a crime against the present and immediate future . In sum, nuclear development is morally unacceptable on several grounds. A corollary is that only political arrangements that are morally unacceptable will support the impending nuclear future. VIII. A NUCLEAR FUTURE IS NOT A RATIONAL CHOICE, EVEN IN OLD PARADIGM TERMS. The arg ument thus far, to anti-nuclear conclusions, has r elied upon, and defended premisses that would be rejected under the Old Paradigm; for examp l e, such theses as that the interests and utilities of future people are not discounte d (in contrast to the temporally-limited utilitarianism of marketcentred economic theory ), and that serious costs and risks to health and life cannot admissibly be simply transferred to uninvolved parties (in contrast to the transfer and limited compensation assumptions of mainstream economic theory). To close the cas e, arguments will now be outlined which are designed to show that even within the confines of the Old Paradigm, choosing the nuclear future is not a rational choice . Large-scale nucl ear developme nt is not just something that happens, it requires, on a continuing basis, an immense input of capital and energy . Such investment calls for substantial reasons; for the investment should be, on Old Paradigm assumptions, the best among feasible alt ernatives to given economic ends. Admi t tedly so much capital has already been invested in nucle ar fission research and development, in marka:l. contrast to other newer rival sources of power, that there is strong political incentive to proceed - as distinct from requisite reasons for further capital and energy inputs. The reasons can be divided roughly into two groups, front reasons, which are the reasons given (ou t) , and which are, in accordance with Old Paradigm percepts, pub l icly eco nomic (in that they are app roved for public consumption), and th e r ea l r ea s ons , which involve private economic factors and matters of power and social control. �39. The main argument put up, an economic growth argument, upon which variations are played, is the following version of the lights-going -out argument (with economic growth duly standing in for material wealth, and even for what is valuable!): - Nuclear power is necessary to sustain economic growth. Economic growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e . g. to increas e the size of the pie, to avoid or postpone redistributi on problems, and connected social unr e st, e tc.). Therefore nuclear power is desirable. The first premiss is part of US energy policy, 46 and the second premiss is supplied by standard economics textbooks . But both premisses are defective, the second because what is valuable in economic growth can be achieved by selective economic growth, which jettisons the heavy social and environmen tal costs carried by unqualified 47 economi c growth . More to the point, since the second premiss is an assumption of the dominant paradigm, the first premiss (or rath e r an appropriate and less vulne rabl e restatement of it) fails even on Old Paradigm standards. For of course nuclear power is not necessary given that there are other, perhaps costlier alt e rnatives . The premiss usually defended is some elaboration of th e premiss Nuc lear power is the economicall y best way to sustain economic growth, 'economicall y best' being filled out as ' most efficient', 'cheapest ' , 'having most favourable benefit-cos t ratio', etc. Unfortunate ly for the argument, and for nuclear development schemes, nuclear power is none of these things decisively, unless a goo d deal of economic cheating (easy to do) is done. Much data, beginning with th e cancellatio n of nuclear plant orders, can't be assembled to show as much. Yet the argument requires a true premiss, not an uncertain or merely possible one, if it is to succeed and detachment is to b e permitted at all, and evidently true premisses if the argument is to be decisive. The data to be summarised splits into two parts, public ( governmenta l) analyses, and private (utility) assessments . Virtually all available data concen1s the USA; in EuroZS, West and East, true cos ts of uniformly "publicly= controlled" nuclear power are generally not divulged. Firstly, the capital costs of nuclear plants, which have been rising much more rapidly than inflation, now exceed those of coal-fired plants . Komanoff has estimated that capital costs of a nuclear generator (of optimal capacity) will exceed comparable costs of a coal-fired unit by about 26 % in 1985. 49 And capital costs are only one part of the equation that now tell rather decisively against private utility purchase of new nuclear plants . Another main factor is the poor performance and low reliability of nuclear generators . Coney showed that nuclear plants can only generate about half the elect ricit y th ey were designed to produ ce , and that when Atomic Energy Commis sion estimates of relative costs of nuclear and coal power, which assumed that both opera t ed at 80% of design capacity , were adjusted accordingly , nuclear generated power proved to be far more �40. . h . d 50 expensive tan estimate. The discrepancy between actual and estimated capacity is especially important because a plant with an ac tual capacity factor of 55 % produced electricity at a cost about 25% high e r than if the plant had performed at the manufacturers' projected capacity rate of 70-75%. The low reliability of nuclear plants (p e r kilowatt output) as compared with the superior r e liability of smaller coal-fired plants adds to the case, on conventional economic grounds of ef ficienc y and product production costs , against nuclear powe r . Thes e unfavourable assessments are from a privat e (utility) perspective, before the very extensive public subsidization of nuclear power is duly taken into account . The main subsidies are through research and development , by way of insurance (under the important but doubtfully constitutional Price-Anderson 51 Act ), in en richme n 4 and in waste management . It has been estimated that charging such costs to the electricity consumer would increase electricity bills for nucl ea r power by at least 25% ( and probably much more) . Wh en official US cost/benefit analyses favouring nuclear power over coal are examined, it is f ound that they inadmissibly omit seve ral of the public costs i nvolve d in producing nuclear power . For example, the analyses igno re waste costs on the quite inadmissible ground that it is not known curren tly wha t t he costs involved are . But even using actual waste handling cos t s (while wastes await s torage) is enough to show that coal power is preferable to nuc l ear . 52 When further public costs, such as insurance against accident and for radiation damage , are dul y taken into account, the balance is swung stil l further i n favo ur of al te rnatives to nuclear and aga i nst nuclear power . In short , eve n on proper Old Par a digm accounting, the nu c l ear alte rn at iv e s hould be rejected. Nuclear development is not economical, it certainly se ems ; it has b een kept going n~ through its clear economic v iability, but by massive pub li c s ubsidization , of s e vera l types . In USA, to take a main examp le where information is available , nuclear developme nt is publicly supported through heavily subsidized or somet i mes free research and development , thro ugh the Price-Anderson Act, which sharply limits both private and public liability, i . e . wh ich in ef fe ct p rovided t he insurance subsidy making corporat e nuclear development e conomicall y f e asibl e, and through government ag r eement to handle all r adioactive wastes . While the Old Paradigm str ictly construed c annot sup port un economical developments, cont empo rary liberalisation of the Paradigm do e s allow fo r un economi c projects, seen as operated in the public interest, in such fields as soc ial welfare. Duly admitting s ocial welfare and some equity pr i nciples �41, i n th e dist ribut ion of wealt h (not necessa rily of pol l ution) l e ads the modern version of the Old Paradigm , called the Mo dified Old Paradigm . The main changes from the Old Paradigm are (as with state socialism) as emphasis of economic facto rs, e . g . individual self-he lp is down- played , wealth is to a small extent redistributed, e.g . through t:axation , market forces are re gulated or disp la ced (not in principle eliminat e d, as with stat e s ocialism). Now it has been cont ended - outrageous though it should now se e m - that nuclear powe r is i n the public interest as a means to various sought public ends, for example , apart from those already mentioned suc h as energy fo r growth and che ap e l ect ricity, and such as plantiful powe r f or heating and cooking a nd app lian ce use , avoidan ce of shortages , rat ioning , brown-outs and the like . Since alternative power sources, such as coal, could s e rve some ends given power was supplied with suitable extravagance, the argumen t has aga in to show that t he cho ice of nucle ar power over other a lterna tives is best in the requ isite respects, in s erving the public interes t. Such a n ar gumen t is a matter for decision theory, unde r which head cost -bene f i t analyse s which rank alternatives a l so fall as special cases . Decision theory purports to cover th eo r e tically the field of choice b e tween alte rnatives; it is present ed as the theory which ' dea l s with t he . pro bl em o f c h oosing one cours e o f acti. on among s e vera 1 poss1'bl. e cou r ses 1 . 53 Th us the choice of alt e rnati~ modes of energy pro duc ti on, t he ene r gy choice problem, be comes an exercise in decision theory; and the nucl ea r choice is often ''.justi f ied" in Old Paradigm terms t h rough app e al to decision t heo ry. But though decision theory is in principle comp rehens ive , as soon as it is put to work in such practi cal cases as energy choice, it is very considerably contracted in scope, several major assumptions are surreptitiously imported, and what one is confronte d with is a depauperate theory drastically pruned down to confo r m with the narrow utilitarianism of mainstream e conomic theory . The extent of reduction can be glimpsed by comp a ring , to take one imp ortant example , a general optimisation model for decision (wh ere uncertainty is not gross) with comparab le decision the ory methods, such as th e expe cted uti lity model. The general model for best choice among alte rnatives specifies maximisation of expected value subject to constrain ts, which may include et hical constraints ex clud ing cert a in alt e rnati ves under gi ven cond itions . Expected utility models dEmote value to utility, assuming thereby measurability and transference prop e rt ies t hat may not obtain, and elimina te constraints altoget her (absorbing what is fo rbidden, fo r examp le , as having a hi gh dis u tili ty, but one that can be compensate d for none th eless ). Thus , in �42. particula r, e thical constrain ts against nuclear developme nt are replaced, in Old Paradigm fashion, by allowance in principle for compensat ion for damage sustained . Still it is with decision making in Old Paradigm terms that we are now embroiled , so no longer at issue are the defective (nee-clas sical) economic assumptio ns made in the theory, for example as to the assessmen t of everythin g t o be taken into account through utility (which comes down to monetary terms : everythin g worth accountin g has a price), and as to the legitimac y of transferr ing with limited compensat ion risks and costs to involved parties. The energy choice problem is, so it has commonly been argued in the assumed Old Paradigm framework , a case of decision under uncertain ty . It is not a case of decision under risk (and so expected utility models are not applicabl e), be cause some possible outcomes are so unce rtain that, in contrast to the case of risk, no (suitably objective ) quantifia ble probabil ities can be assigned to them. It ems that are so uncertain are taken to include nuclear war and core me ltdown of a reactor, possible outcomes of nuclear de velopment : 54 widesprea d radioactive pollution is, by contrast, not uncertain . The correct rule for decision under uncertain ty is, in the case of energy ch oice , maximin, to maximize the minimum payoff, so it is sometimes contended . In fact, on ce again, it is unnecessa ry for present purposes to decide which energy option is selected, but only whether the nuclear option is rejected . Since competing selection rules tend to deliver the same rejection s for options early rejected as the nuclear options, a convergen ce in the rejection of the nuclear option can be effected . All rational roads lead, not to Rome, but to rejection of the nuclear option . A further convergen ce can be effected also , because the best possible (economic ) outcomes of such leading options as coal and a hydroelec tric mix are very roughly of the same order as the nuclear option (so Elster contends, and his argument can be elabo rated). Unde r these condition s complex decision rules (such as the Arrow-Hor wicz rule) which take account of both best possible and most possible outcomes under each option reduce to the maximin rule . Whichever energy option is selected under the maximum rule, the nuclear option is certainly rejected since there are options where worst outcomes are substanti ally better than that of the nuclear option (just consider the scenario if the nuclear nightmare , not th e nuclear dream, is realised) . Further applicati on of the rejection rule will reject the fossil fuel (predomin antly coal) option, on the basis of estimated effe cts on the earth 's climate from burning massive quantitie s of such fuels . �43. Although the rejection rule coupled with maximin position several rivals to maximin proposed, each enjoys a privileged for decision under uncertainty have been of which has associated rejection rules. Some of these rules , such as the risk- added reasonin g criticised by Goodin (pp.507-8), which 'assesses the riskiness of a policy in terms of the increment of risk it adds to those pre-existin g in the status quo, rather than in te rms of th e absolute value of the risk associated with the policy' are decidedly dubious, and rather than offering a rational decision procedure appears t o afford protection of the (nuclear) status quo. ~~at will be argued, or rather what Goodin has in effect argued for us, is that wherever one of these rival rules is applicable, and not dubious, it leads to rejection of the nuclear option . For example , the keep -options-op en or allow-for-r eversibility (not an entirely unquestiona ble rule rule 'of strictly limited applicabili ty') e xcludes the nuclear option because 'nuclear plants and their by-products have an air of irreversibi lity ... " One cannot simply abandon a nuclear reactor the way one can abandon a coal-fired plant"' (p.506). The compare-the alt e rnatives rule, in ordinary application , leads back to th e cost -b e nefit assessments , which, as already observed, tell decisively against a nuclear option when costing is done properly. The maximise-s ustainable-b enefits rule, which ' directs us to opt for th e policy producing the highest level of net b enefits which can be sustained indefinitel y', 'decisively favours r e newable sources ', ruling out the nuclear option. Other lesser rules Goodin discusses, which have not really been applied in the nuclear debate, and which lead yet further from the Old Paradigm framework, harm-avoida nce and protecting- thevulnerable als o yields th e same nuclear-exc luding results. Harm-avoida nce, in particular, points 1 decisively in favour of "alt ernative" and "renewable " energy sources ... combined with strenuous efforts at energy cons ervation' (p.442) . The upshot is evident: whatever reasonable decision rule is adopted the result is the same, a nuclear choice is rejected, even by Old Paradigm standards . Nor would reversion to an expected utility analysis alter this conclusion; for such analyses are but glorified cost-benefi t analyses,wi th probabiliti es duly multiplied in, and the conclusion is as before from cost-b enefit co nsideration s, against a nuclear choice. The Old Paradigm does not, it thus appears, sustain the nuclear juggernaut : nor does its Modificatio n. The real reasons for the continuing development program and the heavy commitment to the program have to be sought elsewhere, outside the Old Paradigm, at least as preached. It is, in any case, sufficientl y evident that contemporar y e conomic behaviour does not accord with Old Paradigm percepts, practice does not accord with nee-classic al economic .... �44. th eory nor, to consider the main modification , with social democratic th eory . There are , firstly, reasons of previous commitment, when nuclear power, cleverly promoted at least, looked a rather cheaper and safer deal, and certainly profitable one : corporations so committed are understandably ke en to realise returns on capital already invested . There are also typical self-interest reasons fo r commitment to the program, that advantages accrue to some, like those whose field happens to be nuclear engineering, that profits accrue to some, like giant corporations, that are influential in politica l affairs, and as a spin-off profits accrue to others , and so on . The r e are just as important, ideological reasons, such as a belief in the control of both political and physical power by t e chnocratic-entrepre nial elite, a belief in socl al control from above , control which nuclear powe r o f f ers f a r mo r e tlwn alternatives, some of which (vaguely) threaten to alter th e power bas e , a f a ith in th e unlimitedness of t e chnological enterprise, and nuclear in particular , so that any real probl ems that arise will be solved as development proceeds. Such b e li e f s are especially conspicuous in the British scene, among the gove rning and technocratic classes. Within contemporary corporate capitalism, thes e sorts of reasons for nuclear development are intimately linked, because thos e whos e types of enterprise benefit substantially from nuclear developme nt are commonly those who hold the requisite beliefs . It is then, contemporary corporate capitalsim, along with its state e n t erprise image, that fuels the nuclear juggernaut. To be sure , corporate capitalism , which is the political economy largely thrust upon us in we stern nations, is not necessary for a nuclear future; a totalitarian state of the t ype such capitalism often supports in the third world will suffice . But, unlike a hypothetical state that does conform to precepts of the Old Paradigm, it is sufficient for a nuclear future - evidently, since we are well embarked on such a future. The historical route by which the world reached its present advanced threshold to a nuclear future confirms this diagnosis. split into two main cases, the notional US This diagnosis can be development of nuclear power in the and the international spread of nuclear technology for which the US has been largely responsible . By comparison with the West, nuc lear power production i n th e small Eastern bloc is and is largely confined to the Soviet Union which had in 19 77 only about nuclear plants . one -sixth the wattage output of US Nuclear development in USSR has been, of course, a state controlled and subsidized venture, in which there has been virtually no public participation or discussion; but Russian technology has not been exported elsewhere to any great extent . American technology has . �45, The 60s were, because of the growth in electrici ty demand, a period of great expansion of the elec trical utilities in the US . These companies we re e ncouraged to build nuclear plants, rather than coal or oil burning plants, for several state controlle d or influence d reasons:- Firs tly, owing to governme ntal regulatio n procedure s the utilities could (it then seemed) earn a higher rate of profit on a nuclear plant than a fossil fuel one. Secondly , the US governmen t arranged to meet crucial costs and risks of nuclear operation , and in this way, and more directly through its federal agencies , actively encourage d a nuclear choice and nuclea r deve lopment. In particula r, state limitatio n of liability and shoulderi n g of part o f insurance for nu clear accidents and state arrangeme nts to handle nuclear wastes were what made profit able private utility operation appear feasibl e and r esulting in nuclea r investmen t. In the 70s, though the state subsidiza tion continued , the private pict ur e changed : 'high costs of construct ion combine d with low capacity factors and poor r eli ability have wiped out the last advantage that nuclear power ' had enjoyed in the US. Much as the domestic nuclear market in th e US is con trolled by a few co rpor ations , so the world mark et is dominated by a few countries , predomina ntly and first of all the US, which through its two leadi ng nuclear companies , We stinghous e and Gen e ral Electric, has been the major exporter of nuclear technolog y. 55 These companies were enabled to gain entry into European and subsequen tly world markets by US foreign policies, ba sically th e " Ato ms for Peace" program supplemen ted by bilateral agreement s providing for US technolog y , r e search, enri ched uranium and financial capital. ' The US offered a [ s tat e s ub si dize d ] nuclear package that Europe could not refus e and with whi ch the British could not compete'. In the 70s the picture of US dominatio n of Common Market nuclear technolog y had given way to subtler influence : American companies held (actually dealing with relevant governmen ts) substanti al interests in Europ ean and Japanese nuclear companies and held licences on the technolog y which remained largely American. Meanwhile in the 60s and 70s the US entered into bilateral ag re ements for civilian use of atomic energy with many other countries , for example, Argentina , Brasil, Columbia, India, Indonesia , Iran, Ire l and, Israel , Pakistan, Philippin es, South Korea, Portugal, South Africa, Spa in, Taiwan, Turk ey , Venezuela , South Vi etnam. The US proceeded , in this way, to ship nuclear technolog y and nuclear materials in gre at quantitie s round th e world. It also proceeded to spread nuclear t echnology t hrough th e Internati onal Atomic Ene rgy Agency , originall y de si gne d to control and saf eg uard nuclear ope rati ons, but most of whos e ~udget and activitie s • .. have gone to promote nu c l ear activitie s' . �46. A main reason for th e promotion and sales pressure on Third World countries has been the failure of US domestic market and industrial world markets for reactors. Less developed countries offer a new frontier where reactors can be built with easy public financing, where health and safe t y regulations are loose and enforcement rar e , where public opposition is not pennitted and where weak and corrupt regimes offer easy sales. [Forj ..• the US has considerabl e leverage with many of these countries. We know from painful expe rience that many of the worst dictatorshi ps in the planet would not be able to stand without overt and covert US support . Many of those same regimes are now pursuing the nuclear path, for all the worst reasons. 56 It is e v ident from this sketch of the ways and means of r eactor proliferatio n that not only have practices departed far from the framework of the Old Paradigm and the social Modificatio n, but that the practices (of corp orate capitalism and associated third world imperialism ) involve much that is eth ically unacceptabl e, whether by olde r, modif ied, or alternative 57 percepts; for principles such as those and self-d e termination are grossly vio late d. IX. SOCIAL OPTIONS : SHALLOWER AND DEEPER ALTERNATIVES . The futur e energy option that is most often contrasted with nuclear power, namely coal power, while no doubt preferable to nuclear power, is hardly acceptable . For it carries with it the likelihood of serious (air) pollution and associ ated phe nomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to ment ion the despoliatio n caused by extensive strip mining , all of which result from its us e in meeting very high projected consumption figures. Such an option would also fail, it seems, to meet the necessary transfer condition, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbenefic iaries for some concentrate d benefits to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production 58 and replacement . To these conventiona l main options a third is often added which emphasizes softer and more benign technologie s, such as those of solar energy and, in Northern Europe, hydroele ctricity . The deeper choice, which even softer paths tend to neglect, is not technologic al but social , and involves both conservatio n measures and the restruct urin g of production away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumerist ic and nonconsume ristic futures. These more fundamental choices between social alternative s , conventiona l t echnologica lly-oriented discussion of energy options tends to be obscure. It is not just a matter of de ciding in which way to meet �4 7. give n and unexamine d goals (as the Old Paradigm would imply), but als o a matter of examining the goals. That is, we are not merely faced with the question of comparing different technolog ies or substitut e ways of meeting some fi xed or give n demand or level of consumpti on, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with s oft rather than hard technolog ies; we are also fac e d, and pr i ma rily, with th e matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of a society t hat creates them . It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to mee t these alleged needs conceived of as inevitabl e and unchangea ble . (Hence there are solar ways of producing unnecessa ry trivia no one really wants, as opposed to nuclear ways.) Na turally this is not to deny that th e se softer options are sup e rior because of the ethically unaccepta ble features of the harder options. But it is doubtful that any technolog y, howe ver benign in principle , will be likely to leave a tolerable world for the future if it is expect e d to meet unbounded and uncontrol led energy consumpti on and demands. Even the more benign technolog ies such as solar technolog y could be used in a way which creates costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriora ted world being hand e d on to them . Consider, for example, the effect on the world's forest s , which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for productio n of methanol or o f e lectricit y by woodchipp ing (as already planned by forest authoriti es and contempla ted by many other energy organisat ions) . While few would object to t he use of genui ne waste material for energy productio n, the unrestric ted exploi t ation of forests - whether it goes under the name of " solar energy" or not. - to meet e ver increasin g energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world's already hard-pres sed natural forests. The effects of such additiona l demands on the maintenan ce of the forests are often dismissed , even by soft technolo gicalists, by the simpl e expedient of waving around the label 'renewabl e resources '. Many forests are in principle renewable , it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of exploitat ion , but in fact there are now very few forestry operation s anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completel y renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values. 59 In many regions too the rate of e xploitatio n which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total decline is widely thought to be imminent if not already well advanced . It certainly has begun in many regions, and for many forest types (such as rainfores t types) which are now, and very rapidly, being lost for the future. The addition of a major further and not readily limitable demand pressure, that for energy, on top of present pressures is one which anyone with a realistic appreciat ion of the conduct of contempor ary forestry operation s, who i s also concerned with long-t erm conservat ion of the forests and remaining natural communiti e s, must regard with alarm. The result of massive deforesta tion for energy purposes, �48, r esemb li n g the deforesta tion of England at the beginning of th e Industrial Revolution, again for ene rgy purposes, would be extensive and devastating erosion in s t eeper lands and trop i cal are as , dese rtification in more a rid r egions, possib le climatic change, and massive impoverishm en t of na tural ecosystems . Some of us do not wa nt to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - a de fores ted world to the future, any more than we want t o pass on on e poisone d by nuclear products or polluted by coal p roduct s . In sh or t, a mere swi t ch t o a more benign t e chnology - important though this i s - wi th out any more bas ic structural and social change is inadequate . Nor is such a simple technolo gi cal swi. tch likely to be achieved. It is not as if political pressure could oblige the US government to stop its nuc lear program (and that of the countrie s it influences, much of the world), in the way pressure appeared to succeed in halting the Vietnam war. While without doubt it would be good if this could be accomplishe d, it is ve ry un likely give n th e inte gration of political powe rholders with those sponsoring nuclear de velopment . 60 The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social structure which promotes consumerism , consumption far beyo nd genuine needs, a nd a n e conomic s tructure which en coura ge s increasing use of highly energy-inte nsive mode s of prod uc tion. This means, for instance, trying to change a social stru c ture in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work f o rce are cogs i n a production machine over which they have ve ry little r eal cont r ol an d in which most people do unpleasant or boring work fro m which they derive very 1i t tle real satisfactio n in orde r to obta i n the r eward of consume r goo ds and services . A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from prod ucts rather than proc es s e s, fro m consumption , rath e r than from satisfac tion in work an d in social r e lations and oth er activities , is virtually bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unn e cessary consumption . (A production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but fo r created and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce . ) Consumption frequently be comes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas. The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the large r set of adjustments involved in s ocially implementin g the New Paradigm , the move away f rom consumerism is for examp le part of th e more ge ner al shift from ma t eri al ism and ma terialist values . The social change option tends to be obscured in mos t dis cussions o f energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it do e s que stion unde rlying values of current social arrangemen ts . The conventiona l discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or 61 n ee ds ) as unchall e ngeable, and th e iss ue to be on e of which t ech nology can �49. be most profi tably employed to meet th em. This e ffectiv e ly pre s en ts a f a l se choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand a s lacking a s ocial contex t so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly take n as unchallengeable and unchangeable . The point is readily illustrated. It is commonly argue d by representat i ves of such industries as trans!X)rtation and petroleum, as for exampl e by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, powe r boats, ... It would be authoritarian to prevent th em from satisfying th e se wants. Such an argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such nee ds and wants arise or are produced. To point to th e de t e rmination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach a ccording to which they are entirely de t ermined at the framewo rk level ( e .g. by indu s trial organisation) and th e r e is no such thing as indivi dual ch oic e or de termination at all. It is to s ee the soci a l framework as a major f a c t o r i n de t e rmining certain kinds of choices, such as those for travel , a n d t o see ap pare ntly individual choices made in such matte rs as being channelle d a nd dire cte d by a social framework de t e rmined l argely i n th e inte r es t s o f corporat e an d private pro f it and advantage . The so cial change option is a hard option - at l e ast it wil l b e difficult to obtain pol itically - but it is the only way , so it has been argued , of a voidin g passing on serious costs to the future. And there are other sorts of r easons t han suc h ethical ones for taking it: it is the main, indeed the only sort of option open to those who take a deeper ecological perspective 62 , a perspective integ ral with the New Paradigm but not essential to radical departure from the dominant paradigm. The ethical transmission requirement defended accordingl y requires, hardly surprisingly, social and pol i tical adjustment. The social and political changes that the deeper alternative require s will be strongly resisted because they and power structure. mean changes in current social organisation To the extent that the option repre sents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surp r ising that official energy option discussion proceeds by misre pres enting and often ob scuring i t . But difficult though a change will be , es pec ially one with s uch f a r - r eaching e ffects on th e prevailing power struc tur e , is to obt ai n, it is imp e rative t o try: we are al l on the n uclear train. �FOOTNOTES 1. All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Goodin, p. 417; the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6. While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear fuel cycle in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it helps to know a little. & Abbotts , Gyorgy. The basics are presented in many texts, e . g. Nader Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such important background and stage-settin g matters as the likelihood of a core meltdown of a (lightwater ) reactor, much more information is required. For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fallacies and decision theory is at least a s important as knowledge of nuclear technology. 2. to the first, see references cited in Goodin , p . 417, footnote 1. As regards the second see Cot grove and Duff, and some of the references As given therein. 3. Cot grove and Duff, p. 339. 4. The table is adapted from Cotgrove and Duff, p. 341; Catton and Dunlap, especially p. 34 . 5. compare also See, e.g ., Gyorgy , pp . 357- 8. 6. For one illustration , see the conclusions of Mr Justice Parker at the Windscale inquiry (The Windscale Inquiry Vol. 1., Her Majesty 's Stationery Office , London, 1978), discussed in both Cotgrove and Duff , p. 347 and in Goodin, p. 501 ff. 7. Much as with the argument of one theory or position against another . One can argue both from one's own position against the other, and in the other's own terms against the other. 8. As well as screening the debate from the public such manoeuvres favour the (pro-)nucle ar establishme nt, since they (those of th e alliance of military, large industry, and government) control much of the information and (subject to minor qualificatio ns) can release what, and only what , suits them. 9. This is a conclusion of several governmenta l inquiries and is conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear deve lopment; for requisite details up to 1977 see Routley (a). The same conclus ion has been reached in some, but not all, more recent official reports, see , e . g., �2 10. For some details see Gyorgy, p. 60 ff. 11 . Se e the papers, and simulations, discussed in Goodin, p. 428. lla. Naturally the effect on humans is not the only factor that has to be taken into account in arriving at moral assessments. Nuclea r radi ation , unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life and welfare. But since the harm nuclear development may afflict on non-human life, for exampl e , can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the convent ional (Old Paradigm) way. 12. On the pollution and waste disposal record of the nuclear industry, see Nader and Abbotts, Lovins and Price, and Gyorgy. On the more general problem of effective pollution controls, see also, Routley (a), footnote 7. 13. Back of thus Humanity Unlimited assumption is the idea of Man replacing God. First God had unlimited power, e.g. over nature, then when during the Enlightenment Man replaced God, Man was to have unlimited power. Science and technology were the tools which were to put Man into the position of unlimitedness. More recent l y nuclear power is seen as providing man at least with unlimited physical power, power obtained through technology. [ability to manage technology repr esent s the past] 14 . On such l imitation theorems, which go back to Finsler and Godel on one side and to Arrow on the other, see, e.g. Routley 80. All these theorems mimic paradoxes, semantical "paradoxes" on one side and vot ing "p aradoxes" on the other. Other different limitation resu1 ts are presented in Routley 81 . It follows that there are many problems that have no solution and much that is n e cessarily unknowable. Limitative results put a serious dent in the progress picture. According th e Dominant Western Worldview, the history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem there is a solution, and thus progress need never cease (Catton and Dunlap, p . 34) . 15. See Lovins and Price . 15a . The points also suggest a variant argument against a nuclear future, namely A nuclear future narrows the range of opportunities open to future generations. 'What justice requires ... is that the overall range of opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed' (Barry, p. 24 3). Therefor e ~ a nuclear f utur e contrav enes r equirements of justice . �3 16. For examples , and for some details of the history of philosoph e rs' positions on obligatio ns to the future, see Routley (a). 17 . Passmore, p. 91. Passmore' s position is ambivalen t and , to all appearanc es, inconsist ent. It is considere d in detail in Routley (a), as also is Rawls ' position. 18. For related criticism s of the e conomists ' arguments for discounti ng, a nd for citation of the often eminent economist s who sponsor them, see Goodin , pp. 429-30. 19. The reasons (not elaborate d here) are that the propertie s are different e . g. a monetary reduction of value imposes a linear ordering on values to which value rankings , being only partial orderings , do not conform. 20. Goodin however puts his case against those rules in a less than satisfact ory fashion . What he claims is tha t we cannot list all the possible outcomes in the way that such rules as expe ct ed util ity maximiza tion presuppos es, e.g. Goodin suggests that we cannot list all the things that can go wrong with a nuclear power plant or with waste storage procedure s. But outstandi ng alternativ es can always be comprehen ded logically , at worst by saying "all the rest" (e.g. "'P covers everythin g except p). For example , outcomes Goodin says cannot be listed, can be comprehen ded along such lines as "plant breakdown through human error". Furthermo re the different more app ropriate rules Goodin subsequen tly considers also requir e listing of "possible " outcomes . Goodin's point can be alternati vely stated however. There are really two points. The first trouble is that such ragbag alternati v es cannot in general be assigned required quantitat ive probabil ities, and it is at that point that applicati ons of the models breaks dovm. The breakdown is just what separates decision making under uncertain ty from decision making under risk. Secondly, many influenti al applicatio ns of decision theory methods, the Rasmussen Report is a good example, do, illegitim ately, delete possible alternati ves from their modelling s. 21 . Discount, or bank, rates in the economis ts' sense are usually set to follow the market, cf. P.A. Samuelson , Economics , 7th Edition, McGraw-H ill, New York , 1967, p.351. 22 . Thus the rates have little moral relevance . A real possibili ty is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate . A real possibili ty requires producibl e evidence for its considera tion . The contrast is with mere logical possibili ty. 23. �4 24. Such a princip le is explici t both in classica l utilitar iani s m (e.g. Sidgwick p. 414) , and in a range of contrac t and other theories from Kant and Rousseau to Rawl s (p.293). How the princip le is argu ed for will depe nd heavily , however, on the underlyi ng theory; and we do not want to make our use depend he avily on particu lar ethical theories . 25. The latter question is taken up in section VII; see especia lly, the Poverty argumen t. 26 . SF, p. 27. Shrader -Freche tte is herself somewha t critical of the carte blanche adoption of these methods , suggesti ng that ' whoever aff irms or den ies the desirab ility of ... [such] standard s is, to some degree, symboll ically assentin g to a number of American value patterns and cu l tural norms' (p. 28 ). 27. The examp le paralle ls the sorts of countere xamp les often advance d to utilitar ianism, e.g. the admissi ble lynching of an innocen t person because of pleasure given to the large lynching party. against utilitar ianism, see ... For the more general case 28 . US Atomic Energy Commissi on , Compara tive Risk-Co st-B en ef it Study of Alterna tive sources of Electric al Energy (WASH-1224), US Governm ent Printing Office , Washing ton, D.C., Decembe r 1974 , p.4-7 and p. 1-16. 29 . As SF points out, p.37-44 ., in some detail. As she remarks, ... since standard s need not be met, so long as the NRC [Nuclea r Regulato ry commiss ion] judges that the licence shows 'a reasonab le effort' at meetin g them, current policy allows governm ent regulato rs to trade human health and welfare for the [apparen t ] good intentio ns of the promo tors of technolo gy. [Such] good intentio ns have never been known to be sufficie nt for the morality of an act (p. 39). The failure of state regulati on, even where the standard s are as mostl y not very demandin g, and the alliance of regulato rs with those th ey a re s upposed t o be r eg ulating, are conspicu ous features of modern environm ental control, not just of (nuclear ) pollutio n control. 30 . �31 . The figures are thos e from the origin al Bro okhaven Report: ' Theo r e t ical possib ilities and consequ ences of major accide nts in large nuclea r plants ', USAEC Report WASH-740, Governm ent Printin g Office , Washin gton , D. C., 1957. This r e port was r eques ted in the first place because the Commis sion on Atomic Energy wanted pos i tive safe t y conc l usions "to r eass ure th e private insuran ce compan ies" so that they would pr ovid e coverag e for th e nuclea r indust ry. Since even th e cons e rvative statist ics of the r eport we r e alannin g it was supp r essed and its data we r e not made public until. almost 20 years later, after a suit was brough t as a r esult of the Freedom of Inform ation Act (Shrad er-Frec hette, pp. 78-9). 32 . Atomic Energy Commis sion, Re actor Safe ty Study: An Ass e ssment of Acc ident Risks in US Comme rcial Nuclea r Power Plants , Governm ent Printin g Offi ce , Washin gton, D.C., 1975 . This report, the only alleged ly comple te study , conclud ed that fission reactor s presen ted only a minima l health risk t o the public . Early in 1979, th e Nuclea r Regula tory Commis sion (th e r elevan t organ isation that superse ded the trouble d Atomic Energy Commis sion) withdre w i ts suppor t for the report, with the result that there is now no compreh ensive analys is of nuclea r power approve d by the US Governm ent. 32a . Most presen t and planned r eactors are of this type: see Gyo r gy . 33 . 34 . Even then relevan t environ ment factors may have been neglec t ed . 35. There are variati ons on (i) and (ii) which multip ly costs agains t number s such as probab ilities. In this way risks, constru ed as probab le cos ts, can be taken into accoun t in the assessm ent. (Alt e rnative ly, risks may be assesse d through such familia r method s as insuran ce.) A princip le varying (ii), and fonnula ted as follows : (ii ) a is ethica lly accepta ble if (for some b) a include s no more risks than b and b is sociall y acce pted. was the basic ethica l princip le in terms of which the Cluff Lak e Board of Inquiry recentl y decided that nuclea r power de velo pme nt 1 �in Saskat chewan is ethically acceptable : s e e Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final Report, Departme nt of Environment , Government of Saskatchewa n, 1978, p. 305 and p . 288 . In this report, a is nuclear power and bis either a ctiviti e s clearl y accepted by society as alternative power sources. In other application s b has been taken as cigarette smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietna m War(!) The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to principles (i) - (ii'). The principles are certainly ethically substantive , since an ethical consequence cannot be deduced from nonethical premisses, but they have an inadmissibl e conventiona l character. For l ook at the origin of b: b may be socia lly accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though its social acceptibili ty is no longer so cle arcut and it would not have been socially accepted if as much as is now known had been known when it was introduced. 'What is required in (ii'), for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing is then 'ethically acceptable' rather than 'socially accepted'. But even with th e amendments the principles are invalid , for the reasons given in the text. It is not disconcertin g that thes e arguments do not work . It would be sad to see yet another area lost to the exper ts, namely ethics to actuaries. 36. A main part of the tr oubl e with the models is that they are narrowly utilitarian , and like utilitariani sm they neglect distributio nal features , involve na tu ralistic fallacies, et c. Really they try to treat as an uncon- straine d optimisatio n what is a deontically constraine d optimisatio n : V. Routley 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarian ism'. s ee R. and 37. Ap parent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and redistr i bution of income generally) vanish when wealth is construed (as it has to be i f taxation is to be properly justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly monopolised by a minority of the population . Example s such as that of motoring dangerously do not constitute counterexam ples to the principle; for one is not morally entitled to so motor. 38. SF, p. 15, where references are also cited. 39 . Goodin, p. 433. 40 . On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy , Environment a lists for Full Employment, Washington DC, 1977, pp.1-7, and also the details supplied in substantiat ing th e interesting case of Commoner [7 ] . On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23 . On th e employment issues, see too H. E. Daly in [ 9], p. 149. �7 A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich, Ene rgy and Equality , Calden and Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly th e opp osite of what the poor need. 41 . For much more deta il on the inappropria teness see E.F . Schumacher, Sma ll is Beauti ful, Blond and Briggs, London, 1973. As to the capital and o ther requirement s, see [2] , p. 48 , and also [7] and [9] . For an illuminatin g l ook at the sort of d evelopmen t high - energy t e chnolo gy will t end to promote in the so-called unde rdeveloped countri es see the pap e r of Waiko and other papers in The Melanesian Envfr•onment (edited J . H. Wins l ow), Au s tr a l ian National University Press, Canb e rr a, 1977. 42 . A useful survey is given in A. Lovins , Energy Strategy : The Road Not Taken , Fr iends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Fo 1°eign Affair•s , Oc tob e r 1976); s ee also [ 17], [6 ] , [ 7], [14] , p . 233 ff, and Schumacher, op . cit . 43 . An argument like this is suggested in Passmo re, Chapters 4 and 7, with respect to the question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the ove rriding importance of passing on contemporar y culture is underpinn e d by what appears to be a future-dire cted ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed he fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good interventio n is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care of t he present and immediate future. The argument has all t he defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others. 44. See Nader and Abbotts, p. 66, p . 191, and also Commoner . 45 . Very persuasive arguments to this effect have been a dvanced by civ il liberties groups and others in a number of countri e s: see especially M. Flood and R. Grove-White , Nuclear Pr ospects. A comment on the individual , the State and Nuclear Power , Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties , London, 1976. 46. ' US energy policy, for example , since the passage of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act , has been that nuclear powe r is necessary to provide "an e conomical and reliable basis" n eed ed "to sustain economic growth" (SF, p . 111, and r efe rences there cit e d) . �47. There are now a great many criticism s of the second premiss in th e literat ure . For our criticism , and a r e formulati on of the premiss in terms of selec tive economic growth (which would exclude nu clear developm ent), see Routley (b) , and also Berkley and Seckler. To simple-mi ndedly contrast e conomic growth with no-growth , in the fa shion of some discussio ns of nuclear power, c . f . Elster, is to leave out crucial alte rnatives ; the contracti on of course much simplifie s the otherwise faulty case for unalleged growth. 48. In UK and USSR nuclear developme nt is explicitl y in the public domain, in such countries as France and West Germany the governmen t has very s ubstantia l interests in main nuclear involved companies . Even as regards nuclear plant operation in the US, it is difficult to obtain comprehen sive data. Estimates of cost very dramtical ly according to the sample of plants chosen and the assumptio ns made concernin g the measureme nt of plant performan ce (Gyorgy, p. 173). 49 . See Kalmanoff , p . 50. See Corney. 51. Ref. to what it has to say about Price Anderson Act. 52. Full ref to SF on argument from ignorance etc. 53 . These e . g. Elster, p. 377. On deci sion theory see also, 54 . A recent theme in much economic literatur e is that Bayesian dec ision theory and risk analysis can be universal ly applied . The theme is upset as soon as one steps outside of select Old Paradigm confines. In any case , even within these confines there is no consensus at all on, a nd few (and widely diverging ) figures for the probabili ty of a reactor core meltdown, an d no reliable estimates as to the likelihoo d of a nuclear confronta t i on. Thus Goodin argue s (in 78) that 'such uncertain ties plague energy theories' as to 'rend er expected utility calculati ons impossibl e '. 55 . For details see Gyorgy, p. 398 ff ., from which presentat ion of the internati onal story is adapted. �1 56. Gyo rgy, p . 307, and p. 308. points, see Chomsky For elaborati on of some of th e important and Hermann. 57. Whatever one thinks of the ethical principle s underlyin g the Old Paradigm or its Modificat ion - and they do form a coherent set th at many people can respect - these are not the principle s unde rlying contempor ary corporate capitalism and associate d third-wor ld i.mperialis m. 58. Certainly practical transitio nal programs may involve tempo rary and limited us e of unaccepta ble long t erm commoditi es such as coal, but in presentin g su ch practical details one should not lose sigh t of the more basic social and structura l changes, and the problem is really one of making those. Similarly practical transitio nal strategie s should make use of such measures as en vironment al (or replaceme nt) pricing of energy i . e . so that the price of some energy unit includes the full cost of r e placing it by an equivalen t unit taking account of environm ental cost of productio n. Other (sometime s coopU.ve) s trategies towards more satisfact ory alternativ es should a lso, of course , be adopted, in particula r the removal of institutio nal barriers to energy conservat ion and alternati ve technolog y (e . g. local governmen t regulatio ns blocking these), and the removal of state assistanc e to fuel and power industrie s. 59. Symptoma tic of the fact that it is not treated as r enewable is that forest economics do not generally allow for full renewabi lity - if th ey did the losses and deficits on forestry operation s would be much more s triking tha n t hey already are often enough. It is doubtful, furthermo re, that energy cropping of forests can be a fully r e newable operation if net energy productio n is to be worthwhil e; see, e.g . the argument in L. R.B . Mann 'Some difficult ies with energy farming for portable fuels', and add in the costs of e cosystem maintenan ce. 60. For an outline and explanati on of this phenomena see Gyorgy, and also Woodmansee . 61 . The requisite distinctio n is made in several places , e . g . Routley (b), and (to take one example from the real Marxist literatur e), Baran and Sw eezy . 62 . The distinctio n between shallow and deep ecology was first emphasise d by Naess. For its environm en tal i mpo rtance see Routl ey (c) (wher e further reference s are cited) . �• REFERENCES . In o rde r to contai n refe r e n ces to a modes t length, r efrre ncc to primary sources has often been replaced by referen ce through secondary sources . Generally the reader can easily trace the primary sour ces . For those parts of the text that ove rlap Routley (a), fuller references wil l be found by consulting the latter article. S. Cotgrove and A. Duff, 'Environmen talism, middle-clas s radicalism an d politics', Sociologica l Review 28 (2) (1980), 333-51. R.E . Goodin, 'No moral nukes ', Ethics 90 (1980), 417-49. A. Gyorgy and Friends , No Nukes: everyone's guide to nuclear power, South End Press, Boston, Mass., 1979. R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Ato mic Energy, Outb ack Press , Melbourn e , 1977. R. a nd V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', Inquiry 21 ( 1978), 133-79 (cited as Routley (a)). Fox Repo rt: Ranger Uranium Environmen tal I nquiry First Report , Australian Go vernmen t Publishing Service, Canberra , 1977. K.S. Schrader-Fr echet te, Nu clea r Power and Publi c Policy, Reidel, Do rdrecht, 1980 (refe rred to as SF). W. R. Cat ton, Jr., and R. E. Dunlap, 'A new ecol ogical paradigm for post - ex uber an t sociology', Ame rican Behavioral Scientist 24 (1980) 15-47 . Unite d States Interagency Review group on Nuclea r Waste Managemen t, Repo rt to the President, Wash i ngton. (Dept. of Energy) 1979. (Ref. No . El. 28 . TID29442) (cited as US(a)) . A.B . Lovins and J.H. Price, Non-Nuc lear Futures : The Case for an Eth ical Energy Strategy, Friends of the Earth Internation al, San Fran cisco , 1975. R. Routley , 'On the impossibili ty of an ortho dox social theory and of an orthodox solution to environmen tal problems', Logique et Analyse, 23 (1980), 145-66. R. Routl ey , 'Necessa r y limits for knowledge: unknowable tru ths', in Es says in honour of Paul Wei nga rtner, (ed. E. Norscher ), Salzberg, 1980. J. Passmore , Man's Responsibi lity for Nature, Du ckworth , London, 1974 . �,,,. .-2. R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, Third Editi on, RSSS, Austra lian National University, 1975 (cited as Routley (b)). J . Rawls , A Theory of Justice, Harvard Unive rsit y Press, Cambridge , Mass., 19 71. P . hl . Berkl ey a nd D.W . Seckler, Economic Gr owth and Environment a l Dec ay, Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch , New York, 1972 . J . Elster, 'Risk, uncertainty and nuclear power' , Soci al Science Information 18 (3) (1979) 371-400. J. Robinson , Economic Heresi e s, Basic Books, New York, 1971. B. Barry, 'Circumstan ces of Justice and future generat i ons ' in Obligations to Future Generations (ed. R.I. Sikora and B. Barry), Templ e Universit y Press, Philadelphi a, 1978. H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics , Macmillan, London , 1962 (r e issue ). B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power , Knopf, New York, 1975. N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Right s , 2 vols., Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1979 . J. Woodmans ee , The World of a Giant Corporation , North Coun tr y Pr es s , Seattle , Washing ton, 1975. P . A. B~r a n and P . Sweezy, Monopoly Capita l, Penguin, 1967. A. Naess, ' The shallow and the deep, long range eco l ogy movement. A summary ', Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document NUCLE AR POWER - I. ETHIC AL, SOC I AL AND POLltt AAL DI MiN S I ONS COMPETING PARADIGMS AN D THE NU CLEAR DEBAT E. 1870 One ha rdly needs initia t i on i nt o the dark my s te ri e s of nucl ear ph ys i cs to contribu te use f ully t o t he debat e no w wid e l y r anging ov e r nuc lear powe r . While ma ny i mpo r tan t empi rica l que stions ar e s t i ll unr e s olved, t hese do not r e a lly l i e a t th e ce nt r e of t he con t r ove rsy. In st e ad, it is a de ba t e about val ue s . .. ma ny of the que s tions ~hi ch a ri s e are s oc i al an d et hica l one s . 1 Socio logical inves tigation s have conf i rme d that th e n ucl ea r deba t e is primaril y one ove r what is wor th having or pursuing and over what we a re ent i t l ed to do to o th e rs . They ha ve also confirme d tha t t he debate i s polaris ed a lon g t he li nes o f compe ting paradigm s. 2 Accordin g to the entre nc he d parad i gm dis ce rn e d, that conste llation of value s , attitude s and be liefs o fte n ca ll e d t he Domi nan t So ci a l Pa radigm (hereaft er the Old Paradigm ), economic criteria be come the be nchmark by whi ch a wi de ran ge of individu al and social action is judged and e va luat e d . And be li e f in the market and marke t mechan isms is quit e ce ntral . Clust e rin g around this core belief is the convicti on th a t e nt e r p r i s e flou r is hes bes t i n a system of r isks and rewards, that di ffe r e nti als a r e neces sary ..• , and in the nece ssity for some fo r m o f di vis i on of labour, and a hi e rarchy of skills and exper t is e . In pa rt i cul a r, t here i s a be li e f in th e comp e t e nce o f e xperts i n gener a l and of sci entis t s in pa r ticular . the re is an empha s i s on q uantif i ca t ion . 3 The ri v a l world view , sometime s c all e d t he Alte rnative Environm e ntal Par ad igm (the New Paradi gm) dif f ers on almos t e ve ry pcint , and, acco rdin g t o so ciologi sts , in ways summari sed i n th e fo llowing t a bl e 4 Domi nant Socia l Para digm CORE VALUES Ma te r i a l (e conomic growth , progress an d dev elopmen t ) Na tu ra l env ironment va lu e d as resourc e Dom i nat i on over na t ur e Al t e rn a tive Env ir onme nt al Pa rad igm Non-ma terial (se l f -r eali sa t io n) Na t ural e nvir onm e nt i ntrin s i cally valu ed Ha r mo ny with na tu r e ECONOMY* Ma rket forces Ri s k a nd rewa r d Rewa r ds for ach i evemen t Diff e rent i a l s Individ ua l se lf-help Public i nte r es t Sa fety Incomes r elat ed t o nee d Egali t a r ian Co ll ective/soc i al provi s i on PO LITY Authori t at iv e s t ru c t ures (e xp e r t s in flue ntia l) Hi e r a r ch1.c a l Law and order Ac t io n through o ffi c ia l i nst it ut io ns Pa rtic ip a tive s t ruc t ur e s ( ci ti zen/ wo r ke r invo lveme n t ) No n- hi era r chical Liberation Di r ec t a c ti o n SOCIETY Ce ntr a lised La r ge-s ca le As socia tional Or der ed Dece ntr a l ised Small - s ca l e Communa l Flexib l e NATURE Ampl e rese r ves Nature host il e/ ne u t r a l Envi r onmen t cont roll a ble Earth ' s r esou r c e s lim i ted Nature be nign Na t ure de l i ca t el y ba l a nc ed KNOWLEDGE Co nf idence in sc i ence and t ec hnology Ra t i onal i t y of mea ns (only) Li mit s t o sc i e nce Rati ona lit y of en ds *Stat e socia l ism , as pr a ctised i n mo s t of t he " Eastern b l oc" , di ffers as to eco nomi c o r ganisation , t he ma r ket i n pa r ticula r be i ng rep l ac ed sys tem hy ~ comma nd sy st e m) . Bu t sin c e t he r e i s v irt ual l y no debate r·o ni i nes 'l l s r a t <! ., ociali sm , 5 that mJnnr va riant on th e Old Para digm from t he Ol d Pa rad i gm r eall y on ly by cen t ral planning (a ma r ke t over o nu c lea r futu r e within t he ne ed no t be de lineat ed he r e . 2 No doubt the competing paradigm picture is a trifle simple (and subs equently it is important to disentangle a Modified Old Paradigm, which softens the old econ omic assumptions with social welfa r e requirements : really and instead of a New Paradigm there are rather count erpa radigms, a cluster of not very well worked out positions that diverge from the cluster marked out as the Old Paradigm) . Nonetheless it is empi rically investigable, and, most important, it enables the nuclear debate to be focuss ed . Large - scale nuclear development, of the sort now occurring in much of the world , runs counter to leading tenets (such as societal features) of the New Pa radigm. Indeed to introduce ethical and social dimensions into the assessment of nucl ear power, instead of or in addition to merely economic factors such as cost and efficiency, is already to move somewhat beyond the recei ved paradigm. For under the Old Paradigm, strictly construed, th e nuclear debate is confined to the tenns of the narrow utilitarianism up on which contemporary economic practice is p r emisse d, the issues to questions of economic means (to assumed economistic ends) along with technological, social engineering and other instrumental details : whatever falls outside these terms is ( dismissed as) . . 1.6 irrationa Furthermore, nuclear development rece ive s its support from adherents of the Old Paradigm. Virtually all the arguments in favour of it are set within the assumption frame.work of the Old Paradigm, and without these assumptions the case for the nuclear future the world is presently committed to fails . But in fact the argument for a nuclear future from the Old Paradigm is itself broken-backed and ultimat ely fails, unless the free enterprise economic assumptions are replaced by th e ethically unacceptable assumptions of advanced (corporate) capitalism . The two paradigm picture also enables our case against a nuclear future (a case written from outside the Old Paradigm) to be structured. . 7 main parts : - There are two It is argue d, firstl y , from without the Old Paradigm, that nuclear development is ethically unjustifiable; but that, secondly, even from within the framework of the ethically dubious Old Paradigm, such development is unacceptable, since significant features of nuclear development conflict with indispensible features of the Paradigm (e . g . co sts of project development and state subsidization with market independence and crite ria for project selection) . It has appeared acceptable from within the dominant paradigm only because ideals do not square with practice, only because the assumptions of th e Old Paradigm are but very rarely applied in contemporary political practice, 3 th e place of pure (or mixed) capitalism having been usurped by corporate capitalism. It is because the nuclear debate can be carried on within th e framework of the Old Paradigm that the debate - although it is a debate about values, because of the conflicting values of the competing paradigms - is not just a debate about values; it is also a debate within a paradigm as to means to already assumed (economistic) ends, and of rational choice as to energy options within a predetermined framework of values. (In this corner belong, as explained in section VIII, most decision theory argume nts, arguments often considered as encompassing all the nuclear debate is ethically about, best utilitarian me ans to predetermined ends . ) For another leading characteristic of the nuclear deb a te is the attempt, under the dominant paradigm to remove it from the ethical and social sphere, and to divert it into specialist issues whe th e r over minutiae and contingenci es of present techno l ogy o r ove r medical or legal or mathematical details. 8 The double approach can be applied as regards each of t he main problems nuclear development poses. There are many i nte rr ela t ed problems, and the argument is further structured in terms of these. For in the advancement and promotion of nucle ar power we encounter a remarkable combination of factors, never befo re assembled : establishment, on a massive scale , of an industry which involves at each stage of its processing serious risks and at some stages of p roduction possible catastrophe , which delivers as a by-product rad ioactive wastes which require up to a million years' storage but for which no sound and e conomic storage methods are known, which grew up as part of the war industry and which is easily subverted to deliver nuclear weapons, which r equires for i t s operation considerable secrecy, limitations on the flow of informa tion and r es trictions on civil liberties, which depends for its economics, and in orde r to generate expected profits, on substantial state subsidization, supper½ and intervention. with problems. It is, in short, a very high techological develo pmen t, beset A first important problem, which serves also to exemplify e thical issues and principles involved in other nuclear power que st i on s , is th e unreso l ved matter of disposal of nuclear wastes. II . THE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM, AND THE TRAIN PARABLE . A long distance country train has just pulled out. crowded carries both pass e ngers and fr e i gh t. The train which is At an early stop in the journey someon e con signs as freight, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a high ly toxic and exp losive gas. This is packaged in a very thin container which, as the consigner is aware, may not contain th e gas for the 4 full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if th e train should strike any real trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the train becomes very hot, if the train should be derailed or involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interefere inadvertently o r deliberately with the freight, perhaps trying to steal some of it. these sorts of contingencies have occurred on some previous journeys. All of If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while othe r s could be maimed or incur serious diseases. Most of us would roundly condemn such an action. consigner of the parcel say to try to justify it? What might the He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will , that the world needs his pr~uct and it is his duty to supply it , and that in a ny case he is not responsible for th e train or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however wo uld norrrally be seen as ludicrous when set in this context . What is worth remarking is that similar excuses are not always so seen I when the consigner, again a "responsible" b usin essman , puts his workers ' health or other peoples ' welf are at risk. Suppose he ways that it is hi s own and otherd press ing needs which justify his action. The company he controls,which produces the material as a by-product , is in bad financia l straits, and could not afford to produce a better container even if it knew how to make one. If the company fails , he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and th e whole company town, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effe ct, will be worse off. The poor and unemployed of the town, whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer espe cially. Few people would accept such a story, even if correct, as justification . Even where there are serious risks and costs to ones e lf or some group for whom one is concerned one is usually considered not t o be entitled to simply transfer the heavy burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they a ri se from one's own, or one's group 's, chosen life-style. The matter of nuclear waste disposal has many moral features which resemble the train case . How fitting the analogy is will become apparent as th e argument progresses . There is no known proven safe way to package th e highly toxic wastes generated by the nuclear plants that will be spread around th e world as large- scale nuclear development goes ahead. 9 The waste problem will be much more serious than that generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, with 5. each one of the 2000 or so reactors envisaged by the end of the century producing, on average , annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb . Much of this waste is extremely t oxic . For example, a millionth of a gramme of plutonium is enough to induce a lung cancer . Wastes will include the reactors themselves, which will have to be abandoned after the ir expected life times of perhaps 40 years , and which, some have estimated, may require l½ million years to reach saf e levels of radioactivity. Nuclear wastes must be kept suitably isolated from the environ ment fo r th e ir entire active lifetime. For fission products the required storage period a ve rages a thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include plutonium, there is a half to a million yea r storage problem . Serious problems have aris en with both short-term and proposed long-t erm methods of storage, e ven with th e comparatively small quantities of waste produced ove r th e last 10 twenty years. Short-term methods of storage require continued human in t e rven tion, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human i nterference and risk of leakage through non-human factors . No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history of the earth over the last million years, a period whose flu ctua tion s in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice Ages , could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be provided for the vast period of time involved. Nor does the history of human affa irs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years . Proposed long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formations or in salt mines, are largely speculative and relatively untested, and have already pro ved to involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice. Even as regards expensive recent proposals for first embedding concentrated wastes in glass and encapsulating the r e sult in multilayered metal containe rs before rock deposit , simulation mo dels reveal that radioactive material may not rema in suitably is ola ted from human environment . 11 In short, the best pres ent storage proposals carry very real possibilities of irradiating future people and . h . . lla d amaging t eir environment. Given the heavy costs which could be involve d fo r the future, and given the known limits of technology, it is methodological ly unsound to bet, as nuclear nations have, on the discovery of safe procedures for storage of wastes. Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on present proposals, and subject to the same inadequacies. For instance , none of the proposed methods for safe storage has been properly test e d, and they may 6. well prove to involve unforeseen difficultie s and risks when an attemp t is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guaran t ee of safety over the storage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt, would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological or future µuman factors . But even if an economicall y viable, rigorously safe long t e rm storage method could be devised , there is the problem of gua rantee ing that it would be universally and invariably used. The assumption that it would be (especially if, as appears likely, such a method proved expensive economicall y and politically ) seems to p r esuppose a level of efficiency, pe rfection and concern for the f u ture which has not previously been e ncountere d in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nucl ea r industry. 12 Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long t e rm storage sites through pe rhaps a million years of possible future human activity, weaponsgrade radioactive material will be accessible , over much of the million year storage peri od, to any party who is in a position to retrieve it. Th e assumption that a way will nonetheless be found , before 2000, which gets around the wastestorag e problem (no longer a nere disposal problem) is accordingly not rationally based, but is rather like many assumpti ons of way s , an article of faith . It is an assunption supplied by the Old Par adigm, a no limitations ass ump tion , that there are really no (developmen t) problems that cannot be solved technologic ally (if not in a fash i on that is always immediately economi cally feasible). The assumption has played an important part in development plans and pra ctic e. It has not only encouraged an unwarrant e d technolog ical optimism (not to say hubris 13 ), that there are no limits to what humans can accomplish , es pe cially through science ; it has led t o the embarcation on projects before crucial problems have been satisfactor ily solved or a solution is even in sight , and it has led to th e idea that technology can always be suitably controlled . It has also led, not surprisingl y, to disasters . There are severe limits on what technology can achieve (some of which a r e becoming known in the form of limitation theorems 14 ); and in addition there are human limitations which modern technologic al development s often fail to take due account of (risk a nalysis of the likelihood of reactor accidents is a relevant example, discuss e d below) . The original nuclear technology dream was that nuclear fissi on would provide unlimi t ed energy (a 'clean unlimited supply of power '). That dr e am soon shattered. The nu clear industry apparently remains a net consume r of power, and nuclear fission will be but a quite shor t-t erm supplier of power. 15 ) 7. The risks imposed on the future by proceeding with nuclea r development are , then, significant. Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the (suspect) breeder r eactor it could be an energy source for only perhaps 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lives could be se riously affected by the wastes. Thus perhaps 40,000 generations of futur e people could be fo rced to bear significant risks resulting from the provision of the (extravagant) energy use of only a small proportion of the people o f 10 generations. Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials th e only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the fu ture . Because the energy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem , that of making a transition t o renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably , again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it . For they may well have to face the change to renewable res ources in an over- populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dreams of global industrialisation are realised , more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associat ed technology and heavy resource use and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it . It will , moreover, probably be a world which is larg ely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which su ch r enewable r eso urces as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form a very important part of the basis of life , 15a are in a run-down condition. Such points tell against th e idea th a t future people mGst be , if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy , at least indirect beneficiaries . It is for such reasons th at the train pa rabl e cannot be turned around to work in favour of nuclear power, with for exampl e , the nuclear train bringing relief as well as wastes to a remote town powered (onl y) by nuclear power. The 'solution" then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems . Like the consigner in the train parable, contemporary industrial society proposes, in order to ge t itself out of a mess arising from its chosen life style - the creation of e conomies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding benefits . The " solution" may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes 8. in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties, whose opportunity to lead decent lives may be seriously jeopardised. Industrial society has - under each paradigm, so it will be argued - cl e ar alternatives to · this action, which is taken essentially to avoid changing corporately-controlled patterns of consumption and protect the interest of those comparatively few who benefit from them . If we apply to the nuclear situation, so perceived , the standards of behaviour and moral principles generally acknowledged (in principle if perhaps of t en not in fact ) in the contemporary wo rld, it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that nuclear development involves gross injustice with respect to 15a th e future . There appear to be only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply because the recipients of the nuclear pa rcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances, for to reject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to imply that there are no circumstances in which such an action might be justifiable, or at least whe re the matter is less clearcut. It is the same with the nuclear case . Just as in the cas e of the consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether they apply in th e present case. We consider these possible escape routes for the proponent of nuclear development in turn, beginning with the ques tion of our obligations to the future. Resolution of this question casts light on other ethical questions concerning nuclear development. It is only when these have been considered that the matter of whether there are overriding circumstances is taken up again (in section VII). III OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE. The especially problematic area is that of the distant (i.e . non-immediat e) fut ure, the futur e with which people alive today will have no direct contact: by comparison, the immediate future gives fewer problems for most ethical theories. In fact the question of obliga tions to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories fail to pass , and also has serious repercussions in political philosophy as regards the adequacy of accepted (democra ti c and other) institutions which do not take due account of the interests of future creatures. 9. Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on the issue. A good many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same considerations being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them a lesser weight, those who deny or who are committed by their general moral position to denying that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those who come down with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political institutions, that th ere are no moral obligations to the future beyond perhaps those to the next gene ration . According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained, there are no moral restrictions on a ct ing or failing to act deriving from the ef fect of our actions on future people . Of those philosophers who say , or whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, who have opted for the unconstrained position, many have based this view on accounts of moral obligation which are built on relations which presuppose some temporal or spatial contiguity . Th us moral obligation is seen as grounded on or as presupposing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time ( o r sometimes in space) . Fo r example, obligation is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also non-transitive . Among su ch suggested bases or grounds of moral obligation, or r eq uirements on moral obligation , which would rule out obligations to the nonimmediate future are these :- Firstly there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligation is held be able to claim his r ights or en titlement . People in the distant future will not be able to claim rights and entitlements as against us, and of course they can do nothing effective to e nforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly , there a re those accounts which base moral obligations on social or legal convention, for example a convention which would require punishment of offenders or at least some kind of social enforcement . But plainly these and other conventions will not hold invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventions and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders, and there couid be no guarantee that any contemporary institutions would do it for them . 10. Both the view that moral obligation requires the cont ex t of a moral community and the view that it is contractually based appear to rul e out th e distant future as a field of moral obligation as they not only require a commonality or some sort of common basis which cannot be guaranteed in the case of the distant future, but also a possibility of interchange or reciprocity of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligation is seen as mutual exchange the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligations to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligations in non-transitive r ela tions of short duration such as sympathy and love. As well there are difficulties about love and sympathy for (non-existent ) people in the far distant futu r e about whose personal qualities and characteristics one must know very little and who may well be committed to a life-style for which one has l ittle or no sympa th y . On the current showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contemporary society lacks both love and sympathy for future peop l e ; and it would appear to follow from this that contemporary people had no obligations concerning future people and could damage them as it suited them. What all these views have in common is a picture of obligation as some thing acquired, either individually or institutionally , something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. pa rticipatin g in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can fail to have (e . g . love, sympathy, empathy). 16 Because obligation therefore becomes conditional, features usually (and correctly) thought to characterise obligation such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features) are lost, especially where there is a choice wh e ther or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so as to whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. The view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act however one likes with respect to them, is not however sustainable. Consider, for example , a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch . No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affected, but the population of ... 11. the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a direct and predictab le result of the action. The unconstra ined position clearly implies that this is an acceptabl e moral enterpris e, that whatever else we might legitimat ely criticize in the scientis ts' experimen t, perhaps its being ove r-e xpensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it will do to futu re people . The unconstra ined position also endorses as morally acceptabl e the following sort of policy: - A firm discovers it can make a handsome profit from mining , processin g and manufactu ring a new type of material which, although it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendan ts, will over a pe ri od of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous ep idemi c of cancer among the inhabitan ts of the earth at that time . According to the unconstra ined view the firm is free to act in its own interests , without any considera tion for the harm it does r emote future people. Such counterex amples to the unconstra ined view, which are easily vari e d and multiplie d , might seem childii>hl y obvious. Yet the unconstra ined position concernin g the future f rom which they follow is far from being a straw man ; not only have several philosoph ers endorsed this position, but it is a cl e ar implicati on of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligatio n, as well as of prevailin g e conomic theory. It seems that those who opt for the unconstra ined position have not considere d such examples , despite their being clearly implied by their position. We suspect that - we would certainly hope that - when it is brought out that the unconstra ined position admits such counterex amples , that being free to act implies among other thin gs being free to inflict pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for the unconstra ined position would want to assert that it was not what they intended. What many of those who have put forward the unconstra ined position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligatio n is rather that · future people can look after themselve s, that we are not responsib le for their lives. The popular view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causal l y independe nt of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, in the counterexample cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being left alone to take care of itself . Present people are influenci ng it , and in doing so thereby acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsi bilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future, namely the obli gation to tak e accoun t i n what they do of people affected and their interests , to be care ful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probabili ty of their actions causing harm, and to see that th ey do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life. 12. Furth e rmore, to say that we are not respon s ible f o r th e lives o f future people does not amount to th e same thing as sayin g t hat we are fr ee to do as we like with r es pe ct to them , that there are no moral constraints on our act io n involving th e m. In just th e same way , th e fact that on e does no t hav e o r ha s not acquired an obliga tion to some stran ge r with whom one has ne ver been i nvolved , that on e has no responsibil ity for his life, does not imply that on e is fr ee t o do what on e like s with respect to him, for e xample to r ob him or to pursue some course of action of advantage to on e self which could s e riously ha rm him. These difficultie s for the uncons trained position arise in part from the (sometime s deliberate) failure to make an important distinction betwe e n acquired or assume d obligation toward somebody , for which some act of acquisition or a s sumption is required as a qualifying condition , and moral constraints , which require, for example, that one should not act so as t o damage or harm someone , a n d for which no act of acquisition is required. There i s a conside rable di ffer ence in the level and kind of responsibil ity involved. In the first cas e on e must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e . g. have loves, sy!ll)athy, be contracted. In the second case responsibil it y arises as a r e sult of being a causal agent who is aware of the cons eque nces o r probable consequence s of his action, and thus does not have to be es pecially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latt e r class , moral c onstra ints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult o r i mpossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfi e d . They appl y a s a result o f th e abil i t y to produce causal effects on the distant future of a r eas onably pr e dict a ble nature . Thus also moral constraints can apply to what do e s not (ye t) e xist, just as actions can cause results that do not (yet) exist . Wh ile it may pe rhaps be the case that there would need to be an acquired or a ssume d ob liga tion in order for it to be claimed that contemporar y people mus t make special sacrifices f or future people of an heroic kind, or even to he lp them e s pe cially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrain e d from harming them . Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigne r cannot argue in justificatio n of his action that he has never assumed or acquired re s ponsibility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no l ove or sympathy for th em and that t hey are not part of his moral community , in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one ne eds to argue concerning the train, and the nuclear case , is that there are mo ral constrain ts against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibil ity for the live s of people involved . There has been an attempt to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self- sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinction s between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogat ion this is just 13 . to misrep resent the positio n of these obliga tions. For exampl e, one is no more engagin g in heroic self-sa crifice by not forcing future people into an unviab le life positio n or by refrain ing from causing then direct harm than the consign er is resorti ng to heroic self-sa crifice in re frainin g from placing his dangero us package on the train. The conflat ion of moral restrai nts with acquire d obliga tion, and the attemp t there~ ith to view all constra ints as acquire d and to write off nonacq uired constr aints, is facilit ated through the use of the term ' moral obligat ion ' both to signify any type of deontic constra ints and also to indicat e r athe r someth ing which has to be assumed or require d . The conflat ion is encoura ged by reduct ionist positio ns which, in attemp ting to accoun t for obligat ion in genera l, mistake nly endeavo ur to collaps e all obligat ions . Hence the equa ti on , and some main roots of the uncons trained positio n, of the erron eous belief that there are no moral constr aint s concern ing the distant future. The uncons trained view tends to give way , under the weight of counte rexampl es , to more qualifi ed, and sometim es ambiva lent, positio ns , for example the positio n that our obliga tions are to immedi ate poster ity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immedi ate succes sors in a better conditi on, and that is all; 17 there are in practic e no obliga tions to the distan t futur e . A main argume nt in favour of the latter theme is that such obliga tions would in practic e be otiose . Everyth ing that needs to be accoun ted for can be en compass ed through the chain picture of obliga tion as linking succes sive genera tions, under which each genera tion has obliga tions, based on loves or sympath y , only to the succeed ing genera tion . The re are at least three objecti ons to this chain accoun t. First, it is inadeq uate to treat constr aints concern ing the future as if they applied only between genera tions, as if there were no questio n of constr aints on individ uals as opposed to whole genera tions, since individ uals can create causal effects , e . e. harm, on the future in a way which may create individ ual respon sibility , and which often cannot be sheeted home to an e ntire genera tion . Nuclea r power and its wastes , for exampl e, are strictl y the respon sibility of small groups of power- hol ders, not a genera tional respon sibility . Second ly, such chains, since non-tr ansitiv e, cannot yield direct obligat ions to the distan t future . But for this very r eason the chain pict ure cannot be adeq uate, as exampl es again show. For the pic ture is unable to explain severa l of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the exampl es already discuss ed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distan t future withou t affecti ng the next genera tion, who may not even be able to influen ce matters . 14. Thirdly, improvement s fo r immediate successors may be achieved at th e expense of disadvantag es to people of the more distant future . Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with, and may even in some circumstanc es be most easily achieved by , ruining it for less immediate successors . Such cases can hardly be written off as "ne ver- never land" examples since many cases of environment al exploitatio n might be seen as of just this type. e . g . not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of non-renewab le resources and the long- term depletion of renewable resources such as soils and forests through overus e . If then such obvious injustices to future people arising from th e fa vouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed ove r time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests . IV . ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUTURE: ECONOMISTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS. While there are grave difficultie s for the unconstrain ed position, qualificatio n leads to a more defensible position. According to the main qualified position we a r e not entirely unconstrain ed with respe ct to the distant future , there are obligations , but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the pres ent and immediate future . The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, coun t for very much l ess than the interests of present people. Hence such thin gs as nuclear development and various exploitativ e activities which benefi t present people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewha t) disadvantag ed by them . The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in prevailing economic theories , where the position of a decrease in weight of future costs and benefits (and so of future interests) is obtained by application over time of a discount rate , so dis counting costs and risks to future people. a t tempt to apply economics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingl y common , can lead then to the qualified position. What is objectionab le in such an approach is that The economics should operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints , just as in practice it operates within legal constraints , not detennine what those constraints are. There are moreover alternative economic theories and simply to adopt, without further ado, one which discounts the future is to beg many questions at issue. 15. Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting the future, the most threadbare is based on the assumption that future generations will be better off than present ones, and so better placed to handle th e waste problem. 18 Since there is mounting evidence that future ge ne rations may well not be better off than present ones, especially in things that matter, no argume nt for discounting the interest s of future gcncrntionfl on thi s can carry much weight. Nor is that all that is wrong with the argument. biH:1i. B For it depends at base on the assumption that poorer contemporar ies would be making sacrifices to richer successors in foregoing such (allegedly beneficial) development s as nuclear power . That is, it depends on the already scotched sacrifice argument . In any case, for the waste disposal problem to be legitimatel y bequeathed to the future gene rations, it would have to be shown, what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will be , not just better off , but so much better off and more capable that they can duly absorb the nuclear waste burden. A more plausible argument for discounting is directly in terms of opportunity costs. It is argued , from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth much more than a dollar received in the non-immedia te future (because the first dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is required to obtain equivalent monetary values, and so for efficient allocation of resources . Similarly it is argued, by virtue again of equalizatio n of monetary value, that compensatio n - which is what the waste problem is taken to come to economica lly - costs much less now th an later . Thus a few pennies set aside (e.g . in a trust fund) now or in the future, if need be, will suffice to compensate eventually for any victims of remote radioactive waste leakage. There are, presently at least , insurmounta ble practical difficultie s about applying such discounting , e . g . how to de t ermine appropriate future discount rates . A more serious objection is that applied generally, the argument presupposes , what is false, that compensatio n, like value, can always be converted into monetary e quivalents , that peo ple (including those outside market frameworks) can be monetarily compensated for a variety of damages, i n cluding cancer and loss of life . There is no compensatin g a dead man, or for a lost species. In fact the argument presupposes a do uble reduction neither part of which can succeed : it is not just that value cannot in general be represented at all adequately monetarily , 19 but (as against utilitariani sm, for example) that constraints and obligations can not be somehow reduced to mat t ers of value . It is also presupposed that all decision me thods, suitable for requisite nuclear choices, 16. are bound to apply discounti ng . This is far from so : indeed Goodin argues that, on the contrary, more appropria te decision rules do not allow discounti ng, and discounti ng only works in practice with expected utility rules (such as underlie cost-bene fit and benefit-r isk analyses) , which are, he contends strictly inapplica ble for nuclear choices (since no t all outcomes can be duly determine d and assigned probabil ities, in the way that applicatio n of the rules requires. ). 20 As the preceding arguments reveal, the discounti ng move often has the same result as the unconstra ined position . If, for instance, we consider the cancer example and reduce costs to payable compensa tion, it is evident that over a sufficien tly long period of time discounti ng at curren t prices would lead to the conclusio n that there are no recoverab le damages and so , in economic terms, no constrain ts . In short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bias against future people is by the applicatio n of discoun t rates which are set in accord with the current economic horizons of no more than about 15 years, 21 and applicati on of such rates would simply beg the question against the i.nterests and rights of future pe ople . Where there is certain future damage of a morally forbidden type, for example , the whole method of discounti ng is simply inapplica ble, and its use would violate moral constrain ts . Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids th e objection s from cases of certain damage, comes from probabili ty considera tions. The distant future, it is argued , is much more uncertain than t he present and itillue diate fut ure, so that probabili ties are consequen tly lower, perhaps even approachi ng or coincidin g with zero for any hypothesi s concernin g the distant future. But then if we take ac count of probabil iti es in the obvious way , by simply multiplyi ng th e m against costs and benefits , it is evident that the interests of future people , except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty , must count for (very much) less than those of present and neighbour ing people where (much ) high~r probabil ities are attached. So in the case of confl ict between the present and the future where it i s a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediat e future against a much lower probabili ty of indetenni nate costs to an indetermi nate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved . But of course it cannot be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nucle ar case, especial ly if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years , with consequen t risk of serious harm to thousands of ge nerations of future people, in order to obtain doubtful benefits for some present people, in the shape of the opportuni ty to maintain corporati on profitabi lity or to continue unnecess arily high energy use. And even if the costs an d benefits were comparabl e or evenly weighted, " 17. such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was s ufficiently large. Such a cost-benefi t or risk-benefi t approach to moral and decision problems , with o r without the probability frills , is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned or to deal with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintu itive results. For example, it would follow on such principles that it is permissible for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large ga in from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferabl e in any simple or general way from one party to another . Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly rais e moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs on y - which are not susceptible to a simple cost-benefi t approach of the sort adopted in promotion of nuclear energy, where costs to future people are sometimes dismissed with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefits. The limitations of tran sfer point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptabili ty of the nuclea r risk, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel or cigarette smoking . In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity are also, to an overwhelmin g extent, those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved . In contrast the users and supposed beneficiari es of nuclear energy will be r isking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also that of others who may be non-benefic iaries and who may be spatially or temporally removed, and these risks will not be in any dire ct way related to a person ' s extent of use . The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian ' s (happiness) sums as a way of solving moral conflict between different parties, and the introductio n of p r obability consideratio ns - as in utilita r ian de cision methods such as expected utility rules - does not change the principles involved but merely complicates the analysis . One might further object to the probability argument that probabiliti es involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes , and that the outcomes of some morai prob l ems do not depend on a high level of probability anyway . In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the train parable reveals , that a significant risk is created ; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments . 18 . Uncerta inty argumen ts in various forms are the most common and importan t ones used by philo s ophers, economi sts and others to argue f or the position that we cannot be expe cted to distant future . take serious ac count of the effects of our actions on th e There are two strands to the uncertai nty argumen t, capable of s eparatio n , but frequen tly tangled up. Both argumen ts are mistaken , the first on a priori grounds, the second on a posterio ri grounds. The first argumen t is a gene ralised uncerta inty argumen t which runs as fol lows :- In contras t to the exa ct informa tion we can obtain about the present, the informa tion we can obtain about the effects of our a-ctions on the di s tant future is unreliab le, fuzzy and highly specula tive. But we cannot base assessm ents of how we shoul d act on informa tion of this kind, especia lly when accurate informa tion is obtainable about the present which would indicate differen t act ion. Therefo re we must r eg retfully ignore the uncertai n effects of our actions on the distant fut ure. More formally and crudely: One only has obligati ons to the futur e if t hese obliga tions are based on reliable in forma tion at present as regards th e distant future. Therefo re one has no obligati ons to the distant future. This first argumen t is essentia lly a variant on a sceptica l argwnen t in epistemo logy concerni ng our knowledg e of the future (formall y, replace 'obligat ions ' by 'knowled ge' in the crude stateme nt of the argumen t above). The main ploy is to conside rably overesti mate and oversta te the degree of certaint y availabl e with r es pect to the present and immedia t e future, and the degree of certaint y which is required as the basis fo r moral conside ration with r espect to the present and with respect to the f uture. Associa ted with thi s is the attempt to sugges t a sharp division as regards certaint y between the present and immedia te future on the one hand and the distant future on the other . We shall not find, we suggest , that there is any such sharp or simple divi sion between the distant future and the adjacen t future and the present, at l east with re spect to those things in th e pres e nt which are normally subject to moral constra ints. We can and constan tly do act on the basis of such "unrelia ble " informa tion, as the sceptic as regards the future conveni ently labels "unce rta i nty"; for scepticproof certaint y is rarely, or never, availab le with respect to much of the present and immedia te future . In moral situatio ns in the pres e nt, action often takes acco unt of risk and probabi lity , even quite low probab iliti es . Conside r again the train example. We do not need to know for certain that the containe r will break and the lethal gas escape . In fact it does not even have to be probable , in the relevan t sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consign er's action. It is enough that there is a signific ant risk of harm in this sort of case. It does not matter if the decrease d wellb eing of the consigne r is certain and that the prospec ts of the passeng ers quite uncertai n, the resoluti on of the problem is neverth eless clearly in fa vour of the so-calle d "specul ative" and "unrelia ble". But if we do not require certaint y of action to apply moral constra ints in cont emporary affairs, why 19. should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require for the future, ep istemic standards which the more familiar sphere of moral act ion concerning the present and adjacent futur e does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consi deration ca n be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an eipstemic double standard. But such an epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining th e difference between the present and the future a nd to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to e ach class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical unc e rtainty argument, that whatever our theoretical obligations to the future, we cannot in practice take the interests of future people into account becaus e uncertainty about the distant future is so gross th a t we canmot determine what the lik ely cons equences of actions on it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rati onal ground for ch oosing between them. this way : - The seco!ld uncertainty argume nt can be put alternatively If moral principles are. like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as "if x has character h then x is wrong, for eve r y (action) x", then what the argument claims is that we cannot ever obtain the info rmation about future actions which would enable us to detach the an tecedent of the implication . So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obtain cl ear conclusions or dire ctions concerning contemporary action action of th e "It is wrong to do x" type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument can be conceded. If th e distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what th e effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to th e future, will in practice not be applicable to obtain an y clea r conclusions about how to act. on action . Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints However the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate . Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future , but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the " 20 . argument has to assume . There are some areas where un certainty is not so grea t as to ex clude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point , which was noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certain ty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncerta inty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally r e levant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance t o moral is sues . For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be in a hundred years in names or footwear, or what flavour s of ice cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, espe cially if we consider 3000 years of history, that what peop le there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unli ke our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or ge netic defec ts, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from the ear th of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place . For this sort of r eason , the second uncertainty argument should be rejected. The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we can ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of orde r as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. In particular there is not gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as is evident from the train example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the defects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to write off probable or possible harm to future people as outside the scope of prope r consideration. Most of these popular moves employ both of the uncer taint y arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves . For example, we may be told that we cannot r eally take account of future people because we cannot be sure that th ey will exis t or that their tast es and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the 21. things that would affect us. But this is to insist upon compl e t e ce r taint y of a sort be yond what is required for the pre sent and imme diate future, whe r e there i s also commonly no guarantee that some disast e r will not overtake t hose we are mo rally cowmi tted to. Again we may be told that th e r e i s no guarant ee that future peopl e will be worthy of any e fforts on our part, because th ey may be mo rons or for ever plugged into enjoyme nt or other machin es . Even if on e is prepare d t o accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or int e ll e ctual standards a r e e ligible for moral consideration - what we are being han de d in such ar guments as a serious defeating consideration is a gain a mere outside possibility li ke the sceptic who says that solid-looking desk in front of us is pe rhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular r e ason for doing so, but bec ause he hasn't looked around the back , drilled holes in it, etc. etc . Ne ith e r the cont emporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleas ure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as opposed to a logical possibility. We can contrast with th e se me re logical possibilities the very real historically supportab l e risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilisation through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty argume n t s of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succee d in showing th a t it is a c ce ptab l e to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future , people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste cas e . This is the argument that future p eople may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage me thod for nuclear was tes before they are damaged by escaped waste material . Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not) . This still does not affect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible . In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer : that this appears to be a live possibility, and not merely a logi cal possibility, does not make the action of the firm earlier discussed, of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible . The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these s orts were admissible only j_f what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it . In such cases before such actions could 22. be conside r e d admissible what would be required is far more than a possibility, 22 real or not - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be expected to apply to protect th emselves . The strategy of these and other uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, and may be brought out by looking yet again at the train example wh ere the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of th e effec t of his actions on the passengers b ec ause they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g . the train may break down and they may all change to a different transport leaving the parcel behind, or the train may crash killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities of course, but there is no positi ve r eason to believe that they are any more than that, that is they are not live possibilities. The strategy is to stress such remote possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the container will break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigner's taking account of the passengers' welf are and th e real possibility of harm from his parcel and thereby to excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real possibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints. This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty of harm, or at least a very high probability of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the re al possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly r eq uired high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strate gy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat th e application of moral constraints . But, as we have seen, this is often not so. Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the indeterminacy of the future . In particular it is argued that the indeterminacy, for example , with respect to the number and exact character of people at future times, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present . Since th e ir numbers are ind eterminate and their interests unknown how, it is asked, can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is rais ed particularly by problems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present and future people, for example oil, when the numbers of the latte r are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved by 23, ignoring such factors. Nor are distributio nal problems as large and representat ive of a class of moral prob lems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. It can be conceded that there will be cases where the indetermina cy of aspects of the future will make conflicts very difficult to resolve or indeed irresoluble - a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be othe r conflict cases where the level of indetermina cy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e . g . the train example which is a conflict case of a t ype . In particular, th e re will be many cases which are not solved by weighing numb ers , n umbers of interests, or whatever , cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteris tics of future people . The crucial question which emerges is then : are there any features of futu re people which would disqualify them from full moral consideratio n o r r e duce thei r claims to such below those of present people? The answe r is: in principle None . Prima facie, moral principles are universalis able , and lawlike, in that they ap ply independent ly of position in space or in time, for examp le. But universalis ability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories whi ch are capable of dealing satisfactor ily with the pres ent : in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards th e present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e .g. those remotely located, those outside some select subgroup, such as (whit e skinned) humans , etc . The only candidates for characteris tics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, such as uncertainty and indetermina cy; but, as we have argued, it would be far too sweeping to see thes e features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determinatio n of best probable of practical course of action given only present information ) . In particular, they do not affect cases of th e so~t be ing considered, nuclear development , where highly determinate or certain infonnation about the numbers and characteris tics of the class likely to be harmed is not required, nor is certainty of damage. To establish obligations to the future a full universaliz ability principle is not required: it is enough that the temporal position of a person cannot affect his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideratio n; 24 inversely, that it is without basis to discriminat e morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position . As a result of this . 23a. universalizabi lity, there are the same general obligations to future peo ple as to the present; and thus there i s the same obligation to take account of them and thei r interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing harm or damage , and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life . Uncertainty and inde t e rminacy do not relieve us of these obligations. If in a closely comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of 24. harm in the future case under conside ration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceed ing with the action, thus discri mina ting against future people. Accordin gly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity , the conclusi on already tentativ ely reached, that proposa ls for nuclear developm ent in the present and likely future state of technolo gy and practice s for future waste disposa l are immoral. Before we conside r (in section VII) the remainin g escape route from this conclusi on, through appeal to overridi ng circumst ances , it is importan t to pick up th e further case (which heavily r einforce s the tentativ e conclusi on) against nuclear developm ent, since much of it relies on ethical princip les similar to those that underlie obligati ons to the future, and since it too is commonly met by similar appeal to extenua ting ci rc umstanc es. V. PROBLEMS OF SAFE NUCLEAR OPERATION: REACTOR EMISSIONS, AND CORE MELTDOWN . The eth ical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to futur e creature s. Just as remoten ess in time does not erode obligati ons or enti tl emen ts t o just treatmen t, neither does location in spac e , or a particu lar geograp hical position . First of all, the problem of nuclear waste disposa l rais es serious question s of distribu tive justice not only across time, across generat i ons, but also across space. Is one state or region entitled to dump its radioac tive polluti on in another state's or region's yard or water s? When that region receives no due compens ation (whateve r that would amount to, in such a case), and the people do not agree (though the leaders imposed upon them might)? The answer, and the argumen ts underpin ning the answer, are both like those already given in arguing to the tentativ e conclusi on concerni ng the injustic e of imposing radioac tive wastes upon future people. But the cases are not exactly the same: USA and Japan cannot endeavo ur to discoun t peoples of the Pacific in whose regions they propose to drop some of their radioac tive pollutio n in quite the same way the y can discoun t people of two centurie s hence . (But what this conside ration really reveals is yet another flaw in the idea that entitl ement to just treatmen t can be discoun ted over time.) Ethical issues of distribu tive justice, as to equity , concen1 not only the spatio-t emporal location of nuclear waste, but also arise elsewher e in the assessm ent of nuclear developm ent; in particu lar, a s regards the treatmen t of those in the neighbou rhood of reactors , and, dif fe rently, as regards the • distribu tion of (alleged ) benefits and costs from nuclear power across nations. 25 People living or working in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor are subject to special costs and risks : firstly, radioac tive pollutio n, due to the fact that reactors discharg e radioac tive materia ls into the air and water near the plant, 25 . and secondly catast rop hic accidents, such as (steam) explosion of a reactor . immediate question is whether such costs an d risks can be imposed, with any An eth ical legitimacy, on these people, who frequently have little or no say in their imposition, and who have mostly not been informed of any choices regarding the "risk/benefit tradeoffs" of nuclear technology. That they are so imposed, without local participation, indeed often without local input or awareness as with local opposition, reveals one part of the antidemocratic face of nuclear development, a part that nuclear development shares however with otl1er largescale polluting industry, where local participation and que stions, fundamental to a genuine democracy of regional det ermination and popular sovereignty , are commonly ignored or avoided. The "normal" emission, during plant operation, of low level radiation car ri es carcinogenic and mutagenic costs . While the re are undoubtedly costs, there remains, however, substantial disagreement over the likely numbe r of cancers and precise ex tent of genetic damage induced by exp os ure to such rad iation , over the local health costs involved. Under t he Old Paradigm, whi ch (ill egi timately) permits free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the e thical issue directly raised is said to be: what extent of cancer and genetic damage, if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nucl ear power, and under what conditions? Under the Old Paradigm the issue is th en translat e d into decision-theor etic questions, such as to 'how to employ risk/benefit analysis as a prelude to government regulation' and ' how to determine what is an acceptab le level of risk/safe ty for the public. 26 The Old Paradigm attitude, reflected in the public policy of some countries that have such policies, is that the economic benefits conferred by allowing radiation emissions outweigh the costs of an increase in cancer and genetic damage . An example will reveal that such evaluations, which rely for what appeal th ey have on a dubious utilitarianism, will not pass muster. It is a pity about Aunt Ethyl getting cancer, but it's nice to have this air con ditioner working in summer . Such frequently trivial and rather inessential benefits, which may be obtained alternatively, e.g. by modification of houses, in no way comp ensate for the agony of cancer . 27 The point is that the costs to one party a r e not justified, especially when such benefits to other parties can be alte rnatively obtained without such awful costs , and morally indef ensible , being imposed . People, minorities, whose position is particularly compromised are those who live within 50 miles of a nuclear plant . (Children , for example, are in a 26. particularl y vulnerable position, since they are severa l times more likely to contract cancer through exposure than normal adults). In USA, such people bear a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the population at large. A non-negligi ble percentage (in excess of 3% of those exposed for 30 years) of people in the area will die, all egedly for the sake of the majority who are benefitted by nuclear powe r production (allegedly, for th e real reasons for nucl e ar development do not concern this silent majority) . Whatever charm the argument from overriding benefits had, e ve n unde r the Old Paradigm, vanishes once it is seen that t he re are alternative , and in several respects less expensive, ways of deliveri ng the r eal benefi ts involved. There are several other tricks used in showing that the imposition of r adia tion on minorities, most of whom have little or no genuine voice in the location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serio us losses, is quite (morally) acceptable. One ch eape r trick, deployed by the US Atomic Energy Commission, 28 is to suppose that it is permissible to double, through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) radiation that a pop ulation has received with apparently negligible consequence s, th e argument being that the additional amount (being equivalent to the "natural" level) is also likely to have negligible consequence s. The increased amounts of radiation - with their large man-made component - are then accounted no rmal, and, of course, so it is th en claimed, what is normal is morally acceptable. None of the steps in this argument is sound. Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no illeffects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affe ct a person's well-being; and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger one will, unde r such conditions, not be. Finally, what is or has become normal, e . g. two murde rs or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptabl e . In fact, even the USA, which has strict standards by comparison with most other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits ra diation emissions very sub s tantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is worse than me re consideratio n of the standards would disclose. Furthermore , the monitoring of the standards "imposed" is entrusted to th e nuclear op erators themselves, scarcely disintereste d parties . Public policy is determin ed no t so as to guarantee public he alth, but rather to serve as a ' public pacifier' wh ile private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered . 29 2 7. While radioacti ve emissions are nn ordinary feature of react o r op e ration, breakdown is, hopefully , not: an accident of magnitude is accounted , by official definitio n, an 'extraord inary nuclear occurrenc e'. But such accidents can happen, and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island). 30 If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water) 30a r e actors , then the core melts and 'containm ent failure' is likely, with the r e sult that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioacti vely contamina ted . I n the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident , prope rt y da mages would exceed $1 7 billion and an area the size of Pennsylva nia would be destroyed . Mod e rn nuclear reactors are about five times the size of the reactor for which . . 31 t h ese conservat ive Us governmen t f'igures are given t he con s equences of a s imilar accident with a modern reactor would according l y be much great e r still. Th e consigner in risking the lives, we ll-being and property of the passenger s on the train has acted inadmissi bly. Does a governme nt-sponsor ed private utility act in a way that is anything other th an much less responsib le in siting a nuclear reactor in a community , in planting such a dangerous package on the community train. The answer will be No, if the analogy holds good and the consigner s ' action is , as we would ordinaril y ·suppo se , inadmissi ble and i rrespon- sible. The proponent s of nuclear power have in effect argued to the cont rary, while at the same time endeavour ing to shift the dispute out of the ethical arena and into a technolog ical dispute as to means (in accordanc e with the Old Paradigm) . It has been contended , firstly, what con trasts with the train example, that there is no real possibili ty of a catas trophic nuclear accident . Indeed in the influenti al Rassmusse n report 32 - which was extensive ly used to support public confidenc e in US nuc lear fission technolog y - an even stronger, an incredibl y strong , improbab ility claim was stated: n amely , the likelihoo d of a catastrop hic nucle ar accident is so remote as to be '3.lmost) impossi.bl e. The main argument for this claim de rives from the assumptio ns and estimates of the report i.tself . These assumptio ns like the claim are undercut by nuclear incidents that came very close to accidents , incidents which reflect what happens in a reactor rather better than mathemat ical models. As with the storage of nuclear wastes, so with the operation of nuclear reactors, it is important to look at what happens in the actual world of technolog ical limitatiom s and human error, of waste leakage and r eactor inciden t s and quite possibly accidents , not in an ideal world far removed from the actual , a technolog ical dream world whe re there is no real possibili ty of a nuclear 28, catastrophe. In such an ideal nuclea r world, wh e re wa s t e disposal we r e fool-proof and reactors we re accident-proof, thin gs would no doubt be morally different. But we do no t live in s u ch a world . According to the Rasmuss en r e port its calc ulat ion of extremely low accident probabilities is based upon reasonable mathematical and technological a ssumptions and is methodo logically sound. This is ve ry far from being the cas e . The under- ly ing mathematical methods, variousl y called "fault tree analysis " and "reliability estimating techniques", a r e unsound, because they exclude as "not credible" po s sibilities or as "not significant" branches that are re a l possibilities, which may well be realised in the real world. It is the eliminations that are othe rworldly . In fact the me thodology and dat a of the report · · 1 y cr1.t1.c1.ze h as b een soun dl y an d d ec1.s1.ve . · · d . JJ And 1.t . h as b een s h own t1at I t he r e is a real possibili t y, a non-negligible probability, of a serious accident . It is contended, secondly, that even if there is a non-negli gib l e prob abi li ty of a reactor accident, still it is acceptable, be ing of no greater orde r than risks of accidents t hat ar e already socially accepted. Here we enco unt e r agai n that insidious e ngin e ering approach to morality built into mod e ls of an e conomic cast, e.g. benefit - cost balance s heets , risk assessment mode ls, et c. Risk assessment, a sophistica ti on of trans ac tion or tr ade -off mode ls, pur.-ports to p ro vide a compari s on between th e relative ri sks at tach ed to different options, e . g . e nergy options, which settl es th e ir ethical status . The fo llowing lines of argume nt are encountered in a risk assessme nt as applied to energy options: (i) if option a imposes costs on fewer people than option b then option a is preferable to option b; (ii ) option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths, injuries , etc .) which is less than th at of option b, which is already accepted; there for e op tion a is acceptable . 34 For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations is less than the likely number killed by cigarette smoking or in road accident s , which a r e accepted: so nuclear power stations are acceptable . A little reflection reveals that this sort of risk assessment argt.mlent involves the same kind of fallacy as transaction models. I t is far too simple -minded, and it ignores distrib ut ional and other r e l e vant aspect s of the context. In o rde r to ob tain an ethical assessment we s hould need a much fuller pi cture and we sho uld nee d to know at least t he s e thin gs :- do the costs and benef it s go to th e same parti es ; and is the person who undertakes the risks also t he person who receives the benefits or 29. primar ily, as in driving or cigare tte smokin g, or are the costs impos e d on other parties who do not benefi t? It is only if the parties are the same in the case of th e options compar ed, and there are no such distrib utiona l problem s, that a compar ison on such a basis would be val.id. 35 This is rarely the cas e , and it is not so in the case of risk assessm ents of energy options . Second ly, does the person incur the risk as a result of an activit y which he knowin gly underta kes in a situati on where he has a r easona ble choice, knowing it entails the risk, etc ., and is the level of risk in propor tion to the le~el of the rel evant ac tivity, e.g. as in smoking ? Thirdly , for what reason is the risk imposed : is it for a s e rious or a relativ ely trivial reason? A risk that is e thica lly accepta ble for a serious reason may not be ethica lly accepta ble for a trivial reason. Both the argume nts (i) and (ii) are often employe d in trying to justify nuclea r power. The second argume nt (ii) involve s the fallaci es of th e firs t (i) and an additio nal set , namely that of forgett ing that the health risks in the 36 nuclea r s e nse are cumula tive , and already high if not , some say , too high. The maxim "If you want the benefi ts you have to accept th e costs " is one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefi ts then you have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is anothe r and very differe nt thin g . It is a widely accepte d moral princip le, already argued for by way of exampl es and already invoked , that one is not, in genera l, entitle d to simply transfe r cos ts of a signifi cant kind arising fron an activit y which benefi ts onesel f onto other parties who are not involve d in the activit y and are not benefi ciaries 37 . This transfe r princip le is especi ally clear in cases where the signifi cant costs include an effect on life or health or a risk thereof , and where the benefi t to the benefi tting par ty :is of a noncru cial or dispen sible nature , becaus e, e . g. it can be substit uted for or done withou t. Thus, for instanc e , one is not usually entitle d to harm , or risk harmin g, anot her in the process of be nefitti ng onesel f . Suppose , for anothe r example , we consid er a village which produc es, as a result of an indust rial process by which it lives, a noxious waste materi al which is expens ive and difficu lt to dispose of and yet creates a risk to life and health if undispo sed of. Instead of giving up thei r i.ndus trial process and turning to some other way of making a living such as farming the surroun ding country side, they persis t with this way of life but ship their problem on a one-way deliver y service , on the train, to the next village . The inhabi tants of this village are then forced to face the problem either of under taking the expens ive and difficu lt dispos al process oor of sustain ing risks to thei r own lives and health or else leaving the village and their livelih oods. Most of us would see this kind of transfe r of co s ts as morally unacce ptable . JO. From this arises a necessary condition for ene rgy options: that to be morally acceptable they should not involve the trans fer of significant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, do not use the energy source or do not benefit correspondingly from its us e . Included in the scope of this condition are not only future people and future generations (those of the next vil lages) but neighbours of nuclear reactors , especially, as in third world co untries, neighbours who are not nuclear powe r users. The distribution of costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. on to non-beneficiaries is a characteristic of certain wide spread and serious forms of pollution, a nd is one of its most obje ctionable moral features. It is a corollary of the condition that we sho ul d not hand the world on t o our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it - t he tramsmission principle. For if we did then that would be a signi ficant transfe r of costs . (The corollary can be independerltly argued for on the basis of certain e t hic al theories) . VI . OTHER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND COSTS OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR. The problems already discuss ed by no means exhaus t the envi ronme ntal, health and safety risks and costs in or arising from th e nuclea r fuel cycle. The full fuel cycle include s man y sta ges both before and after r eacto r operation , apart from waste disposal, namely mining , milling, conversion, enrichment and preparation, reprocessing spent fuel, and trans po rtati on of materials. Seve ral of these stages involve hazards. Unlike the special risks in the nuclear cycle - of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionab le material, and of the further prolife ration of nuclear armaments - thes e hazard s have parallels, if not exact equival ents, in other very polluting method s of generating power, e . g. "workers in the uranium mining industry sustain 'the same risk' of 38 fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry". Furth ermo re, the various (often serious) hazards encountered in working in some sectors of uranium fabrication should be differently viewed from those resultin g from location, for instance from already living where a reactor is built or wastes are dumped. For an occupation is, in principle at any rate, chosen (as is occupational relocation), and many types of hazards incurred in workin g with radio a ctive material are now known in advance of choice of such a n occupation: with where one al re ady lives things are very different. The uranium mine r's choice of occup ation can be compared with the airline pilot's choice, whe r eas t he Pacific Islander ' s "fact" of location cannot be. The social issue o f arrangements that contract occupational choices and opportuni ti es and often a t l east ease peo ple into hazardous occupations such as uranium or tin or coal mining (where the risks, in contrast to airline piloting, are mostly not duly compensated), while very important, i s not an i ssue newly produced by nuclear associated occupa tions . 31. Other social and environm ental problems - though endemic where large-sca le industry operates in societies that are highly inegalita rian and include sectors that are far from affluent - are more imtimatel y linked with the nucle ar power cycle. Though pollu tion is a common and generally undesirab le component of large-sca le industria l operation , radioacti ve pollution , such as uranium mining for instance produces, is especiall y a legacy of nuclear developme nt, and a specially undesirab le one , as enormous rectifica tion estimates for de ad radioactive lands and waterways reveal . Though sabotage is a threat t o many large industrie s , so that modern factory complexes are often guarded like concentra tion camps (but from us on the outside), sabotage of a nuclear reactor can have dire consequen ces, of a different order of magnitude from most industria l sabotage (consider again the effects of core meltdown) . Though theft of material from more dubious enterpris es such as munitions works can pose threa ts to populatio ns at large and can assist terrorism , no thefts for allegedly peaceful enterp rises pose problems of the same order as theft of fissionab le material . No other industry produces materials which so readily permit of fabricatio n into such massive explosive s. No other industry is, to sum it up, so vulnerabl e on so many fronts. In part to reduce it, vulnerab ility, in part because of its long and continuin g associati on with military activitie s, the nuclear industry is subject to, and encourage s, several practices which (certainly given their scale) run counter to basic features of free and open societies , crucial features such as personal liberty, freedom of associati on and of expressio n, and free access to informati on . These practices include secrecy , restricti on of infonnati on, formation of speci al police and guard forces, espionage , curtailme nt of civil lib e rties. Already operators of nuclear installat ions are given extraordi nary powers, in vetting employees , to investiga t e the backgroun d and activitie s not only of employees but also of their families and sometimes even of their friends. The installati ons themselve s become armed camps, which especiall y offends British sensibili ties. The U.K. Atomic Energy (Special Constable s) Act of 1976 created a special armed force to guard nuclear installat ions and made it answerabl e ..• to the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority . 39 These developme nts in the United Kingdom, and worse in West Germany, presage along with nuclear developme nt increasin gly authorita rian and anti-demo cratic societies . That nuclear developme nt a ppears to force such political consequen ces tells heavily against it. 32. Nuclear developme nt is further indicted political ly by the dire ct connectio n of nuclear power with nuclear war. It is fortunate ly true that e thical questions concernin g nuclear war - for example, whether a nucle ar war is justified , or just, under any circumsta nces , and if so what circums tances are distingui shable from those concernin g nuclear power. Undoubted ly , however, t he spread of nuclear powe r is substanti ally increasin g the technical me ans for engaging in nuclear war and so, to that extent, the opportuni ty for , and chances of, nuclear engagemen t. Since nuclear wars are neve r account able positive goods , but are at best the lesser of major evils, nuclear wars are always highly ethically undesirab le . The spread of nuclear power according ly expands the opportuni ty for, and chances of, highly undesirab le consequen ces. Finally the la tt e r, so increasin g thes e chances and opportun ities, is itself undesirab le, and therefore what leads to it, nuclear developme n t, is also undesirab le . The details and considera tions that fill out this argume nt, from nuclea r war against nuclear developme n t, are many. They are fir stly technical , that it is a relativel y straightfo rward and inexpensi ve matte r to make nuclear explosive s given access to a nuclear powe r plant, secondly political , that nuclear engagemen ts once institute d likely to escalate and that those who control (or different ly are likely to force access to) nuclear power plant s do not shrink from nuclear confronta tion and are certainly prepared to toy with nuclear engagemen t (up to "strategi c nuclear strikes" at least) , and thirdly ethical, that wars invariabl y have immoral consequen ces, such as mas sive damage to involved parties, however high sounding their justifica tion is. Nucl ea r wars are certain to be considera bly worse as regards damage inflicted than any pr e vious wars (they are likely to be much worse than all previous wars p ut together) , because of th e enormous destructi ve power of nuclear weapons, and the extent of spread of their radioacti ve effec ts, and because of the expected rapidity and irreversi bility of any such confronta tions . The supportin g considera tions are, fourthly, drawn from decision theory, and a r e designed to show that the chances of such undesirab l e out comes is itself und e sirable . The core argument is in brief this (the argument will be elaborate d in section VIII):- Energy choice between alternativ e options is a case of de ci sion making under uncertain ty , because in particula r of th e gross uncertain ties involved in nuclear developme nt. In cases of this type the ap propriate rational procedure is to compare worst cons equences of each alternati ve, to reject those alternati ves with th e wor s t of these worst consequen ces (this is a pretty uncontrov ersial part of th e maximin rule which enjoins selection of the alternati ve with the best worst consequen ces) . The nuclear alternati ve has, in particula r because of the r e al possibili ty of a nuclear war, the worst worst consequen ce~ and is according ly a particula rly undesirab le alternati ve. 33. VII. CONFLICT ARGUMENTS,AND UNCOVERING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. As with nuclear war, so given the cumulative case against nuclear development , only one justificatory route r emains open, that of app e al to important overriding circumstances. That appeal, to be ethically acceptable, must go far beyond merely economic considerations. For, as already observed , the consigne r's action cannot be justifi ed by purely economistic argume nts, such as that his profits would ris e , the firm or the village would be more prosperous , or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. The transfer principle on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitl ed to cre ate a serious risk to othe rs for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in parti cular, applied to the nuclear case. For this r eason the economistic arguments which are those most commonly advanced under th e Old Paradi gm to promote nuclear development - e .g. cheapness, efficiency, profitability for electri city utilities, and the need otherwise fo r uncomfortable changes such as restructuring of employment, investment and consumption - do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an acceptable one. Even if these econornistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct - it will be contended that most of them are not - the arguments would fail because economics (like the utilitarianism from which it characteristica lly derives) has to operate within the framework of moral constraints, and not vic e versa . What do have to be considered are however moral confli ct arguments, that is arguments to the effe ct that, unless the prima facie unacceptable (nuclear) alt e rnative is taken, some even more unacceptable alternative is the only possible outcome, and will ensue . For example, in the train parable, the consigner may a rgue that his action is justified becaus e unless it is take n his village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justification as this would be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcu t, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstances. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral confl i ct are based on competin f commitments to present people, and others on competing obligatio ns to future people . both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impos e on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arguments is based crucially on the presentation of a genuine and e xhaustive set of alternatives (or a t ].east practical alternatives ) and upon showing that the only alterna tives to admittedly mo rally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some practical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in th e argument - for example, if in the village case it turns out that the villagers have another option to starvi ng or to the sendin g off of the parce l, name l y ea rning a liv ing in some other way - then the argum ent is defect ive and cannot r eadily be patche d . Just s uch a suppre ssion of practi cable altern atives has occurr ed in the argum ent design ed to show that the altern atives to the nuclea r option are even worse than the option itself , and that there are other factua l defect s in thes e argum ents as well. .In short, the argum ents depend essen tially on the presen tation of false dichot omies . A first argum ent, the povert y argum ent , is that there is an ove rridin g ob li gation to the poor , both the poor of the third world and the poor of indus trialis ed countr ies . Failur e to develo p nuclea r energy , it is often claime d, would amoun t to denyin g them the oppor tunity to reach the standa rd of afflue nce we curren tly enjoy and would create unemp loymen t and povert y in th e indus triali s e d n a tions. The unemp loymen t and povert y argume nt does not stand up to exami nati on eithe r for t he poor of th e indus trial countr ies or for thos e of th e thir d world. The re is good eviden ce that large- scale nuclea r energy will help to increa se unemp loymen t and povert y in the indus trial world, throug h the divers i on of very much availa ble capita l into an indust ry which is not only an excep tional ly poo r provi der of di rect employ ment , but also helps to reduce availa bl e jobs throug h encour aging substi tution o f energy use for labour use. 40 The argume n t that nuclea r ene rgy is needed for the third world is even less convin cing. Nuclea r energy is both politi cally and econom ically inapp ropria te for th e third world, since it requir es massiv e amoun ts of capita l , requir es numbe rs of import ed sci en tists and engine ers, but create s neglig ible local employ ment, and depend s for its feasib ility upon, what is largel y lackin g , establ ished electr icity transm ission system s and back-u p facili ties and suffic ient electr ical applia nce s to plug into the system . Politi cally it increa ses foreig n depend ence, adds to ce ntrali sed entren ched power and reduc es the chance for change in the oppres sive politi cal struct ures which are a large part of the proble m . 41 The fa c t that nuclea r energy is not in the intere sts of the people of t he third world does not of course mean that it is not in the intere sts of, and wanted by, their rulers , the wester nised and often milita ry elites in whose intere sts the econom ies of thes e countr ies are usuall y organi sed, and wanted often for milita ry purpos es . It is not patern alistic to examin e critic ally the demand s these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. 35 . The po verty argume nt is then a fraud. Nuclear ene r gy will not be used t o help th e poor. Both for the third world and for the industr ialised co untrie s there are well-kno wn energy-c onservin g alternat ives and the practi cal option of developi ng oth e r energy sources, alternat ives some of which offer f a r bette r prospec ts for helping the poor . It can no longer be pretende d that there is no alt e rnative to nuclear de velopme nt: indeed nuclear de velopme nt is itself but a bridging , or stop-gap , procedu re on route to solar or perhap s fusion deve lopment . And there a r e various alternat ives : coal and other fossil fuels, geotherm al, and a range of solar op tions (includi ng as well as narrowly solar, wind, water, tidal and plant power), each po ss ibly in combina tion with cons e rvation measures ~ 2 Despit e the availab ility of alterna tives, it may still be pre t e nde d that nuclea r deve lopment is ne cess ary fo r affluenc e (what will emerge is that it is advantag eous for the power and aff luence of ce rtain select groups ) . Such an assumpt ion really und erlies part o f t he pover ty argumen t, which thus amounts to an elabora tion of th e trickledown argumen t (much f avoured within the Old Paradigm se tting) . For the a rgument runs : - Nuc l ea r developm ent is necessar y for (continu ing an d in c r eas in g) affluenc e. Affluenc e inevitab ly tr i ckl es down to th e poor. Th e r e for e nuclear developm ent benefits the poor . First, the argumen t does not on i ts own sh ow a nything specific about nuclear power : for it works equally well if ' ene r gy ' is substitu ted f or ' nuclear ' . It has also to be shown , what the next major argumen t will try to claim, that nuclear developm ent is unique among e ne rgy alternat ives in increasi ng affluenc e . The second assumpt ion , that affluenc e inevitab ly trickles down, has now been roundly refuted , both by r ecent historic al da ta, which show increasi ng affluenc e ( e .g. in terms of GNP averaged per capita) co upled with increasi ng poverty in several countrie s, both developi ng and de veloped , and th r ough economic models which reveal how "affluen ce" can increase withou t r e dist ribution occur ring . Another maj o r argumen t a dvanced to show moral conflic t app eals to a set of suppos e dly ove rr iding and competin g obligati ons to future people . We have, it is said , a du ty to pass on the immense ly valuable things and institut ions which our culture has develope d . Unless our high-tec hnology , high ene r gy industr ial society is continue d and fo s tered, our valuab l e institut ion s and tra ditions will fall into de cay or be swept away. The ar gument is essentia lly th a t without nuclear powe r, withou t th e conti n ued level of materia l wealth 43 it alone is assumed to make possible , the li gh ts of our civiliza ti on wil l go out. Fut ure people will be th e los e rs. 36, The lights-goin g-out argument doe s rais e quest ions as to what is valuable in o ur society, and of what characteris tics are necess ary for a good society . But for the most part th ese large questions, which deserve much full e r ex amination , can be avoided . The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely un critical position with re spe ct to present high-techno logy societi es , apparently assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable . It assumes that technologi c society is unmodifiabl e , that it cannot be changed in the direction of energy conse rvation or alternative (perhaps high technology) energy sources without collapse. It has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of ene rgy - such as nuclear and only nuclear power is a ll eged t o furnish ar e essential to maintain this whole. These assumptions are hard to accept. The assumption that technologic al so c ie ty's energy patterns are unmodifiabl e is especially so - after all it has survived events such as world wars which have r equired major social and technologic a r es tructuring and consumption modificatio n. If western society ' s demands for energy a re totally unmodifiabl e without collapse, not only would it be committed to a program of increasing destruction , but one might ask what use its culture co uld be to future people who would very likely , as a consequence of this destruction , lack the resource base which th e argument assumes to be essential in the case of contemporar y society. There is also difficulty with th e assumption of uniform valuablene ss; but if this is rejected the question be comes not: what is necessary to maintain exis ting high-techno logical society and its political institution s, but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and th e political institution s which are needed to maintain those valuable things . While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumption centrally controlled is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to a rgu e that it is e ssential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably that we have a du ty to pass .on to the fut ure. The evidence, for instan ce from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable. The re is good reason in fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But e ve n if a radical change in these di rec tions is independent ly desirable, as we should arg ue, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at least, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-goin g-out a rgument a re wrong. No enormous reduction of well-b e ing is required to consume less energy than at 37. present , and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of consumption which is assumed in the usu al economic case for nucl ear energy . 44 What the nuclear strategy is really designed to do then is not to preven t the lights going out in west e rn civilisation , but to enable th e lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of th e Energy Extravaganza. In fact there is good reason to think that, far from the high e nergy consumption society fostering what is valuable, it will, es pecially if e nergy is obtained by nuclear fission means , be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an ext remely high centralised, controlled and garrisoned, capital- and expertise-intensive energy source, must be one which is highly susce ptible to entrenchment of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source , whether capitalist or bureaucratic, can exert enormous power over the political system and over people's lives, even more than they do at present. Such a society would, almost inevitably t e nd to become autho ritarian and increasingly anti-democratic, as an outcome, among other things, of its response to the threat pos ed by dissident groups in the nuclea r . . situation. 45 Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations some of th e worst aspects of our society - the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature, and latent authoritarianism - while many valua ble asp e cts, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for p ersonal and collective autonomy which exist , would be lost or diminish e d: political freedom , for example, is a high price to pay for consume ri sm and energy extravagance. But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumably, that we have some obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternatives, alternative social, economic and political choices, which do not involve such unacceptable consequences, are available. The alternative to the high technologynuclear option is not a return to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but either the adoption of an available alternative such as coal for power or, rath e r, the development of alternative technologies and lifestyles which offer far greater scope for the maintenance and further development of what is valuable in our society than the highly centralised nuclear option. The lights- going-out argumen t, as a moral conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a false dichotomy. 38 . Thus the further escape route, the appeal to moral conflict, is, like the appeal to fut urity, closed. If then we apply - as we have argued we should - the same standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the present, the conclusion that large-scal e nuclear developmen t i s a crime agains t the future is inevitable . Closed also, in the same way, are the escape routes to other ar_guments - from reactor melt-down, radiation emissions, and so on for rejecting nuclear development as morally unacceptable, for saying that it is not only a moral crime against the distant future but also a crime against the present and immediate future . In sum, nuclear development is morally unacceptable on several grounds. A corollary is that only political arrangements that are morally unacceptable will support the impending nuclear future. VIII. A NUCLEAR FUTURE IS NOT A RATIONAL CHOICE, EVEN IN OLD PARADIGM TERMS. The arg ument thus far, to anti-nuclear conclusions, has r elied upon, and defended premisses that would be rejected under the Old Paradigm; for examp l e, such theses as that the interests and utilities of future people are not discounte d (in contrast to the temporally-limited utilitarianism of marketcentred economic theory ), and that serious costs and risks to health and life cannot admissibly be simply transferred to uninvolved parties (in contrast to the transfer and limited compensation assumptions of mainstream economic theory). To close the cas e, arguments will now be outlined which are designed to show that even within the confines of the Old Paradigm, choosing the nuclear future is not a rational choice . Large-scale nucl ear developme nt is not just something that happens, it requires, on a continuing basis, an immense input of capital and energy . Such investment calls for substantial reasons; for the investment should be, on Old Paradigm assumptions, the best among feasible alt ernatives to given economic ends. Admi t tedly so much capital has already been invested in nucle ar fission research and development, in marka:l. contrast to other newer rival sources of power, that there is strong political incentive to proceed - as distinct from requisite reasons for further capital and energy inputs. The reasons can be divided roughly into two groups, front reasons, which are the reasons given (ou t) , and which are, in accordance with Old Paradigm percepts, pub l icly eco nomic (in that they are app roved for public consumption), and th e r ea l r ea s ons , which involve private economic factors and matters of power and social control. 39. The main argument put up, an economic growth argument, upon which variations are played, is the following version of the lights-going -out argument (with economic growth duly standing in for material wealth, and even for what is valuable!): - Nuclear power is necessary to sustain economic growth. Economic growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e . g. to increas e the size of the pie, to avoid or postpone redistributi on problems, and connected social unr e st, e tc.). Therefore nuclear power is desirable. The first premiss is part of US energy policy, 46 and the second premiss is supplied by standard economics textbooks . But both premisses are defective, the second because what is valuable in economic growth can be achieved by selective economic growth, which jettisons the heavy social and environmen tal costs carried by unqualified 47 economi c growth . More to the point, since the second premiss is an assumption of the dominant paradigm, the first premiss (or rath e r an appropriate and less vulne rabl e restatement of it) fails even on Old Paradigm standards. For of course nuclear power is not necessary given that there are other, perhaps costlier alt e rnatives . The premiss usually defended is some elaboration of th e premiss Nuc lear power is the economicall y best way to sustain economic growth, 'economicall y best' being filled out as ' most efficient', 'cheapest ' , 'having most favourable benefit-cos t ratio', etc. Unfortunate ly for the argument, and for nuclear development schemes, nuclear power is none of these things decisively, unless a goo d deal of economic cheating (easy to do) is done. Much data, beginning with th e cancellatio n of nuclear plant orders, can't be assembled to show as much. Yet the argument requires a true premiss, not an uncertain or merely possible one, if it is to succeed and detachment is to b e permitted at all, and evidently true premisses if the argument is to be decisive. The data to be summarised splits into two parts, public ( governmenta l) analyses, and private (utility) assessments . Virtually all available data concen1s the USA; in EuroZS, West and East, true cos ts of uniformly "publicly= controlled" nuclear power are generally not divulged. Firstly, the capital costs of nuclear plants, which have been rising much more rapidly than inflation, now exceed those of coal-fired plants . Komanoff has estimated that capital costs of a nuclear generator (of optimal capacity) will exceed comparable costs of a coal-fired unit by about 26 % in 1985. 49 And capital costs are only one part of the equation that now tell rather decisively against private utility purchase of new nuclear plants . Another main factor is the poor performance and low reliability of nuclear generators . Coney showed that nuclear plants can only generate about half the elect ricit y th ey were designed to produ ce , and that when Atomic Energy Commis sion estimates of relative costs of nuclear and coal power, which assumed that both opera t ed at 80% of design capacity , were adjusted accordingly , nuclear generated power proved to be far more 40. . h . d 50 expensive tan estimate. The discrepancy between actual and estimated capacity is especially important because a plant with an ac tual capacity factor of 55 % produced electricity at a cost about 25% high e r than if the plant had performed at the manufacturers' projected capacity rate of 70-75%. The low reliability of nuclear plants (p e r kilowatt output) as compared with the superior r e liability of smaller coal-fired plants adds to the case, on conventional economic grounds of ef ficienc y and product production costs , against nuclear powe r . Thes e unfavourable assessments are from a privat e (utility) perspective, before the very extensive public subsidization of nuclear power is duly taken into account . The main subsidies are through research and development , by way of insurance (under the important but doubtfully constitutional Price-Anderson 51 Act ), in en richme n 4 and in waste management . It has been estimated that charging such costs to the electricity consumer would increase electricity bills for nucl ea r power by at least 25% ( and probably much more) . Wh en official US cost/benefit analyses favouring nuclear power over coal are examined, it is f ound that they inadmissibly omit seve ral of the public costs i nvolve d in producing nuclear power . For example, the analyses igno re waste costs on the quite inadmissible ground that it is not known curren tly wha t t he costs involved are . But even using actual waste handling cos t s (while wastes await s torage) is enough to show that coal power is preferable to nuc l ear . 52 When further public costs, such as insurance against accident and for radiation damage , are dul y taken into account, the balance is swung stil l further i n favo ur of al te rnatives to nuclear and aga i nst nuclear power . In short , eve n on proper Old Par a digm accounting, the nu c l ear alte rn at iv e s hould be rejected. Nuclear development is not economical, it certainly se ems ; it has b een kept going n~ through its clear economic v iability, but by massive pub li c s ubsidization , of s e vera l types . In USA, to take a main examp le where information is available , nuclear developme nt is publicly supported through heavily subsidized or somet i mes free research and development , thro ugh the Price-Anderson Act, which sharply limits both private and public liability, i . e . wh ich in ef fe ct p rovided t he insurance subsidy making corporat e nuclear development e conomicall y f e asibl e, and through government ag r eement to handle all r adioactive wastes . While the Old Paradigm str ictly construed c annot sup port un economical developments, cont empo rary liberalisation of the Paradigm do e s allow fo r un economi c projects, seen as operated in the public interest, in such fields as soc ial welfare. Duly admitting s ocial welfare and some equity pr i nciples 41, i n th e dist ribut ion of wealt h (not necessa rily of pol l ution) l e ads the modern version of the Old Paradigm , called the Mo dified Old Paradigm . The main changes from the Old Paradigm are (as with state socialism) as emphasis of economic facto rs, e . g . individual self-he lp is down- played , wealth is to a small extent redistributed, e.g . through t:axation , market forces are re gulated or disp la ced (not in principle eliminat e d, as with stat e s ocialism). Now it has been cont ended - outrageous though it should now se e m - that nuclear powe r is i n the public interest as a means to various sought public ends, for example , apart from those already mentioned suc h as energy fo r growth and che ap e l ect ricity, and such as plantiful powe r f or heating and cooking a nd app lian ce use , avoidan ce of shortages , rat ioning , brown-outs and the like . Since alternative power sources, such as coal, could s e rve some ends given power was supplied with suitable extravagance, the argumen t has aga in to show that t he cho ice of nucle ar power over other a lterna tives is best in the requ isite respects, in s erving the public interes t. Such a n ar gumen t is a matter for decision theory, unde r which head cost -bene f i t analyse s which rank alternatives a l so fall as special cases . Decision theory purports to cover th eo r e tically the field of choice b e tween alte rnatives; it is present ed as the theory which ' dea l s with t he . pro bl em o f c h oosing one cours e o f acti. on among s e vera 1 poss1'bl. e cou r ses 1 . 53 Th us the choice of alt e rnati~ modes of energy pro duc ti on, t he ene r gy choice problem, be comes an exercise in decision theory; and the nucl ea r choice is often ''.justi f ied" in Old Paradigm terms t h rough app e al to decision t heo ry. But though decision theory is in principle comp rehens ive , as soon as it is put to work in such practi cal cases as energy choice, it is very considerably contracted in scope, several major assumptions are surreptitiously imported, and what one is confronte d with is a depauperate theory drastically pruned down to confo r m with the narrow utilitarianism of mainstream e conomic theory . The extent of reduction can be glimpsed by comp a ring , to take one imp ortant example , a general optimisation model for decision (wh ere uncertainty is not gross) with comparab le decision the ory methods, such as th e expe cted uti lity model. The general model for best choice among alte rnatives specifies maximisation of expected value subject to constrain ts, which may include et hical constraints ex clud ing cert a in alt e rnati ves under gi ven cond itions . Expected utility models dEmote value to utility, assuming thereby measurability and transference prop e rt ies t hat may not obtain, and elimina te constraints altoget her (absorbing what is fo rbidden, fo r examp le , as having a hi gh dis u tili ty, but one that can be compensate d for none th eless ). Thus , in 42. particula r, e thical constrain ts against nuclear developme nt are replaced, in Old Paradigm fashion, by allowance in principle for compensat ion for damage sustained . Still it is with decision making in Old Paradigm terms that we are now embroiled , so no longer at issue are the defective (nee-clas sical) economic assumptio ns made in the theory, for example as to the assessmen t of everythin g t o be taken into account through utility (which comes down to monetary terms : everythin g worth accountin g has a price), and as to the legitimac y of transferr ing with limited compensat ion risks and costs to involved parties. The energy choice problem is, so it has commonly been argued in the assumed Old Paradigm framework , a case of decision under uncertain ty . It is not a case of decision under risk (and so expected utility models are not applicabl e), be cause some possible outcomes are so unce rtain that, in contrast to the case of risk, no (suitably objective ) quantifia ble probabil ities can be assigned to them. It ems that are so uncertain are taken to include nuclear war and core me ltdown of a reactor, possible outcomes of nuclear de velopment : 54 widesprea d radioactive pollution is, by contrast, not uncertain . The correct rule for decision under uncertain ty is, in the case of energy ch oice , maximin, to maximize the minimum payoff, so it is sometimes contended . In fact, on ce again, it is unnecessa ry for present purposes to decide which energy option is selected, but only whether the nuclear option is rejected . Since competing selection rules tend to deliver the same rejection s for options early rejected as the nuclear options, a convergen ce in the rejection of the nuclear option can be effected . All rational roads lead, not to Rome, but to rejection of the nuclear option . A further convergen ce can be effected also , because the best possible (economic ) outcomes of such leading options as coal and a hydroelec tric mix are very roughly of the same order as the nuclear option (so Elster contends, and his argument can be elabo rated). Unde r these condition s complex decision rules (such as the Arrow-Hor wicz rule) which take account of both best possible and most possible outcomes under each option reduce to the maximin rule . Whichever energy option is selected under the maximum rule, the nuclear option is certainly rejected since there are options where worst outcomes are substanti ally better than that of the nuclear option (just consider the scenario if the nuclear nightmare , not th e nuclear dream, is realised) . Further applicati on of the rejection rule will reject the fossil fuel (predomin antly coal) option, on the basis of estimated effe cts on the earth 's climate from burning massive quantitie s of such fuels . 43. Although the rejection rule coupled with maximin position several rivals to maximin proposed, each enjoys a privileged for decision under uncertainty have been of which has associated rejection rules. Some of these rules , such as the risk- added reasonin g criticised by Goodin (pp.507-8), which 'assesses the riskiness of a policy in terms of the increment of risk it adds to those pre-existin g in the status quo, rather than in te rms of th e absolute value of the risk associated with the policy' are decidedly dubious, and rather than offering a rational decision procedure appears t o afford protection of the (nuclear) status quo. ~~at will be argued, or rather what Goodin has in effect argued for us, is that wherever one of these rival rules is applicable, and not dubious, it leads to rejection of the nuclear option . For example , the keep -options-op en or allow-for-r eversibility (not an entirely unquestiona ble rule rule 'of strictly limited applicabili ty') e xcludes the nuclear option because 'nuclear plants and their by-products have an air of irreversibi lity ... " One cannot simply abandon a nuclear reactor the way one can abandon a coal-fired plant"' (p.506). The compare-the alt e rnatives rule, in ordinary application , leads back to th e cost -b e nefit assessments , which, as already observed, tell decisively against a nuclear option when costing is done properly. The maximise-s ustainable-b enefits rule, which ' directs us to opt for th e policy producing the highest level of net b enefits which can be sustained indefinitel y', 'decisively favours r e newable sources ', ruling out the nuclear option. Other lesser rules Goodin discusses, which have not really been applied in the nuclear debate, and which lead yet further from the Old Paradigm framework, harm-avoida nce and protecting- thevulnerable als o yields th e same nuclear-exc luding results. Harm-avoida nce, in particular, points 1 decisively in favour of "alt ernative" and "renewable " energy sources ... combined with strenuous efforts at energy cons ervation' (p.442) . The upshot is evident: whatever reasonable decision rule is adopted the result is the same, a nuclear choice is rejected, even by Old Paradigm standards . Nor would reversion to an expected utility analysis alter this conclusion; for such analyses are but glorified cost-benefi t analyses,wi th probabiliti es duly multiplied in, and the conclusion is as before from cost-b enefit co nsideration s, against a nuclear choice. The Old Paradigm does not, it thus appears, sustain the nuclear juggernaut : nor does its Modificatio n. The real reasons for the continuing development program and the heavy commitment to the program have to be sought elsewhere, outside the Old Paradigm, at least as preached. It is, in any case, sufficientl y evident that contemporar y e conomic behaviour does not accord with Old Paradigm percepts, practice does not accord with nee-classic al economic .... 44. th eory nor, to consider the main modification , with social democratic th eory . There are , firstly, reasons of previous commitment, when nuclear power, cleverly promoted at least, looked a rather cheaper and safer deal, and certainly profitable one : corporations so committed are understandably ke en to realise returns on capital already invested . There are also typical self-interest reasons fo r commitment to the program, that advantages accrue to some, like those whose field happens to be nuclear engineering, that profits accrue to some, like giant corporations, that are influential in politica l affairs, and as a spin-off profits accrue to others , and so on . The r e are just as important, ideological reasons, such as a belief in the control of both political and physical power by t e chnocratic-entrepre nial elite, a belief in socl al control from above , control which nuclear powe r o f f ers f a r mo r e tlwn alternatives, some of which (vaguely) threaten to alter th e power bas e , a f a ith in th e unlimitedness of t e chnological enterprise, and nuclear in particular , so that any real probl ems that arise will be solved as development proceeds. Such b e li e f s are especially conspicuous in the British scene, among the gove rning and technocratic classes. Within contemporary corporate capitalism, thes e sorts of reasons for nuclear development are intimately linked, because thos e whos e types of enterprise benefit substantially from nuclear developme nt are commonly those who hold the requisite beliefs . It is then, contemporary corporate capitalsim, along with its state e n t erprise image, that fuels the nuclear juggernaut. To be sure , corporate capitalism , which is the political economy largely thrust upon us in we stern nations, is not necessary for a nuclear future; a totalitarian state of the t ype such capitalism often supports in the third world will suffice . But, unlike a hypothetical state that does conform to precepts of the Old Paradigm, it is sufficient for a nuclear future - evidently, since we are well embarked on such a future. The historical route by which the world reached its present advanced threshold to a nuclear future confirms this diagnosis. split into two main cases, the notional US This diagnosis can be development of nuclear power in the and the international spread of nuclear technology for which the US has been largely responsible . By comparison with the West, nuc lear power production i n th e small Eastern bloc is and is largely confined to the Soviet Union which had in 19 77 only about nuclear plants . one -sixth the wattage output of US Nuclear development in USSR has been, of course, a state controlled and subsidized venture, in which there has been virtually no public participation or discussion; but Russian technology has not been exported elsewhere to any great extent . American technology has . 45, The 60s were, because of the growth in electrici ty demand, a period of great expansion of the elec trical utilities in the US . These companies we re e ncouraged to build nuclear plants, rather than coal or oil burning plants, for several state controlle d or influence d reasons:- Firs tly, owing to governme ntal regulatio n procedure s the utilities could (it then seemed) earn a higher rate of profit on a nuclear plant than a fossil fuel one. Secondly , the US governmen t arranged to meet crucial costs and risks of nuclear operation , and in this way, and more directly through its federal agencies , actively encourage d a nuclear choice and nuclea r deve lopment. In particula r, state limitatio n of liability and shoulderi n g of part o f insurance for nu clear accidents and state arrangeme nts to handle nuclear wastes were what made profit able private utility operation appear feasibl e and r esulting in nuclea r investmen t. In the 70s, though the state subsidiza tion continued , the private pict ur e changed : 'high costs of construct ion combine d with low capacity factors and poor r eli ability have wiped out the last advantage that nuclear power ' had enjoyed in the US. Much as the domestic nuclear market in th e US is con trolled by a few co rpor ations , so the world mark et is dominated by a few countries , predomina ntly and first of all the US, which through its two leadi ng nuclear companies , We stinghous e and Gen e ral Electric, has been the major exporter of nuclear technolog y. 55 These companies were enabled to gain entry into European and subsequen tly world markets by US foreign policies, ba sically th e " Ato ms for Peace" program supplemen ted by bilateral agreement s providing for US technolog y , r e search, enri ched uranium and financial capital. ' The US offered a [ s tat e s ub si dize d ] nuclear package that Europe could not refus e and with whi ch the British could not compete'. In the 70s the picture of US dominatio n of Common Market nuclear technolog y had given way to subtler influence : American companies held (actually dealing with relevant governmen ts) substanti al interests in Europ ean and Japanese nuclear companies and held licences on the technolog y which remained largely American. Meanwhile in the 60s and 70s the US entered into bilateral ag re ements for civilian use of atomic energy with many other countries , for example, Argentina , Brasil, Columbia, India, Indonesia , Iran, Ire l and, Israel , Pakistan, Philippin es, South Korea, Portugal, South Africa, Spa in, Taiwan, Turk ey , Venezuela , South Vi etnam. The US proceeded , in this way, to ship nuclear technolog y and nuclear materials in gre at quantitie s round th e world. It also proceeded to spread nuclear t echnology t hrough th e Internati onal Atomic Ene rgy Agency , originall y de si gne d to control and saf eg uard nuclear ope rati ons, but most of whos e ~udget and activitie s • .. have gone to promote nu c l ear activitie s' . 46. A main reason for th e promotion and sales pressure on Third World countries has been the failure of US domestic market and industrial world markets for reactors. Less developed countries offer a new frontier where reactors can be built with easy public financing, where health and safe t y regulations are loose and enforcement rar e , where public opposition is not pennitted and where weak and corrupt regimes offer easy sales. [Forj ..• the US has considerabl e leverage with many of these countries. We know from painful expe rience that many of the worst dictatorshi ps in the planet would not be able to stand without overt and covert US support . Many of those same regimes are now pursuing the nuclear path, for all the worst reasons. 56 It is e v ident from this sketch of the ways and means of r eactor proliferatio n that not only have practices departed far from the framework of the Old Paradigm and the social Modificatio n, but that the practices (of corp orate capitalism and associated third world imperialism ) involve much that is eth ically unacceptabl e, whether by olde r, modif ied, or alternative 57 percepts; for principles such as those and self-d e termination are grossly vio late d. IX. SOCIAL OPTIONS : SHALLOWER AND DEEPER ALTERNATIVES . The futur e energy option that is most often contrasted with nuclear power, namely coal power, while no doubt preferable to nuclear power, is hardly acceptable . For it carries with it the likelihood of serious (air) pollution and associ ated phe nomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to ment ion the despoliatio n caused by extensive strip mining , all of which result from its us e in meeting very high projected consumption figures. Such an option would also fail, it seems, to meet the necessary transfer condition, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbenefic iaries for some concentrate d benefits to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production 58 and replacement . To these conventiona l main options a third is often added which emphasizes softer and more benign technologie s, such as those of solar energy and, in Northern Europe, hydroele ctricity . The deeper choice, which even softer paths tend to neglect, is not technologic al but social , and involves both conservatio n measures and the restruct urin g of production away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumerist ic and nonconsume ristic futures. These more fundamental choices between social alternative s , conventiona l t echnologica lly-oriented discussion of energy options tends to be obscure. It is not just a matter of de ciding in which way to meet 4 7. give n and unexamine d goals (as the Old Paradigm would imply), but als o a matter of examining the goals. That is, we are not merely faced with the question of comparing different technolog ies or substitut e ways of meeting some fi xed or give n demand or level of consumpti on, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with s oft rather than hard technolog ies; we are also fac e d, and pr i ma rily, with th e matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of a society t hat creates them . It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to mee t these alleged needs conceived of as inevitabl e and unchangea ble . (Hence there are solar ways of producing unnecessa ry trivia no one really wants, as opposed to nuclear ways.) Na turally this is not to deny that th e se softer options are sup e rior because of the ethically unaccepta ble features of the harder options. But it is doubtful that any technolog y, howe ver benign in principle , will be likely to leave a tolerable world for the future if it is expect e d to meet unbounded and uncontrol led energy consumpti on and demands. Even the more benign technolog ies such as solar technolog y could be used in a way which creates costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriora ted world being hand e d on to them . Consider, for example, the effect on the world's forest s , which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for productio n of methanol or o f e lectricit y by woodchipp ing (as already planned by forest authoriti es and contempla ted by many other energy organisat ions) . While few would object to t he use of genui ne waste material for energy productio n, the unrestric ted exploi t ation of forests - whether it goes under the name of " solar energy" or not. - to meet e ver increasin g energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world's already hard-pres sed natural forests. The effects of such additiona l demands on the maintenan ce of the forests are often dismissed , even by soft technolo gicalists, by the simpl e expedient of waving around the label 'renewabl e resources '. Many forests are in principle renewable , it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of exploitat ion , but in fact there are now very few forestry operation s anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completel y renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values. 59 In many regions too the rate of e xploitatio n which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total decline is widely thought to be imminent if not already well advanced . It certainly has begun in many regions, and for many forest types (such as rainfores t types) which are now, and very rapidly, being lost for the future. The addition of a major further and not readily limitable demand pressure, that for energy, on top of present pressures is one which anyone with a realistic appreciat ion of the conduct of contempor ary forestry operation s, who i s also concerned with long-t erm conservat ion of the forests and remaining natural communiti e s, must regard with alarm. The result of massive deforesta tion for energy purposes, 48, r esemb li n g the deforesta tion of England at the beginning of th e Industrial Revolution, again for ene rgy purposes, would be extensive and devastating erosion in s t eeper lands and trop i cal are as , dese rtification in more a rid r egions, possib le climatic change, and massive impoverishm en t of na tural ecosystems . Some of us do not wa nt to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - a de fores ted world to the future, any more than we want t o pass on on e poisone d by nuclear products or polluted by coal p roduct s . In sh or t, a mere swi t ch t o a more benign t e chnology - important though this i s - wi th out any more bas ic structural and social change is inadequate . Nor is such a simple technolo gi cal swi. tch likely to be achieved. It is not as if political pressure could oblige the US government to stop its nuc lear program (and that of the countrie s it influences, much of the world), in the way pressure appeared to succeed in halting the Vietnam war. While without doubt it would be good if this could be accomplishe d, it is ve ry un likely give n th e inte gration of political powe rholders with those sponsoring nuclear de velopment . 60 The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social structure which promotes consumerism , consumption far beyo nd genuine needs, a nd a n e conomic s tructure which en coura ge s increasing use of highly energy-inte nsive mode s of prod uc tion. This means, for instance, trying to change a social stru c ture in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work f o rce are cogs i n a production machine over which they have ve ry little r eal cont r ol an d in which most people do unpleasant or boring work fro m which they derive very 1i t tle real satisfactio n in orde r to obta i n the r eward of consume r goo ds and services . A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from prod ucts rather than proc es s e s, fro m consumption , rath e r than from satisfac tion in work an d in social r e lations and oth er activities , is virtually bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unn e cessary consumption . (A production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but fo r created and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce . ) Consumption frequently be comes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas. The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the large r set of adjustments involved in s ocially implementin g the New Paradigm , the move away f rom consumerism is for examp le part of th e more ge ner al shift from ma t eri al ism and ma terialist values . The social change option tends to be obscured in mos t dis cussions o f energy options and of how to meet energy needs, in part because it do e s que stion unde rlying values of current social arrangemen ts . The conventiona l discussion proceeds by taking alleged demand (often conflated with wants or 61 n ee ds ) as unchall e ngeable, and th e iss ue to be on e of which t ech nology can 49. be most profi tably employed to meet th em. This e ffectiv e ly pre s en ts a f a l se choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand a s lacking a s ocial contex t so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly take n as unchallengeable and unchangeable . The point is readily illustrated. It is commonly argue d by representat i ves of such industries as trans!X)rtation and petroleum, as for exampl e by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, powe r boats, ... It would be authoritarian to prevent th em from satisfying th e se wants. Such an argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such nee ds and wants arise or are produced. To point to th e de t e rmination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach a ccording to which they are entirely de t ermined at the framewo rk level ( e .g. by indu s trial organisation) and th e r e is no such thing as indivi dual ch oic e or de termination at all. It is to s ee the soci a l framework as a major f a c t o r i n de t e rmining certain kinds of choices, such as those for travel , a n d t o see ap pare ntly individual choices made in such matte rs as being channelle d a nd dire cte d by a social framework de t e rmined l argely i n th e inte r es t s o f corporat e an d private pro f it and advantage . The so cial change option is a hard option - at l e ast it wil l b e difficult to obtain pol itically - but it is the only way , so it has been argued , of a voidin g passing on serious costs to the future. And there are other sorts of r easons t han suc h ethical ones for taking it: it is the main, indeed the only sort of option open to those who take a deeper ecological perspective 62 , a perspective integ ral with the New Paradigm but not essential to radical departure from the dominant paradigm. The ethical transmission requirement defended accordingl y requires, hardly surprisingly, social and pol i tical adjustment. The social and political changes that the deeper alternative require s will be strongly resisted because they and power structure. mean changes in current social organisation To the extent that the option repre sents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surp r ising that official energy option discussion proceeds by misre pres enting and often ob scuring i t . But difficult though a change will be , es pec ially one with s uch f a r - r eaching e ffects on th e prevailing power struc tur e , is to obt ai n, it is imp e rative t o try: we are al l on the n uclear train. FOOTNOTES 1. All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Goodin, p. 417; the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6. While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear fuel cycle in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it helps to know a little. & Abbotts , Gyorgy. The basics are presented in many texts, e . g. Nader Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such important background and stage-settin g matters as the likelihood of a core meltdown of a (lightwater ) reactor, much more information is required. For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fallacies and decision theory is at least a s important as knowledge of nuclear technology. 2. to the first, see references cited in Goodin , p . 417, footnote 1. As regards the second see Cot grove and Duff, and some of the references As given therein. 3. Cot grove and Duff, p. 339. 4. The table is adapted from Cotgrove and Duff, p. 341; Catton and Dunlap, especially p. 34 . 5. compare also See, e.g ., Gyorgy , pp . 357- 8. 6. For one illustration , see the conclusions of Mr Justice Parker at the Windscale inquiry (The Windscale Inquiry Vol. 1., Her Majesty 's Stationery Office , London, 1978), discussed in both Cotgrove and Duff , p. 347 and in Goodin, p. 501 ff. 7. Much as with the argument of one theory or position against another . One can argue both from one's own position against the other, and in the other's own terms against the other. 8. As well as screening the debate from the public such manoeuvres favour the (pro-)nucle ar establishme nt, since they (those of th e alliance of military, large industry, and government) control much of the information and (subject to minor qualificatio ns) can release what, and only what , suits them. 9. This is a conclusion of several governmenta l inquiries and is conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear deve lopment; for requisite details up to 1977 see Routley (a). The same conclus ion has been reached in some, but not all, more recent official reports, see , e . g., 2 10. For some details see Gyorgy, p. 60 ff. 11 . Se e the papers, and simulations, discussed in Goodin, p. 428. lla. Naturally the effect on humans is not the only factor that has to be taken into account in arriving at moral assessments. Nuclea r radi ation , unlike most ethical theories, does not confine its scope to human life and welfare. But since the harm nuclear development may afflict on non-human life, for exampl e , can hardly improve its case, it suffices if the case against it can be made out solely in terms of its effects on human life in the convent ional (Old Paradigm) way. 12. On the pollution and waste disposal record of the nuclear industry, see Nader and Abbotts, Lovins and Price, and Gyorgy. On the more general problem of effective pollution controls, see also, Routley (a), footnote 7. 13. Back of thus Humanity Unlimited assumption is the idea of Man replacing God. First God had unlimited power, e.g. over nature, then when during the Enlightenment Man replaced God, Man was to have unlimited power. Science and technology were the tools which were to put Man into the position of unlimitedness. More recent l y nuclear power is seen as providing man at least with unlimited physical power, power obtained through technology. [ability to manage technology repr esent s the past] 14 . On such l imitation theorems, which go back to Finsler and Godel on one side and to Arrow on the other, see, e.g. Routley 80. All these theorems mimic paradoxes, semantical "paradoxes" on one side and vot ing "p aradoxes" on the other. Other different limitation resu1 ts are presented in Routley 81 . It follows that there are many problems that have no solution and much that is n e cessarily unknowable. Limitative results put a serious dent in the progress picture. According th e Dominant Western Worldview, the history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem there is a solution, and thus progress need never cease (Catton and Dunlap, p . 34) . 15. See Lovins and Price . 15a . The points also suggest a variant argument against a nuclear future, namely A nuclear future narrows the range of opportunities open to future generations. 'What justice requires ... is that the overall range of opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed' (Barry, p. 24 3). Therefor e ~ a nuclear f utur e contrav enes r equirements of justice . 3 16. For examples , and for some details of the history of philosoph e rs' positions on obligatio ns to the future, see Routley (a). 17 . Passmore, p. 91. Passmore' s position is ambivalen t and , to all appearanc es, inconsist ent. It is considere d in detail in Routley (a), as also is Rawls ' position. 18. For related criticism s of the e conomists ' arguments for discounti ng, a nd for citation of the often eminent economist s who sponsor them, see Goodin , pp. 429-30. 19. The reasons (not elaborate d here) are that the propertie s are different e . g. a monetary reduction of value imposes a linear ordering on values to which value rankings , being only partial orderings , do not conform. 20. Goodin however puts his case against those rules in a less than satisfact ory fashion . What he claims is tha t we cannot list all the possible outcomes in the way that such rules as expe ct ed util ity maximiza tion presuppos es, e.g. Goodin suggests that we cannot list all the things that can go wrong with a nuclear power plant or with waste storage procedure s. But outstandi ng alternativ es can always be comprehen ded logically , at worst by saying "all the rest" (e.g. "'P covers everythin g except p). For example , outcomes Goodin says cannot be listed, can be comprehen ded along such lines as "plant breakdown through human error". Furthermo re the different more app ropriate rules Goodin subsequen tly considers also requir e listing of "possible " outcomes . Goodin's point can be alternati vely stated however. There are really two points. The first trouble is that such ragbag alternati v es cannot in general be assigned required quantitat ive probabil ities, and it is at that point that applicati ons of the models breaks dovm. The breakdown is just what separates decision making under uncertain ty from decision making under risk. Secondly, many influenti al applicatio ns of decision theory methods, the Rasmussen Report is a good example, do, illegitim ately, delete possible alternati ves from their modelling s. 21 . Discount, or bank, rates in the economis ts' sense are usually set to follow the market, cf. P.A. Samuelson , Economics , 7th Edition, McGraw-H ill, New York , 1967, p.351. 22 . Thus the rates have little moral relevance . A real possibili ty is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate . A real possibili ty requires producibl e evidence for its considera tion . The contrast is with mere logical possibili ty. 23. 4 24. Such a princip le is explici t both in classica l utilitar iani s m (e.g. Sidgwick p. 414) , and in a range of contrac t and other theories from Kant and Rousseau to Rawl s (p.293). How the princip le is argu ed for will depe nd heavily , however, on the underlyi ng theory; and we do not want to make our use depend he avily on particu lar ethical theories . 25. The latter question is taken up in section VII; see especia lly, the Poverty argumen t. 26 . SF, p. 27. Shrader -Freche tte is herself somewha t critical of the carte blanche adoption of these methods , suggesti ng that ' whoever aff irms or den ies the desirab ility of ... [such] standard s is, to some degree, symboll ically assentin g to a number of American value patterns and cu l tural norms' (p. 28 ). 27. The examp le paralle ls the sorts of countere xamp les often advance d to utilitar ianism, e.g. the admissi ble lynching of an innocen t person because of pleasure given to the large lynching party. against utilitar ianism, see ... For the more general case 28 . US Atomic Energy Commissi on , Compara tive Risk-Co st-B en ef it Study of Alterna tive sources of Electric al Energy (WASH-1224), US Governm ent Printing Office , Washing ton, D.C., Decembe r 1974 , p.4-7 and p. 1-16. 29 . As SF points out, p.37-44 ., in some detail. As she remarks, ... since standard s need not be met, so long as the NRC [Nuclea r Regulato ry commiss ion] judges that the licence shows 'a reasonab le effort' at meetin g them, current policy allows governm ent regulato rs to trade human health and welfare for the [apparen t ] good intentio ns of the promo tors of technolo gy. [Such] good intentio ns have never been known to be sufficie nt for the morality of an act (p. 39). The failure of state regulati on, even where the standard s are as mostl y not very demandin g, and the alliance of regulato rs with those th ey a re s upposed t o be r eg ulating, are conspicu ous features of modern environm ental control, not just of (nuclear ) pollutio n control. 30 . 31 . The figures are thos e from the origin al Bro okhaven Report: ' Theo r e t ical possib ilities and consequ ences of major accide nts in large nuclea r plants ', USAEC Report WASH-740, Governm ent Printin g Office , Washin gton , D. C., 1957. This r e port was r eques ted in the first place because the Commis sion on Atomic Energy wanted pos i tive safe t y conc l usions "to r eass ure th e private insuran ce compan ies" so that they would pr ovid e coverag e for th e nuclea r indust ry. Since even th e cons e rvative statist ics of the r eport we r e alannin g it was supp r essed and its data we r e not made public until. almost 20 years later, after a suit was brough t as a r esult of the Freedom of Inform ation Act (Shrad er-Frec hette, pp. 78-9). 32 . Atomic Energy Commis sion, Re actor Safe ty Study: An Ass e ssment of Acc ident Risks in US Comme rcial Nuclea r Power Plants , Governm ent Printin g Offi ce , Washin gton, D.C., 1975 . This report, the only alleged ly comple te study , conclud ed that fission reactor s presen ted only a minima l health risk t o the public . Early in 1979, th e Nuclea r Regula tory Commis sion (th e r elevan t organ isation that superse ded the trouble d Atomic Energy Commis sion) withdre w i ts suppor t for the report, with the result that there is now no compreh ensive analys is of nuclea r power approve d by the US Governm ent. 32a . Most presen t and planned r eactors are of this type: see Gyo r gy . 33 . 34 . Even then relevan t environ ment factors may have been neglec t ed . 35. There are variati ons on (i) and (ii) which multip ly costs agains t number s such as probab ilities. In this way risks, constru ed as probab le cos ts, can be taken into accoun t in the assessm ent. (Alt e rnative ly, risks may be assesse d through such familia r method s as insuran ce.) A princip le varying (ii), and fonnula ted as follows : (ii ) a is ethica lly accepta ble if (for some b) a include s no more risks than b and b is sociall y acce pted. was the basic ethica l princip le in terms of which the Cluff Lak e Board of Inquiry recentl y decided that nuclea r power de velo pme nt 1 in Saskat chewan is ethically acceptable : s e e Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry Final Report, Departme nt of Environment , Government of Saskatchewa n, 1978, p. 305 and p . 288 . In this report, a is nuclear power and bis either a ctiviti e s clearl y accepted by society as alternative power sources. In other application s b has been taken as cigarette smoking, motoring, mining and even the Vietna m War(!) The points made in the text do not exhaust the objections to principles (i) - (ii'). The principles are certainly ethically substantive , since an ethical consequence cannot be deduced from nonethical premisses, but they have an inadmissibl e conventiona l character. For l ook at the origin of b: b may be socia lly accepted though it is no longer socially acceptable, or though its social acceptibili ty is no longer so cle arcut and it would not have been socially accepted if as much as is now known had been known when it was introduced. 'What is required in (ii'), for instance, for the argument to begin to look convincing is then 'ethically acceptable' rather than 'socially accepted'. But even with th e amendments the principles are invalid , for the reasons given in the text. It is not disconcertin g that thes e arguments do not work . It would be sad to see yet another area lost to the exper ts, namely ethics to actuaries. 36. A main part of the tr oubl e with the models is that they are narrowly utilitarian , and like utilitariani sm they neglect distributio nal features , involve na tu ralistic fallacies, et c. Really they try to treat as an uncon- straine d optimisatio n what is a deontically constraine d optimisatio n : V. Routley 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarian ism'. s ee R. and 37. Ap parent exceptions to the principle such as taxation (and redistr i bution of income generally) vanish when wealth is construed (as it has to be i f taxation is to be properly justified) as at least partly a social asset unfairly monopolised by a minority of the population . Example s such as that of motoring dangerously do not constitute counterexam ples to the principle; for one is not morally entitled to so motor. 38. SF, p. 15, where references are also cited. 39 . Goodin, p. 433. 40 . On all these points see R. Grossman and G. Daneker, Guide to Jobs and Energy , Environment a lists for Full Employment, Washington DC, 1977, pp.1-7, and also the details supplied in substantiat ing th e interesting case of Commoner [7 ] . On the absorption of available capital by the nuclear industry, see as well [18], p. 23 . On th e employment issues, see too H. E. Daly in [ 9], p. 149. 7 A more fundamental challenge to the poverty argument appears in I. Illich, Ene rgy and Equality , Calden and Boyars, London 1974, where it is argued that the sort of development nuclear energy represents is exactly th e opp osite of what the poor need. 41 . For much more deta il on the inappropria teness see E.F . Schumacher, Sma ll is Beauti ful, Blond and Briggs, London, 1973. As to the capital and o ther requirement s, see [2] , p. 48 , and also [7] and [9] . For an illuminatin g l ook at the sort of d evelopmen t high - energy t e chnolo gy will t end to promote in the so-called unde rdeveloped countri es see the pap e r of Waiko and other papers in The Melanesian Envfr•onment (edited J . H. Wins l ow), Au s tr a l ian National University Press, Canb e rr a, 1977. 42 . A useful survey is given in A. Lovins , Energy Strategy : The Road Not Taken , Fr iends of the Earth Australia, 1977 (reprinted from Fo 1°eign Affair•s , Oc tob e r 1976); s ee also [ 17], [6 ] , [ 7], [14] , p . 233 ff, and Schumacher, op . cit . 43 . An argument like this is suggested in Passmo re, Chapters 4 and 7, with respect to the question of saving resources. In Passmore this argument for the ove rriding importance of passing on contemporar y culture is underpinn e d by what appears to be a future-dire cted ethical version of the Hidden Hand argument of economics - that, by a coincidence which if correct would indeed he fortunate, the best way to take care of the future (and perhaps even the only way to do so, since do-good interventio n is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care of t he present and immediate future. The argument has all t he defects of the related Chain Argument discussed above and others. 44. See Nader and Abbotts, p. 66, p . 191, and also Commoner . 45 . Very persuasive arguments to this effect have been a dvanced by civ il liberties groups and others in a number of countri e s: see especially M. Flood and R. Grove-White , Nuclear Pr ospects. A comment on the individual , the State and Nuclear Power , Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural England and National Council for Civil Liberties , London, 1976. 46. ' US energy policy, for example , since the passage of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act , has been that nuclear powe r is necessary to provide "an e conomical and reliable basis" n eed ed "to sustain economic growth" (SF, p . 111, and r efe rences there cit e d) . 47. There are now a great many criticism s of the second premiss in th e literat ure . For our criticism , and a r e formulati on of the premiss in terms of selec tive economic growth (which would exclude nu clear developm ent), see Routley (b) , and also Berkley and Seckler. To simple-mi ndedly contrast e conomic growth with no-growth , in the fa shion of some discussio ns of nuclear power, c . f . Elster, is to leave out crucial alte rnatives ; the contracti on of course much simplifie s the otherwise faulty case for unalleged growth. 48. In UK and USSR nuclear developme nt is explicitl y in the public domain, in such countries as France and West Germany the governmen t has very s ubstantia l interests in main nuclear involved companies . Even as regards nuclear plant operation in the US, it is difficult to obtain comprehen sive data. Estimates of cost very dramtical ly according to the sample of plants chosen and the assumptio ns made concernin g the measureme nt of plant performan ce (Gyorgy, p. 173). 49 . See Kalmanoff , p . 50. See Corney. 51. Ref. to what it has to say about Price Anderson Act. 52. Full ref to SF on argument from ignorance etc. 53 . These e . g. Elster, p. 377. On deci sion theory see also, 54 . A recent theme in much economic literatur e is that Bayesian dec ision theory and risk analysis can be universal ly applied . The theme is upset as soon as one steps outside of select Old Paradigm confines. In any case , even within these confines there is no consensus at all on, a nd few (and widely diverging ) figures for the probabili ty of a reactor core meltdown, an d no reliable estimates as to the likelihoo d of a nuclear confronta t i on. Thus Goodin argue s (in 78) that 'such uncertain ties plague energy theories' as to 'rend er expected utility calculati ons impossibl e '. 55 . For details see Gyorgy, p. 398 ff ., from which presentat ion of the internati onal story is adapted. 1 56. Gyo rgy, p . 307, and p. 308. points, see Chomsky For elaborati on of some of th e important and Hermann. 57. Whatever one thinks of the ethical principle s underlyin g the Old Paradigm or its Modificat ion - and they do form a coherent set th at many people can respect - these are not the principle s unde rlying contempor ary corporate capitalism and associate d third-wor ld i.mperialis m. 58. Certainly practical transitio nal programs may involve tempo rary and limited us e of unaccepta ble long t erm commoditi es such as coal, but in presentin g su ch practical details one should not lose sigh t of the more basic social and structura l changes, and the problem is really one of making those. Similarly practical transitio nal strategie s should make use of such measures as en vironment al (or replaceme nt) pricing of energy i . e . so that the price of some energy unit includes the full cost of r e placing it by an equivalen t unit taking account of environm ental cost of productio n. Other (sometime s coopU.ve) s trategies towards more satisfact ory alternativ es should a lso, of course , be adopted, in particula r the removal of institutio nal barriers to energy conservat ion and alternati ve technolog y (e . g. local governmen t regulatio ns blocking these), and the removal of state assistanc e to fuel and power industrie s. 59. Symptoma tic of the fact that it is not treated as r enewable is that forest economics do not generally allow for full renewabi lity - if th ey did the losses and deficits on forestry operation s would be much more s triking tha n t hey already are often enough. It is doubtful, furthermo re, that energy cropping of forests can be a fully r e newable operation if net energy productio n is to be worthwhil e; see, e.g . the argument in L. R.B . Mann 'Some difficult ies with energy farming for portable fuels', and add in the costs of e cosystem maintenan ce. 60. For an outline and explanati on of this phenomena see Gyorgy, and also Woodmansee . 61 . The requisite distinctio n is made in several places , e . g . Routley (b), and (to take one example from the real Marxist literatur e), Baran and Sw eezy . 62 . The distinctio n between shallow and deep ecology was first emphasise d by Naess. For its environm en tal i mpo rtance see Routl ey (c) (wher e further reference s are cited) . • REFERENCES . In o rde r to contai n refe r e n ces to a modes t length, r efrre ncc to primary sources has often been replaced by referen ce through secondary sources . Generally the reader can easily trace the primary sour ces . For those parts of the text that ove rlap Routley (a), fuller references wil l be found by consulting the latter article. S. Cotgrove and A. Duff, 'Environmen talism, middle-clas s radicalism an d politics', Sociologica l Review 28 (2) (1980), 333-51. R.E . Goodin, 'No moral nukes ', Ethics 90 (1980), 417-49. A. Gyorgy and Friends , No Nukes: everyone's guide to nuclear power, South End Press, Boston, Mass., 1979. R. Nader and J. Abbotts, The Menace of Ato mic Energy, Outb ack Press , Melbourn e , 1977. R. a nd V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', Inquiry 21 ( 1978), 133-79 (cited as Routley (a)). Fox Repo rt: Ranger Uranium Environmen tal I nquiry First Report , Australian Go vernmen t Publishing Service, Canberra , 1977. K.S. Schrader-Fr echet te, Nu clea r Power and Publi c Policy, Reidel, Do rdrecht, 1980 (refe rred to as SF). W. R. Cat ton, Jr., and R. E. Dunlap, 'A new ecol ogical paradigm for post - ex uber an t sociology', Ame rican Behavioral Scientist 24 (1980) 15-47 . Unite d States Interagency Review group on Nuclea r Waste Managemen t, Repo rt to the President, Wash i ngton. (Dept. of Energy) 1979. (Ref. No . El. 28 . TID29442) (cited as US(a)) . A.B . Lovins and J.H. Price, Non-Nuc lear Futures : The Case for an Eth ical Energy Strategy, Friends of the Earth Internation al, San Fran cisco , 1975. R. Routley , 'On the impossibili ty of an ortho dox social theory and of an orthodox solution to environmen tal problems', Logique et Analyse, 23 (1980), 145-66. R. Routl ey , 'Necessa r y limits for knowledge: unknowable tru ths', in Es says in honour of Paul Wei nga rtner, (ed. E. Norscher ), Salzberg, 1980. J. Passmore , Man's Responsibi lity for Nature, Du ckworth , London, 1974 . ,,,. .-2. R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, Third Editi on, RSSS, Austra lian National University, 1975 (cited as Routley (b)). J . Rawls , A Theory of Justice, Harvard Unive rsit y Press, Cambridge , Mass., 19 71. P . hl . Berkl ey a nd D.W . Seckler, Economic Gr owth and Environment a l Dec ay, Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch , New York, 1972 . J . Elster, 'Risk, uncertainty and nuclear power' , Soci al Science Information 18 (3) (1979) 371-400. J. Robinson , Economic Heresi e s, Basic Books, New York, 1971. B. Barry, 'Circumstan ces of Justice and future generat i ons ' in Obligations to Future Generations (ed. R.I. Sikora and B. Barry), Templ e Universit y Press, Philadelphi a, 1978. H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics , Macmillan, London , 1962 (r e issue ). B. Commoner, The Poverty of Power , Knopf, New York, 1975. N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Right s , 2 vols., Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1979 . J. Woodmans ee , The World of a Giant Corporation , North Coun tr y Pr es s , Seattle , Washing ton, 1975. P . A. B~r a n and P . Sweezy, Monopoly Capita l, Penguin, 1967. A. Naess, ' The shallow and the deep, long range eco l ogy movement. A summary ', Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 1873: Draft of Nuclear power - ethical, social and political dimensions Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy) of draft, undated. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'Nuclear power—some ethical and social dimensions', in Regan T and VanDeVeer D (eds) And justice for all: new introductory essays in ethics and public policy, Rowman and Littlefield. Description An account of the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 1873 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0475e12">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0475e12</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-01-01 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Far Bookshelf - Second Bay - Top Shelf - Pile 2 Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Top Shelf > Pile 2 Box 59: Nuclear https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/afa9cbba22cebf06f3dc69f209f159a4.pdf 1d2e17f1654f4f1dfca304ea2d3c8ce9 PDF Text Text 1875 �/IN/J , AJuncl)L NUCLEAR POWER • - ETHICA L,a& SOCIAL DIMENSIONS ---.. Compet ing paradig fus and · the nuclea r debate . ~ J C/l/'I One hardly 1ieeds ini t.. i ation into the dark myster ies of nuclea r physic s to contrib ute useful ly to the debate now widely raging over nuclea r power. While many import ant empiri cal questio ns are still unreso lved, these do not really lie at the centre of the controv ersy. Instead , it is a debate about values ... \ many of the questio ~which arise are social and ethica l ones. 1 •.:tSociol ogica) investi gation s have confirm ed fJ £ a t~ I pa,i I 11g , I a1:a1Hiliit e:f! the ,! 01\.C!.. debate l=!S:&!!!!t'!~ primar ily over what is w.9rth having or pursuin g and over what we are 'tli.a,., /i.,we 4ho cc,-.+·,r,.,../),l fl..,,/ it,, J;,'/.wh :1 ;•,l~:,~-11 .entitle d to do to others .~,] ii pelaFi oatienA along the lines of compet ing paradig ms. 2 Accord ing to the entrenc hed paradig vtldisc erned, that constel lation. a' of values , attitud es and beliefs often called the nomina nt Social Paradig m (herea fter I ena ipsoiac to u hl:ttan f!nD --) I r/ I riteria become the benchm ark by which a v.;id..e/ range of individ ual and social action is J IA"{'J4.l and evalua ted. AW'\d belief in the market and market mechan isms is quite centra l. Clv'.:ite...<il"\<J around this col'"e belief is the convic tion that enterp rise flouris hes best in a system of risks and r ew~ rds, that differe ntials are necess ary ..• , and in the necess ity for some form of divisio n of labour , and a itfl1rar chy of skills and expert ise. In particu lar, there is a belief in the compet ence of ~xpert s in genera l and of scient ists in particu lar , m More thau this, scient: ifie knowle dge aftd t:he scient ific speei:r~:'i~/,;2··::.,,./ method enjoy a -ef knowiftg , • , , A:Re 3 S = ~ : . . _ 4"-- quanti f ica.tion . .status as super, '(P' ::::j there 1s an emphas is on ~~,3 The rival world view, sometim es called the Altern ative Environ mental Paradig m ( the ~ Paradig m) differs on almost every point, and, accord ing to sociol ogists , in ways su~mar i~ din the followi ng table 4":Nature hostile/ne utral Environm ent controllable ---·. ,csourccs limited Nature benign Nature clclicatdy balanced \. \ �EDGE .,. Confidence in science and technology ~ation:ility of means~} Limits to science ~ationality of ends • S.t-~te socialism, as practiced in most of the "EasteI11 bloc", differs from the 01/ PaLl.digm really only as to economic organisation, the market in particular l\ ffl~' being replaced by central planning (a market system by a command system). / o-Y ,r,~t)tlt But since there is virtually no debate over a nuclear future within the confines of · h · 1·ism, 5 tat variant on the Old Paradigm need not be delineated here. minor s t a t e socia ,,.... 1 Nctl.cu,t .WailiaA the competing paradigm picture is a trifle s i m p l e ~ instead ~ a New Paradigm there are rather counterparadi gms, a cluster of not very well out rositions that diverge from the cluster marked out as the wo,•k~ Jfl01+,;.,./'cr-hJ, )/o,ie,/{~(J Old Paradigm~ i t is empirically investigable, and.I\ it enables the nuclear debate be focussed. Large-scale nuclear development, of the sort now occurring in much of the world , counter to leading tenets (such as societal features) of the New Paradigm. Indeed to introduce ethical and social dimensions into the assessment of nuclear power, instead of ~,.. olt-0u'-, merely economic 1in addition to jJa9.,-.d .. u(_, \-"-.. factors such as cost and efficiency, isAto move somewhat received paradigm. g.gl; .. i le the For under the Old Paradig~, strictly construed, the nuclear debate is confined to the terms of the narrow ut1litarianism upon which contemporary economic practice is premissed, the issues to questions of economic means (to assumed economistic ends) along with technological, social engineering and other instrumental details whatever falls outside these terms is (dismissed as) irratfonal. I /;,(4.(11,-,'1"4-J J~clear development receives its support from adherents of the Old Paradigm. Virtually all the arguments in favour of it are set within the assumption framework of the Old Paradigm, and without these assumptions the t:o fails. But in · and ultimately fails fact the argument for a nuclear future from the Old Paradigm is itself broken-backedj) case for the nuclear future the world is presently committed unless the free enterprise economic assumptions are replaced by the ethically unacceptable assumptions of advanced (corporate) capitalism. r->~~~tt--en--e--a:nm~m-t~ 7 �The two paradigm picture also enables our case against a nuclear future (a case written from outside the Old Paradigm ) to be structur ed. There are two main part~JJ :It is argued, firstly, from the Old Paradigm , that nuclear J&tfSe developm ent is ethicall y unjusti fiable; A but that, secondly , even from within e·th,t" I~ ,;,{,.l,fo "1 the framewo rk of the,\Old Paradigm , such developm ent is unaccep table, since signific ant features of nuclear developm ent conflic t with indispe nsible features of the Paradigm (e.g. costs of project developm ent and state :s ... lPs ,l ,J"--f:,,;, •., with market independ ence and criteria for project selectio n). It has _?~E_~ d accepta ble from within the claminan t paradigm only because )rfo,,Js do not square with practice , only because the assumpt ions of the Old Paradigm are but very ~A~~ty applied in contemp orary politica l practice the place of i ru.<<I!.(~., "'1( td) ,v capitali sm having been usurped by corpora te capitali sm. It is because the nuclear debate <:<1.vi bL. carried on within the framewo rk of the Old Paradigm that the debate - although it is a debate about values, because of the conflict ingvalu es of the <c.,..,.,fL-f;;"1 paradigm s - is not just a debate about values; it is also a debate within a paradigm as to means to already assumed (ec:.on0" 1istid ends, and -:=:- of rationa l choice as to energy option.5 within (~ ~ 0 1""Q;i1f 2'n this corner ~ 0<,f/e,,..Jj4 ft!1ho',. "JllD I most !i F I Im. decision 1 a predeter mined framewo rk of values. tlrp~ theory argumen ts,often conside red " as encompa ssing all the nuclear debate is ethicall y about, I\best util.i t~rian means to predeter mined ends..,) be l : ~ For another leading charact eristic of the nuclear debate is the attempt , under the dominan t par_adigyn, to r~c'1~ it from t/•IIW 1f the ethical and social sphere) and to turR ; t into spec,iali st issues ef' #" whether over minutia? .and conting encies A present technolo gy or overme&lw,,/ ~legal or ~) mathem atical ,,' upeciaJ J y de, rs r 011 tbentetf c: and Stat Is Lica:1:, or amdie&t details.,8 / £' ;or The double approach can be applied as regards each of the main problems nuclear . developm ent poses. There are 7any A inter~e lated problems and -fl. t.- OAJ'""'"cd · , is further ,) I\ /_,flW4r structur ed in terms of these. For in the advancem ent and promotio n of nuclear ~ we encount er a remarka ble combina tion of factors, never before assemble d establis hment, on a massive scale, of an industry which involves at each stage of its process ing serious risks and at some stages of product ion possible catastro phe, which delivers as a by-prod uct radioac tive wastes which require up to a million years' storage but for which no sound and economi c storage methods are known, which gr~w up as part of the war industry and which is easily $""h v,e..,rld to deliver nuclear weapons , which require s for its operatio nconsid erable secrecy , limitati ons on the flow of informa tion and restrict ions on civil libertie s, which depends for its economi cs, and in order to generate expected private profits, on Sl.\bs-i.4.,,/..,~/ state subsidi zation, support , and interven tion. It is, in short, a very high technol ogical developm ent, ba~«-f. with problem s. first importa nt problem .which serves also to exempli fy ethical issues and princip les involved in other nuclear power questio ns, is the unresolv ed matter of disposa l of nuclear wastes. A �.------------- ------------ ------------ -------~--- ---. f 5. t annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb. of this waste is extremely toxic. ) Much For example, a millionth of a gramme of plutonium part of the waste material of even a is enough to induce a lung Wastes will include the reactors themselves, ...contamination which will have to be abandoned after their expected life times of perhaps 40 years, and which, some have estimated, may require l½ million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity. P,,.tcAF A~astes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire For fission products the required storage period averages a active lifetime. thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include plutonium, there is a half million to a million year storage problem. Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed long-term methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste produced over the last twenty years. ~ Shortterm methods of storage require continued human intervention, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human interference and risk of leakage through non-human factors. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history ti of the earth over the last million years, a period whose fluctuations in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice Ages, could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be provided for the vast period of time involved. Nor does the history of human affairs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years. Proposed long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formation s or in salt mines, are largely speculative and relatively untested1 and have already proved to involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice. Even as regards expensive recent proposals for the result in first embedding concentrated wastes in glass and enca/ulating ,i multilayered metal containers before rock radioactive material may not remain deposit 1 si~ulation models reveal that 11. . , 'II isolated from human environments. S'k,t.<\t1 f~4. In short, the best present ~iapeoel proposals carry very real possibilities of .J... /Id • // I lZ..t-u ~~~ • irradiating future people- (V',i,,l. Given the c<c,,,~'7 I Atu.lflf .QA:Q;pQfiQWB costs which could be involved for the future, and given 0 the known ~~mits of technology, it is £i?la:h:tw methodol@gi cal.ly unsound amt to bet,• as nuclear Mlin,-J ~ A t~a. have,• on the discovery of safe procedures for 1tis.pr19i,j of wastes. Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on present proposals, and subjecJto the same inadequacies. methods for safe l storage For instance, none of the proposed X "'t.H has been properly tested, and they mayAprove to involve ell :sorts o:fi unforseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee �, I I 09 when set in this context. t,/wo/! are not so ruf'I What is worth remarking is that similar excuses when the consigner, again~ "responsible" businessman, puts ). his workers' health or other peoples' welfare at risk. ~ THE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM, AND THE1~IN PARABLE . II. A long distance country train has just pulled out. crowded carries both passengers and freight. journey The train which is At an early stop in the someone consigns as freight , to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explosive gas. container which> as the consigner ii ava..r4- 1 Jii' l 'J I ems This is packaged in a very thin may~ not contain the gas for the ~ full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the train should strike any real trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the train becomes very hot, if the train should be derailed or involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interfere try; to steal some 1e t 11 r 5ffi'1jhQ~ ot eliherately ~ the freight~ inadvertent! Ml tX,lA4'rcd,. have happened on some previous journeys. All iii,. ~ with fU: ft,1-h ~ fCJ Laps Conf• ;;bi.c, ;_,,, of these tie:! cg ,.. ,\ If the container should "' break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while others could be maimed or incur serious diseases . ..,., Most of us would Aoundly condemn such an action. of the parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not responsible for the train or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however 1$ would normally be s een as ludicrous~ a11rlo'1er1 (~~up~~he says that it is hisgownA pressing needs which justify his action. The ~ h e 0!111!!6, ,\ which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial A straits, and could• n.,r ,. afford to produce a better container even if it knew how to r~..../'441' ~ ,1/r make one. If t h e ~ §?PB ersl~~, he and his family will suffer, his employees r~L'~~ will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the who}eA 1~,~, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off. ()It,/ rl.A~"/t ~ " .fo-... The ppor of t'he ¥.j)Jag_P,whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will ,1 suffer especially. ::, ,1r.,i/Q G ew people would accept~ story1 even if correct, as justification. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneseLf or some group for whom one is (o concerned one is usually m,""kM,l ii,b. w;gil1'UA not hacc.u_y to be entitled to simply transfer the,4 burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise 1 ()r 1 CI U J 1 /JIZMJ' J ) from one's own.< chosefi Iife-style.ca:nd the t~nsfer af cos.ts creates a risk of ,ae-r ious harm t:e G - t ~ r ----- The matter of nuclear waste disposal has many moral features which resem\1le the train (i4.tqatiaeu There is no known proven safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by the nuclear plant~ that will be spread around the world as large/9 scale nuclear development goes ahead. ' The waste problem will be much more serious than thut generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, withx'each one of the 2000 or so r actors envisaged by ,IJ ,f/4. J.IYl/4w l#i7 l,Q. ~~'4~ ,i· dfi) flp,J4v{- ...,_, jj{'. , ,~IL cue end of the century producing, on average, A . /"'-A 'VI '/I Ji? t • s/4 /7 __ / L_:~-..':~. . :~===================== ==---___,tl~===~l_____i_~ ~---- ------,_,.........----------~---_......._ ----:,..........,__.. �6. { of safety over th e s torage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt , would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably . . as The assumption that it would be{ especially if, ~ used. - likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically) seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection and concern for the f uture which has not previously been e~counter~in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nuclear industry. 1 . Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long term storage sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human ac t ivity, weapons-grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million year storage period, to any pa rt y who is in a position to retrieve it. nonetheless be found 1 before 2000, (no longer a mere disposal pfioblem) s accordingly not t"~t,cnA '( which gets around the waste storage problem . like ma~v assumptions ?~ifH~s, It is an assumption supplied by the based, but is ratne ~ ~an artitle or The assumption that a way will /! Old Paradigm, 1 Cit M limitations assumption , that there are really no (development) - · -. problems that cannot be solved technologically (if not in a fashion always immediately ·· economically feasible). part in development plans and practice.. technological optimism (not to say what humans can accomplish, The assumption that is has played an important It has not only encouraged an unwarranted t3 -h(A.J,,.,·::, -____ ); that there are no limits to ;~;:14. i<. through science ; it has led to the em~rcation on projects before crucial problems have been satisfactorily solved t,r a solution is tNll.~ i n sight, and it has led to the idea that technology can always be suitably controlled. It has also led , not surprisingly, to disasters. There are severe limits on what technology can achieve (some of which are becoming known in the form of '"' limitation theorems,~ and in addition there are human limitations which modern technological developments often fail to take due account of (risk analysis of the · , llliu:,,olll( lido-wliklihood of reac t or accidents is a relevant exampll). The original nuclear technology dream ..fj 1>S1.l»-'I was that nuclear 'clean unlimited supply of power'). apparently remains a net will be but a quite X That dream soon shattered . cons &-1>t1~ "!)hc..-l::-tM1<1 would provide unlimited energy (a The nuclear industry of power, and nuclear ..flt~, ;o,,.. s upplier of power/> The risks :l.mposed on the future by proceeding with nuclear development then , significant. are, Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the (suspect) breeder reactor it could be an energy source for only perhaps 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lj_ves could be seriously affected by the wastes. �I pt,..."'tl.Mt.. It is for such reasons that the train aua]og; cannot be turned around .p, .. ~,.,,,/(._ . s. to work in favour of nuclear power, w1.·th .:e::g:.-"1 t, h e nuc 1 ear train b r1.n1.ng I 4 relief as well as wastes to a remote town powered (only) by nuclear power. 7. ~ ~~----Thus perhaps 40,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks resulting from the provision of the (extravagant) energy use I.I f»l~)'r•jloiT,,j.,. d r{4. of onlyAlO generations. l''°/'k o.f Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the ene~gy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it ~ For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dream~of global industrial:lsation are realised, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy resource use and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it. It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form 4 a very important part of the basis of life, are in a run·-down condition. Such pointf~~ll against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least indirect beneficiaries. The "solution" then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Like the consigner in the train parable, contemporary indu st rial society proposes, in order to get itself out of _a mess arising from its chfik Q,W:fl life style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding benefits. . The ''solution" may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes~n the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties, whose opportunity to /eJ J.Q.c~nt /,vu Afli1J may be seriously jeopardised. Industrial society has - under e~ch paradigm, so it will be argued clear alternatives (YJ>o~-t~ 1 cf i patterns ~ w to this action, which is taken essentially to avoid changing c~mpet,Nil,iJo.l'J ~ of consumption and protect the interest of those,\who benefit from them. I r~ pcrca.,t1cd, If we apply to the nuclear situation the standards of behaviour and moral 1 principles generally acknowledged (in principle if perhaps often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that nuclear development firTr-/S~ inv61ves injustice ~ /:T4- • with respect to the future 1,0 .I\ li g s111l s n 1J e> . The.re appear to be only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. �(p) !Pa {csfuP~ c C--?\ Ce/>'\ r.,--,._ ( .__:.. '7 1 </{_:_, rh~, t ✓~ ~ I d04r7 A ~ /'{,I(~ ~ ~ UL-117 KL- #- "d c ...... /~,::;., , ~7 (~ ' a-r ,,:ZZ-: :.,.,/ ~ 7 ka.-~ ,,.,;,{,,;,,, j ~ ~ ~ cf~~c-r 77~ 7W{~ ' £--) 11-/'l,,._,r ,/~ £e..-r<- ~ ~7~ ~~ t, .r \t Y/1 ) . 8. I i I First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply f{,_ because the recipients of...- nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to !eject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to 1 ~ that there are circumstances in which such an action might ~,.;s i];Jj' no be justifiable 1 or at least where the the nuclear case. f,t,,J/,e,, ~ is less clearcut. It is the same with Just as in the case of the consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether (on(l,/e,r- We ~urfl now to the first oA these possible escape they apply in the present case. h,1',.,. ,¼ ,,;I,11. ,~ 1V,r,q routes for the proponent of nuclear developmen~, A~ the ~ ~ a i e::u, question of our obligations to the future.@ III The especially problematic area OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE. is that of the distant (i.e. ~ ,-inun({..!',l j ate) future, 11( the future with which people alive today will have no direct contact; by comparison, the immediate &,I" In fact the question of future gives fe~ problems for most ethical theories. obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories ( tl~eu,lf;"i, a;iff. ill}~-?~ • • 1-t,u,· fe,!, 0 "! 1-ope:ram,o_rLJ fail to pass, and also o'Ji(~) tlo .-u-r ~ t/JM_ the adequacy of accepted;/ institutions which leave future pe pl.c. in political philosophy cen:e!r .. in:g 01:1~ <YP of account~ the interests of ll'd"-lvx~, ;>?Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on the issue. A good many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them a lesser weight, those who deny or who are committed by their general moral position to denying that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political pcr/1t,,/IJ institutions,that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond ~those f@raap,s to the next generation. According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained, there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, who have opted for the unconstrained position, many have based this view on accouna of moral obligation which are builh. on relations which presuppose some ckiguhl uf \ �9. temporal or spatial contiguit y. Thus moral obligatio n is seen as grounded on or as presuppos ing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligatio n is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also nontransitiv e. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligatio n, or requireme nts on moral obligatio n, which would rule out obligatio ns to the non.immediate future are these:- Firstly there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligatio n is held be able to claim his rights or entitleme nt. People in the distant future will not be able t'b-claim rights and en«fw11. entitleme nts as aga:inst us, and of course they can do nothingAt o enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligatio ns on social or legal conventio n, for example a conventio n which would require punishmen t of offenders or at least some kind of social enforceme nt. But plainly these and other conventio ns will not hold invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventio ns and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders , and there could be no guarantee that any contempo rary institutio n would do it for them. ~ Both the view that moral obligatio n requ{es the context of a moral community and the view that it is contractu ally based appear to rule out the distant future as a field of moral obligatio n as they not only require a commonal ity or some sort of common basis which cannot be guarantee d in the case of the distant future, but also a possibili ty of interchan ge or reciproci ty of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligatio n is seen as mutual exchange the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligatio ns to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligatio ns in non-tran sitive relations of short duration such as sympathy and love. As well there are difficult ies about love and sympathy for (non-exis tent) people in the far distant future about whose personal qualities and characte ristics one must know very little and who may well Ji/fa,,,,be committed to a life-styl e for which one has no sympathy. On the current 1 showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contempo rary society lacks both love and sympathy for future people; and it would appear to follow fr om this that contempor ary people had no obligatio ns concernin g future people and could damage them as it suited them. ( �10. j What all these views have in common is a picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can \b 5 fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empffathy). { t:#11/ Because obligation therefore fOt1'0i7'1 ) c,4/t..,&,./.h. become\conditional, features usually"' thought to characterise ia;~such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features) ate lost,~special.ly where there is a choice whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so as to whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. The view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act however one likes with respect to them, Mt is Ahowever Jurn.mi).(/e. ,fl ·•=~ aH:llLalt one te ~t113ta1A J Irr Consider, elm example , a a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affecte.d, but the population ofY the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a The unconstrained position clearly direct and predictabl~ result of the action. implie s that this is an acceptable moral enterpris e, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being overexpensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it The unconstrained position also endorses as morally J,,)rc'y: acceptable the following sorts of linEOfflf':les:- A firm discovers it can make a will do to future people. handsome profit from mining, processing and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendents, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm i .t does ,ren,,~ future people. Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view, which are easily varied and multiplied, might seem childishly obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not 0... only have several philosophers endorsed this position, but it i s ~ clear impli cation of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of prevailing economic theory. It seems that those who opt for the unconstrained position have not considered such examples, -, /J/(l. by their position. despite their being clearly implied w ..ld cuh..117 ~o/1'1 Md;{ - We suspect thatAwhen it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being free to act implies among other things being free to inflict pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for �11. the unconstrained position would want to assert that it was not what they intende.d. I What many of those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not reponsible for their lives. The popular view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, r:-- in the counter/ example cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being .....:.,..., left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so thereby acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future, namely the obligation to take account in what they do of people affected and their interests, to be careful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probability of their actions causing harm, and to see that they do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life. Furthermore, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same thing as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have or has not acqu.ired an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved, that one has no responsibility for his life, does not imply that one .is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some course of act.ion of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him. These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the (sometimes deliberate) failure to make an important distinction between acquired or assumed obligations toward somebody, for which some act of acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of acquisition is required. and kind of responsibility involved. There is a considerable difference in the level In the first case one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent who is aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not p{jf-lrr (yet) exist. While it may~be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make speci.al sacrifices for future people of an heroic kind, or even to help them �12. especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigner cannot from harming them. argue in justification of hi.s action that he has never assumed or acquired responsfbility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them and that they are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue concerning the train, and the nuclear case, is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility for the lives of people involved. There has been an attempt to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self- sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more engaging in heroic self- sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm than the consigner is resorting to heroic self- sacrifice in refraining from placing his dangerous package 6n the train. - 1~ ,-;.,,. The conf~ of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off nonacquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral obligation' both to signify any type of deontic constraints and also to indicate rather something which t?t-. con.Pl~"' has to be assumed or acquired. a .~is encouraged by reductionist positions which, in attempting to account for obligation in genera~mistakenly endeavour to collapse all obligations into acquired obligations. Hence the equation, and some main roots {),nu,,WUI of the unconstrained position, of theAbelief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future. The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent, positions, for example the position that our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condtion, and that is all; il,/7 there are irferactice no obligations to the distant future. A main argument in favour of the latter theme is that such obligations would in practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through the �chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves or sympathy, only to the succeeding - generation. /hftfe.. 'U'L P..t (t A.,t ~ . A three objections to this chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of constraints on individuals opposed to whole generations, since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create individual responsibility, and which often cannot be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters. VThirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense oflcfi\advantages to people of the more distant future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with , and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors. examples Such cases can hardly be written off as "never-never land" since many cases of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of nonrenewable resources and the long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils t.($l. and forests through over crttl If then such obvious injustices to future W• people arising from the favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests. IV. ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY OBLIGATI_ONS TO THE FUTURE : ECONOMISTIC r.\ Ul\tERTAINTY AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS. While there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible . , ~ ,;. position. According to thej qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant future, there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future . The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewhat) disadvantaged by them. The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in prevailing economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future �( 'tJ c./,~ 14. c,,...,.,,..7 e-.Al'I r~e/ ,,_0 /1//4,r.4'---/o/_/,._ costs and benefits (and so of future inter~s) is obtained by application over time of a ! ~ discount rateJ l The attempt to apply eco~omics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. J What is objectionable in such an approach is that rl..ooA.cl economics~ operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just A as in practice it operates within legal constraints, not determine what those There are moreover alternative economic theories and simply constraints are. to adopt, without further ado, one which discounts the future is to beg ~.rn.<)~ t=t.m questions at issue. Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting the future 1 the most threadbare is based ~n the assumption that future generations J'{ than present ones > and so better placed to handle the waste off willj€:tter Since there is mounting evidence that future generations may well UQ_l= problem. be better off than present ones, especially in things that matter, no argujJnent can carry Much discounting the interests of future generations on this basis For it depends qf Nor is that all that is wrong with the argujtnent. weight. ~ 1 ~.<f_.: ~ assumption that poorer contemporaries would be making (ullRJ_td/., h-n.a-hc '"/ J richer successors in foregoing such,i de.f5elopments as nuclear power. Tl,q•f ;1 1 il-.la/Jt,,,.1U H:O::f t f ~ a ~ I cl:e..vi?1tiprirn~ M th. f:>.I~,. .Ly rcdr.lul -Be:t,\ the sacrifice {(J/0..) lias , 1r cad, li @an ~ ~ hi¥/~ -tl,e., on sacrifices to f or 8'1. Qto @h es. t"/!"4;/ "r: toJ/IJ-f,444 the future 'i1:m:1 for the waste disposal problem to be ~ argument . Iii\ ""1 legitimately generations, it would have to be shown, what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will be, not just better U 11.,t J1' 011!.. C u.;,,;/,/e_. off, but so much better offAthat they can duly absorb the nuclear waste burden. A more plausible argument for discounting is d.i rectly in terms of opportunity costs. It is argued_, from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth much more than a dollar received in the non-immediate future (because the first dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is required to obtain equivalent monetary values, and so f~r efficient allocation of resources. Similarly it is argued, by virtue again of 'r/'~/,·s-.-l,~..... of monetary value, that compensation - which is what the waste problem is taken to cawii:a. to 71....r a few pennies set now than later. ~ costs much less_ economically ,1ov.)Q/" -- ,...... aside (e.g. in a trust fund)Ain the future, if need bev, will suffice to compensate eventually for any v,c. t,w>.f of remote radioactive waste leakage. There are, presently at least, in surmountable pract1cal _ _ difficulties about applying such discounting, e.g. how to determine appropriate future discount rates. A more serious objection is that �15 . applied generally, the argument presupposes , what is false, that compensatio n, like value, can always be converted into monetary equivalents , that people ~ncluding I those outside market frameworks) can be monetarily compensated for a variety of damages, including cancer and loss of life. There is no compensatin g a dead man, or for a lost species. In fact the argument presupposes neither part of which can succeed be represented , at all adequately it is not just /</ a double reduction that value cannot in general , -fa' /J,'K~~ monetarily, but (as against utilitariani sm) ,t -LJ..,.t constraints and obligations can not be somehow reduced to matters of value. It i s also presupposed that all decision methods, suitable for requisite nuclear choic e s,'!_--- - -~ are bound ~o apply discounting . This is far from so : indeed A Goodi~ argues that, on the do not allow discounting , and discounting only works in practice with expected utility rules (such as underlie cost-benef it and benefit-ris k analyses), which ,r,// are, he contends strictly inapplicabl e for nuclear choices (since aJncrt 1 pnl'>Si],1 f3 {,/,11.{f al f<j''1. a,t /'.,~,,/,/;#b J outcomes can be duly determirte1, in the way that application of the rules 1-0 requir es). 1/ contrary, more appropriate decision £~1¢s ,, As the f~e.ceid;nJ . arguments reveal, the discounting move often has the same result as the unconstrain ed position. If, for instance, we consider the cancer i example and reduce costs to payable compensatio n, it is evident that over a sufficientl y long period of time discounting at current prices would lead to the conclus ion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints . I n short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bi a s against future people is by the application of discount rates which are set in accord with the current e conomic horizons of no more than about 15 years~2/ and appli.cation of such rates would simply beg the question against the interests a nd rights of fu t ure people. Where there is certain future damage of a mo rally f o rbidden t ype, f or example, the whole method of discounting is simply inappl.icabl e, and its use would violate moral constraint s.~ Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from ca ses of c ert a in d a mage, comes from probability considerati ons. The distant future, it is a rgued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabiliti es are consequentl y lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.• But then if we take account of probabiliti es in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people; except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, much) less than those of present and must count for (very neighbourin g people where (much) higher probabj_lities are attached. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate f(Jture against a much lower probability of indetermina te �16. costs to an indeterminate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it cannot be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to obtain am:±E doubtful fU" t, i :b4. benefits for some present people, in f11(,i11i.1,~ c,HJcn.A,;;,. l';-of,Y~;l,7 or le the shape of the opportunity to). continue unnecessarily high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted ,)<such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. or l"isl.~JwiolilSuch a cost-benefitAapproach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned or to deal with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results. it would follow on such principles that it is permissible For example, for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any s1mple or general way from one party to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs on y - whi.ch are not susceptible to, a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted J~ J,!01-Ult;,... •F enenza, of nuclear energy, ltho attefl@J':=::f::fl=di-smiss the costs to future ,~~ # "41'- . ~'?f1¥=;ll,, d?,,-,ipQ/i,,. people~with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefHs. The limitations of transfei:_ point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear -- risk, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel or cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity -3. are also, to an overwhelming extent, those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also that of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or temporaJ.ly removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related to a person's extent of use. The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's {happiness) sums as a way ~f solvini moral. conflict between diff_e_r ent parties, and the . . - 1J.1 ,,. u/i'th:urty,- ~IJ-UJI--. NJ/t.J1 ~ O-? 'Hf/t• """~ aP/2~.i.-1-;- 1ntroduct1on of probabi.lity cons1derations.-l does not change the principles involved but merely complicates the analysis. One might further object to the probability argument that piobabilities involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes, and ~ �17. that the outcomes of some moral problems do not depend on a high level of f probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the train parable I reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important ones used by philosophers, economists and others to argue for the position that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of sep- aration, but frequently tangled up. priori Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalised uncertainty argument which runs as follows:- In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain -ft1Z'L:J about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreli.able,wootl; and highly A speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the X uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. crudely: More formally and One only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information. distant future. There is no reli.able information at present as regards the Therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. This first argument is essentially a variant on a sceptical argument in epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace 'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and the adjacent future and the present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly do act on the basis of such "unreliable" information, as the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels "uncertainty"; for sceptic-proof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. Consider again the train example. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is a significant �18 . in this sort of case. risk of harnt J It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and that the prospects of the passengers quite uncertain, the resolution of the problem is nevertheless clearly in favour But if we do not require of the so-called "speculative " and "unreliable". certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require for the future, episte.m ic standards which the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such a~ epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument, that whatever our obligations to the future, we cannot in practice theoretical take the interests of future people into account because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions on it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can be put alternatively this way:- If moral principles are, like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as "if every (action) x" , x has character h then x is wrong, for then what the argument claims is that we cannot ever obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obt.ain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action of the "It is wrong to do x" type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument be conceded. If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the future, will in practice not be applicable to obtain any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints on action. However the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the �~~ --t9-. argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as I to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point, which was noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be -f/,u.'fN-r I in a hundred years i n ~ names o r ~ footwear, or what praod1 of ice • • .._A'.~ cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from t h e ~ earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. Ill uncertainty argument should be rejected. For this sort of reason, the second The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we can ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. In particular there is not gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as~• eac. ~ eu,~ ~ ··from the train example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this { type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the def ects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to 0~1,.(t_ write off probable~ harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves emv ,< .loy both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the~hings that would c,.ffect us. But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are mora.lly committed to. Again we may �be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons of forever plugged into enjoyment of other machines. Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility like the sceptic who says that solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. etc. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as oppo s ed to a logical possibility. We can contrast with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilisation through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still does not ~ffect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer: that this app ears to be a ~ live possibility, and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm tu ..c tbeaa-:&-xam~ aiscussed earlier of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases before such actions could be considered admissible what would ?e required is 22 far more than a possibility, real or not - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be to protect themselves. ~tpected to apply �~/l,.. a..,,.L- a«'if The strategy of /tnost af rbes9 uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, I and may be brought out by looking yet again at the train example where the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the train may break down and they may all change to a different transport leaving the parcel behind, or the train may crash killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities of course, but there is no positive reason to believe that liC/t2- they are any more than that, that is they are n o t ~ possibilities. ~k- The ;\, strategy is to stress such bH~sid& possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the contai.ner will break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners' takin~ account of the passengers' welfare and the real possibility of harm from his parcel and thereby to excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real vossibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints. This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty of harm, or at least a very high probability of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not so. Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the indeterminacy of the future. In particular it is argued that the indeterminacy, for example with respect to the number and exact character of people at future times, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are ,:J$ '<>A, indeterminate and their interests unknown how, it is SloM!-d, can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by pr,Pblems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present -fu,-- Q ~11.,,y,.La.. ..,, I, and future people," wherf the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims f ) of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved byVignoring such factors. Nor are distributional problems as large and representative a cl'ass of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. can be conceded that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of It �the future will make co~flicts very difficult to resolve or indeed irresoluble - J a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e.g. the train example which is a conflict case of a type. In particular, there will bi~ many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. The crucial question which emerges is then: are there any features of future people which would disqualify them fro~ral consideration or reduce their claims to such below those of present people? Prima facie, The answer is : in principle None. ,. moral principles are universalisable, and lawlike, in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example. But universalisability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are capable of deali.ng satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e.g. those remotely located. those outside some select subgroup, such as (white-skinned) humans, etc. candidates The only for characteristics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, such as uncertainty and indeterminacy; ht1 1l, , . ~ we have argued 1 p: ai-Oia) it would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only present information). In particular/ they do not affect cases of the sort being considered, nuclear development, where highly determinate. or certain information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be harmed is not required, nor is certainty of damage. To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is not required: it is enough that the temporal position of a person cannot af feet his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideration ;i Zfj inversely, that it is without basis to discriminate morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this universalizahility, there are the same general obligations to future people as to the present; and thus there is the same ooligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy tf,1'1 Q.v. a. do not/\:krt: u s ~ of these obligations. If in a closely comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of �I harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people. Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion already tentatively reached, that proposals for nuclear development in the present and likely future state of technology and practices for future waste disposal are immoral. Before we consider (in section VII) the remaining escape route from this conclusion, through appeal to overriding circumstances, it is important to pick up the further case (which heavily reinforces the tentative conclusion) against nuclear development, since much of it relies on ethical principles similar to those that underlie obligations to the future, and since it too is commonly met by similar appeal to extenuating circumstances. V. Problems of safe nuclear operation: reactor emissions, and core meltdown. ethical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to future creatures. Just as remoteness in time does not erode obligations or entitlements to just treatment, neither does location in spa ce, or a particular gqsgraphical position. First of all, the problem of nuclear waste disposal raises serious questions of distributive justice not only across time, across generations, but also across space. Is one state or region entitled to dump its radioactive pollution in e,,- ,.q/Jjel'J another state's or region's yard? ,( When that region receives no due compensation (whatever that would amount to, in such a case~ and the people do not agree (though the leaders imposed upon them might)? The answer, and the arguments under- pinning the answer, are both like those already given in arguing to the tentative conc.lusion concerning the injustice of imposing radioactive wastes upon future people. But the cases are not exactly the same: USA and Japan cannot endeavour fl'I- cf to discount peoples of the Pacific in whose regions they propose to drop~ their ,a,ltdi;~ pollution in quite the way they can discount people of two centuries hence. (But what this consideration really reveals is yet another flaw in the idea that e ntitlement to just treatment can be discounted over time.) ! �' ~ '· i Eth~· c 1 i ssues of distr i bu tive j ustice, • as to equityI / ,:,J ~ J.._ /, ,tJ tc..id~,,..__ v J{ ~iv9ly=~=in ~ , also arise elsewhere in the assessment of nuclear development ; in particular, a s regards t h e treatment of those in the neighbour of reactors, and, tud rorb differently, as r~gards the distribution of (alleged) b~nefits Afrom nuclear power across ~ ~5' (The la t ter ques tion is t aken up ,\ a~ s ~~~ , especja] Jy , tb s Pev etty argument . ) ~ Weople livin g or working in the vicinity special costs and risks: f ~w{ffitrrf oslde, al ll rn ;i" a nuclear reactor are subject to firstly, radioactive pollution, due to the fact tha t reactors discharge radioactive ma terials into the air and water near the plant , and secondly catastrophic accidents, such a:; {steam) explosion of a reactor. ~ ,I/;.._ ~ question is whether such cos t s and risks can be imposed, with any ethical legi- timacy, on these people, who frequently have little or no say in their imposition, and who have mostly not been informed of any choices regarding the "risk/benefit -- tradeoffs" of nuclea r _technology. -:::)__ ( That they are so imposed, without local participation, indeed often without local input or awareness as with local opposition, reveals one part of the antidemocratic face of nuclear development, a part that nuclear development shares however with other large-scale polluting industry, where local participation and questions, fundamental to a genuine democracy/ of regional determination and popular sovereignty, are commonly ignored or avoided. .-:-,,, The "normal" ei 1ssion , during plant operation1 of low level rad~ ation carcinogenic and mutagenic costs. While there are undoubtedly costs, there r mains /,id,, substantial disagreement over theAnumber of cancers and precise extent of genetic damage induced by exposure to such radiation, over the local health costs involved. Under the Old Paradigm, which (illegltimotely ) permits free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the ethical issue directly raised is said to be: what extent of c~5cer and genetic damage, if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nuclear power, and under what conditions? m Under the Old Parad the issue is then translated into decision-theor etic questions, such as to 'ho · to e mploy risk/benefit analysis as a prelude to government regulation' and 'how t o ....1. �25. determine what is an acceptable level of risk/safety for the pub lic' .:ii } 3/ The Old Paradigm a t titude, ref~ted in the public policy o f s ome count r ie s that have such policies, i s t ha t the economic benefits conferred by allowing radiation emissions outweigh the costs of an increase in cancer and genetic damage. An example will reveal that such evaluations , which rely~ what appeal they have on a dubious utilitarianism, will not pass muster. It is a pity about Aunt Ethyl getting cancer, but it's nice to have this air conditioner working in summer. Such frequently trivial and rather inessential benefits, which may be obtained alternatively, e.g. by modification of houses, in no way compensate for the (a;~nf Y, of cance~ '---- The point is that the costs to one party 27 are not justifie~ '-.:,. especially when such benefits to other parties can be alternatively obtained a,-,{,...~ without such ~ awful costs.:. People, minorities, whose ,;.~;(a_, .Jro/ ~ within 50 miles of a nuclear plant. p().~M...11£; ,1711~, position isA compromised are thos\/ who live (Ehildren, for example, are in aAparticularly vulnerable position, since they are several times more likely to contract cancer through exposure than normal adults.) In USA, such people bear a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the population at l arge. ~i A notinegl 11ble percentage (in excess of 3% of those exposed for 30 years) o f ~ qJ'~c~ R@r~ t a? s&&-eh:e people 1 in the area will di~j for the sake of the majority who are 111,(.ctaii-J" 'I aailat.'@ffl benefitted byApower producti~n . ~e~~a ft~elear. Whatever charm t he argument from overriding benefits had, even under the Old Paradigm, vanishes once it is seen that there are alternative, and in several respects less expensive ~ ways/ of delivering the real benefits involved. There are several other tricks used in showing that the imposition of radiation t:Jt/~ or on minorities, most of whom havei\ no genuine voice in the location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serious losses, is quite (morally) acceptable. l~ One cheaper trick, deployed by the US Atomic Energy Corrnnission, is to suppose that it is permissible to double, through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) rqdiation that a population have received with apparently negligible consequences, the argument being that the additional amount (being "natural" level) is also likely to have negligible consequences. equivalent to the The increased amounts of radiation - with their large man-made component - are then accounted normal, and, f<-,f- i, l(e,,... c-ltt<..,cd. of course,,\ what is normal is morally acceptable. in this argument is sound. None of the steps Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no ill-effects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affect a person's well-being; and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger one will, under such conditions, not be. Finally, what is or has become normal, e.g . two murders or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptable. In fact, even the USA, which has strict standards by comparison with most other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits radiat i on emissions very substantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is worse than mere consideration of the standards wou'ld disclose. Furthermore , the �~------- -------- ----~-- -------- -------- -------- ---monitoring of the standards "imposed" is entrusted to the nuclear operators themselves, scarcely di.sinterested parties. Public policy is determined not so as to guarantee public health, but rather to serve as a 'public pacifier' while private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered~ While radioactive emissions are an ordinary feature of reactor operation, breakdown is, hopefully, not: an accident of magnitude is accounted, by official definition, an 'extraordinary nuclear occurrence'. But such accidents can happen, and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island) Y-Q If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water) 1flore acto rs, then the core melts and 'containment failure' is likely, with ~he result that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioactively contaminated. In the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident, property damages would exceed $17 billion and an area H,e size of Pennsylvania would be destroyed. Modern nuclear reactors are abo ut five times the size of the reactor for which these conservative US government figures are giveti' : the consequences of a similar accident with a modern reactor would accordingly b~Y~~eater still. The consigner in ri sking the lifes, well-being and property of the passengers on the train has acted i_nadmissibly. Does a government or govern~t-spon sored private utility act in tay that is anything other than much less responsible in siting a nuclear reactor in a community, in planting such a dangerous package on the community train. The answer will be No, if the analogy holds good and the consigners' action is, as we would ordinarily suppose, inadmissible and irresponsible. The proponents of nuclear power have in effect argued to the contrary, while at the same time endeavouring to shift the dispute out of the ethical ar€/1 and into a technological dispute as to means (in accordance with the Old Paradigm). It has been contended , firstly, what contrasts with the train example, that there is no real possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident. Indeed in the '11- influential Rassmussen report - which was extensively used to support public confidence in US nuclear fission technology - an even stronger, an incredibly strong, improbability claim was stated: namely, the likelihood of a catastrophic nuclear accident is so remote as to be (almost) impossible. The main argument for this claim derives from the assumptions and estimates of the report itself. These assumptions li ke the claim are undercut by nuclear incidents that came very cil:ose to accidents, incidents which reflect what happens in a reactor rather better than mathematical models. As with the storage of nuclear wastes, so with the operation of nuclear reactors, it is important to look at what happens in the actual world of technological limitations and human error, of waste leak.age and reactor incidents and quite possibly accidents, not in an ideal world far removed .from the actual, a technological �27. ( dream world where there is no real possibility of a nuclear catastrophe. In such an ideal n ucle a r wo r ld , where waste disposal were fool-proof and reac tors were accident-proof , things wo uld no doubt be morally different. But we do no t live in such a world. "" According to the Ra\ussen report its calculation of extremely low accident probabilities is based upon reasonable mathematical and technological assumptions and is methodological ly sound. This is very far from being the case. The under- lying mathematical methods, variously called "fault tree analysis" and "reliability as estimating techniques", are unsound, because they exclude .-1 "not credible" ,>Difl~;l,,9'?~ ~ possibilities or as branches t;o:1:t!il fl Ellffl "not significant" that are real .m:d" may well b'1. rt:i./f,04,( ~1cq1pen1 in the real world. \ It i.s the eliminations that are otherworldly. Infact the methodology and data of the report has been soundly and decisively criticized .Ji And it has been shown that there is a real possibili.ty, a notjpegligibJ.e probability, of a serious accident. It is contended, secondly, that even if there is a non-negligible probability of a reactor accident, still ibis acceptable, being of no greater order than risks of accidents that are already socially accepted. Here we encounter again that insidious engineering approach to morality built into models of an economic cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk assessment models, etc. Risk assessment, a sophistication of transaction or trade-off models, purports to provide a comparison between the relative risks attached to different options, e.g. energy options,which settles their ethical status. The following lines of argument are encountered in risk assessment a.s applied to energy options: (i) if option a imposes costs on fewe.r people thq.n option b then option a is preferable to optic+; (ii) option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths, injuries, etc.) which is less than that of option b, which is already accepted; therefore option a is acceptable. 3 f For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations is less than 1,r 1'-i l'Jp.,( ,-c.c.,',l.ci...fs ~ the likely number killed by cigarette smoking, which jjB accepted: so nuclear pqwer A stations are acceptable. A little refle c tion reveals that this sort of risk assessment argument involves the same kind of fallacy as ll!l!it transaction modek. It is far too simple--minded, and it ignores distributional and other relevant aspects of the context. In order to obtain an ethical assessment we should need a much fuller picture and we should need to know at least these things:- do the costs and benefits go to the same parties; and i1·he person who undertakes the risks also the person who receives the benefits or primarily, as in driving or cigarette smoking, or are the costs imposed on ot e parties who do not benefit? It is only if the parties a r e the same in the case of the options compared, and there are no such distributional problems, that a comparison on such a basis would be valid.i '})This is rarely the case, and it is not so in the case of risk assessments �Secondly, does the person incur the risk as a result of an of energy options. 28. activ.Lty which be knowingly unclcttakes in a situationw-iere he has a reasonable choice, knowing it entails the risk, etc., and is the level of risk in proportion to the level6f the relevant activity, e.g. as in smoking? Thirdly, for what / reason is the risk imposed: is it for a serious or a relatively trivial reason? risk that is ethically acceptable for a serious reason may not be ethically acceptable for a tr:Lvial reason. Both the arguments (i) and (ii) are often A employed in trying to justify nuclear power. The second argument (ii) involves the fallacies of the first (i) and an additional set, namely that of forgetting that the health risks in the nuclear sense are cumulative, and ) 'n bhw ey ;i s g f:" P'J;ct'.) pce i,1 e~ already '°fc' not A oo high.16 high if ~ 1 The maxim "If you want the benefits you have to accept the costs" is one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefits then you have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is another and very different thing. It is a widely accepted d/' l).,c-~ ~ flJ,;<d ,;k~4 .~ vr4..a) I fl/rotl,7 ~~ kr 1/1 / moc.tal plfinci'ple,\ that one' is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs I r7n of a significant kind arising from an activity which benefits oneself onto other This parties who are not involved in the activity and are not beneficiaries~ transfer principle is especially clear in cases where the significant costs iq;lude an effect on life or ~ealth or a ,risk thereof, a~d where the benefit to j<2,c-(kUt , «J,•1 ,r ·~ ,k ,-,1,-.r.:.. ,riz.._~, t.4,/,:K/~7',-,t ~ ~ q:.:rLc-1- . the benefit ting party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature,.,\ { Thus ,tone is not usually entitled to harm, or risk harming, another in the process of benefitting CIA.en(~ Suppose, forA example, we consider a village which produces, as a result of an i.ndustrial process by which it lives, a nox~us waste material which is expensive and difficult to dispose of and yet creates a risk to life and health oneself. f if undisposed of. Instead of giving up their industrial process and turning to some other way of making a living such as farming the surrounding countryside, they persist with this way of life but ship their problem on a one-way delivery ,Oil ·/J..0- ~ ) service Ato the next village. The inhabitants of this village are then forced to face the problem either of undertaking the expensive and difficult disposal or ol,e_ i'1M,).; 1(4. e1/Tl~L. ~ ~ Cdt'-/.:/4r,h . process or of sustaining risks to their own lives and healthA Most of us would see this kind of transfer of costs as. morally unacceptable. From this arises a necessary condition for energy options: that to be morally acceptable they should not involve the transfer of significant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, do not use the energy source or do not benefit correspondingly from its use. Included in the scope of this /trl" gA'-, condition are future people /§.~~~~ B ~eeiji~ a ~~~~m~aE~:iic=;m ;;~~i;E~~ 1 The distribution of -hut rd~ future generations (those of the next villages~; costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. o~to non-benef is one of its most of certain widespread and serious fonns of objectionable moraL£eatures- ;-- - - /4' ..;~<fi'nt ~ ,u/4.v tfi/1_ ,.,c,,r r«-,,.4/ .......,,_,, f"u<H;f I l4'(!,,r) \ iaries is a characteristic =&, 7''7, ~ ,;_ ~ __../4;,, - 7:.(,/,_.., ~ v / __ - •_ __ �·~-~---- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ---~ ,. It is a corollary of the condition that we should not hand the world on to our successors in substantial ly worse shape than we received it - the transmissio n principle. For if we did then that would be a significant transfer of costs. (The corollary can be independen tly argued for on the basis of certain ethical theories.) eJpoc,"ct lly ru,clc>u- //)CL-; • Other social and environmen tal risks and costs of nuclear development ;~ The problems already discussed by no means exhaust the environmen tal, health and safety VI. risks and costs in or arising from the nuclear fuel cycle. The full fuel cycle includes many stages both before and after reactor operation, apart from waste disposal, namely mining, milling, conversion, enrichment and preparation , reprocessing spent fuel, and transportat ion of materials. Several of these stages involve hazards. Unlike the special risks in the nuclear cycle - of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionable material, and of the further proliferati on of nuclear armaments - these hazards have p~rallels, if not exact equivalents , in other very polluting methods of generating power, e.g. 'workers in the uranium mining industry sustain 'the same risk' of fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry 1 1'f Furthennore , the various (often serious) hazards encountered in working in some sector of uranium fabrication should be differently viewed from those resulting from location, for instance from already living where a reactor is built or wastes are dumped. For an occupation is, in principle at any rate, chosen (as is occupationa l relocation) , and many types of hazards incurred fr/working with radioactive material are now known in advance of choice of such an with where one already lives things are very different. The uranium miner's choice of occupation can be compared with the airline pilot's choice, whereas the Pacific Islander's 11 fact" of location cannot be. The social issue occupation: of arrangement s that contract occupationa l choices and opportuniti es and often at least· ease people into hazardous occupations such as uranium or tin or coal mining (where the risks, in contrast to airline piloting, are mostly not duly compensated ), while very important, :i.s not an issue newly produced by nuclear associated occupations . Other social and environmen tal problems - though endemic where large-scale industry operates in societies that are highly inegalitari an and include sectors that are far from affluent - are more intimately linked with the nuclear power cycle. Though pollution is a common and generally undesirable component of largescale industrial operation, radioactive pollution, such as uranium mining for instance produces, is especially a legacy of nuclear developmen t, and a specially C-,t.o ,,._......., eef, :i.i.lef undesirable one, as~ rectificatio n eosb~ for dead radioactive lands and waterways reveal. Though sabotage is a threat to many large industries, so that modern factory complexes are often guarded like concentrati on camps (but from us on the �dire conse quen ces, of a diffe rent outs ide), sabot age o a nuc ear react or can have (cons ider again the effec ts of orde r of magn itude from most indu stria l sabot age more dubio us enter prise s such as core meltd own) . Though theft of mate rial from at large and can assis t terro rism , muni tions works can pose threa ts to popu latio ns probl ems of the same orde r as no theft s for alleg edly peac eful enter prise s pose produ ces mate rials which so theft of fissi onab le mate rial. No othe r indu stry explo sives . No othe r indu stry is, read ily perm it of fabri catio n into such mass ive to sum it up, so vulne rable on so many front s. , in part becau se of its long and In part to ~ ; ; , . ; ; : ; ~ ~ ~ ~ r a b i l i t y , the nucle ar indu stry is subje ct conti nu ing asso ciati on with milit ary activ ities ainly given their scale ) run to, and enco urage s, seve ral prac tices which (cert tiesy Th ese ~e secre cy, coun ter to basic featu res of free and open socie ial polic e and guard force s, restr ictio n of infor mati on, form ation of spec espio nage , curta ilme nt of civil liber ties. / 'l given extra ordin ary Alrea dy ope rator s of nucle ar insta llati ons are backg round and the te stiga powe rs, in vetti ng empl oyees , to inve fami lies and their of activ ities not only of emplo yees but also them selve s ons llati some times even of their frien ds. The insta sens ibili ties. sh become armed camp~ which espe ciall y offen ds Briti creat e d a 1976 of The U.K. Atom ic Energ y (Spe cial Cons table s) Act it made ons and spec ial armed force to guard nucle ar insta llati ority 1' answ erabl e ... to the U.K. Atom ic Energ y Auth If\ th,_ µ.• ;-fud K~~~fh ar worse in West Germ any, presa ge along with nucle These devel opme nts, and ,-\ anti- demo crati c soci eties . That devel opme nt .i ncrea singl y auth orita rian and litiui/ :conse quen ces tells heav ily again st it. nucl ear devel opme nt appe ars to force such' ,/i.~tdi't-... A conne ct1.on of the by ly tical poli :lslted inia:i: er furth is Nucl ear devel opme nL t ethic al ques ti?ns conc ernin g nucle ar powe r with nucle ar war. It is ~&te -',tha 4 Of'}'4ff'; . unde r any fiea, justi is war ar nucle a nucle ar war - for exam ple, whet her are disti ngui shab le from those circu msta nces , and if so what circu msta nces er, the sprea d of nucle ar powe r is conc ernin g nucle ar powe r. Undo ubted ly, howev [tl~Jfc -,C,ltt nucle ar war and so, to that exten t, ~inc re~i ng the techn ical means for engag ing in ,~ c.Aq,,,_ ceJ ef 1 Since nucle ar wars are ,fleJ de"') f'41' neve r the oppo rtuni ty for 1 nuc1 ear engag emen t. e-;(4vry J , / ~ a.r~«'../~ ~"'1 '~/e .. ,,t,uclo f¥ c.riu-1" CU'-11. " the"' lesse r of'm ajor evils ~Jhe eprea d bes~ at are but s, good tive posi le acco untab ty for / ~dc/a .-.,e,, -, 1 of nucle ar powe r acco rding ly expan ds the oppo rtuni o/~ ~ /Z/ 7 r ;Z_ cbhJ,1 04-r/ u.--, ,..<. .M/~ ; ➔/~) 1~ a~(/ -- -- -- -- ! - - -- -- -,77,._, ~ ~ t,-m k~/e ~~~ LIIL :I'., ~ 70-...___/- 1 /4tY'..-r ,,. ,,"/2._v ,,,_,,o,µ;..~&_ I' ~ll ~ <~~ '- / --/_ ~ I -~ ~~ / ~ 4--t'/o ~c../ C..IY'C- I'-..,._ ~ ....w./ C1-j, ~ / ~~~ W-r C-L- r•l~~ «./c; ,_ di../-<_ ~ ........,, ~/., _ / c-.b To ~ ~,, ~ ~ C.,-1,,, __- r ;, , �30.1 many. They are firstly technical, that it is a relatively straightforw ard and inexpensive matter to make nuclear explosives given access to a nuclear I power plant, secondly political, that nuclear engagements on<~ inJf,ntf~u likely to esculate and that those who control (or differently are likely to force access to) nuclear power plants do not s.hrin k from nuclear confrontati on and are certainly prepared to toy with nuclear engagement (up to " S'fr-c1.feeiic v "tla,ut nuclear strikes; ), and thirdly ethical, that wats invariably have immoral consequence s, such as massive damage to involved parties, however high sounding their justificatio n is. Nuclear wars are certain to be considerabl y worse as regards damage inflicted t har1 any previous wars (they are likely to be much worse than all previous wars put together), because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, and the extent of spread of their radioactive effects, and because of the expected rapidity and irreversib ility of any such confrontati ons. The supporting considerati ons are, fourthly, drawn from decision theory, and -----------are designed to show that the chances of such undesirable outcomes is itsclf unde si i- able. The c or e arguement is in brief this (the W"J"~.wt will be in section :m:I) :- Energy choice between alternative options is a case of decision making under uncertainty , because in particular of the JN.If Utt.UrffJt~fi'es involved in nuclear developmen t. In cases of this type the 1"rlt•c':-iov/ appropriate procedure is to compare worst consequence s of each alternative , e. /c.J,orP>lt>A A ' to r e_Je-cL . those alternative s with tht ~-, --the bs~t (the roaxiro m rule) , f.llCl'tf:" ~ of these worst consequence e-nd select J II The nuclear alternative has, in particular because of the) p,.o ssibility of a nuclear war, the WotJC and is according 1a particularl y unde$itable alternative . wo1"Jt "' . ( ~ ,i it ,'l, /4 /A- 4.//t'dJ' (l,- (fAt_~; d/6;-,rf ~ ~ d,.'£1/ ~d~ .JIM,;,,_ 1 d:L 6e-fC w_"o/- r,?t/7/UI~~). «-/~~ / n.:.__.. W✓ ~ �I tPI.Ccn/4.J~ :.::n:::.t. :. aee-=o-=-l~o.s;gi.::i:..:c::a:.:l::_.:b::..:a::.:s=-e=-"'=-c,_:::._o..::f_..::.n:::u:.::c:.:l::.!e:.::a~r~d~e=-v.!..e:::..:::.l::::.01::p!!:m~e :, t=.,;h~e=--=I= · _a_r_g_u_m_e_n__t_~,,.....a.:. :n.:. ;d:,4-i ~,-JV_I_I_.__C_o_n_f_l_i_c_t_ ~ ~~ ~) r Jct ,,MCkv ~ ~ , ~ .~~ ✓/4.- ~ ~ : ; ; ~ ~ r' ~ 7~ , v--0"~7 7 ~~~/, r ou7,fdL{_ , ,,_,,.,,~/,,_ /-c,-?"" ) As /.,,,_. /7~7 ~ 7 1 ~ ~ 7Zr p-'&.-4, 7-/ ~ ¼ A<L ~ '"-;fo- .,_,~=-.:.__ ~ already observed, the consigner's action cannot be justified by purely economisti c arguments , such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village woul be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. The transfer Iffiinciple on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to �f 31. For this r eason t he economistic argumen t s whi ch are t hos e mo s t commonly advance d under the Old Paradigm to promote nuclear develo pment - e . g . ch apness, efficiency, profitabili ty for electricity unilities, and the need the nuclear case . otherwise for un comfortable chan ges such as restructurin g of employment, i nves t ment and consumption - do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an Even if these economistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct - j_t will be contended that most of them are not - the arguments ) h as to . .- ;-,'d~er1.ves · h it,\ ~h ic f rom w . . · (like t h e ut1· 1 1tar1an1sm . wou ld f a1· 1 b ecause economics acceptable one . operate within the framework of moral constraints , and not vice versa. What do have to be considered are however moral conflict arguments, that is /'~} arguments to the effect that, unless the prim.a facie unacceptabr e~ alternative is taken, some even more unacceptabl e alternatice is the only possible outcome; and will ensue. For example, in the train parable, the consigner may argue that his h,J action is justified because unless it is taken~ village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justificati on as this wou~ be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstanc es. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing ~ present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, /\. both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arglllll.ents crucially on the presentatio n of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternative s (or at least practical alternative s) and upon showing that the only :is based alternative s to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some pratical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument - for "j 11~~ case it turns out that the -1ril1:agers have another option e xample, if in the t~:~~r: ) ~ to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living is some othe r way - then the argwnent is defective and cannot readily be patched. Just . such a suppression of practicable alternative s has occurred in the argument designed to show that the alternative s to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentatio n of false dichotomies . A first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of indusFailure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemploymen t and poverty in the industriali sed trialised countries. nations . �1 32. J The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use.~ "'°The argument that nuclear energy i1needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy~ both politically and econom- ically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, but creates negligible local employment, and depends .for its feasibility upon, what is largely lacking, established electricity transmission systems and back-up facilities and sufficient electrical appliances to plug into the system. Politically it increases forei¾ dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for lt/,zc change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem. The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of the people of the third world does not of course mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, · their rulers, the westernised and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organised, and wanted often for military purposes. It is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. The ooverty argument is then a fraud. the poor. Nuclear energy will not be used to help Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and t he practical option of developing other energy sources~ alternatives some of which offer far better prospects for helping the poor. It can no longer be pretended that there is no alternative to nuclear development: indeed nuclear development is itself but a bridging, or stop-gap, procedure on route 1~1 to solar or1 £usion developme nt. And there are various alternatives: coal and other fossil fuels, geothermal, and a range of solar options (including aAi<J.1fiM.r ) eti~L._01,i:/j,:,,-;._ as well as narrowly solar, wind, water ami tidal power)1 ' A " <t.,,(C:...uf~... Despite the availabiity ~~ . of alternatives, it may still be pretended that nuclear development is necessary for affluence ~( what will emerge is that it is advantageous for the power and affluence of certain select groups )-: ~ .)uch an assumption really underlies part of the poverty argument, which thus amounts to an Q.la.bcn'~-l,;;,,.,, trickle-down argument (much favoured within the Old Paradigm setting). argument runs:affluence. Affluence inevitably trickles down to the poor. For the _si,,,}:,~-l-,{v1.t.d. Therefore nuclear First, the argument does not on its own show anything specific about nuclear power2: is of the Nuclear development is necessary for / continuing and increasing) development benefits the poor. for 'nuclear'. . ~2 ,,,,7t ~~4 for j_t works equally well if 'energy' It has also to be shown, what the JI • rsnd M,<J(t major argument will try to claim, that nuclear development is unique among energy �33. alternati ves in increasin g affluence . The second assumptio n, that affluence ( inevitabl y trickles down, has now been roundly refuted, both by recent historica l data, which show increasin g affluence (e.g. in terms of GNP averaged per capita) coupled with increasin g poverty in several countries , both developin g and developed , and through economic models_, which reveal how "affluenc e" can increase Jt without redistrib ution occurring -_J Another major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set of supposedl y overridin g and competing obligatio ns to future people . We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutio ns which our culture has developed . Unless our high-tech nology, high energy industria l society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutio ns and tradition s will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essential ly that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilizat ion will go out.4J Future people will be the losers. The lights-go ing-out argument does raise questions as to what is valuable in our society, and of what characte ristics are necessary for a good society. But for the most part these large questions , which deserve much fuller The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely uncritica l position with respect to present high-tech nology societies , apparentl y assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable. It assumes that technolog ical examinati on, can be avoided. society is unmodifia ble, that it cannot be changed in the direction of energy conservat ion or alternati ve (perhaps high technolog y) energy sources without It has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of energy -· such as nuclear and only nuclear power is alleged to { ..._v-.,, •sf.t - collapse. are essential to maintain this whole. These assumptio ns are hard to accept. The assumptio n that technolog ical society's energy patterns are unmodifia ble is especiall y so - after all it has . survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technolog ical restructu ring and consumpti on modifica tion. If western society's demands for energy are totally unmodifia ble without collapse, not only would it be committed to a pro gram of i.ncreasin g destructi on, but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would very likely, as a consequen ce of this destructi on, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contempo rary society. There is also difficult y with the assumptio n of uniform valuablen ess; but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain existing high-tech nological society and its political institutio ns , but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political institutio ns which are needed to maintain those valuable things. While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumpti on centrally controlle d is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to arguethat it �.... ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --~- ----34-. ( is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence, for instance from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable . There is good x·eason i~ fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical chan1e in these directions is independen tly desirable , as we should argue, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at leas;, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-goin g-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of well-being is required to consume less evergy than a \ present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of asstili1ption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.~ What the nuc~ear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilisatio n, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganz a. In fact there is good reason to think that, fa r from the high energy society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy is obtained by nuclear fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralised , controlled and cons 1.At'1f10"' garrisoned, capital- and expertise-i ntensive ener gy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchmen t of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source , whether capitalist or bureaucrati c, can exert enenormous powe r over the political system and over people's lives, even more Such a society would, almost inevitably tend to become authoritari an and increasingl y anti-democ ratic, as an outcome, among other things, of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation. ~ than they do at present. Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations some of the worst aspects of our society - the consumerism , alienation, destruction of nature, and latent authoritaria nism - while many valuable aspects, such as the degre e of political freedom and those opportuniti es for personal and collective autonomy whic h exist, would be lost or diminished: political freedom, for example, is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagenc e. the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumabl 1, But it is not that we have some obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternative s, : l?a,#1-0.'t\..t...G-- alternative socia;Aand political choices, which do not involve such unacceptabl e consequence s are available. The alternative to the high technology- nuclear option 1 Ii- c,/~e/4,,._ ~ /4 f ettl..i,,- fl.a,. u/4jr/iP- "f- "- ~ is not a retturn to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but~ the development of a'tlJ,ernative technologie s and lifestyles which offer far greater scope for the li).,j· c-o,y( /'IWQ.r rr ' ~#a-r, maintenance and further development of whAt . is valuable in our society than the The lights-goin g-out argument, as a moral highly centralised nuclear option. ~ �/;,. conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a fa l se dichoto-y. r fJ.J,.., I( J:r._,._ Th us the Aescape route/, the appeal to moral conflict aua to t he appeal t o 1 fu ty, ~ closed. If then we a pply - as we have argued we s hould - t he s ame l. J standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the presen t, the conclusion that large~-~sca le nuclear development is a crime agains t the f uture is inevitable. 1 from reactor Closed also, in the same way, are the escape routes to other argumentst:IAtt Ji> <>'l ;'${1~ ma(/_ ~wn J radiation emissions, Aetc:::::t for · ~ / nuc ~ development as morally unacceptabl e, for saying that it is not only a Acrime against the distant future but also a ~ ~rime against the present and immediate future. In sumJ nuclear development is morally unacceptabl e on several grounds. A corn--o llary is that only political arrangement s that are morally unacceptabl e will · suppor_t th.e i(1!pending nuclear _future . of future people not tf'.I J ;,; I discounted (in contrast to the temporally - limited utilitariani sm ~"'of_ n,,ia,-k-4!.t - ~~economic theory)J and that serious costs and risk~ to health and life.cannot admiss ~ ly be simply transferred to uninvolved parties ( h ~ I /4- /4 ~1~ a-<<h'-,::4,~c..:.,__ o.;rr,llc,;.._.)f'c,d /o / / , , / ). 7 CI//C-1~ e a{_ &, N- t-f"/<7/2#;,__, ~~ ~~ LL ,, ~ ~ /~ ~ "°''f"(JI{ will now be outlined whichAshow that even within the confines of the Old Paradigm, choosing the nuclear future is not a rational choice . ..Jl: Large-scale nuclear on &,<. cc,,//,,,_.,,,;,, h-4111, development is not just something that Mppens, it requires,.\ an immense input of capital and energy. , J,.j ,:_ .~J.-..r~ ,,.,;_,R.J .J""11 ~-.,,&./ 7'iN/ t>h- ? ~ /-7,._ rt..-JJu..7~-.',- /4- '.,..... ~ o//-,.;?.,/ ~ /;: ,J''"'e"' eccJnom,'c__ /~t:'tJJ-rl,-~« ~ - ;t,4 r r/4'-Ntr/ been i nvested in nuclear .fiH1on '4~ .-Utti,.r, ,r ~ -d'M.r J ~? Admittedly so much capital has already research and development, :i..n marked contra t )I to othe~rival sources of powes that t hert is strong political incentive top f1'7 - as distinct fromAreason s for further capital and energy inputs. ~ ~ /(,v;,~..,. 6-4'C t¾t aff_ ,,,1 ~ IU- '1 /'t~ /&J 7~ / t:1/1). ... "'--.f 11<11f4.., /4-:J~vf_/J _/ l ~ f.,..,._r), q /l~ ~~,:as;-~ /<ff"" /J~ (~~6t;..._ ) /'~a.. o.u~•~,._•~/.c~ -~ ~k / I ~-.:..,,Lc.1 ,-•.A-e/ 1/ tL/t,.,.f ~ d, ,Af'.._:,:! .,>V°L / ~~ ( _J ~~ /4.l()~J/ > ~ ~k ;_ r/~ / ~C--, /nrv-7 ~ ,..~~,,._~ .- ('c;.. rr.;-/ trv/4.,;_/ wt~ o/ ...-? ' ~ a/~ ~4-t.d ,, <~CU'~ /CJ-u_J,./ ~ ~. �The main argume£~~~an economic growth argument, upon which variat~S , re played., is the following version of the lights-going-o ut argument (with economic . e~ / growth duly standing in for ll'late•oal wealth, and Afor what is valuable!):Nuclear power is necessary to su.stai.n economic growth. Economi c growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e.g. to increase the size of the t:,'IU{ c·o,,,ae,cf,,l( /ocip,/ k/!Mff, , , , ~ f()'f" f'~ J to-1 postpone reJistribution problems,/\ etc.). Therefore nuclear power is desira.ble ~ The first premiss is part of US energy policj~ and the second premiss is suppli ed by standard economics textbooks. Ja U>'t~ fr C(,a<~ A/~{ 1~! M ~k. t~ -1<>c~JL But both premisses are ~~<IL (U_ - - J L u.LJ/~/~ 7!d. .,,('°7 O</?'V 0d U,#\.r/Jo./ (2..-<~~c...·c-- I/ f-7 __ -~ '2-?·e--rt.-,hL' c./~ ~ c..... /e_/ ~ ~A;-,..,,rc.-,,..~ -I' CUI/I ~o(_ ,.KtL- c,;,l~il/~C!- , I 7 · / More to the since the second premiss is an assumption of the dominant paradigm, the first {tltK. !t(J (IQ~/,,, ( or rather · an appropriate,{ restatement of it ) fails even on Old Paradigm For of course nuclear power is not necessary given that there are other, perhaps e:=-1:.I,~ alternatives. N-.e,./41" elaboration of the /)tPwt--Y ptemiss out as 'most efficient', etc . 1',s Je.feviltl The premiss usually l:.j,..1.. ~t:.e;nOMfCtf :A //y b~--f:: . is s,ome "'-'AY i.Q ,&to--t;t:<11'\ 4!<:.e>;,c:>111tc.. growth, 'economically best' being filled 'cheapest', 'having most favourable 'cost' benefiti-ratio ~--_..,, 1 > Unfortunately for the argument, and for nuclear development schemes, nuclear po er is none of these things decisively , unless a good deal of economic cheating (easi..4 to do) ~ I 1 I ~is done. - .,,/ ~ L, / / ~~t,.L( U~l-r-u- &w /1~~&-1 ~ pu.u.. Ya,1 q(v ~ G-?'d ~ / /I(!/) 1 ~ c_ ~/c.-,1\1 IP~ _ ,,1 / / .. . ~ <t~ ~/Mf?.--7 . / ';;!C.,,,-17 I ...u. ·~ <AJ7?4; e:,r<,- ,Y?/·.u.//u-{ ~ p/C4t.-,t✓// .A'./ , C-tt.../lt..?-Vc~ Yo t'/~ ~~-,,e: d-::;F ,;,er~ ,_._.l.<-//4....:.. I <er ,;;t, ,·, /2 1rd('('n-4c one! 1 , d k,,£~~~ ,,~ /2,. ~/~/-(",., J ~ ~ ,·/ ~ ~~ :/-ru<.. /1/'C./'__,__°'.J~J /1' /4 /4_ t-U?<.,J~ . ;Z / t' Le ;/~1 c~/vr ~~ 1r ~ / e(' e:4A/~ r"' 4e 1/ ~~ ~/ L..-7 ~urr~u<6 d,(_ 't1'~ c-~ e- ~ c,,-e_ Ju~ui-.fw J-e-.J ) c- ~e./ / ,./4~... ~~ c:Mh -,,,,C- f1 td:-, ~.-.. ~ ) 7 c//#'; ....:, ~ . , ,,,,,,,J e,. ,4_ ~ c"~ /21/c 7 -~ ~~ /~7 r7 A~ ~/c1-;fy,, ~L-r/77 ~ ~ - ; , , ~&?Yrn>~ c/4Jrpc,d , // �75t /:-,,', rf ; ~ 7J-I' <'Mh? ~ ~ J~'£ /&WL ~ ~7 ~ ~ 7r~,5 a:_ ) , , -- ., <. r'/~ ;I = cy~ r~~ ,;.,I~ f';;;.;:,t. ~ , /~,q. u7·c.4-I tvut' £..Lr 0 CL-r'U-~ ,J'-,..A }? ~&~/ ·cl- 7~/A_ 7✓~~- ~~;~7 ,£ b e r;rf;:;r- 7 .,.;,., 7 ; ~ /p..nLv,._a__ 1rLvf / du/2AJ-C. /;-<l~ ✓t/ ~-~e,( £-4 U-..,,(_A /.,:., ,,,,,_..,_ ..,._/ / f~ I ftJ / ~ ~, &g f-~ a&-c~7 d/2-~ ~o7,l ~ c~} ea: b.-~',uvr} ~: ~ ~ ~ J,& -17 7 ~/'~. r/~~ •'= 7 c~ /?~_, /'¼/ 7 Zz; we_~ ~ 7 2 I U.:- . Z:._ ~/.,_;~ ~ ~-c G>.-r e,_/ '• ~ Ii.~~ ,$"~ , 7i-, 7~ 27, ~ ~: a. "' 1 ?~~ '\. /~~-«-.:/~ ~ /'~-d 4, /..__ ~ ~~ n'~ ._, ,4,___:,~ _ n /'~._, J ~ 4 t ~ c/"➔ ~ A;f-7 ~ ,_,,_.;_,, ~ /'~--UW ~/ 4,..-,f c,.,;,,t ,_ 7 1/4...f. • . 7~~) ~r-'d /(c/l/Y/~/ ~ i,,~ u~ ,,{e_ /~ /'~w-<_ / . r--1,f.,..~_pAf ~u&.,/ ~ - ( --t<~</4-, £.,_,UA-'-<._ /- / /er-iv d_ o/,,~ T 1 70 1 7 7, <e/1 ~ l= e:., 7' c.. .#-,.../ ~~ ;~~~ ;;t AM~~/' {1,.../4 ~ rA~ ~ 7 '!f ✓ u,,v:,;- / ~ t✓.c✓z/,7 ~~/4-- ~ (/ <~ / 7:fJ '7, ,-". ~/er-/(;/, £4 ~ ,,_ ___,___ /~u-c.~k'L-T~~~ 1 Uvy;,C-, t~ d 7➔ o../4J a. r/-.e.« lo - ;ff~. ./-,c,;. r.:.. r 1 7 "--7 /c,_.(a,... ,7 ceryr, ~ ?-Z -r-4 c.4-'~ <7 ,,___ 7,2 ?>?P 27{,~ //-2{_ ~a...._ • d ,...__ ---7~~ ,/ 7 ...,;,~ / �/! I ~~-~7 i/4f £~1 (/ ~ / ~"7 -7 /4r r ignore waste cos ts on the quite . in'.)idmissib It. } ground that it is not known currently what the costs involved are. But even using actual waste handling costs (while wastes await storage) is enough to show that /~'-" /./t,.,. v-< re-.elll.,t-t ~ /t4--i4- I!:. is preferable to nuclear. ~'-"'"' c~h , ,~L 7,.-~;.__1/ *;7'_..c ,4---.1,____ . _:__ ro ~ ~1-if!' coal i~ C:,,,,(A /--0v-r~ 1 ~rew- - /~ ,1,0; ,,.,w-!£~ u,/k-,~-/2~ r «--, ,;.., G.•~ C/',._1- / ~ d;<--.n,-d '"'--:•~ a ~/ ( > ~ , b ~ /:V~ e~....._._7"',~ ~ rc: ~ - ·-~ J~1/?/ ,·Ut" ,i...-r~7 a-~'r ------/_7·--- r?/4 /~~ ~ ;L/~ /4 71.J~' ~/e--1, ~ I -~/ �dA,,ri,/,f""'-•J>~t grsm is ~Nuclear rAA,{,~_f.u not economical_,it ll.l'0'ud:tl see111lr it has been ~ c..lQ.N"" "' going ~ t through its ebd.ovs economic#). viabili~y, but by massive public of several types :# 9-</ l a,/_,p.;fi.. ~1~ \ C< _:., u~n:,.~'/~{k_ ,' ~~--o-~~ ..2.. At:Lc--&a-, /J/4i7 /ful-,u/ '7f::,c7,t' --..... o~,,_f";_ ;!,~ heavily subsidized esearch and development, through the Price-Anderson Act, which sharply limits both private and public li.ability, i.e. which i.n effect provided th~ ub s :i.dy ~ 1 king corporate nuclear development economically feasible,~ through 0 overnment agreement to handle all radioactive wastes. / ~ ~-/c,J~~ 0~ I ~;,_err /7' ~ ~ 4~7~ ~/'~ r d/?l' A ~ z:, ~ CLAI ,P~ .... < . •. (1/4(:f:>t cP-, C ~ ~7 ~ a./Ww/ ~ A-~ • r~Lc~ .c.-, t7r/~~ ~o4 /o/ I ;1., ✓/I ~tJ4 , ~ ~ ~ /v~ / f ~ /4- 7~ /4 ~ ~ 7f''4u/ ~/4r-..v o/('<;~~ J /j ,~ ~ do..-.l /;-~--zz' ~ c..o_ ~I ~~;7 I~ •~t,L- / ~76._ ~ . 1r:-:..-- ~ ~ ~) ~ ~ ~ /~~ 4.µ>:z:" a - , < ~ (tA.t{<L.. ~I e«--Y~ nkv4+fv•, -r-C: / ~ d✓ ~/ ~ ~ /J-J~ ~I~/. J 74-'r /,.a-~-- ~ ~ /~d~ / ~ er<~ ('(fi1_'717 (1.-c~ ~ ~ I c:;f eo.c-/1/~ ____7._, £.7 r ;1:£. /"",~-<~ '-- r ?71~ 1,r1c.y-'/ ~r ~7 -~ ~ry ~/ r/4-;r /~7 ' ~ -~, r;:/1~7 k /4.7:.._ r)U ~?TJ:;i; _.£§;~~I:~ ~ff?t,~✓:: CL-+-~./~ ftµ~ nsurance j c/4 r-71 c~ /jf!.. ;/ ~ ~4o...// I ~ 7,.4:-r...:.r ~ r~ 7✓~ ,I /4✓ " �- - --' �• �~~ /7 , ,__ £_ /~ U/t,e- c/f. tr I A -r4 e~<~. dL cZ...,~~_, r ,-K <M'-71 -:::z J ~/n~ ,,__.,.....,._,,.,,t. /4,_,,-- ~~ /~'- ,/4 r/.. ~ ~ ~ ~ /fe-"f ~ ~~7 ~A-/1 ,__~~... fl /j =-=. ~/4.,,_ /Jv /~ ~ i ~ '1.d ilc. / c~ /tr V4'l, ./'£u..,,· ✓~ ~ 7?f;-t"' I~ ~ V-k &-<.'-4 ~ ' ~~ ~ ,er .~e_..,.-(r'~ ! ~ ;:1:, ;. of eY~) /2-"I!---.. a.-. c.,,_.. ~ c6'1 ~,_r?'~.&_) 1 ~ k - I ~ , ~-C.A-/,,<U-. /.¢' I I J ;?b,,~ 7"4" ~ 7,,..,,.,, -ro 7¼'_.,___ ' <~?f~ ~:J~ 7 /e/Y 1-¥~ .. ;z .~~1~; ~ o/~~~",,:e_ 7 /-'-' ,,,,.f" ;, /\-4J},,!.4/'' f t1/<L ~'L / t(!c /1"' ,<;, /4;;/, c-e,...-/-e. ~~pl,(!_/ ~k /e,/d ,~li/'7 ,.-.,-.~ ;_, , ,,,. 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"''. ~~ a ,,,.A..,;_.~. d.,;, ~ �.b-, ·._:h AoJ,I,. r. t,~, 37 //1.d' The ~aradigm does not, it j/i«,f 7~r,) _sustain the nuclear jl.(ggernau~:l?The real _reasons for the continuing development program ~ commitment .,- -·- A.~ the r --.. to the program have to be sought elsewhere,, outside the Old Paradigm, at leas-t as preached.® There are, firstly reaso?s of previous 1'ru,.J_ l e,iQAFa.-;~ , ~ PJ,/{/M.rfr, ,.J/.u l;vf,f,,U_DN!; commitJ!lent, when nuclear power \ looked a cheaper and safer• deal. corpouations (;~.&? ~ . A ,{ rd_,~ _A ei/10 are ;\_ keer{ -t:o ,,e,,._(,:;<.,, returns on capital,{ invested. There are lypical _,. , ~~fl ~ uc/~/"-7 s e l ~ reasons for commitment to the program, that £erµ_ (V,?µ_ /.aY•~ / ~ ra o..c~IILL ~ ~7 '7o /,24- I ~ :> ~ i t s accrue to some, lil<e ' !}cr'o.-t,.J;' ~ in o__ liti ~ corporations, that are influent1·a1 c:--_ _r_ · _ca 1 · .tr Sf1n-~, 1 · a ff_airs, an d as a profits <;1-ccrue to others, tV't/ Jc on ·.., -·1c J ear eng1 nee.,r,:i ng, -etG-:- There . J,.cLa.-t are A ideological reasons ~ a belief in the control of both political and phys ical ~ b1Z,/,e..f1 IYJ ScC/4 I c.on-l •✓-ol -f'.-e,,,-n itho ,/2 power by technocratic-entreprenial elite, C&t/nd-- ~ /l~ ~i'tu.r J , ,Juf-41 ~ '7..~,/4.,,./:-, )i..--..r - fj fa.-r o~J /4 Awt- fA.#1. ,4(' /IC/VvU- d/-c,,,r (p/;?~J~, /41~ , /~€- ;t ~ .,r o/7)d~ a faith in the unlimitedne ss at ' . technological enterprise, and nuclear in particular, so that any real problems that arise will be solved as development proceeds. Such beliefs are especially conspicuous in the British scene, among the governing and technocratic classes. /It ' ;,:. <=c<--,,../4-;:?-»'r~ ~~ _ -r -/- I cr~'-'-_0 , ' / ~fJ;,~ ·these :;orts of reasons for nuclear development are,.\ linked, h /, C- C i4t /-(!_. • ~- t-h.,, ret13f'lfl tJ,tH those whose types of enterprise/ benefit @8rf?lislit O n ,pi tq l i e substantially nuclear development are commonly those who hold the. requisite beliefs. f;.C-A I <-0•1.:f°'7~1"U:I .Lt is ti _ corporate capitalism, , ~ its state enterprise image, ; / "''#. Hu · cm t.min i;s;;; pc e I if\~, that fuels the nuclear juggernaut. corporate capitalism, which is the political · e ?t~r~,d col'l.o,.,.._"/ v To be sure, largely thrust upon us in ilr/es•-ern .11~ .sln e, is nnt ni>ce~sary fn:r a nuclear furur@; a totalitarian state of the typ (~ such capitalism often supports in the third worl"d w.i ll suffice. But, unlike a hypothetical state tl'tA--C. does conform to precepts of the Old Paradigm, it is sufficient for a nuclear future - evidently, since we are well embarke d 4111 such a future -/ ��7 ��,,.f d.ta.~ l ~ </~ I& ,uu. •1:,=r, Q/v-~~ ~A _,1~'/r ~ ./4X ~~ t"-.7 ✓~~· - c/2~ ¢~ ~~ ~/ ~/or- ~~ 11 ~ /1'"~ f!.//' / /'~/~o~ , , CA~ ry~ 7 ~./rL" c~~ ~~4//EP.A:,,p_, _ / - 1'/J~~:::~~ ~ ~ / t > . ~/ a---4 J~ ~ /~ ~ "~ p ~ ~ <-,. r~ AOC r~ -fl.JI' o--/z; ~ 6,--..,__,;,r / ~~~ ~~ //07 j7' 1Jtif'l'€--,1;_ ~ I ~ ~L&l- ·-<- < ,-, ,,.. .__/- /4/' ~r;:t( ,.&;7"'~:-r,,_,7; I l ,u-,.....,e,.___ ~~, ~ c ~ e . ~ ~ ~ _I ... r/4- c// ~ ~ u Y ~ ·7 ✓ ~~-1~r 11 7<L/~ ~,/4- , ,~ .~/ /~~' t~ _,,r~~ --- ~a,f , . ~.AV/~~ C( ~ £--L-. d / ✓ ~/ "- c). c,._...-<. ~~7_D1 ~ f /'~ ~ /A., _,' O,A{:,G ~ ~/ 4 ~~ , ~7 7;;~ ,,,,,._,-6( <r--/ ./J~ ~,,L 6'£ • / .,. tt/(J_ /c~ <C~~ ,f' r,i ~//'71~. /~ /~ pAf 7 /. '-~------------------------------~--"' �~--v>~-e/f 1~,.~ .?~C. .f ~ 41i;L; c--( p7 p-r uf-._!e~~c)~ ;g.,__-,L~ ~~3tf ~G, -";) ' ---:? ~ 11 . ,1~ - - .~ - :-X.ft ~ �_,,,""--'.___;:._;;_..::..::::.=-=-"-=:..::..:~;:_.:_~=-=...:.:...:::.;::_-=~-=-=L.:;;-=-~a~l~t~e~r~n~a~t~i~v~e~s=-=-.- The future energy ['cJ4¢-r Y>tAlf't°' 0 ootion that is ttS11 a H-,A contrasted with nuclea~, namely coa¾, wMe , _,., ,__,. I /~u- c/4u,,/f-r_a/'~k- t'a-- ~w.r :> /J / ~ the likelihood of .;r;.edty serious (air) pollution and associated phenUIII-• s uch as acid rain and atmospheric heating 1 not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining 1 all of which will result from its use in meeting very ttigh projected consumption figures. Such an option would also fail, it seems, to meet the 'j?u.-,/e,. necessary~ condition, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for r some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement..iS$J . f>t.l.t-,;,.. lo 'these a r 112' conventiona~ options .-- a third is often added which emphasizes r,,,u{ .:, Alt<K/l..11A. Gc-l7L-., "-yd/otJ/,: J.riufy A. _,t.,,...a, softel.-4 benign technologies, such as those of solar' energyA The deeper choice, which '!Ven soflllfpaths tend to neglect, is not technological but social, and involves r~11la/lJ4~ ~Ht-,-4,,? 6<'tl bot~ the restructuring of production away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristjc and nonconsumeristic futures. These more fundamental choices between soci ,tl alternatives, conventicnal technologically ol CA-V":fr ~fu~ oriented discussion At.ends to obscure. It is not just c. rr:.atter of deciding in ,;.,-hich ~ ytil•- Mr/ way to meerxt..:.nexam~nEd goals (as the Old Paradign ~ d 1· of examining the goals. 14' , )t J\.. Ml )' but alEC: a rr.atter That is, we are not merely faced with the que.stion of comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the a- . matter of examing those alleged needs and the cost o~ society that creates . them. It is not just a question of devising less damaging wais to meet these alleged needs conceived of us inevitable and unchangeable. (Hence there are solar ways of producing unn~cessary trivia no one really wants, as opposed to nuclear wayst al' ber1.11ft o.f ~<1.. ~ /J '1-tf--t' ~ A. ot(Ql.Se)'blie~s Hot uaat to deny that these softer optfons are superior • ethically unacceptable features of the 'lltl et :u ~ i b f rt,~, But it is doubtful that any technology, however benign in principl~will h likely to leave a tolerable world for~ future ,., . p:l:i2: if it is expected to meet �f 38 . u,.',awo.d. i ~mit lcss and uncontrolled e nergy consumption and demands. Even the more benign technologies such as solar technology could be used in a way which creates costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being handed on to them. Consider, fo r exa mple, t he effect on t he world's forests, whic h are commonly counted as a solar res ource, of use for production of methl•nol or of electricity by woodchipping ( as already planned by f ~ist authorities and contemplated by many other ener gy organisations) J\ f'ew would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, -b:ttt the unrestricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of "solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world's already hard- pressed natural fores t s. The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the r?ftJfiW forests are often dicem:1Ht@d, even by soft technologicalists, by the simple A-expedient of waving around the label 'renewable resources'. May forests are in A principle renewable, it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of exploitation, but in fact there are now very few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values . ~$, In many regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total decline is widely thought to be immanent if not already well advanced. It certainly has begun in( ~ n.--11> regions, and for U'-Plr,•0-:1:i!PJ~,; ~ which are,\ beifig 16st for the future. that f o r ~ on top of ~ present forest types (such ~s rainforest types) amt "•i M11,f."5 /.~.t,.//4__ )!HtJ~ The addition of a major further ,\demand ee2rn:e,,, J'f't!4J~ is one which anyone with a realistic (o,t/<>,,./l_rl"~ . appreciation of the conduct 6fAforestry operations, who is also concerned with long-term conservation of the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with alarm. The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes ~ resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, again for energy purposes, w ould be extensive and devastating erosion in steeper lands and tropical ar eas, desertification in more arid regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural ecosystems. Some of us do not want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products. In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - i.mportant though this is - without any more basic structural and -locial change is inadequate. f,,t,.,,IOJ1,",;/ Nor is such a simple.4 switch likely to be achieved. ~1&4- It is no t as if fc political pressure could i -11st bene:,\ the US government,\ stop its nuclear ~ = Ntn-G ( and that of the countries it influences, much of the world), in the way pressure appeared to succeed in 11,-1.lting the Vietnam war. could be accomplished, it is very While without doubt it would be good if this unlikely given the integration of political powerholders with those spons r ring nuclear development .'° �I The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social , ,om......,,.;.,. ,A.. h~JG".t j"-.:; ~ no.odr, s tructure which promotes consumerismAand ah economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensive modes of production. This means, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services. A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from rer~ satisfaction in work and in social re.lations and other activities, is.\ bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption. (A production system that produces goods not to meet ge~uine needs but for created and non-genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.) Consumption frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas . The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the larger set of adjustments involved in socially j_mplementing the New Paradigm, the move away from ,:::6',t.SIArne<•S"Yl is for example part of the more general shift from material ism and materialist values. / ~ Th4 c ' A=::O:f social change option tends to be obscured in most ol discussions of energy options andAhow to meet .---. @S energy needs, in part because question• underlying values of current social arrangements. The conventional 6.,; ,. nee~) or wants with conflo..W (often demand alleged taking by proceeds discussion as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengeable arid unchangeable. The point is readily illustrated., It is commonly argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people ~deep ~ezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... 1t would be authoritarian to ps:t:llp them satisfying these wants. ~ tl+c A argument conveniently ignores the soc:f.al framework in which such needs and wants �To point to the determinati on of many such wants at t he framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach according to whic h they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial or are produced. organisatio n) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determinati on at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices , such as those for travel , Mle iafrastrtt~t u"v and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and diLected by a social framework determined largely in the interests of corporate and private prt,fit and advantage. The social change option is a hard option - at least it will be difficult to obtain politically - but it is the only wa» so it has been argued, of avoiding passing on serious costs to the future. And there are other sorts of reasons than it is the main, indeed the only sort of option open to those who take a deeper ecological perspectivef .2..-a perspective integral with the New Paradigm but not essential to radical departure from the dominant such ethical ones for taking it: paradigm. tJa,,u#t;LJ J',;..., The ethical , requirement defende.o<., I social and political d. -, £ CUr{f?'?~{j ~~~ J t<~ ~~ -f7 ~ ?t,(""f""e.u • ,uu1...l',1;1.ial The socialAchan ges that the deeper alternative requires will be strongiy r esisted because they mean changes in current social organisatio n and power structure • ..tt'ld<°f:o the extent that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of presen t political and economic arrangemen ts it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds by misrepresen ting and often obscuring it. But i.,,·11 Jtz_ difficult though a change t,f t:icn~inant p: a @eigm, especially one with such ~rreaching effects on the prevailing power structure, is to obtain, it is imperative to try; we are all on the nuclear train. �V ( • I - FOOTNOTES ~ 1. - All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Good in ., p. 417; the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6. While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear .fuel cycle in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it helps to know a little. & Abbotts, Gyorgy. The basics are presented in many texts, e.g. Nader Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such important background and stage-setting matters as the likelihood of a core meltdown of a (lightwater) reactor, much more information is required. For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fal la cies and decision theory is at least as important as knowledge of nuclear technology. ~ 2. As to the first, see references cited in Gooij_in, p. 417, footnote 1. As regards the second see Cotgrove and Duff, and some of the references given therein. 3. Cotgrove and Duff, p. 339 4. The table is adapted from Cotgrove and Duff, p. 341; compare also catton and Dtinlap, especially p. 34. -- 5. See, e.g., Gyorgy ~ e.nd$, pp. 357-8. 6. For one illustration, see the conclusions of Mr. Justice the Windscale inquiry (The Windscale Inquiry Parker a~ Vol. 1. Her Majesty's Office, London, 1978), discussed in both Cotgrove and Duff, p. 347 and in Goodin, p. 501 ff. 7. Much as with the argument of one theory or position against another. One can argue both from one's own position against the other, and in the other's own terms against the other. 8. As well as screening the debate from the public such manoeuvltfls .... favour the (proLnuclear establishment, since they (those of the alliance of military, large industry, and government) control much of the �information and (subject to minor qualifications) can release what, and only . them. what, s f)f1ts 9. This is a conclusion of several governmental inquiries and is conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development; for requisite The same conclusion has been reached in details up to 1977 see Routley (a) . L /;..:i /t,lrf ~t/ J i I! rl. I e ·7. [{CL /i 10. For some details see Gyorgy, p. 60 ff. 11. eol . See the papers, and simulations, discuss :bal in GoodiA p. f-28. /~ On the pollution and waste disposal ·r"ecoff'd of the n uclear industry, , 12. see Nader and Abbotts, Lovins and Price1 and Gyorgy. On the more general problem of e..f fective pollution controls, see also, Routley (a), footnote 7. Back of this Humanity Unlimited assumption is the idea of 13. replacing God. power. Man First God had unlimited power, e.g. over- nature, then when during the Englightenment Man replaced God, Man was to have unlimited Science and technology were the tools which were to put '1an into the position of unlimitedness. More recently nuclear power is seen as providing man at least with unlimited physical power, power obtained through technology. [ability to 14. manage technology represents the past] On such limitation fhe.o~UJ?l, which go back to Finsler and Godel on one side and to Arrow .,-----------.....- fk d.n · o ther · .I\ ~ see, e.g. Routley 80. ,j Other different are presented in Routley 81. ' l,,;,.;l-etht>,..,, te1t1/tf It follows that there are many problems that have no solution and much that is necessarily lJ/lkA•N4'/4. . Limitative results put a serious dent in the progress picture. According the Dominant Western Worldview, t he history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem there is a solution, and thUf progress need never cease (C cttto,i and p.34). 15. See Lovins and Price. ,1 OS (a,:.J Amore recent official reports, ft n r, <t:etieHlar \ f.,~ J JJ~/o/J, Jr �7~ "r 7~ /,,.__~ '(,; l't?I - ---~ co/c.,:;..e., •--:;,..,<r~ / (,__ /'° ~ ;I (>-..._ ;f ,;(~ ;- - ~ -6 - / Y ~ r. C~< <~ (&cn&'tU /?,u~.va- ih ~ ~4~~ I \ •7 /,._,k µ{ ~ I ,,.,_ , I ~ ,__,_ n-t' ,-/4 ,f,_ v -f/tfJ,--f~~-t:, , • r~ r~ bu- /4/~~~~ I/le,/_,~ /(-, /'M-r_ /-L--t.C..h.,-/' //- • #f1 a r~ To~..,.._ ,lr·- -1~.,,,~-7 ,{Mt7 a,,,,_ o/'~ / e. ,,..,_,r_,__ YC- . . .:. 4'/4_ ,i', •..,t CC'.,A-V"~~--- ~7 o-r, d-.,/ ~~. /!....,'f' ~I'~~ ' ,, fe__ , ,-r~~~ J /~"'-:;, _ A--,i,( ~,,..~.L- · ~ , { a f r ~ r1 h ( Th~ ~ r ~~•--L ~ 1/'f~ _y ,11(,,, C.,.;-<:_ J<1./?o.,,-_;~~l _7 :c£. ~ z:., . ,. , 1/ c.1--{,1 7 �3. I For examples. and for some details of the history of philosophe~ 16. positions 4 n obligations to the future. see Routley (a). Passmore, p. 91. 17. Passmore's position is ambivalent and, to all appearances, inconsistent. as also is Rciw/s , It is considered in detail in Routley (a), position. For related criticisms of the economists' arguments for 18. discounting, and for citation of the often eminent economists who sponsor them, see . ,, Good11, , pp 429-30. 19. The reasons (not elaborated here) are that the properties are different e.g. a monetary reduction of value imposes a linear ordering on values to which value rankings, being only partial orderings, do not conform. 20. Goodin/ however puts his case against those rules in a less than satisfactory fashion. What he claims is that we cannot list all the possible outcomes in the way that such rules as expected utility maximization prefi, poses, e.g. Goodin suggests that we cannot list all the things that can go wrong with a nuclear power plant or with waste storage procedures. But outstanding alternatives can always be comprehended logically, at worst by saying "all the rest" (e.g. "'P covers everything except Cll#l- p) . For example, outcomes Goodin says cannot be listedJ aMI be comprehended along such lines >. as "plant breakdown through human error". �-,u.fU 7o--n-l'"'--? ~~ ,!e__u;,.h, ,;?,,-z)~ ~,-'Lr .....,./7 -~ ~ ~ ff.7'L . ·(j-, ~ ~~- 7-~A..'-., 7 ~7 ~er,&,. , 4 ~~ ~~ 7,6- ,,,ffe d,,_ $ ,' .;;,?'? ~6:,cc,.Jro/, /""'.d IE=i")'JC,,.-,... 6 '--X ,..o:,,,...__/J<:r--t.<"it/£ , µ & ~ ~ / ,.,_ ""~ 21 l-9!" • ?Co ,;W'L,_,,,;, ., Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market, cf. P.A. Samuelson, Economics , 7th Edition, McGrawHill, New York, 1967, p.351. Thus the rates have little moral relevance. A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with me re logical possibility. �Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitaria nism (e.g. 'lf. J.H'.1,A'" Sidgwick p.414), and in a range of contract and other theories How the principle is from Kant and Rousseau to Rawls (J8(A" p.293). argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlyin g theory; and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particula r ethical theories. ;=,..;,. //4 /4 ;,/<, o/u_ z ,G/( . F >/,2 7. 7 Jk_,t,_, - k/4/I,,. ,~ .J-/4 ~ -~.:I ,&.,~ jr "~~7 ~!½-~~ 'l~J / c-,e ~ C>7 "'/· /L !? L-... ,f !JJ ~ ;fI ~-£,-'-. __ 7 ,co/ • ro c ~/,. ~ / _ c..--e_ ••,,( ,r; L- .,.__;__ ...c .,,At /4_ ,,.,. 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I / ✓~.L 'trv'/ ,,-0 ' ~~'Pc jf. /k /;11~ ..-~ ~/V-rl_ I/fl 1~rrn_ /7w.rficd v?:-./ (-~ - C-,-Z/1-,_;,., I ,../fr"" //4 ~ /;2,~~I/~- ~~ L-:. --< -~ tr,7c ~ . . r / ~ /d~,e;;, 1/#"l'~ ,i,,,,ft//-?ft' ,J7._:, ~ ~ .-,I_;;:;;_._, cb- ~~, 7Z AC'c__ ~) . r - ~r ~ t{e/..//1 ~ ,,--~6,,- (--l-i..-< �Even then relev ant envi ronm ental facto rs may have been negl ected . , 1 Ther e are vari ation s on (i) and (ii) whic h mult iply cost s agai nst numb ers such as prob abil ities . In this wav risk s, cons trued as prob able cost s, can be taken into ' acco unt in the asses smen t. (Alt erna tivel y, risks may be asse ssed throu gh such fami liar meth ods as insu ranc e). ' A prin ciple vary ing (ii), and form ulate d as follo ws: (ii') a is ethi cally acce ptab le if (for some b) a inclu des no more risk s than band bis soci ally acce pted . was the basi c ethi cal prin ciple in term s of whic Lake Boar d of Inqu iry rece ntly decid ed that nuclh the Cluf f ear powe r deve lopm ent in Sask atche wan is ethi cally acce ptab le: see Cluf f Lake Boar d of Inqu iry Fina l Repo rt, Depa rtmen t of Envi ronm ent, Gove rnme nt of Sask atche wan, 1978 , p.305 and p.28 8. In this repo rt, a is nucl ear powe r and bis eithe r acti vitie s clea rly acce pted by soci ety as alter nativ e powe r sour ces. In othe r appl icati ons b has been taken as ciga rette smok ing, moto ring, minin g and even the Vietn am war( !) The poin ts made in the text do not exha ust the obje ction s to prin ciple s (i)- (ii') . The prin ciple s are certa inly ethi cally subs tanti ve, sinc e an ethi cal cons eque nce cann ot be dedu ced fro m none thica l prem isses , but they have an inad miss char acte r. For look at the orig in of b: b may ible conv entio nal be acce pted thoug h it is no long er soci ally acce ptab soci ally le, or thoug h its soci al acce ptib ility is no long er so clea rcut and it woul d not have been soci ally acce pted if as much as is now know n had been know n when it was intro duce d. What is requ ired in (ii') , for insta nce, for the argum ent to begi n to look conv incin g is then 'ethi call y acce ptab le' rath er than 'soc ially acce pted '. But even with the amen dmen ts the prin ciple s are inva lid,f or the reaso ns give n in the text . It is not disc once rting that these argum ents do not work . It woul d be sad to see yet anot her area lost to the expe rt~ name Jy ethic s to actu aries . - A main part of the trou ble with the mode ls_is that narro wly utili taria n, and like utili tari~ ni~m they they are distr ibut iona l featu res, invo lve natu ralis tic fa~l~ n~gl ect Real ly they try to trea t as an unco nstra ined optim cie~ , etc. isati on what is a deon tical ly cons train ed optim isati on: see R. and V. Rout ley 'An expe nsive repa ir kit for utili taria nsim '. I.-"\ Appa rent exce ption s to the prin ciple su~h as taxa redi strib utio n of incom e gene rally ) vani sh when tion (~nd weal th is cons trued (as it has to be if taxa tion is to be P:ope r,J_y justi fied ) as at leas t part ly a so~i al asse t unfa irly mono polised by a mino rity of the popu latio n. -:) · ~ Exam ples such as that of moto ring dang er~u sly coun terex ampl es to the prin ciple ; for one is not do not cons t~tu t~ mora lly entit lcu to so moto r. �f, ;o». ,> /;o cfobs and On all these points see R. Grossm an and G. Daneke r , t7w· L E'nergy, Environ men 1:a]jsts for Fu.11 Employ ment, W;:ishington DC, 1977, ting pp.1-7 , and also the details supplie d in substa ntiatin g the interes case of Commoner · [7]. nuclea r indust ry, On the absorp tion of availab le capita l by the see as well [18], p.23. On the employm ent issues , the see too H.E. Daly in [9], p.149.X A more fundam ental challen ge to poverty argume nt appear s in 1. I 11 i.rli Energy a:nd Equal·i ty, Cal den and Boyars , London 1974, where it is atgued that the sort of develop ment need. nuclea r energy represe nts is exactly the opposi te of what the poor Small For much more detail on the inappr opriate ness see E.F. Schuma cher, is Beauti ful, Blond and Briggs , London , 1973. As to the capita l and other require ments, see [2], p.48, and also [7] and [9]. For an illumin ating look at the sort of develop ment high-en ergy techno logy will tend to promot e in the so-cal led underd evelope d countr ies see the paper .of Waiko and other papers in The Melane sian Environ ment (edited J.H. Winslo w), Austra lian Nation al Univer sity Press, Canber ra, 1977. .-B9-..- -'.JT;lhHi~sHf§'..ia'!1ee,jtE---:1ii·ss-:1t.i·m;a:pE>cll-1.ic·e.eici~t±l:-;:v-r-4r:ee~c,QO'l:!g,i;ineii~s~e~0Hittrrr- [P.2f]~,:7p~.~5516J. A use Ta 1 survey is given in A. Lovins . Energy Strateg y: The Road Not n, Friend s of the Earth Austra lia, 1977 (reprin ted from Foreign / Af. airs, Octobe r 1976); see also [17], [6], [7], [14], p.233 ff, and Schum~ cher, op. cit. //3· An argume nt like this is sugges ted in Passmo re -f-fi, chapte rs 4 and 7, with respec t to the questio n of saving resour ces. In Passmo re this argume nt for the overrid ing importa nce of passing on contem porary l culture is underp inned by what appear s to be a future -direct ed ethica version of the Hidden Hand argume nt of econom ics - that, by a coincid ence care of which if correc t would indeed be fortun ate, the best way t o take the future (and perhap s even the only way to do so, since do-good of iRterv ention is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care the presen t and immedi ate future. The argume nt has all the defects of the related Chain Argume nt discuss ed above and others . �/1, IA;, u,./n er Very persuasive argurn en t sAh ave b een advanced by civil liberties groups and othe.rs in · a number of countries: C.$ee especia· 11y M. · , Nuclear Prospects. y· Flood and R. Grove-White, A Comment on the Individual., the State and Nuclear Power, 'F riends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural. England _a~d National Council for Civil Liberties, London, 1976. y~.;.~ f- 7 ~ ~ 7,,....J., / ~ / ¾,_ r-!! 0~ 4S>- I'-- ~ !' ~ / ,,.~~ l'/4 ~ ~ e- ~N~ .,..,_.,,« LvV"' 7#'~} J u /~7 ~~ .a - / .,J.,/2., k._,,,,, ". .,,.-b ~ ./ ~/4:-._ /. £. /4 cl,< .,,.,..( ,i;;..,,.<- ,,-::: c:e£l/.? ,,_~, ,t,_,.,__,. <C'" /''j!fK .;. /)-...._;, ·- di de,.,~,?,;, . h ~ ·~' I '-,,.,_,~ /.,_, , . 7 /.1- ·,',( ... :.... 7 1-. 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Similarly practical transitional strategies should make use o f such measures as environmental (or replacement) pricing of encn1y, i.e. so that the price of some energy unit includes the full cosl ,. ------~-- �tl ~ -1 footno te le continued. of replacing it by an equivalent unit taking ac count of environmental cost of production . Other (sometimes strategies towards more s a tisfactory altercooptive) natives should also, of course, be adopted, in particul a r the removal of institutional barriers to energy conservation and alternative technology (e.g. local g ove rnment regulations blocking these), and the removal of state assistance to fuel and power industries. ff Symptomatic of the fact that is it not treated a s rene wa ble is that forest economics do not generally a llow for full renewability - if they did the losses and de ficits on forestry operations would be much more striking than they already are often enough . 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Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 1875 /IN/J , AJuncl)L NUCLEAR POWER • - ETHICA L,a& SOCIAL DIMENSIONS ---.. Compet ing paradig fus and · the nuclea r debate . ~ J C/l/'I One hardly 1ieeds ini t.. i ation into the dark myster ies of nuclea r physic s to contrib ute useful ly to the debate now widely raging over nuclea r power. While many import ant empiri cal questio ns are still unreso lved, these do not really lie at the centre of the controv ersy. Instead , it is a debate about values ... \ many of the questio ~which arise are social and ethica l ones. 1 •.:tSociol ogica) investi gation s have confirm ed fJ £ a t~ I pa,i I 11g , I a1:a1Hiliit e:f! the ,! 01\.C!.. debate l=!S:&!!!!t'!~ primar ily over what is w.9rth having or pursuin g and over what we are 'tli.a,., /i.,we 4ho cc,-.+·,r,.,../),l fl..,,/ it,, J;,'/.wh :1 ;•,l~:,~-11 .entitle d to do to others .~,] ii pelaFi oatienA along the lines of compet ing paradig ms. 2 Accord ing to the entrenc hed paradig vtldisc erned, that constel lation. a' of values , attitud es and beliefs often called the nomina nt Social Paradig m (herea fter I ena ipsoiac to u hl:ttan f!nD --) I r/ I riteria become the benchm ark by which a v.;id..e/ range of individ ual and social action is J IA"{'J4.l and evalua ted. AW'\d belief in the market and market mechan isms is quite centra l. Clv'.:ite...<il"\<J around this col'"e belief is the convic tion that enterp rise flouris hes best in a system of risks and r ew~ rds, that differe ntials are necess ary ..• , and in the necess ity for some form of divisio n of labour , and a itfl1rar chy of skills and expert ise. In particu lar, there is a belief in the compet ence of ~xpert s in genera l and of scient ists in particu lar , m More thau this, scient: ifie knowle dge aftd t:he scient ific speei:r~:'i~/,;2··::.,,./ method enjoy a -ef knowiftg , • , , A:Re 3 S = ~ : . . _ 4"-- quanti f ica.tion . .status as super, '(P' ::::j there 1s an emphas is on ~~,3 The rival world view, sometim es called the Altern ative Environ mental Paradig m ( the ~ Paradig m) differs on almost every point, and, accord ing to sociol ogists , in ways su~mar i~ din the followi ng table 4":Nature hostile/ne utral Environm ent controllable ---·. ,csourccs limited Nature benign Nature clclicatdy balanced \. \ EDGE .,. Confidence in science and technology ~ation:ility of means~} Limits to science ~ationality of ends • S.t-~te socialism, as practiced in most of the "EasteI11 bloc", differs from the 01/ PaLl.digm really only as to economic organisation, the market in particular l\ ffl~' being replaced by central planning (a market system by a command system). / o-Y ,r,~t)tlt But since there is virtually no debate over a nuclear future within the confines of · h · 1·ism, 5 tat variant on the Old Paradigm need not be delineated here. minor s t a t e socia ,,.... 1 Nctl.cu,t .WailiaA the competing paradigm picture is a trifle s i m p l e ~ instead ~ a New Paradigm there are rather counterparadi gms, a cluster of not very well out rositions that diverge from the cluster marked out as the wo,•k~ Jfl01+,;.,./'cr-hJ, )/o,ie,/{~(J Old Paradigm~ i t is empirically investigable, and.I\ it enables the nuclear debate be focussed. Large-scale nuclear development, of the sort now occurring in much of the world , counter to leading tenets (such as societal features) of the New Paradigm. Indeed to introduce ethical and social dimensions into the assessment of nuclear power, instead of ~,.. olt-0u'-, merely economic 1in addition to jJa9.,-.d .. u(_, \-"-.. factors such as cost and efficiency, isAto move somewhat received paradigm. g.gl; .. i le the For under the Old Paradig~, strictly construed, the nuclear debate is confined to the terms of the narrow ut1litarianism upon which contemporary economic practice is premissed, the issues to questions of economic means (to assumed economistic ends) along with technological, social engineering and other instrumental details whatever falls outside these terms is (dismissed as) irratfonal. I /;,(4.(11,-,'1"4-J J~clear development receives its support from adherents of the Old Paradigm. Virtually all the arguments in favour of it are set within the assumption framework of the Old Paradigm, and without these assumptions the t:o fails. But in · and ultimately fails fact the argument for a nuclear future from the Old Paradigm is itself broken-backedj) case for the nuclear future the world is presently committed unless the free enterprise economic assumptions are replaced by the ethically unacceptable assumptions of advanced (corporate) capitalism. r->~~~tt--en--e--a:nm~m-t~ 7 The two paradigm picture also enables our case against a nuclear future (a case written from outside the Old Paradigm ) to be structur ed. There are two main part~JJ :It is argued, firstly, from the Old Paradigm , that nuclear J&tfSe developm ent is ethicall y unjusti fiable; A but that, secondly , even from within e·th,t" I~ ,;,{,.l,fo "1 the framewo rk of the,\Old Paradigm , such developm ent is unaccep table, since signific ant features of nuclear developm ent conflic t with indispe nsible features of the Paradigm (e.g. costs of project developm ent and state :s ... lPs ,l ,J"--f:,,;, •., with market independ ence and criteria for project selectio n). It has _?~E_~ d accepta ble from within the claminan t paradigm only because )rfo,,Js do not square with practice , only because the assumpt ions of the Old Paradigm are but very ~A~~ty applied in contemp orary politica l practice the place of i ru.<<I!.(~., "'1( td) ,v capitali sm having been usurped by corpora te capitali sm. It is because the nuclear debate <:<1.vi bL. carried on within the framewo rk of the Old Paradigm that the debate - although it is a debate about values, because of the conflict ingvalu es of the <c.,..,.,fL-f;;"1 paradigm s - is not just a debate about values; it is also a debate within a paradigm as to means to already assumed (ec:.on0" 1istid ends, and -:=:- of rationa l choice as to energy option.5 within (~ ~ 0 1""Q;i1f 2'n this corner ~ 0<,f/e,,..Jj4 ft!1ho',. "JllD I most !i F I Im. decision 1 a predeter mined framewo rk of values. tlrp~ theory argumen ts,often conside red " as encompa ssing all the nuclear debate is ethicall y about, I\best util.i t~rian means to predeter mined ends..,) be l : ~ For another leading charact eristic of the nuclear debate is the attempt , under the dominan t par_adigyn, to r~c'1~ it from t/•IIW 1f the ethical and social sphere) and to turR ; t into spec,iali st issues ef' #" whether over minutia? .and conting encies A present technolo gy or overme&lw,,/ ~legal or ~) mathem atical ,,' upeciaJ J y de, rs r 011 tbentetf c: and Stat Is Lica:1:, or amdie&t details.,8 / £' ;or The double approach can be applied as regards each of the main problems nuclear . developm ent poses. There are 7any A inter~e lated problems and -fl. t.- OAJ'""'"cd · , is further ,) I\ /_,flW4r structur ed in terms of these. For in the advancem ent and promotio n of nuclear ~ we encount er a remarka ble combina tion of factors, never before assemble d establis hment, on a massive scale, of an industry which involves at each stage of its process ing serious risks and at some stages of product ion possible catastro phe, which delivers as a by-prod uct radioac tive wastes which require up to a million years' storage but for which no sound and economi c storage methods are known, which gr~w up as part of the war industry and which is easily $""h v,e..,rld to deliver nuclear weapons , which require s for its operatio nconsid erable secrecy , limitati ons on the flow of informa tion and restrict ions on civil libertie s, which depends for its economi cs, and in order to generate expected private profits, on Sl.\bs-i.4.,,/..,~/ state subsidi zation, support , and interven tion. It is, in short, a very high technol ogical developm ent, ba~«-f. with problem s. first importa nt problem .which serves also to exempli fy ethical issues and princip les involved in other nuclear power questio ns, is the unresolv ed matter of disposa l of nuclear wastes. A .------------- ------------ ------------ -------~--- ---. f 5. t annual wastes containing 1000 times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima bomb. of this waste is extremely toxic. ) Much For example, a millionth of a gramme of plutonium part of the waste material of even a is enough to induce a lung Wastes will include the reactors themselves, ...contamination which will have to be abandoned after their expected life times of perhaps 40 years, and which, some have estimated, may require l½ million years to reach safe levels of radioactivity. P,,.tcAF A~astes must be kept suitably isolated from the environment for their entire For fission products the required storage period averages a active lifetime. thousand years or so, and for transuranic elements, which include plutonium, there is a half million to a million year storage problem. Serious problems have arisen with both short-term and proposed long-term methods of storage, even with the comparatively small quantities of waste produced over the last twenty years. ~ Shortterm methods of storage require continued human intervention, while proposed longer term methods are subject to both human interference and risk of leakage through non-human factors. No one with even a slight knowledge of the geological and climatic history ti of the earth over the last million years, a period whose fluctuations in climate we are only just beginning to guage and which has seen four Ice Ages, could be confident that a rigorous guarantee of safe storage could be provided for the vast period of time involved. Nor does the history of human affairs over the last 3000 years give ground for confidence in safe storage by methods requiring human intervention over perhaps a million years. Proposed long-term storage methods such as storage in granite formation s or in salt mines, are largely speculative and relatively untested1 and have already proved to involve difficulties with attempts made to put them into practice. Even as regards expensive recent proposals for the result in first embedding concentrated wastes in glass and enca/ulating ,i multilayered metal containers before rock radioactive material may not remain deposit 1 si~ulation models reveal that 11. . , 'II isolated from human environments. S'k,t.<\t1 f~4. In short, the best present ~iapeoel proposals carry very real possibilities of .J... /Id • // I lZ..t-u ~~~ • irradiating future people- (V',i,,l. Given the c<c,,,~'7 I Atu.lflf .QA:Q;pQfiQWB costs which could be involved for the future, and given 0 the known ~~mits of technology, it is £i?la:h:tw methodol@gi cal.ly unsound amt to bet,• as nuclear Mlin,-J ~ A t~a. have,• on the discovery of safe procedures for 1tis.pr19i,j of wastes. Any new procedures (required before 2000) will probably be but variations on present proposals, and subjecJto the same inadequacies. methods for safe l storage For instance, none of the proposed X "'t.H has been properly tested, and they mayAprove to involve ell :sorts o:fi unforseen difficulties and risks when an attempt is made to put them into practice on a commercial scale. Only a method that could provide a rigorous guarantee , I I 09 when set in this context. t,/wo/! are not so ruf'I What is worth remarking is that similar excuses when the consigner, again~ "responsible" businessman, puts ). his workers' health or other peoples' welfare at risk. ~ THE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM, AND THE1~IN PARABLE . II. A long distance country train has just pulled out. crowded carries both passengers and freight. journey The train which is At an early stop in the someone consigns as freight , to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explosive gas. container which> as the consigner ii ava..r4- 1 Jii' l 'J I ems This is packaged in a very thin may~ not contain the gas for the ~ full distance for which it is consigned, and certainly will not do so if the train should strike any real trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the train becomes very hot, if the train should be derailed or involved in a collision, or if some passenger should interfere try; to steal some 1e t 11 r 5ffi'1jhQ~ ot eliherately ~ the freight~ inadvertent! Ml tX,lA4'rcd,. have happened on some previous journeys. All iii,. ~ with fU: ft,1-h ~ fCJ Laps Conf• ;;bi.c, ;_,,, of these tie:! cg ,.. ,\ If the container should "' break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the train in adjacent carriages, while others could be maimed or incur serious diseases . ..,., Most of us would Aoundly condemn such an action. of the parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not responsible for the train or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however 1$ would normally be s een as ludicrous~ a11rlo'1er1 (~~up~~he says that it is hisgownA pressing needs which justify his action. The ~ h e 0!111!!6, ,\ which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial A straits, and could• n.,r ,. afford to produce a better container even if it knew how to r~..../'441' ~ ,1/r make one. If t h e ~ §?PB ersl~~, he and his family will suffer, his employees r~L'~~ will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the who}eA 1~,~, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off. ()It,/ rl.A~"/t ~ " .fo-... The ppor of t'he ¥.j)Jag_P,whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will ,1 suffer especially. ::, ,1r.,i/Q G ew people would accept~ story1 even if correct, as justification. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneseLf or some group for whom one is (o concerned one is usually m,""kM,l ii,b. w;gil1'UA not hacc.u_y to be entitled to simply transfer the,4 burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise 1 ()r 1 CI U J 1 /JIZMJ' J ) from one's own.< chosefi Iife-style.ca:nd the t~nsfer af cos.ts creates a risk of ,ae-r ious harm t:e G - t ~ r ----- The matter of nuclear waste disposal has many moral features which resem\1le the train (i4.tqatiaeu There is no known proven safe way to package the highly toxic wastes generated by the nuclear plant~ that will be spread around the world as large/9 scale nuclear development goes ahead. ' The waste problem will be much more serious than thut generated by the 50 or so reactors in use at present, withx'each one of the 2000 or so r actors envisaged by ,IJ ,f/4. J.IYl/4w l#i7 l,Q. ~~'4~ ,i· dfi) flp,J4v{- ...,_, jj{'. , ,~IL cue end of the century producing, on average, A . /"'-A 'VI '/I Ji? t • s/4 /7 __ / L_:~-..':~. . :~===================== ==---___,tl~===~l_____i_~ ~---- ------,_,.........----------~---_......._ ----:,..........,__.. 6. { of safety over th e s torage period, that placed safety beyond reasonable doubt , would be acceptable. It is difficult to see how such rigorous guarantees could be given concerning either the geological or future human factors. But even if an economically viable, rigorously safe long term storage method could be devised, there is the problem of guaranteeing that it would be universally and invariably . . as The assumption that it would be{ especially if, ~ used. - likely, such a method proved expensive economically and politically) seems to presuppose a level of efficiency, perfection and concern for the f uture which has not previously been e~counter~in human affairs, and has certainly not been conspicuous in the nuclear industry. 1 . Again, unless we assume continuous and faultless guarding of long term storage sites through perhaps a million years of possible future human ac t ivity, weapons-grade radioactive material will be accessible, over much of the million year storage period, to any pa rt y who is in a position to retrieve it. nonetheless be found 1 before 2000, (no longer a mere disposal pfioblem) s accordingly not t"~t,cnA '( which gets around the waste storage problem . like ma~v assumptions ?~ifH~s, It is an assumption supplied by the based, but is ratne ~ ~an artitle or The assumption that a way will /! Old Paradigm, 1 Cit M limitations assumption , that there are really no (development) - · -. problems that cannot be solved technologically (if not in a fashion always immediately ·· economically feasible). part in development plans and practice.. technological optimism (not to say what humans can accomplish, The assumption that is has played an important It has not only encouraged an unwarranted t3 -h(A.J,,.,·::, -____ ); that there are no limits to ;~;:14. i<. through science ; it has led to the em~rcation on projects before crucial problems have been satisfactorily solved t,r a solution is tNll.~ i n sight, and it has led to the idea that technology can always be suitably controlled. It has also led , not surprisingly, to disasters. There are severe limits on what technology can achieve (some of which are becoming known in the form of '"' limitation theorems,~ and in addition there are human limitations which modern technological developments often fail to take due account of (risk analysis of the · , llliu:,,olll( lido-wliklihood of reac t or accidents is a relevant exampll). The original nuclear technology dream ..fj 1>S1.l»-'I was that nuclear 'clean unlimited supply of power'). apparently remains a net will be but a quite X That dream soon shattered . cons &-1>t1~ "!)hc..-l::-tM1<1 would provide unlimited energy (a The nuclear industry of power, and nuclear ..flt~, ;o,,.. s upplier of power/> The risks :l.mposed on the future by proceeding with nuclear development then , significant. are, Nuclear fission creates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the (suspect) breeder reactor it could be an energy source for only perhaps 150 years. It will do nothing for the energy problems of the people of the distant future whose lj_ves could be seriously affected by the wastes. I pt,..."'tl.Mt.. It is for such reasons that the train aua]og; cannot be turned around .p, .. ~,.,,,/(._ . s. to work in favour of nuclear power, w1.·th .:e::g:.-"1 t, h e nuc 1 ear train b r1.n1.ng I 4 relief as well as wastes to a remote town powered (only) by nuclear power. 7. ~ ~~----Thus perhaps 40,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks resulting from the provision of the (extravagant) energy use I.I f»l~)'r•jloiT,,j.,. d r{4. of onlyAlO generations. l''°/'k o.f Nor is the risk of direct harm from the escape or misuse of radioactive materials the only burden the nuclear solution imposes on the future. Because the ene~gy provided by nuclear fission is merely a stop gap, it seems probable that in due course the same problem, that of making a transition to renewable sources of energy, will have to be faced again by a future population which will probably, again as a result of our actions, be very much worse placed to cope with it ~ For they may well have to face the change to renewable resources in an over-populated world not only burdened with the legacy of our nuclear wastes, but also in a world in which, if the nuclear proponents' dream~of global industrial:lsation are realised, more and more of the global population will have become dependent on high energy consumption and associated technology and heavy resource use and will have lost or reduced its ability to survive without it. It will, moreover, probably be a world which is largely depleted of non-renewable resources, and in which such renewable resources as forests and soils as remain, resources which will have to form 4 a very important part of the basis of life, are in a run·-down condition. Such pointf~~ll against the idea that future people must be, if not direct beneficiaries of nuclear fission energy, at least indirect beneficiaries. The "solution" then is to buy time for contemporary industrial society at a price which not only creates serious problems for future people but which reduces their ability to cope with those problems. Like the consigner in the train parable, contemporary indu st rial society proposes, in order to get itself out of _a mess arising from its chfik Q,W:fl life style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy, which is limited in supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding benefits. . The ''solution" may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes~n the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties, whose opportunity to /eJ J.Q.c~nt /,vu Afli1J may be seriously jeopardised. Industrial society has - under e~ch paradigm, so it will be argued clear alternatives (YJ>o~-t~ 1 cf i patterns ~ w to this action, which is taken essentially to avoid changing c~mpet,Nil,iJo.l'J ~ of consumption and protect the interest of those,\who benefit from them. I r~ pcrca.,t1cd, If we apply to the nuclear situation the standards of behaviour and moral 1 principles generally acknowledged (in principle if perhaps often not in fact) in the contemporary world, it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that nuclear development firTr-/S~ inv61ves injustice ~ /:T4- • with respect to the future 1,0 .I\ li g s111l s n 1J e> . The.re appear to be only two plausible moves that might enable the avoidance of such a conclusion. (p) !Pa {csfuP~ c C--?\ Ce/>'\ r.,--,._ ( .__:.. '7 1 </{_:_, rh~, t ✓~ ~ I d04r7 A ~ /'{,I(~ ~ ~ UL-117 KL- #- "d c ...... /~,::;., , ~7 (~ ' a-r ,,:ZZ-: :.,.,/ ~ 7 ka.-~ ,,.,;,{,,;,,, j ~ ~ ~ cf~~c-r 77~ 7W{~ ' £--) 11-/'l,,._,r ,/~ £e..-r<- ~ ~7~ ~~ t, .r \t Y/1 ) . 8. I i I First, it might be argued that the moral principles and obligations which we acknowledge for the contemporary world and the immediate future do not apply f{,_ because the recipients of...- nuclear parcel are in the non-immediate future. Secondly, an attempt might be made to appeal to overriding circumstances; for to !eject the consigner's action in the circumstances outlined is not of course to 1 ~ that there are circumstances in which such an action might ~,.;s i];Jj' no be justifiable 1 or at least where the the nuclear case. f,t,,J/,e,, ~ is less clearcut. It is the same with Just as in the case of the consigner of the package there is a need to consider what these justifying circumstances might be, and whether (on(l,/e,r- We ~urfl now to the first oA these possible escape they apply in the present case. h,1',.,. ,¼ ,,;I,11. ,~ 1V,r,q routes for the proponent of nuclear developmen~, A~ the ~ ~ a i e::u, question of our obligations to the future.@ III The especially problematic area OBLIGATIONS TO THE (DISTANT) FUTURE. is that of the distant (i.e. ~ ,-inun({..!',l j ate) future, 11( the future with which people alive today will have no direct contact; by comparison, the immediate &,I" In fact the question of future gives fe~ problems for most ethical theories. obligations to future people presents tests which a number of ethical theories ( tl~eu,lf;"i, a;iff. ill}~-?~ • • 1-t,u,· fe,!, 0 "! 1-ope:ram,o_rLJ fail to pass, and also o'Ji(~) tlo .-u-r ~ t/JM_ the adequacy of accepted;/ institutions which leave future pe pl.c. in political philosophy cen:e!r .. in:g 01:1~ <YP of account~ the interests of ll'd"-lvx~, ;>?Moral philosophers have, predictably, differed on the issue. A good many of the philosophers who have explicitly considered the question have come down in favour of the same consideration being given to the rights and interests of future people as to those of contemporary or immediately future people. Other philosophers have tended to fall into three categories - those who acknowledge obligations to the future but who do not take them seriously or who assign them a lesser weight, those who deny or who are committed by their general moral position to denying that there are moral obligations beyond the immediate future, and those who come down, with admirable philosophical caution, on both sides of the issue, but with the weight of the argument favouring the view underlying prevailing economic and political pcr/1t,,/IJ institutions,that there are no moral obligations to the future beyond ~those f@raap,s to the next generation. According to the most extreme of these positions against moral obligations to the future, our behaviour with respect to the future is morally unconstrained, there are no moral restrictions on acting or failing to act deriving from the effect of our actions on future people. Of those philosophers who say, or whose views imply that we do not have obligations to the (non-immediate) future, who have opted for the unconstrained position, many have based this view on accouna of moral obligation which are builh. on relations which presuppose some ckiguhl uf \ 9. temporal or spatial contiguit y. Thus moral obligatio n is seen as grounded on or as presuppos ing various relations which could not hold between people widely separated in time (or sometimes in space). For example, obligatio n is seen as grounded in relations which are proximate or of short duration and also nontransitiv e. Among such suggested bases or grounds of moral obligatio n, or requireme nts on moral obligatio n, which would rule out obligatio ns to the non.immediate future are these:- Firstly there are those accounts which require that someone to whom a moral obligatio n is held be able to claim his rights or entitleme nt. People in the distant future will not be able t'b-claim rights and en«fw11. entitleme nts as aga:inst us, and of course they can do nothingAt o enforce any claims they might have for their rights against us. Secondly, there are those accounts which base moral obligatio ns on social or legal conventio n, for example a conventio n which would require punishmen t of offenders or at least some kind of social enforceme nt. But plainly these and other conventio ns will not hold invariant over change in society and amendment of legal conventio ns and so will not be invariant over time. Also future people have no way of enforcing their interests or punishing offenders , and there could be no guarantee that any contempo rary institutio n would do it for them. ~ Both the view that moral obligatio n requ{es the context of a moral community and the view that it is contractu ally based appear to rule out the distant future as a field of moral obligatio n as they not only require a commonal ity or some sort of common basis which cannot be guarantee d in the case of the distant future, but also a possibili ty of interchan ge or reciproci ty of action which cannot apply to the future. Where the basis of moral obligatio n is seen as mutual exchange the interests of future people must be set aside because they cannot change the past and cannot be parties to any mutual contract. The exclusion of moral obligatio ns to the distant future also follows from those views which attempt to ground moral obligatio ns in non-tran sitive relations of short duration such as sympathy and love. As well there are difficult ies about love and sympathy for (non-exis tent) people in the far distant future about whose personal qualities and characte ristics one must know very little and who may well Ji/fa,,,,be committed to a life-styl e for which one has no sympathy. On the current 1 showing in the case of nuclear energy it would be easy to conclude that contempo rary society lacks both love and sympathy for future people; and it would appear to follow fr om this that contempor ary people had no obligatio ns concernin g future people and could damage them as it suited them. ( 10. j What all these views have in common is a picture of obligation as something acquired, either individually or institutionally, something which is conditional on doing something or failing to do something (e.g. participating in the moral community, contracting), or having some characteristic one can \b 5 fail to have (e.g. love, sympathy, empffathy). { t:#11/ Because obligation therefore fOt1'0i7'1 ) c,4/t..,&,./.h. become\conditional, features usually"' thought to characterise ia;~such as universality of application and necessitation (i.e. the binding features) ate lost,~special.ly where there is a choice whether or not to do the thing required to acquire the obligation, and so as to whether to acquire it. The criteria for acquisition suggested are such as to exclude people in the distant future. The view that there are no moral constraints with respect to future people, that one is free to act however one likes with respect to them, Mt is Ahowever Jurn.mi).(/e. ,fl ·•=~ aH:llLalt one te ~t113ta1A J Irr Consider, elm example , a a scientific group which, for no particular reason other than to test a particular piece of technology, places in orbit a cobalt bomb set off by a triggering device designed to go off several hundred years from the time of its despatch. No presently living person and none of their immediate descendants would be affecte.d, but the population ofY the earth in the distant future would be wiped out as a The unconstrained position clearly direct and predictabl~ result of the action. implie s that this is an acceptable moral enterpris e, that whatever else we might legitimately criticize in the scientists' experiment, perhaps its being overexpensive or badly designed, we cannot lodge a moral protest about the damage it The unconstrained position also endorses as morally J,,)rc'y: acceptable the following sorts of linEOfflf':les:- A firm discovers it can make a will do to future people. handsome profit from mining, processing and manufacturing a new type of material which, although it causes no problem for present people or their immediate descendents, will over a period of hundreds of years decay into a substance which will cause an enormous epidemic of cancer among the inhabitants of the earth at that time. According to the unconstrained view the firm is free to act in its own interests, without any consideration for the harm i .t does ,ren,,~ future people. Such counterexamples to the unconstrained view, which are easily varied and multiplied, might seem childishly obvious. Yet the unconstrained position concerning the future from which they follow is far from being a straw man; not 0... only have several philosophers endorsed this position, but it i s ~ clear impli cation of many currently popular views of the basis of moral obligation, as well as of prevailing economic theory. It seems that those who opt for the unconstrained position have not considered such examples, -, /J/(l. by their position. despite their being clearly implied w ..ld cuh..117 ~o/1'1 Md;{ - We suspect thatAwhen it is brought out that the unconstrained position admits such counterexamples, that being free to act implies among other things being free to inflict pointless harm for example, most of those who opted for 11. the unconstrained position would want to assert that it was not what they intende.d. I What many of those who have put forward the unconstrained position seem to have had in mind in denying moral obligation is rather that future people can look after themselves, that we are not reponsible for their lives. The popular view that the future can take care of itself also seems to assume a future causally independent of the present. But it is not. It is not as if, r:-- in the counter/ example cases or in the nuclear case, the future is simply being .....:.,..., left alone to take care of itself. Present people are influencing it, and in doing so thereby acquire many of the same sorts of moral responsibilities as they do in causally affecting the present and immediate future, namely the obligation to take account in what they do of people affected and their interests, to be careful in their actions, to take account of the genuine probability of their actions causing harm, and to see that they do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life. Furthermore, to say that we are not responsible for the lives of future people does not amount to the same thing as saying that we are free to do as we like with respect to them, that there are no moral constraints on our action involving them. In just the same way, the fact that one does not have or has not acqu.ired an obligation to some stranger with whom one has never been involved, that one has no responsibility for his life, does not imply that one .is free to do what one likes with respect to him, for example to rob him or to pursue some course of act.ion of advantage to oneself which could seriously harm him. These difficulties for the unconstrained position arise in part from the (sometimes deliberate) failure to make an important distinction between acquired or assumed obligations toward somebody, for which some act of acquisition or assumption is required as a qualifying condition, and moral constraints, which require, for example, that one should not act so as to damage or harm someone, and for which no act of acquisition is required. and kind of responsibility involved. There is a considerable difference in the level In the first case one must do something or be something which one can fail to do or be, e.g. have loves, sympathy, be contracted. In the second case responsibility arises as a result of being a causal agent who is aware of the consequences or probable consequences of his action, and thus does not have to be especially acquired or assumed. Thus there is no problem about how the latter class, moral constraints, can apply to the distant future in cases where it may be difficult or impossible for acquisition or assumption conditions to be satisfied. They apply as a result of the ability to produce causal effects on the distant future of a reasonably predictable nature. Thus also moral constraints can apply to what does not (yet) exist, just as actions can cause results that do not p{jf-lrr (yet) exist. While it may~be the case that there would need to be an acquired or assumed obligation in order for it to be claimed that contemporary people must make speci.al sacrifices for future people of an heroic kind, or even to help them 12. especially, only moral constraints are needed in order for us to be constrained Thus, to return to the train parable, the consigner cannot from harming them. argue in justification of hi.s action that he has never assumed or acquired responsfbility for the passengers, that he does not know them and therefore has no love or sympathy for them and that they are not part of his moral community, in short that he has no special obligations to help them. All that one needs to argue concerning the train, and the nuclear case, is that there are moral constraints against harming, not that there are specially acquired obligations to take responsibility for the lives of people involved. There has been an attempt to represent all obligations to the distant future in terms of heroic self- sacrifice, something which cannot of course be morally required. But in view of the distinctions between constraints and acquired obligation and between obligation and supererogation this is just to misrepresent the position of these obligations. For example, one is no more engaging in heroic self- sacrifice by not forcing future people into an unviable life position or by refraining from causing them direct harm than the consigner is resorting to heroic self- sacrifice in refraining from placing his dangerous package 6n the train. - 1~ ,-;.,,. The conf~ of moral constraints with acquired obligation, and the attempt therewith to view all constraints as acquired and to write off nonacquired constraints, is facilitated through the use of the term 'moral obligation' both to signify any type of deontic constraints and also to indicate rather something which t?t-. con.Pl~"' has to be assumed or acquired. a .~is encouraged by reductionist positions which, in attempting to account for obligation in genera~mistakenly endeavour to collapse all obligations into acquired obligations. Hence the equation, and some main roots {),nu,,WUI of the unconstrained position, of theAbelief that there are no moral constraints concerning the distant future. The unconstrained view tends to give way, under the weight of counterexamples, to more qualified, and sometimes ambivalent, positions, for example the position that our obligations are to immediate posterity, we ought to try to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immediate successors in a better condtion, and that is all; il,/7 there are irferactice no obligations to the distant future. A main argument in favour of the latter theme is that such obligations would in practice be otiose. Everything that needs to be accounted for can be encompassed through the chain picture of obligation as linking successive generations, under which each generation has obligations, based on loves or sympathy, only to the succeeding - generation. /hftfe.. 'U'L P..t (t A.,t ~ . A three objections to this chain account. First, it is inadequate to treat constraints concerning the future as if they applied only between generations, as if there were no question of constraints on individuals opposed to whole generations, since individuals can create causal effects, e.g. harm, on the future in a way which may create individual responsibility, and which often cannot be sheeted home to an entire generation. Secondly, such chains, since non-transitive, cannot yield direct obligations to the distant future. But for this very reason the chain picture cannot be adequate, as examples again show. For the picture is unable to explain several of the cases that have to be dealt with, e.g. the examples already discussed which show that we can have a direct effect on the distant future without affecting the next generation, who may not even be able to influence matters. VThirdly, improvements for immediate successors may be achieved at the expense oflcfi\advantages to people of the more distant future. Improving the world for immediate successors is quite compatible with , and may even in some circumstances be most easily achieved by, ruining it for less immediate successors. examples Such cases can hardly be written off as "never-never land" since many cases of environmental exploitation might be seen as of just this type, e.g. not just the nuclear case but also the exhaustion of nonrenewable resources and the long-term depletion of renewable resources such as soils t.($l. and forests through over crttl If then such obvious injustices to future W• people arising from the favouring or exclusive concern with immediate successors are to be avoided, obligations to the future will have to be seen as in some way fairly distributed over time, and not merely as accruing to particular generations in the way the chain picture suggests. IV. ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY OBLIGATI_ONS TO THE FUTURE : ECONOMISTIC r.\ Ul\tERTAINTY AND INDETERMINACY ARGUMENTS. While there are grave difficulties for the unconstrained position, qualification leads to a more defensible . , ~ ,;. position. According to thej qualified position we are not entirely unconstrained with respect to the distant future, there are obligations, but these are not so important as those to the present, and the interests of distant future people cannot weigh very much in the scale against those of the present and immediate future . The interests of future people then, except in unusual cases, count for very much less than the interests of present people. Hence such things as nuclear development and various exploitative activities which benefit present people should proceed, even if people of the distant future are (somewhat) disadvantaged by them. The qualified position appears to be widely held and is implicit in prevailing economic theories, where the position of a decrease in weight of future ( 'tJ c./,~ 14. c,,...,.,,..7 e-.Al'I r~e/ ,,_0 /1//4,r.4'---/o/_/,._ costs and benefits (and so of future inter~s) is obtained by application over time of a ! ~ discount rateJ l The attempt to apply eco~omics as a moral theory, something that is becoming increasingly common, can lead then to the qualified position. J What is objectionable in such an approach is that rl..ooA.cl economics~ operate within the bounds of moral (deontic) constraints, just A as in practice it operates within legal constraints, not determine what those There are moreover alternative economic theories and simply constraints are. to adopt, without further ado, one which discounts the future is to beg ~.rn.<)~ t=t.m questions at issue. Among the arguments that economists offer for generally discounting the future 1 the most threadbare is based ~n the assumption that future generations J'{ than present ones > and so better placed to handle the waste off willj€:tter Since there is mounting evidence that future generations may well UQ_l= problem. be better off than present ones, especially in things that matter, no argujJnent can carry Much discounting the interests of future generations on this basis For it depends qf Nor is that all that is wrong with the argujtnent. weight. ~ 1 ~.<f_.: ~ assumption that poorer contemporaries would be making (ullRJ_td/., h-n.a-hc '"/ J richer successors in foregoing such,i de.f5elopments as nuclear power. Tl,q•f ;1 1 il-.la/Jt,,,.1U H:O::f t f ~ a ~ I cl:e..vi?1tiprirn~ M th. f:>.I~,. .Ly rcdr.lul -Be:t,\ the sacrifice {(J/0..) lias , 1r cad, li @an ~ ~ hi¥/~ -tl,e., on sacrifices to f or 8'1. Qto @h es. t"/!"4;/ "r: toJ/IJ-f,444 the future 'i1:m:1 for the waste disposal problem to be ~ argument . Iii\ ""1 legitimately generations, it would have to be shown, what recent economic progress hardly justifies, that future generations will be, not just better U 11.,t J1' 011!.. C u.;,,;/,/e_. off, but so much better offAthat they can duly absorb the nuclear waste burden. A more plausible argument for discounting is d.i rectly in terms of opportunity costs. It is argued_, from the fact that a dollar gained now is worth much more than a dollar received in the non-immediate future (because the first dollar could meanwhile be invested at compound interest), that discounting is required to obtain equivalent monetary values, and so f~r efficient allocation of resources. Similarly it is argued, by virtue again of 'r/'~/,·s-.-l,~..... of monetary value, that compensation - which is what the waste problem is taken to cawii:a. to 71....r a few pennies set now than later. ~ costs much less_ economically ,1ov.)Q/" -- ,...... aside (e.g. in a trust fund)Ain the future, if need bev, will suffice to compensate eventually for any v,c. t,w>.f of remote radioactive waste leakage. There are, presently at least, in surmountable pract1cal _ _ difficulties about applying such discounting, e.g. how to determine appropriate future discount rates. A more serious objection is that 15 . applied generally, the argument presupposes , what is false, that compensatio n, like value, can always be converted into monetary equivalents , that people ~ncluding I those outside market frameworks) can be monetarily compensated for a variety of damages, including cancer and loss of life. There is no compensatin g a dead man, or for a lost species. In fact the argument presupposes neither part of which can succeed be represented , at all adequately it is not just /</ a double reduction that value cannot in general , -fa' /J,'K~~ monetarily, but (as against utilitariani sm) ,t -LJ..,.t constraints and obligations can not be somehow reduced to matters of value. It i s also presupposed that all decision methods, suitable for requisite nuclear choic e s,'!_--- - -~ are bound ~o apply discounting . This is far from so : indeed A Goodi~ argues that, on the do not allow discounting , and discounting only works in practice with expected utility rules (such as underlie cost-benef it and benefit-ris k analyses), which ,r,// are, he contends strictly inapplicabl e for nuclear choices (since aJncrt 1 pnl'>Si],1 f3 {,/,11.{f al f<j''1. a,t /'.,~,,/,/;#b J outcomes can be duly determirte1, in the way that application of the rules 1-0 requir es). 1/ contrary, more appropriate decision £~1¢s ,, As the f~e.ceid;nJ . arguments reveal, the discounting move often has the same result as the unconstrain ed position. If, for instance, we consider the cancer i example and reduce costs to payable compensatio n, it is evident that over a sufficientl y long period of time discounting at current prices would lead to the conclus ion that there are no recoverable damages and so, in economic terms, no constraints . I n short, even certain damage to future people could be written off. One way to achieve the bi a s against future people is by the application of discount rates which are set in accord with the current e conomic horizons of no more than about 15 years~2/ and appli.cation of such rates would simply beg the question against the interests a nd rights of fu t ure people. Where there is certain future damage of a mo rally f o rbidden t ype, f or example, the whole method of discounting is simply inappl.icabl e, and its use would violate moral constraint s.~ Another argument for the qualified position, which avoids the objections from ca ses of c ert a in d a mage, comes from probability considerati ons. The distant future, it is a rgued, is much more uncertain than the present and immediate future, so that probabiliti es are consequentl y lower, perhaps even approaching or coinciding with zero for any hypothesis concerning the distant future.• But then if we take account of probabiliti es in the obvious way, by simply multiplying them against costs and benefits, it is evident that the interests of future people; except in cases where there is an unusually high degree of certainty, much) less than those of present and must count for (very neighbourin g people where (much) higher probabj_lities are attached. So in the case of conflict between the present and the future where it is a question of weighing certain benefits to the people of the present and the immediate f(Jture against a much lower probability of indetermina te 16. costs to an indeterminate number of distant future people, the issue would normally be decided in favour of the present, assuming anything like similar costs and benefits were involved. But of course it cannot be assumed that anything like similarly weighted costs and benefits are involved in the nuclear case, especially if it is a question of risking poisoning some of the earth for half a million or so years, with consequent risk of serious harm to thousands of generations of future people, in order to obtain am:±E doubtful fU" t, i :b4. benefits for some present people, in f11(,i11i.1,~ c,HJcn.A,;;,. l';-of,Y~;l,7 or le the shape of the opportunity to). continue unnecessarily high energy use. And even if the costs and benefits were comparable or evenly weighted ,)<such an argument would be defective, since an analogous argument would show that the consigner's action is acceptable provided the benefit, e.g. the profit he stood to gain from imposing significant risks on other people, was sufficiently large. or l"isl.~JwiolilSuch a cost-benefitAapproach to moral and decision problems, with or without the probability frills, is quite inadequate where different parties are concerned or to deal with cases of conflict of interest or moral problems where deontic constraints are involved, and commonly yields counterintuitive results. it would follow on such principles that it is permissible For example, for a firm to injure, or very likely injure, some innocent party provided the firm stands to make a sufficiently large gain from it. But the costs and benefits involved are not transferable in any s1mple or general way from one party to another. Transfers of this kind, of costs and benefits involving different parties, commonly raise moral issues - e.g. is x entitled to benefit himself by imposing costs on y - whi.ch are not susceptible to, a simple cost-benefit approach of the sort adopted J~ J,!01-Ult;,... •F enenza, of nuclear energy, ltho attefl@J':=::f::fl=di-smiss the costs to future ,~~ # "41'- . ~'?f1¥=;ll,, d?,,-,ipQ/i,,. people~with the soothing remark that any development involves costs as well as benefHs. The limitations of transfei:_ point is enough to invalidate the comparison, heavily relied on in building a case for the acceptability of the nuclear -- risk, between nuclear risks and those from such activities as airplane travel or cigarette smoking. In the latter case those who supposedly benefit from the activity -3. are also, to an overwhelming extent, those who bear the serious health costs and risks involved. In contrast the users and supposed beneficiaries of nuclear energy will be risking not only, or even primarily, their own lives and health, but also that of others who may be non-beneficiaries and who may be spatially or temporaJ.ly removed, and these risks will not be in any direct way related to a person's extent of use. The transfer objection is essentially the same as that to the utilitarian's {happiness) sums as a way ~f solvini moral. conflict between diff_e_r ent parties, and the . . - 1J.1 ,,. u/i'th:urty,- ~IJ-UJI--. NJ/t.J1 ~ O-? 'Hf/t• """~ aP/2~.i.-1-;- 1ntroduct1on of probabi.lity cons1derations.-l does not change the principles involved but merely complicates the analysis. One might further object to the probability argument that piobabilities involving distant future situations are not always less than those concerning the immediate future in the way the argument supposes, and ~ 17. that the outcomes of some moral problems do not depend on a high level of f probability anyway. In some sorts of cases it is enough, as the train parable I reveals, that a significant risk is created; such cases do not depend critically on high probability assignments. Uncertainty arguments in various forms are the most common and important ones used by philosophers, economists and others to argue for the position that we cannot be expected to take serious account of the effects of our actions on the distant future. There are two strands to the uncertainty argument, capable of sep- aration, but frequently tangled up. priori Both arguments are mistaken, the first on a grounds, the second on a posteriori grounds. The first argument is a generalised uncertainty argument which runs as follows:- In contrast to the exact information we can obtain about the present, the information we can obtain -ft1Z'L:J about the effects of our actions on the distant future is unreli.able,wootl; and highly A speculative. But we cannot base assessments of how we should act on information of this kind, especially when accurate information is obtainable about the present which would indicate different action. Therefore we must regretfully ignore the X uncertain effects of our actions on the distant future. crudely: More formally and One only has obligations to the future if these obligations are based on reliable information. distant future. There is no reli.able information at present as regards the Therefore one has no obligations to the distant future. This first argument is essentially a variant on a sceptical argument in epistemology concerning our knowledge of the future (formally, replace 'obligations' by 'knowledge' in the crude statement of the argument above). The main ploy is to considerably overestimate and overstate the degree of certainty available with respect to the present and immediate future, and the degree of certainty which is required as the basis for moral consideration both with respect to the present and with respect to the future. Associated with this is the attempt to suggest a sharp division as regards certainty between the present and immediate future on the one hand and the distant future on the other. We shall not find, we suggest, that there is any such sharp or simple division between the distant future and the adjacent future and the present, at least with respect to those things in the present which are normally subject to moral constraints. We can and constantly do act on the basis of such "unreliable" information, as the sceptic as regards the future conveniently labels "uncertainty"; for sceptic-proof certainty is rarely, or never, available with respect to much of the present and immediate future. In moral situations in the present, action often takes account of risk and probability, even quite low probabilities. Consider again the train example. We do not need to know for certain that the container will break and the lethal gas escape. In fact it does not even have to be probable, in the relevant sense of more probable than not, in order for us to condemn the consigner's action. It is enough that there is a significant 18 . in this sort of case. risk of harnt J It does not matter if the decreased well-being of the consigner is certain and that the prospects of the passengers quite uncertain, the resolution of the problem is nevertheless clearly in favour But if we do not require of the so-called "speculative " and "unreliable". certainty of action to apply moral constraints in contemporary affairs, why should we require a much higher standard of certainty in the future? Why should we require for the future, episte.m ic standards which the more familiar sphere of moral action concerning the present and adjacent future does not need to meet? The insistence on certainty as a necessary condition before moral consideration can be given to the distant future, then, amounts to an epistemic double standard. But such a~ epistemic double standard, proposed in explaining the difference between the present and the future and to justify ignoring future peoples' interests, in fact cannot itself provide an explanation of the differences, since it already presupposes different standards of certainty appropriate to each class, which difference is in turn in need of justification. The second uncertainty argument is a practical uncertainty argument, that whatever our obligations to the future, we cannot in practice theoretical take the interests of future people into account because uncertainty about the distant future is so gross that we cannot determine what the likely consequences of actions on it will be and therefore, however good our intentions to the people of the distant future are, in practice we have no choice but to ignore their interests. Uncertainty is gross where certain incompatible hypotheses are as good as one another and there is no rational ground for choosing between them. The second uncertainty argument can be put alternatively this way:- If moral principles are, like other principles, implicational in form, that is of such forms as "if every (action) x" , x has character h then x is wrong, for then what the argument claims is that we cannot ever obtain the information about future actions which would enable us to detach the antecedent of the implication. So even if moral principles theoretically apply to future people, in practice they cannot be applied to obt.ain clear conclusions or directions concerning contemporary action of the "It is wrong to do x" type. Many of the assumptions of the second argument be conceded. If the distant future really is so grossly uncertain that in every case it is impossible to determine in any way that is better than chance what the effects of present action will be, and whether any given action will help or hinder future people, then moral principles, although they may apply theoretically to the future, will in practice not be applicable to obtain any clear conclusions about how to act. Hence the distant future will impose no practical moral constraints on action. However the argument is factually incorrect in assuming that the future always is so grossly uncertain or indeterminate. Admittedly there is often a high degree of uncertainty concerning the distant future, but as a matter of (contingent) fact it is not always so gross or sweeping as the ~~ --t9-. argument has to assume. There are some areas where uncertainty is not so great as I to exclude constraints on action, especially when account is taken of the point, which was noticed in connection with the first argument, that complete certainty is commonly not required for moral constraints and that all that may be needed in some cases is the creation of a significant risk. Again there is considerable uncertainty about many factors which are not highly, or at all, morally relevant, but this does not extend to many factors which are of much greater importance to moral issues. For example, we may not have any idea what the fashions will be -f/,u.'fN-r I in a hundred years i n ~ names o r ~ footwear, or what praod1 of ice • • .._A'.~ cream people will be eating if any, but we do have excellent reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that what people there are in a hundred years are likely to have material and psychic needs not entirely unlike our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life; that like us they will not be immune to radiation; that their welfare will not be enhanced by a high incidence of cancer or genetic defects, by the destruction of resources, or the elimination from t h e ~ earth of that wonderful variety of non-human life which at present makes it such a rich and interesting place. Ill uncertainty argument should be rejected. For this sort of reason, the second The case of nuclear waste storage, and of uncertainty of the effects of it on future people, is one area where uncertainty in morally relevant respects is not so great as to preclude moral constraints on action, where we can ascertain if not absolute certainties at least probabilities of the same sort of order as are considered sufficient for the application of moral principles in parallel contemporary cases, especially where spatially remote people are involved. In particular there is not gross indeterminacy or uncertainty; it is simply not true that incompatible hypotheses about what may happen are as good as each other. It is plain that nuclear waste storage does impose significant risks of harm on future people, and, as~• eac. ~ eu,~ ~ ··from the train example, the significant risk of harm is enough in cases of this { type to make moral constraints applicable. In terms of the def ects of the preceding uncertainty arguments, we can see the defects in a number of widely employed uncertainty arguments used to 0~1,.(t_ write off probable~ harm to future people as outside the scope of proper consideration. Most of these popular moves emv ,< .loy both of the uncertainty arguments as suits the case, switching from one to the other in a way that is again reminiscent of sceptical moves. For example, we may be told that we cannot really take account of future people because we cannot be sure that they will exist or that their tastes and wants will not be completely different from our own, to the point where they will not suffer from our exhaustion of resources or from the~hings that would c,.ffect us. But this is to insist upon complete certainty of a sort beyond what is required for the present and immediate future, where there is also commonly no guarantee that some disaster will not overtake those we are mora.lly committed to. Again we may be told that there is no guarantee that future people will be worthy of any efforts on our part, because they may be morons of forever plugged into enjoyment of other machines. Even if one is prepared to accept the elitist approach presupposed - according to which only those who meet certain properly civilized or intellectual standards are eligible for moral consideration - what we are being handed in such arguments as a serious defeating consideration is again a mere outside possibility like the sceptic who says that solid-looking desk in front of us is perhaps only a facade, not because he has any particular reason for doing so, but because he hasn't looked around the back, drilled holes in it, etc. etc. Neither the contemporary nor the historical situation gives any positive reason for supposing that a lapse into universal moronity or universal-pleasure-machine escapism is a serious possibility, as oppo s ed to a logical possibility. We can contrast with these mere logical possibilities the very real historically supportable risks of escape of nuclear waste or decline of a civilisation through destruction of its resource base. The possibilities just considered in these uncertainty arguments of sceptical character are not real possibilities. Another argument which may consider a real possibility, but still does not succeed in showing that it is acceptable to proceed with an action which would appear to be harmful to future people, is often introduced in the nuclear waste case. This is the argument that future people may discover a rigorously safe and permanent storage method for nuclear wastes before they are damaged by escaped waste material. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that this is a real possibility (though physical arguments may show that it is not). This still does not ~ffect the fact that there is a significant risk of serious damage and that the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action of this type as morally impermissible. In just the same way, future people may discover a cure for cancer: that this app ears to be a ~ live possibility, and not merely a logical possibility, does not make the action of the firm tu ..c tbeaa-:&-xam~ aiscussed earlier of producing a substance likely to cause cancer in future people, morally admissible. The fact that there was a real possibility of future people avoiding the harm would show that actions of these sorts were admissible only if what was required for inadmissibility was certainty of harm or a very high probability of it. In such cases before such actions could be considered admissible what would ?e required is 22 far more than a possibility, real or not - it is at least the availability of an applicable, safe, and rigorously tested, not merely speculative, technique for achieving it, something that future people could reasonably be to protect themselves. ~tpected to apply ~/l,.. a..,,.L- a«'if The strategy of /tnost af rbes9 uncertainty arguments is fairly clear then, I and may be brought out by looking yet again at the train example where the consigner says that he cannot be expected to take account of the effect of his actions on the passengers because they may find an effective way to deal with his parcel or some lucky or unlucky accident may occur, e.g. the train may break down and they may all change to a different transport leaving the parcel behind, or the train may crash killing all the passengers before the container gets a chance to leak. These are all possibilities of course, but there is no positive reason to believe that liC/t2- they are any more than that, that is they are n o t ~ possibilities. ~k- The ;\, strategy is to stress such bH~sid& possibilities in order to create the false impression that there is gross uncertainty about the future, that the real possibility that the contai.ner will break should be treated in the same way as these mere logical possibilities, that uncertainty about the future is so great as to preclude the consigners' takin~ account of the passengers' welfare and the real possibility of harm from his parcel and thereby to excuse his action. A related strategy is to stress a real vossibility, such as finding a cure for cancer, and thereby imply that this removes the case for applying moral constraints. This move implicitly makes the assumptions of the first argument, that certainty of harm, or at least a very high probability of harm is required before an action can be judged morally inadmissible, and the point of stressing the real possibility of avoidance of damage is to show that this allegedly required high degree of certainty or probability cannot be attained. That is, the strategy draws attention to some real uncertainty implying that this is sufficient to defeat the application of moral constraints. But, as we have seen, this is often not so. Closely related to uncertainty arguments are arguments premissed on the indeterminacy of the future. In particular it is argued that the indeterminacy, for example with respect to the number and exact character of people at future times, would at least prevent the interest of future people being taken into account where there is a conflict with the present. Since their numbers are ,:J$ '<>A, indeterminate and their interests unknown how, it is SloM!-d, can we weigh their competing claims against those of the present and immediate future where this information is available in a more or less accurate form? The question is raised particularly by pr,Pblems of sharing fixed quantities of resources among present -fu,-- Q ~11.,,y,.La.. ..,, I, and future people," wherf the numbers of the latter are indeterminate. Such problems are indeed difficult, but they are not resolved by ignoring the claims f ) of the future, any more than the problems raised by the need to take account in decision-making of factors difficult to quantify are resolved byVignoring such factors. Nor are distributional problems as large and representative a cl'ass of moral problems concerning the future as the tendency to focus on them would suggest. can be conceded that there will be cases where the indeterminacy of aspects of It the future will make co~flicts very difficult to resolve or indeed irresoluble - J a realistic ethical theory will not deliver a decision procedure - but there will equally be other conflict cases where the level of indeterminacy does not hinder resolution of the issue, e.g. the train example which is a conflict case of a type. In particular, there will bi~ many cases which are not solved by weighing numbers, numbers of interests, or whatever, cases for which one needs to know only the most general probable characteristics of future people. The crucial question which emerges is then: are there any features of future people which would disqualify them fro~ral consideration or reduce their claims to such below those of present people? Prima facie, The answer is : in principle None. ,. moral principles are universalisable, and lawlike, in that they apply independently of position in space or in time, for example. But universalisability of principles is an outcome of those ethical theories which are capable of deali.ng satisfactorily with the present; in other words, a theory that did not allow properly for the future would be found to have defects as regards the present, to deal unjustly or unfairly with some present people, e.g. those remotely located. those outside some select subgroup, such as (white-skinned) humans, etc. candidates The only for characteristics that would fairly rule out future people are the logical features we have been looking at, such as uncertainty and indeterminacy; ht1 1l, , . ~ we have argued 1 p: ai-Oia) it would be far too sweeping to see these features as affecting the moral claims of future people in a general way. These special features only affect certain sorts of cases (e.g. the determination of best probable or practical course of action given only present information). In particular/ they do not affect cases of the sort being considered, nuclear development, where highly determinate. or certain information about the numbers and characteristics of the class likely to be harmed is not required, nor is certainty of damage. To establish obligations to the future a full universalizability principle is not required: it is enough that the temporal position of a person cannot af feet his entitlement to just and fair treatment, to full moral consideration ;i Zfj inversely, that it is without basis to discriminate morally against a person in virtue of his temporal position. As a result of this universalizahility, there are the same general obligations to future people as to the present; and thus there is the same ooligation to take account of them and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability (and not just the certainty) of our actions causing harm or damage, and to see, other things being equal, that we do not act so as to rob them of what is necessary for the chance of a good life. Uncertainty and indeterminacy tf,1'1 Q.v. a. do not/\:krt: u s ~ of these obligations. If in a closely comparable case concerning the present the creation of a significant risk is enough to rule out an action as immoral, and there are no independent grounds for requiring greater certainty of I harm in the future case under consideration, then futurity alone will not provide adequate grounds for proceeding with the action, thus discriminating against future people. Accordingly we cannot escape, through appeal to futurity, the conclusion already tentatively reached, that proposals for nuclear development in the present and likely future state of technology and practices for future waste disposal are immoral. Before we consider (in section VII) the remaining escape route from this conclusion, through appeal to overriding circumstances, it is important to pick up the further case (which heavily reinforces the tentative conclusion) against nuclear development, since much of it relies on ethical principles similar to those that underlie obligations to the future, and since it too is commonly met by similar appeal to extenuating circumstances. V. Problems of safe nuclear operation: reactor emissions, and core meltdown. ethical problems with nuclear power are by no means confined to future creatures. Just as remoteness in time does not erode obligations or entitlements to just treatment, neither does location in spa ce, or a particular gqsgraphical position. First of all, the problem of nuclear waste disposal raises serious questions of distributive justice not only across time, across generations, but also across space. Is one state or region entitled to dump its radioactive pollution in e,,- ,.q/Jjel'J another state's or region's yard? ,( When that region receives no due compensation (whatever that would amount to, in such a case~ and the people do not agree (though the leaders imposed upon them might)? The answer, and the arguments under- pinning the answer, are both like those already given in arguing to the tentative conc.lusion concerning the injustice of imposing radioactive wastes upon future people. But the cases are not exactly the same: USA and Japan cannot endeavour fl'I- cf to discount peoples of the Pacific in whose regions they propose to drop~ their ,a,ltdi;~ pollution in quite the way they can discount people of two centuries hence. (But what this consideration really reveals is yet another flaw in the idea that e ntitlement to just treatment can be discounted over time.) ! ' ~ '· i Eth~· c 1 i ssues of distr i bu tive j ustice, • as to equityI / ,:,J ~ J.._ /, ,tJ tc..id~,,..__ v J{ ~iv9ly=~=in ~ , also arise elsewhere in the assessment of nuclear development ; in particular, a s regards t h e treatment of those in the neighbour of reactors, and, tud rorb differently, as r~gards the distribution of (alleged) b~nefits Afrom nuclear power across ~ ~5' (The la t ter ques tion is t aken up ,\ a~ s ~~~ , especja] Jy , tb s Pev etty argument . ) ~ Weople livin g or working in the vicinity special costs and risks: f ~w{ffitrrf oslde, al ll rn ;i" a nuclear reactor are subject to firstly, radioactive pollution, due to the fact tha t reactors discharge radioactive ma terials into the air and water near the plant , and secondly catastrophic accidents, such a:; {steam) explosion of a reactor. ~ ,I/;.._ ~ question is whether such cos t s and risks can be imposed, with any ethical legi- timacy, on these people, who frequently have little or no say in their imposition, and who have mostly not been informed of any choices regarding the "risk/benefit -- tradeoffs" of nuclea r _technology. -:::)__ ( That they are so imposed, without local participation, indeed often without local input or awareness as with local opposition, reveals one part of the antidemocratic face of nuclear development, a part that nuclear development shares however with other large-scale polluting industry, where local participation and questions, fundamental to a genuine democracy/ of regional determination and popular sovereignty, are commonly ignored or avoided. .-:-,,, The "normal" ei 1ssion , during plant operation1 of low level rad~ ation carcinogenic and mutagenic costs. While there are undoubtedly costs, there r mains /,id,, substantial disagreement over theAnumber of cancers and precise extent of genetic damage induced by exposure to such radiation, over the local health costs involved. Under the Old Paradigm, which (illegltimotely ) permits free transfer of costs and risks from one person to another, the ethical issue directly raised is said to be: what extent of c~5cer and genetic damage, if any, is permissibly traded for the advantages of nuclear power, and under what conditions? m Under the Old Parad the issue is then translated into decision-theor etic questions, such as to 'ho · to e mploy risk/benefit analysis as a prelude to government regulation' and 'how t o ....1. 25. determine what is an acceptable level of risk/safety for the pub lic' .:ii } 3/ The Old Paradigm a t titude, ref~ted in the public policy o f s ome count r ie s that have such policies, i s t ha t the economic benefits conferred by allowing radiation emissions outweigh the costs of an increase in cancer and genetic damage. An example will reveal that such evaluations , which rely~ what appeal they have on a dubious utilitarianism, will not pass muster. It is a pity about Aunt Ethyl getting cancer, but it's nice to have this air conditioner working in summer. Such frequently trivial and rather inessential benefits, which may be obtained alternatively, e.g. by modification of houses, in no way compensate for the (a;~nf Y, of cance~ '---- The point is that the costs to one party 27 are not justifie~ '-.:,. especially when such benefits to other parties can be alternatively obtained a,-,{,...~ without such ~ awful costs.:. People, minorities, whose ,;.~;(a_, .Jro/ ~ within 50 miles of a nuclear plant. p().~M...11£; ,1711~, position isA compromised are thos\/ who live (Ehildren, for example, are in aAparticularly vulnerable position, since they are several times more likely to contract cancer through exposure than normal adults.) In USA, such people bear a risk of cancer and genetic damage of as much as 50 times that borne by the population at l arge. ~i A notinegl 11ble percentage (in excess of 3% of those exposed for 30 years) o f ~ qJ'~c~ R@r~ t a? s&&-eh:e people 1 in the area will di~j for the sake of the majority who are 111,(.ctaii-J" 'I aailat.'@ffl benefitted byApower producti~n . ~e~~a ft~elear. Whatever charm t he argument from overriding benefits had, even under the Old Paradigm, vanishes once it is seen that there are alternative, and in several respects less expensive ~ ways/ of delivering the real benefits involved. There are several other tricks used in showing that the imposition of radiation t:Jt/~ or on minorities, most of whom havei\ no genuine voice in the location of reactors in their environment and cannot move away without serious losses, is quite (morally) acceptable. l~ One cheaper trick, deployed by the US Atomic Energy Corrnnission, is to suppose that it is permissible to double, through nuclear technology, the level of (natural) rqdiation that a population have received with apparently negligible consequences, the argument being that the additional amount (being "natural" level) is also likely to have negligible consequences. equivalent to the The increased amounts of radiation - with their large man-made component - are then accounted normal, and, f<-,f- i, l(e,,... c-ltt<..,cd. of course,,\ what is normal is morally acceptable. in this argument is sound. None of the steps Drinking one bottle of wine a day may have no ill-effects, whereas drinking two a day certainly may affect a person's well-being; and while the smaller intake may have become normal for the person, the larger one will, under such conditions, not be. Finally, what is or has become normal, e.g . two murders or twenty cancers a day in a given city, may be far from acceptable. In fact, even the USA, which has strict standards by comparison with most other countries with planned nuclear reactors, permits radiat i on emissions very substantially in excess of the standards laid down; so the emission situation is worse than mere consideration of the standards wou'ld disclose. Furthermore , the ~------- -------- ----~-- -------- -------- -------- ---monitoring of the standards "imposed" is entrusted to the nuclear operators themselves, scarcely di.sinterested parties. Public policy is determined not so as to guarantee public health, but rather to serve as a 'public pacifier' while private nuclear operations proceed relatively unhampered~ While radioactive emissions are an ordinary feature of reactor operation, breakdown is, hopefully, not: an accident of magnitude is accounted, by official definition, an 'extraordinary nuclear occurrence'. But such accidents can happen, and almost have on several occasions (the most notorious being Three Mile Island) Y-Q If the cooling and emergency core cooling systems fail in American (light water) 1flore acto rs, then the core melts and 'containment failure' is likely, with ~he result that an area of 40,000 square miles could be radioactively contaminated. In the event of the worst type of accident in a very small reactor, a steam explosion in the reactor vessel, about 45,000 people would be killed instantly and at least 100,000 would die as a result of the accident, property damages would exceed $17 billion and an area H,e size of Pennsylvania would be destroyed. Modern nuclear reactors are abo ut five times the size of the reactor for which these conservative US government figures are giveti' : the consequences of a similar accident with a modern reactor would accordingly b~Y~~eater still. The consigner in ri sking the lifes, well-being and property of the passengers on the train has acted i_nadmissibly. Does a government or govern~t-spon sored private utility act in tay that is anything other than much less responsible in siting a nuclear reactor in a community, in planting such a dangerous package on the community train. The answer will be No, if the analogy holds good and the consigners' action is, as we would ordinarily suppose, inadmissible and irresponsible. The proponents of nuclear power have in effect argued to the contrary, while at the same time endeavouring to shift the dispute out of the ethical ar€/1 and into a technological dispute as to means (in accordance with the Old Paradigm). It has been contended , firstly, what contrasts with the train example, that there is no real possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident. Indeed in the '11- influential Rassmussen report - which was extensively used to support public confidence in US nuclear fission technology - an even stronger, an incredibly strong, improbability claim was stated: namely, the likelihood of a catastrophic nuclear accident is so remote as to be (almost) impossible. The main argument for this claim derives from the assumptions and estimates of the report itself. These assumptions li ke the claim are undercut by nuclear incidents that came very cil:ose to accidents, incidents which reflect what happens in a reactor rather better than mathematical models. As with the storage of nuclear wastes, so with the operation of nuclear reactors, it is important to look at what happens in the actual world of technological limitations and human error, of waste leak.age and reactor incidents and quite possibly accidents, not in an ideal world far removed .from the actual, a technological 27. ( dream world where there is no real possibility of a nuclear catastrophe. In such an ideal n ucle a r wo r ld , where waste disposal were fool-proof and reac tors were accident-proof , things wo uld no doubt be morally different. But we do no t live in such a world. "" According to the Ra\ussen report its calculation of extremely low accident probabilities is based upon reasonable mathematical and technological assumptions and is methodological ly sound. This is very far from being the case. The under- lying mathematical methods, variously called "fault tree analysis" and "reliability as estimating techniques", are unsound, because they exclude .-1 "not credible" ,>Difl~;l,,9'?~ ~ possibilities or as branches t;o:1:t!il fl Ellffl "not significant" that are real .m:d" may well b'1. rt:i./f,04,( ~1cq1pen1 in the real world. \ It i.s the eliminations that are otherworldly. Infact the methodology and data of the report has been soundly and decisively criticized .Ji And it has been shown that there is a real possibili.ty, a notjpegligibJ.e probability, of a serious accident. It is contended, secondly, that even if there is a non-negligible probability of a reactor accident, still ibis acceptable, being of no greater order than risks of accidents that are already socially accepted. Here we encounter again that insidious engineering approach to morality built into models of an economic cast, e.g. benefit-cost balance sheets, risk assessment models, etc. Risk assessment, a sophistication of transaction or trade-off models, purports to provide a comparison between the relative risks attached to different options, e.g. energy options,which settles their ethical status. The following lines of argument are encountered in risk assessment a.s applied to energy options: (i) if option a imposes costs on fewe.r people thq.n option b then option a is preferable to optic+; (ii) option a involves a total net cost in terms of cost to people (e.g. deaths, injuries, etc.) which is less than that of option b, which is already accepted; therefore option a is acceptable. 3 f For example, the number likely to be killed by nuclear power stations is less than 1,r 1'-i l'Jp.,( ,-c.c.,',l.ci...fs ~ the likely number killed by cigarette smoking, which jjB accepted: so nuclear pqwer A stations are acceptable. A little refle c tion reveals that this sort of risk assessment argument involves the same kind of fallacy as ll!l!it transaction modek. It is far too simple--minded, and it ignores distributional and other relevant aspects of the context. In order to obtain an ethical assessment we should need a much fuller picture and we should need to know at least these things:- do the costs and benefits go to the same parties; and i1·he person who undertakes the risks also the person who receives the benefits or primarily, as in driving or cigarette smoking, or are the costs imposed on ot e parties who do not benefit? It is only if the parties a r e the same in the case of the options compared, and there are no such distributional problems, that a comparison on such a basis would be valid.i '})This is rarely the case, and it is not so in the case of risk assessments Secondly, does the person incur the risk as a result of an of energy options. 28. activ.Lty which be knowingly unclcttakes in a situationw-iere he has a reasonable choice, knowing it entails the risk, etc., and is the level of risk in proportion to the level6f the relevant activity, e.g. as in smoking? Thirdly, for what / reason is the risk imposed: is it for a serious or a relatively trivial reason? risk that is ethically acceptable for a serious reason may not be ethically acceptable for a tr:Lvial reason. Both the arguments (i) and (ii) are often A employed in trying to justify nuclear power. The second argument (ii) involves the fallacies of the first (i) and an additional set, namely that of forgetting that the health risks in the nuclear sense are cumulative, and ) 'n bhw ey ;i s g f:" P'J;ct'.) pce i,1 e~ already '°fc' not A oo high.16 high if ~ 1 The maxim "If you want the benefits you have to accept the costs" is one thing and the maxim "If I want the benefits then you have to accept the costs (or some of them at least)" is another and very different thing. It is a widely accepted d/' l).,c-~ ~ flJ,;<d ,;k~4 .~ vr4..a) I fl/rotl,7 ~~ kr 1/1 / moc.tal plfinci'ple,\ that one' is not, in general, entitled to simply transfer costs I r7n of a significant kind arising from an activity which benefits oneself onto other This parties who are not involved in the activity and are not beneficiaries~ transfer principle is especially clear in cases where the significant costs iq;lude an effect on life or ~ealth or a ,risk thereof, a~d where the benefit to j<2,c-(kUt , «J,•1 ,r ·~ ,k ,-,1,-.r.:.. ,riz.._~, t.4,/,:K/~7',-,t ~ ~ q:.:rLc-1- . the benefit ting party is of a noncrucial or dispensible nature,.,\ { Thus ,tone is not usually entitled to harm, or risk harming, another in the process of benefitting CIA.en(~ Suppose, forA example, we consider a village which produces, as a result of an i.ndustrial process by which it lives, a nox~us waste material which is expensive and difficult to dispose of and yet creates a risk to life and health oneself. f if undisposed of. Instead of giving up their industrial process and turning to some other way of making a living such as farming the surrounding countryside, they persist with this way of life but ship their problem on a one-way delivery ,Oil ·/J..0- ~ ) service Ato the next village. The inhabitants of this village are then forced to face the problem either of undertaking the expensive and difficult disposal or ol,e_ i'1M,).; 1(4. e1/Tl~L. ~ ~ Cdt'-/.:/4r,h . process or of sustaining risks to their own lives and healthA Most of us would see this kind of transfer of costs as. morally unacceptable. From this arises a necessary condition for energy options: that to be morally acceptable they should not involve the transfer of significant costs or risks of harm onto parties who are not involved, do not use the energy source or do not benefit correspondingly from its use. Included in the scope of this /trl" gA'-, condition are future people /§.~~~~ B ~eeiji~ a ~~~~m~aE~:iic=;m ;;~~i;E~~ 1 The distribution of -hut rd~ future generations (those of the next villages~; costs and damage in such a fashion, i.e. o~to non-benef is one of its most of certain widespread and serious fonns of objectionable moraL£eatures- ;-- - - /4' ..;~<fi'nt ~ ,u/4.v tfi/1_ ,.,c,,r r«-,,.4/ .......,,_,, f"u<H;f I l4'(!,,r) \ iaries is a characteristic =&, 7''7, ~ ,;_ ~ __../4;,, - 7:.(,/,_.., ~ v / __ - •_ __ ·~-~---- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ---~ ,. It is a corollary of the condition that we should not hand the world on to our successors in substantial ly worse shape than we received it - the transmissio n principle. For if we did then that would be a significant transfer of costs. (The corollary can be independen tly argued for on the basis of certain ethical theories.) eJpoc,"ct lly ru,clc>u- //)CL-; • Other social and environmen tal risks and costs of nuclear development ;~ The problems already discussed by no means exhaust the environmen tal, health and safety VI. risks and costs in or arising from the nuclear fuel cycle. The full fuel cycle includes many stages both before and after reactor operation, apart from waste disposal, namely mining, milling, conversion, enrichment and preparation , reprocessing spent fuel, and transportat ion of materials. Several of these stages involve hazards. Unlike the special risks in the nuclear cycle - of sabotage of plants, of theft of fissionable material, and of the further proliferati on of nuclear armaments - these hazards have p~rallels, if not exact equivalents , in other very polluting methods of generating power, e.g. 'workers in the uranium mining industry sustain 'the same risk' of fatal and nonfatal injury as workers in the coal industry 1 1'f Furthennore , the various (often serious) hazards encountered in working in some sector of uranium fabrication should be differently viewed from those resulting from location, for instance from already living where a reactor is built or wastes are dumped. For an occupation is, in principle at any rate, chosen (as is occupationa l relocation) , and many types of hazards incurred fr/working with radioactive material are now known in advance of choice of such an with where one already lives things are very different. The uranium miner's choice of occupation can be compared with the airline pilot's choice, whereas the Pacific Islander's 11 fact" of location cannot be. The social issue occupation: of arrangement s that contract occupationa l choices and opportuniti es and often at least· ease people into hazardous occupations such as uranium or tin or coal mining (where the risks, in contrast to airline piloting, are mostly not duly compensated ), while very important, :i.s not an issue newly produced by nuclear associated occupations . Other social and environmen tal problems - though endemic where large-scale industry operates in societies that are highly inegalitari an and include sectors that are far from affluent - are more intimately linked with the nuclear power cycle. Though pollution is a common and generally undesirable component of largescale industrial operation, radioactive pollution, such as uranium mining for instance produces, is especially a legacy of nuclear developmen t, and a specially C-,t.o ,,._......., eef, :i.i.lef undesirable one, as~ rectificatio n eosb~ for dead radioactive lands and waterways reveal. Though sabotage is a threat to many large industries, so that modern factory complexes are often guarded like concentrati on camps (but from us on the dire conse quen ces, of a diffe rent outs ide), sabot age o a nuc ear react or can have (cons ider again the effec ts of orde r of magn itude from most indu stria l sabot age more dubio us enter prise s such as core meltd own) . Though theft of mate rial from at large and can assis t terro rism , muni tions works can pose threa ts to popu latio ns probl ems of the same orde r as no theft s for alleg edly peac eful enter prise s pose produ ces mate rials which so theft of fissi onab le mate rial. No othe r indu stry explo sives . No othe r indu stry is, read ily perm it of fabri catio n into such mass ive to sum it up, so vulne rable on so many front s. , in part becau se of its long and In part to ~ ; ; , . ; ; : ; ~ ~ ~ ~ r a b i l i t y , the nucle ar indu stry is subje ct conti nu ing asso ciati on with milit ary activ ities ainly given their scale ) run to, and enco urage s, seve ral prac tices which (cert tiesy Th ese ~e secre cy, coun ter to basic featu res of free and open socie ial polic e and guard force s, restr ictio n of infor mati on, form ation of spec espio nage , curta ilme nt of civil liber ties. / 'l given extra ordin ary Alrea dy ope rator s of nucle ar insta llati ons are backg round and the te stiga powe rs, in vetti ng empl oyees , to inve fami lies and their of activ ities not only of emplo yees but also them selve s ons llati some times even of their frien ds. The insta sens ibili ties. sh become armed camp~ which espe ciall y offen ds Briti creat e d a 1976 of The U.K. Atom ic Energ y (Spe cial Cons table s) Act it made ons and spec ial armed force to guard nucle ar insta llati ority 1' answ erabl e ... to the U.K. Atom ic Energ y Auth If\ th,_ µ.• ;-fud K~~~fh ar worse in West Germ any, presa ge along with nucle These devel opme nts, and ,-\ anti- demo crati c soci eties . That devel opme nt .i ncrea singl y auth orita rian and litiui/ :conse quen ces tells heav ily again st it. nucl ear devel opme nt appe ars to force such' ,/i.~tdi't-... A conne ct1.on of the by ly tical poli :lslted inia:i: er furth is Nucl ear devel opme nL t ethic al ques ti?ns conc ernin g nucle ar powe r with nucle ar war. It is ~&te -',tha 4 Of'}'4ff'; . unde r any fiea, justi is war ar nucle a nucle ar war - for exam ple, whet her are disti ngui shab le from those circu msta nces , and if so what circu msta nces er, the sprea d of nucle ar powe r is conc ernin g nucle ar powe r. Undo ubted ly, howev [tl~Jfc -,C,ltt nucle ar war and so, to that exten t, ~inc re~i ng the techn ical means for engag ing in ,~ c.Aq,,,_ ceJ ef 1 Since nucle ar wars are ,fleJ de"') f'41' neve r the oppo rtuni ty for 1 nuc1 ear engag emen t. e-;(4vry J , / ~ a.r~«'../~ ~"'1 '~/e .. ,,t,uclo f¥ c.riu-1" CU'-11. " the"' lesse r of'm ajor evils ~Jhe eprea d bes~ at are but s, good tive posi le acco untab ty for / ~dc/a .-.,e,, -, 1 of nucle ar powe r acco rding ly expan ds the oppo rtuni o/~ ~ /Z/ 7 r ;Z_ cbhJ,1 04-r/ u.--, ,..<. .M/~ ; ➔/~) 1~ a~(/ -- -- -- -- ! - - -- -- -,77,._, ~ ~ t,-m k~/e ~~~ LIIL :I'., ~ 70-...___/- 1 /4tY'..-r ,,. ,,"/2._v ,,,_,,o,µ;..~&_ I' ~ll ~ <~~ '- / --/_ ~ I -~ ~~ / ~ 4--t'/o ~c../ C..IY'C- I'-..,._ ~ ....w./ C1-j, ~ / ~~~ W-r C-L- r•l~~ «./c; ,_ di../-<_ ~ ........,, ~/., _ / c-.b To ~ ~,, ~ ~ C.,-1,,, __- r ;, , 30.1 many. They are firstly technical, that it is a relatively straightforw ard and inexpensive matter to make nuclear explosives given access to a nuclear I power plant, secondly political, that nuclear engagements on<~ inJf,ntf~u likely to esculate and that those who control (or differently are likely to force access to) nuclear power plants do not s.hrin k from nuclear confrontati on and are certainly prepared to toy with nuclear engagement (up to " S'fr-c1.feeiic v "tla,ut nuclear strikes; ), and thirdly ethical, that wats invariably have immoral consequence s, such as massive damage to involved parties, however high sounding their justificatio n is. Nuclear wars are certain to be considerabl y worse as regards damage inflicted t har1 any previous wars (they are likely to be much worse than all previous wars put together), because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, and the extent of spread of their radioactive effects, and because of the expected rapidity and irreversib ility of any such confrontati ons. The supporting considerati ons are, fourthly, drawn from decision theory, and -----------are designed to show that the chances of such undesirable outcomes is itsclf unde si i- able. The c or e arguement is in brief this (the W"J"~.wt will be in section :m:I) :- Energy choice between alternative options is a case of decision making under uncertainty , because in particular of the JN.If Utt.UrffJt~fi'es involved in nuclear developmen t. In cases of this type the 1"rlt•c':-iov/ appropriate procedure is to compare worst consequence s of each alternative , e. /c.J,orP>lt>A A ' to r e_Je-cL . those alternative s with tht ~-, --the bs~t (the roaxiro m rule) , f.llCl'tf:" ~ of these worst consequence e-nd select J II The nuclear alternative has, in particular because of the) p,.o ssibility of a nuclear war, the WotJC and is according 1a particularl y unde$itable alternative . wo1"Jt "' . ( ~ ,i it ,'l, /4 /A- 4.//t'dJ' (l,- (fAt_~; d/6;-,rf ~ ~ d,.'£1/ ~d~ .JIM,;,,_ 1 d:L 6e-fC w_"o/- r,?t/7/UI~~). «-/~~ / n.:.__.. W✓ ~ I tPI.Ccn/4.J~ :.::n:::.t. :. aee-=o-=-l~o.s;gi.::i:..:c::a:.:l::_.:b::..:a::.:s=-e=-"'=-c,_:::._o..::f_..::.n:::u:.::c:.:l::.!e:.::a~r~d~e=-v.!..e:::..:::.l::::.01::p!!:m~e :, t=.,;h~e=--=I= · _a_r_g_u_m_e_n__t_~,,.....a.:. :n.:. ;d:,4-i ~,-JV_I_I_.__C_o_n_f_l_i_c_t_ ~ ~~ ~) r Jct ,,MCkv ~ ~ , ~ .~~ ✓/4.- ~ ~ : ; ; ~ ~ r' ~ 7~ , v--0"~7 7 ~~~/, r ou7,fdL{_ , ,,_,,.,,~/,,_ /-c,-?"" ) As /.,,,_. /7~7 ~ 7 1 ~ ~ 7Zr p-'&.-4, 7-/ ~ ¼ A<L ~ '"-;fo- .,_,~=-.:.__ ~ already observed, the consigner's action cannot be justified by purely economisti c arguments , such as that his profits would rise, the firm or the village woul be more prosperous, or by appealing to the fact that some possibly uncomfortable changes would otherwise be needed. The transfer Iffiinciple on which this assessment was based, that one was not usually entitled to create a serious risk to others for these sorts of reasons, applied more generally and, in particular, applied to f 31. For this r eason t he economistic argumen t s whi ch are t hos e mo s t commonly advance d under the Old Paradigm to promote nuclear develo pment - e . g . ch apness, efficiency, profitabili ty for electricity unilities, and the need the nuclear case . otherwise for un comfortable chan ges such as restructurin g of employment, i nves t ment and consumption - do not even begin to show that the nuclear alternative is an Even if these economistic assumptions about benefits to present people were correct - j_t will be contended that most of them are not - the arguments ) h as to . .- ;-,'d~er1.ves · h it,\ ~h ic f rom w . . · (like t h e ut1· 1 1tar1an1sm . wou ld f a1· 1 b ecause economics acceptable one . operate within the framework of moral constraints , and not vice versa. What do have to be considered are however moral conflict arguments, that is /'~} arguments to the effect that, unless the prim.a facie unacceptabr e~ alternative is taken, some even more unacceptabl e alternatice is the only possible outcome; and will ensue. For example, in the train parable, the consigner may argue that his h,J action is justified because unless it is taken~ village will starve. It is by no means clear that even such a justificati on as this wou~ be sufficient, especially where the risk to the passengers is high, as the case seems to become one of transfer of costs and risks onto others; but such a moral situation would no longer be so clearcut, and one would perhaps hesitate to condemn any action taken in such circumstanc es. Some of the arguments advanced to show moral conflict are based on competing ~ present people, and others on competing obligations to future people, /\. both of which are taken to override the obligations not to impose on the future significant risk of serious harm. The structure of such moral conflict arglllll.ents crucially on the presentatio n of a genuine and exhaustive set of alternative s (or at least practical alternative s) and upon showing that the only :is based alternative s to admittedly morally undesirable actions are even more undesirable ones. If some pratical alternative which is not morally worse than the action to be justified is overlooked, suppressed, or neglected in the argument - for "j 11~~ case it turns out that the -1ril1:agers have another option e xample, if in the t~:~~r: ) ~ to starving or to the sending off of the parcel, namely earning a living is some othe r way - then the argwnent is defective and cannot readily be patched. Just . such a suppression of practicable alternative s has occurred in the argument designed to show that the alternative s to the nuclear option are even worse than the option itself, and that there are other factual defects in these arguments as well. In short, the arguments depend essentially on the presentatio n of false dichotomies . A first argument, the poverty argument, is that there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both the poor of the third world and the poor of indusFailure to develop nuclear energy, it is often claimed, would amount to denying them the opportunity to reach the standard of affluence we currently enjoy and would create unemploymen t and poverty in the industriali sed trialised countries. nations . 1 32. J The unemployment and poverty argument does not stand up to examination either for the poor of the industrial countries or for those of the third world. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use.~ "'°The argument that nuclear energy i1needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy~ both politically and econom- ically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, but creates negligible local employment, and depends .for its feasibility upon, what is largely lacking, established electricity transmission systems and back-up facilities and sufficient electrical appliances to plug into the system. Politically it increases forei¾ dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for lt/,zc change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem. The fact that nuclear energy is not in the interests of the people of the third world does not of course mean that it is not in the interests of, and wanted by, · their rulers, the westernised and often military elites in whose interests the economies of these countries are usually organised, and wanted often for military purposes. It is not paternalistic to examine critically the demands these ruling elites may make in the name of the poor. The ooverty argument is then a fraud. the poor. Nuclear energy will not be used to help Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known energy-conserving alternatives and t he practical option of developing other energy sources~ alternatives some of which offer far better prospects for helping the poor. It can no longer be pretended that there is no alternative to nuclear development: indeed nuclear development is itself but a bridging, or stop-gap, procedure on route 1~1 to solar or1 £usion developme nt. And there are various alternatives: coal and other fossil fuels, geothermal, and a range of solar options (including aAi<J.1fiM.r ) eti~L._01,i:/j,:,,-;._ as well as narrowly solar, wind, water ami tidal power)1 ' A " <t.,,(C:...uf~... Despite the availabiity ~~ . of alternatives, it may still be pretended that nuclear development is necessary for affluence ~( what will emerge is that it is advantageous for the power and affluence of certain select groups )-: ~ .)uch an assumption really underlies part of the poverty argument, which thus amounts to an Q.la.bcn'~-l,;;,,.,, trickle-down argument (much favoured within the Old Paradigm setting). argument runs:affluence. Affluence inevitably trickles down to the poor. For the _si,,,}:,~-l-,{v1.t.d. Therefore nuclear First, the argument does not on its own show anything specific about nuclear power2: is of the Nuclear development is necessary for / continuing and increasing) development benefits the poor. for 'nuclear'. . ~2 ,,,,7t ~~4 for j_t works equally well if 'energy' It has also to be shown, what the JI • rsnd M,<J(t major argument will try to claim, that nuclear development is unique among energy 33. alternati ves in increasin g affluence . The second assumptio n, that affluence ( inevitabl y trickles down, has now been roundly refuted, both by recent historica l data, which show increasin g affluence (e.g. in terms of GNP averaged per capita) coupled with increasin g poverty in several countries , both developin g and developed , and through economic models_, which reveal how "affluenc e" can increase Jt without redistrib ution occurring -_J Another major argument advanced to show moral conflict appeals to a set of supposedl y overridin g and competing obligatio ns to future people . We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutio ns which our culture has developed . Unless our high-tech nology, high energy industria l society is continued and fostered, our valuable institutio ns and tradition s will fall into decay or be swept away. The argument is essential ly that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilizat ion will go out.4J Future people will be the losers. The lights-go ing-out argument does raise questions as to what is valuable in our society, and of what characte ristics are necessary for a good society. But for the most part these large questions , which deserve much fuller The reason is that the argument adopts an extremely uncritica l position with respect to present high-tech nology societies , apparentl y assuming that they are uniformly and uniquely valuable. It assumes that technolog ical examinati on, can be avoided. society is unmodifia ble, that it cannot be changed in the direction of energy conservat ion or alternati ve (perhaps high technolog y) energy sources without It has to be accepted and assessed as a whole, and virtually unlimited supplies of energy -· such as nuclear and only nuclear power is alleged to { ..._v-.,, •sf.t - collapse. are essential to maintain this whole. These assumptio ns are hard to accept. The assumptio n that technolog ical society's energy patterns are unmodifia ble is especiall y so - after all it has . survived events such as world wars which have required major social and technolog ical restructu ring and consumpti on modifica tion. If western society's demands for energy are totally unmodifia ble without collapse, not only would it be committed to a pro gram of i.ncreasin g destructi on, but one might ask what use its culture could be to future people who would very likely, as a consequen ce of this destructi on, lack the resource base which the argument assumes to be essential in the case of contempo rary society. There is also difficult y with the assumptio n of uniform valuablen ess; but if this is rejected the question becomes not: what is necessary to maintain existing high-tech nological society and its political institutio ns , but rather: what is necessary to maintain what is valuable in that society and the political institutio ns which are needed to maintain those valuable things. While it may be easy to argue that high energy consumpti on centrally controlle d is necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, it is not so easy to arguethat it .... ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --~- ----34-. ( is essential to maintain what is valuable, and it is what is valuable, presumably that we have a duty to pass on to the future. The evidence, for instance from history, is that no very high level of material affluence or energy consumption is needed to maintain what is valuable . There is good x·eason i~ fact to believe that a society with much lower energy and resource consumption would better foster what is valuable than our own. But even if a radical chan1e in these directions is independen tly desirable , as we should argue, it is not necessary to presuppose such a change, in the short term at leas;, in order to see that the assumptions of the lights-goin g-out argument are wrong. No enormous reduction of well-being is required to consume less evergy than a \ present, and certainly far less than the large increase over present levels of asstili1ption which is assumed in the usual economic case for nuclear energy.~ What the nuc~ear strategy is really designed to do then is not to prevent the lights going out in western civilisatio n, but to enable the lights to go on burning all the time - to maintain and even increase the wattage output of the Energy Extravaganz a. In fact there is good reason to think that, fa r from the high energy society fostering what is valuable, it will, especially if energy is obtained by nuclear fission means, be positively inimical to it. A society which has become heavily dependent upon an extremely high centralised , controlled and cons 1.At'1f10"' garrisoned, capital- and expertise-i ntensive ener gy source, must be one which is highly susceptible to entrenchmen t of power, and one in which the forces which control this energy source , whether capitalist or bureaucrati c, can exert enenormous powe r over the political system and over people's lives, even more Such a society would, almost inevitably tend to become authoritari an and increasingl y anti-democ ratic, as an outcome, among other things, of its response to the threat posed by dissident groups in the nuclear situation. ~ than they do at present. Nuclear development may thus help in passing on to future generations some of the worst aspects of our society - the consumerism , alienation, destruction of nature, and latent authoritaria nism - while many valuable aspects, such as the degre e of political freedom and those opportuniti es for personal and collective autonomy whic h exist, would be lost or diminished: political freedom, for example, is a high price to pay for consumerism and energy extravagenc e. the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumabl 1, But it is not that we have some obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Again, as in the case of the poverty arguments, clear alternative s, : l?a,#1-0.'t\..t...G-- alternative socia;Aand political choices, which do not involve such unacceptabl e consequence s are available. The alternative to the high technology- nuclear option 1 Ii- c,/~e/4,,._ ~ /4 f ettl..i,,- fl.a,. u/4jr/iP- "f- "- ~ is not a retturn to the cave, the loss of all that is valuable, but~ the development of a'tlJ,ernative technologie s and lifestyles which offer far greater scope for the li).,j· c-o,y( /'IWQ.r rr ' ~#a-r, maintenance and further development of whAt . is valuable in our society than the The lights-goin g-out argument, as a moral highly centralised nuclear option. ~ /;,. conflict argument, accordingly fails, because it also is based on a fa l se dichoto-y. r fJ.J,.., I( J:r._,._ Th us the Aescape route/, the appeal to moral conflict aua to t he appeal t o 1 fu ty, ~ closed. If then we a pply - as we have argued we s hould - t he s ame l. J standards of morality to the future as we ought to acknowledge for the presen t, the conclusion that large~-~sca le nuclear development is a crime agains t the f uture is inevitable. 1 from reactor Closed also, in the same way, are the escape routes to other argumentst:IAtt Ji> <>'l ;'${1~ ma(/_ ~wn J radiation emissions, Aetc:::::t for · ~ / nuc ~ development as morally unacceptabl e, for saying that it is not only a Acrime against the distant future but also a ~ ~rime against the present and immediate future. In sumJ nuclear development is morally unacceptabl e on several grounds. A corn--o llary is that only political arrangement s that are morally unacceptabl e will · suppor_t th.e i(1!pending nuclear _future . of future people not tf'.I J ;,; I discounted (in contrast to the temporally - limited utilitariani sm ~"'of_ n,,ia,-k-4!.t - ~~economic theory)J and that serious costs and risk~ to health and life.cannot admiss ~ ly be simply transferred to uninvolved parties ( h ~ I /4- /4 ~1~ a-<<h'-,::4,~c..:.,__ o.;rr,llc,;.._.)f'c,d /o / / , , / ). 7 CI//C-1~ e a{_ &, N- t-f"/<7/2#;,__, ~~ ~~ LL ,, ~ ~ /~ ~ "°''f"(JI{ will now be outlined whichAshow that even within the confines of the Old Paradigm, choosing the nuclear future is not a rational choice . ..Jl: Large-scale nuclear on &,<. cc,,//,,,_.,,,;,, h-4111, development is not just something that Mppens, it requires,.\ an immense input of capital and energy. , J,.j ,:_ .~J.-..r~ ,,.,;_,R.J .J""11 ~-.,,&./ 7'iN/ t>h- ? ~ /-7,._ rt..-JJu..7~-.',- /4- '.,..... ~ o//-,.;?.,/ ~ /;: ,J''"'e"' eccJnom,'c__ /~t:'tJJ-rl,-~« ~ - ;t,4 r r/4'-Ntr/ been i nvested in nuclear .fiH1on '4~ .-Utti,.r, ,r ~ -d'M.r J ~? Admittedly so much capital has already research and development, :i..n marked contra t )I to othe~rival sources of powes that t hert is strong political incentive top f1'7 - as distinct fromAreason s for further capital and energy inputs. ~ ~ /(,v;,~..,. 6-4'C t¾t aff_ ,,,1 ~ IU- '1 /'t~ /&J 7~ / t:1/1). ... "'--.f 11<11f4.., /4-:J~vf_/J _/ l ~ f.,..,._r), q /l~ ~~,:as;-~ /<ff"" /J~ (~~6t;..._ ) /'~a.. o.u~•~,._•~/.c~ -~ ~k / I ~-.:..,,Lc.1 ,-•.A-e/ 1/ tL/t,.,.f ~ d, ,Af'.._:,:! .,>V°L / ~~ ( _J ~~ /4.l()~J/ > ~ ~k ;_ r/~ / ~C--, /nrv-7 ~ ,..~~,,._~ .- ('c;.. rr.;-/ trv/4.,;_/ wt~ o/ ...-? ' ~ a/~ ~4-t.d ,, <~CU'~ /CJ-u_J,./ ~ ~. The main argume£~~~an economic growth argument, upon which variat~S , re played., is the following version of the lights-going-o ut argument (with economic . e~ / growth duly standing in for ll'late•oal wealth, and Afor what is valuable!):Nuclear power is necessary to su.stai.n economic growth. Economi c growth is desirable (for all the usual reasons, e.g. to increase the size of the t:,'IU{ c·o,,,ae,cf,,l( /ocip,/ k/!Mff, , , , ~ f()'f" f'~ J to-1 postpone reJistribution problems,/\ etc.). Therefore nuclear power is desira.ble ~ The first premiss is part of US energy policj~ and the second premiss is suppli ed by standard economics textbooks. Ja U>'t~ fr C(,a<~ A/~{ 1~! M ~k. t~ -1<>c~JL But both premisses are ~~<IL (U_ - - J L u.LJ/~/~ 7!d. .,,('°7 O</?'V 0d U,#\.r/Jo./ (2..-<~~c...·c-- I/ f-7 __ -~ '2-?·e--rt.-,hL' c./~ ~ c..... /e_/ ~ ~A;-,..,,rc.-,,..~ -I' CUI/I ~o(_ ,.KtL- c,;,l~il/~C!- , I 7 · / More to the since the second premiss is an assumption of the dominant paradigm, the first {tltK. !t(J (IQ~/,,, ( or rather · an appropriate,{ restatement of it ) fails even on Old Paradigm For of course nuclear power is not necessary given that there are other, perhaps e:=-1:.I,~ alternatives. N-.e,./41" elaboration of the /)tPwt--Y ptemiss out as 'most efficient', etc . 1',s Je.feviltl The premiss usually l:.j,..1.. ~t:.e;nOMfCtf :A //y b~--f:: . is s,ome "'-'AY i.Q ,&to--t;t:<11'\ 4!<:.e>;,c:>111tc.. growth, 'economically best' being filled 'cheapest', 'having most favourable 'cost' benefiti-ratio ~--_..,, 1 > Unfortunately for the argument, and for nuclear development schemes, nuclear po er is none of these things decisively , unless a good deal of economic cheating (easi..4 to do) ~ I 1 I ~is done. - .,,/ ~ L, / / ~~t,.L( U~l-r-u- &w /1~~&-1 ~ pu.u.. Ya,1 q(v ~ G-?'d ~ / /I(!/) 1 ~ c_ ~/c.-,1\1 IP~ _ ,,1 / / .. . ~ <t~ ~/Mf?.--7 . / ';;!C.,,,-17 I ...u. ·~ <AJ7?4; e:,r<,- ,Y?/·.u.//u-{ ~ p/C4t.-,t✓// .A'./ , C-tt.../lt..?-Vc~ Yo t'/~ ~~-,,e: d-::;F ,;,er~ ,_._.l.<-//4....:.. I <er ,;;t, ,·, /2 1rd('('n-4c one! 1 , d k,,£~~~ ,,~ /2,. ~/~/-(",., J ~ ~ ,·/ ~ ~~ :/-ru<.. /1/'C./'__,__°'.J~J /1' /4 /4_ t-U?<.,J~ . ;Z / t' Le ;/~1 c~/vr ~~ 1r ~ / e(' e:4A/~ r"' 4e 1/ ~~ ~/ L..-7 ~urr~u<6 d,(_ 't1'~ c-~ e- ~ c,,-e_ Ju~ui-.fw J-e-.J ) c- ~e./ / ,./4~... ~~ c:Mh -,,,,C- f1 td:-, ~.-.. ~ ) 7 c//#'; ....:, ~ . , ,,,,,,,J e,. ,4_ ~ c"~ /21/c 7 -~ ~~ /~7 r7 A~ ~/c1-;fy,, ~L-r/77 ~ ~ - ; , , ~&?Yrn>~ c/4Jrpc,d , // 75t /:-,,', rf ; ~ 7J-I' <'Mh? ~ ~ J~'£ /&WL ~ ~7 ~ ~ 7r~,5 a:_ ) , , -- ., <. r'/~ ;I = cy~ r~~ ,;.,I~ f';;;.;:,t. ~ , /~,q. u7·c.4-I tvut' £..Lr 0 CL-r'U-~ ,J'-,..A }? ~&~/ ·cl- 7~/A_ 7✓~~- ~~;~7 ,£ b e r;rf;:;r- 7 .,.;,., 7 ; ~ /p..nLv,._a__ 1rLvf / du/2AJ-C. /;-<l~ ✓t/ ~-~e,( £-4 U-..,,(_A /.,:., ,,,,,_..,_ ..,._/ / f~ I ftJ / ~ ~, &g f-~ a&-c~7 d/2-~ ~o7,l ~ c~} ea: b.-~',uvr} ~: ~ ~ ~ J,& -17 7 ~/'~. r/~~ •'= 7 c~ /?~_, /'¼/ 7 Zz; we_~ ~ 7 2 I U.:- . Z:._ ~/.,_;~ ~ ~-c G>.-r e,_/ '• ~ Ii.~~ ,$"~ , 7i-, 7~ 27, ~ ~: a. "' 1 ?~~ '\. /~~-«-.:/~ ~ /'~-d 4, /..__ ~ ~~ n'~ ._, ,4,___:,~ _ n /'~._, J ~ 4 t ~ c/"➔ ~ A;f-7 ~ ,_,,_.;_,, ~ /'~--UW ~/ 4,..-,f c,.,;,,t ,_ 7 1/4...f. • . 7~~) ~r-'d /(c/l/Y/~/ ~ i,,~ u~ ,,{e_ /~ /'~w-<_ / . r--1,f.,..~_pAf ~u&.,/ ~ - ( --t<~</4-, £.,_,UA-'-<._ /- / /er-iv d_ o/,,~ T 1 70 1 7 7, <e/1 ~ l= e:., 7' c.. .#-,.../ ~~ ;~~~ ;;t AM~~/' {1,.../4 ~ rA~ ~ 7 '!f ✓ u,,v:,;- / ~ t✓.c✓z/,7 ~~/4-- ~ (/ <~ / 7:fJ '7, ,-". ~/er-/(;/, £4 ~ ,,_ ___,___ /~u-c.~k'L-T~~~ 1 Uvy;,C-, t~ d 7➔ o../4J a. r/-.e.« lo - ;ff~. ./-,c,;. r.:.. r 1 7 "--7 /c,_.(a,... ,7 ceryr, ~ ?-Z -r-4 c.4-'~ <7 ,,___ 7,2 ?>?P 27{,~ //-2{_ ~a...._ • d ,...__ ---7~~ ,/ 7 ...,;,~ / /! I ~~-~7 i/4f £~1 (/ ~ / ~"7 -7 /4r r ignore waste cos ts on the quite . in'.)idmissib It. } ground that it is not known currently what the costs involved are. But even using actual waste handling costs (while wastes await storage) is enough to show that /~'-" /./t,.,. v-< re-.elll.,t-t ~ /t4--i4- I!:. is preferable to nuclear. ~'-"'"' c~h , ,~L 7,.-~;.__1/ *;7'_..c ,4---.1,____ . _:__ ro ~ ~1-if!' coal i~ C:,,,,(A /--0v-r~ 1 ~rew- - /~ ,1,0; ,,.,w-!£~ u,/k-,~-/2~ r «--, ,;.., G.•~ C/',._1- / ~ d;<--.n,-d '"'--:•~ a ~/ ( > ~ , b ~ /:V~ e~....._._7"',~ ~ rc: ~ - ·-~ J~1/?/ ,·Ut" ,i...-r~7 a-~'r ------/_7·--- r?/4 /~~ ~ ;L/~ /4 71.J~' ~/e--1, ~ I -~/ dA,,ri,/,f""'-•J>~t grsm is ~Nuclear rAA,{,~_f.u not economical_,it ll.l'0'ud:tl see111lr it has been ~ c..lQ.N"" "' going ~ t through its ebd.ovs economic#). viabili~y, but by massive public of several types :# 9-</ l a,/_,p.;fi.. ~1~ \ C< _:., u~n:,.~'/~{k_ ,' ~~--o-~~ ..2.. At:Lc--&a-, /J/4i7 /ful-,u/ '7f::,c7,t' --..... o~,,_f";_ ;!,~ heavily subsidized esearch and development, through the Price-Anderson Act, which sharply limits both private and public li.ability, i.e. which i.n effect provided th~ ub s :i.dy ~ 1 king corporate nuclear development economically feasible,~ through 0 overnment agreement to handle all radioactive wastes. / ~ ~-/c,J~~ 0~ I ~;,_err /7' ~ ~ 4~7~ ~/'~ r d/?l' A ~ z:, ~ CLAI ,P~ .... < . •. (1/4(:f:>t cP-, C ~ ~7 ~ a./Ww/ ~ A-~ • r~Lc~ .c.-, t7r/~~ ~o4 /o/ I ;1., ✓/I ~tJ4 , ~ ~ ~ /v~ / f ~ /4- 7~ /4 ~ ~ 7f''4u/ ~/4r-..v o/('<;~~ J /j ,~ ~ do..-.l /;-~--zz' ~ c..o_ ~I ~~;7 I~ •~t,L- / ~76._ ~ . 1r:-:..-- ~ ~ ~) ~ ~ ~ /~~ 4.µ>:z:" a - , < ~ (tA.t{<L.. ~I e«--Y~ nkv4+fv•, -r-C: / ~ d✓ ~/ ~ ~ /J-J~ ~I~/. J 74-'r /,.a-~-- ~ ~ /~d~ / ~ er<~ ('(fi1_'717 (1.-c~ ~ ~ I c:;f eo.c-/1/~ ____7._, £.7 r ;1:£. /"",~-<~ '-- r ?71~ 1,r1c.y-'/ ~r ~7 -~ ~ry ~/ r/4-;r /~7 ' ~ -~, r;:/1~7 k /4.7:.._ r)U ~?TJ:;i; _.£§;~~I:~ ~ff?t,~✓:: CL-+-~./~ ftµ~ nsurance j c/4 r-71 c~ /jf!.. ;/ ~ ~4o...// I ~ 7,.4:-r...:.r ~ r~ 7✓~ ,I /4✓ " - - --' • ~~ /7 , ,__ £_ /~ U/t,e- c/f. tr I A -r4 e~<~. dL cZ...,~~_, r ,-K <M'-71 -:::z J ~/n~ ,,__.,.....,._,,.,,t. /4,_,,-- ~~ /~'- ,/4 r/.. ~ ~ ~ ~ /fe-"f ~ ~~7 ~A-/1 ,__~~... fl /j =-=. ~/4.,,_ /Jv /~ ~ i ~ '1.d ilc. / c~ /tr V4'l, ./'£u..,,· ✓~ ~ 7?f;-t"' I~ ~ V-k &-<.'-4 ~ ' ~~ ~ ,er .~e_..,.-(r'~ ! ~ ;:1:, ;. of eY~) /2-"I!---.. a.-. c.,,_.. ~ c6'1 ~,_r?'~.&_) 1 ~ k - I ~ , ~-C.A-/,,<U-. /.¢' I I J ;?b,,~ 7"4" ~ 7,,..,,.,, -ro 7¼'_.,___ ' <~?f~ ~:J~ 7 /e/Y 1-¥~ .. ;z .~~1~; ~ o/~~~",,:e_ 7 /-'-' ,,,,.f" ;, /\-4J},,!.4/'' f t1/<L ~'L / t(!c /1"' ,<;, /4;;/, c-e,...-/-e. ~~pl,(!_/ ~k /e,/d ,~li/'7 ,.-.,-.~ ;_, , ,,,. J CY..C / ~ : , . _ _/ ~ 1 · &n<,., 4t-,z, 1 _r--::-f <~ /' U ,1~ n-1~ ~£~) /~~ t: rl I r~~ ~ f 1 ~--"..;.. CJ( ~-e < k ~ 12 7 1/.d' .,:.. ,;,-,,,,0/~ ,v/4 ~ , ' I ,...:4::,,/'- 6/ oC ./t.A-u// ~ ,·1 / 7i.,~d / A ~ ;...d' 0 ~/2,,✓ 4--? ,. ~7 ,, .., ~"" ,,,4 ,..LI / .-..4 7l(vuL ~-v-~ ~~ r~·✓-7 ,r;. ,, ) ,,,.,_,. ,//' /,,-u;t-.. cv• p-~ J.-4.// 7/4.. ,rt_.<,A , .,~,,, r ~.. ,~ .--<A_ _.,4'__...,-.; ~ , ,:__ ~ .A.(.AAL,UJ /~7-- /6.:-. ✓~ /J a.-r-7Jh--? o/";,,, t--t,~,e~: ~ :;).r,vt.) ' <' ,,,_,,,,,,__ < ✓~ ~ d/c✓ ~?( ..,..,..-u~.:_ '" J.A'A?..r ;,I'~ ~ J ~ .?.;_ ;/✓ ,,,,7,,. ~7,~ ..,. -~~:a ~ -,, ,.__,, d' ,i<, ~ - /~--""'l..rr ~~..A✓.,,,_y~~ 1 / ,,._c,,_ < ·-,e- .-../--..L.. "''. ~~ a ,,,.A..,;_.~. d.,;, ~ .b-, ·._:h AoJ,I,. r. t,~, 37 //1.d' The ~aradigm does not, it j/i«,f 7~r,) _sustain the nuclear jl.(ggernau~:l?The real _reasons for the continuing development program ~ commitment .,- -·- A.~ the r --.. to the program have to be sought elsewhere,, outside the Old Paradigm, at leas-t as preached.® There are, firstly reaso?s of previous 1'ru,.J_ l e,iQAFa.-;~ , ~ PJ,/{/M.rfr, ,.J/.u l;vf,f,,U_DN!; commitJ!lent, when nuclear power \ looked a cheaper and safer• deal. corpouations (;~.&? ~ . A ,{ rd_,~ _A ei/10 are ;\_ keer{ -t:o ,,e,,._(,:;<.,, returns on capital,{ invested. There are lypical _,. , ~~fl ~ uc/~/"-7 s e l ~ reasons for commitment to the program, that £erµ_ (V,?µ_ /.aY•~ / ~ ra o..c~IILL ~ ~7 '7o /,24- I ~ :> ~ i t s accrue to some, lil<e ' !}cr'o.-t,.J;' ~ in o__ liti ~ corporations, that are influent1·a1 c:--_ _r_ · _ca 1 · .tr Sf1n-~, 1 · a ff_airs, an d as a profits <;1-ccrue to others, tV't/ Jc on ·.., -·1c J ear eng1 nee.,r,:i ng, -etG-:- There . J,.cLa.-t are A ideological reasons ~ a belief in the control of both political and phys ical ~ b1Z,/,e..f1 IYJ ScC/4 I c.on-l •✓-ol -f'.-e,,,-n itho ,/2 power by technocratic-entreprenial elite, C&t/nd-- ~ /l~ ~i'tu.r J , ,Juf-41 ~ '7..~,/4.,,./:-, )i..--..r - fj fa.-r o~J /4 Awt- fA.#1. ,4(' /IC/VvU- d/-c,,,r (p/;?~J~, /41~ , /~€- ;t ~ .,r o/7)d~ a faith in the unlimitedne ss at ' . technological enterprise, and nuclear in particular, so that any real problems that arise will be solved as development proceeds. Such beliefs are especially conspicuous in the British scene, among the governing and technocratic classes. /It ' ;,:. <=c<--,,../4-;:?-»'r~ ~~ _ -r -/- I cr~'-'-_0 , ' / ~fJ;,~ ·these :;orts of reasons for nuclear development are,.\ linked, h /, C- C i4t /-(!_. • ~- t-h.,, ret13f'lfl tJ,tH those whose types of enterprise/ benefit @8rf?lislit O n ,pi tq l i e substantially nuclear development are commonly those who hold the. requisite beliefs. f;.C-A I <-0•1.:f°'7~1"U:I .Lt is ti _ corporate capitalism, , ~ its state enterprise image, ; / "''#. Hu · cm t.min i;s;;; pc e I if\~, that fuels the nuclear juggernaut. corporate capitalism, which is the political · e ?t~r~,d col'l.o,.,.._"/ v To be sure, largely thrust upon us in ilr/es•-ern .11~ .sln e, is nnt ni>ce~sary fn:r a nuclear furur@; a totalitarian state of the typ (~ such capitalism often supports in the third worl"d w.i ll suffice. But, unlike a hypothetical state tl'tA--C. does conform to precepts of the Old Paradigm, it is sufficient for a nuclear future - evidently, since we are well embarke d 4111 such a future -/ 7 ,,.f d.ta.~ l ~ </~ I& ,uu. •1:,=r, Q/v-~~ ~A _,1~'/r ~ ./4X ~~ t"-.7 ✓~~· - c/2~ ¢~ ~~ ~/ ~/or- ~~ 11 ~ /1'"~ f!.//' / /'~/~o~ , , CA~ ry~ 7 ~./rL" c~~ ~~4//EP.A:,,p_, _ / - 1'/J~~:::~~ ~ ~ / t > . ~/ a---4 J~ ~ /~ ~ "~ p ~ ~ <-,. r~ AOC r~ -fl.JI' o--/z; ~ 6,--..,__,;,r / ~~~ ~~ //07 j7' 1Jtif'l'€--,1;_ ~ I ~ ~L&l- ·-<- < ,-, ,,.. .__/- /4/' ~r;:t( ,.&;7"'~:-r,,_,7; I l ,u-,.....,e,.___ ~~, ~ c ~ e . ~ ~ ~ _I ... r/4- c// ~ ~ u Y ~ ·7 ✓ ~~-1~r 11 7<L/~ ~,/4- , ,~ .~/ /~~' t~ _,,r~~ --- ~a,f , . ~.AV/~~ C( ~ £--L-. d / ✓ ~/ "- c). c,._...-<. ~~7_D1 ~ f /'~ ~ /A., _,' O,A{:,G ~ ~/ 4 ~~ , ~7 7;;~ ,,,,,._,-6( <r--/ ./J~ ~,,L 6'£ • / .,. tt/(J_ /c~ <C~~ ,f' r,i ~//'71~. /~ /~ pAf 7 /. '-~------------------------------~--"' ~--v>~-e/f 1~,.~ .?~C. .f ~ 41i;L; c--( p7 p-r uf-._!e~~c)~ ;g.,__-,L~ ~~3tf ~G, -";) ' ---:? ~ 11 . ,1~ - - .~ - :-X.ft ~ _,,,""--'.___;:._;;_..::..::::.=-=-"-=:..::..:~;:_.:_~=-=...:.:...:::.;::_-=~-=-=L.:;;-=-~a~l~t~e~r~n~a~t~i~v~e~s=-=-.- The future energy ['cJ4¢-r Y>tAlf't°' 0 ootion that is ttS11 a H-,A contrasted with nuclea~, namely coa¾, wMe , _,., ,__,. I /~u- c/4u,,/f-r_a/'~k- t'a-- ~w.r :> /J / ~ the likelihood of .;r;.edty serious (air) pollution and associated phenUIII-• s uch as acid rain and atmospheric heating 1 not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining 1 all of which will result from its use in meeting very ttigh projected consumption figures. Such an option would also fail, it seems, to meet the 'j?u.-,/e,. necessary~ condition, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for r some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement..iS$J . f>t.l.t-,;,.. lo 'these a r 112' conventiona~ options .-- a third is often added which emphasizes r,,,u{ .:, Alt<K/l..11A. Gc-l7L-., "-yd/otJ/,: J.riufy A. _,t.,,...a, softel.-4 benign technologies, such as those of solar' energyA The deeper choice, which '!Ven soflllfpaths tend to neglect, is not technological but social, and involves r~11la/lJ4~ ~Ht-,-4,,? 6<'tl bot~ the restructuring of production away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristjc and nonconsumeristic futures. These more fundamental choices between soci ,tl alternatives, conventicnal technologically ol CA-V":fr ~fu~ oriented discussion At.ends to obscure. It is not just c. rr:.atter of deciding in ,;.,-hich ~ ytil•- Mr/ way to meerxt..:.nexam~nEd goals (as the Old Paradign ~ d 1· of examining the goals. 14' , )t J\.. Ml )' but alEC: a rr.atter That is, we are not merely faced with the que.stion of comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the a- . matter of examing those alleged needs and the cost o~ society that creates . them. It is not just a question of devising less damaging wais to meet these alleged needs conceived of us inevitable and unchangeable. (Hence there are solar ways of producing unn~cessary trivia no one really wants, as opposed to nuclear wayst al' ber1.11ft o.f ~<1.. ~ /J '1-tf--t' ~ A. ot(Ql.Se)'blie~s Hot uaat to deny that these softer optfons are superior • ethically unacceptable features of the 'lltl et :u ~ i b f rt,~, But it is doubtful that any technology, however benign in principl~will h likely to leave a tolerable world for~ future ,., . p:l:i2: if it is expected to meet f 38 . u,.',awo.d. i ~mit lcss and uncontrolled e nergy consumption and demands. Even the more benign technologies such as solar technology could be used in a way which creates costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being handed on to them. Consider, fo r exa mple, t he effect on t he world's forests, whic h are commonly counted as a solar res ource, of use for production of methl•nol or of electricity by woodchipping ( as already planned by f ~ist authorities and contemplated by many other ener gy organisations) J\ f'ew would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, -b:ttt the unrestricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of "solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands could well be the final indignity for the world's already hard- pressed natural fores t s. The effects of such additional demands on the maintenance of the r?ftJfiW forests are often dicem:1Ht@d, even by soft technologicalists, by the simple A-expedient of waving around the label 'renewable resources'. May forests are in A principle renewable, it is a true, given a certain (low) rate and kind of exploitation, but in fact there are now very few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values . ~$, In many regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded, so that a total decline is widely thought to be immanent if not already well advanced. It certainly has begun in( ~ n.--11> regions, and for U'-Plr,•0-:1:i!PJ~,; ~ which are,\ beifig 16st for the future. that f o r ~ on top of ~ present forest types (such ~s rainforest types) amt "•i M11,f."5 /.~.t,.//4__ )!HtJ~ The addition of a major further ,\demand ee2rn:e,,, J'f't!4J~ is one which anyone with a realistic (o,t/<>,,./l_rl"~ . appreciation of the conduct 6fAforestry operations, who is also concerned with long-term conservation of the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with alarm. The result of massive deforestation for energy purposes ~ resembling the deforestation of England at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, again for energy purposes, w ould be extensive and devastating erosion in steeper lands and tropical ar eas, desertification in more arid regions, possible climatic change, and massive impoverishment of natural ecosystems. Some of us do not want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - a deforested world to the future, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products. In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - i.mportant though this is - without any more basic structural and -locial change is inadequate. f,,t,.,,IOJ1,",;/ Nor is such a simple.4 switch likely to be achieved. ~1&4- It is no t as if fc political pressure could i -11st bene:,\ the US government,\ stop its nuclear ~ = Ntn-G ( and that of the countries it influences, much of the world), in the way pressure appeared to succeed in 11,-1.lting the Vietnam war. could be accomplished, it is very While without doubt it would be good if this unlikely given the integration of political powerholders with those spons r ring nuclear development .'° I The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social , ,om......,,.;.,. ,A.. h~JG".t j"-.:; ~ no.odr, s tructure which promotes consumerismAand ah economic structure which encourages increasing use of highly energy-intensive modes of production. This means, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are lucky enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services. A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from rer~ satisfaction in work and in social re.lations and other activities, is.\ bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption. (A production system that produces goods not to meet ge~uine needs but for created and non-genuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.) Consumption frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas . The adjustments focussed upon are only parts of the larger set of adjustments involved in socially j_mplementing the New Paradigm, the move away from ,:::6',t.SIArne<•S"Yl is for example part of the more general shift from material ism and materialist values. / ~ Th4 c ' A=::O:f social change option tends to be obscured in most ol discussions of energy options andAhow to meet .---. @S energy needs, in part because question• underlying values of current social arrangements. The conventional 6.,; ,. nee~) or wants with conflo..W (often demand alleged taking by proceeds discussion as unchallengeable, and the issue to be one of which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengeable arid unchangeable. The point is readily illustrated., It is commonly argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people ~deep ~ezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... 1t would be authoritarian to ps:t:llp them satisfying these wants. ~ tl+c A argument conveniently ignores the soc:f.al framework in which such needs and wants To point to the determinati on of many such wants at t he framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach according to whic h they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial or are produced. organisatio n) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determinati on at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices , such as those for travel , Mle iafrastrtt~t u"v and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and diLected by a social framework determined largely in the interests of corporate and private prt,fit and advantage. The social change option is a hard option - at least it will be difficult to obtain politically - but it is the only wa» so it has been argued, of avoiding passing on serious costs to the future. And there are other sorts of reasons than it is the main, indeed the only sort of option open to those who take a deeper ecological perspectivef .2..-a perspective integral with the New Paradigm but not essential to radical departure from the dominant such ethical ones for taking it: paradigm. tJa,,u#t;LJ J',;..., The ethical , requirement defende.o<., I social and political d. -, £ CUr{f?'?~{j ~~~ J t<~ ~~ -f7 ~ ?t,(""f""e.u • ,uu1...l',1;1.ial The socialAchan ges that the deeper alternative requires will be strongiy r esisted because they mean changes in current social organisatio n and power structure • ..tt'ld<°f:o the extent that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of presen t political and economic arrangemen ts it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds by misrepresen ting and often obscuring it. But i.,,·11 Jtz_ difficult though a change t,f t:icn~inant p: a @eigm, especially one with such ~rreaching effects on the prevailing power structure, is to obtain, it is imperative to try; we are all on the nuclear train. V ( • I - FOOTNOTES ~ 1. - All but the last line of the quote is drawn from Good in ., p. 417; the last line is from the Fox Report, p. 6. While it is unnecessary to know much about the nuclear .fuel cycle in order to consider ethical and social dimensions of nuclear power, it helps to know a little. & Abbotts, Gyorgy. The basics are presented in many texts, e.g. Nader Of course in order to assess fully reports as to such important background and stage-setting matters as the likelihood of a core meltdown of a (lightwater) reactor, much more information is required. For many assessment purposes however, some knowledge of economic fal la cies and decision theory is at least as important as knowledge of nuclear technology. ~ 2. As to the first, see references cited in Gooij_in, p. 417, footnote 1. As regards the second see Cotgrove and Duff, and some of the references given therein. 3. Cotgrove and Duff, p. 339 4. The table is adapted from Cotgrove and Duff, p. 341; compare also catton and Dtinlap, especially p. 34. -- 5. See, e.g., Gyorgy ~ e.nd$, pp. 357-8. 6. For one illustration, see the conclusions of Mr. Justice the Windscale inquiry (The Windscale Inquiry Parker a~ Vol. 1. Her Majesty's Office, London, 1978), discussed in both Cotgrove and Duff, p. 347 and in Goodin, p. 501 ff. 7. Much as with the argument of one theory or position against another. One can argue both from one's own position against the other, and in the other's own terms against the other. 8. As well as screening the debate from the public such manoeuvltfls .... favour the (proLnuclear establishment, since they (those of the alliance of military, large industry, and government) control much of the information and (subject to minor qualifications) can release what, and only . them. what, s f)f1ts 9. This is a conclusion of several governmental inquiries and is conceded by some leading proponents of nuclear development; for requisite The same conclusion has been reached in details up to 1977 see Routley (a) . L /;..:i /t,lrf ~t/ J i I! rl. I e ·7. [{CL /i 10. For some details see Gyorgy, p. 60 ff. 11. eol . See the papers, and simulations, discuss :bal in GoodiA p. f-28. /~ On the pollution and waste disposal ·r"ecoff'd of the n uclear industry, , 12. see Nader and Abbotts, Lovins and Price1 and Gyorgy. On the more general problem of e..f fective pollution controls, see also, Routley (a), footnote 7. Back of this Humanity Unlimited assumption is the idea of 13. replacing God. power. Man First God had unlimited power, e.g. over- nature, then when during the Englightenment Man replaced God, Man was to have unlimited Science and technology were the tools which were to put '1an into the position of unlimitedness. More recently nuclear power is seen as providing man at least with unlimited physical power, power obtained through technology. [ability to 14. manage technology represents the past] On such limitation fhe.o~UJ?l, which go back to Finsler and Godel on one side and to Arrow .,-----------.....- fk d.n · o ther · .I\ ~ see, e.g. Routley 80. ,j Other different are presented in Routley 81. ' l,,;,.;l-etht>,..,, te1t1/tf It follows that there are many problems that have no solution and much that is necessarily lJ/lkA•N4'/4. . Limitative results put a serious dent in the progress picture. According the Dominant Western Worldview, t he history of humanity is one of progress; for every problem there is a solution, and thUf progress need never cease (C cttto,i and p.34). 15. See Lovins and Price. ,1 OS (a,:.J Amore recent official reports, ft n r, <t:etieHlar \ f.,~ J JJ~/o/J, Jr 7~ "r 7~ /,,.__~ '(,; l't?I - ---~ co/c.,:;..e., •--:;,..,<r~ / (,__ /'° ~ ;I (>-..._ ;f ,;(~ ;- - ~ -6 - / Y ~ r. C~< <~ (&cn&'tU /?,u~.va- ih ~ ~4~~ I \ •7 /,._,k µ{ ~ I ,,.,_ , I ~ ,__,_ n-t' ,-/4 ,f,_ v -f/tfJ,--f~~-t:, , • r~ r~ bu- /4/~~~~ I/le,/_,~ /(-, /'M-r_ /-L--t.C..h.,-/' //- • #f1 a r~ To~..,.._ ,lr·- -1~.,,,~-7 ,{Mt7 a,,,,_ o/'~ / e. ,,..,_,r_,__ YC- . . .:. 4'/4_ ,i', •..,t CC'.,A-V"~~--- ~7 o-r, d-.,/ ~~. /!....,'f' ~I'~~ ' ,, fe__ , ,-r~~~ J /~"'-:;, _ A--,i,( ~,,..~.L- · ~ , { a f r ~ r1 h ( Th~ ~ r ~~•--L ~ 1/'f~ _y ,11(,,, C.,.;-<:_ J<1./?o.,,-_;~~l _7 :c£. ~ z:., . ,. , 1/ c.1--{,1 7 3. I For examples. and for some details of the history of philosophe~ 16. positions 4 n obligations to the future. see Routley (a). Passmore, p. 91. 17. Passmore's position is ambivalent and, to all appearances, inconsistent. as also is Rciw/s , It is considered in detail in Routley (a), position. For related criticisms of the economists' arguments for 18. discounting, and for citation of the often eminent economists who sponsor them, see . ,, Good11, , pp 429-30. 19. The reasons (not elaborated here) are that the properties are different e.g. a monetary reduction of value imposes a linear ordering on values to which value rankings, being only partial orderings, do not conform. 20. Goodin/ however puts his case against those rules in a less than satisfactory fashion. What he claims is that we cannot list all the possible outcomes in the way that such rules as expected utility maximization prefi, poses, e.g. Goodin suggests that we cannot list all the things that can go wrong with a nuclear power plant or with waste storage procedures. But outstanding alternatives can always be comprehended logically, at worst by saying "all the rest" (e.g. "'P covers everything except Cll#l- p) . For example, outcomes Goodin says cannot be listedJ aMI be comprehended along such lines >. as "plant breakdown through human error". -,u.fU 7o--n-l'"'--? ~~ ,!e__u;,.h, ,;?,,-z)~ ~,-'Lr .....,./7 -~ ~ ~ ff.7'L . ·(j-, ~ ~~- 7-~A..'-., 7 ~7 ~er,&,. , 4 ~~ ~~ 7,6- ,,,ffe d,,_ $ ,' .;;,?'? ~6:,cc,.Jro/, /""'.d IE=i")'JC,,.-,... 6 '--X ,..o:,,,...__/J<:r--t.<"it/£ , µ & ~ ~ / ,.,_ ""~ 21 l-9!" • ?Co ,;W'L,_,,,;, ., Discount, or bank, rates in the economists' sense are usually set to follow the market, cf. P.A. Samuelson, Economics , 7th Edition, McGrawHill, New York, 1967, p.351. Thus the rates have little moral relevance. A real possibility is one which there is evidence for believing could eventuate. A real possibility requires producible evidence for its consideration. The contrast is with me re logical possibility. Such a principle is explicit both in classical utilitaria nism (e.g. 'lf. J.H'.1,A'" Sidgwick p.414), and in a range of contract and other theories How the principle is from Kant and Rousseau to Rawls (J8(A" p.293). argued for will depend heavily, however, on the underlyin g theory; and we do not want to make our use depend heavily on particula r ethical theories. ;=,..;,. //4 /4 ;,/<, o/u_ z ,G/( . F >/,2 7. 7 Jk_,t,_, - k/4/I,,. ,~ .J-/4 ~ -~.:I ,&.,~ jr "~~7 ~!½-~~ 'l~J / c-,e ~ C>7 "'/· /L !? L-... ,f !JJ ~ ;fI ~-£,-'-. __ 7 ,co/ • ro c ~/,. ~ / _ c..--e_ ••,,( ,r; L- .,.__;__ ...c .,,At /4_ ,,.,. 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I / ✓~.L 'trv'/ ,,-0 ' ~~'Pc jf. /k /;11~ ..-~ ~/V-rl_ I/fl 1~rrn_ /7w.rficd v?:-./ (-~ - C-,-Z/1-,_;,., I ,../fr"" //4 ~ /;2,~~I/~- ~~ L-:. --< -~ tr,7c ~ . . r / ~ /d~,e;;, 1/#"l'~ ,i,,,,ft//-?ft' ,J7._:, ~ ~ .-,I_;;:;;_._, cb- ~~, 7Z AC'c__ ~) . r - ~r ~ t{e/..//1 ~ ,,--~6,,- (--l-i..-< Even then relev ant envi ronm ental facto rs may have been negl ected . , 1 Ther e are vari ation s on (i) and (ii) whic h mult iply cost s agai nst numb ers such as prob abil ities . In this wav risk s, cons trued as prob able cost s, can be taken into ' acco unt in the asses smen t. (Alt erna tivel y, risks may be asse ssed throu gh such fami liar meth ods as insu ranc e). ' A prin ciple vary ing (ii), and form ulate d as follo ws: (ii') a is ethi cally acce ptab le if (for some b) a inclu des no more risk s than band bis soci ally acce pted . was the basi c ethi cal prin ciple in term s of whic Lake Boar d of Inqu iry rece ntly decid ed that nuclh the Cluf f ear powe r deve lopm ent in Sask atche wan is ethi cally acce ptab le: see Cluf f Lake Boar d of Inqu iry Fina l Repo rt, Depa rtmen t of Envi ronm ent, Gove rnme nt of Sask atche wan, 1978 , p.305 and p.28 8. In this repo rt, a is nucl ear powe r and bis eithe r acti vitie s clea rly acce pted by soci ety as alter nativ e powe r sour ces. In othe r appl icati ons b has been taken as ciga rette smok ing, moto ring, minin g and even the Vietn am war( !) The poin ts made in the text do not exha ust the obje ction s to prin ciple s (i)- (ii') . The prin ciple s are certa inly ethi cally subs tanti ve, sinc e an ethi cal cons eque nce cann ot be dedu ced fro m none thica l prem isses , but they have an inad miss char acte r. For look at the orig in of b: b may ible conv entio nal be acce pted thoug h it is no long er soci ally acce ptab soci ally le, or thoug h its soci al acce ptib ility is no long er so clea rcut and it woul d not have been soci ally acce pted if as much as is now know n had been know n when it was intro duce d. What is requ ired in (ii') , for insta nce, for the argum ent to begi n to look conv incin g is then 'ethi call y acce ptab le' rath er than 'soc ially acce pted '. But even with the amen dmen ts the prin ciple s are inva lid,f or the reaso ns give n in the text . It is not disc once rting that these argum ents do not work . It woul d be sad to see yet anot her area lost to the expe rt~ name Jy ethic s to actu aries . - A main part of the trou ble with the mode ls_is that narro wly utili taria n, and like utili tari~ ni~m they they are distr ibut iona l featu res, invo lve natu ralis tic fa~l~ n~gl ect Real ly they try to trea t as an unco nstra ined optim cie~ , etc. isati on what is a deon tical ly cons train ed optim isati on: see R. and V. Rout ley 'An expe nsive repa ir kit for utili taria nsim '. I.-"\ Appa rent exce ption s to the prin ciple su~h as taxa redi strib utio n of incom e gene rally ) vani sh when tion (~nd weal th is cons trued (as it has to be if taxa tion is to be P:ope r,J_y justi fied ) as at leas t part ly a so~i al asse t unfa irly mono polised by a mino rity of the popu latio n. -:) · ~ Exam ples such as that of moto ring dang er~u sly coun terex ampl es to the prin ciple ; for one is not do not cons t~tu t~ mora lly entit lcu to so moto r. f, ;o». ,> /;o cfobs and On all these points see R. Grossm an and G. Daneke r , t7w· L E'nergy, Environ men 1:a]jsts for Fu.11 Employ ment, W;:ishington DC, 1977, ting pp.1-7 , and also the details supplie d in substa ntiatin g the interes case of Commoner · [7]. nuclea r indust ry, On the absorp tion of availab le capita l by the see as well [18], p.23. On the employm ent issues , the see too H.E. Daly in [9], p.149.X A more fundam ental challen ge to poverty argume nt appear s in 1. I 11 i.rli Energy a:nd Equal·i ty, Cal den and Boyars , London 1974, where it is atgued that the sort of develop ment need. nuclea r energy represe nts is exactly the opposi te of what the poor Small For much more detail on the inappr opriate ness see E.F. Schuma cher, is Beauti ful, Blond and Briggs , London , 1973. As to the capita l and other require ments, see [2], p.48, and also [7] and [9]. For an illumin ating look at the sort of develop ment high-en ergy techno logy will tend to promot e in the so-cal led underd evelope d countr ies see the paper .of Waiko and other papers in The Melane sian Environ ment (edited J.H. Winslo w), Austra lian Nation al Univer sity Press, Canber ra, 1977. .-B9-..- -'.JT;lhHi~sHf§'..ia'!1ee,jtE---:1ii·ss-:1t.i·m;a:pE>cll-1.ic·e.eici~t±l:-;:v-r-4r:ee~c,QO'l:!g,i;ineii~s~e~0Hittrrr- [P.2f]~,:7p~.~5516J. A use Ta 1 survey is given in A. Lovins . Energy Strateg y: The Road Not n, Friend s of the Earth Austra lia, 1977 (reprin ted from Foreign / Af. airs, Octobe r 1976); see also [17], [6], [7], [14], p.233 ff, and Schum~ cher, op. cit. //3· An argume nt like this is sugges ted in Passmo re -f-fi, chapte rs 4 and 7, with respec t to the questio n of saving resour ces. In Passmo re this argume nt for the overrid ing importa nce of passing on contem porary l culture is underp inned by what appear s to be a future -direct ed ethica version of the Hidden Hand argume nt of econom ics - that, by a coincid ence care of which if correc t would indeed be fortun ate, the best way t o take the future (and perhap s even the only way to do so, since do-good of iRterv ention is almost certain to go wrong) is to take proper care the presen t and immedi ate future. The argume nt has all the defects of the related Chain Argume nt discuss ed above and others . /1, IA;, u,./n er Very persuasive argurn en t sAh ave b een advanced by civil liberties groups and othe.rs in · a number of countries: C.$ee especia· 11y M. · , Nuclear Prospects. y· Flood and R. Grove-White, A Comment on the Individual., the State and Nuclear Power, 'F riends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural. England _a~d National Council for Civil Liberties, London, 1976. y~.;.~ f- 7 ~ ~ 7,,....J., / ~ / ¾,_ r-!! 0~ 4S>- I'-- ~ !' ~ / ,,.~~ l'/4 ~ ~ e- ~N~ .,..,_.,,« LvV"' 7#'~} J u /~7 ~~ .a - / .,J.,/2., k._,,,,, ". .,,.-b ~ ./ ~/4:-._ /. £. /4 cl,< .,,.,..( ,i;;..,,.<- ,,-::: c:e£l/.? ,,_~, ,t,_,.,__,. <C'" /''j!fK .;. /)-...._;, ·- di de,.,~,?,;, . h ~ ·~' I '-,,.,_,~ /.,_, , . 7 /.1- ·,',( ... :.... 7 1-. 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I o.----~< ~ ~- J<:7 ,!!:,<'--4--r ~ ~~µ/~-~ ~ y //' ,//_?)' ~ I /4.~, _~~ ~ ~ r4 <'~oA-c-:5 ~~ 7 i,v_/ / r7-4-7' 7 """"~ ,~ '~ '7!(,,/ ✓.f rr~• C,!+,._;,,~i</1 7, ~w,_ ~~ I /' er t'""" , y ~ CJ V J,, /4,~ .,,nd,,,:_ 7~~ ~-- ° /{ 0 t..A"t-"'/--« 1 ..,,-/~ ~ /&v>--,7--. 7,_;;..e__..f -r;. ~~ /0,,£,V ~ ~ / e-- "-7,,,____;. 7~ ~~ ~L =---<' it!. ~~ I'~ 1 /- / ~J , <;• i ,c__ c.,,..,_ kl k-- ' /r ("'~ z e-t zb%, 7 ~~77 J/~ /~~4-/~dr• /~ 7~ ~Ci ]%-& 7,~.Hc7~7r10 ,,-,e ,:;;-,;.,(;.(,~ 7- ._.~,,,,.,;: ,.,,,.~_ ~~;(Jf L.11$ Ce.-rc:-- , ; : n r / ~ / ~~-I ;z__, /rd-e-{4 7~ A /~ ~ I ,L',.y;~ /'<!..fe,.__·f;;;(,~ fl, fd &<--, f (~ ,.~1'~4' I"'- ill lt<d. 7µ,,,, ~ 1 7 4-t,/ <!ed, ~..: t ' ~ ~ j/7l , j'-k?, ~Jul. tA..,-17 T/4_ -7 1~/<'N/4 / '---2/7,n,;;'k 1'.~ .t;/4-.. ~LC-~~ //~ //7( , JI" .Jff;+. ~ t'C~ & TI c: ,4,,eJ,...if c~~ /4./4.e~ I /-- 7~ ){~, , ~ 17 ,:_, ch7/4_.,<, A,f._,J-.__ ,7 ,...,.._,_ ;/ #~ Certainly practical transitional programs may involve tempor ary and limited use of unacceptable long term commodities such a s coal, but in presenting such practical details one should not lose sight of the more basic social and structural changes, and the problem is really one of making those. Similarly practical transitional strategies should make use o f such measures as environmental (or replacement) pricing of encn1y, i.e. so that the price of some energy unit includes the full cosl ,. ------~-- tl ~ -1 footno te le continued. of replacing it by an equivalent unit taking ac count of environmental cost of production . Other (sometimes strategies towards more s a tisfactory altercooptive) natives should also, of course, be adopted, in particul a r the removal of institutional barriers to energy conservation and alternative technology (e.g. local g ove rnment regulations blocking these), and the removal of state assistance to fuel and power industries. ff Symptomatic of the fact that is it not treated a s rene wa ble is that forest economics do not generally a llow for full renewability - if they did the losses and de ficits on forestry operations would be much more striking than they already are often enough . It is doubtful, furthermore, that energy cropping of f o rests can be a ! fully renewable operation if net energy see, e.g. the argument in production is to be worthwhile; L.R.B. 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Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 1875: Draft of Nuclear power - ethical, social and political dimensions Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations and annotations, and handwritten notes, undated. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'Nuclear power—some ethical and social dimensions', in Regan T and VanDeVeer D (eds) And justice for all: new introductory essays in ethics and public policy, Rowman and Littlefield. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Big mss on nuclear. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 1875 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [71] leaves. 58.48 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8e30ade">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:8e30ade</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-01-01 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant n/a - location not listed in manuscript finding aid Box 59: Nuclear https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b7e96b71fefc9988ef3929fd7866bb10.pdf 5fb8e8a6531d12dab3e477279d64ead8 PDF Text Text l 89 - .r 1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N. Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from ;-1 SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German, British or Fre nch) viewpoint. This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect the morality o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt. eitlH_•t t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e als o a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans, or for the American sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear ar r angemen ts involve. Mtwh o f U~A, CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n structure of the argument Pag e No §O. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral l. i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter. §1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the 2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war. War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt featur es o f nucle ar wars. 2 0 §2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations -~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war. The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted. Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus: s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated. Li mits of st ate e n titlement. §3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars. One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of the ke y argumen t elabo r ated. §L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ . Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality , p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles. § 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~· De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata: p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through <l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of 1. 5 11 1 !• 17 �Page No !,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es; separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle: the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism . AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence . piu,.,f Till·lll H. 56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas . The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode]. §7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their _supporl e rs. Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs 37 43 fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts. §8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e ethical res 1lts. Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it. FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention. Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r 1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons. 49 The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states. Appendix 1: On Scl1;!1l t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to and Anders. Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption . Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e. H 64 �.1,t . . .. Page No ~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y a nd on regional strat egies. Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration . Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons. Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes: what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social and po litical adjus tment. iii 73 �ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!) NtlCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated, ~ Ll o r n~ arly HO th11 n e of even t he larges d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war. invo l ve, and threatened sa id to so differ co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a CertFdnly ma s sive PX hAnges Gt1ch as nuc.le:ir wars exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of Muc h at forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often f r om eit her just wars. new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will se rv e as initial ethical ba se. Al though nuclear wars are, thus non ex i s tent (extrapolat e va r ie tiea, objects, 1 nuclear wa rs from n very limited Ia fnr, only a decidedly menac1.ng class of proper have several distinctive properties nu .lear experlence 2 ) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) - - - ------- ---- -1, The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forc e fully: 'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could ima g ine: we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y, peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to give it , e .g. sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence, pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds, ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality. �111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 • explosio n A large-sca le nuclear involv es war of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region; a [unction of two main parameter s: distr i bution. Such strnt.egic ) nuclear quant l t leo of a war war quantity diffe rs which explosivc n, ts markedly limited, nnd (megatonn age wh ere from by the a of t:,Hget.s it i s ex plosive) limited assumptio n, the to and (tactical much or smaller chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y arc cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in a given reg ion. Though t he focus in what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no nucl.car arsenal means a separate st r ike 1 s ince a is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1 waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns second iss ue , et c. ). 4 Because of these of follow -up or connecti ons, much of the ca se made acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent . How nuclear wars reHultlng d-Lffer from oth er war s: wars and states and th e -- ---------- - -- - -- llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war. of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c two party (or thinking, A model is th e severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or trib e bat tle ~. A picture of war thu s refle c tion r e quirement s for legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical on advances have trad iti ona l now theo ry ender ed of war, emerg ed, inapprop riate ha rdly and especiall y sometimes surprisin gly, as a result inapplica ble. of The made no allowance for such J. Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially the type of strike :lnvolved. Though the sequence is j_mportant for the mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge. 4. 'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars: t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European "theatre'' , is really a myth. 5. There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given, etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a mu h deeper wa y, �j phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s Tokyo. rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th And j t.' many occurred wi.th Dre s d e n and further crucial effects be yond mass bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions . Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument 1Jnchors, Lo historica l were accounted unjust war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control: the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n ar1ncd 'war' of content io n or comba t; cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience . but other are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8 proLagon ists, antag onists or players; means and or wrong. to elabo rate by means of forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ; noun linkages G to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter), and of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions Firstly , r e tain always a f nction of sens es of the States are the forces c omprising armed soldiers are the a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent Thus wars ar _ external or internal states or their rule. (c.ivi.l), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have transform ~d, and nuclear war has emerged with nuclear states. lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states : 6. An obvious :i.n short, wars ar e There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term 1 war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt ( OED) o n wa r, 7. But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of nation--s tates. 8. Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone .t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e. James proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12). What it boiled down to, howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil, especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness, con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast. Again specious arguments enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc . �.:1n uut ,~01•1p of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture, and are nltcr i ng by the s tructu r e. Wars j _Lu a t from c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of (other wi se defect ive) politi ca l organ isatio n of states ; they are a ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation . helps wa r arise War Thls seman t.ically based pictur e of exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and deterr ence d t: vo lves into an war-m akers , argume nt agains t aga.in st states . In the fact ( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d) on the war-d eclare rs and tradit ional theory , wars wer e r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as t heir r emoved t1 e right of r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es; states or the argume nt was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the c our ts 9, while states did not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of th e law courts ). But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim at e place of wars; ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc. Let. us a h OW\ ) V1_. r to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on - basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s tates or sets (axes) of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars. ·ompr litive game s, could be won. attent uated form for some "victo rs") Lhc World vfars. strate gy. surrou nding trad i tional ly firstl y for mass ive armed wa rs, Like exchan ges such as th •re may well be no winnin g in ar e as the of No r thern very hemisp here countr yside. Thus, and the second ly, for laying the was te _£Dint of of substa ntially substa ntiall y oblite rated 10 , (cxe rcl sed and most as nothin g all worse off than at the outset of the "play" . are huge war seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d: a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that prepar ed that: That assum ption still held good ~hough in Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds; is settle d with main protag onists player s It war; assume d An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n metro polita n agglom e ra tio ns 9. to main Hence elabor ately f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ; Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p . 776, top). The argume nt presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva te dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way, it looks as if it could be readil y t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern ment, or at least effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a t that time to be one state! �5 hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e. .:uid ot her Lhf' e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was not pu re de t e rr e nc e . to mil i tary Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff, Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in tar gets r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ; and military e xchanges. principle 11 This feature iG fundnnent al as for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality. ways to The special effects of nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear canno t w3rs be legitimat e ly confined. l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s uz0ne <lestr uc ti on, s hockwav es, suc h effe cts gign nt l c fum i gat i on s §2. a nd th e e nti re l y rapid ••. speed special effects (presente d in Schell) include radioacti vity, pu lses, fireball or firestorm e tc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s. The mora l s ituation: be c ome as el ec troma gnet1 c <lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s, com pounded Th e se the r ecent tend e ncy submerged in the context of war. of moral considera tions to It is particula rly important i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient distinctio n mo r a lity or local or nat :l. onal and ~ ..e5:..diency. What is done in war, especiall y between advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the l ') . There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves " suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on. Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective me d ical int e rvention (PL, p.313). Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons de veloped in the tex~. Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" . 11. In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc. �l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH' Much t.h at oug h t war , of or othenlis e 12, not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like . we liv e not go in a rat her bar barous age : unremarke d, if the th e horrors of the twentieth century will history Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd ge t s writt e n as wi pi ng moves : based on "stra t e gy" disad van t ages , of mor a lly excluded actions, ·a J.culaU o ns. charncterist i ca---1J:x its is. that rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in o t con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr d0.Lcrmi nes (accurately) str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e such Hllitarily its e xp<'di e n cy . by gains own i.t _o u~ !:_, morally, cons i d e r i n g and Eac h side only lo s 8e s a s a in a military encounter own its advantages and r e sult. of alterna tJve possible to consider those of the other side( s) as well. In t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality . I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted wa y, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of eLc.) . Such t he class lcal through "bald an inc r emental a distinct nrgumen t tc.tt1s . g a r gument from an t ha t th e It would And (bu t The externally wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e . ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed. the of li mit) escalation man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit. assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as enforced force, Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated. Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue, reall y this Thus t oo follow from i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable . c onfusion Nuclear 12. For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness. These t li cn1<•s run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r. 13. As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument Jike the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. Th e fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1.. �i' war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n . for the l anc, r or players Still the !irgument is inc onclu s ive; can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate, examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4 A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by of mo ·al i t y: lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y c<;p,~, f,11 ly t lw 1 constraint s from the ot her s'ido. 11w~Liou not onl y as to ma y well enc ount e r, So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps it wlw t o u g ht to do in mor a lly permi ss ibl e si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf. But the last question do e s not, in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y . There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having 0:x.pe<.lienc y, even under extreme to give way to circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war involves . Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of give to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often way morality eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations. t hcorc~ical fac t is that both deliver f r om us But the the vnlue the o q'.: . to Expedlency fact, but urg('s , tba t does foreign takes local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e conside rat i on s . proper charact risa t i on , a remote By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its much univ• r sa lizable mor e univ e rsal pr inciples . rePultan t i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y fairness, eq u ita billty and of value and, And morality thereby imposes, through principl e s, jus t ice. distributio n c ertain requ i rements of general Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly Ttie no t It assumes, or what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of or to cruci al simply narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable . even bound moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same, eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue miraculousl y are placed 1 :., . Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e of ·va l untioi1~:; pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under 14. 11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1 i nt e rr e pla cement, from the same As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war. �B . expr d 1e1cy assessm ents 16 • ic c~ n For expedie ncy loes not elude deontic presen tation: be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right", or ft lvcn tight formal rest•mb le charac terisat ion . The charac terisat ion will normal ly that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to, or arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds. Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity ~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi ned. util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as cnn Thus onside ring only expedie ncy; intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ; meet do it Lt does not, unlike the me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the individ ual uti.lity of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say. There are dc•ont.o .logis ts r egardin g war mora ll y howeve r signlfic a11t e.speci ally, 17 • which differe nces, between utilita rians serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have permis sible, or to seemed to effect some to rend er justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards ~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not permit. already and partisa nship , since utilita rians But this is would reject the descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly'; wherea s an a im in what follows is to avoid meta-e thical me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not there is a neutra lity. to achieve And morally large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn. S('Vcr al moral partisa nship, VJ.rtua ily all positio n s grc• that the obltter ation of major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous. If tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists who seem to feel no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for some Rus si a n ones, s imply increas e the costs involve d, up to loss of whole nations if l.5. The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ", nationa lism and pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which exces siv e applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi ng a person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards treatme nt. The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require ment of morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require ment to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte nds to strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry). Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72. 16. The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic . 17. Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, i.n Collen et al. by Pl ato ; see on �:iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs Tile ncounlere d; _!: hen try to work down again. fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally oul of perspecti ve, morally. abandon or Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has tended to suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does not m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be Cons id er t he w11rld ,·inpl r1•. be so thern risi.ng (hemisphe re) no one's advant3ge . strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try nil lear to exchange in the North, There would southern to be waters encourage a hardly an of US all - out point then in securing institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much espe . ially given the apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts. tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e: lhc present point :1. has and tts power, limitatio ns, is an thnt ( t he fnct of) moral inadequat e But conse nsus const r aint without accompany ing struct ural adjus tments. For , typJrnlly , <lifferc11 tly to nationa l impose interest ls taken hosta ges or override morality, e ven holding civilian populatio ns kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ). unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian such as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitut ion of jus tificatio n; fails in The first, expedienc y , . C.!.BSSC,S And, regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overridin g for morality , of morality, which the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of :important or irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the mo r al interests , of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the case of LSN war. 18 . As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her than based on national interests . �Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis , Ii:!. It nol be pretended expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y , that tha t of it i.s "group but n montl basi, as distJnct from one of ego1 sm " ). There no 1s special moral d.ispensa ll on fo r governments. j ndiv iduals : ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or analys is of obligation. Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds; no di ff e r e nce organisation. extenuating killers: whether X is an · individual States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion reaso ns aside, be having just as beeu conce ded , special moral dispensations; more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism. cannot immorally makes system, grou p or of Lebano n) are, as brigands or mass there is no moral difference. Certainly t here are gro unds on which states or individual or and it f11rnish two (incompatibl e) their a gents 01: have claimed , but the excuses offered are no A moralities , a s atis factory state moral theory or public one and a private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual morality becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3 ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled Y are permuted . special 01 1t cover (e.g. to considerati.ons citizen Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or pe rson can be der iv ati ve damage For bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are der ivative prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly 1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency . particular, a sta te is not 1 morally) survivrd . In entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even ow n ( at for its Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge. 19 . There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or see Routley a nd Plumwood. multiple) morality Lines: �11 !-: ' ) 'j.J. The i_ni t i<d argument p:1cifli;m yield arguments to the tmmora1 lt.1_ of _ LSN wars. to tb e 1mmora1it.y of war. But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire controversi a l in an area where th ere is no go od r·ason to Argumen ts be for controve rsial. Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of LSN wars follows . All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime. nil wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling po litlcal issues between states . wa r s who Not are Among more or l es s admissible th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors volu11l'cer :w Ho ldlers nnd whos<' actfon does no t 6pi.ll ov er on to noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants were kjl.led in war. conscrip tlon, Since the esta bl i shme nt press-gangs and recruitment of such of the lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms; induction prac tices as near-d es titute, wars hav e modern massive war s are far removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ). imrnornl, Most s orts of wars are because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such a n exte nt as LS N war s . The first argument to th e immorality of LSN wars and of sufficientl y larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong. P2. LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts. P3. Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong . ( KA) LSN wnrs ar• wrong. The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set of Lhis type. the (KA ) t·cpL1ccs But the qu1. te 'kl.11:!.ng su ff i c l en tly 11v :i.l. crcH tu res' . Thu s t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or i. nvolvecl f ocus can destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a on arguments Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen. vadu tlo n of not ll fir s t uitable directly Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding �th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) . The argumenL Js valid, ,1L t a .kcd) on the basi :3 but of may each be attacked ( and of its p1·emisses. has in ef fe ct been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves 11 what is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are, in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said robbed; but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong, to "involve." providing For which instance, that person ' s assistance belng is also wrong. But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20 As aga inst P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that mi lit ary nuclear targets. wars can be encounters But given the character of nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets. net merely the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings. fnlloul There i s down-wlnd from military pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl tnrgcts US and For example, t he radioactive will affect large conc entratio ns o( European t argets , and may affe ct as Conn <l o. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal cffcrl ) 2 1. t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side If missiles wer e c haracte ristically r.eliAbly on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc diagn osed. 21. According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are rcs ponsJblc only for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even U these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended conseq uences . Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is pernicious , a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions . �whicl1 was intend ed unfort unatel y only went off to destro y an unma1H1<HI und e r g round Such claims shou ld be reject ed : ci ty. dou bl e effect Noneth e l ess the circum sta nc es differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo ns lbl f' ,1 for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce the the thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e ~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on. innkc silo course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under could missil e j t was not as if t he y had del iberat ely aimed at The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of] respo nsibil ity Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of the act. ~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of argued tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation . the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' . killin g and P2, it The equivo cation is induc ed by be conc eded that de libera te milJta ry , e . g. farmer s or goods or servic es bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs . used exclud ed as innoce nt . The s econd d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2. other. for re a sons, it by proper ly point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s Bec a use P2 s o amende d is less defen sible, is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'. What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status of what is mixtur e of tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs. requir e the qualif icatio n 'delib e rate' or done, So 'delib erate' gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so does Pl. not t he Second ly, it will be conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin g of t hos e a It no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi litary ef f ort, whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of not be charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin guish able, by and ma y of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will be made . will b are While it will Pl For Pl do es 'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22 Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none the worse for that, and Lhere is no seriou s p·o blem in markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s, people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and J.s, mnrco v'r, no need to adopt action chains . There the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic 22. Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ). The sugge stion depend s upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent ion, and wrong ness with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri ne. �,1 rlns:; ":'i ,c mnk.t~ t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try t:(, endenvourlng c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants. there Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met, .tr,~ for ;ir311mcnts the prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl and Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t tend will For examp le, one argument for v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory. Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one, (to poi.nt) , re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns mi n f nn l from -~_gume nts §4 . the understate sc,rio usly doing so 23 histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts on wars, just ur dreamed by conlemporary "free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and opponents communis t im portant the The conclusion t hat LS,' wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified - 1e that fail s to treat them with the .0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments . r.;omet. lti to of is Americ a inspired, me r ely not or et c), th e of same The conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al t:irnt•s , (or jusL wars. first One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the ;>1 :irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it to no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killc.:<l (cf. be Barnes , p .77.5) . A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be fought by morally which impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate killing of noncombatants . The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e legitimate of means , discrimination (betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) /. ~:, . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate ') ( I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' . 7.3. Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One ;.rngLP favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there in are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g. c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of See a l so PL , p.312, where a their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r. uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed . 2 1~. Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally usage. of �- - - -··---·-- Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f being that of net evil to net good: pro ro rLi on cor; tr-: up proporclonality, 'the damage to be infljcted and lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed the damage and costs , req 1irement: disproportio nate to goods moral pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R er i t1! rlon of the which doctrine through war . "improvement" ln achieved of confined, nationally no t ar that way. ov e r a ll co n sequences of abstaining i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts": c ondi. tion s "nmel.ioratlve " wn y the 'a nation wages war justly than Similarly on l y if the for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent s:1tisfy for bad, from war ' (Barnes, p.72) . LSN wars can in these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also wa rLl , nnd war According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no are Entangl ed with the justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less th e taking by p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this (PL, arms' the e :a mple that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r t!il' v0 ry d lf !<r<' n t'Jy, cx rhanges . 1 lmilcd prospccUJ of: succl'SS for whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in Wha t some sm11ll strictly state limited clltc , or nucl ea r is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right intention. Fo r One (by no means be arg ued to in various ways. c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that, 1 wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 25 . Til e principle can 26 . wars where t he targets ar e c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he For such wars remain unjust on pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect . on lif e several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were s ys tnms, etc. mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be nucl 'lH kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear ndded ). Zi. Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack, �t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what are se e n as b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars can b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed. Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion of medieva l theory oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e was no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf. lltt J e is wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc se nsitive howe ver, me rit, ( a nd when issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently). a r g uments are not do There .In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents, dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s h i st orica l r e quireme nts Barnes, p .778). not simply commit argumen t s matters underlyi ng the Finally , these argumen ts from any presc r iptive fallacy; from historic al autho r ity for to th e mo r al c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed, a nd nome times applied , were justifie d. As they are. I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the mo ral rightnes s or justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin e on co ntempor ary u n ti l times. Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and This ls the involve beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars : such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once remov ed ( a nd e ven, howr• vcr you look conse ns us violence 28 • Ht very f requentl y , when it is not) . il morally . a r gument; it The argume nt i.s not proceeds expedi.en cy that is duly They a re morally wrong the same as the weaker fr om similar results from the full sweep of ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion. The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case each type of moral theory. Fortuna tely deta ils can be de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents 28. one, from shortcu t. For for just war These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear. For the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it. The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may be co nd emned 'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311). Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780). �.l / whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate. w.1r were i_;ornctimes a rriv ed at or l n fact conditions for just defended through pr inciples of such moral th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative been done . work already The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is maxim j.sati on utl lHy has is final ly ac complished, LSN adopted, wars are howe ve r excluded ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an · g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1 l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ; wars Llw l involv e on LSN 1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure, tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in utllitarlan Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 • L1i; ldon. The arguments ovcrwhc .lming so moral far case outlined against such mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n principles are de riv able from agains t some LSN wa rs. LSN would su bstanti ally wo rse are tha n exhaust th e violate thes e of the theories just considered). These ac countable, condition not ( again th e obligation to maint a in earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems : we do For there are oth e r significant war pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns : p,cnera tions, to whom wars we the r.-esponsibility to futur e pas s to th e " recei ved the world it". Such on" not in conservative principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are bound to be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war. §5. The shi ft to nuclear deterrence: suppo rt nuclear arguments to its immorality . Those who arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars , by pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars. What i s being done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om war: deterrence is most important precisely engagement in preventing in LSN such wars from ever occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values. it is continued , deterrence is the .9nly practical d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments 29. For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail, complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'. are But compare Hardin. though not in �a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented in: mutually ;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31 Su,h c1aims as to the roles and dubious, for seve ral reasons. objective s of deterrence If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. s uperior ity. than th i s, and sometime s even a mili ta ry goal. In fac t there ha s renewed driv e for Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32 process decidedl y A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce, despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only - been a que st for more are Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate for dctct"rence . On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its" impu.ls e there has been almost unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318). A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what sold 31. is being 11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor: marketed a nd deterrence has It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es "flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic pulses. In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it. It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM, p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed [1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front, which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. �i.ncrt.:ascd the probability nrms-race type t hat of LSN war. More precis ely, deterrence of th e is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and hns to that ,,,·te nt least en hanced its prospect s of occurring . at r easons also, connected with pure original setting), the last 30 years. the deterrence and with the For other "cold war"' (its probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to main tain credibility overridden or with ''sacrificed" a population whos e real for military objectives; state of military readiness; etc. The situation has many ther e sober analysts century , i.e. think before 2000 . is a high There are s e veral interests are being the dangerous and risky now been reached where pr obability of an LSN war this routes to such a probability assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and Amer lean 2000. alerts, hav e been lucky already . In of nuclear markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that th e For the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucia l the arms of nuclear acci dent and human or t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf . :l.ncrease zones separating the superstates are increasing in sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and r e veals the exchange . number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l race, on sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in r e cent years. Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128). �20 conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) . s e em s no way Fof better or worse, ther e to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight; a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight . IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it proha bJ~ that LSN an war will d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it proba bl e that c entury. And that is enough a grossly occur this ce ntury. is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is i.mmoral. For then it follows ( by plausi ble that it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this warrant morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome. de terrence highly is evasiv e act.Lon. We ought That in turn implies taking steps , presently practised. Thus present That i.s but the first of several ways we shall nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies. The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of war h a s of cour s e been disputed. LSN The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows : Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying. The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with ar c improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much ava i lable evidence counters this More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper ). What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the ce r tnin ly Ther e by, through det errence, we si t uation, since have already got into t.h e probA.bility. immoral of r aising The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity of nucle ar deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense war, against evidence s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an LSN war . LSN a nd way of princ iple s mapping war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war. mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic connecti ng pr inciples . moral arg uments Such principles The fl rst of the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form: Cl. should If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only be pr ob3ble is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly �i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur . Thus, f or example , s i nc e is it wrong to ki l l a large noncomb atant po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k and wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out, which nuclea r de terre nce does . botl1 of For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t ho se of third part y no nal i gned most Like "' t tuations . defeat by example , 0 t a te s . sub s t an ti ve Unless mo ra l count erexamp l es, the second principl es oc c u r s. probabi lity that par t princ ipl e s in Cl runs into dilemma. and of a c c ord i ng l y, Cl e ncount e rs to require complic ation. For apparen t trouble where clash of Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the oc curs X ord er to apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 • nuclec1r ethi s, d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to t o avoid a greater evil. pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y c r ashes, in dct:crrcn ce , make that t he Cons i der for example the passeng er plane he ic flying sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of ihe r e (though the r e explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not ls a of fs e t clash or of principl e s, as §6 removed by its role in avoiding greate r e vil. I L can be a r gued that it is: argumen t from t he pr e vious a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le perhaps f rom more such is pa rt of succe s s credence t he de terrence . th a n the of the popular However this inductiv e racing world As Barnett argues, driver's argumen t, 'the happy acciden t has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war 34. point a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet (des pite some close calla ) , he won't, th a t of the in the coming era, This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D. Johnston . There are more dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es. For example , in inciting people to c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d. Thus, t o ta ke C, Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj. But surely Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence . But spelling out what 'dir ec tly' means in terms of short causal chains over which r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to ot her connect ing princ i ples. �·2 (p. 100) . lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power incrt.' ,ise 111 Russian strengt h, the ri se r e 1aU. ons, th e of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc . (cf. simllarly Cox ). There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Dl. De errencc will not continu e to work, and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that D2 . De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war. The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together : some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r. proliferati on, the emergence bu t the focus is on the ( in An initial of lesser nuc lear powers. reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that lt. -i~i us e of nuclear weapons by confrontation a 11 lesser very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th stat e . Moreover scarcitJ ;::i nd o f chea per suppli es, etc , weapo n systems, more or Lcrror s ltua ttons, deterrence power lnvolv e s 36 , being mainta.ined : costs Wi t h so many more Arms races, and interwoven balanc e of have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record. lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds . of resource A second group of reasons concerns the Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that pres en t for wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased. powrr opportunities growing nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to. wec1pons .lnltlnl to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline, and the of lead escalating eventually to arms war , races, with such as probabili.ty Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for 35. that deterrence practice increases It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf. n 1clcar p .. 2JO n. 36. supposi ng th e armed with Lackey, MM, The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for dcle rrenc e. Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled. �probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in poli c y, US especiall y th e rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides to rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being advantage of ov erwhelme d, USA the to take superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy the tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as hostages ), thereby war. also weakens the case against resort to nucle a r detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t of mutual understan ding, leaders, and even some nuclear. sha r ed principle s , cooperati on supe r-states. and soundness transmi ss i on Finally, impor tant) level judgement among of of and informati on between It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for instance, follow through on delusions of one sort or another. deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding the other It is al so tha t side , which slde ' s threat is to the other' (P L, p.313) . we think' • 38 But about what the o t her considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of evidence, that on e perceptio n of what is possible resul t As s ide side thinks e rror. Not thinks , there only not can be is a there sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n; must now be severe doubts cffectlvc ly. "conv inc ing " There is a grain of truth in the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other what be a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how one may as to whether rationa l principle s are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward defence) have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies : we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and i.rrntiona llty . J8. Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'. This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e. �24 idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA and in UK) that LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won. The suppor ter of det er rence connec ting rrlnci ple s ri val case. such J1as not onl y to defeat a rgumen ts Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing as For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly ~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_. t hr o ugh practic e of Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed ( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl), only a feeble case through the questio na b le obv ers e of Cl, Cl i. If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X, nppears open . • For it has to be shown that deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war , and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options . o The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill be argu e d. reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim. up i-hc v ery cond 1 t:1.ons probab ility of suc h for a an LSN war, it So , for When nuclear deterr e nce set s can ha rdly have reduced th e war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le. More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi e d, it i s c..! l1 0l l f',h refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong. LO out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t. altcrn1 1LJvc pe rmissi ble courses of a c tion condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ; to be no t merely alrigh t , bu t ;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA, r ig ht. But I t is not enough to make For t he re certain ly seem to withou t deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory. uniciue ne s s includi ng fright To surpass t hese option s, a nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown es tablish ing such a 39. LSN war s , withou t .(cf. Jl 11 claim, to fear or is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39 OED) 40 • For most people, portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough from be the costs or problem s of Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by t hr ea t s not the enormo us expense , t rouble vivid scenari os to deter t hem and wastage of An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre nce is the way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum stances . Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu res , the an s wl!r hn-, to be, No. �- - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em. det t·r rl'ncc And deterren ce i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of by such means ourse not immoral . (whi ch miJit4ry (Sc.h e ll was not immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New Yo rk .) But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where this o bj e ct, a LSN war., itself is no t permiss ible. The argumen t for this is thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple C2 . l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong. Hence since p re para t i on, LS N wars nuc l ear are wrong and nuclear deterren ce deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong . claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X: wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn i Y• wi11at W.'.1 S wrong. complete It is not however being Y and Z may both be 41 i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1. " Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that L SN wa r implies complete prepara tion for Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls (which tr ied the major war c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added). But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the become J ncreasi ngly liable to question . wrongne ss implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty, deceptio n, mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally unde sirable traits. Li l . Nor a re ordered be cause wrong, equally degr e es of wrongne ss required : wrongs can simply be as reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally evil. Thus, e.g. William s: . partiall y labourin g are both wrong or . there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil a s the second. This is because both are held to be absolute ly forbidde n. Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to "S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z" and to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and 3 lg a numbe r; s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numeri c , lly from 3! �26 a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s. Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as sever~] other fea tures. LSN war , already writes in In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pret e nce. Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence. too sophistica t ed for bluff alone to Military succeed: t here preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in t he ot her hand , has to is now be serious deterr ence . But, on c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly: imply attemp t ed X. c omplete preparatio n for X does not It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed with wha l is prcpa·ed whell1er intelligenc e for under c ertain conditio ns. Comple te preparation , for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a (proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an be taken of connecting for granted . Principle C2 principles . is part way not the line in a series pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that A con necting X with a tt empted X: perh,ps down if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not . But the se ries ends ; off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to the (thoug h it cuts claims of various religious pos i tio ns. For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong then X the co n temp l ati on con sidcra t Jon of of is wrong carrying out Xis wrong. or that non-action- oriented The point ap plies equally to sexual fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares . no Lhing mere In particular, there is wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable , and in some senses are all too thinka ble. Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each common ly involves lt connects with. decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanyin g the increased probability are certain r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves; nol I ho:a· of mere pas s ! vc .o nt emµ l at f on I,, 1 '. Howev er oll the sets of these are connectl.ng �n prL nc lple s invoked except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased. c ho:;c n One rea son for th1s is that the means o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft . The inc r eased prohabi llty of an evil out come o l.mply makcB things worse . Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but thi s accompa nied by threats and a threaten ing posture . pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved, announce ment For some pa rty , th e if deterr e nce s ucce ed : the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible . n uc 1 L' i1 r deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le: CJ. of is to This aspect of if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also wr o ng ; or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng . The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form CG . If Xis wrong so is a cond itional r eq uires some further ex planati on. the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere of' • 4 3 thre ate ning ~ Apar t intensio n to A condit'o na l do intentio ns e . g. themselv es, 1 the t ha t ) . C to (or in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style: the most cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the oblj gati on form a are not impossi ble claim in whnt or even remote or imp r obable: (spe c ifica lly those involvin g cornmitn e nt) for follows certain is tha t s ort s there of discusse d an it is obligato ry conditio ns the conditi ons typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l fund ame ntal cred1ble functor: To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the involv ed whic h intensio n is a judgemen t of is some intensio nal functor, f rom X enemy . The are intensio nal funct ors threaten ing , intendin g , and whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate the immoral ity 42 . There is plenty of scope for f ur ther elabora tion here. Passiv e s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other worlds where e vil oc curs . 43. The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey strike : Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e theories of condi ti onality. of nuclear deterren ce. Natural ly again there are many �28 no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions c.ont. :•mplat J.on, t'1l nld.ng, dreaming, etc. of e.g . fail, those of The.r e is also a n interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) , expecting, awaiting and the like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:. Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is then threatcn.ing X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that to do into prac tic e (e.g. if wrong 'What is wrong putting something committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to that into pract i ce. beginning as fo] lows: The point ca n if worlds where alternative ly X happens be are put argued semanti cal ly, exclude d then so are adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen. The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons. nuclear war obta i n. However t he required c onditional form can be derived form, is through only c onditionall y threatened , i.e . the f ollowing wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if argument:- c. should certain cond itions particular, (of §§3-4) LSN oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it wrong, 44. so a lso is simple if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails arg uments the Observe, furthermore that if something Xis have b en wrong in the first place. ear lier from su bstitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions; by Firstly , threatening X if C, war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to e sta blish CG it is Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272. It i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and also, i.n view of CJ, not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t. S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops: se PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared "i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong. Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality mentione d below. �29 enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X. CG'. The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to ca us es more t roubl e . a serious threat, Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e is t l1r e o.tene d what l . i s wrong , to prevent t,1c occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion at all to pr oceed t o action on plaus ible Lhrc a t s . removes i t the support bas i s for of threats. s i mpl i f ied CJ. Insofar A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l. sense co nditi on s, is con s i de r a accide nt . intended, For the challenge grossly immo r al unconvincing, case wh e r e conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. ci rcum st ances th e result from improbable To bring this an intricat e Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her not . is in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious thr ea t s to under t a ke out is Principle CJ is not ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ. says this Hence the shift to serious one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible. which as it is way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the thr eat nor ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al more .. pra ctic al " rep r es e n t atives grounds. Further more, while states thei r and ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot: it moral principled agents they ar e or take natu r es , to t he kinds of th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains). i nsignif i c ant mora lly would run For su c h agents , who may counter to comprise their a not proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such a s CJ are no t in doubt. The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e --- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n. �30 t.hrcnt involved then is it Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t, inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no Lhen by CJ deterren ce depcn<l is wrong . The maintain ed. sub-argu ment on se ri ous threats is a practica l one: Lf it s no t seri ous Bu t if i t j s ser io us that nu c l ea r dete r re nce name l y , that if the t h rea t s were not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro ugh , then the op posit ion would flnd out, in one way or a nother. could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l wi LhouL A policy of bluff system , f or examp l e, coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n . Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems maintain ing such a po licy weapons , espec ially informa lion would clown during l i kel y times escape the of there would be ma jor di f fic u l t ies i.n chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear change through in gov e rn ing el i t es , a nd the op pos itio n i ntellige nce. But then , since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d . Ther e a re as we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s. On e is t hat nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts a bo ut the r ationa lity of carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity essentia l. to its effec t iven ess . To be effec tive then i t mu s t be s e r i ous ( c f. Benn). Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of one centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent. CG, Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e C4 . If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is n!so wr0ng. The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o die tionarie s, etc . ' . of 'a d claratio r of intent to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury, It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of deter rence, which in tend ing to go to war . princip l e , th a t turn 0 11 C4 is s ome pa r a doxes the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout Princ i ple C4 is j us t i f i e d th rough th e s i mplified inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s p inc.iple some an ex tr emel y position prevail. Si mplif i ed wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly. Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d to �Jl agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows : argue siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng to go to LSN wa r when the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong . Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows. He nc e nuclear deter rence is wrong. But like virtua lly every utilita rian princip les utiJita rian grounds . deontic t hems e lv es , princip le , princ i ples For it is not difficu lt to except thos e flowing from CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on outline str a tegic situati ons wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear det e rr ence. But on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon C4. For it likewis e fs not princip les C3 difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d by maximum expe cted a nd utility . pu rsuit Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism , scrappi ng the sp ots not by doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will trou bl e of wit h utilit a riani sm. enable So .i. t them to evade the worst is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its mo r al f avour depend s upon uti.lita rian ass umption s . Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of fwbst,r ntial 1itil.ita ri a n e l ements ' (PD, p.287). consequ e n tia l elemen ts systems incl ud e must infiltr ate, an with the ' ass umption if Eve n observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one e thic s thing this upon must hav e astonis hing confla ting utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e particu lar that assump tion produce s normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he a ct Kavka thereup on t ries the paradox es of · deterre nce'. wi t h maximum expecte d to The utility '( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great deal of utility - - 46. ·•---- ---- - Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip le (PD , p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler, Bentham , Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as to why the pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora l' (cf . Kavb p.29 1 ). It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les (espec iall y the maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka 's f irst paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see PD. �. , •" . 12 i.s s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87). :;t obj ec tions as This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h ut il i taria nism i self: it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e . usud l stratc ~y of of Kavka tries t he weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the ~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising u t i lit y can mora l ly e njo i u. But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies fo l Low fr om t he normative ( p . 28 7) • 11 7 what ov erridde n by C4 s u ppo sed u t il i t a rian to a ssumptio ns ' Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t and is assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e t h at .•. in produce , situa t i on s , are whe n moral c ombi ned dilemmas . in si tu a t i ons These are not s uc h th e f udg ed as sump ti on as special de t e rr e nt c a ses where one decnti c pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it int e nd right to to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) . wr ong : that judg ement is not ov e rr i den. Nuc lear de t e rr e nce is also t he case is t hat in r emai ns Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4 i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion, what is th e~e s pe cial p.290) . situations, Howeve r , t her e ar e count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives . For .ln t he s e is wrong . s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what Howe ver it is ha rdly ne ws, but a standing objection, that ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g . Spec ial s pons on s hip de t e rre nt may appea r s itua t i.on a, where under ntl lit a ri a n t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l. char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he 47 . deterrence de t e r r e nce is very likely As to Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 . Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles, but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s . �sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely tp lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well. This is ve ry far removed from the real world su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e. si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the deterrence probabiU.ty is of LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence . that <l1~ont <: principles sllbject Even if it were mistakenly to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working such RS supposed de ontic principles C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons. Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it equi. r es, by wa y of the following principle: CS. If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis The reason is that the commitment is a commitment circumstances; and that commitment is to act itself wrong . lso wrong. wrongly in cer-tain Nuclear deterrence is however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions . And as wi th conditional intention, so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt th a t su perstates and controlling commitmen t and their intention to use representatives nuclear weapons. did not occur) is enough to establish the relevant The dangerous strategy of launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a thut have response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence. Now the connecting principles suffice logically , but are nucl ar deterrence, for weighty principle would detachment from the by complete preparat i on fo r and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so parad ox ical: det e rrence. ir self By case . i nstance conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong. This sound wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles one applied: it ou t the connections between and not be engaged in (unl ess i ts ha s appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should chang ed, e.g . left bizarre nuclear war direct ion can be drastically at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare, �to purely mi l i t ary targe ts). Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different sort s of ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e . a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s I There wh i ch start from the commonplace ob se r va ti o n that ~ All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in favou r of nuclear deterrence are broadl y ut ilitar i an. In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many t hat inf iltra t ed hav e the e thi.c a l l i t erature , ar e those of ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the one playe r, t h r> USA. Utilitar ia nism , t hough s till looking of those expedie ncy -· advantage of basically at ~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of posi t io n, a nd consider [ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity sup po r t t d by o t he r na tional i ties othe rwi s e . The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains, dflrive s from ut il i tarianism. 118 Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst de terrence, either by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme , Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments. The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in f av our d ir ec tion: 48 . of de terrence. moral arguments Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second a ft e r all it is widely thought that u tilitarianism is a false, Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a much t oug her ent e rprise. Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was · cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes t.o deterre nce . An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological ~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily he way of <lcontic connecting pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail. In the light of these prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical positi ons would go. After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even. �seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition. pol it i ca l s yst em whic h depends in some uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo. It hardly does measure then for a upon consensus , to rely on Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e just thnt appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on: how it ls applied; with which maximisa tion recipes; along with what other r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well); genc>rous arc utll i.ty· assignmen ts or upon With different (and · a rguably superior) va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49 basic reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4). LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility. deterrenc e out to whi.c h increases th other recipes of feasible a how for such things as preservat l on of national sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc. assumptio ns , and on Any policy such The It is that as nuclear probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e alternati ves, conseque ntialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance , Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) . The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism o[ ut j lltaria nlsm, beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else 11t i l i tarla ni sm when applied One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this: by to addressin g s ome of the inadequac ies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e. on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the improbabi l ity of other options working. deep, uti ~itarlanis m If the deterrenc e probabili ty-well is morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are pro babl e. 49. Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the discussio n inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally opposed conclusio ns are reached. (Hardin 's approach tends however to expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-know n to repeat. Some of the main defects are considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilit arl.an ism'. The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to stand comes from L, Mirlin. �36 wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s likPly to work or not. indepe nde nt deterrence are decidedly essentially nowhere i.s Moral princi p~s not are through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be . depend .Lt If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter . det:crmlne<l whcrhc r of upon firm to stand. Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these a nd of the results util i ta r ianism delivers uncert ainty measures> util itari anism off ers In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle , utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and. The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism. (orm shows at special int e rests, such as conditions security (the of estimation rules are pulled in). probability- well state , have hi gh 1s deep , utilities, nat io n- s tat e and spe cial It does not yie ld a deterrence polici; ind eed hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ). 11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a o[ act most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s under very il The acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity; These seque nce di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left (as also associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd war breaks out. In this event it can hardl y be argued that deterrence is t he pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence. Along wit h the argument s, there are dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence. other concom.itant conventiona l wa rs . f or Firstly, the peace it has provided 011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re smaller-s cale reasons is no deep is s hort age of And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at any stage by a r ange of 51.. Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the simplificat ion . In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e (ref rred to in footnote 49 ). 52. Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open. becaus e �- - - -- - -- - - - - - · - 37 fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and t ec lrn1 .:fl.1, j)C:lc (_~ , p 0:i It thofl not offer genu i ne of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e ·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ). Secon dly, there enorm ous is cost, mora l -~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly Marx i st way, in terms of destr uctiv e capac i ty and what 'the ls contr a dic tion ne e ded f or betwe en what cons truct iv the is spent for devel opme nt' ( PL, p . 316) . §6. Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts from natio nal dange rs nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene sis of nucle ar dilem mas. to Whil e there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also counr c ·-arg ument s, that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe ciall y to Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l just:!.fiab ili ty of nucle ar war pr e para tion in the _p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es. The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift, of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and every bit a r gu1r.e nt from local dang ers. dom inati on ; a nd dubio us fir st of all seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 . atom ic s urren der and so avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ). prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more than these ; third eleme nt , name ly, loss of basic rig hts there with these . black mail of forei gn appea seme nt In fact nucle ar is ways a cruc ial of life This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the dange r of forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at e eleme nt from risk of Thoug h and (free dom, equa lity, etc .) and fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human dign ity, etc .) and int eg rat ed that The two go toget her, sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh t adop t a polic y or as It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be en tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er: forei gn as black mail. dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic value s it does imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin ation , freed om to choos e vario us natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta nce, as is comm onpla ce in the �"[ r •e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a nti clcnr prepnratlon incr easi ngly nuclear risks, state demands, extensive etc. But what nuclear destruction, also involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction ti, _ material of 53 of the cherJshed life-style. So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut bnse me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51• fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of lncku cogency an d rings ho 1 low, It is basic values and ri ghts hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c: oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like ci tati.o n of religious values at politica l ceremonies; clean cover for economic consideration of one sort from demand s of the military-indus trial of private wealth and vnl \les appealed to category: in and anot he r, them having However arising to do with th e an argument isn't, or associations. And the rights and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice . this of power. oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury that t he argument 1.s a omplex , many concerned with foreign domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many conccut ·at:1.on pious of "communism" of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of cnpi talism. communi.sm has What has been happened here confused with of course (the t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion , association, is reality basic information, that ( the of) state values, etc., ideal socialist namely etc.), of) and certain so does derivative~ threaten basic values. One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear LSN wa r, and indeed for rational way of preservtng nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life. 54 . The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1. .... , �'lQ J, Simi la r ci. ue s tions dominntion and arJs e as regard s blackmail. argumeq;; H from er, e Justification danger which is itself open questioned (i n §8 ), both from the to ser i ous point foreign of the methods of extensi ve nuclear preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e structure of of question, v iew of nation and basic states, a i s subsequently valu s, such as freedom, and oth r wise. But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or dangers are no t, t hese from natlonal those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear prcpnration, and jus tific, tlon. have They been have par t of many people ' s accepted in moral by policy outlook. particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar however , the makers as affording moral fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form Wi thi n frnmework the moral justification holds good . others, ar gumen t s arguments not a c onv entio nal Northern It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in preparatio n do such engenders establis h a moral fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people not also face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls specif ically moral one. ,1 impressed by And for ma ny other s again, who are who not so or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life, and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. peop)c Such live beyond For such the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged . Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated people who live in people. Consi de r some a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet) under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nucl~ar d ter r c nce (a s under pr inciple Cl). For such isolated people, who may ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no nucl ea r diJ emma , and nuclear lo cations may have problems problems people. as deterrence to natio nal is wro ng. dangers, genuine People in less fo r tu na te but in meeting these they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated In doing so i mmorally; and f or through similar nuclea r reasons deterrence , superstates the are proceeding conventi onal No rthern framework is �j_mpug rwd. conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l Tht'. same argument:: put a reflective i s olat e d pe rson, and check S! 11 ci> Amer ican the or- resulting by a substitution Russi.an 1n the position of such an asse ssment of nuclear deterrence. IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y transfixed, t h <~ c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality. The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending whc her on the arguments are appU.ed as rega rds a superstate or not. The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something Jn orde r t hP meet of the nuclear armoury that it has. Or, weakening the theme to ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it retain i1 t l east solid a ou~ core of the nu c 1ear devices it has. (moretlly] to For su bs equent argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for inst a nce be cause of the character the of pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of g rou nds to those di. sa rmame nL supporting ag ainst a the dangerous SS reason 55• prudent:ial the me nuclea r Northern values supposedly being On similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentiall y Jrralto nal. It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is a s11 hopLimal st rategy , li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games . that a su peri or would be cooperative For expen sive , re source s, dr ai ning of such t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1. 55. admitted arrangement s. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a ra nge of other r espects . future be strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the lik . could be achif?Ved , would agreeme nt So it should arrangement s would be much less risky , destructive of the environment , a nd so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. �rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~ unfortunate ly rather remote: only the ca make their polici es sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate : proceed, largely unabated . nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a one's a rsen a l, umbrella. nu c l ear pre paration , th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md for huddl es conf l.dencc in !ts and which under co ntrast s ncouragcd elsewhe r e . st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear grrH1nd one anoth e r's But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof, with nu clear in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly thr oug h some supcrstate 's nuclear COVt!r super-· ally Does a "d epe nd ent" on a s 1pc r -a lly, rather tha n strangely have that exchange on its territory? mu ch Jt s ally's opponen t ? Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or nuclear must stag e a Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d . Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e it <loes theme , not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers f rom SST nnd end s as follows: DST. Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally . ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd same goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ). Nor do the arguments of f ered for SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments striking l y illu str ated by the case the for DST. 56 This is more of more remot e nuclear dependent states. Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans of the Sovi et Union. Nor ar e they thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical 56. As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g. eco nomic consideratio ns such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs. �ca1 1acity to launc h mot j .ve Lo <.111y <l o look convincing . carries full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but R wc .i ght. reasons In fact, the with a rgumen t from of For there arg ument t he only is qucstLonable non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs. of 58 domina tion In this way too) the from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified . such supe r state foreign li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of a economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d. fore(• lack(ing] so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol For similar 1 it t le 'clearly danger because nuclear of umbrella, superstate dang er facilities and th e tha t would be removed wi th With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these sorts a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may b e defeated along analogous lines . The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and peoples, break theme the of a of monolithic West. differently situated This is a theme especially favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West, its freedom, as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n. und i.ffrrentiatcd unit. dep1!nd0nL i;tntes with But this l eadi ng idea, NATO desig ne d powers , and In this the West is a single in and part to align lesser to justify pu tting them at nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West. The West is not so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it (i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination. Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is now coming unde r attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the. und er lying retaliatory model that 0 Safety lies in weapons , More weapons i mply more. security59 , Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear. a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s from nuclear submar ines ) . Europe ans are ar guing in present of syslem is more a similar wa y, that the a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g. 57. For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 . 58 . The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2. 59 . Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson. argument for it, s ee Threats to �Thompson, p.251); envi s -1ged and thnt: w-ithou!: Lhcut.r e for a h\icJ. ,;,)ll'' instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l thf' is now seen by US ( ut not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are qu es tioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely ci Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular o Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed , say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or, takin g off from the previ ous point, ~ Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through ar e proper methods, armaments , etc.) or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resoLuti.on at the int er national level. It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no ordinary level do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and r e ally warranted, frontier ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60 and explana tion it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that already nation-states. While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c. nation-state system ': For 'forc e has [a] permanent plac,~ in the thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. Th resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites Ass~mbli.ng r eferred th~ to as themes the so far nuclear de v e lope d fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 ) to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east 60. yields the both and their supporters. deontic dilemma. often ought not to engage in it is immoral, and also ought for prudential reasons (as Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alter native systems , see su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s . argu ed using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, �·,,,,._ 44 SST and DST). tl w Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction of virtues parac.onsisteot logic), but ( c onc octed 61 prod uced by war itself 62 , or at war and its version of the deon tic least war which spr.·eads beyond purely mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably e . g. nuclear , a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions. ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense di 1 emma demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, t he ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on asper.ts to do (since ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) . military arrangeme nt s, The ma in dil emma arises from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of war. War is requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold); but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es . war can undPr also ce rtain justified. be se e n as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that ctrcumstanees Thus ' some these reall y ju tifications 0 evi l consequences Regis of war ' (Walls , p.260). accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic are morally of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible the The doctrine of " ju st But this argume nts when perfo rmed under is no better or mor e morally for uti l itorianism as bein g corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e . W;n· and preparedness for 61 . wa r als o gene rate s ubsidiary di.lemmas f or Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence the best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii). Green also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s down): though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue. Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops d :llemma; they s peak of ' th e dilemma of how to prev ent the use Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation i n terms of a mora l political paradox of de terrence •.. the of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13). In too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs. But it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework. 62. Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein. �. ... inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and difficult prohlcms au t ho f· t c y: 'one of th e ~0s t o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL, p.324). The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts. The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed by t he co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a ., " lnd.lvidual li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) . othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas , ( poll U ca l) obl lgations to s for example (the question the extent of one' s a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear res c•archer It also accentuates of politic a l obligation s armame nt s and processor or eva sion is their considered f urther in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re several ques Ions to 'Wh, t. should my sta t e be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e be doing and influence, d epending on who one is. I do? 1 one Jives, - do?', on whi c h one may exert influences, i.e. in what l it tle There is not only the question 'What shou ld a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending a nd ar e on whe re sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the questions ' What sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64 Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o act ion-or ien t ed questions . Each of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas . The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or di ffe rently, pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy. obliga tory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas. T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state. 64. For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate than they are . �moral d il emmas ure not l i t.t>r;,Lure f, !., • widely or well und er stood, p...." t'ticular]y __ e 1-1 ~ 1i in ca .1 Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which giv•s to rise them but the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y. d i lemma doe Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons a not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better a nd worse ways By 01t . wh c h assessments, contr a st f orm the with basis s uc h e thical theories , preanalytical oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s. Reactions an f rom the res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas fix. nuclear The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to <lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to temporary Thus , crutch . for as world' GG , that b st" j ethical RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o way a of neve r exerci s ing "mora lly ou r s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld . fu nctor s peak moral A similar th e 'strictly mor;il Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role but de t e er e nc: e th e c i rc um s t a nce s. de ter r .nc e, is be in a fallen to " second a acceptability ' object mus t cert ainly one str ictly and wrong, is of from th e conditional be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a optlon as to of what the to nucl ear do in Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion though a "morally try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And can shift 'moral c ond i tional ' while a ccepta bi U.ty , good", responsibility d~t c rrcnce fix. ·s (as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic of we gra s p examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e acceptable'' emerge neverthel e ss the policy to fix. awkward that war in the pursu e circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as Sar t re; a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood. 66. Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n 1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2. 6 7. As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable' hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s . The Australian, February 12-13 �!i '.rnp erior pol Ley ~ nsscrabled (in sufficien tly it is §5-§6), a dt! cidetlly reasons of ·1 }-toor the opti_ n, sort reasons i'o r that are decisive already for those, outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find no genuine of nuc le ar nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re, stal1.:s' own mald.n&_. fix a It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the Lhc escaJAtio n of In these respects the situation is like peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble relations hips , and build up though and U.:, A, has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by the USA and the USSR in in teractio n. th:1 t The one there by. It is build-up. The fact i programme is t o be in addition to existing ( which are to Sovi et that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does. esources myth, a some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response bui ld·-up, nucl~a · with onflJctin g obligatio ns generally agr eed The recent (1980) United to States' strategic be already in excess of Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) . The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly, state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. indicates especiall y that merely route by a taken advanced response to capita list t he nations, Soviets (or of USA and its NATO state socialism ). would not have been feasible without compleme nting And independe nt evidence, t l1 ere is then a direct outcome suc h as Soviet-Si no confronta tion, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist n.:.iti.ons . There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts nation-st.' .ltes and the nuclear f ix . arrangeme nts are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increa singly present wo rld polJU.cal structure . is widely promulgat ed .'.lrrangcm ents : it .is' seen On the dil emma as one hand, with t he these result through political that the i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state n world of sovereign states . • . which brought the �wo.ld to the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ). nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into On th e other hand, th e the statist form, into arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast. stutlst espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the and security, to defend national inter est s , reasons such as perpetuating the system advantageous of confrontation, st ate to (!), provid e but underneath there ore other sovereign st a tes and frame work the rlnd peace The military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and polit i cally favoured of inequa l ity it supports . The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e statist arrangements a nd interr e lations ( conomic ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock a rr nngcme nl.s of s overeign where the pa ttern world states And zones of inter e st . t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one . side the rivalries, into conflict i ng the present The argument to th1. s Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer . The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) . "We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also integrated with state appara tus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68 Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements, by th ing s S llCh as the SALT negotiation s ; shown there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a (growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a rule , partly held in place by deterrence . as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this , there are cases rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US i s 68 . of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e not over.duly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would free ly concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. �diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~ adj~c ~nt ~estcrn oil supp li es : concerning, were these lay within the US zone of interest (cf . th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212). §8 . Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: results. in itia l political fall-out from the ethical Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limJt~tions on the thu s inevitable. and more or power s of states. Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re The limitations may be reache d by agreement and negotiation , less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war. As with other fixes produced by there are suggested ways the structural ar rangements of states, ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts, inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure nnd power ·elations extrastate approaches . of state s (and, in the limit, remove t hem altogether) , All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" , attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations , etc . , are interstate ; sovereign state . The s ame goes (graduated) unilate ral disarmament . about the nation- state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for les s "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empi rical fact , is it part icula r ly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s. as a We are certainly free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s demise sacred it is not a particularl y well justified political form; it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers, lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like these . Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders regarded the institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration between city-st a t es , not seeing its social, structurally -emergent, characte r. �50 approaches take one of Extrnstr1te ittlernat ional of slate s. r.ol two rou tes, way ~Ile to l~, ge nuine power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0 The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; ,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e . but they are Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to world governmen t, is alre ady there in the international law-courts. Wer e the courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal acl ion, that· medie val principle theo ri. t s saw to all disputes, could in be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T. given intrastate s n fflcienl least jilitial]y) But if the law courts were power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t upon war deterrence , though not by military means. perhaps Law courts, as usually conceived, are not effective without police and jails or their and equiva l ent supcr-statist back-up eq uivalent for of economic other penalties; and the either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will typicnlJy be organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other In pa rt i es. repC'ilt uninvolved short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to rt . Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying ec:t t. n gri.ps with the nuclear though mostly 1n passing to be to problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned, dismi ss ed 71 , in orthodox strategic texts on -·--------- - - - -- -70. Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the uni on. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR , UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together; and the one recent attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e . The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns .illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification of Germany should be resi sted; instead a more rational regional deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border regio n, and so on. 71 . Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical , etc. Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations. �5l thermonuclear war . By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like the new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions, combined with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls: unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s considered however beginning to be cf. Way and is more sometimes The Way Up, sympatheti cally by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing inte rna tiona l system'; and 'the 'towards a no but lt is making Galtung). much by Up mora lly There is integrated missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320). A main argume nt for the Way Up is just a repetition of that which is commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners' Tragedy of t he Commons. traditionally, ecological order. not herdsmen as best solutions regards to problems as the of organisation, public order and, more rec ently, as to So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are but nation·-states , and one of the prospects is destruction of a r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now sort such It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the state - a r e r equired to ensure espe cially, Dilemma, of superstnt e. said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some of thcjr be order-imposing corr espo, dingly weakened. ar gum ent s are role, and But all political this is obligation to There a re, then, many problems through these A further theoretical with h:1.tch the is Way that Up, a both "tragedy" theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated 72 . will 72. stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only that states good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. prac t ical. assume to See further loutley and Routley especially Griffin. and material referred to a level therein, up and The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital. �again . The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h no prospect at all of getting su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose. Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century ago , In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before Wo rld War TI. The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui, pp.2-3 ). The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line . future For t he foreseeable nuclea r ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of opcrnt l vc world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear hostlllt i es . extre~ely I n some ways, this is just as well. monol ithic, woul d World gov ernme n t would cer t ainly , whatever it s ( g ray?) politic al colour, {~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e impose damage on to It undesira b le l eve l Ideological, r equ1 site the world an many remaining of inde e d u nity political and parad 'gmatic , cannot be and, e c o nomi c sepa r atio n expect e d in some crucial respects, unity. of Moreover , give n Northern main within nuclea r dea dlines. swee ping more sovereig nty , c o ul d blockages and agr ~ements, be negotiated? dea dl ocks i1 the involving genuine There an way is When not even endless of of that state series of s uch state reconciliation. a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e the of The s ame Way Up nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged • - through the Unit ed Nations); 73. it limitations almost the cultures, nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is (e .g . would systems. 7 3 The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly much be f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism. ·1 n .:ltur.:iL an 7 11 Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world gov e rnment, see Galtung. Naturall y the objections to world gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf . Ma zrui ). Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can be genuinely s yn thesized with the Way Down. �jJ There is arrnrgemant s regrettably and als o conventions much are e~ tdert ce frequ ently concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are scntJments signed does slide smoothly that not not 1nce rnational observed (especially those worth into despicable dee d s . bode well ever be rcc1chcd. ln <'nnv,•11t f< n any great deal: openly violated. I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one fon·C!, of lofty It for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t wl 1I C'h tn nl1 the following intEirna t i ona l i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en, w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc includes a Even agreements states have are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or not tr ea tie s , 1 , t h ton genocide. Genoc i de ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group as such: ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life to bring about physical destruction i.n who l e or i n pa rt. f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e : dJrcct and public shall Beside genoc ide th e c onspira cy to commit be Persons committing genocide o r any of punl.shed , whether they are the othe r act s responsible rul er s, priva te individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue nucl~ar genocide, inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e , complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de. mentioned ca lculat ed that a larg er st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. conspir acy repr:esentati .v 'S does to some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear deterrence stands indicted pa r ticular it of the and as involving i.ncitement . nuclea r s t a tes acts ass oci a ted with genocide, in Some wel.i - known political and military would thus ap pear to be li.able to indictment . and punishment und er internation al law . 7L1. Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp. 210- 13). Reasons include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n drlvc f or strategic super ior ity . 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports. in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden. 76. The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff . Most of the points text of the �The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the appare11t I mpot ence interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation ne:.rer to nuclear the " brink" is now taken to ind ica te contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l tias gi v en new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions . The According to can reorganise the radical namely n iclear in Sc.hell ' s 1 unsatis factoriness situat .l on The should the foundations of politic c l thought' pollllcal t.iicy opvrate •. , the indicates inst itutions Fate lead political of to req u i red a t he Earth . ' ful l-sca le to make 't he co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ... its political li fe' (p.219). However Schell himself tri e s to avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by the of the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed stands, Schell reexaminatio n o f world ' c and book a new a rrangements, thesis that the nuc l ear problem national ( f r om and work of our age' else overimpressed by political t he oris ts. the 7 Z history, c onstitute So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or real ities of (unstable) nation-states , do most But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation. There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too 11nthinklngly) with an an tiquated s ystem many present state arrangements, representative century communications •ery different condition; in a 77. when and the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier. of ( a llegedly 17th we re willing ly , The feat ures go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he especially , us even of poli t ical a rrangements which t he nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion . best of even dem ocratic) techno log y, more were t he and primit i v e d iscerned, In the br iefs prese nt ed A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l ( sec Co x , p. 225). Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival " bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1. �for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged . But such systems con tinue to opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es und c r mi ne<l. prese nt Nuclear problems rep r esentative have political emphasized have been several other defici encies in arrangement s. In particular, they have rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles Euro pe a n countri es. cen tury ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved. issues, ~ i s sues. The least, be reduced. reduced excessive power back at dev e lopme nts , pro cedures, But the route down through issue-regul ated large i mposes and complex other modern requirement s. states What lnl t .t1-1.l s maller a s iL ls to inf or med citizens gro uping than approx i mate of a g lant satisfa ctory good will. As the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n the l.nf ormation by are stn tes, government recent tec hnologic al called for a re smaller Firstly, in present information and democratic progressive procedure, of control, nation-stat es, channels, and so f o r.th. ncc e ptable the from These upon nuclear problems have again made patent, even ·release the and distributio n distortion r estrictive of most liberal of them (and Aga in, especi a lly with new and less systems , there is little excuse for thls. information , upward depends But there ar e e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited pub} l t:1 y and Secondly , democracy, insofar political rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on). flow major li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation. a nd on of governments would, to that ex tent at grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education. cx pe n,, ive lea st governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e poss ibl e ev en in mu ch elected wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer polic:y th e It is past time for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once (i n some Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major 19tl1 in of data featu res in have a vailab ility major communicati on helped in making present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e �56 co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's nuclear superstates are often seen to be gJlemma type situation th e locked into (on which see, e.g., llardin1. A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for political questi oning current arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at le~sl), takes the following shape:• Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain j,rnt iff.-.d 111 te1·ms of dolng ut .eas t where and are so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those arrangement s, requirement s (as certainly in who operate under the muc h of the West) the basic mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met . • l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have these requirement s. For guarnntce the prospect of arrangement s. nation-stat es, good meaningful lives those to under their yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a meet at least in the North, can no longer such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way. support to A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ; m.-iny and ceased s tate to Furthermore a acquiesc e in or engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn) . Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have should be amended . have their justificatio n, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though not all) natlon-stat es: natio n- s t ate f orfeited it ls not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed . There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control stght of, or worse have lost don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the irn lerlyi.ng politica l theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68). �r;7 rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both c lai m popular Ln and mandate ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! , power~. put a value hi3 lier where, nlrea y illustrated milita ry situa ti ons: viol.1ted the 'IH' t:.1k er s on some have more often , they act without it or as The sit1.1at-ton has been reached sove reignty nation al survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210; is -✓ hl.'lfe where than 'nuc l ear: they do on human for copio us evidence see Kupe r). Thi s by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear the principles of just warfare repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples. much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l have been blatantJ.y Such states have forfeited respect or internal political obedienc e; so, on other grounds, have many other state s . It could just be, of course, as is oft en a lt er nat ives, that have been re s arc hlng glimpsed, though of world go vernment). dismissed, for s tirc withou very no possibly better alterna tives . but little As to whether all has such are no been expended on opportunity do to work, a nd not Appea r to give we alternative s w~y Down. There working tow ar d s the wea kening es pec .i.ally can be the may and ha ve been given know very little a bou t how humans suff icicnt org anisi ng and trying out alternative accessi ble alter natives instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely operate under su bstantially different arrangement s. But, t ime arrangemen t s, to even once again, proc eed thos e nuclear very far on of the mor e be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in breakdown of t he large r s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem. ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd while t here But alternat i ves the r e are, effor t toking the risk of being dogmati c; little d e ad ii ne[, tha t t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e 0 op Li. on or insinuated , nuclear st a tes, Thus i t woul d be s oc i a l arrangemen t s, theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x. But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of dll emrna to th t: exclusion of all olh .rs: quite the contra r y . t he nuclear We can no t only afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her ) con st rain ts ; Indeed, given the urge ncy, the direness of t he si tuat i on , we �58 :,hou1d ~s be fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such boRged rlown ( a nd v ery on a rms limitations ner,ot inti o n s m"thod::i should si~nifica nt be undemocratic perservered concessions unrepr•sentativ e) between main nuclear states. wi.th, from cert ai nly tJ nd and the attemp t s superstates, made to e.g . No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even s uch a wring further jointly signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially new . The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have la rg e r eve r y liberal or huma nitarian been on issue that has matte r ed: from ou tside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or nnd it ' by furnishing self ·- organising characte r is tically Bottom-Up famiL l ar cons i de rations are methods an alternatives practically wi t hout which never virtually upon bypass it , Top-Down. Such but part of the more general , and very effective, case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to supply, but whic h effectively and [or can almost t hat invariably mnttcr le ss be obta i ned, where required, more e x pensive ly without them (and their monopo1 i.es) • In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions, impo sed , or acqulc s ced and nuclear weapons . frequently from time being , movement have in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations The opposition to th e local a nd neighbourhood esca lating grou ps, nuclear fix has come some of them now feder a ted :1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate). !we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1 that These groups have in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the some a ga inst nuclear-free nu c le a r neighbourhoods . equipment The patchwo r k grass-roo ts is strongest in Europe, which is - as the mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American Europe will E11 ropc wil l these mnke it a saf er place : American shores. nuclear r emoved installations in on the contrary it seems probable that bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements installations It is succeed a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free. g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced. Ln having The chances of �mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and Exc:c•p l in the case of Eu ope, where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication . 8Cr i ou s ly And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is failing partly g iant fashioned military-in dustrial allianc e. inc r easJ. ngly dominated and largely domi na t ed financially ideo l ogically. much propped exaggerat ed. no t nnd c1d c quatcJJ and ec onomically some of and, in some mea sure, Indeed much of the "free" world countered as mil.itary by The means . i .," in basic any mode of mUitary . But mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by the Sovi e ts is a problem, t here are several ways other predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it. on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down alternative is it domina ted economicall y , by the US A. doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant in sofa r a up by the NATO powers ' i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and ls anyon' Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA , c a1;e Does expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a or Brasil say? Th Rt other? social methods but also some and much r eliance on These should include not state-suppl ied social decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of orga nlsat{ons, than me thods, or r estructurin g, such as power to dispersed local mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and East e rn Europe. Part of the point of whether external or r es tructuring internal, so is especiall y situa tions, is to st a t e-contrived 79. break make any military takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of int e rch1nge, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to s abotage the West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options. �60 ot.hC'r motl ves fo r, and Western popul ar suppor t Eu r ope , for f or, long j. much Uitary too adventures partial to and military advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean nucl e ar umbrella for its defe nce . Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least, 1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging t he world in the i nterests of its own security . extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European impositlon. There wo rl<l, wha t LS N war is no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing othe r parts of t he Europe, rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d. which has long exporte d There ar e better. options than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe. -·-·- ----- --·- . ·-- 80. Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated uni ts it in tegra t e d. The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c. The net effect (as c. Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high. One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62). Ycl th 1 9 112 (wa r r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81 . In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l supporting deterrenc e policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would b e further co rroded. In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas, to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gi.( t pro Jee ts . If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g. as part of the strnteg y of the "cold war". ~ �6J What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press b,oa rl out1 i.nc; fof ::tccordingly i.ic> perceptive t r ansarmamen t, to i.e. conversion outer edges of graduat e d the movements, alternative social defence arrangements). Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go, t hrough in i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more wa y clear namely all the disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's s ur t~cc , inc luding especially Europe. For once the state is demoted , its i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance on dec i s i on- making its diminished de ci s ion-making - once all that is happe n ) , one in duly favour of allowed more localised cont r ol and for (it does not need to major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty . Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers. What is important and wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the stn r- c . The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying features s uch as mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation . On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments fr om nat iona l conce rni ng part i cul a r. dangers .lndividual also and grou p rights and In their freedoms, by t he that nation- s tate . matter The are to arguments liberties in for t hem, as sma ller or exclusivel y nation-state is neith r sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not? ri sks are civil necessarily th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties nec e ss ary pl ace None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None o f ti e rights and freedoms g ua r a n te ed disintegrate. in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln: To be sure, th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not ---~------ ----82. The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s. The ste ps to disarmament ;ire well-known , e.g. the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as Euro pe, et c . �62 hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of moslly to wont be sure t hat nucle or arc othe r outsiders. People t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course, i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be Russ nns natlon- states. t controlle d by Amiirican s or Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives not a rational rout e to these ends . In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way dilemmas the as nuclear out of such deo ntic fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of things those the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare and a ut onomy; wc,1pons. but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by The main reasons are fam il iar : threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values, such the removal nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstanc es as welfare and autonomy, for many cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another with nuclear weapons ). ideological party the o pportunity armed There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons; example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of remain welfare for (because costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e accompanyin g sec urity measures). Thus the appropriate ly de vi ces and nuclea r fix limiting weapo ns is resolv ed , theoretical ly it can deploy, and how ), and rate, by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be s ince any sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty . pra ctice , at strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e au s pices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act aga i nsl the state . Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since sovereignt y reduction in ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons . 83. the Ind eed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s. Until human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty. �agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) . to far with the superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further: for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation. i.nto both milita ry s yst ems - and ( c ivil) Rather it is industrial production of the states So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being concerned. ti ed solidly resisted by super states. Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s and espec i ally against the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r. variety of organ is ed forms. These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or wld •l y, from such s t e ps ns Once again it will take a The indir ect l y. the forms of action range block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s, t he to withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes. They inc l ud e as we ll the whole r a ng e nuclea r facilities i nstal l a tions and of nonviolent (methods protest which method s against do exclude not i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new model . 8'~ resistance and de f e nce organisations). It is important to realise that petitioning of powe r state representat i ves and ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored, th e r esul t s disco u r aging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a mor e com prehensive politi c al strategy, which also involves withdrawing s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially alternative defence forms. 85 Sufficient d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp. 85. For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g. fu rt her Appe ndix 2. Martin . As to what to do, see �64 APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE or MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Sch e ll, and to Anders. A ncrtes of nucl cn r prophet s lw a pr odu c ed a EJ e r:les of ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary. The most wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th. This skillful piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable f or i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e defects . Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage: to selec t one example , consider the claim that ' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e [ human] spec i.es nothing else t hat we undertake together can make any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense (p.1 73, rearranged ). Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds. Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r presently a rrang ed nuclear ho l oca usts . l. The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire to the be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination, A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity . But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such: a l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it , While the sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e) w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all f al l Rcy. J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all: t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1. �was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes, two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers: Sl. Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on arth (the 2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and S2. 111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon). It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Th ·-- exDmp l e Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of con tracting the world to North Arner.lea . (All that matters, all worthwhile civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schel l's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4 Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions o( S2 , se Foley JS. 3. Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box . Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pando ra's box. Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing t'r""l . �66 th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense. But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e . Ther e are man y examples of technological advances that have not been t ak en adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns . Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons i t would not tell aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and the limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work , to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the " J.abnrn t.ories". Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r weapons in concer t, e . g . for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war, and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested and lypothelical in chara ct er. The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially. This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2 being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl Such ar e all eged imp lications of ex tinction ; but the fact is that the truths of arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of gods or g iraffes . In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form. Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the strea m of huma n t.ime, The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and futur e (p . 14 0) 6 • Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass' (p. lli3) . But it: is simply false that the tenses are human; the tens e s depend on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons). And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor there were any human beings. - •••-- - - H•--- - --- - - - - - S. Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry ha s a wea pon it will u se it. 6. Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73. (etc.) is �Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been, if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n mm1y other org anisms would be differe n t. Temporal themes do not la c k ' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or verified] by anyone'; truth, signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion. be Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in talki ng ab out what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims. The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [si c!] th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) . These are no facts, but deeply entrenche d philo sophical dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d elsewhere 7. Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans: trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles , songs , Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss , and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not worthwhi. le. 8 Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both. 'The death of mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166) a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d, becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of prec edi ng lif e and on the very questiona ble represent ation of this mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e . From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that ' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly 'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+; S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental Ph i l oso n~ (ed i ted D. Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980. 8. Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of the argument from �68 rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e . 1 011 Nor are all pe opl e C<JuaJJy locked in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d, th e po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR. Nor, --- 1 i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme, (in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go theme, ,iccord ing to which -S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really) distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9 B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows: ' t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated e l sewhere : we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) . But this is more of an argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points: we are pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152). And again '[ as] perpe trators we co nvey t he steady message that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that it had bee n judg ed acceptable fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e less . Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among wi ll c :1 Schell --- ·------·---- - - - 9. An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng, whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry, a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of political control . 10. Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows: 'The self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning . Fur ther 't he world chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194): the world'? This connec ts of course with the ideological argument from defence of fuodamental s, e .g. for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against soc inli.sm. In the' .nurse of th:fA argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) . �mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility, st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s, part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc. (the whole ea r th theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed, unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scatter ed and fragmentary. As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternative s. At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Wa y Up. So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns ( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-indus trial organisation and ways of life . But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd , more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies . And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial feature Ls the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear] supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base, the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state, and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, ma le- female re l ations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything 11. Sec p.225ff. 12. In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin. The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164. and especially p.227, bottom paragraph . j �nee ds to be accompl ished at once; and the clus~~ - of damaging power and do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of sta tes. [n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics. The teaching that 'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times, ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134). So 'stat es may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions . Even if all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is 13. These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated packag e, compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, ('TI C" rgy, sp ecr, sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the newer Enlightenme nt (but Faustian ) vlr tues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues . Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel maximls ation of knowledge paradoxes of omniscience . There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative t heo rems). IL, . R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral science. There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single, source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false . Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and promoted , while other alternative s were not. Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable, but dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitran t technologie s. They also admit of being made t o look r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation. �7l claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context, t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its n uc l ear pol i cies . 15 An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state ends. So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational. As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war, Schell leave s us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187). Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred. It is on this basis th a t peace ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as •xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185). Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an end' ( p .189 ): but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends ( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games a r e wo n). It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests tha t coul d s e rv e , and there is also th e possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit as if war and violence were thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of understandl ngs , conventions and rules . The y are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if no t a logic . Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic] plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd, 15. Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context. - j �72 rcnGonab.le, rational. However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap semn nti.cal trJ.ck . Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion (as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning; but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extraloglca lly. There are various ways these va lue assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirement s or not; but in nuclear s tr ~tegic planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng 11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat of thi s unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t . 16. Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly; for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions . 17. Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g . it wishful]y thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix radioactiv ~ ashes . has be en f rom th e The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e one, but a n ideological one: eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture dominance of the riva i deo l ogy . 18. An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "'negate" incoming USSR missiles . Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction; although involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention to proceed. Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed how satisfactor ily in another matter by a dis ti nction between longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing �.PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility and on Regional ~~rategie ~ What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be . So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt• pol te l. cs . The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states, a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people many for th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s, r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of ce r tain soci al a r r angements . Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t. They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l argument take s t he following lin es: 1. The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore 2. Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a differenc e . Hence 3. Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when thint s go wr ong. There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can " t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e . While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many other i. nd lvidua ls do. In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in ma nner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly. Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in ways t hat do make a differenc e. An i ndividual is not exonerate d from r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument . While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical di s obedi enc e. An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards defenc e or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g. nuc lear weapons productio n and de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace fun ds, Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities. 1. Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood. - II �.,I<,' Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under Ro1ne sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s, etc., and o such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individua l need bear.) One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear wea pon s to, fo example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the we~pons for such war. The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through d e fence taxes . The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be : Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns? Or with making c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like? What follows applies primarily to people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people . Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions , perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the national defenc e effort? It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ; for in this case moral obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts. \n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n this: to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing ower from ind ividuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is Seattle in �"co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more that ch:ing,.. tha t . H T ~~ s intact, and deeper (ecological ) sch emes Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper se t of cha nge s in the superstates . For those whose very limited political i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow goa ] ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er c ontr ol . The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war, whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers). There i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps towards s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated. Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance, wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ). That much is easy, in pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of d e t erre nc e ' • 6 More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of 1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e 5. Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1. How slight t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA . Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated: from a Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe ( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important. A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series . and alternative s, �76 whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even dh,r ,, r t i ng "d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive. I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with Northern nuclear powers 8 , a nd s hould be preparing now, socia lly and e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war. Howev er ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield poli t i c al powe r . But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj so why bot he r". One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic . A mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o bcf;1l l th e m. These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them. It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e : rather i t is that i t seems unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes ~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear. war. Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in 6. Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture , as Hawke~ notes. The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is not in any do u bt: 'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e; quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17). Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk. ' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f . Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has a non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk .for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s . A worthwhile re presenta tive government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term co mme r c ial considerati ons. 7. As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment. 8. Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e. �77 achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t. -yen those who believe tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life) do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessmen t: . 9 Richard Routle y* 9. Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g. Mart in . There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts . * The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C. Pigden , R. Good in, N. Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through cor r espondenc e with G. Fo ley. J. Norma n has helped in its final organisat ion. The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y in 1982 . �REFERENCES c;. Anders, Die __Ant_~q •i erthe!.t des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; to a$ A/i,. G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE. Situation , referred c.u. Beck, T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71. D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions Hale & Iremonger , Sydney, 1980. in Australia , J. Barnes, 'The just war' in N. Kretzmann , A. Kenny and J . Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press, 1982, pp . 771-784. R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon s. & Schuster , New York, 1981 . Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? Or, on trying to be rational about war', Appl led Philosoph y, to appear. nuclear P. Berg, Re!:._1::habitlng a Sepa_rate Countr.y, Pl anet Drum, San Francisco , 1979. M, Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlan Pr inceton, Princeton UP, 19 74. (eds.), War and H.C. Coombs, 'The ec onomi c and social consequen ces of (Septembe r 1983) 8-9. Moral nuclear Responsi bility, Natuni war ', 5 A.i'!. Cox, Russian Roulette: the Superpowe r Game , Times Books, London, 1982 . J. Dahlltz, Nuclear Arms Control: with McPhec Gribble, Melbourne , 1983. effective internati onal G. Foley, ' Jonathan Schell : Genius - Phi losop her - Rewrite Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Man ', agreemen ts. t ypescript , G. Foley, Nucl ea r Prophets. The True and the False_, typescrip t, Bri sbane, 1983. J. Galtung, The True Worlds, Free Press, New Yo r k, 1981. D, Gautier, 'Deterren ce, maximisa tion , and rationali ty ' , in The Security Gamble: Deterrenc e Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, (ed. D. MacLean), Rowman and Littlefie ld , To t owa, N.J ., to appear ; also f ort hcoming in Et hics, April 198/¼. R.E . Goodin, 'Disarmin g nuclear apo l ogists', typescr i pt , 1982 . R.E. Goodin, 'Disarmam ent as a moral certainty ', Et_l2ics 95 ( 1984 ) , to appear. P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic : The Theory Universit y Press, Columbus, 1966. of Nuclear Deterrenc e, Ohio State N. Griffi n, ' Lifeboat USA', Discussio n Papers in Environme ntal Philosoph y fi8, Research School of SociRl Sciences, Australia n National Universit y , 1983. Grou nd Ze ro Orgnnisat ion, Nuclear War: What's lo It For York, 1982. You? Pocke t Books , New R. Bardin, 'Unilater al vers us mutual disarmame nt', Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 (1983) 236-54. J.E. Hare nnd C.B. Joynt, Ethi c s and Internati onal Affairs, 1982. Macmillan , London , �79 R.M. ll;,r.e, Applicati ons o[ Moral Philosop ~, M&Q1t1illan, l,~rn,hin , 1972. R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decis~on, McGraw-H ill, York, 1965. New H. Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960. G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal 285-302; referred to as PD. of Philosol?.!"1y G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory (1980) 41-60; referred to as RC . and 75 (1978) Decision 12 G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU. L. Kuper, Genoclde: its Eoli~ical use Jn the Twentieth Century, Yale UP, 1982 . D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e', Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. in Moral Problems (ed. James D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' , Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM. D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64. a nd Har de n', Phil osopl'l_ B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to appear. A.A. Mazrui , A World Federatio n of Cultures: An African Pe rspective , Free Press, New York , 1976. J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War, Affairs , New York, 1959. Cou ncil on Reli.gi on and Inte r nati onal T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre ', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narveson, 'Vlolence and War ', i n Regan, pp.109 -146. National Conferenc e of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Wa r and Peace, ' The challenge of peace: God's promise and our re s ponse' , Origins 12 (20) (1982) 306-328; refer red to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter '. Oxford E_i~~lish Dictionar y, Oxford, 1971; referred to as QED. B. Paski.ns and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth , London, 1979. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingen cies 4. Nuclear Disasters , A Rep o rt to the Comn1issio n for the Future, Governmen t Printer, Wel lington, New Zealand, 1982. P. Ramsay, The Just War : force and political responsib il itt, Scribner, New York, 1968. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 . T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980. R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley and V. Routley , 'The Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8. irrefutab ility of ana rchism' , Social �80 R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984. R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House, York, 1982. New J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker, February 48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book. 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-11 3, T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 . G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971. D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983. F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 . T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An 19 72. American Tr agedy, Times (ed. Books, F.T. London, E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York, 198 1. Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981. probabi lity, Austral ian R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960. M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview , Colorado . 1979. Boulder , t M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970. B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982. ( Nov . 18, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document l 89 - .r 1 NTRO!)UCT f 0N. Vlrt· uc1l ly .11 1 t h e ph i1os ophi.c ;l1 lit cri'!ture on nur.le a r war ls wr i t te n from ;-1 SllfK·rpower (predomin an tly Amer i can) or e lse European (mainl.y German, British or Fre nch) viewpoint. This art:icle, a f ter connecting in initial section s with Northern Catholic literatur e , adopts a very different Antipodean s La nce . Such re gional per spective s , whil e t he should not affect the morality o [ t he mat t e r, ,ff , highly po1i ticaJly relevrmt. eitlH_•t t he phJ.lo so ph i ca l li tera tun~, c>spec ially t:ha t emanating from th e als o a i l s th e test of morality. lt is c oncerned only or primAr i ly with what i s good o r "rati onal" or prudential f o r A.raer.i.cans, or for the American sl.ltc, t o do ~ whereas mora l ity is ind e pende n t o f place, race , natio na lity and t ile li ke . This article tries t.o take the morality of the matter, and the r es ult ing r ed is tribution of mora l and political obligations, seriously. It c onc l ud es, amon g other things, that th e Ame r i can and Russian states have no moral bu s ine ss putting nonaligned peoples at suc h grave risk as pre sent nuclear ar r angemen ts involve. Mtwh o f U~A, CUNTENTS AND OUTLINE: Itali ci sed heading s §3 - §8 indicate the ma i n structure of the argument Pag e No §O. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wa rs, and new moral l. i ss llPS . L,1 rg e-sc nle (LSN) vs limited nuel ea r wars , the focus on the f ormer , but the l mplic tions for the latter. §1 . J_l5)w nuclea r wa rs differ from o t her wars; wars and Htates, and the 2::.9s ulti ng l imi ted appr~riateness of older models and theories of war. War chc1rac t e ri sed. The e ss e ntial role of th e state. New and diff~r nt featur es o f nucle ar wars. 2 0 §2 . The mora l si tuation: the recent: tendE:'n_c::L of moral consid e rations -~-~~s_ome e_n t.i.re ly submerge d_ in_ the context o f war. The nncl e nt d ist i nction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning base on expe di enc y. Argume nts tha t war must be expediency-base d refuted. Mor a l i ty dues nol have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Uti lit ari a ni sm nnd expediency distinguish ed . Limits to consensus: s upermen and s u pe rhawks. National Interest and expediency assimilated. Li mits of st ate e n titlement. §3 . The initial a rgum':nt to the immorality of LSN wars. One ke y argume nt, from the wrongness of ki.lling noncombatants in mass, is pr esen t ed, ass es sed, and criticisms met. Ar guments for the premisses of the ke y argumen t elabo r ated. §L1. Argum e nt s f r om historica] r equirement s on ,just wars: the important a rgume nt from convergence, and env:l.ronment a_l ar~Ements_ . Argume nts from just war requJrements: di sc rimination; proportionality , p r ospe ct of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from enviro1nental principles. § 5. The shift t:o nuclear deterrence: nrgume nts to its immora~-~~· De t e rre nc e seen a s the only prac tical way to satisfy major desiderata: p re ve ntion of wa r: and maintenance of pruden t ial values. Pure deterrence not t. he po H e y. De terr c nce ais prac t.! c (• d has i.ncreased the probability of nuclea r war. Th e first argume nt to imruorHlity of deterrence, from the pla u s ibi l i t y of probab-Ui.ty of Immorality. F11rther arguments through <l ~u n t i c conn e ct.l.ng principl(~S : the probahl ll Ly l.inkage. Refuti.ng the c ou n t e rargume nt from the succe ss of deterr ence . The way the onus of 1. 5 11 1 !• 17 Page No !,ills on deterrence policy , 1.Jhi ·h cannot mt>et. evidcnlla J. requireThe second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious prc'p.tralio n for nuclear war. The general form of connecting pri nc ipl es; separating out t hose hat arc correct . Th e third connecting principle: the wrongness of se rious threats of nuclear devastati.on . Criticism of this principle lead s to further connecting principles, th rough i n te ntion and through commitment. Meet i ng counterargumen ts from utilitarianism . AppJying the connec ting prlncip1es to argue to the jmmoral:tty of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti -ut ilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with de terrence . piu,.,f Till·lll H. 56. ~£0Ctical ,___pru<lcnU.al and more moral arguments from national daugers Lo nuclear build-up of the ~upe r statc.s, and the genes i s . - of nu c 1 t',ff di lemmas . The tirgume nts from nucle,:-ir black.ma:!.l and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial arg ume11t from basic ri g ht s and f11ncl;iml.'nl.al values. The argument from i solated people to superstate iwnoral ity. The supers tat e theme, and rea&ons for its appeal . The much less p0rsuasive de endcnt state theme. Ch:1llcnging the assumptions of tllr> undt'rlying rc latiatory mode]. §7. The rcsulring nuclear di~emmas ·- fo r nligned states and their _supporl e rs. Ch,nc1ct. er ot the nuclear fix. Subsid iary di lemmas: natio na l securit y vs 37 43 fre edo m nnd democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontlc dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-bes t escape from the nud.car fix . The nuclear fix a fix of s t ates' own making . Interconnection s between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangeme nts. §8. Wavs out of nuc lear dilemmas: initial political fall-out f rom th e ethical res 1lts. Tl1e inevit.c1bil i ty of limitation s on nat1onal sovereignt y. In terstate and ex trastate approache s . The Way Up and th e Way Down of extrastate approaches . Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case aga i.ns t it. FaiJurc of internati onal agreement s) espe ci ally on human rights and geno ci de. Excl11s ion of nuclear dete rrence und er the Genocid e Convention. Need fur the reexam i na t i on of current political arrangements i mpo sed b y the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated politi cal a r ra ngen.ents revealed by nuclear problems . Further arguments from the nucle a r 1 ix for polll lc:il reassessme nt. The we . k J i.nk: the sovereig n nationstatc. Forfeit11re of political obligation by many st~tes . Alternative po 1 I. Lical arr;__ingcmen t s vs nuc lcar time hor 1.zons. 49 The rnultt-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main polit ica l mea ns lle outside state governmenta l apparatus. Laying the s pectre of ideo1ogicnl domination. Social restr uct u ring a nd devolution of powe r. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments f r om natiorrnl dangers. S .. a e r e si.stance to loss of po wer . Further lines of o r ganised act ion agains t nuclear states. Appendix 1: On Scl1;!1l t he fate of mankind and the ea r th, according to and Anders. Nuclear prophets a nd prophet .i c ru bb ish . The ext in ct ion assumption . Common emerging themes of Sc-hell and Anders. The extravagant anthropocentric assumption , and some of wha t is wrong wi.th i t. Second death dlsmlssed . The universal i ty of peril. The alleged universality of responsibili t y : the Pogo theme . The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme . Ultimately Schell offers little hope and s upe rf icialiqy. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of de t er renc e. H 64 .1,t . . .. Page No ~~~_cl_:!~~; On mat t ers of co lJective and individual rt'sp oirn:ibilit.y a nd on regional strat egies. Individual and state responsibi.J.ity. Opt-·ouL positions , and o.rguments t.o Lhem. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group co peration . Arguments to direct obligations of individ1rnls to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political ob l igati ons. Dif f eren L pol ic y r e organi sati on for d:i ff 're n l regions. Shallm,•er and deeper g a]s. Th e important opportunity for deepe r r eo rg.nnisution afforde d by nuclear dilemmas. Ob.ligations of those in the Antipodes: what i. s required, and justifi d . Soci a l and ec onomic reorganisation in the An tipodes, and reducing costs i.nvolv1~d. Bloc kages to social and po litical adjus tment. iii 73 ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEA! WAR AN!) NtlCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large -seal ~ nuclear wars raise cthlcal questions not generated, ~ Ll o r n~ arly HO th11 n e of even t he larges d if f0 r· c n c:' !n kln<l of war. invo l ve, and threatened sa id to so differ co nv entiona l wars ( t he World Wars ) as to yield a CertFdnly ma s sive PX hAnges Gt1ch as nuc.le:ir wars exchanges such a s nuc lear deterrence presupposes , ar e neither envisaced nor fully accommodate d by tr·d ltional theories of Muc h at forcefully, by previo us human mili tar y cncounters. 1 This is at bottom because of their projected effect . , which are often f r om eit her just wars. new philosophic al reflection and inveRtigatio n is required, even if r a ther wel l -t est d and old-fashion ed moral princip l es will se rv e as initial ethical ba se. Al though nuclear wars are, thus non ex i s tent (extrapolat e va r ie tiea, objects, 1 nuclear wa rs from n very limited Ia fnr, only a decidedly menac1.ng class of proper have several distinctive properties nu .lear experlence 2 ) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear war s, of which tactical or st rat eg ic ar c subvarietie s, contrast witl1 lirge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) - - - ------- ---- -1, The US Catholic Bi shops i n t heir Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forc e fully: 'Nuclear weapons •.. and nuclear warfare ••• are new moral issu s . •. The re exists a capacity to do something no other age could ima g ine: we can threaten the created ord 1· • • • We could des roy [God ' s] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal .i n common with the Bishop ' s position, it differs significant ly in removing the religious backdrop and associated fe a tures and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illust ra t e the differences tha t emerge with removal of the religious backdrop ~nd its the associated unity-of-ev il theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- First l y, peace is possible without religious enligh t enment if it is possible wit h it: religious enlightenme nt is not an essential c ondition as there implied . Secondly, violence does no take all the forms the Bishops tr y to give it , e .g. sexual discriminat ion is hardly a form of violence, pornography an aper tc without it , etc. It ia a serious m stok e to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms or violence) along wi.th war aa if t hey stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note tha t referencing , ·where not through an au thor's name, :ls by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolal ed, and unnece sary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will he very different and v ry nmeh mo re horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortab ly adjacent possible wor l ds, ought therefore to be onfined t o merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to act~ality. 111hicl. r1c'ed not howe ver. be unlimited 3 • explosio n A large-sca le nuclear involv es war of l arge quantitie s of nucl ear devices ove r a sizeable region; a [unction of two main parameter s: distr i bution. Such strnt.egic ) nuclear quant l t leo of a war war quantity diffe rs which explosivc n, ts markedly limited, nnd (megatonn age wh ere from by the a of t:,Hget.s it i s ex plosive) limited assumptio n, the to and (tactical much or smaller chnr.uctcr i Rtic ,111.y arc cl rcumscr ibed, f or instance confined in pr i ncip l e to military inst al l ations in a given reg ion. Though t he focus in what follows is upon I.SN wars and th eir prev e nti.on, limLted nuclear wars are by no nucl.car arsenal means a separate st r ike 1 s ince a is a prereq utsite, an d th e probabil ities of escalatio n of suc l1 waxs to LS N wars arc high (given usual reasonabl e aosumptio ns second iss ue , et c. ). 4 Because of these of follow -up or connecti ons, much of the ca se made acainst LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as wi l l become evid ent . How nuclear wars reHultlng d-Lffer from oth er war s: wars and states and th e -- ---------- - -- - -- llmltcd appropria teness of old er modelY and theories of war. of war that has dominated mucl1 thinking, including strategi c two party (or thinking, A model is th e severa l person) game or, as a complicat ion of that, th e clan or trib e bat tle ~. A picture of war thu s refle c tion r e quirement s for legitimat e and just wa rs, which technolog ical on advances have trad iti ona l now theo ry ender ed of war, emerg ed, inapprop riate ha rdly and especiall y sometimes surprisin gly, as a result inapplica ble. of The made no allowance for such J. Another dimension of varia tion concerns the sequence of the war, es pe cially the type of strike :lnvolved. Though the sequence is j_mportant for the mo r al ass es smen t , for example of th e ma in actors , it in no way alters the immorali ty of LS N wars, as will emerge. 4. 'T he overwhelm in pro babi li.ty [.is1 that a nucl e ar exchange would have no limits ' (PL, p.31 !+). He nce am, Jor org ument. against limited nuclear wars: t hat any such war risks , inde ed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the ris k is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by s Lrai g htforwanl a ppli a_tio n of decislon theory, multi.plyi ng the mass lv e undesira bi lit y (mora l and ot h ~rw ise ) of n LSN war by 'ts probabill ty gi ven a limited nuclear war.-Giv en th e character of weapons developme nt and present communica tion ar.rangem ents, the id e a of a highly circumscr ibed purel y nuclea r exchange between the s upe rpower s , perhaps in the European "theatre'' , is really a myth. 5. There was a substanti al element of sport (and connec ted features of prowess) in t radi tional wars tha t bas been eroded in modern t echnologi cal wars. Nuc lear wars may be not just un s po r ting , in that no notice is given, etc. , t hey a re also remote and impersona l, and different ly unjust, in a mu h deeper wa y, j phenomena ns mass bomb.lng o f lar.ge citJes, such a s Tokyo. rn1clear bomb.fng , wi.th And j t.' many occurred wi.th Dre s d e n and further crucial effects be yond mass bombJng, adds furthe r new d imens ions . Ycl lt is impor t a nt for tic argument 1Jnchors, Lo historica l were accounted unjust war l s essential ly a ma tter of states and their control: the Oxford Eng l is h Dictionar y acc ount, w~..!::_ is 'hos t .ile contentio n ar1ncd 'war' of content io n or comba t; cxct1i1nge is the actual e xp<irience . but other are not literal, but transferr ed, metaphor ic, etc. 8 proLagon ists, antag onists or players; means and or wrong. to elabo rate by means of forces, car ried on betwe en nations, states , or rulers, or between part i es in t he same nation or state' for control of the state7 ; noun linkages G to be awa re of what counted as war (the :emantice of the matter), and of wh Pn , 2nd why, w;-1rs an<l military ac tions Firstly , r e tain always a f nction of sens es of the States are the forces c omprising armed soldiers are the a nd comba t or forceful and typically viol_ent Thus wars ar _ external or internal states or their rule. (c.ivi.l), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and fr eque ncy as states hav e expanded , wars have changed as states have transform ~d, and nuclear war has emerged with nuclear states. lhf,on°tic al way then to eliminate wars is t o remove states : 6. An obvious :i.n short, wars ar e There arc interes ting si delights concernin g eve n the etymology of the term 1 war' , wh ich wa s deri ved from a term meaning 'confusio n ' . In particula r, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times ha d in living use any word pro pe r ly meani ng 'war'': Oxford English Dictiona rt ( OED) o n wa r, 7. But of co urse there can be something quite a nalogous to war waged between clans , gangs, multinati onal firms, even against Nature , and still more me taphorica lly against poverty, etc. To this extent , a strict definitio n of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structure s the argumen t will direct us to, has to ex t end beyond just the brea k-down of nation--s tates. 8. Tn to thls category (si.n ce Natu re i s no naU.on) falls the ubiquitou s and unwa rranted war against Nature of modern times , wh ic h features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism . As could have be en guessed , someone .t was James - suggest ed channelli ng all war into "war'' in the me taphorica l sens e agai.nst that unarmed and nonaggres sive "opponen t'', Natur e. James proposed a s a substitut e for war proper, conscripU .on of the youth for a wa r again st Nature (see Wasserstr om, p.12). What it boiled down to, howev er , was that youth -was to be c hannelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acqui r e manly virtu.s mil i tary ac.tivit.ie s "rightly" i.nstil, especia lly discipline ;---but also service, devotion, physical fitness, con struc tive exertion, responsi bility, and order. Another less diabolica l sub st it ute for wars p r oper (in America n ecoropian literatur e) is through wnr gam es and other game s of competit i ve cast. Again specious arguments enter for t hose bringing- out the "best" in human males, etc . .:1n uut ,~01•1p of ro llt:ica l :.ind asso ci ated t cclmoJ .ogJ--n l st ru cture, and are nltcr i ng by the s tructu r e. Wars j _Lu a t from c an thu s be seen as a struct ural problem of (other wi se defect ive) politi ca l organ isatio n of states ; they are a ional fix , n struct ural malfor mation . helps wa r arise War Thls seman t.ically based pictur e of exp.la in why th e rad ical a rgumen t agains t nuclea r wars and deterr ence d t: vo lves into an war-m akers , argume nt agains t aga.in st states . In the fact ( s<'1 f-legit i.mise d) on the war-d eclare rs and tradit ional theory , wars wer e r estric ted to extern al wars, which were coni:;tr u ed as t heir r emoved t1 e right of r ulers (p ri nces) to conduc t for certai n politi cal purpos es; states or the argume nt was that priva t e person s with grieva nces had access to the c our ts 9, while states did not ( wa r s w_re, so to speak, the intern a ti.onal analog ue of th e law courts ). But this is itself a very sta tist conce pti on of th• legitim at e place of wars; ll1c• scmiJn tica i s not so rest.r .i ctive and permtt s intern a l wars with i.n i; t ate s, for examp le t.o end wars, injust ice, etc. Let. us a h OW\ ) V1_. r to brlng out what is differ ent now - confin e att e nt1on - basic and moat famili ar cas e, extern al wa rs hetwe n two s tates or sets (axes) of st a t. es , two-pl a yer ex t cr n;il wars. ·ompr litive game s, could be won. attent uated form for some "victo rs") Lhc World vfars. strate gy. surrou nding trad i tional ly firstl y for mass ive armed wa rs, Like exchan ges such as th •re may well be no winnin g in ar e as the of No r thern very hemisp here countr yside. Thus, and the second ly, for laying the was te _£Dint of of substa ntially substa ntiall y oblite rated 10 , (cxe rcl sed and most as nothin g all worse off than at the outset of the "play" . are huge war seen, to settle seriou s inters tate disput es , is remove d: a nothe r point of diff e rcn ~e , the phenom enon of wars that prepar ed that: That assum ption still held good ~hough in Wj th LSN wars it no longer holds; is settle d with main protag onists player s It war; assume d An LS N war could involv e destru c t ion of all main Wester n metro polita n agglom e ra tio ns 9. to main Hence elabor ately f0r , etc,), but which can never be pointf ully fought ; Thus Aquina s a nd Grotiu s for examp le (see Ba rnes , p . 776, top). The argume nt presup poses rather a lo t , includ ing a neat public /priva te dis t inctio n . Put Aquin as's way, it looks as if it could be readil y t r .-:m sf erred into an argume nt for intern atio·n al govern ment, or at least effect ive law-co urt s , Yet all Christe ndom was suppos ed a t that time to be one state! 5 hence t he ineviL Bl>Je emphasis on .l:..l!.E.~- deterrenc e. .:uid ot her Lhf' e lements o f gamesmen ship ha d a role in earlier wars, but it was not pu re de t e rr e nc e . to mil i tary Certainly , deterrenc e, bluff, Lastly, tradition al wars could be confined in tar gets r egn rd s ju s t wa r s ; and military e xchanges. principle 11 This feature iG fundnnent al as for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross uni nvolved par t ie s sac rifice any pretensio n to morality. ways to The special effects of nu -lea r exp lo s i •cs , e s pecially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear canno t w3rs be legitimat e ly confined. l1orrify lng det a i l i n popu l a r so 1rce s uz0ne <lestr uc ti on, s hockwav es, suc h effe cts gign nt l c fum i gat i on s §2. a nd th e e nti re l y rapid ••. speed special effects (presente d in Schell) include radioacti vity, pu lses, fireball or firestorm e tc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resembl e mor e than they re semble old e r - style war:s. The mora l s ituation: be c ome as el ec troma gnet1 c <lcv .,su1t .i o11, rog ue bac t e r in ;.rnd viru se s, com pounded Th e se the r ecent tend e ncy submerged in the context of war. of moral considera tions to It is particula rly important i n t he ca se of war to mainta in a firm grasp on the ancient distinctio n mo r a lity or local or nat :l. onal and ~ ..e5:..diency. What is done in war, especiall y between advant a ge, may be very diff e r ent from what ought morally to be done, whether the l ') . There is however the degen e rate idea of war as i.nvolving annihilat ion or extinctio n, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilat ion of the enemy whil e no t be i ng e ntirely annl.hilat ed oneself: the side that somehow "survlves " suff ic iently to r ebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely t e nuous sense of winning , wl1ich in any case neglects the medical ev idence conce rning nuclear destructi on. Recen t t alk a bout winning or even s urviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appre ciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitabl y cause death, disease and suffering of pa nde~onic proportio ns and without the possibili ty of effective me d ical int e rvention (PL, p.313). Mo reov e r an y such phoenix war is r adically unjust, because of violat ion cf the tr adit i onal requireme nt of pro portional ity, and for other reasons de veloped in the tex~. Unf o rtunat e ly as doc umented ir Sch ee r, significa nt off i cials who are resp o nsibl e for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of t he world t hink that the devast a tion o nuc l ear war an be survived by Americans and t hat a gl oba l nucl e2 r war can actua lly be "won"! They re ly , among other things, on a n incredibl y low , and unaccepta ble, redefinit ion of "winning" . 11. In prac t i ce they often were not, they drained limited economies , they layed wa s te countr yside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or c hemic al wa rf Rre or mod er n min i ng), im poverishi ng inhabit·n ts, etc. l all('.l" f u determ in e d usi ng the cod es :ind conv en l:lotH' Much t.h at oug h t war , of or othenlis e 12, not t o be do 1c i n wa r is do ne, for one (alleged) advantage or anothr·r, desplte modern m:i l tt ar y cod es a n d co nv ent i ons ani the like . we liv e not go in a rat her bar barous age : unremarke d, if the th e horrors of the twentieth century will history Furt.l1c1inore rn Ll tta ry t h i nki n g a nd ge t s writt e n as wi pi ng moves : based on "stra t e gy" disad van t ages , of mor a lly excluded actions, ·a J.culaU o ns. charncterist i ca---1J:x its is. that rur al populations, be come real 1o ss ib i liti e s, included in o t con,w<ptr·n ti nli.sr d0.Lcrmi nes (accurately) str ate gtc pl an n ing tend (.1s Nagel ex plains) t o induce a ce r ta i n mo ral numbing, so th a t a r ang e such Hllitarily its e xp<'di e n cy . by gains own i.t _o u~ !:_, morally, cons i d e r i n g and Eac h side only lo s 8e s a s a in a military encounter own its advantages and r e sult. of alterna tJve possible to consider those of the other side( s) as well. In t h is way stra t eg ic planning di s places morality . I nd eed l t ha s been contended that wa r should be planned and conducted wa y, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without l i mit s , moral or other (except insofar a s technology limits the means of eLc.) . Such t he class lcal through "bald an inc r emental a distinct nrgumen t tc.tt1s . g a r gument from an t ha t th e It would And (bu t The externally wil l be broken by each pl a yer in turn for advantag e . ext r aordi na r i l y na rrow motivat1ona l bas e i s assumed. the of li mit) escalation man" f a llac yi 3), t hat there can be no limit. assum p tion is t hat a ny merely s e lected limit (as enforced force, Js the so-called "classic " view of Clausewicz, oft: repeated. Cl ause wicz Lr ics to argue, reall y this Thus t oo follow from i d ea of a limited wa r is some so r t of contradiction i n nut i t i. s not, though breaking off i n the he at of war, or the s upposedl y l imited nucle a r exchange, may be s ingularly impr obable . c onfusion Nuclear 12. For a s Nage l c ontend s (early on), there are moral restr ic tions on the c onduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither a r bit r a ry no merely conventional, nor a mat t e r of usefulness. These t li cn1<•s run er Lindy co11n t •r Lo the. cll.llrn :l.c t heory of war of Clnuscwic z - n th e ory outlin ed In Walz e r. 13. As one l e s s hair does not, at any stage, dis t inguish a bald man from a hirsute ma n, there a r , starting from the hirsute end, no ba ld men. Th e prog~e ssiv e escalation ar.gument concerning war is an inc remental ar gument Jike the t e chnic a l Sorites syJlo gisms , formalising the type of fallaciou s a r g ume n t which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. Th e fn l l;i.cio us e scalation argument 'i. s pa rt of the so-called "logi.c of war ", f or more on whJch see the conclusion of Appendtx 1.. i' war s thus appear dec i dedl y Cla usewiczj_ a n . for the l anc, r or players Still the !irgument is inc onclu s ive; can choose, at leafJ t J n sma ll er calmer wars, not t o e scnlate, examplt!, agree to abide b y arranged practlccs , t y pes of we a pons, etc. l· 4 A s t 11tc engaged in war se ld om sees i t self a s e ntirely bound by of mo ·al i t y: lt i s t ake n to be me r e prude nce on t he pa r t o f those attacked to take account of the no-imr oral- holds-ban:-e d appr oa ch t h e y c<;p,~, f,11 ly t lw 1 constraint s from the ot her s'ido. 11w~Liou not onl y as to ma y well enc ount e r, So 0a , h g1·oup po t e n t i a 1l y e ngn g cd in war f;1cps it wlw t o u g ht to do in mor a lly permi ss ibl e si. lu<1tlons , but al s o both wha t i t ou g h~_ r ea l ly do, a nd wh a t it can morally do in the morally flawed situati on s it finds i t s e lf. But the last question do e s not, in tli,1L cnsc•, r e d uce t o o ne of ex pe di e nc y . There i s no que st ion, then, of moral i t y giving or having 0:x.pe<.lienc y, even under extreme to give way to circumst a nc e s such as the prospect of LSN war involves . Fo r it i s not as if s haky con Ri de r a tions of give to the f i rm ground of exped iency when t he c hips are down, since often way morality eno1gh such mora l ero s ion does not occ ur in c risis s ituations. t hcorc~ical fac t is that both deliver f r om us But the the vnlue the o q'.: . to Expedlency fact, but urg('s , tba t does foreign takes local va l.ue s - o f sel f , family, clan, class, or nation - ar e conside rat i on s . proper charact risa t i on , a remote By cont r ast, mo rality requires, as a matter of its much univ• r sa lizable mor e univ e rsal pr inciples . rePultan t i1,tersu bstlt uti vit y fairness, eq u ita billty and of value and, And morality thereby imposes, through principl e s, jus t ice. distributio n c ertain requ i rements of general Ex pe di e ncy yields an unfair , inequitable value system, one tha t subscribe rs would not a dh e re to if differe n tly Ttie no t It assumes, or what really coun t, and ov e rride or are t o be max imized at the expe ns e of or to cruci al simply narrowl.y-co nstr;.icd l oca l a dv anta ge or powe r a s wha t i s valuable . even bound moral i ty a nd expe dien c y fall within the same, eq 1:. 'J l y f~lrnky or equally sol ! d , doma tn_ of v al ue miraculousl y are placed 1 :., . Jeep thcorcL ical u1 s ati sfact orinc ss of ex pedi e ncy, and associa t ed strategic Lhinldne , n l so Jer lv ci; from Lh i s faU. ur e of ·va l untioi1~:; pe r so ns X and Y are interchange d under 14. 11nd r es ults not ho ld -f ng whe1 i nt e rr e pla cement, from the same As Wa l zer a r gue s, p. 24. An histori cal ex ample i s the era of ge nu inely I imi t cd w:1 rs l n Europe fo ll owi ng t he hilrba rl s m o f th e Thirty Years war. B . expr d 1e1cy assessm ents 16 • ic c~ n For expedie ncy loes not elude deontic presen tation: be pr er;ented as through such popul a r slogans as "local might i.s right", or ft lvcn tight formal rest•mb le charac terisat ion . The charac terisat ion will normal ly that o[ utilita rianism , except Lhat util i tic . are only assigne d to, or arc bi asse d in favo ur of, certnin indivld u~ds. Howeve r, theorie s of ut.llity ~ol have to he posi tions of expedie ncy if utility is 11ot locally confi ned. util llariun ism prope r is not to be dismiss ed as cnn Thus onside ring only expedie ncy; intcrsu bstitut iv:i. y rc'quire ments of morali ty ; meet do it Lt does not, unlike the me hods of war game theory, assign differe nt weights to the individ ual uti.lity of ( ce rtnin) Americ ans, as opposed to Russi ans , say. There are dc•ont.o .logis ts r egardin g war mora ll y howeve r signlfic a11t e.speci ally, 17 • which differe nces, between utilita rians serve to further compli cate the moral pie t u re In particu lar , utilita rian approac hes have permis sible, or to seemed to effect some to rend er justify , ugly strateg i es and practic es as regards ~nemy civi. lians, that deonto logical princ iples wo uld not permit. already and partisa nship , since utilita rians But this is would reject the descrip tion of pr.ctic es permitt ed under thei r princip les as 'ugly'; wherea s an a im in what follows is to avoid meta-e thical me ta-ethi cal neutra lity, though of course not there is a neutra lity. to achieve And morally large area of consen sus, or at least moral converg ence, from which ar gumt'n l ,an bt'gtn. S('Vcr al moral partisa nship, VJ.rtua ily all positio n s grc• that the obltter ation of major ci ties ln a LSN war. would be wrong, indeed morally outrage ous. If tltere is diss e nsion, as there may be among nuclea r stra tegists who seem to feel no qur.Jms when lt. comes to trading loss of some Americ an cities for some Rus si a n ones, s imply increas e the costs involve d, up to loss of whole nations if l.5. The severe limitat ions of t:hoBe l esse r ''virtue s ", nationa lism and pAlriot isrn, also come from the failure of replace men t which exces siv e applica tions of nationa lism easily engend er. Try for example swappi ng a person from inside the homelan d with one from outs i de as regards treatme nt. The point of, and reaso·n s for , intersu bs t itutivi ty as a require ment of morali ty, is well explain ed in Har e , p.78ff. Hare applies the require ment to make a telling case agains t nEtion ali sm (a case which exte nds to strat eg ic decisio n-theo ry). Nation alism, al ong with fanatic ism, is the main cause of war, so Hare conten ds, p . 72. 16. The case aga inst expedie ncy was develop ed in detail especi ally the critici sm of Thrasym achus in The Republ ic . 17. Thus the differe nces between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, i.n Collen et al. by Pl ato ; see on :iccesi:iary , unti.l moral repugnanc e :fs Tile ncounlere d; _!: hen try to work down again. fact remains howe ver that Jn the nuclear area things have got substanti ally oul of perspecti ve, morally. abandon or Strategic thinking, i n particula r, has tended to suppress moral considera tions ( as indeed theories of the state also do, somet imes flamboyan tly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally Lhe fact of broad consensus as to the morality of th e matter does not m ·an that there are none who would welcome such outrageou s happening s, that to t al nu clear destructio n of the North even, would be Cons id er t he w11rld ,·inpl r1•. be so thern risi.ng (hemisphe re) no one's advant3ge . strongman , SS, who has v :lsions of Wlillo l.lH' t,uperpowt• rn of lli<' no ·t. h rcm:i in, SS ' 1.1 dnwm ·a n realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid s ubmarines and ·outhern lands of US bases, is to try nil lear to exchange in the North, There would southern to be waters encourage a hardly an of US all - out point then in securing institutio nal arra ng emen ts so that potential SS's do not accum ulate much espe . ially given the apparent instabi lity of crucial world arrangeme nts. tlrnt is to nnt1eipnt e: lhc present point :1. has and tts power, limitatio ns, is an thnt ( t he fnct of) moral inadequat e But conse nsus const r aint without accompany ing struct ural adjus tments. For , typJrnlly , <lifferc11 tly to nationa l impose interest ls taken hosta ges or override morality, e ven holding civilian populatio ns kill:lng m111.lons in the national :i.nterest 18 ). unfortuna tely, these assumptio ns are not confined to more totalitar ian such as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitut ion of jus tificatio n; fails in The first, expedienc y , . C.!.BSSC,S And, regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overridin g for morality , of morality, which the second, the alleged mor a l dominance of :important or irresi stibl e ethic a l claims t ha t dominate mo r e ordinary cthicnl considera tions (such as those conc er ni g nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the mo r al interests , of cases, including , so the argument wi.11 go, the case of LSN war. 18 . As Sche ll blun l:ly puts it, 'What io being cl.aj_med is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardis e all countries and their descenden ts in the name of certain bel iefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity , since the belie fs may be morally grounded rat her than based on national interests . Stales may i ns i st upon opera ting one self ish national interest basis , Ii:!. It nol be pretended expcJ i<"ncy (na me l y , that tha t of it i.s "group but n montl basi, as distJnct from one of ego1 sm " ). There no 1s special moral d.ispensa ll on fo r governments. j ndiv iduals : ther e ia no loe;i.cal diffe ' nee .ln the patter1 of jus ti fi.cation, or analys is of obligation. Morality works :ln the same way for groups as for For e xample , what ought to be as regards Xis (analy~ed semant i cally) what would happen as reg a rd s X in all ideal worlds; no di ff e r e nce organisation. extenuating killers: whether X is an · individual States such as Israel (in i ts recent invasion reaso ns aside, be having just as beeu conce ded , special moral dispensations; more Lhan tha.t and do not sta nd up to crit.i.cism. cannot immorally makes system, grou p or of Lebano n) are, as brigands or mass there is no moral difference. Certainly t here are gro unds on which states or individual or and it f11rnish two (incompatibl e) their a gents 01: have claimed , but the excuses offered are no A moralities , a s atis factory state moral theory or public one and a private or individual ci tiz en one - state expediency Rnd individual morality becaur;e thi s would lead t o violations of sub st itutlvity , neutrality, etc. 1 '3 ins t ance , a state ope ra ti e X could us e s tate mor~lJy impermi ssi ble ways, ways ruled Y are permuted . special 01 1t cover (e.g. to considerati.ons citizen Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or pe rson can be der iv ati ve damage For bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are der ivative prin c iples - good for any such 1nstitution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justlfied ( i nsofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly 1orR l principles which convenien tl y coincide with those of state expediency . particular, a sta te is not 1 morally) survivrd . In entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other p~oplcs and creatures for its own ends, even ow n ( at for its Thus it is not entJ.t led to do what both nuclear war and nuclear de terre n ce r equ l re, as will emerge. 19 . There a n ~ also othc•r arguments agai nst two (or see Routley a nd Plumwood. multiple) morality Lines: 11 !-: ' ) 'j.J. The i_ni t i<d argument p:1cifli;m yield arguments to the tmmora1 lt.1_ of _ LSN wars. to tb e 1mmora1it.y of war. But 1wch a rgum ents ;ire controversi a l in an area where th ere is no go od r·ason to Argumen ts be for controve rsial. Pacifism can accordingly be se t aside as a spec i a l case, stnce the immorality of LSN wars follows . All but pacif is t positions concede that war in itsel f is not a c rime. nil wars are immo ral, though eve n inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling po litlcal issues between states . wa r s who Not are Among more or l es s admissible th e inte rna tiona l " tourname n ts '' of arlstocrat ic young men or warriors volu11l'cer :w Ho ldlers nnd whos<' actfon does no t 6pi.ll ov er on to noncombar.an ts , a nd some early a nd medievvL wars , wh ere few or evet no combatants were kjl.led in war. conscrip tlon, Since the esta bl i shme nt press-gangs and recruitment of such of the lHrgely ceased to take these less offe nsive for ms; induction prac tices as near-d es titute, wars hav e modern massive war s are far removed from the ideal war-tourn ament typ es (which fea ture now only in ecotopian por traya l s, in ways that are in creasingly dub ious ). imrnornl, Most s orts of wars are because of what is done to the essentially un5_nvolved, but few to such a n exte nt as LS N war s . The first argument to th e immorality of LSN wars and of sufficientl y larg e-sca l e wars ge neral ly, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate ) killing in mass of noncombatan ts is wrong. P2. LS N wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatan ts. P3. Wha t inv olv es wha t Is wrong is wrong . ( KA) LSN wnrs ar• wrong. The parttcular a rgument g lven i s ju st one r epresenta tive of a set of Lhis type. the (KA ) t·cpL1ccs But the qu1. te 'kl.11:!.ng su ff i c l en tly 11v :i.l. crcH tu res' . Thu s t n ma ss o f noncombatan ts' by a cl~rnse concerning 'huge des truct-lon of 11.f esty l e of uninvolved or i. nvolvecl f ocus can destructio n cf li.festyle of nonhumans and humans fJJ i k(~ Ll w t :in L'., N war wJ 11 brf ng l a on arguments Cha racte ri sti cally, in Western culture, it is thought that mass kl l Ling of h11m<1ns ls a bout the worst th i ng that can happen. vadu tlo n of not ll fir s t uitable directly Other vuriatlons will emerge in the di.scussi.on (i.ncluding th at: where the bracketed 'de.liberate' figures ) . The argumenL Js valid, ,1L t a .kcd) on the basi :3 but of may each be attacked ( and of its p1·emisses. has in ef fe ct been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves 11 what is wrong" is -wrong, has been c hallenged on r:1ther Scholastic grounds. There are, in partic ular. problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport o shot.J tha t some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. as~~lst.i.ng :rn in jured robbed per son is said robbed; but, s ince the ro bbin g is wrong, to "involve." providing For which instance, that person ' s assistance belng is also wrong. But thes e pr oblems derive from too slack a not1on of i.nvolvement; w:i:th a tighter accoun t of invo lvement th e problems disappear and P3 stands . 20 As aga inst P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that mi lit ary nuclear targets. wars can be encounters But given the character of nuc lear wea pon s, LSN war s could in no way be co nfined to such targets. net merely the likelihood that many missiles ex plode off target, ther e are all the ot:he r eff ects of large-scale nuclear. bombings. fnlloul There i s down-wlnd from military pcopJc, es pecial Ly in the cas e of uninvo.lved co u11 t rl cs aucl tnrgcts US and For example, t he radioactive will affect large conc entratio ns o( European t argets , and may affe ct as Conn <l o. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal cffcrl ) 2 1. t o s uch dubious pri nciples as the doctri ne of double effect (or side If missiles wer e c haracte ristically r.eliAbly on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obl igat ion over entailment " pd.nciple ,, can be removed by a ti.ghter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For de t a il s s ec Routley nnd Plumwood, where Good Snmar.i tan problems arc diagn osed. 21. According t o the doctrine , which is one concerni ng responsibility, we are rcs ponsJblc only for the intended e ffects or consequenc ~s of our freely-c hos e n actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even U these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended conseq uences . Unless carefully hedg ed, the doctrine is pernicious , a llowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evi l th e y knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme comma nd which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect , have no responsi bil ity for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the i ssues concerning do ub le effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly dis tingui s hed acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions . whicl1 was intend ed unfort unatel y only went off to destro y an unma1H1<HI und e r g round Such claims shou ld be reject ed : ci ty. dou bl e effect Noneth e l ess the circum sta nc es differ ence , for they m.ay mitiga te atti tu des to tho s e rcflpo ns lbl f' ,1 for firing the nd ssi.le, .·i.nce the the thr actjo n would be wrong, and th e ~.:_~:~ ~css nol ]c$sen cd by the g lv n lntent l.on. innkc silo course and destro yed a large ci ty, it c ould be claime d th.:it t.h ~~ (uni.nt cndcd) mass dest ructio n is legitim ised under could missil e j t was not as if t he y had del iberat ely aimed at The double effect princ ipl e confla te s [dimin u tion of] respo nsibil ity Assign ed for an act with the [dimin ution of ] wrong ness of the act. ~s agains t Pl, and as regard s the middle term of argued tha t there is an impor tant equivo cation . the br~cke ted term, ' delibe rate ' . killin g and P2, it The equivo cation is induc ed by be conc eded that de libera te milJta ry , e . g. farmer s or goods or servic es bootma ke r s or ente rtaine rs . used exclud ed as innoce nt . The s econd d~ten sible - versio n of pr emis s P2. other. for re a sons, it by proper ly point concer ns a much narrow er - and les s Bec a use P2 s o amende d is less defen sible, is bes t to l eave out the "modi fier" 'd el ibera te'. What is import ant for the presen t purpos es i s the moral status of what is mixtur e of tha t wi th the motive s of the perpet ra to rs. requir e the qualif icatio n 'delib e rate' or done, So 'delib erate' gets left out, equiv ocatio n is avo ided, P2 stands , and so does Pl. not t he Second ly, it will be conten ded thAt LSN wars do no t i nvolve t he delibe rate killin g of t hos e a It no means al l inn ocent , many being direct ly involv ed in mi litary ef f ort, whethe r just as taxpay ers or as s upplie r s of not be charge d firs tly that noncom batant s, insofa r as they are distin guish able, by and ma y of genuin e innoc ents is imperm issible , two challe nges will be made . will b are While it will Pl For Pl do es 'int e ntiona l' or the like. 22 Admit tedly nlso 'nonco mbat a nt' is a fuzzy term , but none the worse for that, and Lhere is no seriou s p·o blem in markin g out a class of clear noncom batant s, people who a rc not <lir cctly involv ed i n the comman d and J.s, mnrco v'r, no need to adopt action chains . There the prncti c e , derivi ng from catho li c ism, of statin g rn init i.al verslo n of Pl in terms of in noce nts at l e ast as proble matic 22. Despit e Na3el ' s sugge stion that it does (p.158 ). The sugge stion depend s upon oimila r mistak en assim ilati ons , of ac t wi t h intent ion, and wrong ness with respo nsibil ity, to t ho se of the double effect doctri ne. ,1 rlns:; ":'i ,c mnk.t~ t,-,nt of r~on ,~omb:1t ants to try t:(, endenvourlng c..hnrac t er i z .. , -- Rnd then i:h c dif f ic11.Lt transiti.on to noncombatants. there Nnt only can arguments aga i ns t the premlsses of the argument be met, .tr,~ for ;ir311mcnts the prt:'ndsses, thongh for t he subc-tant iv e moral premiss Pl and Lhcy aru of the cha tacterlstlcally nonconclu sive moral sor t tend will For examp le, one argument for v3ry sowcwhat with th e underlyi ng ethical th e ory. Pl, .rnd for objecting to the kil l ing of non~ombatan ts, ts the Kant i a n one, (to poi.nt) , re s pect: owe d to tnem a<· pc so ns mi n f nn l from -~_gume nts §4 . the understate sc,rio usly doing so 23 histori_ca~ __ ..::_e~qu i rcm nts on wars, just ur dreamed by conlemporary "free·-enl<'. rp r fs c" cap:l. Lalist st.ale (and opponents communis t im portant the The conclusion t hat LS,' wars cacno t be justly waged - nnd accordingly are ?njustified - 1e that fail s to treat them with the .0..1~Jl~l5:!..'..~- from con-:_er_ger~£:::J and cnv.t ronment al arguments . r.;omet. lti to of is Americ a inspired, me r ely not or et c), th e of same The conclus ion fnlls out of vc1rlouR trc1dj t i0nc1l requirements, worked out i.n mediev al t:irnt•s , (or jusL wars. first One of t h e r equi r ements gives but a varia nt on the ;>1 :irgumen t (KA). · 1 For a necesso r y co nd i Lion for fighting a wat· justly was th a t it to no t be the case t hat large numb e rs of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killc.:<l (cf. be Barnes , p .77.5) . A just war req ui res just means , that t he war should be fought by morally which impli es in partic ula r that there is no indis c riminate killing of noncombatants . The implied principle was escapsulated in a princi pl e legitimate of means , discrimination (betwee n combata nts and othe rs) whi c h 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) /. ~:, . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate ') ( I.lits ·cqulremcnt '' . 7.3. Of course there are co~nterarg uments too , and not merely from t c military in the case of small numbers of obst r uc tive noncomb a tants. One ;.rngLP favored argument is a va r i at ion on the Bald Man: the re is no clear line between combatants and noncombata11ts. Howe v er a s Nag el a rgues (p . 20) there in are distinctions between t hem, firstly in terms of thei r roles , e.g. c,irry-Lng or u!,in? ;irm · o r dircc . ing t. lnBe who do, a nd s econdly in terms of See a l so PL , p.312, where a their liarmf.uJ.ness , the threat they offe r. uj rr.p1, and ef fec ive paradigm case nrg11mcnt is up pli ed . 2 1~. Note th at throughout, tile• te:xt adopts Llie OED eq u.:itio ns, reflecting common lust wit h mo~ally right or correct, and unjust with morally usage. of - - - -··---·-- Overlapping the requirement of Just means is thac 6f being that of net evil to net good: pro ro rLi on cor; tr-: up proporclonality, 'the damage to be infljcted and lnc urn.> d by the war must be pro porti.onate to the good ex pect ed the damage and costs , req 1irement: disproportio nate to goods moral pr0p0 rt lonnl ·l ty re qui.r ement i R er i t1! rlon of the which doctrine through war . "improvement" ln achieved of confined, nationally no t ar that way. ov e r a ll co n sequences of abstaining i mprov ement "puts wrongs to righ ts": c ondi. tion s "nmel.ioratlve " wn y the 'a nation wages war justly than Similarly on l y if the for that nation or the wronged n8tion it is supporting have a decent s:1tisfy for bad, from war ' (Barnes, p.72) . LSN wars can in these conditio ns, as scen.-i:rios depicting the aftermath of s 1ch Some oft.h e lesser r e quirements for a just war are also wa rLl , nnd war According to the fl.rst, 'X wages wa r c han ce of be ing better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no are Entangl ed with the justly upon Y if the overall consequences of wa r a re bette r, or less th e taking by p,312). 27 Tt Ls not difflcu lt to see that LSN wars violate this (PL, arms' the e :a mple that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that tl ie r· c ca n b e no rea onable expe c tation of suite success in nn LSN war ·- whatev e r t!il' v0 ry d lf !<r<' n t'Jy, cx rhanges . 1 lmilcd prospccUJ of: succl'SS for whatever the p rospcct:s of succf•ss in Wha t some sm11ll strictly state limited clltc , or nucl ea r is le ss clear cut is th e question of whether LSN wars conflict with th e requir ements of just cause or due fnu lt, and of right intention. Fo r One (by no means be arg ued to in various ways. c onclusive) way is Nage l's way, from the requirements of directness and r e l e vance in combat, the underlying ( co ntroversial) principle being that, 1 wh<1tcvcr on<.> does t:o another person inte ntionally must be ai med at him as a subject, wlth the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 25 . Til e principle can 26 . wars where t he targets ar e c8 s cntially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "!nd:lrectly",would b~~ :i.ffe r cnt. Such wars are no t however excused by t he For such wars remain unjust on pe rnicious doctrine ~f double effect . on lif e several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. As Zuckcrmnun says, 1 Tt is st ill inevitable t hat were s ys tnms, etc. mil i tary i nstalla t ions rather than cities to become the objectives of nt lack, millions, even Lens of mlll.lons of ci v.Lli a.ns w-ould be nucl 'lH kill e d .. • ' (quoted i.n Thomp s on and Sm i.th , p .14, where the italics are The situation witli strlctly llmi ted nuclear ndded ). Zi. Tli! r; i s riol Lo b e confus0d wi.tli wlwt lB very different, the vi.cious anclent doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest offi cial policy of fli>;,cib1e r e so0T1se. ,vii11~ted to the level " f att ack, t hi i, ilc> p e nds on the s e nsitive jssue of the weight assigned to what are se e n as b:J1; i c human r1. gh ts and fundame ntal value s , a nd the extent to which just wars can b e i.dco J og i.c a lly justif i ed. Whil<': the ma instr eam pos1.tion of medieva l theory oppo s ed to id e ologica ll y jus tifi ed war s a nd "humani tarian" wars, these wer e was no L ck f' nitlvely exclud ed by the trndiU.o nal theory ( cf. lltt J e is wlw n 1.;o m,rn y arc se nsitive howe ver, me rit, ( a nd when issue s will ari s e again subsequ ently). a r g uments are not do There .In puzzling ov e r dubi usly effcctlv e requirem ents, dec isive ng a lnst LS N war s h i st orica l r e quireme nts Barnes, p .778). not simply commit argumen t s matters underlyi ng the Finally , these argumen ts from any presc r iptive fallacy; from historic al autho r ity for to th e mo r al c oncl 11 s i ons, but use also premisse s to the effect that th e requirem ents imposed, a nd nome times applied , were justifie d. As they are. I n the Christia n traditio n t here were two main strands of r eflectio n on the mo ral rightnes s or justness of wars, the just war t heory and a rival pacifist str a nd, promine nt in early Christia nity, but largely submerge d from Augustin e on co ntempor ary u n ti l times. Both exc lude nuclear wars, one strand because they arc ine v i tably unjust, the other because they are wa rs and This ls the involve beginnin g of the converge nce argumen t agai ns t nuclear wars : such wari, a re exclud e d from all ethical perspec tives, once remov ed ( a nd e ven, howr• vcr you look conse ns us violence 28 • Ht very f requentl y , when it is not) . il morally . a r gument; it The argume nt i.s not proceeds expedi.en cy that is duly They a re morally wrong the same as the weaker fr om similar results from the full sweep of ge nui nely e thi c al position s, not from massive agreeme nt of opinion. The deta :! le d conv ergence argumen t is an exhausti ve case by case each type of moral theory. Fortuna tely deta ils can be de ontolog ical a nd contrac tual theories l ead back to requirem ents 28. one, from shortcu t. For for just war These alte rnatives are not as far. removed .r..ractic ally as may appear. For the aim of just wa ~ theory is not 'to legitimi ze war but t o pr event it. The pr1~sump tion is against the use of force ' (PL, p.312 ) . And ~..£. types of wa r s a r c ruled out by Lite theory. However not all wars or violent revoluti ons a re excluded , and that is enough to guarante e the distinct ion be tween t he a ltern a tives. In particu lar, defensiv e ware are allowed - at l e ast for th e defendin g side, though from a wider viewpoi nt these too may be co nd emned 'the classic case [of the just war] ••• was the use of l et ha l forc e to prevent aggressi on against innocen t victims' (PL, p.311). Und e r rec e nt internat ional law, defence , narrowly construe d, is the only legi Uma t e basis for wa r; Roma n law was only slightly more generou s, in a llow i ng for th e restitut ion of eoods (see Barnes , p.780). .l / whi c l1, it ha s ,ilrcady been s hown, LSN wai·s violate. w.1r were i_;ornctimes a rriv ed at or l n fact conditions for just defended through pr inciples of such moral th12ori · s , so tl,at a good deal of the r equls i. te argumentative been done . work already The latter point hold s a lso as r egards ut ilitarianism, where it has in c[fec t bee n c•hown that whatever br a nd of utilitarianism is maxim j.sati on utl lHy has is final ly ac complished, LSN adopted, wars are howe ve r excluded ut1· 1 ·Ltar1an · g r oun d s . 2 9 Tl,e reason f or suc1 l converg nee .i snot f ar to see k ; wars Llw l involv e on LSN 1:uch ma ssive infliction of pa in and colossal removal of pleasure, tills dominates i n assessmentn howev •r Lhey 1:1 te accomplished in utllitarlan Tilu s any genuine alternative to LSN war ls bette r 30 • L1i; ldon. The arguments ovcrwhc .lming so moral far case outlined against such mora J princi ples whi ch the waging of a n principles are de riv able from agains t some LSN wa rs. LSN would su bstanti ally wo rse are tha n exhaust th e violate thes e of the theories just considered). These ac countable, condition not ( again th e obligation to maint a in earth jn proper shape a nd not de grade it s systems : we do For there are oth e r significant war pri q•f pl es include e nvironmental ones, such ns : p,cnera tions, to whom wars we the r.-esponsibility to futur e pas s to th e " recei ved the world it". Such on" not in conservative principl 0s - howeve r they are finally s atisfact or i ly formulated - are bound to be vio lat ed in t he event of a n LSN war. §5. The shi ft to nuclear deterrence: suppo rt nuclear arguments to its immorality . Those who arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars , by pointing out that there is no actual engagemen t in any such wars. What i s being done ls, it is cla imed, quite different fr om war: deterrence is most important precisely engagement in preventing in LSN such wars from ever occur ri ng , as we ll as in mR int ai ning other fundamental Western values. it is continued , deterrence is the .9nly practical d e siderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments 29. For details see, e.g ., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argwnent of this sort is devel oped in more detail, complete gc ner ality, j r Goodin, esp •c i £tlly 'Disarmame nt'. are But compare Hardin. though not in a<lvnncerl for all tl1e va ri ous guises that de terrence is presented in: mutually ;.~ssurcd des truction as fnrrnerly, fle xi ble r espo nse as latter ly, or otherw.ise. 31 Su,h c1aims as to the roles and dubious, for seve ral reasons. objective s of deterrence If i.t t.rere, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. s uperior ity. than th i s, and sometime s even a mili ta ry goal. In fac t there ha s renewed driv e for Pure delerrence can account nei t her for act ual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Wester n military strategy 32 process decidedl y A first reason is th a t there i s much e vid e nce, despite pronouncements, that dete rrence is not the - the only - been a que st for more are Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels ap propriate for dctct"rence . On the cont rn ry, un<ler " its" impu.ls e there has been almost unli mi te d acce l era tion in building arms (to pa ra phr a se PL p.318). A other major re a son for serious doubt a bout what sold 31. is being 11nder "d e terrence" labe ls conce r ns th e _proba bility f actor: marketed a nd deterrence has It ts important to observe that the di sc ussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies t o al l for ms of response likely to engender LSN wa r. This includ es "flex ible r es ponse", since the lik e ly further development i s massiv e ret al iation to a n ini tia l Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for thi s is the extreme vuln erabilit y of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes a nd to electromagnetic pulses. In the result i ng great confusion, escalation appears the likely out come . I n a ny case, fle x ible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its ra ng e and is ultimat e ly backed by it. It is a l so im portant to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) a ttack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nucle a r power. I t is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the firs t po int, there is not onl y overkill capacity and the driv e for suped ori ty ( oft e n repr esent ed as '"negotiating'" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been de cidedly expansionist with regul a r intervertion in o ther nations; there have been r epe ated US threats to use nucl0ar weapons, espec ially to deal wi th revolutionary activities in t he third wo rld , but also in Europe in "li.mited'" nuclear war; and i n official military stra tegy no s ha rp line has be e n drawn between c.onventi.onal and nuclear weapons: on these and other r elated points see furth e r Lackey MM, p.19lff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed [1rLher, to the alarming conclus ion that deterrence is larg e ly a front, which plays onl y a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among fu rther evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrenc e policy would repeatedl y emphasize its strength (even when it la c ks strengt h), whereas the US govcrrnnent ofte n parades its vulnerability and weakness in public . For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. i.ncrt.:ascd the probability nrms-race type t hat of LSN war. More precis ely, deterrence of th e is being practised, which invol·es full-scale prepar a tion for Lota] nuclear war, has prepared the cond i tions for nuclear war to occur, and hns to that ,,,·te nt least en hanced its prospect s of occurring . at r easons also, connected with pure original setting), the last 30 years. the deterrence and with the For other "cold war"' (its probability of a LSN war has increased consid erabl y in The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to main tain credibility overridden or with ''sacrificed" a population whos e real for military objectives; state of military readiness; etc. The situation has many ther e sober analysts century , i.e. think before 2000 . is a high There are s e veral interests are being the dangerous and risky now been reached where pr obability of an LSN war this routes to such a probability assir,nrnc•n t.33 It wo uld only rccp ii re one in ' id e nt wi.th a 20% chance of leading to an rscalating wnr every 8 years between 1960 and Amer lean 2000. alerts, hav e been lucky already . In of nuclear markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that th e For the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucia l the arms of nuclear acci dent and human or t ec l1nical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf . :l.ncrease zones separating the superstates are increasing in sjze and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and r e veals the exchange . number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war wil l race, on sidE? ;i.lone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes , as with the Cuban missile crisis , carry a considerably higher chance We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a moie than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' a sse ssments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only ''nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in r e cent years. Amer ica n officials have themselves admitted that the policies of r ealis ing th e st rategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear wnr (Hall, p.128). 20 conlcntlous (thoug h not always for good reasons) . s e em s no way Fof better or worse, ther e to rna~e such an overall probability argument particularly tight; a nd ti1t: r E:! arc p] a usi. b le arguments , from the complexity of th e data concerned and t he conti ng ency of the future, that it cannot be made tight . IL is bad enough however that l.t 2-._~_ de c idedly pla usible that it proha bJ~ that LSN an war will d i st r ibu tion pri c iples) that it proba bl e that c entury. And that is enough a grossly occur this ce ntury. is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is i.mmoral. For then it follows ( by plausi ble that it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this warrant morally to take acti on to avert the outc ome. de terrence highly is evasiv e act.Lon. We ought That in turn implies taking steps , presently practised. Thus present That i.s but the first of several ways we shall nrrivc at that damaging conclusion for pres ent super-state deterrence policies. The plnusibil ity of claims as to the hi gh or increasing probability of war h a s of cour s e been disputed. LSN The mai n counte rargument runs as fol lows : Nuclear war is unlikely , be ca use the consequ ences are too horri fying. The underlying assumption i.s that wars and the like, with ar c improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much ava i lable evidence counters this More th an enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horr if y i ng wars , or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper ). What ts le!;s assailable than the high probabili ty claim, what the ce r tnin ly Ther e by, through det errence, we si t uation, since have already got into t.h e probA.bility. immoral of r aising The mor e detai led underlyi.n g arg ument s , then, to the immora lity of nucle ar deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for thereby perhaps helping t o bring it about, in the sense war, against evidence s eems to support, ls that there is a non-negl i g ible probability of an LSN war . LSN a nd way of princ iple s mapping war into ar.gum~nts a gaJns t deter r ence of LSN war. mi.gilt appropriately be called deont:ic connecti ng pr inciples . moral arg uments Such principles The fl rst of the s e principles t a kes the foll owing preliminary form: Cl. should If 1t is wro ng that X s ho uld occur, t hen not only be pr ob3ble is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly i ncrease t he pt' o ba bility that X occur . Thus, f or example , s i nc e is it wrong to ki l l a large noncomb atant po~ulatf on in LSN wa r (by §4) it is al s o wr ong to put the populati on at ris k and wrong to increase t he chance tha t the hostage popul a tion is wiped out, which nuclea r de terre nce does . botl1 of For simil ar r eas ons a super s t te is not morally entitled to im pose nucl ea r r i sks upon un invo l ved noncomb atants, esp ecial ly t ho se of third part y no nal i gned most Like "' t tuations . defeat by example , 0 t a te s . sub s t an ti ve Unless mo ra l count erexamp l es, the second principl es oc c u r s. probabi lity that par t princ ipl e s in Cl runs into dilemma. and of a c c ord i ng l y, Cl e ncount e rs to require complic ation. For apparen t trouble where clash of Thu s it may be argued th a t it is permiss ible to increase the oc curs X ord er to apartmen t bui l dings 3 4 • nuclec1r ethi s, d l l emmas a r e duly all owed for, Cl appears li a ble to t o avoid a greater evil. pilot who increase s the pr obabilit y c r ashes, in dct:crrcn ce , make that t he Cons i der for example the passeng er plane he ic flying sure that the troubled aircraf t does not hit cit y Suc h a defeatin g cond i tion do e s not apply in the case of ihe r e (though the r e explains ) wro ngness of a pr a ct ic e is not ls a of fs e t clash or of principl e s, as §6 removed by its role in avoiding greate r e vil. I L can be a r gued that it is: argumen t from t he pr e vious a r gumen t. de s erves lit t le perhaps f rom more such is pa rt of succe s s credence t he de terrence . th a n the of the popular However this inductiv e racing world As Barnett argues, driver's argumen t, 'the happy acciden t has surv iv ed the first thirty-f ive years of th e nuclear era is unimp r e s si ve e v i d e nce that we can avoid nuclea r war 34. point a s imilar time base, that because he hasn't had a fa tal crash yet (des pite some close calla ) , he won't, th a t of the in the coming era, This dilemma exampl e was s uppli ed by D. Johnston . There are more dif f i c ul t putative coun t e rexampl es. For example , in inciting people to c ivil disobedi ence, the ri s k of stat e violence in r etaliat i on is increase d. Thus, t o ta ke C, Pigden's example , 1.n encourag ing disobed ience, Gandhi i nc r ea s ed t he proba bility of wrongdo ing by the British Raj. But surely Ga ndhi, un l i ke th e Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi d i d no t d irect ly incre a s e the probabi l i ty of viol ence . But spelling out what 'dir ec tly' means in terms of short causal chains over which r espo nsi bil i ty ca n be distribu ted - i s not only problem atic but leads on to ot her connect ing princ i ples. ·2 (p. 100) . lie offers fami.liar reasons suc h as the changing power incrt.' ,ise 111 Russian strengt h, the ri se r e 1aU. ons, th e of other nu c lear powcr·s, etc . (cf. simllarly Cox ). There ar e, a ccordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Dl. De errencc will not continu e to work, and. more lmportant for the present argumenl, that D2 . De t e rrence does increase the proba bi lity of LSN war. The themes are of course i.nter related, and t he re as ons for t hem (which are again persuasive bu t in: oncl usive) can be t a ken together : some respects) weaker D2 ·- the probability facto r. proliferati on, the emergence bu t the focus is on the ( in An initial of lesser nuc lear powers. reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagrat.i on, and so enhanced prospect Some nnnlyula co ns id e r that lt. -i~i us e of nuclear weapons by confrontation a 11 lesser very Jf ke ly route to I.SN war l · th stat e . Moreover scarcitJ ;::i nd o f chea per suppli es, etc , weapo n systems, more or Lcrror s ltua ttons, deterrence power lnvolv e s 36 , being mainta.ined : costs Wi t h so many more Arms races, and interwoven balanc e of have an exc eed ingly bad 1,istorical track record. lncr cas lng as tl1c race p roce eds . of resource A second group of reasons concerns the Ther e is substantial inductive evi dence that pres en t for wi<iel y d lstributed, the probabili.ty of war through accide nt o r e rr o r is inc reased. powrr opportunities growing nuclear arms race which deterr e nc e, as practised, is ti ed to. wec1pons .lnltlnl to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political Jnstnbillty , relat ing to thlrd world economic de cline, and the of lead escalating eventually to arms war , races, with such as probabili.ty Next, deterrence dep ends on a certai n balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for 35. that deterrence practice increases It can be the or etically a r gued t hat the fewer the nations weap ons, t.he l ess the chance of nuclear. war: cf. n 1clcar p .. 2JO n. 36. supposi ng th e armed with Lackey, MM, The standard ar gument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the proboblli y of wa r, would be decidedly better if the arms race were nbandoned, a nd weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for dcle rrenc e. Of c our se s uch a probability-well assumption is only one of scvera l_ thi. ngs required if det erre nce i.s to be just:!.fled. probabili ty of war conce rn s the continuin g shifts in poli c y, US especiall y th e rcncwc<l quest for superio rity wh i ch is in creasing the inc en tiv e of both sides to rcsorL to nuclcJr war, the USSR t o avoid being advantage of ov erwhelme d, USA the to take superiori ty ac hi eved . 37 Rece nt dangerous shifts in US poli cy the tow;Jrds war fighting a r e .in part induce d by a much inc re ased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrenc e (sinc e mi l itary tar-gets con be selected for strike and ci ties to some extent r emoved as hostages ), thereby war. also weakens the case against resort to nucle a r detrrrenc c requires a certain (admitted l y r a ther minimal, ye t of mutual understan ding, leaders, and even some nuclear. sha r ed principle s , cooperati on supe r-states. and soundness transmi ss i on Finally, impor tant) level judgement among of of and informati on between It is not just that t he increasin g numbers of operator s in n position to J.aunch nuclear weapons must remain of " sound mind" and not, for instance, follow through on delusions of one sort or another. deterrenc e depends upon judgeme nts seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding the other It is al so tha t side , which slde ' s threat is to the other' (P L, p.313) . we think' • 38 But about what the o t her considera ble , and perhaps catastrop hic , margin of evidence, that on e perceptio n of what is possible resul t As s ide side thinks e rror. Not thinks , there only not can be is a there sid e (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliatio n; must now be severe doubts cffectlvc ly. "conv inc ing " There is a grain of truth in the c1a"im that 'deterren ce is primarily about what t he other what be a t the mercy of t he o the r's percept io n of wha t strategy is "r.atio al", what kind of damage .is " un nccept able", how one may as to whether rationa l principle s are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discus sed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for super iority is doct1me nted. The v.lci ssi tudes of US "d efenc e" policy - not to say its shiftines s and occas ional incoheren ce (as in strategic forward defence) have confused many of lts supporter s even . Perhaps there is some advantage in the ver y incomplet e and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies : we don't see, wit h alarm, their incohe renc e and i.rrntiona llty . J8. Pym, quot,.• d .Ln Thompson , p .19. Yet a fundamen tal problem Russi a and the West fac e, Lt is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understan d one another but that 'ther, is a lack of a wish to understan d'. This casts into douht the psycholog ical basis of nuclear deterrenc e. 24 idea (alread y allu<led to , as he l d in hi.gh pl a ces of powe r in USA and in UK) that LSN war cnn be sur viv ed i n r ud ime ntary s hel ters , and also won. The suppor ter of det er rence connec ting rrlnci ple s ri val case. such J1as not onl y to defeat a rgumen ts Cl, but, more difficu lt, to fie ld a convin cing as For the onus of pr oof lies in showing that the costly ~:.:..!.~_rr.cncc Ls justifi ed_. t hr o ugh practic e of Bu t for from th e fair ly decisiv (~ case that i s requi r ed ( Lo contras t with t he argume nt through Cl), only a feeble case through the questio na b le obv ers e of Cl, Cl i. If Xis wr ong then it is right to reduce the probab ility of X, nppears open . • For it has to be shown that deterre nce ( s ubstan tially) r e duc e s the proba bility of LSN war , and st ri ct lt (this indica tes part of the trouble with Clt) that deterre nce does this bett e r (more morally ) than availab le options . o The latter uniquen ess condit. ion ce rtainly fails, so it r,.,ill be argu e d. reasons already gi ven, does the probab ility claim. up i-hc v ery cond 1 t:1.ons probab ility of suc h for a an LSN war, it So , for When nuclear deterr e nce set s can ha rdly have reduced th e war , e speci a lly over the situati on a mere 25 years ag o when such an LS N wa r was not technic ally possib le. More genera lly , i n showlng that nuclear deterre nc e ls justifi e d, it i s c..! l1 0l l f',h refute the theme Lhat deterr e nce is wrong. LO out that deterre nce is permis sible, or alrigh t. altcrn1 1LJvc pe rmissi ble courses of a c tion condit:f . on ha s to be est a bli.shed ; to be no t merely alrigh t , bu t ;H:cc·p ' ah l<' cvidt!n tin l ato nd nrdA, r ig ht. But I t is not enough to make For t he re certain ly seem to withou t deterr ence , wh ic h appear more morally satisfa ctory. uniciue ne s s includi ng fright To surpass t hese option s, a nuclea r deterre nc e has to be shown es tablish ing such a 39. LSN war s , withou t .(cf. Jl 11 claim, to fear or is vf.nunl ly tmposa iblc. 39 OED) 40 • For most people, portray ing the horror of LSN wa rs would serve adequa tely enough from be the costs or problem s of Deterre nce cons ists in preven ting someth ing (often some wrong ) by t hr ea t s not the enormo us expense , t rouble vivid scenari os to deter t hem and wastage of An analogo us point will ap pea r whe n i.t is asked whethe r deterre nce is the way o ut oft.he nuclear fix, the thin g to persist with in the circum stances . Given that there are appare ntly super ior, le ss dangero us procedu res , the an s wl!r hn-, to be, No. - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - p r epar i ng to e ngag e i n th em. det t·r rl'ncc And deterren ce i.n a ny cas e de pends upon) is of by such means ourse not immoral . (whi ch miJit4ry (Sc.h e ll was not immora l in publ ish ing hi s gra phic descri p tions of the nuclear destruc tion of New Yo rk .) But t hou gh de te rrence per se is permi ssible, nuclea~ deterren ce, that is deterren ce by complete prepa ration for the object to be preven te d , is no t , where this o bj e ct, a LSN war., itself is no t permiss ible. The argumen t for this is thro ug h t he pr lnc J ple C2 . l f X is wrong then c omplete prepara tion for (carryin g out) Xis wrong. Hence since p re para t i on, LS N wars nuc l ear are wrong and nuclear deterren ce deterren ce of LSN wars is wrong . claimed th a t prepa ring for Xis just as bad as doing X: wr ong a n d Z ( mue h) worse t1wn i Y• wi11at W.'.1 S wrong. complete It is not however being Y and Z may both be 41 i s wrong i s b y no means un if orm l y ev1.1. " Tn 19115 Lhcre would ha ve been littl e doubt that L SN wa r implies complete prepara tion for Among the three types of crime s pecif led in Article 6 of the Cha rt e r f or th e I nternati onal Military Tribuna ls (which tr ied the major war c r iminals a t Nurcm burg) we r e Cr1- mes a ga ins t peace: namely planning , .:e_repar ation, initiati on or waging o f a wa r of aggr e ssion, or a war in violatio n of internat iona l tr eat:!.es , ag reements or a s surance s, or particip ation in a common plan or cons pi ra c y for the accompl ishment of any of the followin g ( cited in Ku pe r , p.2 1; ita lic s added). But af t e r ma ny yea rs of nuclear deterren ce, the become J ncreasi ngly liable to question . wrongne ss implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. De t er r e nc e a lso commonly includes elements of mendaci ty, deceptio n, mi si nforma t ion, that is elements of what a re, for the roost part, morally unde sirable traits. Li l . Nor a re ordered be cause wrong, equally degr e es of wrongne ss required : wrongs can simply be as reg a rds relative worsene ss. The point requires some it has been quite erroneo usly assumed t hat if y and z cat egorica lly or absolute ly , then they mus t be equally evil. Thus, e.g. William s: . partiall y labourin g are both wrong or . there is no moral differen ce between running a deterren t st r ategy on the one hand, and intentio nally - indeed wantonly - start i ng a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil a s the second. This is because both are held to be absolute ly forbidde n. Not a t a ll. The argume n ts from "Y and Z are both absolute ly forbidde n" to "S o Y i s a s totally evil as Z" and to "Therefo re Y and Z do not differ mor all y " a r e both ent:i.rely without validity . Compare : 2 is a number, and 3 lg a numbe r; s o 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numeri c , lly from 3! 26 a~sum ing t!w l comp l e t e prepara t.i o n i nc }udc i:; l ss t: lwn Lt nee ds to or do e s. Complete prepa ration for something, s uch as sever~] other fea tures. LSN war , already writes in In particular, i t presup po ses the preparation is no t ha1 (·-hea rt ed hnt is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pret e nce. Obser e tha t mere pretence, or ot her more psychologic a l ploys, cannot substi tut e for comp l ete prepa r a tion in nuclea r deterrence. too sophistica t ed for bluff alone to Military succeed: t here preparatJon for wa r accompanyin g the t h rea t s involved in t he ot her hand , has to is now be serious deterr ence . But, on c omplet e prepara tion does not imply that what i s prepared for wi l l be attempted other than condi tona lly: imply attemp t ed X. c omplete preparatio n for X does not It does however 1.nvolve a conditional undertaki ng to proc eed with wha l is prcpa·ed whell1er intelligenc e for under c ertain conditio ns. Comple te preparation , for a we dding or murder or wha tevcr, wo uld be po int les s otherwise, so a (proclaimed ) comm itment to proceed under given circumstanc es c an be taken of connecting for granted . Principle C2 principles . is part way not the line in a series pr inciple of the same sort that is hig he r in the series is that A con necting X with a tt empted X: perh,ps down if Xis wrong then attempted Xis wrong as bad ) , whether X succeeds or not . But the se ries ends ; off well before th e l ower limits of i nte ns ionalit y, contrary to the (thoug h it cuts claims of various religious pos i tio ns. For example, it does not foll ow that if Xis wrong then X the co n temp l ati on con sidcra t Jon of of is wrong carrying out Xis wrong. or that non-action- oriented The point ap plies equally to sexual fant asie s, power fan tasies, and nuclear nightmares . no Lhing mere In particular, there is wrong with contemplatin g nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even lf their horrors don't be ar thinki.ng on, a re not unthinkable , and in some senses are all too thinka ble. Indeed one of the reas on s why the connecting principles appeal is that each common ly involves lt connects with. decidedl y increased pro ab ility of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanyin g the increased probability are certain r eprehensibl e atti tud e s tied t o the ac tion t he evil outcome involves; nol I ho:a· of mere pas s ! vc .o nt emµ l at f on I,, 1 '. Howev er oll the sets of these are connectl.ng n prL nc lple s invoked except Cl ho l d, where the y do, ~, a n when the proba bi lity of wrongdo i ng ev e ntuating is not inc r eased. c ho:;c n One rea son for th1s is that the means o r epre hensible end s may be ineffica cious, for instance intendin g to do s omeo ne harm using witchcr aft . The inc r eased prohabi llty of an evil out come o l.mply makcB things worse . Nu clear deter r ence involves not only war pre parat ion, but thi s accompa nied by threats and a threaten ing posture . pot e ntial e nemy, has to be sui tably frighten ed or moved, announce ment For some pa rty , th e if deterr e nce s ucce ed : the threat must be recognis ed as s uch and be cr edible . n uc 1 L' i1 r deterren ce yie l ds a further conne cting princip le: CJ. of is to This aspect of if Xis wrong the n serious threat ening of X und er gi ven conditio ns is also wr o ng ; or , in br ief, If Xis wrong then conditio nal thre a tening of Xis wro ng . The r ema in i ng connecti ng conditio ns invoked all take this general form CG . If Xis wrong so is a cond itional r eq uires some further ex planati on. the fo rm, ~ ( X if C), wl1ere of' • 4 3 thre ate ning ~ Apar t intensio n to A condit'o na l do intentio ns e . g. themselv es, 1 the t ha t ) . C to (or in pr opos iti onal ra ther than event style: the most cond i tion a l lnte1slo ns are conditio nal obligati ons where~ is the oblj gati on form a are not impossi ble claim in whnt or even remote or imp r obable: (spe c ifica lly those involvin g cornmitn e nt) for follows certain is tha t s ort s there of discusse d an it is obligato ry conditio ns the conditi ons typicall y conc e rn those specif ying a rtuclear st rike by a potentia l fund ame ntal cred1ble functor: To r emove complica tion it can b e ass umed hencefo rth that the involv ed whic h intensio n is a judgemen t of is some intensio nal functor, f rom X enemy . The are intensio nal funct ors threaten ing , intendin g , and whic h CG holds , and that these versions suffice to demonst rate the immoral ity 42 . There is plenty of scope for f ur ther elabora tion here. Passiv e s pectntor shJp of evil e vent s where one is in an appropr iate pos i tion to make a differen ce i s quite another thing, from contemp lation of other worlds where e vil oc curs . 43. The condi tionnl i.nt nsion, ~ ( X if C), whic h is an intensio n , should not be confused wit h the provisio nal form, 1f C then ~x. which is not . The Ame rfcnns nre t hr eatening the Russians with retaliat ory action If tl1ey strike : Lt is not that: if the Russians strike the American s will threaten them with reta l ia t ory action . Such confusi on has arisen because of the problems of formalis ing conditio nal obligati on given usual defectiv e theories of condi ti onality. of nuclear deterren ce. Natural ly again there are many 28 no11-;-1ction ·-oriented functors for whi ch ve r s ions c.ont. :•mplat J.on, t'1l nld.ng, dreaming, etc. of e.g . fail, those of The.r e is also a n interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping ( for) , expecting, awaiting and the like, for which CG is only dub:i.ously correct:. Connecting pri nciple C3 evolved from the simp ler pri~ciple, if X is then threatcn.ing X 1s also wrong, or, as f ormulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten .•• ' 44 The r e ason is that to do into prac tic e (e.g. if wrong 'What is wrong putting something committ ing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into tlin•at<'nl ne t o pu t that lnto practice , in pn rti c ul ar the declflred intent to that into pract i ce. beginning as fo] lows: The point ca n if worlds where alternative ly X happens be are put argued semanti cal ly, exclude d then so are adjacent wo rlds where Xis poised to happen. The comp li cat lon of the simple form is required for two reasons. nuclear war obta i n. However t he required c onditional form can be derived form, is through only c onditionall y threatened , i.e . the f ollowing wh ic h is pe rf ectly general , X if argument:- c. should certain cond itions particular, (of §§3-4) LSN oppo si. tion has struck, or not , and so wrong when it wrong, 44. so a lso is simple if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails arg uments the Observe, furthermore that if something Xis have b en wrong in the first place. ear lier from su bstitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is a l so wrong under restrictive co nditions; by Firstly , threatening X if C, war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to e sta blish CG it is Ramsay's formula tion of simplified CJ is considered in Wal zer, p.272. It i s this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk , int o the awkward position he ends in, whi c h as Walzer explains , really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of slmp li.f led CJ H must he allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, Lhe exchange permitted must both threaten and also, i.n view of CJ, not threaten nonmi.lit ary targets, collateral oon-cornbata nt populations . It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, wou1d be inconsi.sten t. S!mpllf1cd pri nclple CJ 1.£ nlso invok<'d by the US Catholic Bishops: se PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared "i.ntent to use nuclenr we apons, which they pronounce morally wrong. Ho wever s implifi ed CJ is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to nssess Lhe moral stntus of u threat by way of expected utility. This is open to Rll the objec tions to expected utility as a test of morality mentione d below. 29 enough to e sta blish the s i mpl e r If Xis wron g s o i s a n int e nsion t o do X. CG'. The s e cond com plic ation in C3, modifying the threat to ca us es more t roubl e . a serious threat, Some modi f ica tion a ppears required, because it is often contend e d tha t empt y t hrea t s or bluff a r e wa rranted on occasion even whe r e is t l1r e o.tene d what l . i s wrong , to prevent t,1c occ urrence o f som et h.1 ng worse .11 s A"n d 1.n f ac t one wny o f tr ying to vi ndica te de te rrence , a s morally permissible , has been by pre se nti ng de t er rence as lnvo lv ing thr eats which do not involve any i nt en tion at all to pr oceed t o action on plaus ible Lhrc a t s . removes i t the support bas i s for of threats. s i mpl i f ied CJ. Insofar A seri ous th r eat th e n, in the slJ ghtly t echnic a l. sense co nditi on s, is con s i de r a accide nt . intended, For the challenge grossly immo r al unconvincing, case wh e r e conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. ci rcum st ances th e result from improbable To bring this an intricat e Eithe r the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Mac h in e c ircui try, etc.) or w1th further choice, or - somehow Eit her not . is in ef fect tha t it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious thr ea t s to under t a ke out is Principle CJ is not ope n to the same c ha l lenges as sJmplified a nd unqualified CJ. says this Hence the shift to serious one tha t i s no t a pre t ence, empty or a blu ff , but credible. which as it is way the out c ome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously , in the s e c ond cas e be cause the intermedia te reconsideration makes it plain that the thr eat nor ought not to have been issued at a ll, be ing justifiable on neither mo r al more .. pra ctic al " rep r es e n t atives grounds. Further more, while states thei r and ma y accept moral double at t itudes, such as morally assenting to immor a l threa t s, les s corrupt agents cannot: it moral principled agents they ar e or take natu r es , to t he kinds of th emse l ves to be ( a s Benn exp lains). i nsignif i c ant mora lly would run For su c h agents , who may counter to comprise their a not proportion _ of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such a s CJ are no t in doubt. The a r gum e nt agai nst nu c le a r deterr e nce using C3 is as follows:- Either th e --- ---- ---- - - -- - - For a di sc us s ion of threats whe r e the threatener has no intention of ca r r ying ou t t he threat, or inc e ntive to do so, see Schelling, p.JSff . The quest ion of t he mo r ality of th e s e threa ts, where the item threatened is i.m,-,, or a l , ca n be left ope n. 30 t.hrcnt involved then is it Ln deterren ce is ser .!. 1);..i1.. or l t is m 1 t, inadequ ate. s o deterren ce is no Lhen by CJ deterren ce depcn<l is wrong . The maintain ed. sub-argu ment on se ri ous threats is a practica l one: Lf it s no t seri ous Bu t if i t j s ser io us that nu c l ea r dete r re nce name l y , that if the t h rea t s were not serio us , but merely gave the lmpressi o n that they would be fo l lowed thro ugh , then the op posit ion would flnd out, in one way or a nother. could not be entlorseJ i.n an open or democra tic polit i ca l wi LhouL A policy of bluff system , f or examp l e, coining some discussi on, and so giving the game away to the oppos iti o n . Even i n close d non-demo cratic systems maintain ing such a po licy weapons , espec ially informa lion would clown during l i kel y times escape the of there would be ma jor di f fic u l t ies i.n chains of c ommand i nv olved wit h nuc l ear change through in gov e rn ing el i t es , a nd the op pos itio n i ntellige nce. But then , since t he bluff could be called, deterren ce wou ld no t ha ve su c ceede d . Ther e a re as we l l ot her argumen t s t hat the thr ats invo l ved mu st he s e r io u s. On e is t hat nucl e ar d terrcnce already faces a cred i bility probl em , namely tha t do ubts a bo ut the r ationa lity of carry i ng out t he big nuclea r t hre a t weak e n th e c r e di bil ity essentia l. to its effec t iven ess . To be effec tive then i t mu s t be s e r i ous ( c f. Benn). Meeting obj ec tions t o pri ncip l e C3 leads on t o two fur t he r ve r sions of one centred on intent io n , one on commitm ent. CG, Princ ip l e CJ is int1ma t e ly linke d with , and it some times co nside r ed bu t a variant upon , t he pr i ncipl e C4 . If Xis wrong then t o conditio nally intend to do X [kn owing it is wrong ] is n!so wr0ng. The' prJrcJpl cs arc intimate ly a ssoci at ed because a th ea t is, ac c ordi ng t o die tionarie s, etc . ' . of 'a d claratio r of intent to 1nfU.c t puni shment, l oss , injury, It i s their intercon nect i o n which lies a t the bo t t om of deter rence, which in tend ing to go to war . princip l e , th a t turn 0 11 C4 is s ome pa r a doxes the prob l em of c red ibly t hrea tening war wi thout Princ i ple C4 is j us t i f i e d th rough th e s i mplified inte ndi ng to do wrong j_s wr ong, a nd s o al s o i s i nte ndl ng to do wrong unl es s favoura b le circums tanc es f o r one' s p inc.iple some an ex tr emel y position prevail. Si mplif i ed wi del y assumed mora l thesis, 46 perhap s for the excellen t reason that it holds a nalytica lly. Its ela bo ra t io n C4 can be us e d to Jl agains t nuclear deterre nce , ea follows : argue siQ ~a pfoce eding to LSN war when the Qnemy duly misbeha ve s is wrong (by §§J-4) , by C4. intendi ng to go to LSN wa r when the enemy duly misbeh aves is also wrong . Nuclea r deterre nce involve s such an intenti on, all the availab le evidenc e shows. He nc e nuclear deter rence is wrong. But like virtua lly every utilita rian princip les utiJita rian grounds . deontic t hems e lv es , princip le , princ i ples For it is not difficu lt to except thos e flowing from CJ and C4 c a n be challe ng ed on outline str a tegic situati ons wher e mnxlrnum ex pected utility result s from a poli cy of nuclear det e rr ence. But on il s own this conces sion casts but little doub t upon C4. For it likewis e fs not princip les C3 difficu lt t o ou tli ne situati ons where the hanging oE innoce nt people , or other injusti ces , are sa nctio ne d or enjoine d by maximum expe cted a nd utility . pu rsuit Those who appeal to utilita rian assump tions try t o avoid suc h more obvious di fficult ies with .elianc e upon utilita rianism , scrappi ng the sp ots not by doctrin e, bu t by hedging app licatio ns of their princip les around with quall ficatio ns , whic h, they hope , will trou bl e of wit h utilit a riani sm. enable So .i. t them to evade the worst is with Kavka, whose work ni ce l y illustr ates that whatev er (little ) deterre nce has in its mo r al f avour depend s upon uti.lita rian ass umption s . Kavka 'bcgin[ s ] by no t ing that any reas ona ble system of fwbst,r ntial 1itil.ita ri a n e l ements ' (PD, p.287). consequ e n tia l elemen ts systems incl ud e must infiltr ate, an with the ' ass umption if Eve n observ atio n were correc t - it is nox, dep e nding f or one e thic s thing this upon must hav e astonis hing confla ting utilita rian - it would not follow that reasona bl e particu lar that assump tion produce s normat ive assump tio n involv e d is that t he a ct Kavka thereup on t ries the paradox es of · deterre nce'. wi t h maximum expecte d to The utility '( the most useful ac t) should be performe d whe never a very great deal of utility - - 46. ·•---- ---- - Ka vka , who labels simpli fie d C4 the Wr ongf ul Inte ntions Princip le (PD , p.289 ), attri butes th e princip le to Abela rd, Aquina s, Butler, Bentham , Kan t, Sldgwi. ck, Kenny and Narveso n. Ka vka also gi ves reasons as to why the pr i nciple ap pe ars 's o obviou sly tr ue'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Cathol ic Bishop s , that ' nuclea r deterre nce is immora l' (cf . Kavb p.29 1 ). It is the clas h of C4 with certain utJ li tarian princip les (espec iall y the maximi sation pr inc iple of p. 28 7) that directl y genera tes Kavka 's f irst paradox of dete rrenc e and l ies behind his other "parado xes'' : see PD. . , •" . 12 i.s s t. a ke ' ( p .Z87). :;t obj ec tions as This as s um p t io n is ope n to es s e n tia lly the same ba t c h ut il i taria nism i self: it is mainl y a mat t er o f i ncre a sing or vary! ,1g the s t okes i nvol ved s uf ficient l y in a y co unte r examp l e . usud l stratc ~y of of Kavka tries t he weakening a nd fudging the nor mative a s s umption to a voi d the ~o r sl pro bl e ms of distri butive i n justice , and t he like , t hat max i mising u t i lit y can mora l ly e njo i u. But the c ru cial defect in Ka vka ' s argume n t l ies fo l Low fr om t he normative ( p . 28 7) • 11 7 what ov erridde n by C4 s u ppo sed u t il i t a rian to a ssumptio ns ' Though Kavka tends t o a pply t he fudg ed normat iv e as sumption s in thi s way, as If it domina ted C/4 ( see e s pe c ia lly p , 29 0), wh a t and is assump t i on howeve r fudged, namely that ' t his mea ns o t he r mo r al ass ump t io ns a r e t h at .•. in produce , situa t i on s , are whe n moral c ombi ned dilemmas . in si tu a t i ons These are not s uc h th e f udg ed as sump ti on as special de t e rr e nt c a ses where one decnti c pr inc ipl e , tl1a t yie l ded by ut i l i t a r ian i sm , ove rrid e s o t hers, but wher e t he r e ar e c ompe ting, ev en c nt ra d ic tory de ont ic pr inc i p l e s , such a s tha t it int e nd right to to pro c eed to LS N war whe n t he e nemy mi sbe ha ves (on specious u til i tarian gr ound s ) and. also wrong to i n te nd to do s o ( by C4) . wr ong : that judg ement is not ov e rr i den. Nuc lear de t e rr e nce is also t he case is t hat in r emai ns Nor do es it in any way foll ow that C4 i s in 1eed of qu a lifica ti on as a r es ult (Ka vka' s a ssump t ion, what is th e~e s pe cial p.290) . situations, Howeve r , t her e ar e count e r vall i ng u t ili t arian cons i dera tions s ugge sti ng different imperatives . For .ln t he s e is wrong . s pe c i a l ci rcumst a nce s a greater uti l:lty can be realised by doing what Howe ver it is ha rdly ne ws, but a standing objection, that ut ili t a ri a nism some time s en joins wl1at is wron g . Spec ial s pons on s hip de t e rre nt may appea r s itua t i.on a, where under ntl lit a ri a n t o get a foot i n t he moral door, ar e very speci a l. char a c ter is ed by Ka vka , the y a r e s uch that t he 47 . deterrence de t e r r e nce is very likely As to Lacke y ' s utiljt a rian app ro ach r e s t s on o similar fallacy, that u ti litari a n cons iderations predom~n a te wher e s t a k es are larg e enough: see hi s argument f or the ;i pp ro nch in MM p. 192 . Wha · hap p n s i s not that importa n t c ons quenc es ov e rrid e moral principles, but tha t Applica t ion of one pr inc iple wit h important consequence s conflic t s with t hat of ano t he r pr inci pl e wi t h less s i gni f i cant consequence s, and in the we igh-·up of what t o do in t he pro blemat ic circumstanc es the principl e with impor ta nt con s eq uence pr evai l s . sucr<"£:d , and nothing else .i s likely tp lodc ed in a deep pr.obability-well. This is ve ry far removed from the real world su.:, ceed (see p . .2~16), i.e. si.tuat.J.on whe re nuc lear deterrence appears to be increasing the deterrence probabiU.ty is of LSN wRr, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as J.ikely to succeed as deterrence . that <l1~ont <: principles sllbject Even if it were mistakenly to real-life d .1 .lcmmas should be qualified to avoid di.l mmas, there is little point in qualifying working such RS supposed de ontic principles C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situati ons. Instead of pul ling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral inte nt:lons it involves, it can be criticized more broadly throug h the commitments it equi. r es, by wa y of the following principle: CS. If Xis wrong then a conditional commltment to carry out Xis The reason is that the commitment is a commitment circumstances; and that commitment is to act itself wrong . lso wrong. wrongly in cer-tain Nuclear deterrence is however a poli cy which commits states to war under certain conditions . And as wi th conditional intention, so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt th a t su perstates and controlling commitmen t and their intention to use representatives nuclear weapons. did not occur) is enough to establish the relevant The dangerous strategy of launc h-on-warning (which could , for instanc e , result J n a thut have response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite s ufficient factual evidence. Now the connecting principles suffice logically , but are nucl ar deterrence, for weighty principle would detachment from the by complete preparat i on fo r and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so parad ox ical: det e rrence. ir self By case . i nstance conditi.onal comm.ltment to LSN war, is wrong. This sound wh n all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles one applied: it ou t the connections between and not be engaged in (unl ess i ts ha s appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should chang ed, e.g . left bizarre nuclear war direct ion can be drastically at .least limited, per impossibile in the case of nucl ea r warfare, to purely mi l i t ary targe ts). Til e a rguments t hrou gh conn e cting pr i nc i. ple s, can be reinforced by different sort s of ar gument s agai ns t the mo ral c orre c t ne s s of nuclear deterrenc e . a n 1 a r g uments from lim i ted c~nv erge nc e of et h i cal t heori e s I There wh i ch start from the commonplace ob se r va ti o n that ~ All the ethi c al a t"gum ents in favou r of nuclear deterrence are broadl y ut ilitar i an. In f nct roost of the arguments i.n favour of de t e rrence, including many t hat inf iltra t ed hav e the e thi.c a l l i t erature , ar e those of ge ner., l ly drawn f rom game t heory, and primar :tly intere sted in the one playe r, t h r> USA. Utilitar ia nism , t hough s till looking of those expedie ncy -· advantage of basically at ~dva n tages , i n t e r es t s and ( t ypi ca lly ind i vidual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of posi t io n, a nd consider [ or[eiti ng i ts claim t o mor a lity sup po r t t d by o t he r na tional i ties othe rwi s e . The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fa c t that such qual i fied moral support as deter rence obtains, dflrive s from ut il i tarianism. 118 Th e re a r e two d ir e c tions on to a gene ra l cla1m ag a i.nst de terrence, either by wa y of t h e pro- ut il itar i an theme Uti l ita r ianism properly a pplied also comes out against deterrence or, 1n o r e s t rongly, by way of the a nti- utilt t arion t heme , Utilita r la nism doe s not furnish satisfactory moral arg uments. The n , by t h e ;rnti. -utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in f av our d ir ec tion: 48 . of de terrence. moral arguments Na turally, it would be easy to strengthen the second a ft e r all it is widely thought that u tilitarianism is a false, Thu s t he hed g ed utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and J oynt, and a l s o within th e broadly utilitarian r ange , of Gautier . Showing that cogent de f ence s of nuclear deterrence have to take a util i tarian r ou te would he a much t oug her ent e rprise. Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the e n te r pr i se c ould be carried through, much would depend on what was · cc oun t e d cogent. For ce rtainly biz ar re principles, e.g. obverses of the conne ct ing pr incip l es, · can be i ntroduc ed, which afford deontological routes t.o deterre nce . An,l, rl e spi t r some back sliding by bi s hop s , all other ethical positions can be m., d c to "' penk again s t deterrence and i. t s cont.l.nuntio n . • A deontological ~RRC ngnln At dctc rr c nc · , pr ima rily he way of <lcontic connecting pr i ncip l e s, has been a rgued i n some detail. In the light of these prlnciplcs , Lt i s not difficul t to s e e how c a ses from other ethical positi ons would go. After a ll C4 ha s been defended from a wide range of stanc es , e.g . contra c t ua l, natural law, utilitarian even. seriousl y as tray, or even shabby ethic~ ] pg&ition. pol it i ca l s yst em whic h depends in some uL l l lt:arJan a rgum e nts for its policieo. It hardly does measure then for a upon consensus , to rely on Yet with nuclear de.terrenc e just thnt appe;1rs to be happe ning, with readily ove rturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitari.a nism supports deterrenc e depends ess entia lly on: how it ls applied; with which maximisa tion recipes; along with what other r estrictiv e assum pti ons (such as those of a deep probabili ty-well); genc>rous arc utll i.ty· assignmen ts or upon With different (and · a rguably superior) va rying the guestimat ion methods, very differen t results emerge, oppo sing deterrenc e and favouring unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt. 49 basic reas on for this is straightfo rward (and like that ending §4). LSN war has a n extremely large negative utility. deterrenc e out to whi.c h increases th other recipes of feasible a how for such things as preservat l on of national sovereign ty , nationa l security, etc. assumptio ns , and on Any policy such The It is that as nuclear probabili ty of this, or even risks it , must los e alternati ves, conseque ntialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance , Di.s as ter Avoidance , Expected Value) . The anti-ut ilitarian theme can be def ended either by a full-scal e criticism o[ ut j lltaria nlsm, beginning for instance with its well-know n justifica tion of l ocalised In justic e s , SO or else 11t i l i tarla ni sm when applied One obvi.ous dcflc iency is this: by to addressin g s ome of the inadequac ies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrenc e. on standard util itarianism , what to do , whether to proceed with deterrenc e, depends on the probabili ty of its success and on the improbabi l ity of other options working. deep, uti ~itarlanis m If the deterrenc e probabili ty-well is morally requires deterrenc e, otherwise not. 51 But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are pro babl e. 49. Th e ins ab ility of utilitari anism is illustrate d by the discussio n inv olving KovkR, Lackey and Hardln, continued in Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilita r ianism, diametric ally opposed conclusio ns are reached. (Hardin 's approach tends however to expedienc y reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider critic isms of utilitaria nism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-know n to repeat. Some of the main defects are considere d in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilit arl.an ism'. The point that util:Ltari anism gi ves no firm place to stand comes from L, Mirlin. 36 wheLh<'r deterrence i..s moraJ.ly wrong or not, i. s likPly to work or not. indepe nde nt deterrence are decidedly essentially nowhere i.s Moral princi p~s not are through expected Vf.llues, whether utilities or o th e rwis e - though how ba d :rnme outcome is ma y be . depend .Lt If nuclear deterrence is wrong wher e it increases the probablllty of war, the n ls it wrong, simpllclter . det:crmlne<l whcrhc r of upon firm to stand. Wor s e, si nce the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these a nd of the results util i ta r ianism delivers uncert ainty measures> util itari anism off ers In con t rast wi t h the soli.d deo nti c ground of principle , utilitariani sm provide s only shifting s and. The objections made apply esp eciall y aga ins t act uti l ita r ianism. (orm shows at special int e rests, such as conditions security (the of estimation rules are pulled in). probability- well state , have hi gh 1s deep , utilities, nat io n- s tat e and spe cial It does not yie ld a deterrence polici; ind eed hnrdly yields policies. tall (other than act utilitariani sm it s elf ). 11nd certain othe r diff i ulties may be avoided by considering instead a o[ act most that nuclear deter re nce is "wrong" a c c ordi ng to its l ig ht s under very il The acts. 52 But the method lacks sta bi lity; These seque nce di f fe r en t prescription s will res ult dependi11g upon how the sequence is se l ected, what is inc luded and what left (as also associa ted p obabilit i es depend crit ically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal rec ipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases , for instance cases where deterrence fails a nd war breaks out. In this event it can hardl y be argued that deterrence is t he pol lcy that maximizes u til it y ov er the sequence. Along wit h the argument s, there are dissatisfac tion with nuc lear deterrence. other concom.itant conventiona l wa rs . f or Firstly, the peace it has provided 011l y nuclear pc~ce, or rather lack of nuclear war , as the re smaller-s cale reasons is no deep is s hort age of And the "peace " provided is a t best a tenuous pe3ce, which Is not stable , ~ut liable to upset at any stage by a r ange of 51.. Though this is to oversimplif y, the po int s made ar e not affected by the simplificat ion . In any case the simpl ifi ed picture reflects well enoug h the difference s between Kavka and Lacke y that matter in their debat e (ref rred to in footnote 49 ). 52. Whether thjs is rule util itarianism , or still act util i tariani sm the sequence can be construed as one long ac t, may be left open. becaus e - - - -- - -- - - - - - · - 37 fn,t_0 rs, lncl 11d1ng er rot· , both human and t ec lrn1 .:fl.1, j)C:lc (_~ , p 0:i It thofl not offer genu i ne of the sort re riuir e d fo r a stabl e intec nat.lo nal 1. 1. fe, but only o fragi l e ·e o f a sort" (PL , p.316 ). Secon dly, there enorm ous is cost, mora l -~!_p_po r_t_~.r~~ _: ___ cost of de.ter renc_ ':_, be cause expe nditu re on it exclu des othe r urgen t moral prio ritie s. The US Bisho ps put th is fami liar poin t, in a surpr ising ly Marx i st way, in terms of destr uctiv e capac i ty and what 'the ls contr a dic tion ne e ded f or betwe en what cons truct iv the is spent for devel opme nt' ( PL, p . 316) . §6. Prac tical , prude ntial and more mora l arg umen ts from natio nal dange rs nuclr•ar build -up of the supe rstat es , a nd the gene sis of nucle ar dilem mas. to Whil e there are argum ents to the immo ra lity of nucle ar war prepa ra ti on, there are also counr c ·-arg ument s, that have prove d rema rkabl y persu asive (espe ciall y to Amer I c;wi, ), to the mora l just:!.fiab ili ty of nucle ar war pr e para tion in the _p_!.c s':~- circu mstan c es. The unde rlyin g style of argum ent is simpl y an elabo ratio n, or state -upl ift, of Liw1- for the esca lnti on of weapo ns at the local leve l, for acqu iring a gun or f o r s to c king- tip the neig hbour hood armou ry - and every bit a r gu1r.e nt from local dang ers. dom inati on ; a nd dubio us fir st of all seco nd of nucle ar destr uctio 11 . atom ic s urren der and so avoid the destr uct io n' (Wal zer, p.273 ). prepa ratio n is suppo sed to guard again st more than these ; third eleme nt , name ly, loss of basic rig hts there with these . black mail of forei gn appea seme nt In fact nucle ar is ways a cruc ial of life This furth er set of elem ents is linke d to the dange r of forei gn domi natio n - which is reall y a separ at e eleme nt from risk of Thoug h and (free dom, equa lity, etc .) and fund amen tal value s (upho lding of truth , human dign ity, etc .) and int eg rat ed that The two go toget her, sinc e lf we dtcl not f ea r the black mail , we migh t adop t a polic y or as It is that nucle ar prepa ratJo n, 'so we have be en tol d , gua r ds again st the doub le dang er: forei gn as black mail. dom inntl on -need not imply the loss of most basic value s it does imply the loss of a t le a st of one , self- de te rmin ation , freed om to choos e vario us natio nal objec tives ; conv ersel y loss or erosi on or infri ngeme n t of basic value s can occur witho ut fo re ign demi. natio n, for insta nce, as is comm onpla ce in the "[ r •e " world, by internal change of go,wnmtent or irnvij,fnroenta l approach, through the iiicrc>nsed security and contro l a nti clcnr prepnratlon incr easi ngly nuclear risks, state demands, extensive etc. But what nuclear destruction, also involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction ti, _ material of 53 of the cherJshed life-style. So nuclear preparation is hardly n c l earcut bnse me ans of guaranteeJng basic values. 51• fn other respe cts too t he argument from loss of lncku cogency an d rings ho 1 low, It is basic values and ri ghts hnrd to avoid th' f •cling r:hnt tl1c: oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like ci tati.o n of religious values at politica l ceremonies; clean cover for economic consideration of one sort from demand s of the military-indus trial of private wealth and vnl \les appealed to category: in and anot he r, them having However arising to do with th e an argument isn't, or associations. And the rights and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main a l leged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many are, most:ly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice . this of power. oughtn 't to be, defeated by lts unsavoury that t he argument 1.s a omplex , many concerned with foreign domJnatiun of other lesser states, and many conccut ·at:1.on pious of "communism" of "socialism ", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of cnpi talism. communi.sm has What has been happened here confused with of course (the t o tal i tarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion , association, is reality basic information, that ( the of) state values, etc., ideal socialist namely etc.), of) and certain so does derivative~ threaten basic values. One critical q uest i on, then, is whether extens ive nuclear LSN wa r, and indeed for rational way of preservtng nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerfuJ state imposes its values and way of life. 54 . The argument from freedom , advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives , is further conside red early in Appendix 1. .... , 'lQ J, Simi la r ci. ue s tions dominntion and arJs e as regard s blackmail. argumeq;; H from er, e Justification danger which is itself open questioned (i n §8 ), both from the to ser i ous point foreign of the methods of extensi ve nuclear preparation depends essent i ally on an arrangement of hostil e structure of of question, v iew of nation and basic states, a i s subsequently valu s, such as freedom, and oth r wise. But whether ul tima tely jusU(ied or dangers are no t, t hese from natlonal those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear prcpnration, and jus tific, tlon. have They been have par t of many people ' s accepted in moral by policy outlook. particular , that ex tens i ve nucle ar however , the makers as affording moral fact be e n wide ly accepte d, and undoubt e dly form Wi thi n frnmework the moral justification holds good . others, ar gumen t s arguments not a c onv entio nal Northern It i s within such a fram ewo rk, in preparatio n do such engenders establis h a moral fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparat ion, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people not also face a nucl e ar dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it ls specif ically moral one. ,1 impressed by And for ma ny other s again, who are who not so or as familiar wi th Soviet and American culture and ways of life, and thci.r r espec tive r ights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. peop)c Such live beyond For such the "beneficial" reach of t he supers t ates , prudenti al counter-arguments from national dang ers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged . Thls is the ge nesis of the argument fr om isolated people who live in people. Consi de r some a comparatively remote a rea, whose freedoms are not (yet) under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nucl~ar d ter r c nce (a s under pr inciple Cl). For such isolated people, who may ha ve little interes t i n the preservation of nuc lear states , there is no nucl ea r diJ emma , and nuclear lo cations may have problems problems people. as deterrence to natio nal is wro ng. dangers, genuine People in less fo r tu na te but in meeting these they are not entitled to impo se grave risks on the uninvolved isolated In doing so i mmorally; and f or through similar nuclea r reasons deterrence , superstates the are proceeding conventi onal No rthern framework is j_mpug rwd. conclusion can be al ter n ' tlvely -c t>rl c hc<l Tht'. same argument:: put a reflective i s olat e d pe rson, and check S! 11 ci> Amer ican the or- resulting by a substitution Russi.an 1n the position of such an asse ssment of nuclear deterrence. IL wor Jd be th e snm c as that of n reflecti ve isolated person, stripped o f m1p, rs lntc bins, moral ly opposed to de terr ence and not rnot·all.y transfixed, t h <~ c onventional framework fails t o sati sfy requirement s of morality. The outcome of the arguments fr om dang e rs is, the~ ver y different depending whc her on the arguments are appU.ed as rega rds a superstate or not. The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because o f multiple connected dang e rs from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obllged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Henc e, by detachment, a super- nation-stat e, such as USA, ought to have something Jn orde r t hP meet of the nuclear armoury that it has. Or, weakening the theme to ol.Jjecli on s concerning excess, "overkU.l" capacity, it retain i1 t l east solid a ou~ core of the nu c 1ear devices it has. (moretlly] to For su bs equent argumc~nt it can be left open whether the oblig-'¾tion involved is a moral one, for inst a nce be cause of the character the of pro r·c·c tcd, or only (as nrg ued a bove) one of g rou nds to those di. sa rmame nL supporting ag ainst a the dangerous SS reason 55• prudent:ial the me nuclea r Northern values supposedly being On similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentiall y Jrralto nal. It will be fr ely admitted that what is prudentiall y or morally requir ed is a s11 hopLimal st rategy , li.ke the famili.a r strategies of the prisoners ' dilemma si tu a tions and of certain related competitive games . that a su peri or would be cooperative For expen sive , re source s, dr ai ning of such t he details are wel l- enoug h kno~1. 55. admitted arrangement s. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a ra nge of other r espects . future be strategy for nuclear adversaries , if sufficient trust and the lik . could be achif?Ved , would agreeme nt So it should arrangement s would be much less risky , destructive of the environment , a nd so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospe cts of cooperation a ppear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can stil l, a nd presumably does, amount to more than mere local expedi e ncy, s ince the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. rcprcscnlat lve s , who are (not always ~ ltt t~gly ) helpin~ unfortunate ly rather remote: only the ca make their polici es sure insurance is ex t e nsiv e nu c l ear preparntion and full preparednes s t o 3pply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate : proceed, largely unabated . nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate , but a lesser state one must, the r e presentativ es continue, _t::_':l..l_ on a larger ally who has a one's a rsen a l, umbrella. nu c l ear pre paration , th e lA ck of trust d l splaye d, ,md for huddl es conf l.dencc in !ts and which under co ntrast s ncouragcd elsewhe r e . st·at (• , one whic h r.clics for i ts nuclear grrH1nd one anoth e r's But he r e a level of tr ust and coope ration is_ called for, by dep0 nd ent states, which is far from foolproof, with nu clear in s uranc e (which is pres umably not fre e ) is obtained indirectly thr oug h some supcrstate 's nuclear COVt!r super-· ally Does a "d epe nd ent" on a s 1pc r -a lly, rather tha n strangely have that exchange on its territory? mu ch Jt s ally's opponen t ? Confidence, for instanc e , that its ally will not r e nder i t a ta rget or nuclear must stag e a Given the pr ocliv i ty of states , especia ll y l arg0 states, to res ort to expediency, and give n the recen t histo ric al record of superstates and t heir leaders , too much fait h would be mi spl ace d . Thus, whatever th e l imited force of t he argume nt f or the superstat e it <loes theme , not extend t o the analogous them e for a dependent state, which d if fers f rom SST nnd end s as follows: DST. Because ... , a st a t e without adeq uate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to r e ly upo n a s u pe rstat e ally , and within that arrangement , to accommodate t he facilities and nuclear in stallations of the protecting ally . ln pa r t for reaso ns already given, principle DST is not very plausible (a nd same goes for mo re obvious variants upon it ). Nor do the arguments of f ered for SST t ranspose parti cularly well to direct arguments striking l y illu str ated by the case the for DST. 56 This is more of more remot e nuclear dependent states. Consider the a rgument from basic values, for instance , from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values ln Australia are not threatened by, o r put in j eopardy through, the ac io ns or plans of the Sovi et Union. Nor ar e they thr eatened by the other superstate, t he USA, the only country with ' the physical 56. As ls widely known, inadmissi ble and usual l y much overrated considerat ions o f expediency frequently enter into reaso ns why states allow foreign nuc lea r facilit i e s upon th e ir territories , e. g. eco nomic consideratio ns such as trade or local revenue and short- term jobs. ca1 1acity to launc h mot j .ve Lo <.111y <l o look convincing . carries full scale invasion of Aust r alia ', but R wc .i ght. reasons In fact, the with a rgumen t from of For there arg ument t he only is qucstLonable non-n l lf~twd prnc.ticcs. of 58 domina tion In this way too) the from dang er of nuclear destruction could be nullified . such supe r state foreign li t tl e care, the pr e s e nt level of a economic and political dom i nati on could be much reduc e d. fore(• lack(ing] so , , so far . 5 7 CJ.ear ly the argumen t from basic values does nol For similar 1 it t le 'clearly danger because nuclear of umbrella, superstate dang er facilities and th e tha t would be removed wi th With 1 ess remot e dependent Europc 1rn states these sorts a rguments from nationa l dangers are only marginally more convincing , and may b e defeated along analogous lines . The differe nces in the situations of st ate s, and peoples, break theme the of a of monolithic West. differently situated This is a theme especially favoured by US and the Wes t European rep resentati ves, who present the West, its freedom, as t hr eatened by Soviet domin atio n. und i.ffrrentiatcd unit. dep1!nd0nL i;tntes with But this l eadi ng idea, NATO desig ne d powers , and In this the West is a single in and part to align lesser to justify pu tting them at nuclear rl sk is as muc h a my th as th e idea of the Golde n West. The West is not so monolithic, it ls not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free , much of it (i ncluding the Ant ipodes) is not thr eate ned by Soviet domination. Principle DST - li kewise what it dep ends upon , SST - is now coming unde r attack by Eu ropean disarmament groups , who c hallenge the core assumptions of the. und er lying retaliatory model that 0 Safety lies in weapons , More weapons i mply more. security59 , Cerlainly, for mo:ce :f.s ol ated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear. a t ack l i es not in wea pons bu t in excluding nuclear facilities (including visit s from nuclear submar ines ) . Europe ans are ar guing in present of syslem is more a similar wa y, that the a ris k, indeed l ia bility, than a protection (e.g. 57. For t he quote d c laim, and some of th e Au stralia ' s Se curi ty , p .94 . 58 . The Jssuc is furt her pursued in Ap pendix 2. 59 . Sec, for exam ple, t he las t article in Thom pson. argument for it, s ee Threats to Thompson, p.251); envi s -1ged and thnt: w-ithou!: Lhcut.r e for a h\icJ. ,;,)ll'' instal1.st:!on1>i Europe cannot be limited nucle r wnr , in the way .l thf' is now seen by US ( ut not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are qu es tioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model a nd its variants come up for examination, namely ci Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular o Whe th er tle proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed , say, to other military responses, such as convent.ional arms, or, takin g off from the previ ous point, ~ Whcthrr military approaches and procedures (through ar e proper methods, armaments , etc.) or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resoLuti.on at the int er national level. It ls plausibly arg ued, against military procedures, that at no ordinary level do we sens5bly s et about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and thr eatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and r e ally warranted, frontier ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary 60 and explana tion it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that already nation-states. While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is inrac · , force ls far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expe cted and are l LkcJ y ine vitnhl c. nation-state system ': For 'forc e has [a] permanent plac,~ in the thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. Th resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned st;:ites Ass~mbli.ng r eferred th~ to as themes the so far nuclear de v e lope d fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §J-§5 ) to engage jn war.-·deterrence , at l east 60. yields the both and their supporters. deontic dilemma. often ought not to engage in it is immoral, and also ought for prudential reasons (as Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alter native systems , see su rvey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangemen ts, and a growing literature on i . e . convercd.on t o such arr angement s . argu ed using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, ·,,,,._ 44 SST and DST). tl w Th i s dilemma i.s no idle construction of virtues parac.onsisteot logic), but ( c onc octed 61 prod uced by war itself 62 , or at war and its version of the deon tic least war which spr.·eads beyond purely mjlitary la r gc ts, as larger wars in evi tably e . g. nuclear , a, wel l as bei ng virtu a lly ublqultous i.n nuclear war discu ssions. ThP nuclear fi.x 1s in part simply a mor e intense di 1 emma demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, t he ouLJ.i n s of which are r e peatedly encountered i .n text s on asper.ts to do (since ra il t ra nsport , typically rely on ci.vilian ones) . military arrangeme nt s, The ma in dil emma arises from a combination of t he retaliat ory model with t he feat ures of war. War is requlr 0cl for defence of th e state and valu es it upholds (or pretend s to uphold); but war also invo lves imm oral ac ts and cv.tl co nseque nc es . war can undPr also ce rtain justified. be se e n as a t temp ting a rec onciliation by tryi ng t o show that ctrcumstanees Thus ' some these reall y ju tifications 0 evi l consequences Regis of war ' (Walls , p.260). accept ab l e than falla c ious ,symptotic are morally of war aim to show that a ctio ns deemed normally forbi dd en by moral ma nd ates are now pe rmissible the The doctrine of " ju st But this argume nts when perfo rmed under is no better or mor e morally for uti l itorianism as bein g corre c L \~hen the s takes are larg e . W;n· and preparedness for 61 . wa r als o gene rate s ubsidiary di.lemmas f or Thus Green, along with many others, ' find[s ] nucle a r deterrence the best of pra c tical policies available to us now •.. give n the realities of world politics ' bu t ' s till demur[ s ) because of mo ral qualms' (p . xii). Green also r e presents both Morgent hau a nd Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a • • . case for a deterrenc e strategy, even whil e asserting that the stra.tegy is morally indefensible according to the traditional et hical codes' (p.2 52 ). Walze r ends in a similar dil emma (he is committed to a str onge r a nd less qualif i ed form of it tha n he set s down): though it [deterrence ] is a bad way, there may well be no othe r tha t is practi cal in a world of sove reign and suspicious state s' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pur sue. Similar ly th e US Catho lic Bishops d :llemma; they s peak of ' th e dilemma of how to prev ent the use Fa s kius nn<l Dockrill and i n Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation i n terms of a mora l political paradox of de terrence •.. the of nuclear weapons • .. ' (PL, p.3 13). In too the nuclear situation is pre s ent ed in Th e nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admis sib i lity of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the argumen ts fr om nati onal dang e rs. But it i.s a dilemma for th ose locked into the conventional f r amework. 62. Situatior.s in war are als o a major so urce of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwo od where several exampl es are gi ven. A general logic a l account of and theo r y of moral di.lemmas is elaborated therein. . ... inst;ince, a sevc t·e tensio n be tween freedom and difficult prohlcms au t ho f· t c y: 'one of th e ~0s t o[ war involv es defending a free society witho u t destroying the values that g ive it meaning and vali dity' (PL, p.324). The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arra ng emen ts. The nuclear fix not onl y i nt ensifies a nd complicates other d-Lle rnm:-is induc ed by t he co ntemporary s ov ere i gn s t at~ 63 , in particula r the dee p tension c betwee n national security and the ope r at ion o f libera l-democrati c arrangement s (sucl1 a ., " lnd.lvidual li.herty , popular control of institution s, etc) . othe>r more persona l subsidiary d i l emmas , ( poll U ca l) obl lgations to s for example (the question the extent of one' s a nuclea r stat e, and ro le-induced d Uemmas such as one's conf licting obligatio ns as a docto r or a nuclear res c•archer It also accentuates of politic a l obligation s armame nt s and processor or eva sion is their considered f urther in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, tha t of individual and group ac tion, the re several ques Ions to 'Wh, t. should my sta t e be disen tangled - questions di ffere nt from the key issu e be doing and influence, d epending on who one is. I do? 1 one Jives, - do?', on whi c h one may exert influences, i.e. in what l it tle There is not only the question 'What shou ld a question whi c h will have a quite different force de pending a nd ar e on whe re sort of stat e, where one wo rks, what one contr ols or on who on e ls and one ' s role s - but also the questions ' What sort of person do I wan t to be ?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'. 64 Answe rs to thes e latter char a cter questions will feed back to influence those t o act ion-or ien t ed questions . Each of thos e questions c an , in gi ven situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas . The essential fea t ure of a deontic dil emma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or di ffe rently, pursu ing a nuclear def ence policy. obliga tory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alo ne re sponsibl e fo r these other dilemmas. T.arg -sca l e nuclear power generation, a nd other types of warfare and security ar rangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and autho rity is already an outcome of the la rge central state. 64. For gro up formula t i on of t he que stio ns rep l ace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The l mpo rtnn ce of distilling ouL th e se qu•s t ions, and the moral und es ir a bility of r!Pt0rrr,n~0 fn terms of whnt: Lt docs to p oplc morally, are brought out Ln Benn , where however the issues a r e made t o l ook somewhat more separate than they are . moral d il emmas ure not l i t.t>r;,Lure f, !., • widely or well und er stood, p...." t'ticular]y __ e 1-1 ~ 1i in ca .1 Thi s l s par t ly be c a us e c urre ntly domin a nt e thic a l positlons lik e utilitarlnnism "annot at al l e asil y accommod a t e moral dilemmas or the data which giv•s to rise them but the n such positions do not r eally offer reporti ve acco11nU; of wr on~ an d obli ga_~_:!:_on anyw.-1 y. d i lemma doe Cont r ary t o utilitarian per ce pt:Lons a not neces s arily have any mo ral s olution , though there may be better a nd worse ways By 01t . wh c h assessments, contr a st f orm the with basis s uc h e thical theories , preanalytical oE se n s itive theories, do recognise mor a l dil~mmaa and reflect t he i r f e a tur e s. Reactions an f rom the res ponse s t hat a re c ha r ac t e ristic of deonti.c dilemmas fix. nuclear The r e 1<• an un s t end iness, an uncertainty a s to whnt to <lo , whJ.ch wny tu pr.occed , whl c h pr ind pl •n i n wa ter e d- down for m to temporary Thus , crutch . for as world' GG , that b st" j ethical RU;l1 ,)ps wt-o way a of neve r exerci s ing "mora lly ou r s J. n a morally-str a pped wor ld . fu nctor s peak moral A similar th e 'strictly mor;il Dete r r ence ha s a strlc tly temporary role but de t e er e nc: e th e c i rc um s t a nce s. de ter r .nc e, is be in a fallen to " second a acceptability ' object mus t cert ainly one str ictly and wrong, is of from th e conditional be to move beyond det er r ence, 'towards a optlon as to of what the to nucl ear do in Thus Wal z er, for example, s t r ugg les t o the conclusion though a "morally try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. world free o f the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And can shift 'moral c ond i tional ' while a ccepta bi U.ty , good", responsibility d~t c rrcnce fix. ·s (as from good to a c ceptable) is made by the US Catholic of we gra s p examp l e , th e Bishop of London contends t hat the possession of nuclear wea pons 'whil e acceptable'' emerge neverthel e ss the policy to fix. awkward that war in the pursu e circumstances ( p .274) . 6 7 Howe ver as more than a n immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exce pt i ons of course, e .g . i n the Catholic educated such as Sar t re; a nd Na ge l's f i nal example i s very instructive. For a fuller t h e or y of mo r a l dil emma s s ee howe ve r Routl e y and Plumwood. 66. Repo r ted in The Ec onoml s t; re pr i nted i n 1983, We ekend Magazin e p.2. 6 7. As a response to a moral dil e mma , Walz er ' s approach is perfectly in order logtcal ly. Tho se who, l i k e Be n n , ' f lnd i t ne ither coherent nor cceptable' hnvl! no t gras ped t he logic of mo r al di l emma s . The Australian, February 12-13 !i '.rnp erior pol Ley ~ nsscrabled (in sufficien tly it is §5-§6), a dt! cidetlly reasons of ·1 }-toor the opti_ n, sort reasons i'o r that are decisive already for those, outside the conventio nal Northern f r amework, who find no genuine of nuc le ar nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix ls, furthermo re, stal1.:s' own mald.n&_. fix a It is not somethi ng they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear jnvolveme nt was deli berat e l y c hosen, primarily by the Lhc escaJAtio n of In these respects the situation is like peop.1 e who deliberat ely let themselve s be invo lved in two incompati ble relations hips , and build up though and U.:, A, has by and large also be en deliberat ely chos e n, again mainly by the USA and the USSR in in teractio n. th:1 t The one there by. It is build-up. The fact i programme is t o be in addition to existing ( which are to Sovi et that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has frequentl y l ed escalatio n, and apparentl y still does. esources myth, a some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, an d nuclear in North Amerlca occurred on a defensive basj_s in response bui ld·-up, nucl~a · with onflJctin g obligatio ns generally agr eed The recent (1980) United to States' strategic be already in excess of Russia ' s , and which always have been so ) (Thompson , p.21) . The present dilemma , that many people fe e l acute ly, state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. indicates especiall y that merely route by a taken advanced response to capita list t he nations, Soviets (or of USA and its NATO state socialism ). would not have been feasible without compleme nting And independe nt evidence, t l1 ere is then a direct outcome suc h as Soviet-Si no confronta tion, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist n.:.iti.ons . There is a t wo-way co nn ecti on between world political arrangeme nts nation-st.' .ltes and the nuclear f ix . arrangeme nts are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increa singly present wo rld polJU.cal structure . is widely promulgat ed .'.lrrangcm ents : it .is' seen On the dil emma as one hand, with t he these result through political that the i nd icat ing the inadequac y of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that: the source of the nucl ear problem comes from state n world of sovereign states . • . which brought the wo.ld to the prese n t dangerous situation' ( PL, p,JlJ). nucJ.e11r fix tends to lo':.~ political arrangements into On th e other hand, th e the statist form, into arrangemen ts of an increas ing ly authoritarian and centralist cast. stutlst espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to kee p the and security, to defend national inter est s , reasons such as perpetuating the system advantageous of confrontation, st ate to (!), provid e but underneath there ore other sovereign st a tes and frame work the rlnd peace The military-indus t rial in ter ests, dependent state explo itation, and polit i cally favoured of inequa l ity it supports . The ~merg ing t heme is t he n that the ve ry nuc l ea r s i tuatio n arising from th e statist arrangements a nd interr e lations ( conomic ideologies , etc.) tends to , and is used to, lock a rr nngcme nl.s of s overeign where the pa ttern world states And zones of inter e st . t heme is a pi ecemea l pr a cti cal one . side the rivalries, into conflict i ng the present The argument to th1. s Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of nati ona l control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer . The threat from the West, whether it exi.sts or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does) , has become a necessary legitimatio n for the power of the ruling elites , an excuse for their many ec onomic a nd social fa i lures , and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own bo rders. In the West we have ••. care fully con trolled and se l ec tive release of 'offi c ial information ' (Thompson, p.20 ) . "We" in the West, e specially the Americans, also integrated with state appara tus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major. benefi c iary a nd promoter of the nu c l eR r. arms race . 68 Secondly, there i s evidence of entrenchmen t of the arrangements, by th ing s S llCh as the SALT negotiation s ; shown there are f i xed s uperpower s an d a (growing) nucle ar club of nations all governed by a rule , partly held in place by deterrence . as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this , there are cases rev ea ling the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US i s 68 . of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so th e not over.duly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched i.n Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism , would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would free ly concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. diff~rent, what it was worried a bout a nd made ~uc]d a r threat~ adj~c ~nt ~estcrn oil supp li es : concerning, were these lay within the US zone of interest (cf . th e d Lscuss ion in Sche ll, p.212). §8 . Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: results. in itia l political fall-out from the ethical Virtual ly all the ways are wa ys of limitat:i.on , and they all invol ve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limJt~tions on the thu s inevitable. and more or power s of states. Limitations on national sovere~.EX _~re The limitations may be reache d by agreement and negotiation , less voluntarily agre ed to 69 , or they may be imposed, or possibly worst of all, they may eme rg e from an ini.t i. al war. As with other fixes produced by there are suggested ways the structural ar rangements of states, ou t which do not interfere with these ac-rangemen ts, inter.stR-te approache s, and there a r.e ways which do seriously alter the struct ure nnd power ·elations extrastate approaches . of state s (and, in the limit, remove t hem altogether) , All the familiar , allegedly "practical" and "realistic" , attempt~ to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations , etc . , are interstate ; sovereign state . The s ame goes (graduated) unilate ral disarmament . about the nation- state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for les s "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empi rical fact , is it part icula r ly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternat.ive arrangement s. as a We are certainly free - Jn more libera l states, it should be eve rywhere - to theorise a s demise sacred it is not a particularl y well justified political form; it js 1ot even a very long-standin g form of political arrangement ; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas s houl d have e nc ouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for sta tes to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging a nd expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected rep re sentatives, and not just through fiB l1Llng ln some form, but by contests of footballers , singers, da ncers, lawyers , or etc . In prac ti c e, however, such more civilized alternative s are never much consldered in thes e days of superstates . Animals, by conLrast, are smart enough to settle dis pute s by means much more like these . Even the a nci en t Greeks - though they had a clear appreciatio n of limits, which has been lost by post-Enligh tenment leaders regarded the institution of war as fi nal ( al l egedly inevitable ) means of arbitration between city-st a t es , not seeing its social, structurally -emergent, characte r. 50 approaches take one of Extrnstr1te ittlernat ional of slate s. r.ol two rou tes, way ~Ile to l~, ge nuine power, or the way down, throt1gh fractio nation or deunionisat lon 7 0 The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; ,10ccss;1rily incompatibl e . but they are Some of the impo rt ant machinery, for a way up to world governmen t, is alre ady there in the international law-courts. Wer e the courts ns signed suf fi cien t authorit y and po we r, the remedy , namely through legal acl ion, that· medie val principle theo ri. t s saw to all disputes, could in be rxtended to in t ers ta te disput es , and th e just war between states S and T supersed ed by the just ~ase of S versLs T. given intrastate s n fflcienl least jilitial]y) But if the law courts were power then their a uthority and efficacy would likely rely (a t upon war deterrence , though not by military means. perhaps Law courts, as usually conceived, are not effective without police and jails or their and equiva l ent supcr-statist back-up eq uivalent for of economic other penalties; and the either wi l l involve the capacity to inflict quite substi'.tntial amounts of damage on "delinquents" -· which, bec ause delinquents will typicnlJy be organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissent 'ng , participants in those organisations, as well as to other In pa rt i es. repC'ilt uninvolved short t such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to rt . Tl1 • Way Up is one more stnt i s t, legali stic , authoritarian way of trying ec:t t. n gri.ps with the nuclear though mostly 1n passing to be to problem, and accordi ngly is often men tioned, dismi ss ed 71 , in orthodox strategic texts on -·--------- - - - -- -70. Am e ricans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the US SR) is a union, of fairly recen t orig in, and that a differ e ntly-oriented State of the Union message could well consi der dissolution of the uni on. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular s upport at present. By contras t, the re are signif i cant se para ti on movemen ts , some deserving aid and e ncouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR , UK and France . The USSR already has tr oub le in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite em pire together; and the one recent attempted add ition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor s ho uld powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be f no t c rcd c l ocwhc r e . The some appli es to state empire expansion, ns .illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Mos t important, the reunification of Germany should be resi sted; instead a more rational regional deuni fication than the p resent East-·West division of post-war Germany sho uld be oought , al ong wlth removal of nuclear weapons from the border regio n, and so on. 71 . Thus for example, Ka hn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical , etc. Hardly ne ces sary to s a y the Way Up has won most favour wllh the 1 ga l f r a ternity , and from more Authoritaria n organi s ations. 5l thermonuclear war . By contrast, the Way Down, thoug h like the new, is sca rcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means an appcara nc Q (a comeback) in some more radi ca l discussions, combined with the Way Up (in "world ord e r" mode.ls: unl i ke t he Way Down, i.s considered however beginning to be cf. Way and is more sometimes The Way Up, sympatheti cally by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a r e newed emphasis on world order, in rea c hing inte rna tiona l system'; and 'the 'towards a no but lt is making Galtung). much by Up mora lly There is integrated missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constitu ted political authority' (PL, p . 320). A main argume nt for the Way Up is just a repetition of that which is commonly supposed to underpin sta.tist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument fr om ( gene rous) variations upon the Prisoners' Tragedy of t he Commons. traditionally, ecological order. not herdsmen as best solutions regards to problems as the of organisation, public order and, more rec ently, as to So with the "tragedy of nation-states") where the players are but nation·-states , and one of the prospects is destruction of a r,ood parl of th e commons by rwclear wa r, the solution is now sort such It is that authorlty and coerc ion - in the form of the state - a r e r equired to ensure espe cially, Dilemma, of superstnt e. said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "traged y" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some of thcjr be order-imposing corr espo, dingly weakened. ar gum ent s are role, and But all political this is obligation to There a re, then, many problems through these A further theoretical with h:1.tch the is Way that Up, a both "tragedy" theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the probl ems of interstate relations are not repeated 72 . will 72. stalist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only that states good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. prac t ical. assume to See further loutley and Routley especially Griffin. and material referred to a level therein, up and The rea reas ons for th e state are of course very different from the thf!oretic::il c:ov er such argume nts af ord. Among other things, the state enables and guarant ees the accumulntlon of power, privilege and capital. again . The maj or pra ctical hi tch is that there h no prospect at all of getting su ·ha "solution " t o work in tim e t o Aerve 5.ts intended purpose. Tn rc:,1.li l y , we ar e no ne arer a world gove rnment than we were a century ago , In fact, it is even arguable t hat since World War II we have moved furthe r a way from a world government than we were before Wo rld War TI. The disint e gration of empires has mul tiplied soverei g ntles . I t ia true that we hav e s omething called t he United Nations, but eve n the United Nations has decline d in power as it has grown in memb e rship. By the beg i nni ng of the 1970' s the United Nations ha d bec ome, in some ways, a l e ss powerful and e ven less influen tial organisati o n than it wa s a t the end of the 1950's (Hazrui, pp.2-3 ). The reaso n s for thj s Mazr ui goes on to o u t line . future For t he foreseeable nuclea r ideologica l d i ff e r e n ces be t we e n s tates , including especia l ly differenc e s as to how politica l arr angeme nts shoul d be e ff e cted, exclude any prospect of opcrnt l vc world governmen t or a worl d legal s ystem capable of resolving nuclear hostlllt i es . extre~ely I n some ways, this is just as well. monol ithic, woul d World gov ernme n t would cer t ainly , whatever it s ( g ray?) politic al colour, {~xplo l tatJ v e eco nomic sys tem whi ch would do i mmens e impose damage on to It undesira b le l eve l Ideological, r equ1 site the world an many remaining of inde e d u nity political and parad 'gmatic , cannot be and, e c o nomi c sepa r atio n expect e d in some crucial respects, unity. of Moreover , give n Northern main within nuclea r dea dlines. swee ping more sovereig nty , c o ul d blockages and agr ~ements, be negotiated? dea dl ocks i1 the involving genuine There an way is When not even endless of of that state series of s uch state reconciliation. a pp lies to int e rst a te arrang eme nts, whi .h ma y make limited us e the of The s ame Way Up nego tia tions or other conc i liation pr ocedu r es within a fram ewo rk arranged • - through the Unit ed Nations); 73. it limitations almost the cultures, nuc l ear weapon s li mitations can be worked out, how much less l ikely is (e .g . would systems. 7 3 The Way Up thu s presupposes an unlike ly much be f ost e r e conomism, would ent r ench bureaucracy with all l t s damaging f ea tur e s, a nd could e asil y tend to totalitarianism. ·1 n .:ltur.:iL an 7 11 Fo r a mor e de tailed (bu t decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world gov e rnment, see Galtung. Naturall y the objections to world gov •rnmcnt , 11nd dlffl c ult lca in the woy of oht in i ng 1t, do not extend to mo r e f l ex ible world arrangements, such a world federation ofcultu res (cf . Ma zrui ). Such a plura l lstic ana rchlstic Way Up can be genuinely s yn thesized with the Way Down. jJ There is arrnrgemant s regrettably and als o conventions much are e~ tdert ce frequ ently concerning war and human rights 75), a nd are scntJments signed does slide smoothly that not not 1nce rnational observed (especially those worth into despicable dee d s . bode well ever be rcc1chcd. ln <'nnv,•11t f< n any great deal: openly violated. I ndeed there:.> already appears to he at least one fon·C!, of lofty It for nuclear arms limitations , s hould suffl c i en t ag reemen t wl 1I C'h tn nl1 the following intEirna t i ona l i1P mtljor 11u clc•nr sL 1t:es ore slgnnt:o r l.en, w!1fc:h w11uld rule ·11t LSN war and nuclc11r cl ic• rcnc includes a Even agreements states have are oft e n enough disre ga rd ed, sklrted ar ound, or not tr ea tie s , 1 , t h ton genocide. Genoc i de ac.ts commit ted, in time of peace or war, with inl ~nt to destroy in whole or part a natural, e thical, racinl or rel igio us group as such: ki.11:lng members of the group, causi.ng serious bodily or me ntal harm to the members of the group , d e llbcrately inflicting condittons of life to bring about physical destruction i.n who l e or i n pa rt. f ollowing associated a ct s are also punishabl e : dJrcct and public shall Beside genoc ide th e c onspira cy to commit be Persons committing genocide o r any of punl.shed , whether they are the othe r act s responsible rul er s, priva te individuals or public officials. 76 It is not diffi cult to argue nucl~ar genocide, inc itement to commit ge no ci de , attempts to comm.it ge nocid e , complf.ci.ty i.n genoci de. mentioned ca lculat ed that a larg er st rike (such as det e r rence policy requires as a ba ck-up respon se ) would almost cer t ainl y consti tute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. conspir acy repr:esentati .v 'S does to some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like CS, nuclear deterrence stands indicted pa r ticular it of the and as involving i.ncitement . nuclea r s t a tes acts ass oci a ted with genocide, in Some wel.i - known political and military would thus ap pear to be li.able to indictment . and punishment und er internation al law . 7L1. Even Dahl itz, who gi.ves a detailed and s ympathetic accoun t of nuclear arms control at t empts and lost opportuniti es, is by no means confident th a t suitable arrangement s onn now be achieved (se e pp. 210- 13). Reasons include technologic al advance s now taki.ng place, and the renewed America n drlvc f or strategic super ior ity . 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty Int e rnat ional reports. in t his paragraph were sugg est ed by c. Pigden. 76. The accow1t of genocide given is taken directly f rom the Genocide Convention, whic h is reproduced i n Kuper, p . 210ff . Most of the points text of the The nuclear fi.x cmergi.ng fr om nat.io ,,-stnte arran!_1, 111 ~nz:s - c ombin ed wi th the appare11t I mpot ence interstate relations to alleviate the situati on , indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation ne:.rer to nuclear the " brink" is now taken to ind ica te contemporary angle) the inad equacy of natio n-state po litica l tias gi v en new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to co nsiderat ion of other extrastate r es olut ions . The According to can reorganise the radical namely n iclear in Sc.hell ' s 1 unsatis factoriness situat .l on The should the foundations of politic c l thought' pollllcal t.iicy opvrate •. , the indicates inst itutions Fate lead political of to req u i red a t he Earth . ' ful l-sca le to make 't he co n sonant with t he g lobal reality in which and in ' work [ lng] out the practicnl s teps by which mankind ... its political li fe' (p.219). However Schell himself tri e s to avoid the se ' awesome urgen t tasks, which , imposed on us by the of the present system of nati on stat e s has even reach ed stands, Schell reexaminatio n o f world ' c and book a new a rrangements, thesis that the nuc l ear problem national ( f r om and work of our age' else overimpressed by political t he oris ts. the 7 Z history, c onstitute So, no t feeling th e pressures of history or real ities of (unstable) nation-states , do most But there i s no good r eason to av oid the task of politic al rea ssessmen t, made so much more urgent by the nuclea r situation. There i.s li.tt l e doub t bu t t ha t we live ( too 11nthinklngly) with an an tiquated s ystem many present state arrangements, representative century communications •ery different condition; in a 77. when and the mai n outlines of the mod ern totalitari a n state and its mauifold defic i en cies recogni sed, even ea rl ier. of ( a llegedly 17th we re willing ly , The feat ures go vernme nt: , were largel y fashi oned in t he especially , us even of poli t ical a rrangements which t he nuclear impasse , among others, calls in to q 1est ion . best of even dem ocratic) techno log y, more were t he and primit i v e d iscerned, In the br iefs prese nt ed A similar theme , similarly qu estioning 'such sacred tradi tions as a bs olut e national so ve reignty', was p r essed by Bradley, a significant US g enera l ( sec Co x , p. 225). Sch 11. (like Bradley) does not mak e it entirely clear whether he is thi nking of the Way Up or t h e Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the mai n t hrus t of what he says, e.g. ' Thus the pe ril of extinction is the price that the world pays not f or "safet y" or "survival " bu t for ito [sic !] insistence on co ntinui ng to divide itse l f up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original st ate were an undivided one ? On Schell's position , see further Append ix 1. for political a r rangements such as repr~nontat ive government, the excessive siz an,! compl ex ity of modern states was not envisaged . But such systems con tinue to opcrn Lc , i ns ufflciently questloned, though tl1el r justificato ry bas es und c r mi ne<l. prese nt Nuclear problems rep r esentative have political emphasized have been several other defici encies in arrangement s. In particular, they have rcv cn l ed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of t he people on an issue , for instance in installing US missiles Euro pe a n countri es. cen tury ca s e for r e pr e sentative proced ires is dissolved. issues, ~ i s sues. The least, be reduced. reduced excessive power back at dev e lopme nts , pro cedures, But the route down through issue-regul ated large i mposes and complex other modern requirement s. states What lnl t .t1-1.l s maller a s iL ls to inf or med citizens gro uping than approx i mate of a g lant satisfa ctory good will. As the re .1 r c se riou s dcfic encies .f.n the l.nf ormation by are stn tes, government recent tec hnologic al called for a re smaller Firstly, in present information and democratic progressive procedure, of control, nation-stat es, channels, and so f o r.th. ncc e ptable the from These upon nuclear problems have again made patent, even ·release the and distributio n distortion r estrictive of most liberal of them (and Aga in, especi a lly with new and less systems , there is little excuse for thls. information , upward depends But there ar e e vi dently vest ed i.nterests whi c h stand to benefit from the limited pub} l t:1 y and Secondly , democracy, insofar political rela t ed clcfi c i ncies as regards educati.on). flow major li ke many other social arrangement s, appear to function better with lnt egraLJon of groups by principles of federation. a nd on of governments would, to that ex tent at grou p.i.ng s , information flo w, communicati on and education. cx pe n,, ive lea st governmenta l power to more participato ry democratic forms, a rout e mad e poss ibl e ev en in mu ch elected wny that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues ) are not given an almost f r ee hand on eve ry issue, but are required to answer polic:y th e It is past time for mor e is sue-control led d mocratic procedures , where governments once (i n some Now that modern communicati ons a nd info r mati on-processin g make i t fe a si bl e to dete rmine the mi.x of public positions on major 19tl1 in of data featu res in have a vailab ility major communicati on helped in making present delib e rat e ly fostered pattern of nation-stat e 56 co11frontatl on, and in establishin g the prisoner's nuclear superstates are often seen to be gJlemma type situation th e locked into (on which see, e.g., llardin1. A central a rgument, arising from the nuclear fix, for political questi oning current arrangement s and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at le~sl), takes the following shape:• Political arrangement s shoul d answer ba c k to certain j,rnt iff.-.d 111 te1·ms of dolng ut .eas t where and are so. 78 The s<.i r e quir ements lnclude ,mch things ns en;,blJ ng good and meaningful and moral l lve s for those arrangement s, requirement s (as certainly in who operate under the muc h of the West) the basic mat e rial condit i ons for such lives are met . • l\ccaus c of the nuclear [ix, nation-stat ~ arrangement s have these requirement s. For guarnntce the prospect of arrangement s. nation-stat es, good meaningful lives those to under their yet ther e ls a non-negligi ble probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a meet at least in the North, can no longer such 1.lv •s may terminate, leas tl11rn fulfilled, 1.n this way. support to A life's meaningfuln ess ls certainly diminished if it ends before its 1,rimc inn nuclear d i~aster ; m.-iny and ceased s tate to Furthermore a acquiesc e in or engaged in nucl ear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn) . Th_erefore, nation-stat e arrangement s have should be amended . have their justificatio n, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though not all) natlon-stat es: natio n- s t ate f orfeited it ls not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states a r e corr espo ndingly dissolv ed . There is enough evidence that power- brokers who control stght of, or worse have lost don't care about, t11e point of political arrangement s, of wha t justifies or is supposed to justify their sta tes. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the irn lerlyi.ng politica l theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contract ual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual adva ntage' (p.4). Mao puts i.t in a standard democratic way: 'since Lhe purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and the i r interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the gove rnment' (see Soo, p. 68). r;7 rnnre powerful s tates nnd to lesser states, both c lai m popular Ln and mandate ag;iinsL the wllL of the pcopl(! , power~. put a value hi3 lier where, nlrea y illustrated milita ry situa ti ons: viol.1ted the 'IH' t:.1k er s on some have more often , they act without it or as The sit1.1at-ton has been reached sove reignty nation al survival. ' (Scliel1's conclu sion, p . 210; is -✓ hl.'lfe where than 'nuc l ear: they do on human for copio us evidence see Kupe r). Thi s by I srael, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear the principles of just warfare repeated ly, as hav e ma ny other pr i nciples. much of whn t c l .:i im they lv1d to externa l have been blatantJ.y Such states have forfeited respect or internal political obedienc e; so, on other grounds, have many other state s . It could just be, of course, as is oft en a lt er nat ives, that have been re s arc hlng glimpsed, though of world go vernment). dismissed, for s tirc withou very no possibly better alterna tives . but little As to whether all has such are no been expended on opportunity do to work, a nd not Appea r to give we alternative s w~y Down. There working tow ar d s the wea kening es pec .i.ally can be the may and ha ve been given know very little a bou t how humans suff icicnt org anisi ng and trying out alternative accessi ble alter natives instance as lacking feasibil ty , it is diff i cult to be enti r ely operate under su bstantially different arrangement s. But, t ime arrangemen t s, to even once again, proc eed thos e nuclear very far on of the mor e be time to pr oceed a l i ttle way ho wever , in breakdown of t he large r s uperunion s , which are the immedia te problem. ln valid to simp ly conclud e that alternative poli t ica l a nd while t here But alternat i ves the r e are, effor t toking the risk of being dogmati c; little d e ad ii ne[, tha t t1e r a nge of alte r na t ives or their features (except pe r haps for th e 0 op Li. on or insinuated , nuclear st a tes, Thus i t woul d be s oc i a l arrangemen t s, theoretic a lly feasible and certainly a l onge r- te rm goa l , do not present ly off er a part of t he practical response to the nuclear fi x. But there is no need to insist upon a s1 nglc-trac~ Way Out of dll emrna to th t: exclusion of all olh .rs: quite the contra r y . t he nuclear We can no t only afford to be fa:!.rly catholic about " second best " ap proache s and embra ce wha teve r seems to be working or looks like helpinJi • wUhin re c ogn i sed e thi c al ( and o t her ) con st rain ts ; Indeed, given the urge ncy, the direness of t he si tuat i on , we 58 :,hou1d ~s be fairly catholic and not lnflexibly co~mitt ed to narrow methods, such boRged rlown ( a nd v ery on a rms limitations ner,ot inti o n s m"thod::i should si~nifica nt be undemocratic perservered concessions unrepr•sentativ e) between main nuclear states. wi.th, from cert ai nly tJ nd and the attemp t s superstates, made to e.g . No-first···use declarat.lon, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even s uch a wring further jointly signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially new . The politica l means of the Way Out are what they have la rg e r eve r y liberal or huma nitarian been on issue that has matte r ed: from ou tside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure fr om within or nnd it ' by furnishing self ·- organising characte r is tically Bottom-Up famiL l ar cons i de rations are methods an alternatives practically wi t hout which never virtually upon bypass it , Top-Down. Such but part of the more general , and very effective, case agai nst relia nce upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to supply, but whic h effectively and [or can almost t hat invariably mnttcr le ss be obta i ned, where required, more e x pensive ly without them (and their monopo1 i.es) • In the case of security it i s states , with very few exceptions, impo sed , or acqulc s ced and nuclear weapons . frequently from time being , movement have in, milit a ry solutions involving nuclear installations The opposition to th e local a nd neighbourhood esca lating grou ps, nuclear fix has come some of them now feder a ted :1cr,;11s nntions ( " o the dir c cLion :!.a not rcnlly interstate). !we n rrnc:ccr-rn fu1 that These groups have in blo cki ng some nuclear ln s tal lat.tons and establishing, for the some a ga inst nuclear-free nu c le a r neighbourhoods . equipment The patchwo r k grass-roo ts is strongest in Europe, which is - as the mov emen t realised , and what gave it impetus - a leading thea tr e, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching ext r eme ly doubtful th a t i~1crea i ng NATO and American Europe will E11 ropc wil l these mnke it a saf er place : American shores. nuclear r emoved installations in on the contrary it seems probable that bec nme much eafcr lf t he anti-nuclear movements installations It is succeed a nd Europe r e ndered nuclear-free. g ro ss ly lmmoral condu c t will ther e by also be conside1.·ably reduced. Ln having The chances of mrnt of the spectre of Soviet dc)tnl.11t\don, mil..ib:Jt:t, ideological and Exc:c•p l in the case of Eu ope, where th e inexcusable suppression of Eastern Eu ru pe a ll too ev iden tly persis ts, this is a n obvious fabrication . 8Cr i ou s ly And even ir Western Europe the spec tre is failing partly g iant fashioned military-in dustrial allianc e. inc r easJ. ngly dominated and largely domi na t ed financially ideo l ogically. much propped exaggerat ed. no t nnd c1d c quatcJJ and ec onomically some of and, in some mea sure, Indeed much of the "free" world countered as mil.itary by The means . i .," in basic any mode of mUitary . But mil itary, and associated poli tl c al, domtnatlon of We ste rn Europe by the Sovi e ts is a problem, t here are several ways other predomi na ntly American nuclear weapons to mi tigate it. on] y local def e nc e arrangement s - whethe r top·-down alternative is it domina ted economicall y , by the US A. doml na ti on to whic h nuclea r weapons are con s ide r e d relevant in sofa r a up by the NATO powers ' i s not ge ncraJ. ly considered so much of a problem (as it ts 79 ), and ls anyon' Since the l ast World War, Western Europ e ha s be e n polHlcally and ideologica lly , by the USA , c a1;e Does expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canad a or Brasil say? Th Rt other? social methods but also some and much r eliance on These should include not state-suppl ied social decentralis ation , regionalisa tion and devolution of orga nlsat{ons, than me thods, or r estructurin g, such as power to dispersed local mo r e cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and East e rn Europe. Part of the point of whether external or r es tructuring internal, so is especiall y situa tions, is to st a t e-contrived 79. break make any military takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the rest o r ation of loca l control easier . 80 Part of int e rch1nge, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to s abotage the West-East confrontati ons, and thereby to remove For many pe opl es of the world , and in it s impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppress ive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast wit h a ustere Marxism-·Len i.nism whic h would i mprove the lot of some of Lhe oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corpora t e capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many mo r e individual ri gh t s and libertie s. Ce rtainly Marxism-Len inism which appears to degene rat e in practice to an authoritari an and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative . It is fortunate, then. that we need be saddled wi t h neither: there are s u per ior options. 60 ot.hC'r motl ves fo r, and Western popul ar suppor t Eu r ope , for f or, long j. much Uitary too adventures partial to and military advt'nturcs, sho uld now be hel ping i t se lf rath e r: than relying on a leaky Amer.lean nucl e ar umbrella for its defe nce . Moreover it ough t to be, at the ve ry least, 1ncomfortable about the risls of c a tastrophi ca lly damaging t he world in the i nterests of its own security . extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear depende nt" states be prepared to ac qui esce in this not uncharacteristic European impositlon. There wo rl<l, wha t LS N war is no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing othe r parts of t he Europe, rn i. li t r1ry-base d dom ina tio n to other parts of the worl d. which has long exporte d There ar e better. options than clublou s and ris ky nuclea r shields for Europe. -·-·- ----- --·- . ·-- 80. Thus , for exampl e, t o the exte nt that lo cal defence groups a re integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle th at s urre nder of the central directing sect i on absolved the federated groups fr om following suit or following further dir ec tions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or baste groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section wnuld ho ld only limited informa t ion about the federated uni ts it in tegra t e d. The locally organised groups themselves, which would mer ge wilh local po pulati ons, would be train e d in tact ics of passiv e resist ance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, et c. The net effect (as c. Pigden, who made most of these points , argues) would be to make the cost of militar y conq uest, occupations and exploit a tion prohibitively high. One reason why t he Japanese Army High Conunand decided aga inst invasion of Au s LraHa i n March 1942 was th e cha r acte r of Australi.ans and the fact th a t th ey 'wo uld resist to the end' ( Threa t s to Australia's Secu rity, p . 62). Ycl th 1 9 112 (wa r r edu ced ) Aust ralian populatton was substantI.nlly untrained a nd unorganised for loc ally-based defenc e . With such a defence r estruc t uring, Aus tralia wou· d not only much reduce its vulnerab ility to military adventures, but remove standard reaso ns for succumbing to threat s of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81 . In par ti cular , with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separa te, are removed. So too a main mode l supporting deterrenc e policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would b e further co rroded. In the same direc t io n, i t is import a nt to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below t he l e vel of state trade deals, e.g. in grai n and gas, to communicati on and coope r ation between people. For such commercial deal s there is suff ici e n t tr us t, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also a t more significa nt people-to-people levels? Many f ur ther Ror ts of lnt c r rclo tionshfp ore fe slble, nnd jnexpenaive by m:llltary st a ndards, e . g . sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gi.( t pro Jee ts . If, for ins tnnce , 100 1 000 o r mo r e ord lnnry Americans wer e l i ving, working or holiday i ng in USSR ( and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclea r missiles into Russ ia (or vic e versa ) . Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; or the con tr ary , a l ot of resources have been expended to enco urage pr ecisely th e opposite a tt itudes, e.g. as part of the strnteg y of the "cold war". ~ 6J What th e anti-nucle a r movement s must press b,oa rl out1 i.nc; fof ::tccordingly i.ic> perceptive t r ansarmamen t, to i.e. conversion outer edges of graduat e d the movements, alternative social defence arrangements). Bu t t h e ar gume n t a lso makes it clearer how f a r this should go, t hrough in i n pa rt it i s what they hav e_ been pushing for, nuclear reduction an d rlisarmamen t ( a nd, on the more wa y clear namely all the disarmament 82 to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral c e rt a inl y to lo cal disarmame nt across progr e ssively larger parts of the planet's s ur t~cc , inc luding especially Europe. For once the state is demoted , its i mpo r t ance a nd t he necessity of its maintena nce properly downgraded and reliance on dec i s i on- making its diminished de ci s ion-making - once all that is happe n ) , one in duly favour of allowed more localised cont r ol and for (it does not need to major component in the nucle a r fix is removed, namely the problem o f red 11ction or even loss of state sove reignty . Ma'ntenance of that sovereign ty has been ass i gned a mistake n importance, which in turn acco un ts for the mistaken we ig ht ass i gned to the arguments from national dangers. What is important and wo rt h pres e r vi ng is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the stn r- c . The na ti o n- state and dangers to it, and accompanying features s uch as mis p.l aced natl.onal J.sm, are the weakest links i.n the nuclear fix situation . On ce th e demise of the soverei.gn nation-state is allowed f or, the arguments fr om nat iona l conce rni ng part i cul a r. dangers .lndividual also and grou p rights and In their freedoms, by t he that nation- s tate . matter The are to arguments liberties in for t hem, as sma ller or exclusivel y nation-state is neith r sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But a r guments f r om lnd i vidual and group dangers remain , do they not? ri sks are civil necessarily th em , since i n inc r eas ingly many states the s e liberties nec e ss ary pl ace None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None o f ti e rights and freedoms g ua r a n te ed disintegrate. in div id11a ls 11nd groups r e maln: To be sure, th a t has always been so, 83 and ls not ---~------ ----82. The In i ti a l but impor ta nt st e ps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Wer e det e r re nce re a lJ.y the pol icy there would be little case for more than a f r a c t io n of pr ese11t nuclear arsennJ.s. The ste ps to disarmament ;ire well-known , e.g. the scrapping of obs olete weapons, and an end t o modernisati on, the removal of nuclea . weapons in crucial theatres such as Euro pe, et c . 62 hci n1~ clwnged but only woH,f!ncd in thi. s age of moslly to wont be sure t hat nucle or arc othe r outsiders. People t hclr li v es will contlnue to run their course, i.denlly i n a flourishing fash ion , a nd wi ll not be Russ nns natlon- states. t controlle d by Amiirican s or Nucl e ar arrangeme nts which threaten t he ir lives not a rational rout e to these ends . In t he weigh-u p t hat should occur in char t.tri g a way dilemmas the as nuclear out of such deo ntic fix and its subsid i ary dilemmas, there ar e then much more i mport a n t elements than featut·es of the nat :ion-st:ate, namely E~-~ of things those the st at e is s uppos ed to safeguard, such as individual and local we lfare and a ut onomy; wc,1pons. but those th i ngs are bett e r ensured by The main reasons are fam il iar : threaten Lhe lo ss of basic values, such the removal nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstanc es as welfare and autonomy, for many cr•ntures and reg ions, and the potential los s is in general much great er than in a nuclear-frcP si tuation ( even should another with nuclear weapons ). ideological party the o pportunity armed There are also well -kn own supplementa ry reasons; example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of remain welfare for (because costs of wea pons manu fa cture) and autonomy (bec ause of th e accompanyin g sec urity measures). Thus the appropriate ly de vi ces and nuclea r fix limiting weapo ns is resolv ed , theoretical ly it can deploy, and how ), and rate, by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out , at little c ost in the circums tances , it will be s ince any sovereignty of the st ate (especially as to what nuclear con sidera bl e reduc tion of st a t e sovereignty . pra ctice , at strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it , in one way or another, unde r th e au s pices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act aga i nsl the state . Again the resolution also lo ok s practicnl enough, since sovereignt y reduction in ne ed apply es s e nt ially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons . 83. the Ind eed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will rema in so und er any satisfactor y political arrangement s. Until human s ocial arrangement s change substantial ly , there is no substitute for on-golng vigi lance to ensure or maintain political liberty. agreement ( at the top l e ve l s of s tat e) . to far with the superstates , the li mitations of s tate- powe r will likely ha ve to proceed further: for nuclear weapo nr y doc s no t stand in sp l endid isolation. i.nto both milita ry s yst ems - and ( c ivil) Rather it is industrial production of the states So, uns u r pr i s ingly, practica l- look ing resolu t ions are being concerned. ti ed solidly resisted by super states. Accordingly more popul a r (bottom up) act ion aga ins t nuclear-involved state s and espec i ally against the supe rstate s , af t e r all the stat e s causing the mo s t serious dilemmas, wil l have to be t aken much furth e r. variety of organ is ed forms. These in clud e a refusal to contribute to nuclear war preparatio n , e ithe r d i rectly or wld •l y, from such s t e ps ns Once again it will take a The indir ect l y. the forms of action range block adin g o f shipme nts of ur a nium, and the rc f1 1!:lal of suppJ 1, Qa a nd se rv i c es to sa i1or n o n nuc le ar ships and subma r i ne s, t he to withho lding or r ed i rect i on of t axes des t i ned for nuclear security purposes. They inc l ud e as we ll the whole r a ng e nuclea r facilities i nstal l a tions and of nonviolent (methods protest which method s against do exclude not i ncapaci t a t i on a nd decommissioning of equipment l and which do include new model . 8'~ resistance and de f e nce organisations). It is important to realise that petitioning of powe r state representat i ves and ho l d e rs, f or instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct ap pea l, t s far f rom a complete strategy , a nd may be ine ffecti ve or ignored, th e r esul t s disco u r aging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a mor e com prehensive politi c al strategy, which also involves withdrawing s up po rt f r om prevailing state arrangements, and working out and partic ipati ng in alter nati v e a r r a ng emen ts, especially alternative defence forms. 85 Sufficient d etn' l s as t o what to do ar e already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some imp r e ssion of the rang e of me thods, see aga i n Sharp. 85. For muc h mor e on all these points, s e e e .g. fu rt her Appe ndix 2. Martin . As to what to do, see 64 APPENDI X l. ON THE FATE or MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Sch e ll, and to Anders. A ncrtes of nucl cn r prophet s lw a pr odu c ed a EJ e r:les of ph ilosophj cal ly-·o riented works on nucl e ar war and the all e ged impl i.c c tions of l1 uman ex t inct io n . 1 The series is important for its dee pe r penetration into the nuclear d ilemma , down to metaphysical leve ls; i n this the series contrasts ith the transie nt s u pe rficialities of much o f the political commentary. The most wi de l y c i rc ul ated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the s l ightest of t he ''prophets", Schell' s The Fate of the Ear th. This skillful piec e o f medi a -philo so phy uncannily redeploys some of the appar e ntly deep phenomcno]ogi cal themes of Anders . So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and And ers ca n often be considered together. To critic i se their a ssumptions is not of co u r s e t o belittle their wo rk. In pa rticular , Schell's little book, for a ll i.ts politic al shortcomings, is having a significant a nd much needed ef f ect j n sh i ft i.ng att: lt udes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable f or i ts vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfor t 1111,i t ely it: a lso exhibits, both phi losopld.cally and fac tually, sever e defects . Somr of it 1s simp ly ga rbage: to selec t one example , consider the claim that ' witho u t . . . a world-wide program of action for preserving th e [ human] spec i.es nothing else t hat we undertake together can make any pr a c t tea l or. moral sense (p.1 73, rearranged ). Th is s1ou l d cer t a inly be rejected phi losophica lly ; for ther e is no separate moral issue of s uch overwhelming importance that a ll other lssues become mor ally ne 11 t r al. Mo r a l issue s remain moral issues: they don 't cease to be so when compar ed wi t h more important moral issues ( as Schell effective ly acknowledge s el s ewhe r e, p . 130 ) . And the claim should a l so be junked on more f actual grounds. Humans fo rm a highl y resilient sped.es, like r abbit s i n Australia a survivor spec i es, unl i kely t o be exterminated unde r presently a rrang ed nuclear ho l oca usts . l. The di.st i ng ui shing term i s from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, wher e many of th e l eadi ng prophets are assessed. One well-known pro ph et not so consider e d there i s Jas pers , presumably because hJs ma in work (which might equally we ll ha ve been translated as The Fa te of Mankind) comes out in entirely th e wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophi c al attire to the be tt e r -d e ad -than-red abomination, A ma ln argument agai nst Jaspers so presented i s simple. Howeve r bad being r d mig h t be come ( at present it is debatably worse than living under some of Lh e tot a l i tarian regimes th e free We st props u p), it still gives human s a fu rth e r chance for good lives , since r e gimes fall or can be topp led: bu t t o t al a nnihil a tion removes that all-important oppor t unity . But J as pe r s does not pr e sent his po s ition so simply . Rather his con t e nti on i s t hat there a re circum st a nc e s whe re a nd princ ip les for which a person or group of per sons ought .to s acri f ic e even their lives . Freedom is such: a l i f e worth living i s a fr e e life. But the latter pint can be granted w!. 1:liout conceding tha t s a c rlf1cc is a possible means to it , While the sai:rifice of one or a f e w l i ve s may be a possible ( if dub i ously effec tiv e) w~y t o fr • . l ivc D for oth e r s , c er t a inl y the sacrifi c e of all l ives is not a poss i ble rout e to fr e e llve s for a l l, s ince no human l i.ves r ·emain. To thi s rx Le nt Sche ll l s ri g h t (on p . 131) i n a ccusing Jasper s of an ea ch to all f al l Rcy. J aspe r 1 s i dea that "the f r ee life that they try to save by all po s s ibl e mea ns is mor e th a n me r e lif e or lives'' breaks down when applied to al l participating pe ople. None c a n ga in free live s by extinction of all: t hat is not a possibl e route to l ife e ve1. was selected howev e .· b1?ca,.1se it 1eads i0to, lndeed presupposes, two of the major defec tive assumptiono in the work ot Mchell and And ers: Sl. Nuclear w,n· will ellroinate life, humnn li.fe r1t least, on arth (the 2x~_~nc:Uon assumption); and S2. 111 the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality a nd value, but t hose of time and space for example, make no sense ; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their s nse on a n act ua l human context ( the ext ravagant a nthropocentric assumptlon). It is appli cations of S2 which giv Anders' and Schell 's work 2 some of its apparent phllosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxica l propositions generated. B11t the frequ ent applications of S2 depend esse ntially on Sl. For without total extinction there will he humans abo ut, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Th ·-- exDmp l e Granled the factual assumpti on Sl is by no means ruled out as a real po ssibilit y; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct; 3 granted the prospect of nuclear war does t hreaten leacfing centres of Western c .i vilizat ion witb obliteration. Even so Sl appea r s unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Ca nada, which lies on the pol ar route of Soviet missiles, human li fe should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medi cal studies) . Sche l l's argument to Sl is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hem i s ph ere , but for the most part it does that very North American thing , of con tracting the world to North Arner.lea . (All that matters, all worthwhile civili zati on, i.s in USA, or at least, to be more char.itable, in North Ameri cA and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon , for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significant l y out of <late. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less we ll f rom Nortl1 to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schel l's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisp here , New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa a nd Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges. 4 Roth Anders a nd Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" th e mean s of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibilit y, would furnish a good medium for unl e 3rning nuclear technolog y (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theor y of an earlier "high" technology). In v i rtue of S2, they would however 0xc lud e such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a deta iled comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions o( S2 , se Foley JS. 3. Thus the Las t Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new ur gt'ncy. It is this sort of argumen t: that connects environmental et hic s and nucl ear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulld oz er are out of the s ame technological Pandora's box . Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pando ra's box. Biological and chemical mea ns are perhaps even more effective, and ce rtain l y can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. Howev er, new modellifig~ and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, th e immuni.ty of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned . In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence , has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous diff e rences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind pa tt e rns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p .56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many stotesmen have an interest in minimizing t'r""l . 66 th n t lhc notion no long er rnnde sense. But what tlh•y s(H'm t.o want to s uggest wi. Lh th e impo ssi bility-of-unle a rning mes sage is th "' inevitability of the de velopment and event ual use of the technology - as if having learnt th e means ull else was dete rmi ned , and manufac tur e and use ceased to be a matter of c hoi ce. Certainly such vie ws have been flo ated 5• But: they are no t t e na bl e . Ther e are man y examples of technological advances that have not been t ak en adva nt r1gc of, and there are even cases of tec hnological developme nts that have be en mRnufact u rcd but not marke ted or used. The re is not something ve ry special a bo ut n11 c l ear appa ratus that puts it beyond the scope of such· generalis;<1 tio ns . Both Schell a nd Anders do claim tha t the re are very special things about nu clear wea pon s , in particular that they do not allow "expe riments ". Even if thi s were tru e - i. t is certainly not of smal ler weapons i t would not tell aga .inr,t the pr e v.lous argument: against the ine vitability of nuclear weapons. And in fac t Anders and (e ven) Schell hedge thejr claims a bout testing , and the limits to nuclear sc..ient if i c work , to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere w.ith tl1 e observers and those outside the " J.abnrn t.ories". Again they have latched ont o major po i nts: in parti c ular, we hnv e at present no way of testing the c umul a tive effe cts of large nuclea r weapons in concer t, e . g . for more holistic effe cts such as fireballs or firestorms , e le ct romagnet ic puls e or ozone destruct ion. Sho r t of an LSN war, and l ike ly eno ugh with it, these crucial effects must rema in largely untested and lypothelical in chara ct er. The penetrat.ion of human chauvini sm , a s in S2 , is not something peculiar to Sch e ll, but is a product of Western ph ilosop hy, European philoso phy especially. This cl,auvinism is unfortuna tely alive and sti ll well, Anders' ve rsi on of S2 being ju s t on e striking illustration ( c:f . AA p . 252ff . ) . It ha s a lso deeply penetra ted Anglo- Amer i can phi.losophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenslein ' s wo rk , where even the necessary t ruths of mathematics are taken to be a pro duct of I um:rn co nv enti ons , and would va nish w.lth bumnnsl Such ar e all eged imp lications of ex tinction ; but the fact is that the truths of arithm PLlc a r e in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humano ids or of gods or g iraffes . In Sche ll, human c hauvinis m is dished up in a particularly powerfu l and obnoxious Kant ian form. Th oug ht s and proposit ion s, time and tens e s, history and memories , values and morality, al l depend on the life- giving pres e nce nf human being s - past or fu ture or me rely potential humans are not e nough , persons t hat are not humans are cer t ai nly not enough. Thus, a ccording to Sc hell (p.1 40 , e .g. ), ' ... t he thought "Humanity is now extinct" i s an impo ssi ble one for a rati onal person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining a ny ot her event , we l ook ahead to a moment that is still within the strea m of huma n t.ime, The thought is howeve r perfectly possible for huma ns; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later ratl onal creature may well be able to hav e it tr uly. Schell erroneously denies that: t here is no "later" ' . . . outside th e human tens es of past, pres en t, and futur e (p . 14 0) 6 • Human ext inc t ion eliminates ' the creature that divide s time into past, presen t and f uture ' : so anni h ilati on canno t 'come t o pass' (p. lli3) . But it: is simply false that the tenses are human; the tens e s depend on a local time ordering (per ce ptible to many creature s ot her than humans, but no t depending at all on that perceptibilit y f or its via bil ity) relating other time s to the present , to now (a l so a huma n-independent location, evident t o other cr eatures, an d borne witness to by suc h sequences as the passing seasons). And nnn ih llntion may als o too easily come to pa ss , for ma ny humans in the Nort h at l e ast, as it came to pa ss in recent ge ologic al times that human s began to exist upon earth. Bef ore t hat ther e was a time befor there were any human beings. - •••-- - - H•--- - --- - - - - - S. Not merely by technologica l determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a form e r US general , a r gues by straight induction, that if the US mili ta ry ha s a wea pon it will u se it. 6. Th e ap palling theme that humans c reat e past, present and future repeated e l s ewhere , e . g . p .1 73. (etc.) is Anders ' arg um ent for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no .Longer even what has been', is also explicitl y and narrowly verificat ioni.st: 'for wrwl wo u ld t he d iffer e nce be betwe en what. ha s only been and what has never been, if the r e J s no one t o r emember the things that have been' (AA p.245). Ther e would st l ll remai n ma ny sorts of differenc e; for one, the history record ed i n mm1y other org anisms would be differe n t. Temporal themes do not la c k ' legl lma y be ca use not regist e red [or verified] by anyone'; truth, signl Eica nc e , sti l l less meaning, are not matters of human verificat ion. be Here , a s e ls e where, the human cha uv i nism is mixed with other distortin g metapl1ysi ca l assumptio ns of our Western he ritage , in particula r, verificati onism and on t ol og ical assumptio ns (to the effect that there are severe difficult ies in talki ng ab out what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dub I.o ns metaphys ic s from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossibl e to i magi ne our own death; and whenever we a ttempt to do so, we can perceive that we are i n f a ct s till present as spectator s" (p.138). The second clause goes a good dJ e l a ncc t owards refutjng the first. In fact there is no g r eet dlfficult y in descri bing coun terfactua l s ituations which undermJne both Freud's claims. The same go e s for Schell ' s extension s of human chauvinism into one of i t s main tr a<l 1 ti o nal str ong holds, value theory: the simple and basic fact [si c!] th at befor e t here can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoici.ng there must be li f e' , human life ( p. 171) . These are no facts, but deeply entrenche d philo sophical dogmas whi c h have been exposed and criticise d elsewhere 7. Natura l ly s ome t hi ng s will disappear with the extinctio n of humans: trivial l y t here wi l l be no mor e humans (unless humans re-evolve or are rec eated ) , and t hus no mor e human ins ti tutions, human activitie s, huma n emo ti on s , and so forth. But it is a lready going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that t he r e will a c cord i ngly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope , no comf ort, no sa crifice, no imag e, no song ... '. For there are, and may eontlnue to exist, othe r creatures th a n humans with emotion, struggles , songs , Nor will the endJng of all such human Vf?ntures, if it comes to p3ss, show that nl l past huma n ve ntu res have be en 'all in vain', meaningle ss , and already so Lo say dead. The decay of t he s olar system, or the heat-deat h of the uni.ve r s,~ cv~n, wi l l no t s how t hat worthwhil e human activitie s were not worthwhi. le. 8 Sev er.a l of tbe other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from t he i r shared assumptio ns Sl and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical no t io n (in Re vela tions ) of a Second Death , redeploye d by both. 'The death of mankind ', und e r Sl, is reckon d a ' second death', because by S2 end Sl remaining lJ fe i.s r e nder ed mean.lngle ss and already ' seems to be dead' (AA p .244, S p.166) a nd Ls already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially , a per son f a ··es ' a s econd death ', not merely one's own but in addition that greater de ath of the spe c ies and all future generatio ns (S p.166, p . 115). However even if nu c l e ar ext inction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicate d, becau s e it de pe nds on the fallaciou s inference to the meaningle ssness of prec edi ng lif e and on the very questiona ble represent ation of this mea ni ng l ess nes s as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once , pe rh a ps all at about the same ti me . The idea of a Second Death lacks even a s o li d met aphys i cal bas e . From Sl , t og ether with the minor pr inciple that extinctio n being an absolu t e does n ' t d i ff er in deg ree, come s the universa lity of peril them e that ' we are al l exposed to pe r il in t he same degree', which is according ly 'd isguised' a nd 'diff ic ul t to rec ogni s e', be cause there is no contrast (AE p.61+; S p.15 0 ) . Thi s th eme fall s with Sl. In a ny event, not all peoples are equally i mperilled by t he nuclea r situation , th e Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See , e .g ., ' ll uma n chauvi ni s m a nd env .l r onmental ethics', in Environm ental Ph i l oso n~ (ed i ted D. Mann.ison and other s )) Research School of Social Sciences , Aue trallnn Na tio na l Univ er0 l t y 1 1980. 8. Anders is here ( AA pp .244-5) r e l yi ng upon a ve rs i on of the argument from 68 rnLher betlcr pJac d than the Germans of northern gu , e . 1 011 Nor are all pe opl e C<JuaJJy locked in to the situation or inca pacitated by it; as exp l.aine d, th e po s ition is different in different countries a nd placeR. Nor, --- 1 i ke wise , are all people equally res ponsible, an obnoxious theme, (in co ntrast to Anders) r-c pc a tedly infiltrates . This is the Po go theme, ,iccord ing to which -S3.- · Responsibi lit y for t he pre sent nuclear si.tuation (fiasco, really) distributes onto e verybody, it be longs to very human in the world . 9 B11t there is 3lso , mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one , namely that we have some responsi bil i ty (the Nazi situation is compared). An es peci ally blatant example of the Pogo theme 10 runs as follows: ' t he world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nucl cnr wcapo nG, do so only with our permis si on, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies ' (pp .229- 30) . The theme is elaborated e l sewhere : we are the authors of that extinc tion. (For the populati ons of the super powe rs this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose th e t hrea t of it, while for the peoples of t he non-nuc lear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anythi ng about the danger)' (p . 152) . But this is more of an argt1ment indicting r epresentati ve government, by revealing its insensitiv ity and unr es pon s iveness to many of the populace they alleged ly govern, not to mention those affec t ed by its activJties who are not represented at all (namely ioreigne t-s ). But Schell convenient ly neglects all such points: we are pote n tial mass ki llers. The moral cost of nuclear a r maments is that it makes of all of us underwri. ters of t he slaughter of hundreds of m.lllions ' ( p .152). And again '[ as] perpe trators we co nvey t he steady message that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that it had bee n judg ed acceptable fo r ever yone to be killed' (p.153) . Little of this is true . Those who campaign against nucl ear a rrangements , vote against nu c lear- committed parties so far as is possible , a nd the like, are certainly not the authors of potential des t r uction, and responsibi lity .for the nuclear situation does not simply dist r ibute onto them. Nor does responsibil ity - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell tl l eg itima ely attributes to everyone - fall on those who have don e less . Responslbil ity for de cisi ons taken in "liberal democracies " even by representat i ves (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented , since among wi ll c :1 Schell --- ·------·---- - - - 9. An inter•stJng converse of thls t heme is sometimes advanced , that no one is responsi bl e , the whole thing is out of control. The technologit al vers i on of this no-responsi bi l ity the me is dis cus sed s hort ly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangement s are ou t of political cont ro l , but fo r re aso ns, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclea r things goi ng, whic h enable respons ibility to be distributed . The vested interests , wh i ch bear considerabl e responsibil ity, include the mi li tary weapons i ndustry, a nd r e sea r ch and a cademic commurd.t.ies , Under pressure s for re-election especiall y, politicians give in to these powerf ul groups, so losing contro l o f pol itic a l. processes. The argument fai l s at it s final stag e. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests . Thus polit ic al processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run ou t of political control . 10. Another example of spreading the responsibil ity runs as follows: 'The self-extinc tion of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sa ne or sens ible; neverthel ess, it is an ac t that, without qu ite admitting it to ourselves, we pla.n in certain circumstanc e s to commit' (p . 186). Ev en for most of the plnnners, ex tinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an 1ninte nd ed consequenc ; and most of us have little or no role in the pl a nning, enough of us even campaig n agai nst the planning . Fur ther 't he world chose the course of attemp ting to refashion the system of sovereignty to acconm1oda te nuclear weapons ' ( p . 194): the world'? This connec ts of course with the ideological argument from defence of fuodamental s, e .g. for libe rty, for the (USA ) nation, and against soc inli.sm. In the' .nurse of th:fA argument yet Rn o thm: fallR 1011s assumption is rolled out: ' The means to the end are not limited , for the end itself ~ets the limits in each case' (p,189 ) . mnny otller th1.ngs, a representative .LH only represf.ltiJ:ai:ive of a p· rty which offers a complex and often ill-characteris ed package of policies, and a voter may vote for ze ro or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can respo n s i bility, st .Ill of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to e ve ry one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important refated th eme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nucl ear situation generates responsibilitie s for every social ly involved person (thi s theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying theme s, part of what r es ults is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers (not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out f step with the nuclear age , the one-earth system, etc. (the whole ea r th theme ). Thoug h Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purpo es for which the state is us ed, unfortunat el y he often loses sight of this i mportant theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scatter ed and fragmentary. As observed (in §8) , Schell arrives at the conclusion t hat the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new pol iLlcal institutions more 'consonant with t he global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternative s. At mos t he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Wa y Up. So l utions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simpllstlc way, from the Top Down; tho se who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and pmitat io ns ( such as SALT) and in worl d government ( as with the United Nations) . 1 Given the r ec ord of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations a nd regulators, it is by now a pathetic fai th. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-indus trial organisation and ways of life . But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation a nd , more generally, of t he roots of war can be found elsewhere. 12 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confi ned to the ideologically-a ligned arrangements of nation-slates , but penetrate also into key components of those states, their mjlit.ary, their controlli.ng classes, and their supporting bureaucracies . And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for th e a rrangements, and in key components of the states , a con spicuous and crucial feature Ls the drive for power and domination . 13 Thus the push for [nuclear] supe r iority by the super-states, to be achie ved through military-orient ed science and technology, which involves a nd enables domination, in seve r al inter.related forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed wlth military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found t he h.lgh-te)~nology research and devel opment means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changin g t he structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nucl e ar war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the mai n power·-base, the natlon-stat0.; it ls also Important to alter key component s of the state, and, mor e swe epingly, to ·remove trouble-maki.ng patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements , namely pat tern s of domina tion, patterns anife sted not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, ma le- female re l ations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short , chauvinistic relations . However not everything 11. Sec p.225ff. 12. In Anders and el-borated in Foley, and more straightforward ly, in Martin. The inco1iplete list of items given ab ove, to be investigated in a deep er analysis of the ruclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p,164. and especially p.227, bottom paragraph . j nee ds to be accompl ished at once; and the clus~~ - of damaging power and do1nlnaL l on relatlons tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the probl e ms can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of sta tes. [n ~1at analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats th<• familiar false contrast of state cxpedie.ncy with morality, as a c ontra st between "raison d'etat" and the Socratic-Ch ristian ethics. The teaching that 'tl1e end justifies the means j_s the basi s on which governments , in all times, ha ve li. ccnsed themselves to commit cr::imes of every sort' (p.134). So 'stat es may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival ' . Schel l then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justificatio n by destroying e very end; but again the argument is far from sound, a nd depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions . Even if all humans were extinguishe d (as under Sl) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animal s and extraterres trials , actual or not. The e nds-mea ns argument can however be repaired to remove such objections : instead i t is 13. These motivating drives form pa rt of a larger int egrated packag e, compris ing maximisatio n drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, ('TI C" rgy, sp ecr, sat:f.sfnctto n, . • . • for the newer Enlightenme nt (but Faustian ) vlr tues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessiv e neatness nod implic1ty manifested ) to reduce th package to one main component, prefer e nce-satisfa c tion for 1nstance, or ut .i lity. And the type of drive ls justified (especially for those who have it, but worry abo11t i t) not 01ly as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which agai.n it is not. Rationality , the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisatio n, of the virtues . Maxjmisatio n of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisatio n of power, as with the Christian-I slamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence , the parallel maximls ation of knowledge paradoxes of omniscience . There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for ma x i mum consistency , often taken to be the epit ome of rationality , also l e nd s to inconsisten cy in the case of more important theor i es, s uch as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative t heo rems). IL, . R & D, though directed by military requirement s and the arms race, also drives the a rms race. Its role .is partly disguJsed by the myth of neu tral science. There have been a tt empts, not only by those committed to technologic al dcterminlsm , to involve technology more dee ply as the main, or single, source of t he nucle a r fix . It is technology, th e mega- machine, running out of control , that has brought us to this pred cament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes t his serves to exonerate states and thei.r key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-cont rol machine; but sometimes the s tate itself is se en as a machine also running out of control. But technologic al determinism , like other varieties of stronger (nonana lytic) determinism , is false . Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known po l itical dispu te involv:i.ng distingu1.sh ed scientists ; it was deliberated , fund ed and promoted , while other alternative s were not. Damag ing technologie s of th e nuclear age were not inevitable, but dellbcra el y chosen by certain components of the large nation-sta tes. And murh as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability /determi.nis m themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitran t technologie s. They also admit of being made t o look r idic ulous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolut ion, then if it fu nctions (as it p ·obably will , a matter also determined ), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionar y place in human population regulation. 7l claimed tha t ext inction null i fies ends-me ans justlft&A~ion by frustrating the r a J iqntion of ev ery re levant end - me a ning by ' r e levant', in this context, t hose end,, the rea li sa tion of which th e stat e appeals t o in justification of its n uc l ear pol i cies . 15 An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe c no1 1gh 1 sses , would undoubt e dly frustrat e the realisation of relevant state ends. So eve n f rom an ex pediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe c r i t icism , for exampl e a s motivationa lly irrational. As to th~~ pa r. t of the st a te and (state) sovereignty tn war, Schell leave s us i n no do ub t . A s ov e r e ign state is virtually defin ed as one that enjoys the right and powe r to go to wa r ln defenc e or pursuit of its intet"ests (p,187). Wa r ari s es fro m how thi ngs are; from the a rrangement of politic a l affairs via jealous na t i o n stat es (p.188). Ind e ed th e r e is a two-way linkage betwe e n having s~:".'_E:_r~}:_f;;22.._~ a n d _ca pad 1:.7 t o wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell c o11Lends , nec e ss a r y f o r people to org a ni se fo r war. On the other side, withou t war it is impossibl e t o preserve s overeignty. Neither of these c ontentions i s t r Rnsparen t l y c lea r a s the y stand. The f l rst is damaged by civil war and the like, t h e s eco nd by t he per sistence of sma ll nonmilitary states. Now that the mac r o-state s ystem is e ntrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in pci r ticu l ar ) t o a rgue from t he "'real:1.ti e s"' of international life, which include sel f··i n terest , agg r ,~ss i on, f em.· , ha tred. It is on this basis th a t peace ar r angeme nts are r e adi ly d ismissed as un rea listic, utopian, even (amu s ingly) as •xtrcmlsl (c f . p . 185). Schell's f ur ther th eme that nuclear "wa r"' is not war threatens, however, to undermine hi s ca s e a ga inst the s overeign state; for example, his ends-means arg11m nt and t he a rgument based on its nucl e ar war-maki ng capacity. Fortunately th e nol-wa r t heme needs much qualifi c ation, and starts out from an erroneous c ha rac t e r i s ati on of wa r as 'a violent mea ns employed by a nation to achieve an end' ( p .189 ): but--this is neither ne c e s s a ry nor sufficient for war. What is ri ght ( s o it i s a rgued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different. from ea r lie r c onvent i onal wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end whic h nuc l ear "' va r" does not have. But nuc l ear attacks can certainly have ends ( ev en if LSN war s cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games a r e wo n). It is a lso cla imed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a de cision by arms. But in nuclear "war" thi.s doesn't happen, ' no o ne's st r e ng t h fa ils until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what t hese sorts o f considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wa r s a r e not wa r s, but that they are not wars of certain s o rts, e.g., not just wa r s (be cause they fall on such criteria a s reasonable prospect of successand improveme n t ), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conve n tional war s have pe rs isted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nu r:10,1r we a po ns h av also ru i ned " c onventio nal"' wars, and his connected theme t hat t he demise of war has left no me a ns to finally settle di.sputes between na t lo ns, f or th e final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192- 193 ) . The theme d epend s on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war a nd t he mi s t ak e n proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of a ppea l'' betwe e n nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests tha t coul d s e rv e , and there is also th e possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e . g. joint refer e nda) . The theme also imports the social-Darwinia n assum ption of Clausewicz (the "logic of wa r" theme criticised in §2) that war has to pr oc eed to the t e c hnological li mit as if war and violence were thoroughly nat 1 r a l actlvitLes independ e nt of recognised social settings (for winni ng, su r rende r, etc.) a nd rul e -less activities. On the contrary, wars are pa r asitic on s oc i a l organisations such as sta t es and are governed by a range of understandl ngs , conventions and rules . The y are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if no t a logic . Huch ca pital has bee n ma de not me rely from "the logic of war" but from what i s now cal l ed "'the logic of deterrenc e " a nd the "'logic of nuclear [strategic] plann lng'". The me ssage that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive n uc l cnr 11rr.1 ngemc nt a t he wo d<l l s now en ll ng 1. ed in a rc perfectly loglcnl, sotmd, 15. Thi s re for mu lation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qual ificat ion can be inferred from Sche ll's context. - j 72 rcnGonab.le, rational. However thJs represents li l i:. le more than a cheap semn nti.cal trJ.ck . Logic in no way justifies the present arrangement s, or nnythiu g 1·ke them , or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of deci.sion (as presented , e .g., in Jeffrey) which ca n be appUed in strat eg ic. planning; but it does not yield s pecific results without desirabilit y measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extraloglca lly. There are various ways these va lue assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirement s or not; but in nuclear s tr ~tegic planning they have invariably been set tled on the bas iG of expediency. l& In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very gener ously, as a word of general commendatio n, to cover something like 'rational consideratio ns ente r ing into t he policy or strategy of '. In these terms, S hell, who like o thers enjoys pl.e ying with the term 'logic of', should write o f ' the il logi c of deterrence' , f or he emµlic1size~~ (p.21.J) tlP disparity bct:wc11n the supposed rati.onali ty o f t:hret1t~nl.ng 11se of nuclear weapons and the irrational i ty ( even from a national i n te r e s i viewpoint) of act ually using th m should the threat fail: 17 ~ the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the c redibili ty of the threat of thi s unjustifiab le and irrati onal use. I nd eed Schell wants to go sti l l further a nd locate a contradict ion in deterrence (e. g . pp.201-2): but the argume nt depends on an interesting conf uaion of cont:radictl on with cancell at ion , 18 along with the Rss •mption that deterrence invo lves cancellatio n . Nucl ear deterrence ma y wel l be irrational, i.t is immoral, but it is not inconsisten t . 16. Selecting the 11sual came theory scttlng sees to th is almost automaticnl ly; for it is then assumed that each player plays to ma ximiz e his or her own ndvantagc. Thus too th e presumption Jn Walze r, p .277, that 'the logi c of deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and toot h- for-tooth as sumptions . 17. Even the irrationali ty of the use hac been contested, e . g . it wishful]y thought that America will rise l ike a phoe nix radioactiv ~ ashes . has be en f rom th e The r e is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of th e mis sing mo..!_ivc for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a r etributiv e one, but a n ideological one: eliminate t he prospe ct of the f uture dominance of the riva i deo l ogy . 18. An anal ogous confusion of negation with cancel lation or obliteratio n appears in recent US " st a r war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "'negate" incoming USSR missiles . Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a diffe re nt dire ction; although involving negation t hey dep end upon perhaps questionabl e i nterconnexi ons of intensional func t ors. One type of paradox (consider ed in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proc eed to LSN war, though credible th reats ( ap pear to) imply an intention to proceed. Another s tyle derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when t he persis tent pract ice, which impl ies an intention, is to increase th e number. This paradox is technically r emov ed how satisfactor ily in another matter by a dis ti nction between longer- term ai.ms and :1.mmediate practic e , a time-ho noured method of removing .PPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collt>,.•Uyr,, and Indiyi,hli1 1 Responsi bility and on Regional ~~rategie ~ What one do e s depend s , naturally , on where one lives and what mea ns one hns , AS we ll as on wha t one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be . So too what s tr a t egy a stat e should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is , on national as we ll as on moral co nsi de r ations . In presen t circumsta nces states have an evident responsib il tty to work ouc th~lt• pol te l. cs . The r e nre however some pcrs uua iv • argum ents that this is where uLl r espo ns i bi l i ty ends : t he se major re sponsibi lities accrue entirely to states, a nd ther e is no individua l, or (smal le r scale) c oll ec tive, responsib ilit y to work out a pol i cy or stance on such matters as nuclear ar rangement s and still l ess to ac t, perh a ps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-respon sibi l ity or ~-out posit ion no doubt suits many people many for th emsel ve s, s ome (especial ly mor e a u thoritari an power-hol ders) on behalf of othe s - it do e s involve i nadmissib ly opting out of moral responsib il itie s, r e spon si bil it i e s ac quired by vir t ue of being a person wHhin the fr amework of ce r tain soci al a r r angements . Now the r e is no doubt that individua ls a nd groups can do t his, c an opt ou t. They ca n neglect t he:tr moral re sponsibi liti e s; b ut they are not ju stified tn doing so. Against th i s clai.m, whi ch is bas ed ultimatel y upo n each person's being set i n a we b of respons i bj_lity-- induci.ng social r elat ions, whether they like it or no t so long a s they choose to liv e with others, there are some neat arguments which a ppear to pe r mi t , or even wa rrant, opting out. One influenti a l argument take s t he following lin es: 1. The (o r dina ry) ind i vidual, or group, ha s no poss ibil ity of making a d i fference t o wha t happens. Theref ore 2. Such ind ivid ua ls, or grou ps, have no obligatio n to try to make a differenc e . Hence 3. Suc h i ndivid uals, or groups, are not mor a lly responsib le , f or instance when thint s go wr ong. There are two mai n a ssumption s in this a rgument , both of which should be resiste d: fir stly, in gett i ng from l to 2, a varia n t of the "ought implies can " t heme 1 , and se condly, the ass1mptio n tha t individua ls can't make a differenc e . While it is true tha t individua ls cannot accomplis h much on their own, together th ey can. Wha t a n individua l can achieve depe nd s on what suff ic ien tly many other i. nd lvidua ls do. In highly competiti ve communi ties, full of hopeful f r ee- riders, a pe rson may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in ma nner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangeme nt s , r a tio nally), at con si de r a ble pe r s onal cost , with no gua ra ntee that othe rs wil l also ac t M-ly. Suc h nn impasse no long e r faces so many in the West, at least as regards initi al s t eps agai nst nuclear a rrangemen ts. The individua l can cooperate with others in ways t hat do make a differenc e. An i ndividual is not exonerate d from r e s ponslb1.l ity by the argument . While ind iv iduals can re s pond by joining organisat ions whose activitie s are di rected a t mak i ng some differenc e , many individua ls a l so have the option of more indi vldu All st i c action in such forms as boycotts , go slows, po l itical di s obedi enc e. An important form of individua l resistanc e, a lready adopted in Canada and nor t h··we stern USA, is refusa l to pay income taxes directed towards defenc e or v·r ious pa r t s thereof ( e.g. nuc lear weapons productio n and de plo yment ), or a l ternat ively redirec t ion of such taxes , for instance to peace fun ds, Evi de n tl y, however) all these more indivi dualistic forms of political act ivi ty wo r k mo re ef fe ct iv~ly if individua ls integrate their activitie s, since th e i mpac t s aggregate ( a nd appear aft e r a certain stage to exponenti ate). As we l l co l lective action he lps in distribut ing the impact of retributio n or puni ti ve ac t io n by st a te aut horities. 1. Any sat i s f a c t ory d _ontic th e ory which t akes mora l dilemmas with du e se r io usn e ss is bound to r eject th i s theme. There are als o independe nt g rounds for j e ttisoning this Kantian theme : see Routley a nd Plurowood. - II .,I<,' Th 0 re are, furthermo re, arguments of some weight that individua ls are under Ro1ne sort of moral obligati on to t a ke political ac t ion to disaffili ate tlwm,, l' lves f rom wlrnt contribut es to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of ac t ion Lhjs is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether i l is a nuclea r power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilitie s, etc., and o such complicat ing issues as what kind of preventiv e action the state iN l ikely to take in return. (Any state seriously practis ing deterrenc e Js bound to take some action against effective protest, or ri sk losing cred ibi l ity ; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individua l need bear.) One a rgumen t - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear wea pon s to, fo example, providing fac ili ties for them - proceeds from th e wron g ness of nu c lear war to the pos'ition that it is not right to be making the we~pons for such war. The argument here appli.es connectin g principle s (like those of §5), while appealing to such backgroun d informati on as that the manuf act ure and de ployment of such weapons j_ncreases the risk of s uch war. But j f it is not morally righ t to be making s uch weapons t hen those who live in a state that is doing so ought to d isaffilia te themselve s from such defence productio n, an1 disaffili ation includes not paying for such prodtictio n through d e fence taxes . The argument is not without substanti ve as sumption, but the a s sumptions appear morally reasonabl e and defensi ble. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be : Does one want to le, or effective ly to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destructi on of human populatio ns? Or with making c red i bl e a threat to do so, or th e like? What follows applies primarily to people wh o do not want to be, or be seen as, such people . Arguments like hese not only put opt-outer s and do-nothin gers on the spot insofar as they contribut e to national objective s; they also raise questions , perhaps eve n dil emmas, as to pol:L ti cal obligatio n fo r those who would take act ion, ev en limited action such as redirectio n of taxes 3. For are there not political obligatio ns to the state, such as paying due taxes and supportin g the national defenc e effort? It i.s usually assumed that there are. However, no dile mma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligatio ns to be re gulated in some fashion by moral obligatio ns ; for in this case moral obli ga t i ons ov_rride political obligatio ns. In fact political obligatio ns are alread y significa ntly limited by moral constrain ts. The nuclear situation does not so muc h bring out new limits on political obligatio n, as em phasize the respects in which those obligatio ns are already limited, and introduce further moral considera tions against sponsorsh ip of national defence arrangeme nts. \n obligatio n to try 4 to dissociat e oneself from preparati on for nuclear war or from nuclear-d eterrence , for instance by not spending part of one' s working life contribut ing indirectl y to it, does not commit one to more t ha n this: to an obligatio n, for example, to work for an alternativ e nat ional defenc e policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this wou ld be a good thing to try to contribut e towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on wher e one lives, the level of one ' s commitme nts, e.g . to nonviolen ce, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorienta tion appropria te for different nations and regions, but there are more superfici al and deeper rcori ntations that can be worked out and promoted, e . g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthauss en of s upport of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and op ti on is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes ap parently introduce d to give t he state interest on gross earnings, bu t obviously very effective in remov .i ng taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferr ing ower from ind ividuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutio ns and the state one may be able to do little more than .!:El_, without giving up one's work and thereby one's abili.ty to contribut e to other deserving causes. For example, it may be v ir tua lly mpossiblc for one to avoid contribut ing to a superannu ation fund which is Seattle in "co nven ti on,'.11" warf a re a pparatus more that ch:ing,.. tha t . H T ~~ s intact, and deeper (ecological ) sch emes Th<:! US Bisho p , f or examplet pr esent R rather shallow set of goals for a su pe rp owe r s uc h as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the d e velo pmP n t a nd deployment of destabilizin g nuclear weapons systems and 1o1orking for better co nt r 1 of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear s i t ua t i on a ffords an import ant opportunity to press however for a much deeper se t of cha nge s in the superstates . For those whose very limited political i nfluence is exe rted in cons i derably less powerful states, even the shallow goa ] ma y look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps t ho se of a nother power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to bett er c ontr ol . The vi ew from the very minor powers in the Antipodes i s furthermor e diffe r e nt from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect ln much of the Antipodes of avoid.i.ng the more immediate effects of an LSN war, whi le t her e is Little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and o thers). There i s ac cordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the powe r holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve th e r e in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilizatio n. Local a nd re g ional self-intere st would also suggest substantial steps towards s e l f-p r e s e r va tion that (foolishly) have not been initiated. Wha t i s broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once th e gonls are gli.mpsed. Steps include wlthdrawal from the American alliance, wh jch i s in an y case of questionabl e merit since its main advantages lie with the US a nd J.t affords no guarantee of local defence; 5 c losur e of American bases and wi t hd r awa l of Ame r ican a cess ri.ghts for. nuclear-car ryi ng equipment to por ts , a ir bas e s and other facilities, espe cially so as to remove local nuclear ta rget s; pursu i t of a mor e evenhanded policy of nonalignmen t (something quite s mal l powe rs elsewher e have managed to achieve ). That much is easy, in pri nci pl e ; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to th e Am e r ica n mi lit a ry operations in the r egion lacks a solid f oundation; it is preml s s ed prim a rily on t e acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been a r r, ue <l ( in §5ff.), lacks justificatj_ · n. That Australian commitment to joint Aus t r al ian-US f acilities and to US military operations in the region is e x pl i citly bas e d on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent s t a t eme nt s of gov e rnm e nt policy. The jolnt fAcilities are 'part of a system of d e t erre nc e ' • 6 More dif f icult to e nsure, at least without much preparation , is that economi c and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Se condly, then, the building of increased socio-ec onomic independenc e in th e Antipod e s is r e quired. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear- free zone not wo rth targeting militarily: the regio n must also have a sustainabl e life of 1.ts own. For a small region, thcit lo oks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand' s economic independenc e. 7 For a larger region whi ch included Aus t ra l ia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northe rn military budgets, and l1ave the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structu r al readjustmen t were combined with t he .independen tly desirable aims of moving th e 5. Se e the dJ s cussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.14O-1. How slight t he commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been e mpha si ze d again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA . Of cour s e, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparative ly minor one , of he many mi.litary treaties that should be terminated: from a Eu rop ean nnd world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact ar r a ngeme n t s , and the r moval of American and Russian forces from Europe ( a nd el s ewhere ), are very much more important. A ful l e r d i scussion of Austr.alia's defence phil osophy will appe nr in a subsequent publication in this series . and alternative s, 76 whole reg i on towa rd s a multi- c u ltural conserver societ y and perha ps even dh,r ,, r t i ng "d e fence " spend i ng to conne cted self-managem ent and soci al dt'!f ence gon l s, the costs would be very considerabl y lessened . They only appear so g r eat in th e s e tting of a consumer-s atellite soci ety. In any case, wher e lif e and c ul tu r e themselv e s are conce rned , the cos t s do not appear excessive. I n sum, Southern countries s ho uld be s e vering their milita ry linkages with Northern nuclear powers 8 , a nd s hould be preparing now, socia lly and e conom i cally, for the time af t er the LSN war, the g reat No rth ern war. Howev er ther e are serious blockages in the way of such th ngs in the Ant ipodes) and inde e d impeding an y substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive agai n from the f act that present nuc l ear arrangement s favour man y of the power holders and s u it strong cor porate interests which wield poli t i c al powe r . But the main blockages to mo r e popular action a r e sl og a nis ed r.n the false dlchotomy: "either it won't hnppc.n or we ' re all dead a n}•wayj so why bot he r". One reason for blocka ge is then the extinction assumption ( S l of Appendi x 1), the unwarr · nted a doption of which is excessively nihil is tic . A mor e i mportan t reaso n is that most people, and most of the ir political re pres entatives, do not bel ieve that majo r repercussio ns of LSN war are going t o bcf;1l l th e m. These are e vents which , .l i. ke starvntion and tortur e , happen to o th ~r ( r mot) pe o ple , not them. It is no t tha t LSN war i s unthinkabl e : rather i t is that i t seems unb,~llev a hl e t ha t it should make any d ifference . Most people in t he Antipodes ~eal l y do not believe that thei r lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear. war. Wa king up and mo bi lis ing t hese peo ple is a major part of the problem in 6. Se e th e letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Min1.ster , replying to a symposium on conseque nces of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, l.9 83. The point is also made by the Fore ig n Minister in his Evat t Memor ial Lecture , as Hawke~ notes. The point is softe ne d by r e pr ese nting the fac i li ties as also having a role i n verificatio n, as well a s dete rr ence, 'that mak es arms c o nt rol and reduction feasi ble': the known role of the facilities in war fighting i s not alluded t o , and nor i s t he fact that any verificatio n role can be alte rnat iv ely a ccomplished us i ng satellites. However the matter is not in any do u bt: 'successive Australian governments . • . have taken the vi e w that our primary conce rn should be to suppo rt the effectivene ss of th e Uni ted States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for De fe nc e; quoted in Threats to Aust ralia ' s Sc ur.lty, p.17). Government representat ives (e. g . Hawke ) conc ed e that the joint facilities put Austr a lia at nucl ea r risk. ' Howev e r it is t he judgement of t hi s Government that the benef.its to Australia in terms of its immediate int e rest and globa l st r a tegic consideratio n outweigh potential risks'. A prope r de cision-t heoretic analysis would not sup port Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclenr t arget because of American bas es (c f . Ball, pp.130-8 ), the pot e n t ial risks given that an LSN war has a non-ne gligible probability far outweigh a ny i mme diate benefit s . Since Australia has only a r egiona°i strategic role, the global st r ategic consideratio ns are , as could be othe rwi s e i nferred, primarily those of the ma in user of t he facilities , the USA. The Governme nt is prepare d to put Australia , its peoples and e cosystems , a t what is decide dly serious risk .for i.mmediate and Ame r ica n i.nt ere st s . A worthwhile re presenta tive government docs not hold its people s hostage for such re asons . Not only i s tha t short-sighte d expediency decision maki ng: it seems virtually cer tain t ha t the <letai l s of the decision mak ing, were they ever. revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, bu t wou l d turn on s uch things as present trade advanta ges and short-term co mme r c ial considerati ons. 7. As to the e c onomic and so cial problems Aus tralia would face in t he event of a n LSN wa r, see Coombs fo r a preliminary as s es sment. 8. Id e ally the removal of s igni f icant nuclear targets should t a ke pl c e nc ro as the whole Sou thern Hemisphere , because this is the zone that is r e latively insulated, a t mosph e rically, from the Northern Hemisphe r e. 77 achie ving requ isi te social and politi e Rl ~djustmen t. -yen those who believe tha t LSN war ls no t improbabl e (but may well not be totally destructi v e of life) do little to reo r ganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessmen t: . 9 Richard Routle y* 9. Aga in , for some of what to do, for some ways to reorg a nise, see e.g. Mart in . There is als o much in teJ.J.ec tual work to be undert ake n, for example , searching out details of alternati ve arrangeme nts, and al so dJ.scredit ing establis hment experts, especiall y economist s and poli.tical scienti s ts , who intellect ually underwrit e present nucl e ar arrangeme nts . * The tex t has bee n much improved as a result of detailed commen t s by C. Pigden , R. Good in, N. Gri ff in t B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through cor r espondenc e with G. Fo ley. J. Norma n has helped in its final organisat ion. The initia l outlines of the pa pe r were worked out in Victoria , Canada; and an early version was read a t Simon Fraser Universit y in 1982 . REFERENCES c;. Anders, Die __Ant_~q •i erthe!.t des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, 1956; to a$ A/i,. G. And0rs, Endzeitan d Zeitenend e : Gedanken zur atomaren Munc hen;--Pfi2 ; referred to as AE. Situation , referred c.u. Beck, T. Brownlie , e d., Basic Documents on Human Ri.ghts, Oxford, 19 71. D. Bnl.1, A su i.table. piece of real estate. American installttt ions Hale & Iremonger , Sydney, 1980. in Australia , J. Barnes, 'The just war' in N. Kretzmann , A. Kenny and J . Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge Histo r y of La ter Medieval Philosoph y, Carnbri.dge Universit y Press, 1982, pp . 771-784. R.J. Barnett, Real Security, Simon s. & Schuster , New York, 1981 . Benn, 'Deterren ce or appeaseme nt? Or, on trying to be rational about war', Appl led Philosoph y, to appear. nuclear P. Berg, Re!:._1::habitlng a Sepa_rate Countr.y, Pl anet Drum, San Francisco , 1979. M, Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlan Pr inceton, Princeton UP, 19 74. (eds.), War and H.C. Coombs, 'The ec onomi c and social consequen ces of (Septembe r 1983) 8-9. Moral nuclear Responsi bility, Natuni war ', 5 A.i'!. Cox, Russian Roulette: the Superpowe r Game , Times Books, London, 1982 . J. Dahlltz, Nuclear Arms Control: with McPhec Gribble, Melbourne , 1983. effective internati onal G. Foley, ' Jonathan Schell : Genius - Phi losop her - Rewrite Brisbane, 1982; referred to as JS. Man ', agreemen ts. t ypescript , G. Foley, Nucl ea r Prophets. The True and the False_, typescrip t, Bri sbane, 1983. J. Galtung, The True Worlds, Free Press, New Yo r k, 1981. D, Gautier, 'Deterren ce, maximisa tion , and rationali ty ' , in The Security Gamble: Deterrenc e Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age, (ed. D. MacLean), Rowman and Littlefie ld , To t owa, N.J ., to appear ; also f ort hcoming in Et hics, April 198/¼. R.E . Goodin, 'Disarmin g nuclear apo l ogists', typescr i pt , 1982 . R.E. Goodin, 'Disarmam ent as a moral certainty ', Et_l2ics 95 ( 1984 ) , to appear. P(hilip) Green, Deadly Logic : The Theory Universit y Press, Columbus, 1966. of Nuclear Deterrenc e, Ohio State N. Griffi n, ' Lifeboat USA', Discussio n Papers in Environme ntal Philosoph y fi8, Research School of SociRl Sciences, Australia n National Universit y , 1983. Grou nd Ze ro Orgnnisat ion, Nuclear War: What's lo It For York, 1982. You? Pocke t Books , New R. Bardin, 'Unilater al vers us mutual disarmame nt', Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 (1983) 236-54. J.E. Hare nnd C.B. Joynt, Ethi c s and Internati onal Affairs, 1982. Macmillan , London , 79 R.M. ll;,r.e, Applicati ons o[ Moral Philosop ~, M&Q1t1illan, l,~rn,hin , 1972. R. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decis~on, McGraw-H ill, York, 1965. New H. Kahn, On Thermonu clear War, Princeton Universit y Press , 1960. G.S . Kavka, 'Some paradoxeG of deterrenc e', Journal 285-302; referred to as PD. of Philosol?.!"1y G.S. K.-ivka, 'Deterren ce, utility and rational choice', Theory (1980) 41-60; referred to as RC . and 75 (1978) Decision 12 G,S. Kavkn, 'Doubts about unilatera l nuclear disarmame nt ' , Philosoph y and Public Affairs 12 ( 1983) 255-60; referred to as DU. L. Kuper, Genoclde: its Eoli~ical use Jn the Twentieth Century, Yale UP, 1982 . D,P. Lackey, 'Ethics and nuclear deterrenc e', Rachels), Harper and Row, New York, 1979. in Moral Problems (ed. James D.P. Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitaria n look at nuclea r det e rren ce' , Philosoph y and Public Affai.rs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM. D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmam ent revisited : A reply to Kavka and Public Affairs 12 (1 983) 261-64. a nd Har de n', Phil osopl'l_ B. MarU.n , Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Pr ess , Nottingha m, 1984 , to appear. A.A. Mazrui , A World Federatio n of Cultures: An African Pe rspective , Free Press, New York , 1976. J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War, Affairs , New York, 1959. Cou ncil on Reli.gi on and Inte r nati onal T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre ', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narveson, 'Vlolence and War ', i n Regan, pp.109 -146. National Conferenc e of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Wa r and Peace, ' The challenge of peace: God's promise and our re s ponse' , Origins 12 (20) (1982) 306-328; refer red to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter '. Oxford E_i~~lish Dictionar y, Oxford, 1971; referred to as QED. B. Paski.ns and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth , London, 1979. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingen cies 4. Nuclear Disasters , A Rep o rt to the Comn1issio n for the Future, Governmen t Printer, Wel lington, New Zealand, 1982. P. Ramsay, The Just War : force and political responsib il itt, Scribner, New York, 1968. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Universit y Press, Cambridge Ma ss., 1971 . T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Deat h, Random Hous e , New York , 1980. R. Routley and N, Griffin, 'Unrave l ling the meanings of life' , Discussio n Papers in Env i ronmental Philosoph y 113, Aust ralian Natio na l Universit y, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley and V. Routley , 'The Alternati ves 2 (1982), 23-8. irrefutab ility of ana rchism' , Social 80 R. Rou tl ey ~nd V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paracons i stent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others~ Philosop hia Verlag, 1984. R. Scheer , Wi t h Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House, York, 1982. New J . Sche l l, 'Refle ctions (Nuclea r Arms - Parts I-III) ', The New Yorker, February 48- 109, and 45-10 7, respecti vely. This P.<>rinr; , trnh tl t lcd Th£> Fat e of th Enrth, hfls now appcnred as a hook wlth t hat tit l e (Knopf, New York, 1982). Referenc es in the t ex t are to the book. 1, 8, and 15, 1982, pp.47-11 3, T.C. Sche lling, The St rategy of Conflic t , Ha rvard Univers ity Press, 1980 . G. Sharp, Explo ri ng Nonvio l ent Alterna tives, Boston, 1971. D. and R. Smith , The Economi cs of Militari sm, Pluto, London, 1983. F . Soo, ' Mao's vision for China', in ContemP?_rary Chinese Philosop hy Adelm ann ) Nijhof f , The Hague , 1982, pp.62-80 . T . Taylo r, Nurembu r g and V:letnam: An 19 72. American Tr agedy, Times (ed. Books, F.T. London, E . P. Thompson and D. Smith , Prot est and Survive , Monthly Review Press, New York, 198 1. Threats to Aus tr alia's Security . The ir na ture and Gove r nmen t Publishi ng Service , Ca nb erra , 1981. probabi lity, Austral ian R. W. Tuc ker , The J ust W r, John Hopkins Pr ess, Baltimo re, 1960. M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Mil i tary Professi .on, Westview , Colorado . 1979. Boulder , t M. Wa l ze r, Ju st and Unjust Wars , Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasse rstr om ( ed.) War and Morality , Wadswor th, Belmont , Cal i forni a , 1970. B. Will.lams , ' How to t hink sceptic ally about t he bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuck.e rma nn, Nuc lea r Illus :l.on and Reality, Collins , Lo ndon, 1982. ( Nov . 18,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 1894: Draft of On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy) draft. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'War and peace. 1: on the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 5. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 59, Item 1894 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7122938">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7122938</a> https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ccd54bbcfae9fe07cf40299850560203.pdf fe931fcce3b13680c46d5ca17790a70d PDF Text Text AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY: Further investigations of the nonexistent. ‘The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war’ (Kant, ‘A [the only!] secret article for perpetual peace’, p.158 - a surprising article, flattering no doubt to philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition). A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy, just as a philosophy of technology comprises much more than a technology policy. A policy can be given merely by a list of directives as to what do in various circumstances; even at its best it need only involve practical wisdom. By contrast, a philosophy goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom, integration of the policy into a theoretical setting, which looks, among other things, at the central arguments and key concepts involved: here, security, stability, control, protection, defence, interests, national interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is thus a branch of political and social philosophy, and has long been treated as such, though under such more familiar and honest headings as “of war” and “of peace”. Like most parts of philosophy, it can be applied, for instance in shaping policies, in regional ways among others. A defence philosophy should integrate appropriate defence arrangements and approaches to war and peace, not merely or superficially into “foreign policy” or assumed “international relations”, but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on-going culture and into the intended or planned cultural arrangements. A defence policy typically takes prevailing socio-political arrangements and power structures for granted; a defence philosophy again penetrates deeper, questioning or rejecting features of these structures, enquiring as to the merits of things and institutions of which defence is planned, asking what sort of society should be defended by what sort of appropriate methods and at what lengths. What, for instance, is Australia, what are Australians, defending, concerned to defend, aiming to defend? Here in Australia? In the region? Abroad? How much of what others have, or what we have, is worth defending, preserving? Does Randwick Racecourse, or Pine Gap, merit defending? Would anyone stage a last stand for Oaks Estate, one of Canberra’s dreariest suburbs? If the Indonesians made a lightning strike in Australia just to remove Bjelke-Petersen,1 should we resist? Few of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in Australia, where unplanned muddling through from immediate problem to immediate problem - reactive contingency “planning”, if you want to be generous - is the main style of political life , and, along with the traditional political game of “follow the leader”, of defence planning. Australia �2 does not yet have a defence philosophy. Some of its critical philosophers could help to supply it with the rudiments of one or more, and to inject some depth into broader defence theorizing. What follows is intended as a modest beginning: much of what is attempted, unearthing arguments and assumptions, followed by analysis and criticism, and some elaboration of alternative principles, falls squarely within the domains both of applied philosophy and traditional philosophical practice. 1. Australia’s inappropriate. defence “policy”: incoherent, obsolescent Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence policy. American, This is a commonplace charge (made even by friends of Defence, interested in obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).^ The reasons concern not merely the major unsolved issues of exactly what is being defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms and values, and what role American defence facilities in Australia are supposed to have in this. They concern the status of present treaty arrangements, such as the “cornerstone”/“millstone” ANZUS treaty, signed between Australia, New Zealand and the US, now in disarray (still ’‘maintained” by New Zealand, whom the US has unilaterally announced expelled), and of subsequent associated memoranda of understanding (some secret, involving the local storage of US nuclear weapons, entry of American personnel, etc.). They also concern a range of more detailed lucunae such as: lack of clearly-defined priorities on what needs defending and how it is to be accomplished; doubtful capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level contingencies in and to the north of Australia and in maritime zones; and unsatisfactory (or no) arrangements and planning for “defence-in-depth”, for civil defence and use of civil infrastructure, mobilisation, wartime administration, protection of key facilities and areas, and post-nuclear organization. And, equally damaging, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it is nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.It is left to journalists and newspaper­ watching academics to winkle out what local defence installations may be for and to make various conjectures as to what the policy may be. Of course there are many administrators and policy makers who think that is the way it should be; the public should not be informed, but kept satisfied with some “generalised” statements.As to coherence, Australian policy makers have only recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role, not a global one. This they were told by the Americans in Washington in talks allegedly designed to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the USA. It thus begins to look as if Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is still as much determined abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia. �3 Much circumstantial evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim that Australia’s vague defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA, as it used, before the last World War (and British abandonment), to be stamped Made in UK. For one thing, Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy, so it is claimed. That “policy” has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party, which has governed most of the time (as senior partner in a coalition). But the Liberal party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as planned in Washington for ANZUS) and still does. For instance, the latest package® from the Liberal Party “Defence and Foreign Policy Unit” consists largely of US Defence Department material packaged under a local cover. The Strategic Basis Papers, endorsed by the Labor Government, give virtually unqualified support to US military practices and to the American view of the global strategic situation, and commit Australia to supporting, without any due reservation, American positions in world forums.' The same dependent-policy conclusion can be reached by more devious arguments. regional defence role? When, for example, did Australia find out it had a After the Americans had found that they could no longer afford to police the world on their own and would have to delegate some of that role and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on reliable dogs-bodies; and also after Labor took some faltering steps towards developing a broader foreign more independent policy with some indigenous elements (Australian Minister Hayden was promptly flattened by US heavies such as Schultz). Australian defence and foreign policy copies American policy in main respects, but lags it. The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor government, to the extend that it is visible, is conservative; it coincides with older American defence policy, and diverges from the new (post-Reagan) American war policy. For Australian Labor defence policy supports what the American administration supposedly used to support, namely DI. Multilateral nuclear disarmament (within the framework of series of treaties and agreements), and D2. Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual assured destruction (i.e. MAD). The presence of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to be justified in the framework of these assumptions. For they are to assist in making deterrence under D2 effective, and to provide verification for the arms reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions). There is much evidence indicating however that American policy makers have now abandoned both Dl and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms control8. Certainly they have moved on to the following highly destabilizing doctrines: Nuclear war-fighting, Limited nuclear wars, and Star-Wars (i.e. Strategic Defense Initiative). While this American war policy may well be accepted by the next Liberal coalition government, all of these military doctrines are explicitly rejected by the 1985 Labor government. Since the American “joint” facilities in Australia also facilitate the rejected �4 objectives, the problems concerning these dubious facilities are much aggravated. The Government’s approach concerning them - withholding information concerning the full range of their functions, and particularly their war-fighting roles from parliament and the public - is certainly unsatisfactory, as several of its members realise; and as a result the Government appear in not atypical disarray, further grist for the incoherence theme. If there is perhaps a coherent Australian global defence approach somewhere away from public exposure, it is most likely then an old abandoned American policy.9 But in that case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification. For Australia, in supporting US defence policy and activity, for instance in world forums, is supporting present offensive American policy, not what it reputedly adheres to, deterrence (through MAD). The point holds good whether or not American global policy still includes such deterrence as a proper part10; for it certainly involves other very different and dubious strategies. The commonplace, but increasingly feeble, justification given for Australian’s tagging along after America is that Australian interests are the same as American11. American interests by no means coincide with Australian . However Consider, for instance, such matters as enriching Americans, making conditions favourable for American business, promoting Americans and things American. Consider, differently, American practices in Latin America, from undercutting Allende’s government in Chile to its practices against Nicaragua, to its extensive export of arms and violent methods, there and elsewhere in the world. Thus America, like Russia, is busy meddling in Africa, but ‘Australian security interests are not directly involved’ (SB, p.24). Consider, differently again, escalation of the nuclear arms race. Or consider American strategic planning, and all the game- and decision- theoretic models which concern just USA and its adversary USSR, perhaps occasionally adding Europe as part of the monolithic West, but rarely or never considering the Southern Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America as Poland may be of Russia or it is nothing. Or consider American interests not merely in Soviet and communist containment, but in containing socialism such as might (under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia. An American policy answering to American interests is accordingly inappropriate for Australia, inappropriate for Antipodean socialism. Australians should do their own defence thinking and work out a policy appropriate for Australia. (That applies also to Australian political representatives, who should stop parroting implausible American views and begin developing some genuinely local and original ones.) Should Australia be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation of their style of free-enterprise capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e. that the state socialists don’t already heavily control)? What they quite seriously call ‘keeping the free world free’? Of �5 course freedom has, in this sort of context, multiple meanings and associations (as well as multiple inconsistencies, appearing information” and the like). overtly in subsidized “free trade”, selective “free Significant parts of what mainstream American culture admits under the freedom umbrella, mainstream Australian culture would exclude: for instance, active opposition to and undermining of social and socialist programs and governments, bullying of small countries that impose barriers to US business or military practices (all part of “free enterprise”), etc. What of those intangible freedoms the cultures supposedly agree about, civil liberties, freedom to information, to live and work where one chooses, to travel, and so on? These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) than in most parts of the Eastern Block. But such freedoms, which run counter to dependent policies, hardly require defence subservience. influenced state practices are fast reducing freedom. Moreover, military- Many of the older freedoms have vanished this century, such as freedom to travel, to work and live abroad, etc.; now one requires permits, licences, passports, ... . And many more former freedoms are being or have been eroded; soon it will be identity documents, restricted zones, ID cards, as already in parts of the “free West”. Now nuclearism in Europe ‘is devouring the very freedom it is said to protect: [the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep citizens from assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles’ (Capra and Spretnak, pp.58-9). Further structural changes required for the security of the state, imcompatible with democratic freedoms, include ‘secrecy, lack of commentability, permanent emergency, concentration of authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and police’ (Falk, in Feith p.24). Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve remaining freedoms. 2. Inherited other-reliance, and the populist and elitist cases for patronage and subservience. Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is furthermore inherited rather than regularly (re)thought through. But that procedure - essentially the legal method of precedence, whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in legalistic decision making - is defective when applied in politics or to defence, especially where immediate independent action is required. For precedence methods are extraordinarily slow, as well as characteristically conservative, and as in defence exclude significant and rather urgent alternatives. The unsatisfactory decision-making practices to be revealed in the case of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of the kind of advanced age capitalism Australia operates under, or rather labours under, down under. In setting down those �4. 6 features of aged capitalism (‘of the Corporate State') that the New Left and Alternative Australia movements were reacting against, Cock neatly summed up these practices: Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political interests, rather than by rational goals and means that served public interests. The people were rarely consulted effectively before a decision and often only partially informed afterwards. Planning was based on a mere extension of the present. ... activists felt they were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The availability of space, time, trees and air was also determined by others ... (p.18 italics added).14 As it was and is with one’s defence, military and civil, so it is with the matter of whether one lives in a nuclear target zone or not, and so on (though immigration policy, uranium and woodchip export policies, etc.) In these areas planning remains top-down, with at best consultative elements. No real choices are offered to people. A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance, that Australia’s defence depends on other more powerful allies. That ally was firstly Britain, and since World War II America; but in any event the assumption is that to be safe Australia needs a powerful patron, a protector. A corollary is that Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected concessions. And for the most part it has; however such a defence insurance policy does not come cheap.15 It costs not only money and resources, but quality of life, freedom and independence. The assumption of other-reliance is however unsound, for several reasons. Most important, it characteristically depends upon the following themes, all of which lack solid foundation: 1. Australia is threatened - or at least 1A. Australia is likely to be threatened in the near future. 2. Australia cannot defend itself. 3. Australia can however depend upon its patron (or ally), i.e. upon the USA. These three themes in fact make up what has been called the populist case for the ANZUS alliance.16 It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS, said to hold sway with the Australian government, which, while insisting upon premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead 4. Australian has a vital interest in global stability. 5. Global stability is under threat (constantly) by an expansionist Soviet Union. 6. Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance. Some of techniques the US deploys for holding global balance operate through dependent states and a network of alliances like ANZUS. But obviously further premisses are required to reach the intended conclusions that Australia should be participating in any such �alliance, and what is more, hosting US defence facilities and exercises. A first such premise is the no-shirking theme, that Australia should be contributing its part to “holding the balance’’ (cf. Bell). Even this first further step is pretty shaky; as we shall see, one shaky step in a rather ramshackle case, since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly dubious (and 4 may involve equivocation). For it can be plausibly argued that Australia’s vital interests are not guaranteed by US techniques, which threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS. In any case, it is unclear that local contributions enhance global (nuclear) stability (see e.g. Mack and Davidson). But first, there is more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist position to be considered, what might be called the offshore elitist position. This position grants 2A*. Australia can defend itself against regional threats, and can look after itself regionally. But it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may not) grant 1A. What the offshore position insists upon is 1AI*. Australia’s interests could be threatened in the near future. Since these interests - perhaps concerned with trade, Australian companies or Australians abroad, or whatever - may have little or nothing to do with internal Australian security, this premiss represents an extremely important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift from war to defence). It goes further than what has been called forward defence. In extended form the offshore position does call for some sort of global policeman or police force ready to intervene whenever a “free port” anywhere looks like closing its doors. Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with the elitist position is that it tends to slide through to the offshore position (by way of now evident immediate positions). The arguments against both the populist and elitist cases, and indeed against virtually all of themes 1 through 7 are sufficiently familiar to justify but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points involved. Of course just a couple of defections from themes 1 through 7 would serve logically defeat both cases, but there have been some interesting repair attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses. 3. The brief against the popular populist case; the need for new directions. Contra 1 and 1A. While Australia is not at present under notice of threat, veiled threat or harassment from abroad, a majority of its population appears to believe that it is. As the popular view is not the informed, administrative, or parliamentary view, it is worth inquiring �8 why the popular view persists, as the opinion polls reveal it has. The populace has been deliberately kept in the dark (or even misinformed), because this suits bipartisan government purposes. Although both main Australian political parties are well enough aware that the main assumptions underlying the populist case are false, the reasons for which they support the American alliance (e.g. those of the elitist case) are much more difficult to sell to the public. Accordingly the parties and Government have no political interest in undermining the unsound populist case. In particular they have gone out of their way not to cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is a reliable guarantor against all threats. Thus long-standing Australian psychological insecurity about security has been allowed to stand, and has not been assuaged by any requisite informational and educational effort. In particular, older attitudes to Asia persist not far below the surface of popular Australia: fear, mistrust and xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism. This misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for Eastern picking, instead of the Asians view that Australia, so far as they are aware of it at all, is a remote desiccated uncouth place perhaps good for some trade and investment. Or, to get towards more concrete assumptions, Australians apparently tend to their view country as affluent but underpopulated, resource rich but largely defenceless; yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished, resource poor, and so on . Such a view is seriously out of touch with reality. Parts of Asia are now at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators) as Australia. They do not see themselves as overpopulated, in a way that calls for mass exodus; and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe, such as Java, bribes and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire. So far as they require them, they can purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more easily and cheaply (because they even carry significant local subsidies) than they could obtain • them by seizure. 1s For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat, no other state has a genuine interest in attempting to invade Australia. As it is for interests, so it is for capabilities. No regional power has the capacity to launch a successful invasion of Australia, or is likely to have such a capacity in the near future. As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded, Currently only the United States would have the physical capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia, and it clearly lacks any motive to do so (TAS, p.94). �9 As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff), ... to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the superpowers (TAS). But neither superpower is at all likely to expend effort or resources to such an end. An obvious naive question which at once arises is: Why bother then with much defence? (A later question to entertain is: why not be a free-rider on collectively provided global security, such as it is?) Why not proceed forthwith to unilateral disarmament? Mack for one, having reassembled the now-standard telling case that Australia is not threatened ‘now or for the foreseeable future’, and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted by the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia. He stages a hasty retreat, points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss 2, and proceeds to claim that ‘the populist case for ANZUS is sustained’ even without premisses 1 and 1A. It is however a decidedly problematic retreat. While it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A may sometimes take it for granted that Australia can look after itself to some extend, put up some resistance, it is far from clear that they depend essentially on assumptions approximating premiss 2. Consider the no­ interests argument, which appears decisive given the (estimated) very limited invasion capabilities of potential invaders. The main consideration adduced appears to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia’s dynamic fighting forces. Australian mineral resources, to repeat one of the more sensitive examples involved, can be obtained more readily and cheaply by trade methods than military ones. What all this seems to show is that a rather minimal streamlined force, if any, would presently meet Australia’s military requirements. It is not as if Australia is ‘entirely defenceless’ without a conventional military force, like a babe-in-arms. The whole apparatus of nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well suited to its use, though lacking a population trained in its techniques. But even without requisite popular training in defence methods, Australia would be a difficult place to govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate. It was such features of the Australian character that deterred the Japanese on a previous occasion “If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographical conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one” (TAS, p.62). The points still hold good, and could be strengthened. There are several parts to any such �10 program of nonmilitary defence: making it happen, and putting it abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration) that it has happened. To the issue of alternative defence we are bound to return. For now, when Australia is not threatened, is a good occasion to reconsider, and begin to adapt, defence arrangements. For example, it looks very much as if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent, largely to make many Australians feel secure.But a much more effective and inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite popular education and psychological therapy - with, if it were well done, much more satisfactory results, a more secure and better informed people. Contra 2. As a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and C3I capabilities, the military defence of Australia has become much easier. It comes down to enhancing, through new robust and reliable systems, the enormous strategic advantages Australia enjoys by virtue of geographical isolation. In principle, any maritime invading force can now be detected well in advance of arrival, through modern radar warning systems, and destroyed by precision guided munitions. And any invaders that did manage to gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be subject to disproportionate responses from local defence. Standard discussions (as in Dibb, Mack) proceed to introduce a great deal of “Boys’ Own War Games” stuff concerning contemporary weapon and C3I systems; the essential point is that these could serve to turn Australia into a pretty unvulnerable armed fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory were the oceanic moat crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin). Under such armed neutrality and (differently) fortified Australia defence scenarios, even invasion from outside the region by an inimical world power could be resisted with reasonable prospect of success. There is no power at all likely to mount such an invasion; there is apparently (as noted above) only one power that could, that good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by 6-7% of the Australian population!). Nonetheless the threat of a Soviet invasion is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees of their elected representatives. But the Soviet military has never undertaken such a long-range massive force projection, is ill-equipped to do so, and lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see, e.g., D. Martin; also SS, ST). The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian cities, would be struck at by intercontinental missiles. While this would be bad enough, it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by an invasion. Soviet forces are once again not sufficient, and not thought sufficient by the Soviets for that sort of diversion; they would be required elsewhere in a superpower war; and they would be devastated, unless USA is militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted. �i. 11 Contra 3. What will be argued is not the negation of 3, that the Americans cannot be relied upon, but rather that 3 is dubious, and that it would be rash to place excess reliance on American protection. That being so, and other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own resources, as the American administration is kindly advising. Especially since the American “Vietnam debacle” and the fall of Saigon, things have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability of American patronage. First, the relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined significantly. It no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity); as a connected matter of policy, US world warfighting aspirations have been reduced. Its ability to act as, and afford to be, global policeman has also markedly declined/ Secondly, the willingness of Americans to engage in remote foreign wars has correspondingly tumbled. Although the American administration includes more than enough hawks, to be sure, the people and Congress are not longer in a mood for gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in American interests. Since Vietnam, US opinion polls regularly show strong popular opposition to overseas military involvement. This “Vietnam syndrome” has served as a major constraint on US military policy and foreign involvement. An important manifestation of these changes is the Guam Doctrine, calling upon US regional allies to take primary responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts. Another important outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops are committed abroad there must be reasonable assurance of Congressional and popular support (Weinberger, reported in PC p.14). As Mack comments, ‘such assurance is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries where no US vital national interests are at stake’. Certainly no more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which provides only that each signatory ‘act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes’ (article 4). All the treaty strictly requires is consultation; there is no undertaking or commitment. Isn’t the treaty backed up by informal verbal reassurances? None that are not undermined by others, in American administrative multiple-speak. Even the elite view is that Australia has to ‘work ... to maximize the prospect of US support’ and that the Americans cannot be counted upon. For ‘the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite high, and circumstances at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability to help Australia in other ways?. ‘... we cannot rely upon US support in a defence emergency arising within our own neighbourhood’ (SB, pp.29-30). However a special case has been made for American reliability in Australia’s case - as �12 opposed to examples of American abandonment of earlier military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran) - on the basis of permanent friendship, common interests, and shared values and democratic traditions. There are two difficulties with this type of special pleading: first, as to the basis, and, second, as to the adequacy of such a basis in by-passing Congress, the American people, and slow constitutional processes. Historical evidence hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis in analogous cases. And here, as already indicated, the basis is shaky. For there is not a common culture shared by Australia and America: rather values diverge significantly on quite crucial issues. Even less are interests always common, as the matter of subsidised agricultural produce reveals, and as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently confirmed. Interests diverged, for instance, when Australia toyed with opposing Indonesia’s claim to West Papua. So it is dubious at least that American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation with Asian nations to the North, e.g. with Indonesia or Japan. Of course if the special case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates, then the treaty would be otiose. There was in fact no treaty in operation in 1942; but by then American interests in countering the Japanese were independently aroused. 4. Other-reliance and regional self-reliance A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be deemed entirely reliable, yet precisely here unreliability can hardly be tolerated. When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won’t do for Defense to call up with a message like that from local Services, "We can’t get there till tomorrow’’, or “until after Congress meets”, or “Sorry, Mate!”. More seriously, handing defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others; and given nuclear defence, which too many Antipodean administrations have opted for, it quite likely means literally handing our lives over for many of us. Another problem of other-reliance is thus its adequacy. A further problem is its cost. In principle, if a State hires out its defence it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if, that is, defence is a commodity of a sort, like national shipping, meterological services, etc. The trouble with global defence is that the market is monopolistic, with currently only one supplier of the right complexion22, who accordingly can exact a very high price, and has - making the whole country a nuclear target and demanding substantial subservience. Similar points make part of the case, well-enough appreciated, for not trying to press defence, plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity. When a country can supply its own defence, it therefore makes very good sense for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in its own proper defence than most other parties. Should it also be cheaper in costs that matter, then self-reliance not just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance does not. But in that event, it surely does not need nuclear �13 patrons, or to farm out some of its defence. Such self-reliance undermines an important part of the older case based on other-reliance for alliances such as ANZUS. However newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g. Australian minister Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty ANZUS of what little content it had, and remove much of the apparent point of such older alliances. Since the ANZUS arrangements contain no clear commitments beyond consultation but are merely vague articles of understanding, a simple course is of course to allow them to be emptied of content, so that the alliance, an expensive and outdated “insurance” policy, dies a natural death. It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should American defence facilities be closed or internationalised and passage of American nuclear equipped or powered transport be excluded from Australia. That would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the treaty supposedly affords , while making way for the greater advantages of friendly nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, or so on. But self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient. The world does not consist of separable isolated pieces, as becomes increasingly evident. Most dramatically, Australia will not escape the effects of nuclear winter. The picture is much the same as for other dynamic subjects, such as plants which are not internally self-sufficient but depend crucially on their environment - and indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional holistic component of policy should take? Put this way, it is almost obvious that the appropriate move is not taking sides (as in a kids’ war game or tug-of-war game that is already set up) and doing one’s bit for confrontation. For that will not contribute to stability, to a proper holistic approach, but rather to sectionalism and fragmentation, and to bringing nuclear winter closer. Other-reliance and self-reliance typically present a false contrast, and certainly do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of holism and partism (EE, p.223), and of dependence versus isolationism. In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards - might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance. The elitist case, insofar as it were to call for such reliance (e.g. in assumption 4), could hardly be faulted. But it doesn’t; and is satisfied with much less. Integration may reach only certain inadequate levels, the level of modern alliances and alignment, which are essentially coupled with opposition to an other side, e.g. the monolithic East (or West). It is into just this trap that elitist arguments fall. �14 5. The decline and fall of elitist arguments. Premisses 4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion of stability, as related arguments revolve around that of security. But stability and security are value-laden terms, which are not cultural invariants. What stability comprehends in American administrative perception is very different from what highland villages take it to include. In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude. But both the relevant states and the stationary among them are relative to given frames of reference; for instance, what is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel. As Trudeau has said of the superpowers, ‘they share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates’ (p.10) and disturb stability. But lesser states or regional people, not counting remote business or military interests as relevant, report no instability. Bureaucrats invariably view bombs as necessary to stability, and the nuclear fix as stability; by contrast, gentle people increasingly see bombs as tools of terrorism and as characteristically antithetical to peace. ad 4: Of course Australia has a vital interest in global stability and security: what sizeable nation does not? But the determinable motherhood interpretation (of italicised terms), while no doubt diplomatically convenient, conceals crucial differences, highly material to the argument. For one global stability means something different in USA from what it means in Costa Rica and likely what it intends in Australia. Certainly vital interests are different. America is interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere), and it tends, in more popular rhetoric at least, to equate containing socialism with containing communism and both with Soviet containment. A continental swing to socialism (or Non-Soviet communism) in Latin America, or in Africa, would upset global stability, on American perception, and would indeed have significant effects on US business or investment; but it would not on its own upset or affect most Australians or directly threaten Antipodean stability, and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability. Australians generally are not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing its spread (indeed perhaps the opposite). Australia is not interested in (and oughtn’t to be charmed by the idea of) defence of the (American) “free enterprise” system, or in the defence of uglier forms of capitalism wherever they are presently initiated or opposed (cf. Chomsky and Herman). Contra 5. It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss, that the Soviets are expansionistic, at least in that they are interested in extending their influence where they can. So also are most empires, including American and Indonesian (so for that matter are many academics and most sales-people). But the Soviets have an ideological �15 message to spread, Marxism-Leninism, an ideology they used to anticipate being installed everywhere. But the Americans also have a message, a capitalist message, Free Enterprise Inc, which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them. And they need to be expansionistic to have it adopted, whereas the Russians and Chinese need simply wait for history to take its allegedly determined course (though a little assistance - reflecting legitimate doubt about this determinism? - would surely spread their disconcertingly different forms of “progress” without interfering). But surely the Russian message is pernicious? All these messages are pernicious (for familiar reasons: see e.g. Erlich). The proper question is whether on its own Soviet international activity threatens, in some damaging way, global stability. Undoubtedly Soviet-American confrontation, as in the Cuban missile affair, does threaten global stability; though not in a way that has any bearing on Australian defence. In fact no Russian expansionary tendency, military or otherwise, has an untoward direct effect on Australia, little of significance reaches into the Antipodes (see Dibb SS). So what is the local excitement about? In large measure the excitement has been drummed up by the political right, East European expatriates, and pork-barrelling politicians. The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and overexploited (Mack ST). Viewed from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem, unless the Soviets should get locked into military confrontation with USA - a real problem to be addressed. With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part of a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize apart the heavies, not by seconding and inciting the USA. But confrontation apart, Soviet internationalism, hardly a great success story, does not seriously disturb global stability, as seen from Australia. For a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism, types of expansion should be distinguished - military, potential military, influence with military access, and mere influence. In actual military expansion and involvement since W’orld War II, the Russian record is hardly striking by comparison with the USA or several other states. The one conspicuous case involving control of new territory, that of Afghanistan, has actually had little effect on global stability. The usual Western apprehension concerns not anything the Soviets have accomplished, but what they might attempt militarily, especially in Europe. But the idea of Soviet military adventure in Europe is a Western invention and bogey, lacking in plausibility. The Soviet military lacks the force ratio needed to be assured of military success in Europe, both by their own standards of what is required and by Western strategic standards. And the Soviets have no good reasons or interests in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into nuclear war. They already face enough economic difficulties and troubles with East European client states which they cannot control satisfactorily. �16 The extension of Soviet influence has largely been in the Third world. But it has hardly been successful, with as many failures and losses to record as Soviet “gains” - gains which add to the imperial burden since they involve countries wracked with problems, such as Vietnam. The Third World exercises are marred by Soviet inaptitude and limited by the state of their own economy. They scarcely displace the global structure enough to test its stability; and they produce no shock waves or even significant ripples in the Antipodes. Contra 6. The main current threat to world stability appears to come not from one of the dancers in the East-West dance of death, but from the escalating confrontation, easily ignited, between the lead dancers. With this US policies and practices have at least as much to do as USSR ones. Recent US practices are more destabilizing than Soviet ones, and indeed highly destabilising, because of new weapons and weapons systems, because of rejection of arms control and Soviet proposals, and because of “star wars” preparation which both accelerates the arms race on earth and begins a new one in space. A vast increase in tension and suspicion accompanies the “arms race” which is in large measure due to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines, new weapons systems, with built-in incentives for pre-emption, and deliberate abandonment of arms control (see PR). Such considerations, duly assembled, demolish the received (but nonetheless crazy) theme that an alliance or alignment with USA helps increase stability. American practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet. 6. The East-West balance argument: American alignment versus friendly independence The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by the East-West This politically-important balance argument, which shares key premisses nr with the related elitist argument, runs as follows : balance argument. 7. Global stability is the key to world peace. 8. Stability of the international order is a matter of maintaining a global balance. But 5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR. 6A. The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open and pluralistic international order. 9. Australia’s primary security concern, indeed most vital interest, is this stability. Hence 10. Australia’s role is to help America maintain the balance. The rest of Australia’s intervolvement with American military arrangements is then taken to follow. But there are many reasons for halting the argument before it reaches this stage of practical (and allegedly moral) detail. The balance argument assumes much that has already been rebutted, for instance that the Soviet threat thesis is correct (i.e. 5) and that US �17 policy is stabilizing (part of 6A). It also takes for granted, what now is at least in serious doubt, that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than what the American administration appears to be aiming at, superiority. But in that event, Australia is not really engaged in some longer term balancing feat, so much as in helping USA prevail in nuclear race, contradicting the goal of world peace of premiss 7. Contra 10. and its derivation. The derivation is inadequate: it does not follow that Australia’s role is such a lackey’s one. If the balance of strength is leaning in America’s direction, as most less-biassed evidence indicates, then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in with the Eastern team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war would suggest). Presumably premiss 6A.1 is designed to exclude this deplorable thought, of Australia teaming up with totalitarians. Nevertheless Australia should be putting its slight weight where it is effective, given its own broader objectives, interests, principles and supposedly pluralistic ideals. There are several different roles Australia could fulfil which would enable it to make a more satisfactory, less passive, contribution to world peace, among them de-escalation through active nonalignment, appropriate aid, and so forth. Thus 10 is hardly well-supported or evident. A more direct approach would be better than throwing Australian weight unreflectively on one side of the balance. As a little reflection attests, the balance image and argument point not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment. Contra 6A (and 6). The theme that US maintains the balance, and hence preserves the peace, is of course false. For again, it takes two to tango. While it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and checks the USSR in this munitions dance, the history of the dance reveals that the pace-escalation has flowed from the interaction of the one partner with the other. That is, but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the USSR (the interaction is two-way as with Hegel’s famous master-slave relation). In any case, it looks as if, on a different historical trajectory, the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for they have comparable combined GNP, technological resources, etc.; cf. note 20) Thus it is doubtful that the current Soviet build-up, produced in interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US. ad 6A.1. As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the argument, it is enough to observe that the international order the USA helps maintain leaves very much to be desired. In its intervention, militarily, economically and indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness, is well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes, etc. The negative side of American imperialism as well-enough documented, if not widely enough read or known by Americans themselves (cf. again Chomsky and Herman). Only under scandalously low redefinitions of ‘open’ and ‘pluralistic’ is the present “free” world order �18 either open or pluralistic. ad 8, and the damaging equivocation on ‘the balance’. While balance is one way of maintaining stability in the world arrangements that have presently come to pass, the balance structure can only carry so much loading. Add too much weight (of arms tension, and so forth) to both sides and the precarious structure will fail, probably catastrophically. increasing probability of catastrophic breakdown, for a variety of reasons The (accident, miscalculation, computer error, human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI). While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for stability, the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not. The balance argument, however, neglects this dynamical situation, illegitimately switching from a (certain post) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going) balance in subsequent premisses. The balance argument itself breaks down through equivocation. What the dynamic picture also indicates is the importance of removing some weight from the balance, most obviously by arms limitation and tension reduction. It points too to a different role for Australasia, to a less aligned position genuinely directed at stability. It is to the emerging case for a different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role, that the positive argument will now begin to swing. The inadequate East-West balance argument is typically combined with attacks upon proposals for a different role for Australia than American alliance and. service. effect of these additions is to generate extra confusion and dust. The main For the additions are inessential to the argument, and do not serve to repair it or reinforce it. For example, against nonalignment or neutralism is set the alleged pervasiveness of nuclear winter. We might as well be aligned (it’s good for trade and other economic perquisites), so it is sometimes argued from up top, because if the central balance fails we are all dead. This is a conspicuous nonsequitur^, worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (because it also suggests that balance is a prerequisite for stability). But, in the main, the attack is irrelevant, because the point of nonalignment is to help remove overload and to break down confrontation and its escalation to war; it is a thing to do now, be fore winter descends, to delay or halt its descent, and most important, to reduce its extent and severity. Australia’s weight may be slight, another irrelevant addition goes, but psychologically it is important for the West. Any further spread of the “Kiwi disease” (from New Zealand) would show the weakening of Western resolve, and give the green light for Soviet expansionism. Bell, a leading exponent of the balance argument, virtually gives the impression that if Australia dropped out of American alignment, the Russians would be on the �road down through the isles to Australia tomorrow/ Much of this sort of rhetoric is reminiscent of the baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Vietnam time. The Russians have no such military interests, or present capabilities. And if they were to gear up and set out, they would be met by substantial resistance along most of the route, resistance obtaining Western assistance. For America, for one, has major interests, different from Australia’s, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as elsewhere in East Asia. The addition, so far from strengthening the argument, depends, in its “green light for expansion” comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism. In fact most of the further case for American alignment of one sort or another - when it is argued-, often nonalignment and neutrality are simply denounced in good old-fashioned authoritarian style - turns upon already-faulted assumptions. Catley, for example, another exponent of “central balance”, presents the following ‘consideration’: ... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia is locked by considerations of culture, economics, and political philosophy into the defence of the Western world. It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that defence if necessary by hosting facilities which cannot easily be located elsewhere (p.15). The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated: and the premiss in no way sustains the conclusion, the argument involving among other things, the prescriptive (is-ought) fallacy. Consider the premiss. Australia is not, unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us, locked into Western nuclear defence, but in principle independent and free to reconsider and rethink its options. (American use of the “facilities” is not irrevocable, and shortly comes up, in principle at least, for reconsideration.) How do culture, economics and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but not for nonaligned Western European states? They do not: Australia is not a part of USA or altogether a client state; and the cultures, interests, economic frameworks and political philosophies of the two nations are significantly different (for details, see CPD). But even if the ideological frameworks were much more similar than they are, that would not entail similar defence practices (as, e.g., ANZUS in all its weakness shows), nor any such defence obligations. Most of the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley calibre - or worse. Fortunately, then, such arguments are examined in detail elsewhere, notably by D. Martin in his examination of counter-arguments to Australian armed neutrality, the legally-recognised non-belligerent form of nonalignment he favours. Virtually none of Martin’s counter-case depends for its success on features of neutrality, which is not advocated here. Virtually all of Martin’s argument is moreover couched in negative form; his positive brief is very brief. It �20 reduces to this: alignment or alliance with the USA 'cannot make us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet, while it needlessless exposes to other dangers, including nuclear war (p.l, italics added). While the message is correct enough, and in need of wide propagation, it does little on its own to support neutrality, and it by no means exhausts the positive case for weakening alignment. In particular, there are more positive arguments of much theoretical interest, to be drawn from systems theory and from the burgeoning theory of collective goods and action. 7. Contributions towards stability: free-riding, enlarging group size, and increasing variety. The strategic world situation we now confront can be viewed as a game with more than 100 players, counting in nation-states and leaving out (for convenience) major organisations such as the largest 100 transnational companies. These organisational players align themselves around two large poles, East and West, as indicated: NON-ALIGNED N N WEST EAST India NATO States Japan, Israel Sweden* Switzerland* NZUS: Australi I Ireland1* ^Most Latin ' American States I Tanzania Costa Rica** State capitalist Key: N: *: **: State communist Nuclear weapons states Neutral states Nonmilitary states There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing, some of which are practically important for peace and for stability. Some of these games, such as World Empire and Chicken (already played under one representation), are played essentially between the East-West superplayers. There are several problems about East-West games: for instance, what representation they have, the repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games �21 may, like Russian roulette, end after one round, as they will with the Big One), and the negative sum characters of some games. And the monolithic East/monolithic West dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail (in the way simplifications may). So game-theoretical modelling will be approached differently and more obliquely. World Security, like regional and local security, is a collective good (technically, an item, quality unspecified, in joint supply and precluding exclusion). That is not of course to say that there are not conditions under which security may leave much to be desired, for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and intolerant despotism; but then, so it can be argued, the trouble lies with the provisioning, not the particular product. collective good G for the collection of N nation-states. It is a It is, furthermore, a collective good which permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states. Looked at from this perspective the recent American complaint about its allies, Japan for example, and their insufficient expenditure on defence, is a complaint about their free-riding. Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding are satisfied, for instance by unaligned and unilaterally disarming states. For 1. G is available to all N members of the collective if it is available to any, and the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member better off. 2. G is achieved iff some number m (no larger than that of group K) contribute towards its provision, where under the balance of power assumption Il C K C N and II = {USA, USSR}. 3. The expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less than the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs of contribution exceed likely benefits - except perhaps for members of II given that G is largely provided by II. There is what can be called a pegged (or asymmetric) free-rider problem, pegged by members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open - within the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3 is only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g. there will be a war 10 years down the road so the expected costs each year exceed the expected benefits). For most members of N, by contrast, the benefits of G are available even should they reduce their contributions. There is a straightforward case (in narrow game-theoretical terms) for recommending Australian, and regional, free-riding on the balance of power provision of G. Some arguments, beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:- Either stability breaks down catastrophically and there is a large-scale war or it does not. If it does then the region is �22 better off than it would be if (strongly) aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily) targetted. (Here the dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes might as well be involved gets challenged and rejected: as to how see e.g. MF and B. Martin). If, alternatively, stability doesn’t break down then the region has the benefits in any case, without the costs. For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with the USA enhances global stability, etc.; indeed, as remarked and will be further argued, the evidence points to the contrary. As regards Australasian regional weight in the Western block, do we seriously believe it is significant? That the Australian voice, though useful for propaganda purposes, makes much real difference in the halls of Northern power? We shouldn’t: and if we do we’re living in a delusional framework. Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually all major strategic planning exercises, most difference-making peace initiatives, etc.,etc. Now Eastern block countries would hardly object to Antipodean free-riding, rather than no offering support (however trifling), comfort and incitement to their opposition/ Furthermore free-riding is how the Americans, on their theoretical principles, would expect Australia to act, the rational self-interested procedure (see CPD). It is how lesser nations should act. For it is economically rational; contributing is not. But won’t the US make things economically dear for Australia? In threats and theory, yes; but in practice, no more than it has already done with subsidized wheat deals to the Soviets, no more than it threatened to do already in the case of New Zealand over the nuclear-ships issue. For except for short term aberrations, America will never give up trade or business arrangements: one gets the impressions that America would trade with the Devil Himself, if doing so would open some new markets in Hell. Despite its political stigma, free-riding need be no problem, or in any way immoral or irregular. Perhaps the buses are free; perhaps there is a voluntary payment system, to which only some need contribute, etc. With the nuclear fix, free-riding is indeed the moral course; contributing is not.29 Free-riding, though often protrayed as a problem, is only a problem in certain cases of collective provisioning, where the good involved is sufficiently desirable and will not be provided because of too many free- riders. This is not the situation with global security, which will be provided, in the curious and precarious way that it is, whether or not Australia stays on the escalating treadmill or gets off and rides free. Australia's free-riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia. Interests diverge again. What is more, judicious free-riding can increase stability. In pictorial terms, the stability of a structure is typically increased up to a certain point by securing it more �23 adequately; for example, if it is a wind tower or similar building, by increasing its rigid ties or supports to the ground. Then a tripod (or better still a quadrapod) tower is much less likely to topple than a bipedal one, and requires less guying to stay up. Increasing the diversity, or variety, of supports increases stability. The theme that diversity correlates with stability has been sharpened and confirmed in ecology, for instance in the theory of “spreading the risks” (see EW). The related theme, that a certain variety increases stability, has been elaborated in cybernetics. The core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia’s free-riding in defence, and consequent nonalignment, could help to enhance diversity and variety, and accordingly to increase stability (especially if done in concert with other client and suppliant states). Two interlocked supports in tension, East and West, well dug in but hardly well guyed, are inadequate for the long-term stability of the precarious structure of world peace. What makes engineering sense is not however adding weight to the structure, or even strengthening the supports that are there, helping the East when the balance is disturbed by the more powerful West’s surging ahead and likely overburdening the structure. What makes more sense is increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying group size, as significant independent grouping could do. The monolithic East/monolithic West picture is much more than a convenient simplification, for instance for strategic thinking. It may force damaging mistakes in conceptualisation, mzsconceptualisation perhaps convenient for some larger players. One main reason for mistakes concerns group size. Whereas 11+ = {West, East} is a small group, the number N of nation-states is not, but is considerably larger. But the collective behaviour of large groups differs in theory from that of small groups; group size is a highly significant factor (though its precise import remains contentious). The group N of nation-states is a large group, of essentially self-interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors. collective action applies: So we may expect that the American theory of that the groups will behave in a counterintuitive way. Though expected to act in the common interest, to obtain security in particular, the collection will not. On this account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson’s rapid thinking). But with the collective of nations, there is, as experience has shown, no outside mediator or influence of sufficient authority to ensure attainment of the collective good. The prognosis looks very gloomy: this most important (though far from unique) collective good will not be provided. Fortunately the reasoning, like much of the “logic” of collective action, has been too �21 swift. The group, though large, is highly privileged, in containing several actors for whom costs of war exceed benefits (note the shift in perspective from the earlier free-riding condition 3). Indeed an important economic effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear winter is that virtually all actors involved should now be in that position; for (subjectively) expected costs of nuclear war have become very high. To go back to basics, Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants’ tautology (defining ‘net’) net agent benefit = gross agent benefits - gross agent costs, i.e. in symbols, for each agent or o actor i (in collective N), A- = V-Cj. A group is privileged if Aj is positive for some i in N. It needs little argument to show that for vulnerable European nation-states the net benefits of global security are decidedly positive (e.g. with a nuclear war their respective future GDPs would expectedly fall to near zero). The fact that the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the collective good involved, security, will be supplied, particularly in the longer term. The simple logic is not dynamic; it takes no account of mistake, error, or the like, or of stability achieved through superiority or intermediate instability. An improved modelling - which can take some account of group size and of the dynamics, through iterated games - is gained by returning to game-theoretic grounds. A free rider “problem” is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according to the conventional wisdom, it is a prisoners’ dilemma (cf. Pettit, but contrast Taylor and Ward). The argument can go this way:- a free rider problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good; but the theory of collective goods is equivalent to that of a .QI, generalised prisoners’ dilemma. Certainly the global nuclear situation appears to present a dilemma; as much is a commonplace claim. Elsewhere (e.g. WPI) it is argued in detail that it does indeed present a moral dilemma. Here the argument - which can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the more piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential dilemma (for many members of N).°2 Consider first, since these have obtained some investigation (e.g. Hardin), the range of apparent two party games being played by the US and Soviet Union administration (labelled US and SU respectively) in 1985 as regards the moves of further nuclear armament, A, or nuclear disarmament, N. (It is supposed, naturally, that the game is set in some background context, e.g. nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going French and Chinese nuclear armament). It is important here, as other places, to distinguish the administration - which for the most part calls the shots - from the society and the people. It is administrations or governments that generally take people into war; etc. The American people seem rather more inclined towards nuclear de-escalation than their administration; the German people were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their administration proceeded to install. The strategy games involved are then administration games, which we �25 can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.g. years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until the Big Ones explode. Within this simplistic setting, the apparent games being played by US and SU are those diagrammed next: New Initial game Prisoners’ Dilemma Game SU SU D US A Revised Game D 2,2 A 4,1 1,4 3,3 D US A SU D 3,2 A 4,1 1,4 2,3 D US A D 3,3 A 4,1 1,4 2,2 According to Hardin, ‘giving evidence of [his] deformation professionelle’, the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) ‘represents the preference ordering of virtually all the articulate policy analysts in the United States and presumably also in the Soviet Union’ (p.248). While PD may have represented US policy, there is considerable evidence (as already indicated) that it no longer does, that the US administration has shifted to a more aggressive, war-fighting, phase. That is, the US has interchanged its rankings of (D,D) and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games. The Soviets, who have been much more consistent (and no doubt better censored) in their policy pronouncements, appear not to have changed their game, but have stuck with their form of deterrence and no-first-strike. However they are bound to try to keep up with the Americans, and so are presumably pushed towards the Revised Game shown, which pleasantly restores symmetry. Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled. An outcome is said to be stable if neither player has incentive to switch strategies unilaterally on the strength of the game, i.e. to alter the outcome except by influencing the other player also to alter strategies. All these games provide dilemmas, in a broad sense, that equilibrium is achieved in an undesirable and dangerous outcome. In all the apparent games, arming is the dominant strategy for each player; yet in the PD game that is even Pareto-suboptimal, whence the economic fascination. But as the other games deliver results which are socially suboptimal (and below a satisfying threshold), all these games are dilemmas. And the same applies to suggested alternative games that might plausibly be taken to represent the superpower situation, and such as Chicken. A recognisably suboptimal outcome is guaranteed by the independent ‘‘stable” strategies. What is worse, iteration of games does not help (as it may in other political circumstances). For there are substantial political and military incentives for the superpower players not to adjust their preferences substantially in socially superior directions after repeated games, but to do what the US at least appears to have done, to make the situation worse. �26 It is important then to attempt to modify or curtail these self-interested superpower games. There are various connected ways of going about this. One is for other parties to combine to limit or discourage these games. Another alternative is for them to try to alter the games. Thus much socially preferable would be a switch to a coordination game of some sort; for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey, in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers playing; hence Hardin’s provocative label for this game, ‘Lackey’s game’). In the coordination game diagrammed, WN represents a western-inclined neutral and EN an Eastern inclined neutral (e.g. Yugoslavia): EN WN D D 1,1 A 3,2 A 2,3 4,4 [Other coordination games, with (D,D) assigned (1,1)] Now the dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in isolation; they come together in international settings such as United Nations’ committees (and elsewhere, since coordination games are frequently peoples’ games as well). Superimposing the games, with coordination games of the first sort applied to previously given US and SU games, leads to the following augmented East (E) and West (W) games: New Game, Augmented Prisoners’ Dilemma Augmented E E A D Revised Game, Augmented A 4,1 2,2 : *4,1' \ : 3^2 ’ D 1 : W ......... 1,4: A 2/3: 2/3; D ; 1 w ........ : 1,4 3,3 ; a 4 ; E D 2/3 • • — •- : 3-3’**: D ; 1 W I 2,3 ; . • 2.3 A D 2/3 2,2 a 4 ■ 4,1* ! . ; : 2/3 J 4 Key: rh represents a sequence of ms, i.e. m, m, m ... for each coordination player; 2/3 a sequence of 2s and 3s in some order. As augmenting games reveals, to play with a superpower is to help reinforce a stable deadlock. But playing an independent coordination game increases variety and can help in breaking the deadlock, in fact in several ways. For one, enough significant players playing a coordination game can alter the overall dominant strategy towards disarmament. For another, much more pressure can be brought to bear on the superpowers. For example, with less support, unilateral action by the US administration on Star-Wars and arms build-up can be exposed. Superpower militarism and power excursions would stand naked and �27 unsupported. Australia’s impact, in particular, would be rather greater as a nonaligned free-rider pressing seriously for disarmament and regional nuclear-freedom (instead of, as at present, white-wash polemics and token ambassadors, undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of US support). The strategy suggested by game-theoretic modelling converges then with that suggested by other approaches, notably regional and ecological approaches. The strategy is that of limitation, of disengagement from escalating US/USSR war games, and progressive alteration of their likely outcomes by defusing coordination moves. In more practical terms, the approaches mean trying to limit and modify superpower games by restricting their games and supporting regional or local coordination of players, in forms of organisations both of nations and of people. Such organisations would work, as many have already been doing, to contract the regions and spheres of influence and access of US and USSR military administrations, and to diminish support for their war-fighting objectives. For example, Antipodean groups could, and should, coordinate to ease the American military out of the South Pacific region, meanwhile resisting any intrusion of Russian military. Then, while the Europeans are doing their coordinated de-escalating, denuclearising things right across Europe, the Russian and American war games are progressively excluded from the entire Southern Hemisphere. An eventual aim geographically is, to send their weapons of war back home, to restrict their (and French and other) global military enterprises to their “own” backyards, where they would not always be so enthusiastically received. Fortunately such an ambitious and optimistic project, so unlikely to come to pass given present nation-state arrangments, can be accomplished piecemeal, from small and significant beginnings, already to be seen. As a result of recent movements in the region, a South Pacific nuclear-free region is now a politically-achievable option. A first token step has already been taken. But next steps, towards genuine nuclear-freedom, require above all cooperation of a less aligned Australia, joining other disengaging “free-riders” in the region. That in turn requires, as a practical component, closure of American bases in Australia as their leases terminate, cessation of American nuclear ship visits and aircraft staging, and an end to uranium mining and sales. As Australia is the only country in the region supplying uranium, and the main location of US bases, such steps would be most significant. Even so, the Pacific regional effect would remain unduly limited, so long as France and the US are based within the region, and transit of nuclear ships is internationally sanctioned everywhere on the shrinking high seas. Plainly there are further more difficult steps on the way to southern Pacific nuclear-freedom and independence, i.e. even for one of the easier oceanic regions. But there is no good reason to �28 expect that removing the nuclear scourge, any more than eliminating other major politico­ social evils, will be easy. Permanent removal and a less dubious “peace” than we presently enjoy is not something that will be achieved by more of what we have witnessed, or even through clever diplomacy and smart technological tricks, such as new defensive weapons; it will take difficult structural and radical design change. 8. On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of appropriate structural change. There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural political change would be highly conducive to peace (e.g. democratic reorganisation of the superpowers), and that certain fundamental changes may even be sufficient for permanent peace. With that in view they have long been advocated - at least from Rousseau and Kant onwards. But it has also been supposed that some such changes are necessary for lasting peace; ‘it is also necessary to transform the structures that lead to war’ (B. Martin, p.12). To render this theme immune to obvious criticisms - for example, that straightforward authoritarian extension of certain established structures could bring an end to war - further desiderata, typically presupposed, are invoked, for instance that certain freedoms, modest material standards of life, and so on, are duly guaranteed, and also the type of necessity involved is wound back to some lower technical level (not excluded however by present practicalities). These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to assess, but also more difficult to sustain. There are two parts to its assessment and defence, a negative and critical part, demolishing a range of arguments from determinism, human nature, and the like, to the effect that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and a positive part, comprising direct arguments for the theme. The large negative part of this enterprise will simply be illustrated.34 According to deterministic and mechanistic approaches, such as that of (marxist) technological determinism, nuclear weapons, like megamachines generally, are no aberration. They are an integral part of the business of industrial and ecological conquest, a further stage in human intervention which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides, wastes, etc. The argument tends to the fatalistic. The megamachines of conquest are made, and once made they will be used. No change in political arrangement, which would make any difference, is possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts push their position and luck, even further, that a weapon or device once invented by humans will be used: there is no stopping progress. But in doing so they overextend themselves. While there is, sadly a fair induction from the manufacture of weapons (of any given type, for many batches are never deployed) to their use, inductions from invention of machines or the like to their manufacture are �c 29 unreliable and subject to many counterexamples (and many machines that do eventually get made have been reinvented or independently rediscovered). But even the good inductions do not show that weapons of various sorts must be used, that a change in background political organisation would not frustrate the inductions. The broader deterministic position is of course that such background changes are not possible either; political arrangements too, like the rest of social life, are technologically or economically determined. But (nonanalytical) determinism, technological and other, is false, so it is argued elsewhere (JB, CPD). Different political arrangements, which alleviate problems, are technically possible, and arrangements would be different in differently evolved worlds. Things did not and do not have to be the way they are, or the social and political sort of way they are. Many routes, none of deductive strength, lead to the conclusion that the dominant political structures of our time, fashioned (with much input from schemes of past philosophers) from feudal institutions, require extensive structural alteration. In particular, they need to be superseded by alternative structures less intricately tied to war, which do not promote or lead so readily to war. Such a theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix itself (as e.g. WP1, p.47ff.). But suppose, improbable as it may seem, that nuclear weapons all vanished, thereby removing the current nuclear fix; for instance, they turned out to be quietly self-destructing, or a disarmament actually took place. massive thermodynamic miracle occurred, or nuclear The problem of war would not be thereby removed, and even that of nuclear war would only be given some respite. For the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.04 Conventional weapons would remain, along with weapons perhaps as dangerous as nuclear weapons, such as chemical and biological ones. Nuclear weapons, insofar as they were removed (for small caches are easily hidden away), could soon be replaced, especially if nuclear power plants remained intact; and nothing would prevent the development of (Star-Wars) weapons more diabolical than nuclear ones. War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is - by freezing the status quo. ... The structural conditions for war need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war (B. Martin, p.12: Martin goes on to indicate the types of structures, and how to reach them). Structural adjustments can provide conditions for lasting satisfactory peace. An initial, somewhat simplistic, Kantian argument for the proposition that peace is possible (presented by Latta, introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:- Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a practical idea, a moral principle. Hence this ideal ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally) to be peace. But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible. �30 From Heracleit.us through Hegel there buzzes an impressive swarm of philosophers"*6 who have rejected the second premiss. Some are even captivated by such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would stop, that competition, with war as one limit, is essential to motion and progress! would now be With the recent shift in philosophical fashions, the second premiss more widely conceded, though often not on Kantian grounds, but consequentialist. Such grounds to support the theme that peace is desirable and ought to be realised, but are more discriminating in that they help indicate what sort of peace. Unfortunately, however it is done, the second premiss does not sustain the conclusion, ought does not entail can, as many moral dilemmas reveal (see MD, WP1). So fortunately, there is a more satisfactory and revealing route to the conclusion that peace is possible, and indeed is feasible. That is the more elaborate method of (semantical) modelling: present in detail scenarios of societies where peace persists (for the sceptical it may be necessary to recall n-human models, with n small). This sort of thing is of course already done, in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate, if rather less precisely, by OQ novelists and science-fiction writers, and by activists like the different Martins. What all these scenarios point to, however, are societies considerably different from our own - though not in the people involved, who have their weaknesses, their power drives, and so forth, but because of significant structural alterations in the societies depicted. By way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibility of lasting peace, but push ahead with the argument, that societies of these restructured sorts are desirable alternatives to contemporary military- industrial arrangements. For those of us then who want to move towards such pacific alternatives, the practical inference, from feasibility and desirability is clear: we should begin on the real work of structural change. Peace is possible and desirable, but the prospects are poor (as Heilbroner has said of the human prospect). Present arrangements, though contingent and fashioned in large measure from the schemes of past intellectuals, are thoroughly entrenched, and enforced, both ideologically and by much physical power, often as if along with natural law they were God­ given, though they are no longer appropriate. Even small nonstructural changes look difficult to achieve in present political climates. Through climates have not changed that much, major social improvements have been gained, not instantanously, but in longer-term struggles with government. Such short-term difficulties did not deter social theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau before him and many after him, were concerned with obtaining lasting peace. The world has changed enormously since the time of Kant’s proposals for peace (of 1795), and even since the time of Veblen’s more cynical additions (in 1917). Hard science and �31 destructive power have grown enormously; and even theoretical knowledge of collective behaviour, especially that admitting of game-theoretic treatment, though still slight, has advanced. But political arrangements and what can be accomplished politically have, in important respects, changed very little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761) that governments were probably too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace. Governments have long been, and been seen as, main obstacles to peace. Thus Veblen rightly maintained that ‘... if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management, - in spite of the State rather than by its good offices’ (p.7).^^ So it has been with most major social changes; for they have involved structural political change disturbing to governmental conservatism. In his search for the indispensible conditions for lasting peace, Kant claimed, as others have claimed since, that peace is not possible under present structural arrangements of an unregulated competing nation-state kind. As times have changed, so, to a limited extent, have state structural arrangements, since Kant compiled his conditions. In particular, there is now, in the shape of the United Nations, a very weak reflection of what Kant looks for, a world (or European!) federation of nations. But crucial ingredients in Kant’s resolution are still lacking:- namely, at the upper level, what is required for a standard resolution of Prisoners Dilemma type situations - some surrender of national sovereignty, especially as regards war, and, at the lower level, “republican” states. Major blockages to adequate arrangements for peace remain at two critical levels of organisation, that concentrated upon of the organisation of collectives of states and, in part by devolution, that of the internal organisation of individual states themselves. Much evidence has now accumulated that more far-reaching changes than Kant, Rousseau and Veblen envisaged are required at both international and nation-state levels if genuine peace is to be secured. Indeed significant changes are wanted even in republician states for peace movements to get their mixed message through already fixed channels to state control systems. For this sort of reason, movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to succeed on their own, but should be linked into a broader plurality of movements, which seek to widen informational and democratic channels, and to alter the character and membership of state systems, and thereby render them much more controllable and accountable.40 Many longer-haul structural changes depend upon diverting nuclear war in the meantime. Thus arguing for more far-reaching changes, for an altered nonaligned Australia, �32 for a nuclear-free South Pacific, for regional structural changes, certainly does not exclude arguing and working for obvious measures for reducing risks of nuclear war. These include: a serious commitment to arms control by the superpowers (whose practices threaten our futures, though most of us lack representation in either); a move away from war-fighting strategies and associated destabilising weapons-systems; moderation of confrontational rhetoric and other tensions-inducing practices by superpower administrations, and improved efforts at mutual understanding (as well some appreciation of the elements of political pluralism); and then, remote though it may appear, significant steps towards nuclear disarmament. Richard Sylvan 41 Bungendore NSW �33 NOTES 1. Queensland premier, with destructive deep-South policies. 2. The point, which has become controversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert. 3. See especially Dibb, as reported in the ANU Reporter, and for a more guarded elaboration, his IAD (e.g. p.163 ‘At present, planning for the defence of Australia lack coherence because there is no clear definition, in priority order, of what needs defending’); see also Sharp, p.l48ff and differently Langtry and Ball, p.575ff., p.6O5ff. The much-heralded Dibb Review of mid-1986 would, if (as already seems unlikely) it were adopted, remove some of the lesser incoherence in Australian policy, that involving details of regional defensive defence (as would also Langtry and Ball, if followed through). While Dibb appears to have demolished what he refers to scathingly as the ‘largely mythical “core force” concept’, a new controversy has sprung up over whether Australia’s more self-reliant defence should be purely defensive defence, Dibb’s ill-named ‘strategy of denial’, or whether it should include an offensive component. Dibb himself has rather rapidly shifted ground on this important issue. In late 1983 he was contending that ‘Australia should have in the force-in-being significant deterrent capabilities, based on present air and naval strike assets, which can mount defensive and offensive operations against attacking forces, their staging bases and lines of resupply’ (IAP, p.166). But in the otherwise conservative Review of 1986 such offensive defence is abandoned; no such forces and equipment for offensive off-shore operations are recommended. Instead ‘the review proposes a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest. Our most important defence planning concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap’. The new offensive/defensive defence controversy puts the Review’s adoption in increasing doubt - in which event the local incoherence in strategic planning processes and militational difficulties Dibb alludes to early in his statement will presumably persist. The Review not merely fails to address significant regional issues, as to defence priorities, and as to multiple purpose roles for Australian armed forces given that they will be involved in virtually no military activity other than maintenance and a certain “preparedness” (for on Dibb’s overstatement of the prevailing view of Australia’s very favourable regional security prospects, ‘there is no conceivable prospect of any power contemplating invasion of our continent and subjugation of our population’). But further, the Review is itself vague to incoherent, concerning wider defence issues, vague as to the post-ANZUS situation, and incoherent about Australia’s role in US global “defence” activity. According the Dibb (CT, p.16), ‘there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for global war. The presence of the joint facilities, together with the access that we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through of Australia of B-52 bombers, are a sufficient tangible contribution to the Alliance.’ These contributions are not involvement? That is not how the USSR views the matter: they are the reported sole �34 basis of USSR nuclear targetting of Australia (see Dibb. SS p.13). global stance is left essentially to the USA. And Australia's Amazingly, in the Strategic Basis Papers (SB), Australia criticizes New Zealand because ‘it has still developed no policy for national defence and tends to look to ... the US as its primary source of defence guidance’ (p.29). Note that C3I abbreviates the mouthful, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 4. See Sharp, p.l46ff. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and shared aspirations of local people - to the extent, presumably, that these are commendable; again the presupposed value framework is critical. 5. Thus e.g. Gray (p.17) on the Reagan Administration’s ‘foolhardy brief willingness to talk publicly about nuclear strategy’, and his distain for public involvement or input. There is some concern, especially among neo-conservatives, about US defence strategies being ‘undermined by well-meaning persons who believe they are helping the cause of peace’ (Bell p.10; similarly Gray). Even those not so far right support partial information releases which maintain public confidence; e.g. Dibb on ‘the release of a generalised statement about ;the] functions of the US bases in Australia ... to give Australians more confidence about their crucial contribution to the Allied cause’ (ISA, p.166). ‘Our defence policy-making process is probably more “closed” than that of any other advanced Western democracy’ according to Langtry and Ball (p.608), who contend that ‘the public needs to be involved much more in our defence planning and operations'. For a justified critique of public exclusion and leave-it-to-the-experts approaches, see B. Martin; also Sharp. 6. The paper was drafted in mid-1985. 7. For those amassing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of client states, the following Australian contribution is noteworthy: ‘The US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support’ (SB, p.28) 8. As to DI and arms control, see, e.g. Mack PR and Gray. As to D2, ‘USA has now an announced first-strike nuclear targeting policy’ technologically reinforced, Hayes, p.4; and see also Mack AC, p.111. The goal of the Reagan administration is superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term). Thus e.g. Gray (p.32): ‘it is of course essential that the United States modernize its offensive forces so as to render the Soviet Union genuinely offensive-counterforce incompetent.’ 9. On the major changes in American policy, see e.g. Gray p.118 ff. Though America is now said to have a ‘new national security concept of which SDI is the centerpiece’ it may still lack an ‘arms control policy’ (Gray, p.25,pll). Not only arms control, but American commitment to the security of allies, remain at least decidedly cloudy matters. Thus it is of little avail to contend that Australia does have a coherent secondorder global policy, namely the (discreditable) one of following prevailing American policy. For the US lacks a first-order policy which is sufficiently clear in relevant respects. The American direction of Australian policy had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians, no more than New Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even by Americans. �35 10. Thus we can avoid the important debate as to whether, and to what extent, deterrence remains part of US global “defence” policy (though it certainly remains part of the policy sold to the American public). As to the philosophical significance of the debate, see Gay, p.l29ff. and Benn. 11. The common-interest theme is often traced to (partly self-interested) American action in the Pacific in World War II. Curiously Australia’s interests are are now said also to converge with those of Japan, but to be diametrically opposed to those of the USSR (despite increasing trade). 12. Nor, though this is a longer story, does Australian culture by any means coincide with American: see CPD. Thus a uniform treatment is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, a single overarching treatment for a monolithic West is thoroughly inadequate: see further below in the text. 13. Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic and other) which include Australia. For, as argued below, abandoning the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West, of the West as one parish, makes significant differences to the results yielded. 14. As Cock goes on: ‘These basic issues increasingly become lost in the array of consumer choices’. 15. ‘The serf societies - more or less willingly - accept the status of “allies”, i.e. protection with rights and duties as in feudal societies. They become client countries’ (Galtung, p.169). 16. So-called by Mack PC. But the formulation presented follows G. Davidson’s more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8, 1985, p.2. Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the ‘altogether more sophisticated argument [which] holds sway ... in government’ (p.l, italics added)! 17. The “Asian hordes” derive from one of the less spoken about successors to the Yellow Peril, from the immediate past days of the Asian communist threat, the Domino theory, and White Australia. 18. As Stephenson argued, less fortunately, 20 years ago. Even when around World War II Japan, did have interest in access to strategic raw materials, the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia because of the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much importance. 19. Of course, such military expenditure is also encouraged by economic forces, e.g. like much Third World hard currency expenditure it helps the American economy along a bit. 20. Heilbroner has traced some of the economic components and consequences of what, with excess exaggeration and insufficient irony, he calls ‘the rise and subsequent fall of the American imperium’ (p.52): it hasn’t fallen that far yet. ‘Empires have always been expensive and the American empire was no exception. ... The sheer military cost ... for the United States alone ... is roughly ten percent of ... GNP for the last 25 years ($2 x 10) in 1972 dollars)’. American imperial spending supplemented by other capitalist countries fueled inflation, enhanced poverty, etc., and was complements by, what it was represented as required by, counterexpenditure and efforts by the USSR. �36 ‘The establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and: resulted not just in very large military expenditures, but in the rapid build-up of American capital investments abroad. Between 1950 and 1970, the value of American-owned plant and equipment abroad leaped from $12 billion to $78 billion’ (p.54). A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of payments problem (negative “capital flows” and balances), and a growing accumulation of IOUs. On this sort of basis, Heilbroner speculates that ‘the mere operations of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such critical importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in all likelihood a sufficient condition for the globalisation of the inflationary phenomena’ (p.57 with insert from p.56). According to Heilbroner, ‘Long before the Vietnam debacle, it was clear that American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in the under-developed world’ (p.57). But really very little evidence of collapse is presented by Heilbroner; and seemingly there is little. What there is more substantial evidence for is the marked decline of the American imperium in the period (1973-8) concerned. One piece of evidence is the sharp decline in America’s share of World GDP, shown in the following table of select leading national economies: SHARE OF WORLD GDP (%) POPULATION SHARE COUNTRY RANK 1968 1975 1984 (1984 est) USA 1 35.0 24.3 25.0 5.2 USSR 2 11.1 11.0 13.8 6.2 JAPAN 3 5.2 8.0 9.5 2.7 GERMANY FDR 4 5.1 6.7 5.7 1.5 FRANCE 5 4.6 5.4 CHINA 6 2.9 4.8 4.3 22.6 UK 8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.3 4.4 1.3 INDIA 12 1.3 1.5 1.1 15.1 AUSTRALIA 15 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 �37 The table should also make it clear that if the USA cannot sustain a grand empire, nor can the USSR. A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even less likely than a capitalistic Pax American was. 21. Although, so the documents continue, ‘neighbourhood contingencies .... are at present assessed as impossible’! The theme that the USA affords no sure guarantee of Australian defence is reiterated in Langtry and Bell, e.g. p.608. They go on there to outline the major points that reliance upon the US has distorted Australian arrangements (with forces better equipped to fight alongside the Americans in Asia than on their own in defending Australia) and has led to neglect of the regional priorities, ‘to defence planning which at least would recently paid little attention to the direct defence of our continent and the protection of our remote communities’ (p.608). 22. The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region, have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects French social and cultural arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones than American arrangements are. In these days of technological warfare, the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much weight; we don’t after all look very hard at the American record of defeats and incompetence. Etc. 23. If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real deterrence advantage because nothing to deter. Other advantages of the ANZUS alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious (see PC, D. Martin), but not always guaranteed by the alliance as the blackout of New Zealand shows. 24. Soviet activity is undoubtedly perceived rather differently by American administrations than Antipodean ones. ‘An agressive, treacherous, ruthlessly self-interested, expansionist increasingly powerful, and hence increasingly threatening state - that is the image of the Soviet Union in America. It is the image which has legitimised the strategic modernation and Star Wars programs’ (to adopt Mack ST, pl). To see that this is indeed the intellectually shoddy route by which these grand and dangerous programs are justified, it is enough to work through fundamentalist sources, such as Gray. It is almost as if Americans had projected some of their own occasionally-manifested worst features into the giant enemy. 25. After some considerable reconstruction, that is. For the argument, curiously referred as that of “central balance” in newspaper-level publications of academics (e.g. Catley, Bell), is never presented in requisite detail - which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute. 26. As well both the premiss and its usual substitutes are false (see MF). The type of argument exhibited is a good example of prevalent Australian consequentialist thinking. A parallel argument, enjoying unwarranted popularity, runs: We might as well sell uranium (e.g. to France), because if we don’t someone else will - as if motives counted morally for nothing. 27. See also the discussion of Bell’s claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC. 28. Since the New Zealand restrictions on nuclear ships, ‘the Soviet media has been full of gloating references to the prospect of the collapse of the ANZUS treaty’ according to Dibb (SS, p.14). Given the unimportance of the Antipodes to Soviet interests (as Dibb �38 himself explains), Dibb is surely exaggerating, at least, when he later claims that ‘the prospect of the breakup of the AN ZUS treaty would be of enormous benefit to the USSR’s world-wide interests’ (SS p.31). Soviet support for Antipodean independence and for ‘a real nuclear weapon-free zones' in the South Pacific has its disconcerting elements (‘with friends like that ...’); but luckily the quality of ideas does not depend essentially on their sources and supporters. 29. As WPI serves to show. In a different context, Bell objects to Australian free-loading ‘on other people’s risks and burdens. That has certainly not been our tradition, and I hope it will not become so, since it is morally quite indefensible’ (p.7). Not so: bludging, for instance, is a well-established, if disapproved of, part of the tradition; and in some cases it is morally in order. However, free-riding is not being proposed merely for self interested reasons, e.g. to remove the present risks of nuclear targetting; it is being proposed with a view to altering the two great alliance structures that at present dominate international politics. Bell’s objection to such a course is that it ‘would on the one hand tend to increase the tendency of the superpowers to unilateralism, and on the other hand tend to induce many of the minor powers in question (including Australia) to consider acquiring nuclear capacity’ (p.7). The second alternative neglects the non­ proliferation treaty, to which Australia is a signatory; the first appears to assume erroneously that friendly relations with America are foregone; both are pretty minor considerations (and both can be dealt with in other negotiated ways) compared with the major problem of nuclear war. 30. The less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin (CA, p.20, p.39), but with agents’ costs or contributions, C, duly agent relativized. Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter, thus strictly falsifying the tautology. 31. Thus Hardin who (in CA) claims to ‘demonstrate the equivalence of the logic of collective action and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (p.4) The demonstration is given on p.25ff. 32. But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect. 33. Even so, significant change in USA looks unlikely. Present arrangements suit not only the American corporate-administrative power elite, which can direct public opinion through its control of the main communications media, but many other fat-cat Americans, rather well. The polarisation of the world into two camps increases US control of the larger and far wealthier camp, yet scarcely reduces US trade or markets. While it does limit the global coverage of US business and multinationals, and somewhat restricts the transfer of other regions’ surplus value to the USA, it ensures the much greater advantage of being able to maintain the US domestic political economy on a military basis. The US and the USSR not only dance together; they were made for each other. Abroad US hegemony is maintained through a series of alliances and economic control strategies. Particularly ominous for the South Pacific are the Trilateral and Pacific Rim arrangements (which, with much local assistance, are helping to send Australia on its present economic trajectory). When advice or persuasion directed at allies and client states fail, economic measures can be resorted to (capital outflows, for instance, being a highly effective mechanism, “aid” a lesser device). For the most part, the imperial war machine can remain in the background. At home updated and improved imperial measures also work well. The mass consumerist society affords a rich and diverting selection of bread (much of it again imported) for a majority of Americans; television �39 and its entertainment variants offer a constant diet of circuses. For passive middle mainstream America, the vast police and security network remains a largely background and even unnoticed phenomenon; what is seen is even welcomed as a necessary shield from that other, dangerous, minority America. American social, educational and media management of opinion is obviously successful. Of present relevance, most Americans have been convinced that unilateral disarmament would be unAmerican. Thus the American administration, being hedged in by opinion they have helped to generate, cannot move in any such directions. For, given popular opinion, it would of course be politically disastrous, as well as undemojl’cratic! In the USSR, where political control is exercised to a much greater extent through overt power, present change of substance appears even less likely. 34. More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere, e.g. a critique of the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun in CPD. From Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been erroneously supposed that war, like aggression, is part of human nature, that war is a permanent (and perhaps even desirable) condition of human and social existence. For a refutation, see e.g. Trainer and Waite. 35. As observed by B. Martin, who uses this important form of argument for institutional change to get this thick book started (pp.12-13). 36. The swarm includes some anomalies, such as that somewhat tarnished hero of deep ecology, Spinoza: see e.g. Northedge. 37. Perhaps Kant had some such scenario in view in his theme that peace is empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that peace is morally and rationally imperative. The latter claim, running in direct opposition to the long line of bellicose philosophers, really relies on the correct, but controversial, assumption that states are subject to the same moral relations as individual persons. Both then have an obligation to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from rational autonomy, the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of persons (or, yet more chauvinistically, of humanity). 38. Veblen argued against the State on the basis that ‘governmental establishments and ... powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character’ (p.9), however the Christianfeudal origin of the State provided only one - and a coersive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13), a pattern much influenced moreover by schemes of intellectuals. Other patterns remain feasible. 39. There are now theoretical arguments for Kant’s claim, as well as practical arguments of an inductive sort. 40. Such is also the new message from America: for the peace movement to get through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and revitalised, capitalist democracy superseded by true democracy or “republicanism” (see especially Cohen and Rogers, and earlier Chomsky). But the message, like the US peace movements’ very limited demands for peace, leaves the State, as the bringer of wars, and main source of violence essentially intact; the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much too narrowly conceived. 41. My thanks for information to Andrew Mack and David Bennett, and for comments to �Grover Foley and Russell Hardin. �REFERENCES G. H. Andrewartha and L.C. Birch, The Ecological Web, University of Chicago Press, 1984. W.R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, Second edition, Wiley, New York, 1960. S.Beer, Designing Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, 1974. C. Bell, ‘The case against neutrality’, Current Affairs Bulletin 61(4) (1984) 4-10. S.I. Benn, ‘Deterrence or appeasement? or, On trying to be rational about nuclear war’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 1(1984) 5-19. F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London, 1984. R. Catley, ‘Along with the Bomb ...’ (Review of D. Martin), The Weekend Australian Magazine, 7-8 April, 1984. N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1979. P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Quartet Books, Melbourne, 1979. J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984. P. Dibb (as reported) ‘Defence Planning “lacks coherence” - researcher’, ANU Reporter, 1983. P. Dibb, ‘Issues in Australian defence’, Australian Outlook 37 (1983) 160-166; referred to as IAD. P. Dibb, ‘Soviet strategy towards Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’ paper prepared for Soviet Strategy Against Asia converence, Tokyo, November 1984; referred to as SS. P. Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister of Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986; edited text also published in The Canberra Times, 4 June 1986, pp.16-18; referred to as the Dibb Review. P. and A. Erlich, Population, Resources, Environment, Second edition, Freeman, San Francisco, 1976. H. Feith,‘Richard Falk, World order radical’, Peace Studies 24 (1985) 24-5. J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984. W.C. Gay, ‘Myths about nuclear war: misconceptions in public beliefs and governmental plans’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 9(1982) 117-144. A. Gilbert, ‘The state and nature in Australia’, Australian Cultural History 1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28. �42 C.S. Gray, ‘The Reagan administration and arms control’, paper presented at The Future of Arms Control Conference, Canberra. August 1985. R. Hardin, Collective Action, Resources for the Future, Washington, 1982; referred to as CA. R. Hardin, ‘Unilateral versus mutual disarmament’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(1983) 236-254. M.D. Hayes, ‘Defending the sunburnt country’, Chain Reaction 33(August-September 1983) 11-17. R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York, 1978. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (trans, and introd. M. Campbell Smith), Swan Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795). J. O. Langtry and D Ball (eds), A Vunerable Country, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1986. A. Mack, ‘Farewell to Arms Controls’, Peace Research 9(1984) 9ff.; referred to as PR. A. Mack, ‘The pros and cons of ANZUS’, Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May 1985; referred to as PC. A. Mack, ‘Arms control, disarmament and the concept of defensive defence’, Disarmament 8(3)(1984) 109-119; referred to as AC. A. Mack, ‘The Soviet threat thesis: perceptions, capabilities and interests’ typescript, Canberra, May 1985; referred to as ST. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. B. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne, 1984. F.S. Northedge, ‘Peace, war and philosophy’, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1967, 63-67. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. P. Pettit, ‘Free riding and foul dealing’, Journal of Philosophy, to appear, J.J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace (trans. E.M. Nuttal), London, 1927 (first Published 1761). R. Routley, ‘On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, and the political fall out’, Discussion papers in Environmental philosophy #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. R. Routley, ‘Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 3/4(1984) 19-34; referred to as MF. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #6, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD. �43 R. Sharp (ed.), Apocalypse No. Pluto Press, Sydney, 1984. P.R. Stephenson, The Foundations of Culture, W.J. Miles, Sydney, 1936. R. Sylvan, ‘Culture and the roots of political divergence’, typescript, Canberra, 1985; referred to as CPD. M. Taylor and H. Ward, "Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: alternative models of public­ goods provision’, Political Studies 30(1982) 350-370. T. Trainer and H. Waite, ‘Culture and the production of aggression’, in Sharp, ep.cit, 205-226. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, leaked extracts published in the National Times, March 30-April 5, 1984, 23-30; referred to as SB. Threats to Australian Security, Parliamentary Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred to as TAS. T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 1917). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY: Further investigations of the nonexistent. ‘The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war’ (Kant, ‘A [the only!] secret article for perpetual peace’, p.158 - a surprising article, flattering no doubt to philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition). A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy, just as a philosophy of technology comprises much more than a technology policy. A policy can be given merely by a list of directives as to what do in various circumstances; even at its best it need only involve practical wisdom. By contrast, a philosophy goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom, integration of the policy into a theoretical setting, which looks, among other things, at the central arguments and key concepts involved: here, security, stability, control, protection, defence, interests, national interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is thus a branch of political and social philosophy, and has long been treated as such, though under such more familiar and honest headings as “of war” and “of peace”. Like most parts of philosophy, it can be applied, for instance in shaping policies, in regional ways among others. A defence philosophy should integrate appropriate defence arrangements and approaches to war and peace, not merely or superficially into “foreign policy” or assumed “international relations”, but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on-going culture and into the intended or planned cultural arrangements. A defence policy typically takes prevailing socio-political arrangements and power structures for granted; a defence philosophy again penetrates deeper, questioning or rejecting features of these structures, enquiring as to the merits of things and institutions of which defence is planned, asking what sort of society should be defended by what sort of appropriate methods and at what lengths. What, for instance, is Australia, what are Australians, defending, concerned to defend, aiming to defend? Here in Australia? In the region? Abroad? How much of what others have, or what we have, is worth defending, preserving? Does Randwick Racecourse, or Pine Gap, merit defending? Would anyone stage a last stand for Oaks Estate, one of Canberra’s dreariest suburbs? If the Indonesians made a lightning strike in Australia just to remove Bjelke-Petersen,1 should we resist? Few of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in Australia, where unplanned muddling through from immediate problem to immediate problem - reactive contingency “planning”, if you want to be generous - is the main style of political life , and, along with the traditional political game of “follow the leader”, of defence planning. Australia 2 does not yet have a defence philosophy. Some of its critical philosophers could help to supply it with the rudiments of one or more, and to inject some depth into broader defence theorizing. What follows is intended as a modest beginning: much of what is attempted, unearthing arguments and assumptions, followed by analysis and criticism, and some elaboration of alternative principles, falls squarely within the domains both of applied philosophy and traditional philosophical practice. 1. Australia’s inappropriate. defence “policy”: incoherent, obsolescent Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence policy. American, This is a commonplace charge (made even by friends of Defence, interested in obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).^ The reasons concern not merely the major unsolved issues of exactly what is being defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms and values, and what role American defence facilities in Australia are supposed to have in this. They concern the status of present treaty arrangements, such as the “cornerstone”/“millstone” ANZUS treaty, signed between Australia, New Zealand and the US, now in disarray (still ’‘maintained” by New Zealand, whom the US has unilaterally announced expelled), and of subsequent associated memoranda of understanding (some secret, involving the local storage of US nuclear weapons, entry of American personnel, etc.). They also concern a range of more detailed lucunae such as: lack of clearly-defined priorities on what needs defending and how it is to be accomplished; doubtful capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level contingencies in and to the north of Australia and in maritime zones; and unsatisfactory (or no) arrangements and planning for “defence-in-depth”, for civil defence and use of civil infrastructure, mobilisation, wartime administration, protection of key facilities and areas, and post-nuclear organization. And, equally damaging, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it is nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.It is left to journalists and newspaper­ watching academics to winkle out what local defence installations may be for and to make various conjectures as to what the policy may be. Of course there are many administrators and policy makers who think that is the way it should be; the public should not be informed, but kept satisfied with some “generalised” statements.As to coherence, Australian policy makers have only recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role, not a global one. This they were told by the Americans in Washington in talks allegedly designed to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the USA. It thus begins to look as if Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is still as much determined abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia. 3 Much circumstantial evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim that Australia’s vague defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA, as it used, before the last World War (and British abandonment), to be stamped Made in UK. For one thing, Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy, so it is claimed. That “policy” has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party, which has governed most of the time (as senior partner in a coalition). But the Liberal party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as planned in Washington for ANZUS) and still does. For instance, the latest package® from the Liberal Party “Defence and Foreign Policy Unit” consists largely of US Defence Department material packaged under a local cover. The Strategic Basis Papers, endorsed by the Labor Government, give virtually unqualified support to US military practices and to the American view of the global strategic situation, and commit Australia to supporting, without any due reservation, American positions in world forums.' The same dependent-policy conclusion can be reached by more devious arguments. regional defence role? When, for example, did Australia find out it had a After the Americans had found that they could no longer afford to police the world on their own and would have to delegate some of that role and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on reliable dogs-bodies; and also after Labor took some faltering steps towards developing a broader foreign more independent policy with some indigenous elements (Australian Minister Hayden was promptly flattened by US heavies such as Schultz). Australian defence and foreign policy copies American policy in main respects, but lags it. The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor government, to the extend that it is visible, is conservative; it coincides with older American defence policy, and diverges from the new (post-Reagan) American war policy. For Australian Labor defence policy supports what the American administration supposedly used to support, namely DI. Multilateral nuclear disarmament (within the framework of series of treaties and agreements), and D2. Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual assured destruction (i.e. MAD). The presence of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to be justified in the framework of these assumptions. For they are to assist in making deterrence under D2 effective, and to provide verification for the arms reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions). There is much evidence indicating however that American policy makers have now abandoned both Dl and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms control8. Certainly they have moved on to the following highly destabilizing doctrines: Nuclear war-fighting, Limited nuclear wars, and Star-Wars (i.e. Strategic Defense Initiative). While this American war policy may well be accepted by the next Liberal coalition government, all of these military doctrines are explicitly rejected by the 1985 Labor government. Since the American “joint” facilities in Australia also facilitate the rejected 4 objectives, the problems concerning these dubious facilities are much aggravated. The Government’s approach concerning them - withholding information concerning the full range of their functions, and particularly their war-fighting roles from parliament and the public - is certainly unsatisfactory, as several of its members realise; and as a result the Government appear in not atypical disarray, further grist for the incoherence theme. If there is perhaps a coherent Australian global defence approach somewhere away from public exposure, it is most likely then an old abandoned American policy.9 But in that case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification. For Australia, in supporting US defence policy and activity, for instance in world forums, is supporting present offensive American policy, not what it reputedly adheres to, deterrence (through MAD). The point holds good whether or not American global policy still includes such deterrence as a proper part10; for it certainly involves other very different and dubious strategies. The commonplace, but increasingly feeble, justification given for Australian’s tagging along after America is that Australian interests are the same as American11. American interests by no means coincide with Australian . However Consider, for instance, such matters as enriching Americans, making conditions favourable for American business, promoting Americans and things American. Consider, differently, American practices in Latin America, from undercutting Allende’s government in Chile to its practices against Nicaragua, to its extensive export of arms and violent methods, there and elsewhere in the world. Thus America, like Russia, is busy meddling in Africa, but ‘Australian security interests are not directly involved’ (SB, p.24). Consider, differently again, escalation of the nuclear arms race. Or consider American strategic planning, and all the game- and decision- theoretic models which concern just USA and its adversary USSR, perhaps occasionally adding Europe as part of the monolithic West, but rarely or never considering the Southern Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America as Poland may be of Russia or it is nothing. Or consider American interests not merely in Soviet and communist containment, but in containing socialism such as might (under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia. An American policy answering to American interests is accordingly inappropriate for Australia, inappropriate for Antipodean socialism. Australians should do their own defence thinking and work out a policy appropriate for Australia. (That applies also to Australian political representatives, who should stop parroting implausible American views and begin developing some genuinely local and original ones.) Should Australia be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation of their style of free-enterprise capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e. that the state socialists don’t already heavily control)? What they quite seriously call ‘keeping the free world free’? Of 5 course freedom has, in this sort of context, multiple meanings and associations (as well as multiple inconsistencies, appearing information” and the like). overtly in subsidized “free trade”, selective “free Significant parts of what mainstream American culture admits under the freedom umbrella, mainstream Australian culture would exclude: for instance, active opposition to and undermining of social and socialist programs and governments, bullying of small countries that impose barriers to US business or military practices (all part of “free enterprise”), etc. What of those intangible freedoms the cultures supposedly agree about, civil liberties, freedom to information, to live and work where one chooses, to travel, and so on? These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland) than in most parts of the Eastern Block. But such freedoms, which run counter to dependent policies, hardly require defence subservience. influenced state practices are fast reducing freedom. Moreover, military- Many of the older freedoms have vanished this century, such as freedom to travel, to work and live abroad, etc.; now one requires permits, licences, passports, ... . And many more former freedoms are being or have been eroded; soon it will be identity documents, restricted zones, ID cards, as already in parts of the “free West”. Now nuclearism in Europe ‘is devouring the very freedom it is said to protect: [the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep citizens from assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles’ (Capra and Spretnak, pp.58-9). Further structural changes required for the security of the state, imcompatible with democratic freedoms, include ‘secrecy, lack of commentability, permanent emergency, concentration of authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and police’ (Falk, in Feith p.24). Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve remaining freedoms. 2. Inherited other-reliance, and the populist and elitist cases for patronage and subservience. Australia’s defence policy, such as it is, is furthermore inherited rather than regularly (re)thought through. But that procedure - essentially the legal method of precedence, whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in legalistic decision making - is defective when applied in politics or to defence, especially where immediate independent action is required. For precedence methods are extraordinarily slow, as well as characteristically conservative, and as in defence exclude significant and rather urgent alternatives. The unsatisfactory decision-making practices to be revealed in the case of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of the kind of advanced age capitalism Australia operates under, or rather labours under, down under. In setting down those 4. 6 features of aged capitalism (‘of the Corporate State') that the New Left and Alternative Australia movements were reacting against, Cock neatly summed up these practices: Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political interests, rather than by rational goals and means that served public interests. The people were rarely consulted effectively before a decision and often only partially informed afterwards. Planning was based on a mere extension of the present. ... activists felt they were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The availability of space, time, trees and air was also determined by others ... (p.18 italics added).14 As it was and is with one’s defence, military and civil, so it is with the matter of whether one lives in a nuclear target zone or not, and so on (though immigration policy, uranium and woodchip export policies, etc.) In these areas planning remains top-down, with at best consultative elements. No real choices are offered to people. A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance, that Australia’s defence depends on other more powerful allies. That ally was firstly Britain, and since World War II America; but in any event the assumption is that to be safe Australia needs a powerful patron, a protector. A corollary is that Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected concessions. And for the most part it has; however such a defence insurance policy does not come cheap.15 It costs not only money and resources, but quality of life, freedom and independence. The assumption of other-reliance is however unsound, for several reasons. Most important, it characteristically depends upon the following themes, all of which lack solid foundation: 1. Australia is threatened - or at least 1A. Australia is likely to be threatened in the near future. 2. Australia cannot defend itself. 3. Australia can however depend upon its patron (or ally), i.e. upon the USA. These three themes in fact make up what has been called the populist case for the ANZUS alliance.16 It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS, said to hold sway with the Australian government, which, while insisting upon premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead 4. Australian has a vital interest in global stability. 5. Global stability is under threat (constantly) by an expansionist Soviet Union. 6. Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance. Some of techniques the US deploys for holding global balance operate through dependent states and a network of alliances like ANZUS. But obviously further premisses are required to reach the intended conclusions that Australia should be participating in any such alliance, and what is more, hosting US defence facilities and exercises. A first such premise is the no-shirking theme, that Australia should be contributing its part to “holding the balance’’ (cf. Bell). Even this first further step is pretty shaky; as we shall see, one shaky step in a rather ramshackle case, since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly dubious (and 4 may involve equivocation). For it can be plausibly argued that Australia’s vital interests are not guaranteed by US techniques, which threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS. In any case, it is unclear that local contributions enhance global (nuclear) stability (see e.g. Mack and Davidson). But first, there is more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist position to be considered, what might be called the offshore elitist position. This position grants 2A*. Australia can defend itself against regional threats, and can look after itself regionally. But it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may not) grant 1A. What the offshore position insists upon is 1AI*. Australia’s interests could be threatened in the near future. Since these interests - perhaps concerned with trade, Australian companies or Australians abroad, or whatever - may have little or nothing to do with internal Australian security, this premiss represents an extremely important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift from war to defence). It goes further than what has been called forward defence. In extended form the offshore position does call for some sort of global policeman or police force ready to intervene whenever a “free port” anywhere looks like closing its doors. Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with the elitist position is that it tends to slide through to the offshore position (by way of now evident immediate positions). The arguments against both the populist and elitist cases, and indeed against virtually all of themes 1 through 7 are sufficiently familiar to justify but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points involved. Of course just a couple of defections from themes 1 through 7 would serve logically defeat both cases, but there have been some interesting repair attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses. 3. The brief against the popular populist case; the need for new directions. Contra 1 and 1A. While Australia is not at present under notice of threat, veiled threat or harassment from abroad, a majority of its population appears to believe that it is. As the popular view is not the informed, administrative, or parliamentary view, it is worth inquiring 8 why the popular view persists, as the opinion polls reveal it has. The populace has been deliberately kept in the dark (or even misinformed), because this suits bipartisan government purposes. Although both main Australian political parties are well enough aware that the main assumptions underlying the populist case are false, the reasons for which they support the American alliance (e.g. those of the elitist case) are much more difficult to sell to the public. Accordingly the parties and Government have no political interest in undermining the unsound populist case. In particular they have gone out of their way not to cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is a reliable guarantor against all threats. Thus long-standing Australian psychological insecurity about security has been allowed to stand, and has not been assuaged by any requisite informational and educational effort. In particular, older attitudes to Asia persist not far below the surface of popular Australia: fear, mistrust and xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism. This misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for Eastern picking, instead of the Asians view that Australia, so far as they are aware of it at all, is a remote desiccated uncouth place perhaps good for some trade and investment. Or, to get towards more concrete assumptions, Australians apparently tend to their view country as affluent but underpopulated, resource rich but largely defenceless; yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished, resource poor, and so on . Such a view is seriously out of touch with reality. Parts of Asia are now at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators) as Australia. They do not see themselves as overpopulated, in a way that calls for mass exodus; and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe, such as Java, bribes and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire. So far as they require them, they can purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more easily and cheaply (because they even carry significant local subsidies) than they could obtain • them by seizure. 1s For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat, no other state has a genuine interest in attempting to invade Australia. As it is for interests, so it is for capabilities. No regional power has the capacity to launch a successful invasion of Australia, or is likely to have such a capacity in the near future. As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded, Currently only the United States would have the physical capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia, and it clearly lacks any motive to do so (TAS, p.94). 9 As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff), ... to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years by other than the superpowers (TAS). But neither superpower is at all likely to expend effort or resources to such an end. An obvious naive question which at once arises is: Why bother then with much defence? (A later question to entertain is: why not be a free-rider on collectively provided global security, such as it is?) Why not proceed forthwith to unilateral disarmament? Mack for one, having reassembled the now-standard telling case that Australia is not threatened ‘now or for the foreseeable future’, and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted by the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia. He stages a hasty retreat, points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss 2, and proceeds to claim that ‘the populist case for ANZUS is sustained’ even without premisses 1 and 1A. It is however a decidedly problematic retreat. While it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A may sometimes take it for granted that Australia can look after itself to some extend, put up some resistance, it is far from clear that they depend essentially on assumptions approximating premiss 2. Consider the no­ interests argument, which appears decisive given the (estimated) very limited invasion capabilities of potential invaders. The main consideration adduced appears to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia’s dynamic fighting forces. Australian mineral resources, to repeat one of the more sensitive examples involved, can be obtained more readily and cheaply by trade methods than military ones. What all this seems to show is that a rather minimal streamlined force, if any, would presently meet Australia’s military requirements. It is not as if Australia is ‘entirely defenceless’ without a conventional military force, like a babe-in-arms. The whole apparatus of nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well suited to its use, though lacking a population trained in its techniques. But even without requisite popular training in defence methods, Australia would be a difficult place to govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate. It was such features of the Australian character that deterred the Japanese on a previous occasion “If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also, because the geographical conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one” (TAS, p.62). The points still hold good, and could be strengthened. There are several parts to any such 10 program of nonmilitary defence: making it happen, and putting it abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration) that it has happened. To the issue of alternative defence we are bound to return. For now, when Australia is not threatened, is a good occasion to reconsider, and begin to adapt, defence arrangements. For example, it looks very much as if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent, largely to make many Australians feel secure.But a much more effective and inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite popular education and psychological therapy - with, if it were well done, much more satisfactory results, a more secure and better informed people. Contra 2. As a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and C3I capabilities, the military defence of Australia has become much easier. It comes down to enhancing, through new robust and reliable systems, the enormous strategic advantages Australia enjoys by virtue of geographical isolation. In principle, any maritime invading force can now be detected well in advance of arrival, through modern radar warning systems, and destroyed by precision guided munitions. And any invaders that did manage to gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be subject to disproportionate responses from local defence. Standard discussions (as in Dibb, Mack) proceed to introduce a great deal of “Boys’ Own War Games” stuff concerning contemporary weapon and C3I systems; the essential point is that these could serve to turn Australia into a pretty unvulnerable armed fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory were the oceanic moat crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin). Under such armed neutrality and (differently) fortified Australia defence scenarios, even invasion from outside the region by an inimical world power could be resisted with reasonable prospect of success. There is no power at all likely to mount such an invasion; there is apparently (as noted above) only one power that could, that good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by 6-7% of the Australian population!). Nonetheless the threat of a Soviet invasion is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees of their elected representatives. But the Soviet military has never undertaken such a long-range massive force projection, is ill-equipped to do so, and lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see, e.g., D. Martin; also SS, ST). The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian cities, would be struck at by intercontinental missiles. While this would be bad enough, it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by an invasion. Soviet forces are once again not sufficient, and not thought sufficient by the Soviets for that sort of diversion; they would be required elsewhere in a superpower war; and they would be devastated, unless USA is militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted. i. 11 Contra 3. What will be argued is not the negation of 3, that the Americans cannot be relied upon, but rather that 3 is dubious, and that it would be rash to place excess reliance on American protection. That being so, and other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own resources, as the American administration is kindly advising. Especially since the American “Vietnam debacle” and the fall of Saigon, things have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability of American patronage. First, the relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined significantly. It no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity); as a connected matter of policy, US world warfighting aspirations have been reduced. Its ability to act as, and afford to be, global policeman has also markedly declined/ Secondly, the willingness of Americans to engage in remote foreign wars has correspondingly tumbled. Although the American administration includes more than enough hawks, to be sure, the people and Congress are not longer in a mood for gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in American interests. Since Vietnam, US opinion polls regularly show strong popular opposition to overseas military involvement. This “Vietnam syndrome” has served as a major constraint on US military policy and foreign involvement. An important manifestation of these changes is the Guam Doctrine, calling upon US regional allies to take primary responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts. Another important outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops are committed abroad there must be reasonable assurance of Congressional and popular support (Weinberger, reported in PC p.14). As Mack comments, ‘such assurance is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries where no US vital national interests are at stake’. Certainly no more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which provides only that each signatory ‘act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes’ (article 4). All the treaty strictly requires is consultation; there is no undertaking or commitment. Isn’t the treaty backed up by informal verbal reassurances? None that are not undermined by others, in American administrative multiple-speak. Even the elite view is that Australia has to ‘work ... to maximize the prospect of US support’ and that the Americans cannot be counted upon. For ‘the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite high, and circumstances at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability to help Australia in other ways?. ‘... we cannot rely upon US support in a defence emergency arising within our own neighbourhood’ (SB, pp.29-30). However a special case has been made for American reliability in Australia’s case - as 12 opposed to examples of American abandonment of earlier military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran) - on the basis of permanent friendship, common interests, and shared values and democratic traditions. There are two difficulties with this type of special pleading: first, as to the basis, and, second, as to the adequacy of such a basis in by-passing Congress, the American people, and slow constitutional processes. Historical evidence hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis in analogous cases. And here, as already indicated, the basis is shaky. For there is not a common culture shared by Australia and America: rather values diverge significantly on quite crucial issues. Even less are interests always common, as the matter of subsidised agricultural produce reveals, and as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently confirmed. Interests diverged, for instance, when Australia toyed with opposing Indonesia’s claim to West Papua. So it is dubious at least that American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation with Asian nations to the North, e.g. with Indonesia or Japan. Of course if the special case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates, then the treaty would be otiose. There was in fact no treaty in operation in 1942; but by then American interests in countering the Japanese were independently aroused. 4. Other-reliance and regional self-reliance A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be deemed entirely reliable, yet precisely here unreliability can hardly be tolerated. When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won’t do for Defense to call up with a message like that from local Services, "We can’t get there till tomorrow’’, or “until after Congress meets”, or “Sorry, Mate!”. More seriously, handing defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others; and given nuclear defence, which too many Antipodean administrations have opted for, it quite likely means literally handing our lives over for many of us. Another problem of other-reliance is thus its adequacy. A further problem is its cost. In principle, if a State hires out its defence it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if, that is, defence is a commodity of a sort, like national shipping, meterological services, etc. The trouble with global defence is that the market is monopolistic, with currently only one supplier of the right complexion22, who accordingly can exact a very high price, and has - making the whole country a nuclear target and demanding substantial subservience. Similar points make part of the case, well-enough appreciated, for not trying to press defence, plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity. When a country can supply its own defence, it therefore makes very good sense for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in its own proper defence than most other parties. Should it also be cheaper in costs that matter, then self-reliance not just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance does not. But in that event, it surely does not need nuclear 13 patrons, or to farm out some of its defence. Such self-reliance undermines an important part of the older case based on other-reliance for alliances such as ANZUS. However newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g. Australian minister Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty ANZUS of what little content it had, and remove much of the apparent point of such older alliances. Since the ANZUS arrangements contain no clear commitments beyond consultation but are merely vague articles of understanding, a simple course is of course to allow them to be emptied of content, so that the alliance, an expensive and outdated “insurance” policy, dies a natural death. It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should American defence facilities be closed or internationalised and passage of American nuclear equipped or powered transport be excluded from Australia. That would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the treaty supposedly affords , while making way for the greater advantages of friendly nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, or so on. But self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient. The world does not consist of separable isolated pieces, as becomes increasingly evident. Most dramatically, Australia will not escape the effects of nuclear winter. The picture is much the same as for other dynamic subjects, such as plants which are not internally self-sufficient but depend crucially on their environment - and indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional holistic component of policy should take? Put this way, it is almost obvious that the appropriate move is not taking sides (as in a kids’ war game or tug-of-war game that is already set up) and doing one’s bit for confrontation. For that will not contribute to stability, to a proper holistic approach, but rather to sectionalism and fragmentation, and to bringing nuclear winter closer. Other-reliance and self-reliance typically present a false contrast, and certainly do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of holism and partism (EE, p.223), and of dependence versus isolationism. In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards - might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance. The elitist case, insofar as it were to call for such reliance (e.g. in assumption 4), could hardly be faulted. But it doesn’t; and is satisfied with much less. Integration may reach only certain inadequate levels, the level of modern alliances and alignment, which are essentially coupled with opposition to an other side, e.g. the monolithic East (or West). It is into just this trap that elitist arguments fall. 14 5. The decline and fall of elitist arguments. Premisses 4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion of stability, as related arguments revolve around that of security. But stability and security are value-laden terms, which are not cultural invariants. What stability comprehends in American administrative perception is very different from what highland villages take it to include. In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude. But both the relevant states and the stationary among them are relative to given frames of reference; for instance, what is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel. As Trudeau has said of the superpowers, ‘they share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates’ (p.10) and disturb stability. But lesser states or regional people, not counting remote business or military interests as relevant, report no instability. Bureaucrats invariably view bombs as necessary to stability, and the nuclear fix as stability; by contrast, gentle people increasingly see bombs as tools of terrorism and as characteristically antithetical to peace. ad 4: Of course Australia has a vital interest in global stability and security: what sizeable nation does not? But the determinable motherhood interpretation (of italicised terms), while no doubt diplomatically convenient, conceals crucial differences, highly material to the argument. For one global stability means something different in USA from what it means in Costa Rica and likely what it intends in Australia. Certainly vital interests are different. America is interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere), and it tends, in more popular rhetoric at least, to equate containing socialism with containing communism and both with Soviet containment. A continental swing to socialism (or Non-Soviet communism) in Latin America, or in Africa, would upset global stability, on American perception, and would indeed have significant effects on US business or investment; but it would not on its own upset or affect most Australians or directly threaten Antipodean stability, and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability. Australians generally are not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing its spread (indeed perhaps the opposite). Australia is not interested in (and oughtn’t to be charmed by the idea of) defence of the (American) “free enterprise” system, or in the defence of uglier forms of capitalism wherever they are presently initiated or opposed (cf. Chomsky and Herman). Contra 5. It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss, that the Soviets are expansionistic, at least in that they are interested in extending their influence where they can. So also are most empires, including American and Indonesian (so for that matter are many academics and most sales-people). But the Soviets have an ideological 15 message to spread, Marxism-Leninism, an ideology they used to anticipate being installed everywhere. But the Americans also have a message, a capitalist message, Free Enterprise Inc, which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them. And they need to be expansionistic to have it adopted, whereas the Russians and Chinese need simply wait for history to take its allegedly determined course (though a little assistance - reflecting legitimate doubt about this determinism? - would surely spread their disconcertingly different forms of “progress” without interfering). But surely the Russian message is pernicious? All these messages are pernicious (for familiar reasons: see e.g. Erlich). The proper question is whether on its own Soviet international activity threatens, in some damaging way, global stability. Undoubtedly Soviet-American confrontation, as in the Cuban missile affair, does threaten global stability; though not in a way that has any bearing on Australian defence. In fact no Russian expansionary tendency, military or otherwise, has an untoward direct effect on Australia, little of significance reaches into the Antipodes (see Dibb SS). So what is the local excitement about? In large measure the excitement has been drummed up by the political right, East European expatriates, and pork-barrelling politicians. The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and overexploited (Mack ST). Viewed from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem, unless the Soviets should get locked into military confrontation with USA - a real problem to be addressed. With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part of a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize apart the heavies, not by seconding and inciting the USA. But confrontation apart, Soviet internationalism, hardly a great success story, does not seriously disturb global stability, as seen from Australia. For a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism, types of expansion should be distinguished - military, potential military, influence with military access, and mere influence. In actual military expansion and involvement since W’orld War II, the Russian record is hardly striking by comparison with the USA or several other states. The one conspicuous case involving control of new territory, that of Afghanistan, has actually had little effect on global stability. The usual Western apprehension concerns not anything the Soviets have accomplished, but what they might attempt militarily, especially in Europe. But the idea of Soviet military adventure in Europe is a Western invention and bogey, lacking in plausibility. The Soviet military lacks the force ratio needed to be assured of military success in Europe, both by their own standards of what is required and by Western strategic standards. And the Soviets have no good reasons or interests in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into nuclear war. They already face enough economic difficulties and troubles with East European client states which they cannot control satisfactorily. 16 The extension of Soviet influence has largely been in the Third world. But it has hardly been successful, with as many failures and losses to record as Soviet “gains” - gains which add to the imperial burden since they involve countries wracked with problems, such as Vietnam. The Third World exercises are marred by Soviet inaptitude and limited by the state of their own economy. They scarcely displace the global structure enough to test its stability; and they produce no shock waves or even significant ripples in the Antipodes. Contra 6. The main current threat to world stability appears to come not from one of the dancers in the East-West dance of death, but from the escalating confrontation, easily ignited, between the lead dancers. With this US policies and practices have at least as much to do as USSR ones. Recent US practices are more destabilizing than Soviet ones, and indeed highly destabilising, because of new weapons and weapons systems, because of rejection of arms control and Soviet proposals, and because of “star wars” preparation which both accelerates the arms race on earth and begins a new one in space. A vast increase in tension and suspicion accompanies the “arms race” which is in large measure due to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines, new weapons systems, with built-in incentives for pre-emption, and deliberate abandonment of arms control (see PR). Such considerations, duly assembled, demolish the received (but nonetheless crazy) theme that an alliance or alignment with USA helps increase stability. American practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet. 6. The East-West balance argument: American alignment versus friendly independence The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by the East-West This politically-important balance argument, which shares key premisses nr with the related elitist argument, runs as follows : balance argument. 7. Global stability is the key to world peace. 8. Stability of the international order is a matter of maintaining a global balance. But 5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR. 6A. The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open and pluralistic international order. 9. Australia’s primary security concern, indeed most vital interest, is this stability. Hence 10. Australia’s role is to help America maintain the balance. The rest of Australia’s intervolvement with American military arrangements is then taken to follow. But there are many reasons for halting the argument before it reaches this stage of practical (and allegedly moral) detail. The balance argument assumes much that has already been rebutted, for instance that the Soviet threat thesis is correct (i.e. 5) and that US 17 policy is stabilizing (part of 6A). It also takes for granted, what now is at least in serious doubt, that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than what the American administration appears to be aiming at, superiority. But in that event, Australia is not really engaged in some longer term balancing feat, so much as in helping USA prevail in nuclear race, contradicting the goal of world peace of premiss 7. Contra 10. and its derivation. The derivation is inadequate: it does not follow that Australia’s role is such a lackey’s one. If the balance of strength is leaning in America’s direction, as most less-biassed evidence indicates, then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in with the Eastern team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war would suggest). Presumably premiss 6A.1 is designed to exclude this deplorable thought, of Australia teaming up with totalitarians. Nevertheless Australia should be putting its slight weight where it is effective, given its own broader objectives, interests, principles and supposedly pluralistic ideals. There are several different roles Australia could fulfil which would enable it to make a more satisfactory, less passive, contribution to world peace, among them de-escalation through active nonalignment, appropriate aid, and so forth. Thus 10 is hardly well-supported or evident. A more direct approach would be better than throwing Australian weight unreflectively on one side of the balance. As a little reflection attests, the balance image and argument point not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment. Contra 6A (and 6). The theme that US maintains the balance, and hence preserves the peace, is of course false. For again, it takes two to tango. While it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and checks the USSR in this munitions dance, the history of the dance reveals that the pace-escalation has flowed from the interaction of the one partner with the other. That is, but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the USSR (the interaction is two-way as with Hegel’s famous master-slave relation). In any case, it looks as if, on a different historical trajectory, the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for they have comparable combined GNP, technological resources, etc.; cf. note 20) Thus it is doubtful that the current Soviet build-up, produced in interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US. ad 6A.1. As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the argument, it is enough to observe that the international order the USA helps maintain leaves very much to be desired. In its intervention, militarily, economically and indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness, is well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes, etc. The negative side of American imperialism as well-enough documented, if not widely enough read or known by Americans themselves (cf. again Chomsky and Herman). Only under scandalously low redefinitions of ‘open’ and ‘pluralistic’ is the present “free” world order 18 either open or pluralistic. ad 8, and the damaging equivocation on ‘the balance’. While balance is one way of maintaining stability in the world arrangements that have presently come to pass, the balance structure can only carry so much loading. Add too much weight (of arms tension, and so forth) to both sides and the precarious structure will fail, probably catastrophically. increasing probability of catastrophic breakdown, for a variety of reasons The (accident, miscalculation, computer error, human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI). While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for stability, the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not. The balance argument, however, neglects this dynamical situation, illegitimately switching from a (certain post) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going) balance in subsequent premisses. The balance argument itself breaks down through equivocation. What the dynamic picture also indicates is the importance of removing some weight from the balance, most obviously by arms limitation and tension reduction. It points too to a different role for Australasia, to a less aligned position genuinely directed at stability. It is to the emerging case for a different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role, that the positive argument will now begin to swing. The inadequate East-West balance argument is typically combined with attacks upon proposals for a different role for Australia than American alliance and. service. effect of these additions is to generate extra confusion and dust. The main For the additions are inessential to the argument, and do not serve to repair it or reinforce it. For example, against nonalignment or neutralism is set the alleged pervasiveness of nuclear winter. We might as well be aligned (it’s good for trade and other economic perquisites), so it is sometimes argued from up top, because if the central balance fails we are all dead. This is a conspicuous nonsequitur^, worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (because it also suggests that balance is a prerequisite for stability). But, in the main, the attack is irrelevant, because the point of nonalignment is to help remove overload and to break down confrontation and its escalation to war; it is a thing to do now, be fore winter descends, to delay or halt its descent, and most important, to reduce its extent and severity. Australia’s weight may be slight, another irrelevant addition goes, but psychologically it is important for the West. Any further spread of the “Kiwi disease” (from New Zealand) would show the weakening of Western resolve, and give the green light for Soviet expansionism. Bell, a leading exponent of the balance argument, virtually gives the impression that if Australia dropped out of American alignment, the Russians would be on the road down through the isles to Australia tomorrow/ Much of this sort of rhetoric is reminiscent of the baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Vietnam time. The Russians have no such military interests, or present capabilities. And if they were to gear up and set out, they would be met by substantial resistance along most of the route, resistance obtaining Western assistance. For America, for one, has major interests, different from Australia’s, in both Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as elsewhere in East Asia. The addition, so far from strengthening the argument, depends, in its “green light for expansion” comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism. In fact most of the further case for American alignment of one sort or another - when it is argued-, often nonalignment and neutrality are simply denounced in good old-fashioned authoritarian style - turns upon already-faulted assumptions. Catley, for example, another exponent of “central balance”, presents the following ‘consideration’: ... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia is locked by considerations of culture, economics, and political philosophy into the defence of the Western world. It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that defence if necessary by hosting facilities which cannot easily be located elsewhere (p.15). The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated: and the premiss in no way sustains the conclusion, the argument involving among other things, the prescriptive (is-ought) fallacy. Consider the premiss. Australia is not, unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us, locked into Western nuclear defence, but in principle independent and free to reconsider and rethink its options. (American use of the “facilities” is not irrevocable, and shortly comes up, in principle at least, for reconsideration.) How do culture, economics and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but not for nonaligned Western European states? They do not: Australia is not a part of USA or altogether a client state; and the cultures, interests, economic frameworks and political philosophies of the two nations are significantly different (for details, see CPD). But even if the ideological frameworks were much more similar than they are, that would not entail similar defence practices (as, e.g., ANZUS in all its weakness shows), nor any such defence obligations. Most of the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley calibre - or worse. Fortunately, then, such arguments are examined in detail elsewhere, notably by D. Martin in his examination of counter-arguments to Australian armed neutrality, the legally-recognised non-belligerent form of nonalignment he favours. Virtually none of Martin’s counter-case depends for its success on features of neutrality, which is not advocated here. Virtually all of Martin’s argument is moreover couched in negative form; his positive brief is very brief. It 20 reduces to this: alignment or alliance with the USA 'cannot make us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet, while it needlessless exposes to other dangers, including nuclear war (p.l, italics added). While the message is correct enough, and in need of wide propagation, it does little on its own to support neutrality, and it by no means exhausts the positive case for weakening alignment. In particular, there are more positive arguments of much theoretical interest, to be drawn from systems theory and from the burgeoning theory of collective goods and action. 7. Contributions towards stability: free-riding, enlarging group size, and increasing variety. The strategic world situation we now confront can be viewed as a game with more than 100 players, counting in nation-states and leaving out (for convenience) major organisations such as the largest 100 transnational companies. These organisational players align themselves around two large poles, East and West, as indicated: NON-ALIGNED N N WEST EAST India NATO States Japan, Israel Sweden* Switzerland* NZUS: Australi I Ireland1* ^Most Latin ' American States I Tanzania Costa Rica** State capitalist Key: N: *: **: State communist Nuclear weapons states Neutral states Nonmilitary states There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing, some of which are practically important for peace and for stability. Some of these games, such as World Empire and Chicken (already played under one representation), are played essentially between the East-West superplayers. There are several problems about East-West games: for instance, what representation they have, the repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games 21 may, like Russian roulette, end after one round, as they will with the Big One), and the negative sum characters of some games. And the monolithic East/monolithic West dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail (in the way simplifications may). So game-theoretical modelling will be approached differently and more obliquely. World Security, like regional and local security, is a collective good (technically, an item, quality unspecified, in joint supply and precluding exclusion). That is not of course to say that there are not conditions under which security may leave much to be desired, for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and intolerant despotism; but then, so it can be argued, the trouble lies with the provisioning, not the particular product. collective good G for the collection of N nation-states. It is a It is, furthermore, a collective good which permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states. Looked at from this perspective the recent American complaint about its allies, Japan for example, and their insufficient expenditure on defence, is a complaint about their free-riding. Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding are satisfied, for instance by unaligned and unilaterally disarming states. For 1. G is available to all N members of the collective if it is available to any, and the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member better off. 2. G is achieved iff some number m (no larger than that of group K) contribute towards its provision, where under the balance of power assumption Il C K C N and II = {USA, USSR}. 3. The expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less than the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs of contribution exceed likely benefits - except perhaps for members of II given that G is largely provided by II. There is what can be called a pegged (or asymmetric) free-rider problem, pegged by members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open - within the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3 is only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g. there will be a war 10 years down the road so the expected costs each year exceed the expected benefits). For most members of N, by contrast, the benefits of G are available even should they reduce their contributions. There is a straightforward case (in narrow game-theoretical terms) for recommending Australian, and regional, free-riding on the balance of power provision of G. Some arguments, beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:- Either stability breaks down catastrophically and there is a large-scale war or it does not. If it does then the region is 22 better off than it would be if (strongly) aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily) targetted. (Here the dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes might as well be involved gets challenged and rejected: as to how see e.g. MF and B. Martin). If, alternatively, stability doesn’t break down then the region has the benefits in any case, without the costs. For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with the USA enhances global stability, etc.; indeed, as remarked and will be further argued, the evidence points to the contrary. As regards Australasian regional weight in the Western block, do we seriously believe it is significant? That the Australian voice, though useful for propaganda purposes, makes much real difference in the halls of Northern power? We shouldn’t: and if we do we’re living in a delusional framework. Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually all major strategic planning exercises, most difference-making peace initiatives, etc.,etc. Now Eastern block countries would hardly object to Antipodean free-riding, rather than no offering support (however trifling), comfort and incitement to their opposition/ Furthermore free-riding is how the Americans, on their theoretical principles, would expect Australia to act, the rational self-interested procedure (see CPD). It is how lesser nations should act. For it is economically rational; contributing is not. But won’t the US make things economically dear for Australia? In threats and theory, yes; but in practice, no more than it has already done with subsidized wheat deals to the Soviets, no more than it threatened to do already in the case of New Zealand over the nuclear-ships issue. For except for short term aberrations, America will never give up trade or business arrangements: one gets the impressions that America would trade with the Devil Himself, if doing so would open some new markets in Hell. Despite its political stigma, free-riding need be no problem, or in any way immoral or irregular. Perhaps the buses are free; perhaps there is a voluntary payment system, to which only some need contribute, etc. With the nuclear fix, free-riding is indeed the moral course; contributing is not.29 Free-riding, though often protrayed as a problem, is only a problem in certain cases of collective provisioning, where the good involved is sufficiently desirable and will not be provided because of too many free- riders. This is not the situation with global security, which will be provided, in the curious and precarious way that it is, whether or not Australia stays on the escalating treadmill or gets off and rides free. Australia's free-riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia. Interests diverge again. What is more, judicious free-riding can increase stability. In pictorial terms, the stability of a structure is typically increased up to a certain point by securing it more 23 adequately; for example, if it is a wind tower or similar building, by increasing its rigid ties or supports to the ground. Then a tripod (or better still a quadrapod) tower is much less likely to topple than a bipedal one, and requires less guying to stay up. Increasing the diversity, or variety, of supports increases stability. The theme that diversity correlates with stability has been sharpened and confirmed in ecology, for instance in the theory of “spreading the risks” (see EW). The related theme, that a certain variety increases stability, has been elaborated in cybernetics. The core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia’s free-riding in defence, and consequent nonalignment, could help to enhance diversity and variety, and accordingly to increase stability (especially if done in concert with other client and suppliant states). Two interlocked supports in tension, East and West, well dug in but hardly well guyed, are inadequate for the long-term stability of the precarious structure of world peace. What makes engineering sense is not however adding weight to the structure, or even strengthening the supports that are there, helping the East when the balance is disturbed by the more powerful West’s surging ahead and likely overburdening the structure. What makes more sense is increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying group size, as significant independent grouping could do. The monolithic East/monolithic West picture is much more than a convenient simplification, for instance for strategic thinking. It may force damaging mistakes in conceptualisation, mzsconceptualisation perhaps convenient for some larger players. One main reason for mistakes concerns group size. Whereas 11+ = {West, East} is a small group, the number N of nation-states is not, but is considerably larger. But the collective behaviour of large groups differs in theory from that of small groups; group size is a highly significant factor (though its precise import remains contentious). The group N of nation-states is a large group, of essentially self-interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors. collective action applies: So we may expect that the American theory of that the groups will behave in a counterintuitive way. Though expected to act in the common interest, to obtain security in particular, the collection will not. On this account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson’s rapid thinking). But with the collective of nations, there is, as experience has shown, no outside mediator or influence of sufficient authority to ensure attainment of the collective good. The prognosis looks very gloomy: this most important (though far from unique) collective good will not be provided. Fortunately the reasoning, like much of the “logic” of collective action, has been too 21 swift. The group, though large, is highly privileged, in containing several actors for whom costs of war exceed benefits (note the shift in perspective from the earlier free-riding condition 3). Indeed an important economic effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear winter is that virtually all actors involved should now be in that position; for (subjectively) expected costs of nuclear war have become very high. To go back to basics, Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants’ tautology (defining ‘net’) net agent benefit = gross agent benefits - gross agent costs, i.e. in symbols, for each agent or o actor i (in collective N), A- = V-Cj. A group is privileged if Aj is positive for some i in N. It needs little argument to show that for vulnerable European nation-states the net benefits of global security are decidedly positive (e.g. with a nuclear war their respective future GDPs would expectedly fall to near zero). The fact that the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the collective good involved, security, will be supplied, particularly in the longer term. The simple logic is not dynamic; it takes no account of mistake, error, or the like, or of stability achieved through superiority or intermediate instability. An improved modelling - which can take some account of group size and of the dynamics, through iterated games - is gained by returning to game-theoretic grounds. A free rider “problem” is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according to the conventional wisdom, it is a prisoners’ dilemma (cf. Pettit, but contrast Taylor and Ward). The argument can go this way:- a free rider problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good; but the theory of collective goods is equivalent to that of a .QI, generalised prisoners’ dilemma. Certainly the global nuclear situation appears to present a dilemma; as much is a commonplace claim. Elsewhere (e.g. WPI) it is argued in detail that it does indeed present a moral dilemma. Here the argument - which can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the more piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential dilemma (for many members of N).°2 Consider first, since these have obtained some investigation (e.g. Hardin), the range of apparent two party games being played by the US and Soviet Union administration (labelled US and SU respectively) in 1985 as regards the moves of further nuclear armament, A, or nuclear disarmament, N. (It is supposed, naturally, that the game is set in some background context, e.g. nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going French and Chinese nuclear armament). It is important here, as other places, to distinguish the administration - which for the most part calls the shots - from the society and the people. It is administrations or governments that generally take people into war; etc. The American people seem rather more inclined towards nuclear de-escalation than their administration; the German people were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their administration proceeded to install. The strategy games involved are then administration games, which we 25 can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.g. years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until the Big Ones explode. Within this simplistic setting, the apparent games being played by US and SU are those diagrammed next: New Initial game Prisoners’ Dilemma Game SU SU D US A Revised Game D 2,2 A 4,1 1,4 3,3 D US A SU D 3,2 A 4,1 1,4 2,3 D US A D 3,3 A 4,1 1,4 2,2 According to Hardin, ‘giving evidence of [his] deformation professionelle’, the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) ‘represents the preference ordering of virtually all the articulate policy analysts in the United States and presumably also in the Soviet Union’ (p.248). While PD may have represented US policy, there is considerable evidence (as already indicated) that it no longer does, that the US administration has shifted to a more aggressive, war-fighting, phase. That is, the US has interchanged its rankings of (D,D) and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games. The Soviets, who have been much more consistent (and no doubt better censored) in their policy pronouncements, appear not to have changed their game, but have stuck with their form of deterrence and no-first-strike. However they are bound to try to keep up with the Americans, and so are presumably pushed towards the Revised Game shown, which pleasantly restores symmetry. Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled. An outcome is said to be stable if neither player has incentive to switch strategies unilaterally on the strength of the game, i.e. to alter the outcome except by influencing the other player also to alter strategies. All these games provide dilemmas, in a broad sense, that equilibrium is achieved in an undesirable and dangerous outcome. In all the apparent games, arming is the dominant strategy for each player; yet in the PD game that is even Pareto-suboptimal, whence the economic fascination. But as the other games deliver results which are socially suboptimal (and below a satisfying threshold), all these games are dilemmas. And the same applies to suggested alternative games that might plausibly be taken to represent the superpower situation, and such as Chicken. A recognisably suboptimal outcome is guaranteed by the independent ‘‘stable” strategies. What is worse, iteration of games does not help (as it may in other political circumstances). For there are substantial political and military incentives for the superpower players not to adjust their preferences substantially in socially superior directions after repeated games, but to do what the US at least appears to have done, to make the situation worse. 26 It is important then to attempt to modify or curtail these self-interested superpower games. There are various connected ways of going about this. One is for other parties to combine to limit or discourage these games. Another alternative is for them to try to alter the games. Thus much socially preferable would be a switch to a coordination game of some sort; for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey, in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers playing; hence Hardin’s provocative label for this game, ‘Lackey’s game’). In the coordination game diagrammed, WN represents a western-inclined neutral and EN an Eastern inclined neutral (e.g. Yugoslavia): EN WN D D 1,1 A 3,2 A 2,3 4,4 [Other coordination games, with (D,D) assigned (1,1)] Now the dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in isolation; they come together in international settings such as United Nations’ committees (and elsewhere, since coordination games are frequently peoples’ games as well). Superimposing the games, with coordination games of the first sort applied to previously given US and SU games, leads to the following augmented East (E) and West (W) games: New Game, Augmented Prisoners’ Dilemma Augmented E E A D Revised Game, Augmented A 4,1 2,2 : *4,1' \ : 3^2 ’ D 1 : W ......... 1,4: A 2/3: 2/3; D ; 1 w ........ : 1,4 3,3 ; a 4 ; E D 2/3 • • — •- : 3-3’**: D ; 1 W I 2,3 ; . • 2.3 A D 2/3 2,2 a 4 ■ 4,1* ! . ; : 2/3 J 4 Key: rh represents a sequence of ms, i.e. m, m, m ... for each coordination player; 2/3 a sequence of 2s and 3s in some order. As augmenting games reveals, to play with a superpower is to help reinforce a stable deadlock. But playing an independent coordination game increases variety and can help in breaking the deadlock, in fact in several ways. For one, enough significant players playing a coordination game can alter the overall dominant strategy towards disarmament. For another, much more pressure can be brought to bear on the superpowers. For example, with less support, unilateral action by the US administration on Star-Wars and arms build-up can be exposed. Superpower militarism and power excursions would stand naked and 27 unsupported. Australia’s impact, in particular, would be rather greater as a nonaligned free-rider pressing seriously for disarmament and regional nuclear-freedom (instead of, as at present, white-wash polemics and token ambassadors, undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of US support). The strategy suggested by game-theoretic modelling converges then with that suggested by other approaches, notably regional and ecological approaches. The strategy is that of limitation, of disengagement from escalating US/USSR war games, and progressive alteration of their likely outcomes by defusing coordination moves. In more practical terms, the approaches mean trying to limit and modify superpower games by restricting their games and supporting regional or local coordination of players, in forms of organisations both of nations and of people. Such organisations would work, as many have already been doing, to contract the regions and spheres of influence and access of US and USSR military administrations, and to diminish support for their war-fighting objectives. For example, Antipodean groups could, and should, coordinate to ease the American military out of the South Pacific region, meanwhile resisting any intrusion of Russian military. Then, while the Europeans are doing their coordinated de-escalating, denuclearising things right across Europe, the Russian and American war games are progressively excluded from the entire Southern Hemisphere. An eventual aim geographically is, to send their weapons of war back home, to restrict their (and French and other) global military enterprises to their “own” backyards, where they would not always be so enthusiastically received. Fortunately such an ambitious and optimistic project, so unlikely to come to pass given present nation-state arrangments, can be accomplished piecemeal, from small and significant beginnings, already to be seen. As a result of recent movements in the region, a South Pacific nuclear-free region is now a politically-achievable option. A first token step has already been taken. But next steps, towards genuine nuclear-freedom, require above all cooperation of a less aligned Australia, joining other disengaging “free-riders” in the region. That in turn requires, as a practical component, closure of American bases in Australia as their leases terminate, cessation of American nuclear ship visits and aircraft staging, and an end to uranium mining and sales. As Australia is the only country in the region supplying uranium, and the main location of US bases, such steps would be most significant. Even so, the Pacific regional effect would remain unduly limited, so long as France and the US are based within the region, and transit of nuclear ships is internationally sanctioned everywhere on the shrinking high seas. Plainly there are further more difficult steps on the way to southern Pacific nuclear-freedom and independence, i.e. even for one of the easier oceanic regions. But there is no good reason to 28 expect that removing the nuclear scourge, any more than eliminating other major politico­ social evils, will be easy. Permanent removal and a less dubious “peace” than we presently enjoy is not something that will be achieved by more of what we have witnessed, or even through clever diplomacy and smart technological tricks, such as new defensive weapons; it will take difficult structural and radical design change. 8. On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of appropriate structural change. There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural political change would be highly conducive to peace (e.g. democratic reorganisation of the superpowers), and that certain fundamental changes may even be sufficient for permanent peace. With that in view they have long been advocated - at least from Rousseau and Kant onwards. But it has also been supposed that some such changes are necessary for lasting peace; ‘it is also necessary to transform the structures that lead to war’ (B. Martin, p.12). To render this theme immune to obvious criticisms - for example, that straightforward authoritarian extension of certain established structures could bring an end to war - further desiderata, typically presupposed, are invoked, for instance that certain freedoms, modest material standards of life, and so on, are duly guaranteed, and also the type of necessity involved is wound back to some lower technical level (not excluded however by present practicalities). These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to assess, but also more difficult to sustain. There are two parts to its assessment and defence, a negative and critical part, demolishing a range of arguments from determinism, human nature, and the like, to the effect that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and a positive part, comprising direct arguments for the theme. The large negative part of this enterprise will simply be illustrated.34 According to deterministic and mechanistic approaches, such as that of (marxist) technological determinism, nuclear weapons, like megamachines generally, are no aberration. They are an integral part of the business of industrial and ecological conquest, a further stage in human intervention which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides, wastes, etc. The argument tends to the fatalistic. The megamachines of conquest are made, and once made they will be used. No change in political arrangement, which would make any difference, is possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts push their position and luck, even further, that a weapon or device once invented by humans will be used: there is no stopping progress. But in doing so they overextend themselves. While there is, sadly a fair induction from the manufacture of weapons (of any given type, for many batches are never deployed) to their use, inductions from invention of machines or the like to their manufacture are c 29 unreliable and subject to many counterexamples (and many machines that do eventually get made have been reinvented or independently rediscovered). But even the good inductions do not show that weapons of various sorts must be used, that a change in background political organisation would not frustrate the inductions. The broader deterministic position is of course that such background changes are not possible either; political arrangements too, like the rest of social life, are technologically or economically determined. But (nonanalytical) determinism, technological and other, is false, so it is argued elsewhere (JB, CPD). Different political arrangements, which alleviate problems, are technically possible, and arrangements would be different in differently evolved worlds. Things did not and do not have to be the way they are, or the social and political sort of way they are. Many routes, none of deductive strength, lead to the conclusion that the dominant political structures of our time, fashioned (with much input from schemes of past philosophers) from feudal institutions, require extensive structural alteration. In particular, they need to be superseded by alternative structures less intricately tied to war, which do not promote or lead so readily to war. Such a theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix itself (as e.g. WP1, p.47ff.). But suppose, improbable as it may seem, that nuclear weapons all vanished, thereby removing the current nuclear fix; for instance, they turned out to be quietly self-destructing, or a disarmament actually took place. massive thermodynamic miracle occurred, or nuclear The problem of war would not be thereby removed, and even that of nuclear war would only be given some respite. For the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.04 Conventional weapons would remain, along with weapons perhaps as dangerous as nuclear weapons, such as chemical and biological ones. Nuclear weapons, insofar as they were removed (for small caches are easily hidden away), could soon be replaced, especially if nuclear power plants remained intact; and nothing would prevent the development of (Star-Wars) weapons more diabolical than nuclear ones. War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is - by freezing the status quo. ... The structural conditions for war need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war (B. Martin, p.12: Martin goes on to indicate the types of structures, and how to reach them). Structural adjustments can provide conditions for lasting satisfactory peace. An initial, somewhat simplistic, Kantian argument for the proposition that peace is possible (presented by Latta, introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:- Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a practical idea, a moral principle. Hence this ideal ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally) to be peace. But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible. 30 From Heracleit.us through Hegel there buzzes an impressive swarm of philosophers"*6 who have rejected the second premiss. Some are even captivated by such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would stop, that competition, with war as one limit, is essential to motion and progress! would now be With the recent shift in philosophical fashions, the second premiss more widely conceded, though often not on Kantian grounds, but consequentialist. Such grounds to support the theme that peace is desirable and ought to be realised, but are more discriminating in that they help indicate what sort of peace. Unfortunately, however it is done, the second premiss does not sustain the conclusion, ought does not entail can, as many moral dilemmas reveal (see MD, WP1). So fortunately, there is a more satisfactory and revealing route to the conclusion that peace is possible, and indeed is feasible. That is the more elaborate method of (semantical) modelling: present in detail scenarios of societies where peace persists (for the sceptical it may be necessary to recall n-human models, with n small). This sort of thing is of course already done, in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate, if rather less precisely, by OQ novelists and science-fiction writers, and by activists like the different Martins. What all these scenarios point to, however, are societies considerably different from our own - though not in the people involved, who have their weaknesses, their power drives, and so forth, but because of significant structural alterations in the societies depicted. By way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibility of lasting peace, but push ahead with the argument, that societies of these restructured sorts are desirable alternatives to contemporary military- industrial arrangements. For those of us then who want to move towards such pacific alternatives, the practical inference, from feasibility and desirability is clear: we should begin on the real work of structural change. Peace is possible and desirable, but the prospects are poor (as Heilbroner has said of the human prospect). Present arrangements, though contingent and fashioned in large measure from the schemes of past intellectuals, are thoroughly entrenched, and enforced, both ideologically and by much physical power, often as if along with natural law they were God­ given, though they are no longer appropriate. Even small nonstructural changes look difficult to achieve in present political climates. Through climates have not changed that much, major social improvements have been gained, not instantanously, but in longer-term struggles with government. Such short-term difficulties did not deter social theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau before him and many after him, were concerned with obtaining lasting peace. The world has changed enormously since the time of Kant’s proposals for peace (of 1795), and even since the time of Veblen’s more cynical additions (in 1917). Hard science and 31 destructive power have grown enormously; and even theoretical knowledge of collective behaviour, especially that admitting of game-theoretic treatment, though still slight, has advanced. But political arrangements and what can be accomplished politically have, in important respects, changed very little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761) that governments were probably too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace. Governments have long been, and been seen as, main obstacles to peace. Thus Veblen rightly maintained that ‘... if the peace is to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management, - in spite of the State rather than by its good offices’ (p.7).^^ So it has been with most major social changes; for they have involved structural political change disturbing to governmental conservatism. In his search for the indispensible conditions for lasting peace, Kant claimed, as others have claimed since, that peace is not possible under present structural arrangements of an unregulated competing nation-state kind. As times have changed, so, to a limited extent, have state structural arrangements, since Kant compiled his conditions. In particular, there is now, in the shape of the United Nations, a very weak reflection of what Kant looks for, a world (or European!) federation of nations. But crucial ingredients in Kant’s resolution are still lacking:- namely, at the upper level, what is required for a standard resolution of Prisoners Dilemma type situations - some surrender of national sovereignty, especially as regards war, and, at the lower level, “republican” states. Major blockages to adequate arrangements for peace remain at two critical levels of organisation, that concentrated upon of the organisation of collectives of states and, in part by devolution, that of the internal organisation of individual states themselves. Much evidence has now accumulated that more far-reaching changes than Kant, Rousseau and Veblen envisaged are required at both international and nation-state levels if genuine peace is to be secured. Indeed significant changes are wanted even in republician states for peace movements to get their mixed message through already fixed channels to state control systems. For this sort of reason, movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to succeed on their own, but should be linked into a broader plurality of movements, which seek to widen informational and democratic channels, and to alter the character and membership of state systems, and thereby render them much more controllable and accountable.40 Many longer-haul structural changes depend upon diverting nuclear war in the meantime. Thus arguing for more far-reaching changes, for an altered nonaligned Australia, 32 for a nuclear-free South Pacific, for regional structural changes, certainly does not exclude arguing and working for obvious measures for reducing risks of nuclear war. These include: a serious commitment to arms control by the superpowers (whose practices threaten our futures, though most of us lack representation in either); a move away from war-fighting strategies and associated destabilising weapons-systems; moderation of confrontational rhetoric and other tensions-inducing practices by superpower administrations, and improved efforts at mutual understanding (as well some appreciation of the elements of political pluralism); and then, remote though it may appear, significant steps towards nuclear disarmament. Richard Sylvan 41 Bungendore NSW 33 NOTES 1. Queensland premier, with destructive deep-South policies. 2. The point, which has become controversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert. 3. See especially Dibb, as reported in the ANU Reporter, and for a more guarded elaboration, his IAD (e.g. p.163 ‘At present, planning for the defence of Australia lack coherence because there is no clear definition, in priority order, of what needs defending’); see also Sharp, p.l48ff and differently Langtry and Ball, p.575ff., p.6O5ff. The much-heralded Dibb Review of mid-1986 would, if (as already seems unlikely) it were adopted, remove some of the lesser incoherence in Australian policy, that involving details of regional defensive defence (as would also Langtry and Ball, if followed through). While Dibb appears to have demolished what he refers to scathingly as the ‘largely mythical “core force” concept’, a new controversy has sprung up over whether Australia’s more self-reliant defence should be purely defensive defence, Dibb’s ill-named ‘strategy of denial’, or whether it should include an offensive component. Dibb himself has rather rapidly shifted ground on this important issue. In late 1983 he was contending that ‘Australia should have in the force-in-being significant deterrent capabilities, based on present air and naval strike assets, which can mount defensive and offensive operations against attacking forces, their staging bases and lines of resupply’ (IAP, p.166). But in the otherwise conservative Review of 1986 such offensive defence is abandoned; no such forces and equipment for offensive off-shore operations are recommended. Instead ‘the review proposes a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest. Our most important defence planning concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap’. The new offensive/defensive defence controversy puts the Review’s adoption in increasing doubt - in which event the local incoherence in strategic planning processes and militational difficulties Dibb alludes to early in his statement will presumably persist. The Review not merely fails to address significant regional issues, as to defence priorities, and as to multiple purpose roles for Australian armed forces given that they will be involved in virtually no military activity other than maintenance and a certain “preparedness” (for on Dibb’s overstatement of the prevailing view of Australia’s very favourable regional security prospects, ‘there is no conceivable prospect of any power contemplating invasion of our continent and subjugation of our population’). But further, the Review is itself vague to incoherent, concerning wider defence issues, vague as to the post-ANZUS situation, and incoherent about Australia’s role in US global “defence” activity. According the Dibb (CT, p.16), ‘there is no requirement for Australia to become involved in United States contingency planning for global war. The presence of the joint facilities, together with the access that we provide to visits by United States warships and the staging through of Australia of B-52 bombers, are a sufficient tangible contribution to the Alliance.’ These contributions are not involvement? That is not how the USSR views the matter: they are the reported sole 34 basis of USSR nuclear targetting of Australia (see Dibb. SS p.13). global stance is left essentially to the USA. And Australia's Amazingly, in the Strategic Basis Papers (SB), Australia criticizes New Zealand because ‘it has still developed no policy for national defence and tends to look to ... the US as its primary source of defence guidance’ (p.29). Note that C3I abbreviates the mouthful, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 4. See Sharp, p.l46ff. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and shared aspirations of local people - to the extent, presumably, that these are commendable; again the presupposed value framework is critical. 5. Thus e.g. Gray (p.17) on the Reagan Administration’s ‘foolhardy brief willingness to talk publicly about nuclear strategy’, and his distain for public involvement or input. There is some concern, especially among neo-conservatives, about US defence strategies being ‘undermined by well-meaning persons who believe they are helping the cause of peace’ (Bell p.10; similarly Gray). Even those not so far right support partial information releases which maintain public confidence; e.g. Dibb on ‘the release of a generalised statement about ;the] functions of the US bases in Australia ... to give Australians more confidence about their crucial contribution to the Allied cause’ (ISA, p.166). ‘Our defence policy-making process is probably more “closed” than that of any other advanced Western democracy’ according to Langtry and Ball (p.608), who contend that ‘the public needs to be involved much more in our defence planning and operations'. For a justified critique of public exclusion and leave-it-to-the-experts approaches, see B. Martin; also Sharp. 6. The paper was drafted in mid-1985. 7. For those amassing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of client states, the following Australian contribution is noteworthy: ‘The US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support’ (SB, p.28) 8. As to DI and arms control, see, e.g. Mack PR and Gray. As to D2, ‘USA has now an announced first-strike nuclear targeting policy’ technologically reinforced, Hayes, p.4; and see also Mack AC, p.111. The goal of the Reagan administration is superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term). Thus e.g. Gray (p.32): ‘it is of course essential that the United States modernize its offensive forces so as to render the Soviet Union genuinely offensive-counterforce incompetent.’ 9. On the major changes in American policy, see e.g. Gray p.118 ff. Though America is now said to have a ‘new national security concept of which SDI is the centerpiece’ it may still lack an ‘arms control policy’ (Gray, p.25,pll). Not only arms control, but American commitment to the security of allies, remain at least decidedly cloudy matters. Thus it is of little avail to contend that Australia does have a coherent secondorder global policy, namely the (discreditable) one of following prevailing American policy. For the US lacks a first-order policy which is sufficiently clear in relevant respects. The American direction of Australian policy had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians, no more than New Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even by Americans. 35 10. Thus we can avoid the important debate as to whether, and to what extent, deterrence remains part of US global “defence” policy (though it certainly remains part of the policy sold to the American public). As to the philosophical significance of the debate, see Gay, p.l29ff. and Benn. 11. The common-interest theme is often traced to (partly self-interested) American action in the Pacific in World War II. Curiously Australia’s interests are are now said also to converge with those of Japan, but to be diametrically opposed to those of the USSR (despite increasing trade). 12. Nor, though this is a longer story, does Australian culture by any means coincide with American: see CPD. Thus a uniform treatment is entirely inappropriate. Similarly, a single overarching treatment for a monolithic West is thoroughly inadequate: see further below in the text. 13. Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic and other) which include Australia. For, as argued below, abandoning the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West, of the West as one parish, makes significant differences to the results yielded. 14. As Cock goes on: ‘These basic issues increasingly become lost in the array of consumer choices’. 15. ‘The serf societies - more or less willingly - accept the status of “allies”, i.e. protection with rights and duties as in feudal societies. They become client countries’ (Galtung, p.169). 16. So-called by Mack PC. But the formulation presented follows G. Davidson’s more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8, 1985, p.2. Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the ‘altogether more sophisticated argument [which] holds sway ... in government’ (p.l, italics added)! 17. The “Asian hordes” derive from one of the less spoken about successors to the Yellow Peril, from the immediate past days of the Asian communist threat, the Domino theory, and White Australia. 18. As Stephenson argued, less fortunately, 20 years ago. Even when around World War II Japan, did have interest in access to strategic raw materials, the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia because of the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much importance. 19. Of course, such military expenditure is also encouraged by economic forces, e.g. like much Third World hard currency expenditure it helps the American economy along a bit. 20. Heilbroner has traced some of the economic components and consequences of what, with excess exaggeration and insufficient irony, he calls ‘the rise and subsequent fall of the American imperium’ (p.52): it hasn’t fallen that far yet. ‘Empires have always been expensive and the American empire was no exception. ... The sheer military cost ... for the United States alone ... is roughly ten percent of ... GNP for the last 25 years ($2 x 10) in 1972 dollars)’. American imperial spending supplemented by other capitalist countries fueled inflation, enhanced poverty, etc., and was complements by, what it was represented as required by, counterexpenditure and efforts by the USSR. 36 ‘The establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and: resulted not just in very large military expenditures, but in the rapid build-up of American capital investments abroad. Between 1950 and 1970, the value of American-owned plant and equipment abroad leaped from $12 billion to $78 billion’ (p.54). A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of payments problem (negative “capital flows” and balances), and a growing accumulation of IOUs. On this sort of basis, Heilbroner speculates that ‘the mere operations of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such critical importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in all likelihood a sufficient condition for the globalisation of the inflationary phenomena’ (p.57 with insert from p.56). According to Heilbroner, ‘Long before the Vietnam debacle, it was clear that American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in the under-developed world’ (p.57). But really very little evidence of collapse is presented by Heilbroner; and seemingly there is little. What there is more substantial evidence for is the marked decline of the American imperium in the period (1973-8) concerned. One piece of evidence is the sharp decline in America’s share of World GDP, shown in the following table of select leading national economies: SHARE OF WORLD GDP (%) POPULATION SHARE COUNTRY RANK 1968 1975 1984 (1984 est) USA 1 35.0 24.3 25.0 5.2 USSR 2 11.1 11.0 13.8 6.2 JAPAN 3 5.2 8.0 9.5 2.7 GERMANY FDR 4 5.1 6.7 5.7 1.5 FRANCE 5 4.6 5.4 CHINA 6 2.9 4.8 4.3 22.6 UK 8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.3 4.4 1.3 INDIA 12 1.3 1.5 1.1 15.1 AUSTRALIA 15 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.3 37 The table should also make it clear that if the USA cannot sustain a grand empire, nor can the USSR. A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even less likely than a capitalistic Pax American was. 21. Although, so the documents continue, ‘neighbourhood contingencies .... are at present assessed as impossible’! The theme that the USA affords no sure guarantee of Australian defence is reiterated in Langtry and Bell, e.g. p.608. They go on there to outline the major points that reliance upon the US has distorted Australian arrangements (with forces better equipped to fight alongside the Americans in Asia than on their own in defending Australia) and has led to neglect of the regional priorities, ‘to defence planning which at least would recently paid little attention to the direct defence of our continent and the protection of our remote communities’ (p.608). 22. The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region, have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects French social and cultural arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones than American arrangements are. In these days of technological warfare, the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much weight; we don’t after all look very hard at the American record of defeats and incompetence. Etc. 23. If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real deterrence advantage because nothing to deter. Other advantages of the ANZUS alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious (see PC, D. Martin), but not always guaranteed by the alliance as the blackout of New Zealand shows. 24. Soviet activity is undoubtedly perceived rather differently by American administrations than Antipodean ones. ‘An agressive, treacherous, ruthlessly self-interested, expansionist increasingly powerful, and hence increasingly threatening state - that is the image of the Soviet Union in America. It is the image which has legitimised the strategic modernation and Star Wars programs’ (to adopt Mack ST, pl). To see that this is indeed the intellectually shoddy route by which these grand and dangerous programs are justified, it is enough to work through fundamentalist sources, such as Gray. It is almost as if Americans had projected some of their own occasionally-manifested worst features into the giant enemy. 25. After some considerable reconstruction, that is. For the argument, curiously referred as that of “central balance” in newspaper-level publications of academics (e.g. Catley, Bell), is never presented in requisite detail - which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute. 26. As well both the premiss and its usual substitutes are false (see MF). The type of argument exhibited is a good example of prevalent Australian consequentialist thinking. A parallel argument, enjoying unwarranted popularity, runs: We might as well sell uranium (e.g. to France), because if we don’t someone else will - as if motives counted morally for nothing. 27. See also the discussion of Bell’s claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC. 28. Since the New Zealand restrictions on nuclear ships, ‘the Soviet media has been full of gloating references to the prospect of the collapse of the ANZUS treaty’ according to Dibb (SS, p.14). Given the unimportance of the Antipodes to Soviet interests (as Dibb 38 himself explains), Dibb is surely exaggerating, at least, when he later claims that ‘the prospect of the breakup of the AN ZUS treaty would be of enormous benefit to the USSR’s world-wide interests’ (SS p.31). Soviet support for Antipodean independence and for ‘a real nuclear weapon-free zones' in the South Pacific has its disconcerting elements (‘with friends like that ...’); but luckily the quality of ideas does not depend essentially on their sources and supporters. 29. As WPI serves to show. In a different context, Bell objects to Australian free-loading ‘on other people’s risks and burdens. That has certainly not been our tradition, and I hope it will not become so, since it is morally quite indefensible’ (p.7). Not so: bludging, for instance, is a well-established, if disapproved of, part of the tradition; and in some cases it is morally in order. However, free-riding is not being proposed merely for self interested reasons, e.g. to remove the present risks of nuclear targetting; it is being proposed with a view to altering the two great alliance structures that at present dominate international politics. Bell’s objection to such a course is that it ‘would on the one hand tend to increase the tendency of the superpowers to unilateralism, and on the other hand tend to induce many of the minor powers in question (including Australia) to consider acquiring nuclear capacity’ (p.7). The second alternative neglects the non­ proliferation treaty, to which Australia is a signatory; the first appears to assume erroneously that friendly relations with America are foregone; both are pretty minor considerations (and both can be dealt with in other negotiated ways) compared with the major problem of nuclear war. 30. The less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin (CA, p.20, p.39), but with agents’ costs or contributions, C, duly agent relativized. Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter, thus strictly falsifying the tautology. 31. Thus Hardin who (in CA) claims to ‘demonstrate the equivalence of the logic of collective action and the Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (p.4) The demonstration is given on p.25ff. 32. But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect. 33. Even so, significant change in USA looks unlikely. Present arrangements suit not only the American corporate-administrative power elite, which can direct public opinion through its control of the main communications media, but many other fat-cat Americans, rather well. The polarisation of the world into two camps increases US control of the larger and far wealthier camp, yet scarcely reduces US trade or markets. While it does limit the global coverage of US business and multinationals, and somewhat restricts the transfer of other regions’ surplus value to the USA, it ensures the much greater advantage of being able to maintain the US domestic political economy on a military basis. The US and the USSR not only dance together; they were made for each other. Abroad US hegemony is maintained through a series of alliances and economic control strategies. Particularly ominous for the South Pacific are the Trilateral and Pacific Rim arrangements (which, with much local assistance, are helping to send Australia on its present economic trajectory). When advice or persuasion directed at allies and client states fail, economic measures can be resorted to (capital outflows, for instance, being a highly effective mechanism, “aid” a lesser device). For the most part, the imperial war machine can remain in the background. At home updated and improved imperial measures also work well. The mass consumerist society affords a rich and diverting selection of bread (much of it again imported) for a majority of Americans; television 39 and its entertainment variants offer a constant diet of circuses. For passive middle mainstream America, the vast police and security network remains a largely background and even unnoticed phenomenon; what is seen is even welcomed as a necessary shield from that other, dangerous, minority America. American social, educational and media management of opinion is obviously successful. Of present relevance, most Americans have been convinced that unilateral disarmament would be unAmerican. Thus the American administration, being hedged in by opinion they have helped to generate, cannot move in any such directions. For, given popular opinion, it would of course be politically disastrous, as well as undemojl’cratic! In the USSR, where political control is exercised to a much greater extent through overt power, present change of substance appears even less likely. 34. More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere, e.g. a critique of the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun in CPD. From Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been erroneously supposed that war, like aggression, is part of human nature, that war is a permanent (and perhaps even desirable) condition of human and social existence. For a refutation, see e.g. Trainer and Waite. 35. As observed by B. Martin, who uses this important form of argument for institutional change to get this thick book started (pp.12-13). 36. The swarm includes some anomalies, such as that somewhat tarnished hero of deep ecology, Spinoza: see e.g. Northedge. 37. Perhaps Kant had some such scenario in view in his theme that peace is empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that peace is morally and rationally imperative. The latter claim, running in direct opposition to the long line of bellicose philosophers, really relies on the correct, but controversial, assumption that states are subject to the same moral relations as individual persons. Both then have an obligation to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from rational autonomy, the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of persons (or, yet more chauvinistically, of humanity). 38. Veblen argued against the State on the basis that ‘governmental establishments and ... powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in turn, are of a predatory origin and of an irresponsible character’ (p.9), however the Christianfeudal origin of the State provided only one - and a coersive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13), a pattern much influenced moreover by schemes of intellectuals. Other patterns remain feasible. 39. There are now theoretical arguments for Kant’s claim, as well as practical arguments of an inductive sort. 40. Such is also the new message from America: for the peace movement to get through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and revitalised, capitalist democracy superseded by true democracy or “republicanism” (see especially Cohen and Rogers, and earlier Chomsky). But the message, like the US peace movements’ very limited demands for peace, leaves the State, as the bringer of wars, and main source of violence essentially intact; the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much too narrowly conceived. 41. My thanks for information to Andrew Mack and David Bennett, and for comments to Grover Foley and Russell Hardin. REFERENCES G. H. Andrewartha and L.C. Birch, The Ecological Web, University of Chicago Press, 1984. W.R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, Second edition, Wiley, New York, 1960. S.Beer, Designing Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, 1974. C. Bell, ‘The case against neutrality’, Current Affairs Bulletin 61(4) (1984) 4-10. S.I. Benn, ‘Deterrence or appeasement? or, On trying to be rational about nuclear war’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 1(1984) 5-19. F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London, 1984. R. Catley, ‘Along with the Bomb ...’ (Review of D. Martin), The Weekend Australian Magazine, 7-8 April, 1984. N. Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1979. P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Quartet Books, Melbourne, 1979. J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York, 1984. P. Dibb (as reported) ‘Defence Planning “lacks coherence” - researcher’, ANU Reporter, 1983. P. Dibb, ‘Issues in Australian defence’, Australian Outlook 37 (1983) 160-166; referred to as IAD. P. Dibb, ‘Soviet strategy towards Australia, New Zealand and Oceania’ paper prepared for Soviet Strategy Against Asia converence, Tokyo, November 1984; referred to as SS. P. Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister of Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986; edited text also published in The Canberra Times, 4 June 1986, pp.16-18; referred to as the Dibb Review. P. and A. Erlich, Population, Resources, Environment, Second edition, Freeman, San Francisco, 1976. H. Feith,‘Richard Falk, World order radical’, Peace Studies 24 (1985) 24-5. J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984. W.C. Gay, ‘Myths about nuclear war: misconceptions in public beliefs and governmental plans’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 9(1982) 117-144. A. Gilbert, ‘The state and nature in Australia’, Australian Cultural History 1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28. 42 C.S. Gray, ‘The Reagan administration and arms control’, paper presented at The Future of Arms Control Conference, Canberra. August 1985. R. Hardin, Collective Action, Resources for the Future, Washington, 1982; referred to as CA. R. Hardin, ‘Unilateral versus mutual disarmament’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(1983) 236-254. M.D. Hayes, ‘Defending the sunburnt country’, Chain Reaction 33(August-September 1983) 11-17. R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York, 1978. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace (trans, and introd. M. Campbell Smith), Swan Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795). J. O. Langtry and D Ball (eds), A Vunerable Country, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1986. A. Mack, ‘Farewell to Arms Controls’, Peace Research 9(1984) 9ff.; referred to as PR. A. Mack, ‘The pros and cons of ANZUS’, Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May 1985; referred to as PC. A. Mack, ‘Arms control, disarmament and the concept of defensive defence’, Disarmament 8(3)(1984) 109-119; referred to as AC. A. Mack, ‘The Soviet threat thesis: perceptions, capabilities and interests’ typescript, Canberra, May 1985; referred to as ST. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. B. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne, 1984. F.S. Northedge, ‘Peace, war and philosophy’, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1967, 63-67. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. P. Pettit, ‘Free riding and foul dealing’, Journal of Philosophy, to appear, J.J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace (trans. E.M. Nuttal), London, 1927 (first Published 1761). R. Routley, ‘On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence, and the political fall out’, Discussion papers in Environmental philosophy #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. R. Routley, ‘Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 3/4(1984) 19-34; referred to as MF. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #6, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD. 43 R. Sharp (ed.), Apocalypse No. Pluto Press, Sydney, 1984. P.R. Stephenson, The Foundations of Culture, W.J. Miles, Sydney, 1936. R. Sylvan, ‘Culture and the roots of political divergence’, typescript, Canberra, 1985; referred to as CPD. M. Taylor and H. Ward, "Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: alternative models of public­ goods provision’, Political Studies 30(1982) 350-370. T. Trainer and H. Waite, ‘Culture and the production of aggression’, in Sharp, ep.cit, 205-226. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, leaked extracts published in the National Times, March 30-April 5, 1984, 23-30; referred to as SB. Threats to Australian Security, Parliamentary Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred to as TAS. T. Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 1917).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Draft of Australia's defence philosophy: further investigation of the nonexistent Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout. Handwritten annotation on page 1: War & Peace III. Description An account of the resource Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 680 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:23d96cf">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:23d96cf</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/581b87e4d67a33473f084886196c0964.pdf 9c80f2dae98c9b0e7076149ee0387602 PDF Text Text ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL INSENSITIVITY OF PACIFISM Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement A respectable philooophieg-1 press. another, the within tradition Catholic church , It is commonly portrayed characteristically as as inconsistent. as a continues to have a bad incoherent in one way or Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that consistent, and pacifism is but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be 2 and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and from rights. In an influential and widely disseminated series of articles attacking . pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would better characterised by P2. be A It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. The separate comprehensive pacifism from the main form of pacifism under investigation is called 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual 1 narrower �sense which is restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, and does not rule necessarily out violence elsewhere. Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. The initial slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion the of crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely R2. It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden It is cases to violence). resist The slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out by pacifists and others, which do not involve use of violence (or perhaps force). The initial slide is however that assault on pacifism (after clearing Narveson several exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of pacifism, in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on 2 of �this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with pacifism unless a slide is made. (tentatively) by Nor does T1 and theses does without fighting not mean what Narveson claims it means, comprehensive .pacifism, T2 , imply that we as characterised have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods. Nor does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice therefore is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is. One hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter. All this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that far at there is, so least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. The stunt is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to with violence. Thus from among admissible pacifist methods. of force is taken to by implied in R2. resist cannot excluded be Hence the conflation of T2 and R2; Hence too Narveson’s assumption Hence (p.415). also Narveson’s that against attack' (pp.417-8). use a unwarranted "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended equate such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to pacifist the to be If the stunt were got away with, it would deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action and defensible position. But resistance, and so render pacifism a much less positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, 3 without violence. �Things be can resisted, even things like arrest, without violence (e.g. sliding out of handcuffs and running away). by Force can be applied, as in opening Violence implies force, but not vice versa; and it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists are a jam jar, without violence. bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent castrate to depriving It enjoys some popularity even any case indefensible. and by it of among those of advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions . compromise, But nothing in standard, range the is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in practices, development pacifism, so the characterisation its limits of pacifism, admissible methods: whether comprehensive or nothing exclude^ uncompromising methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ? It is simply that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against just variations qualifier. in those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in terms of ’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist’s ’opposition to violence'. If this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed �Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though to violence. it not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make is much of in his main inconsistency argument. A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument based inconsistency the on to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). Narveson violence in the notion of right. tries to incorporate the right to indulge in The initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement Because ’a right just is a status of it. preventative action ... does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary what to justifying prevent necessary’ infringements of right' his (p.419). That 'whatever may be out to include force, now very generously construed - here is turns the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure. Moreover ’it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is force’ (p.421). of preventative For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion action must have the notion of violence built into it. argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism. it enough is for preventative To block the The argument action associated with rights to be, or to be limited to, nonviolent action. How the argument from rights leads to inconsistency is summed up thus (p.421): SAI. ’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’. �SA2. We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to us’, as have the a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence. right self-contradictory, to use both violence, granting so the pacifist’s position Narveson is that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. is and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming But, therefore, we mistaken p.423). action in That a does not Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by 6 simply rejecting the Narveson slide . What appears in place of SAI is something like SAI#. If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., give facto, an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. does not, ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson’s slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. argument violence and evil. lesser In outline the - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use of violence those where Inconsistency would be morally permissible and morally justified. some is use of immediate violence by T2. would prevent evil, some greater violence. More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much The cases are to admit both that the use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible, because it involves violence. 6 Narveson summarizes an �argument like this as follows It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI] the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force'7. Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches, p It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the ethical role pacifism can assume is to result. lesser The basic argument, from violence, goes as follows Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in any arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized. Therefore ~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according which to it is morally wrong, always, to resort to violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of argument, this together with pulled together from Narveson’s work. support for He not only expouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects argument with the lesser evil argument El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. 9 The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, 7 the the �E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that the is, level of violence ought to be zero. Neither argument is decisive; of that reference both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a should they resist, where moral absolutes are warped into moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible being does it. into got has E3 is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with involved, e.g. E3 things other In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. Thus frame rooting it out which may involve strategies. non-minimization not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to C2. Nor do El and E2 entail C2; so neither does commitment, by to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2. instance, 10 , e.g. evil-perpetrating but argument Narveson's well-known Such nonviolent fails for similar some as cases hypothetical dictators. for For in particular violence is not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by violence pacifists Regan’s increases in slaying of the reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses reasons. concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically 3. 4. The use of force is a substantive evil. Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must great quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: ordering of an ordering of evils force, even though force is an evil. increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on be preferrable \ 8 does be preferred not induce to a a similar It is enough to observe that Regan-Narveson assumptions, �Resort to the theme that Elt, Violence is an irredeemable evil in (proposed by Regan by investigated his Narveson, Np.118) irredeemable evil is figuratively (lesser or evils) whites pacifism, of "defence" promises so black Rp.80, and subsequently a way around the difficulty. that no combination (goods) will lighten its hue; with An grays it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts to What are the grounds for that? Elt. not widely acceptable, most people being amount of As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is prepared to countenance violence in exchange for considerable goods. some (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was gross.) small /not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; underwriting C2. indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by for it removes Cl and, more importantly, It does not however; the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of greater evil than that cases such as DI requires. Rp.80ff.), which however violence is irredeemably with violence; tainted evil, there is no and there are accordingly no This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see he sees as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the 12 which he outlines 9 features of �The approach through violence as an irredeemable evil is mistaken a (utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, adequately meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so as reasons prima are facie, otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or acting for ought but long come not what may, period. old-fashioned Such deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide head-on with utilitarianism both that pacifism'. For the moral ’utilitarianism 'that utility will be ... who is incompatible brought out by doing some violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative' he like positions and Regan (at the time) were working from. Narveson The reason for collision is simply that with malleable highly fashionable, more (Np.121) 13 . So acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may acts sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows little: position every suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is at odds with contractarianism. correct, if other the the ethical positions he presents, libertarianism and But this argument would only carry weight, were it. positions were suitably exhaustive; including no deeper ecological position for instance. is more also otherwise however they are not, What has happened which insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to incompatible ethical positions such as pacifism. 10 There are two more specific �features. damaging consequentalist Firstly, as more approaches have we of consequentialist Secondly, facie prima principles positions out utilitarianism, of This is entirely mistaken. The is a theory-saving device, designed to get difficulties such dilemmas. moral as consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such pacifism, and generally, have made it seem as if no deontic principle were firm, but all are provisional. theory seen, into as sometimes incongruous consequential support for their offering themes. Narveson takes such procedures a assumptions upon violence is that it These (p.425). thus pacifists: produces stage further, and foists utilitarian says that the pacifist's 'objection to he suffering, unwanted pain, in the recipients' incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the action involved and what it does, not astonishing such of only or always at all in the way of suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is more type inflicted. Even utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at least pjotTce prima facie). [N]2. Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425^ ' . 'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the problem', 11 pacifist's �among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). consequences out of the substantive terms such as implicans; otherwise but logic, It would take not merely statements ’violence’ the deal good a of magic, coax to given. For implications to hold the , /''I <</<<-</ ,■/" < F^ and ’right’ must also figure , in the just fail implications on formal grounds. intended argument to the "commitment to force” conclusion appears however to some for e.g. The be of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it sort may C2. such (N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop exceptions being made oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import, in as reflected in Cl, construction work the ethical an end). But, without need not worry pacifists; arguments much further they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be This countered. is argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater the evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence) inconsistency in comprehensive stock examples concern murder, What are these cases^? pacifism. one of them being the Narveson’s situation where (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). is the moral situation here? Narveson ought to prevent but mass-murder, that of a paradigmatic moral In fact the example is dilemma, that of very similar also The to Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives 12 one But what Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. situation is that of a moral dilemma. and if Jim �one shoots Now almost everything turns on what account is given of What a comprehensive pacifist does moral dilemmas. trouble, coherence . of them is to take do, not inadequate utilitarian line of trying to the explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur an than initial intuitive negotiable, etc., etc. is as level), wants he unless if (at at least other all obligations were prime facie, The conflicting obligations stand. What is to done be however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to do in the circumstances. action In trying to determine what circumstances is a satisfied. violent sense this the best e.g. Narveson had better a fix. Narveson dilemma, but no B. shoot (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized; not ought circumstances, he had better do so moral of 17 . to the in course Granted, it is preferable to minimize follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence. remains course best that Suppose one, inconsistency in pacifism follows. in the principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be and is evil, it does not On the contrary the situation shoot B, but in the appalling There is the real-life complication of inconsistency No a through arguments like that from lesser evil. Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion from rights, can now be met. of the argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, use justified in that case? (p.420) is its Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one is to be raped. qualified No: Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is No, it is not deontically 13 justified 18 . It is certainly not �morally it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which and obligatory, reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*. may and because just some might force in solution, a making to amount dilemma be out But justification is The response is qualified then a case. consequentially situation. ambiguous, as justified, a second-best Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking far his proposal as evident. jackpot the question As it is not - the pacifist can simply does not dispute it to a decisive a^rument against pacifism lead (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423). What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. The charge of moral insensitivity. §3. This is less argument an than a damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. is applied avert to greater Regan is envisaging situations evil; where violence and he points to what he takes to be the evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has free herself from an Interestingly, Regan has not aspiring rapist* (Rp.86). described the situation in a way which is incompatible with there is violence, which implies What is at issue the intentional, non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or (cf. a pacifist stand: nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. using to is (or death, the permissibility of infliction of wilful) by forceful means / Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force �And it is by no means so or power. violence inflict upon evident A rapist. aspiring the the that woman is entitled to can hardly now be pacifist accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. More generally, arguments pacifism, the on like Regan’s the to insensitivity moral of basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil I occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity. Narveson p.425) (e.g. Both Regan and assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position. 20 This is far from true, as the variety of nonviolent action methods groups has made plain. comprehend the real possibilities of considered or adopted by Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly nonviolent action. Otherwise, Narveson would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that the pacifist is Narveson's standing negative later 'not by doing assessment does not change the situation: anything about’ violence (p.425). of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence' for this positive approach is simply nonviolence practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the and effectiveness when assembled 21 , of nonviolent practices. much reduce the impact scope Fuller details of these practices, of the argument from social irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity. Pacifism, however, like most positions, has them 22 its weaknesses, one of undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the amounts and of violence greater than zero. Yet scale with minute (non-foot-in-the-door ) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with 15 small the �that evils gross us confront on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the of exclusion larger moral They problems. give certainly will understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2 mean they it undue to be 'non-trivial violence'. §4. and The argument from radical political corollaries The corollaries. out war by definition. so clear. Although War situations? normally would Standard war always would be what excluded, be morally counted brought progressively then second dilemma the impermissible, best but in thing to closer to Comprehensive pacifism can of course extreme principles emphasizing the evil of violence. weighing of Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard A strange pacifism! pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism. be pacifism But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) do. awkward of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war. practice For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. takes other from best choices will pacifism, in practice, through If evil is given a suitably yield the large same results as extreme A pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it would eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all reasonable costs; nor therefore can an argument Wz/Acuf desirability fHur/l of war as an institution against pacifism,! mounted from the or Cldc. However wars are by no be means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u violence extensively. The state and many of its institutions, most obviously �police inadmissibility of characteriscally are contraposition do. also forces, coercive 23 institutions and hence ; pacifism Comprehensive it as such implies police anarchism provides no refutation of pacifism.. the implies 24 moral forces and states But once again For anarchism itself is (to 25 stick with a bold claim) irrefutable Pacifism as an ideal brought not is .down by its political corollaries. Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism. While does it not eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to forbid animals. At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence, animals, continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by restriction of the application of violence to humans little good for however basis corollaries naturally spread suicide, capt^al euthenasia, (or such a chauvinistic restriction. several into punishment, controversial indeed There persons). is The radical moral, wherever to e.g. areas, violence plays a significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason /7j Qc4> for giving it some pause. And there are others. / One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to "natural" behaviour of creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly S' X common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£ Ao'jje.tjw enable ct/ony Ac /Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption /ZeSG- creatures offspring) in their artificial h to be better natural environments fitted environment. substantially 17 developed to for survival (of themselves and their most humans removed from now live situations in for rather which �there is no way they are evolution gradually adapted their features: adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance. have substantially living their adjusted adjust environment, along so with ^oing to Much as humans should they it their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive. There is a residual problem, practices of living creatures like in that confronting natural (relatively) vegetarianism. conditions, such as predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they Sometimes, violence? involve when the violence grossly exceeds what is required yes, Though a way can be beaten around the given the end to be attained; but always? edge of this problem Are 26 it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that <u t be^t nonviolence is not an absolute but^an ideal. The arguments for nonviolence which are mostly violence and do not strictly suggest a to apply since it in creatures natural surroundings opens door the a approaches would categorically exclude. chink to other options The further suggestion that emerges is that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are pretty primitive aimed, among principles state; other than P2. and what - But the suggestion is a dangerous one, sort of conclusion. similar practically at least, nonviolent arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of practical is things, at sharper, This is to in a called for is much more investigation more concede an sensitive, attentuated and less charge insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains blanket of moral unqualified. There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules 18 out such a genuine and more sensitive �pacifism 27 There are other requiriments the position to be worked out should meet. in should, particular, be integrated into a Larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are involve violence, e.g. a of a practices metaphorically, damaging wild nonviolent* practices. are practices But, except destructive to the environment, for instance, do not such river, with piece things dumping vandalism. wastes toxic But mining strip as extended sense, which gets beyond the confines these It of in a valley, fertile in streams and oceans. the property In an picture, all even metaphorically, vandalism does not such cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence as I "psychological violence"). What is sought /is an appropriate synthesis of these notions covering destructive practices - and better than 'vandolence'. an Then P2 is superseded accompanying synthetic term, 4/Z2°. It is morally wrong to use vandolence./ It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices (/V that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. FOOTNOTES 1. ’a valid Christian According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is to Christ and the early long tradition going back position’, with a lifestyle: see Origins Christians who were committed to a nonviolent pp.310-311. 2. Thus, in particular, T. Regan ’A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by _ 3. J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Ethics 75 (1968) and ’Is pacifism consistent’, Ethics 78 (1868). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, T97O7 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Moral Problems (ed. 19 77ju / /A ZAC A IZ(M2 �J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper .Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his ’Violence and war’, Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 4. Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, it is important to distinguish fas Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they not equivalent. /\ 5. Thus, e.g., G. Sharp in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4) sees nothing between (0) defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (1) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights’ occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is that given in R. and V. Routley ’Human chauvinism and environment ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others) Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p. Narveson 'Is pacifism inconsistent' Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. 7. J. 8. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). 9. See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119> where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument for El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for lesser violence. 11. That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 20 �12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas. 13. To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 14. Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely logical or "meta-ethical" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 15. A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s "reconstruction", is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. 17. This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 19. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live(go al-direct ed")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone "violent" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment is different. 20. The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components have been removed 21 the peace movement should be preparing for B. Martin ’How See e.g of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references Bulletin war ’ nuclear cited therein pp.152-3. Williams, //.( Zc (V, /, ( 1 J n l »' /? o C-, / / /' /\ <. ? / < / / i ’'i *7 z* //4 ’Conflict: of values’. �22. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 23. These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their behalf. 24. In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without moral basis or legitimacy. Of course the "state" may have nonviolent methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement. 25. See R. Routley and V. Alternatives, (1982). 26. As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism. 27. The position has been called 'pacificism*. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of 22 anarchism’, Social �On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world. Appendix §5. Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. And it has to be admitted that the real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence than in replacing war \ succeed usually been given a dress rehearsal. defence of a region can vary convention observed is or less likely to Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the 2 detail , usual violent methods, have been described in some never thought though they have The prospects for success of nonviolent significantly, depending upon whether the war If the convention Is observed then pacifism not. stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention unleashed, perhaps broken, is in massive ways, on noncombatants. his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of resistance, 'success ... may all sorts of this: According to Walzer, in nonviolent defence and This is presumably false. that The invaders may give up and depart reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick decisive victory, they got homesick. like is attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with be war - even if some conventions are flouted. for violence is possible only if the invaders are committed to the 3 war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~). Success and sufficiently What Walzer no doubt ruthless invaders sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc. 23 means is something in sufficient numbers with can eventually succeed. But �sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence. that The difference lies in the pattern of events; is more difficult and costly for if the defence is invaders the to well-armed it with and easier start afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-. Walzer is thinking, however, like many who jump to the that conclusion nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of inappropriate examples. command, total in the He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state, way the Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany The providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance". is highly misleading. picture The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous population. occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure. island With such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically territories feasible against a largely united and actively resisting of impression in the acquiscence (e.g. resistance Walzer's population. fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, the test with 4 disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave . Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put adequate way in present state-determined prepared to risk training its populace (civil defence the police: is different). in to any No state would be circumstances. full in action nonviolent techniques It would then be. all to easy for them to "rout" civil obedience, for example, could no longer customary violent means. 24 be ensured by the �FOOTNOTES The replacement of the state is considered op.cit. For example, in Sharp, op.cit. given there. See also in Routley Martin, All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M. Allen Lane, London, 1977. and op.cit., Plumwood, and 82, references Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars, The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. �§6. On the positive case for pacifism. defensive, meeting itself is revealing. deviations enough: a The argument thus far has been largely That in of objections to comprehensive pacifism. range Pacifism is the rest position from it are what require explanation. and state) (inertial -The reason for this is simple violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of it has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifdism position and merely try supposed to be justified. violent opponent: to can advantage take of privileged dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is The favourite exception is self-defence against a the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation) is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker moral bounds. its has overstepped Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma situation. And since it is at least facie prima wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments are arguments for pacifism are conclusive, since even where deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above). are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones. 26 One of the Nor poorer �positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, the e.g. that hope or nuclear selectively and restrictively is an illusion, (moral) limits in Although the chances overstated. war - of whatever they eXcalation are exchanges Limited escalation are be used inevitable. The weapons chemical is will - are bound to be overstepped. often real enough, and confrontation are possible. more social arrangements and much more conventional than the the case is Wars are much theory classical Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more allows. important things intervene (e.g. pollution a crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence. They include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. suffering of modern industrial societies, the broader popular avoidance and anguish of support base obtained None of these well-known types are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable. ' Cz/ // Z'1 1 Is Ct' i L> ) s' *4 / / 27 — > A by of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as a more open, less furtive, society. ) violent futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting the methods, the cost in pain, ? . z.. z . of reason � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY AND MORAL INSENSITIVITY OF PACIFISM Pacifism , despite its.revival lit the nonviolent action movement A respectable philooophieg-1 press. another, the within tradition Catholic church , It is commonly portrayed characteristically as as inconsistent. as a continues to have a bad incoherent in one way or Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that consistent, and pacifism is but insisting otherwise that^is as false as a moral position can be 2 and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its approved analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency;and arguments from irresponsibili ty and from rights. In an influential and widely disseminated series of articles attacking . pacficism3 , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would better characterised by P2. be A It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. The separate comprehensive pacifism from the main form of pacifism under investigation is called 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual 1 narrower sense which is restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, and does not rule necessarily out violence elsewhere. Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. The initial slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion the of crucial phase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely R2. It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden It is cases to violence). resist The slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out by pacifists and others, which do not involve use of violence (or perhaps force). The initial slide is however that assault on pacifism (after clearing Narveson several exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of pacifism, in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on 2 of this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with pacifism unless a slide is made. (tentatively) by Nor does T1 and theses does without fighting not mean what Narveson claims it means, comprehensive .pacifism, T2 , imply that we as characterised have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment will not apply violent methods. Nor does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice therefore is unjust, but only that some - perhaps a good deal - of that machinery is. One hardly needs to be a comprehensive pacifist to coherently think the latter. All this provides some confirmation for the key point, which is that far at there is, so least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. The stunt is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the connotation of -------------------------------------violence, or at least of -----------------------force which Narveson proceeds to with violence. Thus from among admissible pacifist methods. of force is taken to by implied in R2. resist cannot excluded be Hence the conflation of T2 and R2; Hence too Narveson’s assumption Hence (p.415). also Narveson’s that against attack' (pp.417-8). use a unwarranted "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended equate such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to pacifist the to be If the stunt were got away with, it would deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action and defensible position. But resistance, and so render pacifism a much less positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, 3 without violence. Things be can resisted, even things like arrest, without violence (e.g. sliding out of handcuffs and running away). by Force can be applied, as in opening Violence implies force, but not vice versa; and it is violence, not all applications of force, that.comprehensive pacifists are a jam jar, without violence. bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent castrate to depriving It enjoys some popularity even any case indefensible. and by it of among those of advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want: to distance themselves from older standard pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to mediation, negotiation, and including the granting of concessions . compromise, But nothing in standard, range the is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in practices, development pacifism, so the characterisation its limits of pacifism, admissible methods: whether comprehensive or nothing exclude^ uncompromising methods and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. ? It is simply that standard pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the elaboration of the argument against just variations qualifier. in those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person’s opposition to something in terms of ’the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it’ is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist’s ’opposition to violence'. If this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed Even Narveson ’cannot make too much* of this inconsistency, though to violence. it not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make is much of in his main inconsistency argument. A similar slide, together with a further slide, Is made in the argument based inconsistency the on to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the pacifist’s thesis as transformed to the claim that no one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). Narveson violence in the notion of right. tries to incorporate the right to indulge in The initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement Because ’a right just is a status of it. preventative action ... does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary what to justifying prevent necessary’ infringements of right' his (p.419). That 'whatever may be out to include force, now very generously construed - here is turns the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure. Moreover ’it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is force’ (p.421). of preventative For the presupposed logical transformations to work, the notion action must have the notion of violence built into it. argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism. it enough is for preventative To block the The argument action associated with rights to be, or to be limited to, nonviolent action. How the argument from rights leads to inconsistency is summed up thus (p.421): SAI. ’If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right’. SA2. We have, according to the pacifist ’the right not to have violence done to us’, as have the a consequence of the obligation to avoid violence. right self-contradictory, to use both violence, granting so the pacifist’s position Narveson is that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. is and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming But, therefore, we mistaken p.423). action in That a does not Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI by 6 simply rejecting the Narveson slide . What appears in place of SAI is something like SAI#. If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., give facto, an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. does not, ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson’s slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. argument violence and evil. lesser In outline the - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that the pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use of violence those where Inconsistency would be morally permissible and morally justified. some is use of immediate violence by T2. would prevent evil, some greater violence. More explicitly, and in Narveson’s terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much The cases are to admit both that the use of evil, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible, because it involves violence. 6 Narveson summarizes an argument like this as follows It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [LI] the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now, is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force'7. Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches, p It is important to get them unsnagged , especially if a clearer view of the ethical role pacifism can assume is to result. lesser The basic argument, from violence, goes as follows Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in any arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized. Therefore ~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according which to it is morally wrong, always, to resort to violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of argument, this together with pulled together from Narveson’s work. support for He not only expouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects argument with the lesser evil argument El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. 9 The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, 7 the the E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that the is, level of violence ought to be zero. Neither argument is decisive; of that reference both in fact begin easing.pacifists into a should they resist, where moral absolutes are warped into moral relatives, where obligations give, way to obligations all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible being does it. into got has E3 is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with involved, e.g. E3 things other In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. Thus frame rooting it out which may involve strategies. non-minimization not entail E2, and commitment to E3 does not commit pacifists to C2. Nor do El and E2 entail C2; so neither does commitment, by to El and E2 oblige them to accept C2. instance, 10 , e.g. evil-perpetrating but argument Narveson's well-known Such nonviolent fails for similar some as cases hypothetical dictators. for For in particular violence is not the only evil and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by violence pacifists Regan’s increases in slaying of the reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses reasons. concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2, specifically 3. 4. The use of force is a substantive evil. Therefore, a lesser quuantity of force must great quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: ordering of an ordering of evils force, even though force is an evil. increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on be preferrable \ 8 does be preferred not induce to a a similar It is enough to observe that Regan-Narveson assumptions, Resort to the theme that Elt, Violence is an irredeemable evil in (proposed by Regan by investigated his Narveson, Np.118) irredeemable evil is figuratively (lesser or evils) whites pacifism, of "defence" promises so black Rp.80, and subsequently a way around the difficulty. that no combination (goods) will lighten its hue; with An grays it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with Che argument shifts to What are the grounds for that? Elt. not widely acceptable, most people being amount of As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is prepared to countenance violence in exchange for considerable goods. some (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals so long as it was gross.) small /not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get. pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; underwriting C2. indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by for it removes Cl and, more importantly, It does not however; the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of greater evil than that cases such as DI requires. Rp.80ff.), which however violence is irredeemably with violence; tainted evil, there is no and there are accordingly no This is the core of Regan's defence in pacifism (see he sees as converting pacifism into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the 12 which he outlines 9 features of The approach through violence as an irredeemable evil is mistaken a (utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, adequately meaning thereby, as it says, ought not, not just for the time being, or so as reasons prima are facie, otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or acting for ought but long come not what may, period. old-fashioned Such deontological, moral absolutist positions such as pacifism is at bottom, collide head-on with utilitarianism both that pacifism'. For the moral ’utilitarianism 'that utility will be ... who is incompatible brought out by doing some violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative' he like positions and Regan (at the time) were working from. Narveson The reason for collision is simply that with malleable highly fashionable, more (Np.121) 13 . So acccording to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may acts sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows little: position every suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is at odds with contractarianism. correct, if other the the ethical positions he presents, libertarianism and But this argument would only carry weight, were it. positions were suitably exhaustive; including no deeper ecological position for instance. is more also otherwise however they are not, What has happened which insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to incompatible ethical positions such as pacifism. 10 There are two more specific features. damaging consequentalist Firstly, as more approaches have we of consequentialist Secondly, facie prima principles positions out utilitarianism, of This is entirely mistaken. The is a theory-saving device, designed to get difficulties such dilemmas. moral as consequentialist positions tend to suggest that only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such pacifism, and generally, have made it seem as if no deontic principle were firm, but all are provisional. theory seen, into as sometimes incongruous consequential support for their offering themes. Narveson takes such procedures a assumptions upon violence is that it These (p.425). thus pacifists: produces stage further, and foists utilitarian says that the pacifist's 'objection to he suffering, unwanted pain, in the recipients' incongrous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the action involved and what it does, not astonishing such of only or always at all in the way of suffering, to the perpetrators as well as those in whom it is more type inflicted. Even utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the follow three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as mostly good) is to will the means to it (at least pjotTce prima facie). [N]2. Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425^ ' . 'These three principles' which appear in Narveson's 'sum up [of] the problem', 11 pacifist's among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). consequences out of the substantive terms such as implicans; otherwise but logic, It would take not merely statements ’violence’ the deal good a of magic, coax to given. For implications to hold the , /''I <</<<-</ ,■/" < F^ and ’right’ must also figure , in the just fail implications on formal grounds. intended argument to the "commitment to force” conclusion appears however to some for e.g. The be of variant, on the lesser violence argument, with N2 replacing, as it sort may C2. such (N3 and N1 then have oblique roles, N3 to stop exceptions being made oneself, N1 to ensure that violence adopted as a means has its full import, in as reflected in Cl, construction work the ethical an end). But, without need not worry pacifists; arguments much further they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. Much more threatening is the argument from lesser evil, which has yet to be This countered. is argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater the evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence) inconsistency in comprehensive stock examples concern murder, What are these cases^? pacifism. one of them being the Narveson’s situation where (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). is the moral situation here? Narveson ought to prevent but mass-murder, that of a paradigmatic moral In fact the example is dilemma, that of very similar also The to Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives 12 one But what Narveson ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. situation is that of a moral dilemma. and if Jim one shoots Now almost everything turns on what account is given of What a comprehensive pacifist does moral dilemmas. trouble, coherence . of them is to take do, not inadequate utilitarian line of trying to the explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn’t ever, occur an than initial intuitive negotiable, etc., etc. is as level), wants he unless if (at at least other all obligations were prime facie, The conflicting obligations stand. What is to done be however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best thing to do in the circumstances. action In trying to determine what circumstances is a satisfied. violent sense this the best e.g. Narveson had better a fix. Narveson dilemma, but no B. shoot (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized; not ought circumstances, he had better do so moral of 17 . to the in course Granted, it is preferable to minimize follow that Narveson ought to resort to violence. remains course best that Suppose one, inconsistency in pacifism follows. in the principles like N2 and its mate, N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be and is evil, it does not On the contrary the situation shoot B, but in the appalling There is the real-life complication of inconsistency No a through arguments like that from lesser evil. Narveson’s jackpot question, entangled in his discussion from rights, can now be met. of the argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, use justified in that case? (p.420) is its Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one is to be raped. qualified No: Given that force again entails violence, the pacifist answer is No, it is not deontically 13 justified 18 . It is certainly not morally it is not justified in the sense of ’justified* which and obligatory, reflects its deontic origin in ’making right*. may and because just some might force in solution, a making to amount dilemma be out But justification is The response is qualified then a case. consequentially situation. ambiguous, as justified, a second-best Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as as killing another person - but he presents no back-up argument, taking far his proposal as evident. jackpot the question As it is not - the pacifist can simply does not dispute it to a decisive a^rument against pacifism lead (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. , p.423). What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. The charge of moral insensitivity. §3. This is less argument an than a damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. is applied avert to greater Regan is envisaging situations evil; where violence and he points to what he takes to be the evident moral permissibility of a woman's using ’what physical power she has free herself from an Interestingly, Regan has not aspiring rapist* (Rp.86). described the situation in a way which is incompatible with there is violence, which implies What is at issue the intentional, non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or (cf. a pacifist stand: nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. using to is (or death, the permissibility of infliction of wilful) by forceful means / Np.110), that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force And it is by no means so or power. violence inflict upon evident A rapist. aspiring the the that woman is entitled to can hardly now be pacifist accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. More generally, arguments pacifism, the on like Regan’s the to insensitivity moral of basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil I occurrences, depend upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity. Narveson p.425) (e.g. Both Regan and assume that pacifism is a passive do-nothing position. 20 This is far from true, as the variety of nonviolent action methods groups has made plain. comprehend the real possibilities of considered or adopted by Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly nonviolent action. Otherwise, Narveson would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that the pacifist is Narveson's standing negative later 'not by doing assessment does not change the situation: anything about’ violence (p.425). of what he calls 'poslLlve nonviolence' for this positive approach is simply nonviolence practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the and effectiveness when assembled 21 , of nonviolent practices. much reduce the impact scope Fuller details of these practices, of the argument from social irresponsiblity, which is part of what lies behind the change of insensitivity. Pacifism, however, like most positions, has them 22 its weaknesses, one of undoubtedly derives from the fact that violence is a quantitative matter and there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the amounts and of violence greater than zero. Yet scale with minute (non-foot-in-the-door ) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with 15 small the that evils gross us confront on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the of exclusion larger moral They problems. give certainly will understood that by ’violence' in principles such as. P2 mean they it undue to be 'non-trivial violence'. §4. and The argument from radical political corollaries The corollaries. out war by definition. so clear. Although War situations? normally would Standard war always would be what excluded, be morally counted brought progressively then second dilemma the impermissible, best but in thing to closer to Comprehensive pacifism can of course extreme principles emphasizing the evil of violence. weighing of Comprehensive pacifism thus does not include standard A strange pacifism! pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism. be pacifism But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) do. awkward of extreme pacifism would certainly eliminate war. practice For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. takes other from best choices will pacifism, in practice, through If evil is given a suitably yield the large same results as extreme A pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued that it tells against pacifism that it would eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all reasonable costs; nor therefore can an argument Wz/Acuf desirability fHur/l of war as an institution against pacifism,! mounted from the or Cldc. However wars are by no be means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense^ or rely u violence extensively. The state and many of its institutions, most obviously police inadmissibility of characteriscally are contraposition do. also forces, coercive 23 institutions and hence ; pacifism Comprehensive it as such implies police anarchism provides no refutation of pacifism.. the implies 24 moral forces and states But once again For anarchism itself is (to 25 stick with a bold claim) irrefutable Pacifism as an ideal brought not is .down by its political corollaries. Pacifism yields not only a qualified anarchism but qualified vegetarianism. While does it not eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to forbid animals. At least it does this so long as what normally counts as violence, animals, continues to rank as valence, and is not removed from the category by restriction of the application of violence to humans little good for however basis corollaries naturally spread suicide, capt^al euthenasia, (or such a chauvinistic restriction. several into punishment, controversial indeed There persons). is The radical moral, wherever to e.g. areas, violence plays a significant role in many cases'1. The sheer moral power of pacifism is one reason /7j Qc4> for giving it some pause. And there are others. / One is that, like vegetarianism, it runs counter to "natural" behaviour of creatures to which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly S' X common feature of animal and human behavioZur, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made out) involves violence. /Ze /cVXC o/1 //>£ Ao'jje.tjw enable ct/ony Ac /Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption /ZeSG- creatures offspring) in their artificial h to be better natural environments fitted environment. substantially 17 developed to for survival (of themselves and their most humans removed from now live situations in for rather which there is no way they are evolution gradually adapted their features: adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation for instance. have substantially living their adjusted adjust environment, along so with ^oing to Much as humans should they it their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counter productive. There is a residual problem, practices of living creatures like in that confronting natural (relatively) vegetarianism. conditions, such as predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when they Sometimes, violence? involve when the violence grossly exceeds what is required yes, Though a way can be beaten around the given the end to be attained; but always? edge of this problem Are 26 it is an unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that <u t be^t nonviolence is not an absolute but^an ideal. The arguments for nonviolence which are mostly violence and do not strictly suggest a to apply since it in creatures natural surroundings opens door the a approaches would categorically exclude. chink to other options The further suggestion that emerges is that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are pretty primitive aimed, among principles state; other than P2. and what - But the suggestion is a dangerous one, sort of conclusion. similar practically at least, nonviolent arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of practical is things, at sharper, This is to in a called for is much more investigation more concede an sensitive, attentuated and less charge insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains blanket of moral unqualified. There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules 18 out such a genuine and more sensitive pacifism 27 There are other requiriments the position to be worked out should meet. in should, particular, be integrated into a Larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are involve violence, e.g. a of a practices metaphorically, damaging wild nonviolent* practices. are practices But, except destructive to the environment, for instance, do not such river, with piece things dumping vandalism. wastes toxic But mining strip as extended sense, which gets beyond the confines these It of in a valley, fertile in streams and oceans. the property In an picture, all even metaphorically, vandalism does not such cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence as I "psychological violence"). What is sought /is an appropriate synthesis of these notions covering destructive practices - and better than 'vandolence'. an Then P2 is superseded accompanying synthetic term, 4/Z2°. It is morally wrong to use vandolence./ It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices (/V that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. FOOTNOTES 1. ’a valid Christian According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is to Christ and the early long tradition going back position’, with a lifestyle: see Origins Christians who were committed to a nonviolent pp.310-311. 2. Thus, in particular, T. Regan ’A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by _ 3. J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Ethics 75 (1968) and ’Is pacifism consistent’, Ethics 78 (1868). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, T97O7 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis’, Moral Problems (ed. 19 77ju / /A ZAC A IZ(M2 J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper .Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his ’Violence and war’, Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 4. Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, it is important to distinguish fas Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they not equivalent. /\ 5. Thus, e.g., G. Sharp in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4) sees nothing between (0) defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (1) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights’ occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is that given in R. and V. Routley ’Human chauvinism and environment ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others) Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p. Narveson 'Is pacifism inconsistent' Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. 7. J. 8. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). 9. See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119> where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument for El and E2 to premiss 02 for the argument for lesser violence. 11. That is by no means the onlyelement in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 20 12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which Is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas. 13. To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 14. Narveson also wants to contend that ’all of these may be defended on purely logical or "meta-ethical" grounds’. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 15. A surprising feature of Narveson’s argument, also Regan’s "reconstruction", is that these cases are nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. 17. This terminology matches the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood ’Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’ in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 19. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live(go al-direct ed")~systerns and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone "violent" destruction of property either: disab^ling of equipment is different. 20. The methods also include anticipatory action, e.g., the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won’t start, e.g. because components have been removed 21 the peace movement should be preparing for B. Martin ’How See e.g of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references Bulletin war ’ nuclear cited therein pp.152-3. Williams, //.( Zc (V, /, ( 1 J n l »' /? o C-, / / /' /\ <. ? / < / / i ’'i *7 z* //4 ’Conflict: of values’. 22. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 23. These organisations may be ruled out directly as violence-dispensing or else because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their behalf. 24. In the sufficiently comprehensive form that the coercive state is without moral basis or legitimacy. Of course the "state" may have nonviolent methods available to it; it may not be a purely voluntary arrangement. 25. See R. Routley and V. Alternatives, (1982). 26. As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism. 27. The position has been called 'pacificism*. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of 22 anarchism’, Social On the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world. Appendix §5. Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will bo contested - despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. And it has to be admitted that the real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence than in replacing war \ succeed usually been given a dress rehearsal. defence of a region can vary convention observed is or less likely to Yet nonviolent defence methods, to replace the 2 detail , usual violent methods, have been described in some never thought though they have The prospects for success of nonviolent significantly, depending upon whether the war If the convention Is observed then pacifism not. stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention unleashed, perhaps broken, is in massive ways, on noncombatants. his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of resistance, 'success ... may all sorts of this: According to Walzer, in nonviolent defence and This is presumably false. that The invaders may give up and depart reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g., they needed a quick decisive victory, they got homesick. like is attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with be war - even if some conventions are flouted. for violence is possible only if the invaders are committed to the 3 war convention - and they won’t always be’ (Wp.331~). Success and sufficiently What Walzer no doubt ruthless invaders sufficient time and sufficient support lines, etc. 23 means is something in sufficient numbers with can eventually succeed. But sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence. that The difference lies in the pattern of events; is more difficult and costly for if the defence is invaders the to well-armed it with and easier start afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance-. Walzer is thinking, however, like many who jump to the that conclusion nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of inappropriate examples. command, total in the He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state, way the Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany The providing the model of the enslaved population, the ’‘resistance". is highly misleading. picture The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control of all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the For Walzer‘s comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous population. occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure. island With such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically territories feasible against a largely united and actively resisting of impression in the acquiscence (e.g. resistance Walzer's population. fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, the test with 4 disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave . Nonviolent resistance is however unlikely to be put adequate way in present state-determined prepared to risk training its populace (civil defence the police: is different). in to any No state would be circumstances. full in action nonviolent techniques It would then be. all to easy for them to "rout" civil obedience, for example, could no longer customary violent means. 24 be ensured by the FOOTNOTES The replacement of the state is considered op.cit. For example, in Sharp, op.cit. given there. See also in Routley Martin, All page references prefixed by ’W’ are to M. Allen Lane, London, 1977. and op.cit., Plumwood, and 82, references Walzer, Just and Unjust: Wars, The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp’s observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. §6. On the positive case for pacifism. defensive, meeting itself is revealing. deviations enough: a The argument thus far has been largely That in of objections to comprehensive pacifism. range Pacifism is the rest position from it are what require explanation. and state) (inertial -The reason for this is simple violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of it has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifdism position and merely try supposed to be justified. violent opponent: to can advantage take of privileged dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is The favourite exception is self-defence against a the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation) is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker moral bounds. its has overstepped Still the defender is not normally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma situation. And since it is at least facie prima wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments are arguments for pacifism are conclusive, since even where deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above). are all the arguments for pacificism particularly good ones. 26 One of the Nor poorer positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, the e.g. that hope or nuclear selectively and restrictively is an illusion, (moral) limits in Although the chances overstated. war - of whatever they eXcalation are exchanges Limited escalation are be used inevitable. The weapons chemical is will - are bound to be overstepped. often real enough, and confrontation are possible. more social arrangements and much more conventional than the the case is Wars are much theory classical Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more allows. important things intervene (e.g. pollution a crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence. They include (as support for the first premiss above) a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. suffering of modern industrial societies, the broader popular avoidance and anguish of support base obtained None of these well-known types are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable. ' Cz/ // Z'1 1 Is Ct' i L> ) s' *4 / / 27 — > A by of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as a more open, less furtive, society. ) violent futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting the methods, the cost in pain, ? . z.. z . of reason  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Draft of On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity of pacifism Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout (photocopy), with emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R (1984) 'On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Inquiry (Oslo), 27(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748408602030. Description An account of the resource Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6b11360">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6b11360</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/df8ea475ec2b745964d399c943fb6566.pdf e7cd3be667c873fe9f41ed27b4a5ce46 PDF Text Text WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB P-212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much �2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which ij manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved,”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is i. indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all hunqpns as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically* 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wax for party d’.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then z/it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game — in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warnng) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension,.between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party’s territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war qf liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) �13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wwwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. 0 But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �i 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �i 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB P-212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much 2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which ij manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved,”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended; information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is i. indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all hunqpns as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically* 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wax for party d’.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then z/it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game — in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warnng) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension,.between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party’s territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war qf liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf 12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) 13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wwwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. 0 But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. i 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to i 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout. Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource Note, one of four papers digitised from item 680. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 680 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [22] leaves. 14.62 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:16694a5">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:16694a5</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8d68b6d2b8fc13d2658f8bcec5033f90.pdf 133736fbbf882cc36899905ee9ec3212 PDF Text Text ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns thfc conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Processing of dilemma, Arguments to dilemma incompatible input prescriptions situational procedures -» > directive output ■ X. Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Bok rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b£ unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wxfor party d’.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...),. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive vjsi, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) �13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p. 13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the natural order is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �I 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)’, referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. ��2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even z/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just vwcfor party d’.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they — those of the theoretical residue — are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinition al strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessaTy, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) �13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.^ While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS P-152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)', referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, SoczaZ Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu’ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special 2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns thfc conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Processing of dilemma, Arguments to dilemma incompatible input prescriptions situational procedures -» > directive output ■ X. Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Bok rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b£ unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just wxfor party d’.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...),. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive vjsi, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) 13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: • It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), ... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism? While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p. 13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p. 154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p. 153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p. 153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p. 150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the natural order is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) I 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)’, referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 2 more widely, ‘to life in general’ (p. 17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position is taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are “resolved”. Deep-green chart: Arguments to Processing of dilemma, directive dilemma incompatible situational procedures output input prescriptions Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even z/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just vwcfor party d’.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p. 152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they — those of the theoretical residue — are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinition al strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessaTy, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modern civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf 12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) 13 • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wu- wei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. 16 second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.^ While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS P-152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modern quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Inquiry ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)', referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, SoczaZ Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 680: Two drafts of On extirpating on war: Tao and deep-green pacifism Subject The topic of the resource Two computer printouts of draft paper. Second copy, first page is missing and reference page has handwritten annotation. Previous title: War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 680 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [35] leaves. 28.66 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:c8da24a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:c8da24a</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Cupboard - Pile 3 Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/65f3e2936d457cb014383be187407f8d.pdf 0a542b3e86e1dad187a99b772d2f6c88 PDF Text Text - • 00681 ' ' {; /) f¼i:<:LL I f ~sif0l J �IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM I. TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM Richard Routley Philosophy Department Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University and Environmental Studies University of Victoria Canada �IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM~ It is a commonplace of mainstream Western thought that cannibalism - the eating of human flesh by humans, and, more generally, the feeding of animals on members of their own species is, at least in the human case, morally outrageous. © Ri chard Routley, 1982 This repugnan cy thesis appears to be a legacy especially (but not only) of Christianity, probably derived from Jewish teaching, which went much further and excluded the eating of pig, for instance, as well as "long pig". Also in this series: It is a thesis reinforced by the substitution of Man for God of the World rainforest destruction - the social factors "Enlightenment" and consequent elevation and separation of humans Semantical foundations for value theory from other creatures. Unravelling the meanings of life substantially undermined, have for the most part been observed to Nihilisms and nihilist logics rest on a tangle of false views and prejudices about the world, its Nuclear power - ethical, social and political dimensions origin, evolution and purposes , and about the creatures that inl~bit Now that all these positions have been it, their separateness, and their order (in an a lleged chain of be in g ) Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests: wrong directions and the philosophical roots of the problem with humans at the apex, it is past time that major moral theses that these positions have sustained are re-examined and reassessed. The irrefutability of anarchism, enlarged Up for re-examination are, in particular, all theses that Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action depend essentially on the common but mistaken assumption that there is something morally very special or distinctive about simply being a human, that Homo sapiens as a species deserves special treatment. On the contrary, there is no morally relevant distinction between humans and all other creatures. Of course there are various morally relevant distinctions between things, but none concerns the biological species Homo sapiens. What holds rather is an annular 1 model which can be depicted schematically as follows:- �3 instance in removing the idea that the wrongness of such practices 2 as cannibalism is not even open to question 3 . Diagram 1: High in a list of inherited moral assumptions that are ripe ANNULAR PICTURE OF MORAL RINGS IN OBJECT SPACE (and the position of humans). of sapiens for reassessment are those concerning the almost universal ~oral prohibition of and repugnance to cannibalism, a practice that used to be extremely widespread, but that has now been almost e;.tirely extirpated 4 with the very successful cultural conquest of the world by Western thought. But instead of the re-examination that should follow the intellectual erosion of mainstream Western social thought, the growing recognition of its theoretical inadequacy, not to say ~:Notional labels for the interiors of such morally relevant rings (or ellipses), from outer to inner: Objects of value, objects of moral concern Objects having well-being Preference havers, choice makers Rights holders Obligation holders, responsibility bearers Contractual obligation makers poverty, what has followed is the often shoddy defence of many of its leading moral theses, mostly on anthropocentric grounds, but sometimes on other grounds, some of them drawn from contemporary philosophy (e.g. the conventionalistic rejection of cannibalism of Diamond, considered below). Many of the defences preferred of total prohibition of There are also more comprehensive philosophical reasons cannibalism are ludicrously weak, and withstand little examination. for the periodic intellectual review of deeper assumptions (and Consider, to illustrate, the main argument in (what was until very prejudices), reasons furnished by dialectics in combination with recently one of the few books in English on cannibalism) Hogg, the theory of objects. namely 'the innate repugnance of contemporary man to touch human According to the theory of objects there is no assumption that has to be held,that cannot be disbelieved, flesh' (p . 188, also earlier) . while according to dialectics proper every assumption is open to represented as a matter of fact, it does not appear to hold generally, questioning and reconsideration by its methods , and assumptions in and may be largely a matter of background and conditioning. order to be rationally maintained should withstand such critical scrutiny. imply 2 Naturally these (methodological) considerations do not that assumptions under examination do not (frequently) withstand critical discussion, or that there are not (or never could be) good reasons for adhering to them. But the considerations are important in opening larger moral assumptions to due reconsideration, for Insofar as the repugnance is There is no evidence that - what seems unlikely given the former prevalence of cannibalism - it is innate; and insofar as it is a matter of fact it does not support moral prohibition of eating human flesh, any more than the apparently very widespread repugnance of urban Americans �5 4 as observed, it has recently been argued, successfully, that this to eating raw snake underwrites a moral prohibition on consumption of raw snake meat. distinction will not carry very much of the moral weight that has been imposed upon it. 7 On the other hand, if the repugnance in With the breakdown of this sharp moral distinction question is (intended to be) warranted moral repugnance, then the argument is trivially circular, the premiss assuming the point at between humans and other species.orthod ox anthropocentr ic options, which sanction human consumption of animals other than humans but issue. never humans, collapse. One reason why the proferred defences look weak is that it has not been thought necessary to provide any defence; for 'Directly daylight falls on the habit it withers away' 5 - the "daylight" is that of contemporary Western civilization. appears in Langton (initial page): A similar theme cannibalism is 'a custom that of civilization' - or, one might say, before the triumph of human (pure) vegeta!ian options and on the other, cannibal(istic ) options (mixes of these options which allow some human flesh eating will it will be seen that by no means all forms of cannibalism are morally inadmissable. present exercise. Showing as much is the main object of the Though the results arrived at are part of the process of elaborating a non-chauvinis tic ethics, and accordingly have implications for policy, no policy conclusions are drawn in what no recommendatio ns for the implementation , or institution- The vegetarian options face, it certainly seems, insuperable difficulties, especially concerning such issues as animal predation (which is an important, immensely frequent, and often _<!~~rab.!!'_, What will be argued is that, on the contrary, when some daylight does penetrate to the issues concerning cannibalism, follows: (at least as regards "higher" creatures) are, on the one side fall under the latter head). must soon become extinct all over the world before the great march chauvinism. Among the important options left open ecological fact), and concerning the reduction in numbers of animals, especially introduced animals, which build up to "pest proportions" (some reduction is often required for vegetable growing to operate successfully) . But it is unnecessary to elaborate these and connected points here because there are cases where consumption of human flesh is perfectly admissible. The main argument advanced is modelled upon simple inductive arguments: a base case is argued, and this base is expanded step by step to cover other cases. alisation, of cannibalistic practices are made 6. Hardly necessary to say, better defences of the mainstream anti-cannibal istic tradition can be devised or pieced together from the literature than those so far alluded to. for example, on the assumption of sanctity Such defences - based, of all human life, on the theme that cannibalism is a brutalising experience, which puts humans in the same category as the brutes - characteristic ally rely on a sharp distinction between humans and other creatures. But, §1. The Base Cases: Eating the Dead. In setting out the first of these cases it is taken for granted that the practice in some American states and Canadian provinces of allowing accident victims (e.g. those of automobile casualties) to consent to the use of parts of their bodies for organ transplants and also for other medical purposes is admissible, and that the use itself in such cases is �Restricted forms of cannibalism in the interests of 6 survival are now quite widely accepted as admissible. admissible 8. Then, is there any good reason why persons should So there is really nothing extravagant at all in contending that sometimes not similarly consent to the use of their bodies for food upon cannibalism is perfectly alright: their death? fact that the admissible cases lead, naturally and coherently, once For food transfusions, instead of blood or transfuslons · or transplants. plasma And if they do, or so bequeath their bodies, why should their bodies not be eaten? What differences human chauvinism is properly cases. any extravagance is due to the left behind, to much more controversial There are several examples of human cannibalism undertaken there are in the types of cases can be minimized, and those that for survival, which have won establishment approval, from remain seem not to make much - or any relevant - moral difference. or church hierarchies. For example, in order for human parts to be intially taken and used, of members of a Uruguayan rugby party who survived an airplane crash the bodies have to be more or less butchered; in the high Andes (dramatised by Read). but then they may be in much less pretty shape after a serious accident. Again, in each typ e of case, the parts may - or may not - be supplied to people who are in genuine need; etc. Nor does internal ingestion appear to differ, in any way that matters morally, from internal connection, from organ transplantation. It could be objected that with an organ transplant a specific organ is required, whereas with a starving or undernourished person alternative sources of food are - or ought legal A striking recent example is the cannibalism Their eating of dead companions, evidently necessary for survival, was condoned by the Catholic Church of Uruguay and by other prominent Catholic thinkers. Interestingly, Rubio, Auxiliary Bishop of Montevideo, justified such cannibalism, necessary for survival, through a medical transplant comparison 10 .•• Eating someone who has died in order to survive is incorporating their substance, and it is quite possible to compare this with a graft. Flesh survives when assimilated by someone in extreme need, to be - available. But where the parts are used for nonspecific just as it does when an eye or heart of a dead man is grafted onto a living man ••. (as quoted in Read, p. 308). medical testing, e.g. cell culture, or just disposed of (e.g. by But the Bishop tactfully rejected, except 'as a source of inspiration', incineration) without any other use, the specific need consideration the equivalence, appealed to by some members of the team, between does not work. Anyway what would it show? eating the flesh of their friends and participating in communion, as The claim staked is accordingly this:_ where the human initiated by Christ at the Last Supper, where he (figuratively) shared eaten is dead, and certain other conditions are satisfied, cannibalism his flesh and blood with his apostles (Read, p.309; is admissr e. also p. 299). The other conditions~ comprise such things as Exactly why this correlation, which undoubtedly helped the survivors, the following: that the whole thing is done decently (in ways, gets discounted, remains tantalisingly obscure. that is . LO be spelled out specifically); that the person eaten consented (or, differently, would consent) to being eaten, perhaps by the parties concerned, or more strongly that the person directed tha t he or .;he be eaten (or otherwise used); or differently again, tha t the ~onsumption was necessary for survival or well-being. etc. seems worth pursuing further. The correlation For though survival was not a problem �9 Suc h d es pi cable motives as those of the ge t-even s yndrome ("we'll 8 fix the ba s t a rd, we'll eat him") are pointl ess (as well as stup id l y for the apostles at the Last Supper (so destroying a strict correlation), survival is not the only basis justifying the eating of human flesh. As with blood, the gift relation is another v i ndi c tiv e ) wh e re the part y is already dead. It can be argued that eating certain pieces of human flesh out of respect is an exceptional case (like eating a fellow creature to avoid starvation), and that a general principle of respect for important basis. A consent or bequeathal clause 11 is important in under- the dead overrides any consent that may be given. The short cutting various objections to the consumption of dead humans, for answe r to this is, firstly, that grantin g of exceptional cases alr eady in s tance, that it is an affront to human dignity, that it is a mark allows that some cases of cannibalism are admissible, and secondly , of total d isr espec t, that the 'sanctity of the human being' is that no general principle applies in a decisive way to exclude the compl e tely disregarded (Hp. 186), that it is impious (Dp. 467). exampl es alr ea dy considered. Fo r if the person consents it can hardly be an affront to that general principles can always be thwarted, it is instructive to consider per s on's dignity, or violate that person's sanctity (as seen from one po int of view). Nor is it an affront to the dignity of creatures of an irreligious cast, for whom a dead body whether of a human or an animal is a d ead body - though perhaps a dead body of a fellow creature o r of a friend. So it is an affront only to those of particular ( religious) groups, perhaps the same groups for whom dead human bodies are sacred and their disfigurement by humans (whether for medical or 5 other purposes) impious . Just as it is legitimate for one to discount the often illfounded views of such groups - insofar as the views are int ended to have universal applicability - as regards medical use of (forme rly ) consenting humans, as regards sexual relations, abortion, e uthanasia, and so forth, so it is legitimate to discount them in the case at hand. Dev ine ' s argument against cannibalism, namely as a paradigmatic applica tion of his overflow principle. On the contrary, the eating of certain parts of the bodies of dead humans was, amon g certain tribes who used to practice cannibalism, for it was thought that in that way the eaters could acquire or participate in some of the (former) virtues o f the dead , e. g . wisdom, strength, hunting skills, etc. still be, that eating is not disrespectful: So it can what is sometimes dis- respectful is raising for food nnd killing, e.g. in order to ent. The overflow principle~ formed -chiefly to cope with the treatment of animals, is this: Act towaPds that which, while not itself a pePson, is clos ely associated with pePsonhood in a way cohePent with an attitude of Pespect fop pePsons (Vp . 503) . Instead of arguing directly for the principle, Devine suggests firstl y that it may be argued for in rule-cons equ e ntial fashion, secondly tha t it may be made plausible as part of a way of life having respect for persons at its centre, and thirdly that th e prin ciple is well ensconced in the moral consciousness of the plain man. Each of these suggestions can be faulted both in general and as regards the relevant application. For instance, plain men mostly do not object to the bulldozing of old cemeteries to make way for a development. Nor need the eating of a dead human be a mark of disrespect. an act of consider a ble res pect; To illustrate how application of suc h On the other hand, the principle can be rendered analytic by taking up the slack in "associated with" and "coherent with" appropriately - only then it won't yield the relevant substantive application. In application of the principle Devine makes two alternative moves. First, �11 It is by no means obvious, however, that a cons~n 10 is required. similarly if it is going to be incinerated and the ashes s pread, it might better be carefully composted. The point ma de does not exclude organ transplants, eating, and so ecological alternatives to burial or cremation. The most the overflow principle The suggestion that the already dead can, at least in s e ems to show, under this move, is - what does not exclude consumption, certain circumstances, be eaten without moral qualm, innocuous though and what one may well concur with - that the dead (and not merely the human dead) ought to be eaten respectfully; it is, is liable to spark off a series of protests. and even this much some ugly scenes could result i f "long pig" caught on; is not shown if the tense change, the transformation from alive to dead, destroys the requisite closeness of association. outback Australia) competing to pick up "accident" victims. ambulances or tow trucks, are readily enough avoided (by suitable body, which forms the visible aspect of the bulk of persons with whom we are acquainted, and which persists when the person ceases to exist in death. (Vp. 593) organization), and more respectful practices adopted. would, if the objection is to have force - lead to what is normally a~sumcs, overflow to the subsequently dead body (which is no longer inadmissible, for example, to a perverse lust for human flesh, and And again respectful eating be marketable commodities, if there was commerce not just in human flesh. but in bags, shoes, and belts made from human hides, decorations from human bones and teeth, glue and fertilizer from other parts and so on 12 in the way that there is commerce in animal parts? Perhaps, disre sp ec t wo uld be an outcome, but perhaps for the wrong re aso ns. What s ee ms clear is that giving human flesh to the ne edful, s ~y , i s one thing, a llowing commerce in human parts is another. More serious is the objection that such "admissible cannibalism" could - or rather ov e rflow to thl' llvlng body docs not however guarantee, what Devine Wouldn't disrespect be inevitable if human parts become But these types of scenes, which can already occur with competing ... respect for persons overflows to the human to dead bodies. e.g. the the way that refrigerated trucks follow the kangaroo shooters in some heavy assumptions as to features of persons, reveals: could, it appears, be coherent with the alleged overflow of respect It is true that spectacle of the refrigerated vans patrolling the highways (in much Devine assumes it does not, as his second move which begins to buy into the "visible aspect" of a person). so in nci cher case is value diminished, it seems, by (respectful) cannibalism or ordinary garbage (in the literal sense) is not eaten (except in desperation, etc.). A dead body does nee have the value of the person whose body it is in life; Garbage is commonly thrown away, things in these end uses are mostly not; For i f a body is going to be buried and "eat,~" by bacteria, or various carnivores, it might as well be eaten; although a dead body is not a person, still the fact that it (so to speak) was a person means that it ought not to be treated like ordinary garbage (Vp. 503). forth. clause perhaps, thereby to the deliberate killing of humans for food. Hogg makes much of the first of these points, the (unintended) impression he gives being that human flesh is so delicious that it is highly addictive. Whether this is so or not (it would seem unlikely with a preponderance of older stringier humans, though the number of "battery humans" is increasing).it appears not to matter, unless it does lead to what would be more disconcerting, e.g. the establishment of a black market or the like in human flesh, with inputs from killer or Mafia syndicates. But the problem is not substantially different �13 12 of our unwillingness to kill people for food or other purposes, from problems that already arise with the treatment of animals (e.g. traffic in rare species), and over the distribution of dangerous drugs to humans, and can be met in similar ways, i.e. through a similar range of political or organizationa l options. The usual utilitarian defence of vegetarianism based on suffering, pain, and the like caused in raising and killing creatures for food, co llapses. 13 For no direct suff~ring, pain or the like occurs, with the creatures eaten already dead; and any sorts of suffering that might be marshalled among some of the still living who are pained by the consumption can be more than compensated for by th e alleviation of suffering of the meat consumers, for a suitable and secondly not a (direct) consequence of our unwillingness to cause distress to people - not that it always would (contrary to Diamond's assumption) - but rather 'what conditions our attitude to not dining on ourselves is the view that a person is not something The argument turns however on a slide on the mi.ddl.e term 'something to eat' which is ambiguous between (i) something that may be eaten and (ii) something that is eaten; In the second sense the justification given of the fact dead people are not eaten, namely people are not eaten, while in a sense "logically adequate" is trivial, and proves no requisite grounding, and the "justification " does not imply that dead people may not be eaten. In the first sense, a nontrivial justification is offered, that it is impermissible choice of consumers. to eat people,but in this case we cend to repeat the initial question; Some vegetarians however (rightly) reject utilitarian defenses; Diamond, in particular, tries to argue that they involve 'fundamental confusions about the moral relations between people and people and between people and animals ' (Dp. 465), and introduces instead convent ionalist arguments - unfortunately of wide philosophical appea l - against eating people. Some of the reasons for not eating people, she subsequently argues, extend to grounds for not eating animals either. Diamond's argument begins from certain quite central facts ... We do not eat our dead, even when they have died in auto- mobile accidents or been struck by lightning • .. (Dp. 467) An immediate objection is that this is little more than a local fact, Why is it? Diamond has a surprising answer: in effect that it is analytic on, or at least a consequence of, our notion of what a person or human being is. ••• it is not respect for our interests which is involved in our not eating each other . These are all things which go to determine what sort of concept 'human being' is it is one of those things which go to build our notion of human beings (Opp. 469-70). But such a thing as not eating other people is certainly not part of the concept 'human being', indeed it is not merely ~ot analytic or normic (near-analytic ) of human beings,it is not even true of them - good for certain ' we ' but by no means generally, as the history of given that, on well-authentic ated evidence, cannibalism was formerly canniba lism shows. widespread, and that it still persists in isolated place s today. It is equally a fact in the context of quite extensive groups, that .EE~L2o not eat l'i~.· So either the central fact has to be morally grounded or has to have moral consequences. The second option would involve a prescriptive fallacy (deduction of an ought from an is); followin g fashion:- in any case, Diamond tries the first, in the The fact is, firstly, not a (direct) consequence The answer is, in short, radically unsatisfactory . That this is �15 Tt may s eem ... I should find myself havin g t o jus tify slav e ry. For do we not learn - if 14 we liv e in a slav e soci e ty - what slaves ar e the answer Diamond is offering is however at once confirmed by how she goes on (writing in speciesist assumptions 15 in the same revolting fashion): and what masters are through the structure of a life in which we are here and do this, and they are there and do that? Do we not learn the difference between a master and a slave that way? (Dp. 470) Diamond does not manage to escape these difficulties, though sh e And so too - very much so - [built into the notion] the idea of the difference between human beings and animals. We learn what a human being is in - among other things sitting at a table where WE eat THEM. We 16 are around the table and they are on it (Dp. 470) . While we may learn something about what some human beings - not makes various attempts (p. 470 and especially pp. 476-7): the notion of a slave or an enemy or an outlaw assumes a background of response to persons, and recognition that what happens in these cases is that we have something which ;;;;-;;,::-e not treating as what it - in a way - is ( Dp. 476). vegetarians - are like in this way, in the way we can learn what But this is to assume a background of norms, of how things morally some other human beings are like from cannibal feasts where 11 we" are, that a person is not something to enslave, etc. (and to attempt are on the table as well as around it, we learn little of the once more to build a presupposed morality into conv entional facts). notion of human being in this way. Nor does what correct information Furthermore, as this reveals, the same ploy could be worked in the we acquire in this way provide a firm basis for moral judgements case of animals, namely that in hunting them, killing them, serving about the possibility of eating humans, though Diamond appears to them up for dinner, we are ~ treating them as what - in a way think that it does; for she later says that the source of moral they are (or, more accurately, as they mora lly deserve treating). life derives from ways in which we mark what human life is (Dp. 418), Such comparisons make it evident then what Diamond is about, and that another move which involves a prescriptive fallacy, as well as he r conventionalistic approach fails. obvious anthropoce ntri cit y . However, to remove objections to eating the already dead, Indeed many of the sorts of conventional patterns of response under specified conditions, is simply to avoid, rather than face up a nd conventional facts that Diamond alludes to are a fairly direct to, the real opposition to even qualified cannibalism. For an o utcome of human chauvinism, e.g. that drivers mostly stop for important part of the real opposition to qualified canniba lism relies injured humans, not for injured animals, that humans are commonly upon illicit assimilation of cases of eating already dead people given funerals, animals mostly not. Diamond needs to say, and with killing humans for food, and, differently again, rearing some proceeds to say, that these sorts of differences are appropriate, but that is to slide to a value judgement which concedes to he rself part of what is at issue. Diamond's approach encounters serious difficulties when applied to such matters as slavery, the treatment of outlaws and enemies of them, e.g. certain infants, for food . and in an obvious sense ! .!1.~~~., Thus Devine's ambiguous, �17 what is entire l y different, permitting the killin g of humans for 16 food, or to, what is different again, the deliberate raisin g of human s for food. claim that 'a meat diet requires that animals be killed' (Vp. 483). And thus Diamond again, the cases are entirely different. involved both rearing and slaughtering Swift's "proposal" of children for food. Nor is the base position so far reached a new one, but an ancient proposition. it i s one thin g morally to eat an already dead deer, another to let a deer die and then eat it, another again to shoo t What we should be going against in adopting Swift 's "Modest proposal" is something one should be going against in salvaging the dead, more generally useful organs for transplantation, and the rest for supper or the compost heap. (Dp. 469) 17 Not a t all: animals: The differences are already clea r as rega rds For instance, Chrysippus, the Stoic, in his or otherwise kill it and then (perhaps) eat it, and yet another to eat a deer raised (in one or another of very different ways) for food. Within each of these different categories, it is important to distinguish cases. For while eating a dead human, even after it has been allowed to die (by omission), may be admissible, killing humans for food is often not, and raising a human for food (and other goods) is, it is now generally assumed by humans, certainly not. treatise On Justice, 'permitt ed eating of the corpses of the dead• 18 There are several separate issues here, in particular the So also apparently did Diogenes in his Republic, Zeno in his Republic, ~~ban~ or raising for food issue, on which much literature on and Cleanthes, all of whom may have authorised cannibalism on a the moral basis of vegetarianism has in fact focussed, and the broader scale. general l?I~'!_ati~ issue, which includes matters of killing and letting die. Limited extensions of cannibalism beyond the base cases, where humans are allowed to die or are killed . eat ing of (certain of) their parts . Eating dead humans involves But if eating such parts is (often) The issues are separate because creatures may be killed for food, e.g . in hunting, though they are not raised for food, and conversely creatures may be raised for food (or treated as slaves) without, for one reason or another, being killed. Cases of humans admiss ibl e , then so also presumably is consumption of such parts when raising humans for food have apparently never occurred, though humans they are (irrevocably or freely) severed from a living human, e.g. have sometimes been fed up for the pot (e.g. in the Aztec empire and in Fiji). ea ting the amputated limb of a friend or enemy or drinking the blood Humans are the only creatures we in fact know who might (having l ost consider- donated by another, able touch with the natural world) just adopt such a practice: These rather special cases, involving (what is no other ca lled, for s h o r t ) ~ human parts, provide a first set of extensions animals ever raise creatures for food, not did cannibalistic cu ltures of the base cases. ever apparently raise humans for food. These extensions include some bizarre cases, in particular where the part concerned is one's own. However, allowing the eating of dead humans and nonlive hum~ n parts under certai n conditions offers no slippery slide to, It is a serious and difficult question (to which moral philosophers have not sufficiently addressed themselves) why it is that if humans are not under !!.!!i'. conditions entitled to raise other humans for food, they are entitled under many �19 18 th e gene ral i ss ue as to wh e n, or wh e n prec i se l y , killin g f o r food i s jus tifiable can be largely skirt ed. For it is justifiable , it is conditions - indeed, it is often assumed, under a sweeping ra~ th e n claimed, whe n and only when killing itself i s justified, whe ne ve r of factory conditions - to raise other animals for food? that is. They can only be justified in so doing if there are significant and While one half of the italicised equivalence is uncontrover s ial - relevant differences between humans and other creatures raised, if killing for food (or for purpose P) is permissible, so is what it or that might be raised, for human or animal food. involves, killing - the converse is not. Yet there are, For consider some circum- it has already been pointed out, no such appropriate species-wide stances (assuming you can find them) where killing of person x is differences. justifie d, e.g. in war, in retribution, in self-defence, in r e ducin g g reat A fresh start can be made on the issue from a cannibalistic perspective. evil. Since it is not eating human f l e s h ~ that is Th e n killing x for these reasons is not killing for food, even if x is in fact subsequently eaten. There is an important intensional wrong, what is it that is wrong, if anything, with raising humans difference, so that being justified in killing x for some crime say , or other creatures for food? does not justify killing him for food, much as thinking of killing him or is it both? both. Is it the raising, or is it the killing, The answer is, of course, that trouble lies with for the one reason is very different from thinking of killing him for Raising of creatures frequently has one or both of two dama ging features accompanying it: first, the other purpose. deprivation of the What can be argued given the permissibility of- eating dead rai s ed creatures, and secondly, treatment of the raised animal humans, is that where killing of z is permissible, cannibalism of z merely as a means (not as an end). is also IN FACT permissible. The second, attitudinal, difference may have little or no impact beyond the first. For example, if infanticide i s alri ght under certain conditions (as Tooley contends, and others have hinted), And the first may be avoided, e.g. whe re the creatures stay by choice but then in fact cannibalism of infants is alright also under the given could depart if they wished. conditions (but the issues as regards the raising of infants for fo od Kept geese, for instance, may be in that position; they are seemingly not deprived, but may live in rather are, of course, not thereby resolved). natural conditions (except that migration and much that goes with it is permissible can, to this limited extent, be bypassed. II has been lost). Thus the issue of when killing It is worth elaborating these points, since important Killing involves something different again: extensions - not the only extensions - of cannibalism beyond the base all that goes with removing of a life, the termination of projects, purposes, cases depend upon them, and since - very differently - they furnish associations of value, etc. (and also the definitive end of con- clear cases of inadmissible cannibalism. sciousness, etc.). of situations to distinguish:- With the predation issue also, a central issue ls as to when killing an animal for food is permissible. It may be thought indeed that the killing for food issue just is, or is t a ntamount to, the general issue of killing, and that accordingly • There are several clas se s �21 survive themselves, the survivors of an aircrash in a remote area, 20 people on a life raft, etc. Such examples, where defensible, as they sometimes are, provide a further class of examples of admissible la. Killing , causing to die, is impermissible. cannibalism - what might be called exceptional cannibalism, since the lb. Letting die (passive killing, as it is sometimes misleadingly , but conveniently , called) is circumstances are, at present anyway, among higher mammals, rather impermissible . exceptional . Then, in either case , killing or letting die for eating or followed by An important and often times questionable practice, which eating is also impermissible, by preceding principles (essentially can in principle at any rate, deliver exceptional examples 20 , is ~Pp ➔ ~P (p & q)), hunting (in the intransitive form, which involves capture or killing So in particular it is where the creature is of the same species. That is, cannibalism is in these cases inadmissible . But some of these cases are clear; for instance, where creature (or if the object sought is duly located). Men continue to hunt in the French fields, and sometimes still their own species 21 , not at present human) x is leading a worthwhile nonaggressive independent and pro- in the shape of enemy soldiers , but those cast as outlaws (manhunts) . ductive life in a peaceful countryside. (Intransitive) Hunting divides into several types, according to its 2a. Killing is permissible. 2b. Letting die is permissible. end purpose, for sport , for food, for extermination, for capture. Hunting humans for sport (hunting for "sport " , so called, typically In common reckoning there are many examples of both second classes, involves killing) is a practice that has persisted well into this "passive" infanticide, suicide and gambling with life, euthanasia, century, in Australia for example . killing or allowing to die to maximise community values where there though it can be given philosophical support by chauvinistic theories are large numbers of people or choices between them, execution and such as a limited and racially prejudiced group-utilitarianism or by assassination, self-defence , killing in war (the list follows roughly appeal to the "ideal" of pure subspecies (the stud ideal). t he later chapter headings in Glover, where these well-known types such hunting is impermissible, so, for the same sorts of reasons, is of examp les are set out in some detail). the hunting of many animals for sport . In all these types of cases, It has nothing to recommend it, But if Hunting otherwise, except for death can be followed by eating, provided the base class conditions capture, is a restricted form of killing, and to what extent it is are satisfied . permissible turns on when that sort of killing is permissible . In such cases, henceforth called de facto extensions, cannibalism is also in fact admissible . The position arrived at thus far is pulled together in rhe Almost always the killing or letting die in 2a and 2b is not spec ifically for eating. conjoined: Eating the resulting dead is simply th e source of food is adventitious. Sometimes, however, in unusual circumstances some members of a party of the one species kill certain members of the party or allow them to die in order to fo ll owing diagram, which subsequent sections (and parts) endeavol1r to fil l out and render more precise:- �23 §3. 22 Unavoidable detours: when is killing a creature wrong, and when is letting a creature die wrong? It is not necessary, nor is it easy or desirable, to avoid entirely the issues of when killing Diagram 2: TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM is wrong and when killing for food is wrong, and when such kinds of l( ,- killing are not wrong . Type 1 cases (exemplified e.g. in hunting for sport) - - -- ___ _] Base case I ,< conditions fail I X other than rather weak or circular principles. had seemed to be clear turn out on further reflection to be much l ess ,< obvious. \ ESSENTIAL / ,-...__ _ _ _ _ _'-! \ PREDATION..,, For example, it had seemed evident that the onus of jus tification (where this makes sense) characteristically lay with the WATERSHED J(. XCEPTIONAL EXTENSIONS Worse, things chat INADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE BASE CASES But it is not so easy to elicit or to defend action-taking party; \t 'I,( that it is the killing or removal of life that muse be justified, not the letting live. Some things, however, are clearer . 'J{ NONLIVE EXTENSIONS First and foremost, a satisfacto ry (nonchauvinistic) a c count K -J KILLING BOUNDARY of when and why killing a creature is wrong won't make exceptions for REARING FOR SLAUGHTER BOUNDARY humans and, more generally, won't contain the term 'human' or logical So far, in considering examples of killing, issue has not equivalents. This important requirement disposes of much of the been taken with enlightened conventional wisdom, with the result chat philosophical literature. a serious , and perhaps unwarranted, discrepancy between the treatment (9p. 135-9), which refer to the (contractual) conditions for human dished out to animals and that accorded humans is beginning to emerge. social life (the mixed account given should be faulted on several other So the judgements made tend to follow conventional practice: grounds as well). killing It wipes out, for example, Ewin's attempts Similarly it removes the main condition eventually humans for food is admitted but happens only in exceptional circumstances, achieved in Glover (a whole text devoted to moral issues concerning killing killing, which fails to present, or seriously address, the matter of animals for food is a pervasive practice. More generally, killing animals for food is considered permissible in a wide range of circumstances where killing humans is not , yet on what solid grounds? . As regards killing, even enlightened conventional moral wisdom returns us to the heartlands of human chauvinism. necessary and sufficient conditions for when killing is wrong) . The first main condition Glover arrives at is that ' taking human life is normally directly wrong: that most acts of killing people would be J/ To avoid it, the matter of wrong in the absence of harmful side-effects' (Gp . 42), i.e . so long killing and letting die will have (like most moral issues) to be as 'the best total outcome' does not involve killing (cf. p . 286), to reconsidered, nonchauvinistically. set down the underlying utilitarian recipe . Other conditions Glover outlines - similarly unacceptable even to their author when 'animal' replaces 'human' - are likewise faulted as damagingly cha,·vinistic, �25 24 for instance that it is wrong to kill a human whose life is worth l iv i ng (Gp . 53) , whenever that is. e . g. burning a collection of seeds (er seedlings) is one thing, burning Secondly , unremarkably, most of the recipes suggested in the a forest is another, slicing up or eating a raw egg is one thing, slicing literature are defective, first among them utili t arian proposals , which, as is well-known can sanction unjust killing. 22 up or eating an eagle is another, etc. Other (non- utilitarian) potential ys me rit the same consideration as ys, as if th ey we r e ys. recipes are also problematic, as a proposal by Young, wh i ch will he l p Call the r.esult of making the required deletio n, th e us on our way, serves to indicate: modified proposal . . . . what makes killing another person [more genera lly a considered . realisation either of the victim's life purposes or of such life- purposes as the victim may reasonably have been narrower utilitarian frameworks and induces a decided circularity, The proposa l requires some brief explanation. The term ' unjust ' , which takes the proposal outside is qualified in the final proposal (p.519) by 'maximally' , the point expected to resume or to come to have (Yp.518; repeated p.519 with 'maximally ' included). of which (though it is not fully explained) is to permit killing or The qualifying term sacrificing of one person in order to save others . 'irrevocable' is inserted to separate killing from life imprisonment I It is the modified proposal that will be chiefly creature] wrong on occasions is its characte r as an irrevocable, [maximally] unjust preventing of their I It is a popular fallacy that which may, as a matter of fact , defeat the prisoner ' s purposes . The long some members of a group (on a lifeboat or from a remote airplane crash) final disjunction is designed to delegitimize killing of sometime comatose are sacrificed for, or by, others of the group . persons (it also would include people undergoing reform programs) - -,hat is ac counled [maximally] unjust. an additional clause is required - and killing of potential future in way, and almost (but not) captial punishment. debatable judgements , such as that in the common case (on Young ' s ified' (p . 528) , ified. 23 from which it follows that abortion is commonly unjust- The disjunct should, it certainly seems, be deleted - especially since what justifies the main part of Young ' s proposal, considerations of what has value, does not justify the final disjunct, because merely potential persons do not appear to have requisite value, though they might (or might not) come to have such. Generally, potential ys do not have the same range of features (including acquired value, etc.) ll Similarly what one is entitled t o do , or feels like doing with r espect to them may differ; If , however, there are no just wars then most killing in war is wrong; and if punishment by death is sometimes just , capital punishment is sometimes not wr.ong. If, for instance, a person's life purposes are sufficiently evil~ e.g. they include genocide, then their fulfilment is certainly pro1, ~ rJ y , justly, thwarted. 0 1· Thus some proviso as to the chara c t e r or qua lit y of life purposes , such as the term 'unjustly ' obliquely supplies , is essential (but often omitted in ethical discussions) . It is not evident however that killing such a person (as distinct, e.g. from imprisonment , re-education, etc.) is permissible, exc ept perhaps in worst cases. ~ • what they become if their potential is realised . For example, Young claims (Ypp.520-1) that the proposal lets through various types of killing persons such as infants and foetl1ses - thereby writing in some very has only 'morally trivial or no moral support abortion will be unjust- But generally what the proposal permits and what it excludes depends critically upon cases already apparently covered, so that it is not obvious that such construal of 'moral') where the expressed wish of the pregnant woman The qualification makes way for certain cases of cannibalism, for instance those where �I 26 Ther e is no good r eason to restrict the proposal to persons , and Young does not intend to. 27 Many killings of animals constitute , he t ells us (Yp.526), maximally unjust prevention of their realisation of life purposes, and accordingl y are wrong. ' Killing such animals for food is only justifiable when no adequate of other crea tures). acts are avoided. food supply is available and food i s needful' (Yp . 526), in which event, presumably, justice prevails. A characteris tic remnant of Further it is simply assumed - though it could no doubt be argued (rather as below) - that requisite unjust Young's proposal as applied has bite; human chauvinism also intrudes , with Young a ppealing to the ' greater eschewing killing of creatures for food. 25 range of life-purpose s normally human beings have' (Yp.527, italics that the modified proposal has bite: amended) ; 24 and thereby smuggling in a greater value assumptio n as regards humans. Here, as elsewl1ere also , the account of when killin g is wrong is progressive ly l oaded , almost manipulated , to yield the sought r esults : in particular , what is unjust - including which killings are unjust and which class of life-purpos es are more valuable relevant to det e rmining maximal injustice - are bot h open to rigging. These points help to bring out too how back of Young's accoun t and application s of his proposal lie more basic consideratio ns of justice and value (and it is to such considera tions that we should no doubt eventually turn). Consider, for instance, the route to the permissibil ity of systematic cullings of a herd. Wants , now substituting for li fe -purpose s , are simply supposed to be summed up utilitarian- fashion, except th at (somewhat as with Mill ' s utilitariani sm) a weighting is imposed to reflect the respective values of different wants (those of humans, e . g ., as opposed to those It is an illusion however the bite all turns on Young's cunning application , since the modified proposal itself reduces to near tautologous ness. purposes occur? taken. For when does irrevocable prevention of a life's When, and only when (since it is irrevocable) that life is So the modified proposal reduces effectively to AP. Killing x is wrong iff taking x's life is maximally unjust. But killing x is, according to OED, causing the death of x, which is tantamount, in terms of sense, to taking the life of x. And what is wrong is, according to OED again, what is unjust, and would be, if the OED were sharpened 1,1p a little, what is maximally unjust. Whence the adjusted proposal, AP. The proposal does not rule out killings which have the effect overall of fostering th e wants of the largest subset of some group like a wild herd where otherwise the wants of an even larger subset will be thwarted. Systematic cullings in the absence of feasible alternative s, therefore, may be morally pe rmissible. (Yp.527) for example, it would oblige most of us to adopt a largely vegetarian life-style We have come round a circle, but much was glimpsed on the way, so the circuitous route was not without its rewards. By working through other l ess chauvinistic accounts of the wrongness of killing (e.g. the nonchauvin istic base of Ewin's account) we can come a similar circular way and arrive at the same fairly stable result. Moveover, in the adjusted proposal we do have an account, not yet a hi ghly usable account, since circular, but an account nonetheless . In terms of this account clear cases where cannibalism is morally inadmissable can be distinguishe d, for example as follows: Cannibalism of x is wrong wherever it involves maximally unjust taking of x's life. Conversely, there are many cases where �28 the killing of one creature by another creature is, because not maximally unjust, quite permissible; 29 e.g. certain instances of killing in self-defenc e, exceptional cannibalism , abortion, etc . But if the creature is killed, then it is dead, so by the earli er Now let x and y be of the same species, say Homo Sapiens: argument it is permissible to eat it (under certain conditions) . CAP provides exact conditions for when cannibalism is wrong, in So there are many cases where killing a creature and then eating it, cases where cannibalism involves killing. or its then being eaten, are permissible . conditions are satisfied; If some of the many cases of permissible killing are, as they seem to be, cases of killing a then Sometimes these often they are not. Sorting out when they are, and when they are not, will occupy many a controversi al creature of the same species, then active cannibalism involving killing is, in such cases, permissible . The argument needs of course filling out in crucial respects, especially by some enumeration of types of cases where killing is permissible , and a sub-listing of cases where these are intra-specie s killings. Would this suffice? However, it of the) distinction between killing and letting die, by blurring or rejecting the distinction on which it is based~ that betweem omission and One question is whether the account determines (even in its circular way) the precise conditions under which killing for food can permissibly occur. Letting die is not the same as (active) killing . has recently become fashionable to try to remove the (moral significance The question reduces commission (or else it is pretended that it is frightfully difficl1lt to make this distinction s out, etc.). Rejection of the omission/ commission distinction appears to rest on a mix of fallacious moves:- to the logical issue of whether AP as a strong logical equivalence FMl. A some to all argument, warrants intersubsti tutivity in more highly intensional frames such FM2. A confusion of the thesis that the distinction is morally as those declaring purposes. Though I've tended to vacillate on this issue, my feeling increasingly is that substitutiv ity is warranted, important with the quite different thesis that only commi.ssions can be morally blameworthy and that omissions are morally guiltless (the the reason being that the equivalence of AP is of virtually synonymity position reportedly held by some religious groups in the past). strength, which legitimates replacement in all but quotational (type) FM3. An extensional approach to nonextensio nal differences . sentence contexts. But purpose sentence contexts, such as' ... for eating' are not quotational . FAP. Hence it follows using AP that Killing x for food purposes is wrong iff taking x's life for food is maximally unjust, heavily upon the fact that there are some cases where it is morally difficult to distinguish between certain commissions and certain and that CAP. These points are considered briefly in turn:- ad FMl. Those attempting to discredit the distinction usually rely y's killing x for (and followed by) eating is wrong iff y's taking x's life for eating is maximally unjust. omissions, e.g. that in appropriate circumstanc es exposing the baby may be little different morally from directly smothering it. (The Greeks believed it wasn't but that was because exposure gave the gods a chance to intervene and save from death those who were fated to perform especially important tasks). �r JO But the fact that there a r c ~ cases where the JI distinctio n is not of great moral significan ce does not show that it is dispensabl e. In order to show that lt is dispensabl e it is extension ality assumption which removes scope. The principle necessa ry to show that there are no cases where it is needed, that appears to be that failing to provide a condition which would have for all cases failing to provide a condition which would prevent been causally responsibl e for preventing x is morally equivalent to ~x is (morally) equivalent to providing a condition for x. providing a condition which is causally responsibl e for x . But Moral it is easy to produce some cases where the distinctio n seems to be equivalenc e requires interchang eability witin deonitic contexts, essential if we are to account for what we wish intuitivel y to say. indeed it could be characteri sed in terms of such substituti bility . For example, to take a case those who wish to abolish the distinctio n The equivalenc e yielded is of the form -F-x are fnnd nf appealing to, we may wish to say that the people who did commonly falls, especially where Fis not extensiona l. not attempt to help in the Kitty Genovese case were morally culpable, moveover that the causal responsib ility functor is not extension al, perhaps to a high degree, but few of us would wish to say that their and that such a principle fails for it. moral culpabilit y was exactly the same or of exactly the same kind as that of the murderer, and that they should equally be brought to trial on murder ch~rges. Or, to take another case, placing poison in your husband ' s tea is not the moral equivalent of failing to give him the antidote when he has placed it in himself. In order to say +-> Fx. But such a principle It is clear Though letting die differs significan tly, then, from killing, conditions upon when it is wrong may be reached in similar ways. How the condition for letting die correspond ing to AP should go becomes rather more obvious if the righthand side of AP is expanded to: taking (the) action which terminates x's life is maximally unjust. what is evident in such cases, some equivalent of the omission/c ommission The parallel passive condition can th en presumably be formulated distinctio n is needed . thus:- ad FM2. But the thesis that the distinctio n is needed and is morally DP. significan t in many, or at l e a s t ~ , cases must be clearly dis- which continues x ' s life is maximally unjust. 26 tinguished from the very much stronger thesis that all omissions are blameless, and that any commission s are morally open ~o blame - or praisewort hy. This thesis is, rather plainly, indefensib le, yet has been responsibl e for much of the bad light in which appeal to distinctio n appears . ad FMJ. Then in turn, substituti on principles again yield clauses EDP and CDP, correspond ing to EAP and CAP, special cases of which yield conditions under which cannibalism is wrong where it involves letting die. Principle CDP which supplies this condition, where x and y are of the same species, runs as follows:- The principle of moral symmetry between omissions and commission s is in fact refutable. Letting x die is wrong iff refraining from taking (the) action It appears to be based on an CDP. y ' s letting x die for eating purposes is wrong iff y's refraining from taking (the) action which continues x's life, for purposes of eating x, is maximally unjust. Since letting die is, for the most �32 part, less heinous than killing, cannibalism involving letting die 33 i s more widely permissible than cannibalism involving killing . 27 §4 . The matter of predation, and important cases of l egit imat e killing and letting die for food. One tempting model that underlies the conflict picture of Paradigmatic examples of legitimate predation, of predation as basically undesirable but an unavoidable killing are provided by predation, where bis prey of a and a depen ds fact, a model that leads to human vegetarianism, is the following (essentially) for its livelihood, indeed for its survival, on eating kind of atomistic axiological theory (or utilitarianism):- bs.28 Such predat ion i s a n essential part of any su ffici e ntl y rich ecosystem . Essential pr eda tio n i s pre dation which is essent i a l to according to the initial positive value thesis, every living creature (every sentient creature , every higher animal , etc .) has an initial positive the nor,~11 livelihood of tl1e predat or , and where the prcd alor takes non-instrumental value which it retains unless it does something to for itself no more than it requires for it s livelihood. forf eit that value. carn.ivores , such as the big cats , but some humans, such traditional Eskimos, are essential predators. Not only ilS some (On the even simpler position of biospheric egalitarianism, discussed below, all living things have equal worth, The fact that humans ar e part of the natural predatory food chains should not be lost s i g ht o[ . Observe that the argument to permissibility of essential pre- in some nontrivial sense.) These positive values just sum ; and maximisation of value (or suitably averaged value) is, of course , the (or an) ethical objective . Then killing is generally undesirable , dation does ~ take the invalid form: such predation is a fact (a fact because it results in a reduction in net value, and survival is generally of life), therefore it is permissible. That arguments of this type , desirable. 29 The exceptions occur when a creature has forfeited its selectively relied upon by Diamond and (earlier) Hegel, are inval id is value, e . g . it per sists in value-reducing behaviour, so that killing well-enough known (they commit a prescriptive fallacy), and is evident it would prevent a further decline in net value or lead to increase in from such fallacious arguments as the diplomacists' argument, e.g. it is total value . a fact of life that Indonesia has occupied (absorbed) East Timar; when it leads to an overall reduction in value . the re- The underlying theme is that killing is unjustifiable The onus of proof, fore it is pe rfectly alright that Indonesia occupied (absorbed) East Timar. when it can be assigned, lies with those who make the exceptions, who Naturally it would be decidedly awkward if the fact of essential predation do or license the killing . turned out to be impermissible: since, with one item of value consuming another item of value, it trouble. the whole natural order would be in moral This brings us to another defect of the argument from· "facts", Predation now appears as an awkward fact , leads to an overall reduction in value. Since inessential preda tion that it suggests that essential predation is really, at base, something is inessential, it is ruled out as inadmissible. pretty undesirable, but nonetheless something we have to live with - in (nonindigenous) humans for whom predation is, it is plausibl~ argu ed , Thus in particular, contrast with predation, in its associated meaning, as plunder, which we iness en tial, are not entitled to kill for f ood : do n't, or rather oughtn 't to, have to live with morally, and which is usual rai si ng of animals for food, etc . are all excluded in one st r oke , commonly reprehensible. and a l eading feature of vegetarianism imposed . therewith hunting, �34 35 Essential predation is not so satisfactorily dispos ed o f, but introduces conflict. For either one creature, the prey, is sacrificed or another creature, the predator, is: value de c lines . Similar objections apply against biological egalitarianism, either way tot 8 1 In the interim, while vegetarian scientists work even when it is qualified as in Drengson and Naess by an in principle 30 on new diets and new lifestyles for predators, there is an obvious clause. recipe to be applied, which while not eliminating conflict, minimises that predation is rather suboptimal: its effe c t: is strictly ruled out as a general practice. just as steam gives way to sail, so the less valuable gives way to t h e ~ valuable. Thus if humans are reckoned to be It is not (or not only) that it is taken for granted the trouble is that predation Since each lion and each antelope is assigned one unit of whatever is assigned equally, mo re valuable than polar bears - the usual human evaluation - then there is no way of justifying the lifestyle of a lion that consumes polar bea rs are not going to be entitled to prey on humans, in the sens e several antelopes. at least that their predation is not justified. Any equalitarian approach that is E££ atomistic is liable Application of the recip e 31 presupposes a value ranking on creatures under which some are more valuabl e to further incoherence, as Drengson's holism reveals. than others: some living system of living things, e.g . the Earth as on the Gaia otherwise if all are equal, predation is never admissible, and Lets be essential predators just die out - at least that is the simple ethical pic t - hypothesis (p. 233). ure. least of the living things that comprise it, has the same value as This points up one of the many problems for biological egaltarianism. But the picture presented so far is too simple, and tl1e recipes suggested dubious. Then s, which should(?) have the value at each of them (in effect 1 = n, for n>l). Some of t~e ecological consequences of implementing the For if the matter is properly considered not at a given time, but over a time interval, dynamically and not suggested recipes, and reform of essential predators, can now be just statically, it is not so simple, and a rather different result gauged. emerges . the chains of predation are long and complex; One predator takes, over a typical lifetime, rather a lot of prey . Unless the predator ranks very much more highly than Massive environmental interference would be required, since distortions especially in lower-level prey would occur, with resulting the prey, the value of the sum of the prey will exceed that of the ecological instability and often catastrophe. predator. that is, are ecologically highly undesirable. These considerations, in combination with a positive and gross population The consequences, What this and the value thesis, suggest a very different result, that predators should summation problems begin to reveal is that the initial atomistic be allowed to, or encouraged to, die out - unless they are somehow, value distribution picture is inadequate because it leaves out systems what seems improbable for predators that remain wild, converted to and systemic connections such as a more ecological approach would vegetarianism, include, The dynamic picture resorted to is still too simple in one important respect, that over a time interval, prey, which would often exceed natural (and sometimes reasonable) population levels without predation, are replaced. Where population of a preyed-upon species of creature is at an ecological limit, and minor culling of the sort �36 natural predation induces does not, owing to replacement, reduce 37 population levels significantly below that limit, predation has no significant effect on total value, So results yet another, different, recipe, one which is a little nearer the ecologica l mark. 32 farm animals (all of them) can be appropriately filled out, to Some utilitarians, Singer in particular, have recognised exclude replacement of animals with unusual or special properties, the role of replacement a·,1d made some allowance for it (at a serious cost to Singer ' s vegetarianism , it should be added), e.g. those carrying valuable genes, and to allow slaughter, without Singer now allows for killing and replacement of nonselfconscious life, but advances a nonreplaceabllity thesis for self-conscious life. Furthermore, even if a replacement thesis for free-range shorter-term replacement, of those carrying damaging diseases or genes - as it no doubt can, in a modified replacement thesis - still For the basic division Singer appeals to 'Tooley 's distinction' between a nonreplacement thesis fails to allow even for essential predation of selfconscious creatures, and accordingly should be scrapped, beings that are merely conscious and ••• those that Since this pronouncement is likely to be disputed, at least are also self -conscious, in the sense of being able to conceive of themselves as distinct entities, existing by some vegetarians, it is worth trying to indicate why essential over time with a past and a future (Sp.151), At the same time it can be In fact most of the sorts of free-range farmyard animals that Singer predation is perfectly admissible, seems to be envisaging as nonselfconscious, and accordingly replaceable, explained what is still wrong with the tempting dynamic picture and creatures, for instance geese and hens, appear to satisfy Tooley's the initial positive value thesis. tests for selfconsciousness. what is put in as what is left out, Geese are certainly aware of themselves they value members of their own community ; trees, and inanimate such as rocks and buildings,~ have initial and they remember value, but that complexes and wholes, in particular ecosystems, may elements of their past and, in things like nest building (practice), anticipate the future. More important, what has selfconsciousness (reflex- ive consciousness), or consciousness to do with the moral dimension? Until well have initial value, The reduction assumptions underlying value decomposition thereof, itself, because by no means all consciousness of conscious life is _ 32 a to atoms fail , Singer's theses lack foundation and look, while perhaps convenient for that it cannot be duly explained; There are grounds for anticipating for instance, being too valuable to be Such wholes may have value furthermore which is not dissolvable into values of component parts, or atoms this is duly explained - it is not satisfactorily explained as valuable in some traditional farmers, rather ad hoe, What is left out is not just that objects other than living creatures, both animate such as plants and as distinct entities, and of geese as distinct from (and superior to) hens; What is wrong is not So much In terms of the value of wholes such as ecosystems, one of the arguments for essential predation is disarmingly elementary . It takes the form: (sufficiently) rich (natural) ecosystems are Predation is an essential part of these systems . simply replaced, in the sense of having irreplaceable experiences, worth- very valuable, while projects, etc., does not have the requisite linkage with self- What is an essential part of what is very valuable is admissible. consc iousness. Therefore, predation is admissible. Such predation, which may be argued for in other ways , admits of extension by the following principle : �38 EP. If something is entitled to kill for food under certain 39 conditions, e.g. respectfully and when in need, then so are others under the same conditions. §5. The argument for EP is of the same type as that for other Postscript . The paper is very incomplete . It fails to address several issues intimately connected with cannibalism, such as hunting similar indifference, or interchangeability, principles in ethics. of humans and other animals, in particular for food, and as raising It follows from EP and essential predation that, since a tiger may humans and other animals, especially defective infants, for food. when in need kill a cow to eat, then so may humans in need. If Worse, it is evasive on some fundamental issues, and it fails to penetrate very taking the cow's life is not maximally unjust in the one case, nor deeply into some of the issues it does begin to consider, such as is it in the other, since the circumstances are similar. predation, or as the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for admiss- The results reached may be alternatively argued for using principle CP. 33 Perhaps Singer is also on the right track, though he has latched onto the wrong distinction. Perhaps there is a (descriptive) condition q (or a condition qs for each sorts of agent), appropriately ible killing. position. It is little consolation that others are in the same Hopefully some of these deficiencies will be compensated for in subsequent parts. At the same time several themes will be developed that may tied with causing to die, such that while killing creatures without q not have been evident so far, e.g. that in under suitable conditions is permissible, killing creatures with q is far too much killing taken much too lightly, but far too little is not, except under special conditions . 34 general experience of killing and death when it does occur, that is Given that q is 11 modern 11 societies there appropriately morally connected such a procedure would fit into the except usually among small groups mostly of inured professionals, annular picture (given earlier: q would mark out the interior of the which "shield" most humans from the phenomena involved. dotted elipse). Nor need the distinction be chauvinistic, because it cuts across species in a morally defensible way. anything, is q? located? made good? But, what, if Can a suitable morally-unloaded category-based distinction And how disconcerting would it be if some such distinction could no Wait for the next exciting episode . 35 �' 40 FOOTNOTES 41 It was singularly appropriate that this paper should have otained its first (and only) public presentation at the Alfred E. Packer Memorial Center, University of Colorado. I am indepted to several members of the audience for comments and references, and in particular for the first extension of the base case . It is noticeable how people who have never been cannibals despise the horrible thing; and how quickly it disappears when a cannibal tribe comes into contact with a wider world than that Directly merely of their own bush village. daylight falls on the habit, it Withers away . This is remarkable when we remember the sanctity The cannibal of it in primitive man's eyes . is not necessarily a hopelessly degraded brute, but-;-man who has not yet lived out of the dark obscurity of bush tribalism, and so had bli~dly_ followed a practice deep-rooted in the sacrificial These themes are defended, and the annular model explained, in The themes are also defended in HC, p. 103ff., and in AHC. other recent work, e.g. by Tooley and Singer. As the schematic diagram shows, humans do not occupy a central ring. Thus adoption of the model does not imply, what Pickering assumes (p. 374), that 'humans are more~ntral ' or, for that matter, that 'humans are owed more extensive moral consideration Nothing in the model itself depends on humans . than plants'. The model is not species based, or biologically based, but category basect";-and designed to reflect the different sorts of things there are, e . g. things capable of entering into contracts conferring obligations, and things not so capable, things that can have preferences and make choices as opposed to things that cannot (truly, or significantly), things, including systems and Nor, therefore, organisations, with a telos and things without. does the model write in a new type of chauvinism, or confer privilege or moral advantage on things in more central rings. Indeed, things in central rings will have obligations and commitments, and be subject to limitations on what they do, in ways that things further out cannot be; so there will be some As this moral disadvantages in occupying a more central place. indicates, the categories selected are intended to have moral And different sorts of behaviour are morally linkages . appropriate with respect to the different categories of objects. 2. 3. 4. The popular view that dialectics and adoption fraction of assumption themes are dangerous is partly based on a modal fallacy, For the fallacy e.g. that what can be believed is believed . in operation in more intellectually respectable quarters see WW. the Epilogue of Harris Some dialectics are accordingly recommended for anyone convinced that cannibalism must be wrong. The investigations undertaken in this paper alwshare other features with (classic) dialectics: there are many loose ends, and in several crucial areas firm conclusions are not reached. Later parts of the paper will take care of some of these things. Thus Hogg (p. 188), Cannibalism . .. can hardly be said to exist in There may be isolated the world of today. pockets of survival in the heart of New Guinea and among some of the tribes in the remotest corner of South America or African jungles; but they will be no more than the rarest of phenomena. 5. Hopkins, given the last word by Hogg, p. 192. quote from Hopkins is of passing interest: The whole ideas common to man the world over from his earliest days. 6. Some of the advantages of institutionalisation of certain cannibalistic practices are evident, e.g. a_much enh~nced Various disadvantages if not evident should supply of protein. become so in the course of the text. 7. See again in HC and similar. Although the human/nonhuman distinction is not, so it is argued, one of moral significance, not all Other distinctions of moral importance distinctions vanish. - those of the annular model - naturally remain. 8. Of coures, this practice is (still) controversial, and But a offensive to various religious and other groups. great advantage of a pluralistic society is t~at it can acconnnodate (better than alternatives) such differences Issues such as human_ . over the morality of practices . burial and restricted cannibalism, however, make the limits of present pluralism evident . 9. Or else did not incur official establishment disapproval, though the acts strictly appeared to infringe the Every s~~ond_ra~onteur has prevailing law of the land. examples of cannibals not brought to Justice . 10. . This clearly anticipates an initial argument of this My thanks to W. Berryman for drawing my attention paper. to the attitude of the Catholic Church, as presented in Read. 11. Consent in principle will carry the requisited load, and for this it is normally enough that the person would consent. This indicates one logical route to the liberalisation, and removal, of the consent clause. 12. There would (so far) be no trophies, e.g. Z's head ~n the hall, Y's skull on a stand, because trophies involve hunting and killing (for which see below). 13. As some vegetarians would freely admit; other 11 vegetar i ans II f rther and regard the killing of certain (nonself) an1•mals for food as admissible provided no suffering u, go i conscious is incurred and that the animals are replaced. . But it s true that usually 'vegeta;ians do not touch the issue of our attitudes to the dead (D., p.9) . �42 14. 15. In a like vein it is suggested that Singer and Regan do not see that 'a cow is not something to eat; (for them) it is only that one must not help the process along' (D., p. 468). The latter incidentally would not exclude the use of dead creatures for food, leather goods, etc.; things that animal liberationists like Singer definitely exclude. 43 21. Diamond recognizes this objection, p. 471, but does not meet Pace K. Bell, according to whom, Men have always hunted in the fields around Potigny and Falaise . They still do, but no longer their it. own species. 16. 17. 18. In similar ways we are said to gain the concept of an animal; s~~ p. 476. -Diamond introduces this piece of serious confusion in the course of emphasizing why the 'assumption that we all agree that it is morally wrong to raise people for meat ... is not, or not merely, ... too weak' (D.• p . 469). Diogenes Laertius, vol. 11, p. 297. Some of the complex issues concerning hunting will be considered in subsequent parts, others elsewhere. 22. See, e.g., Henson, and also Ewin and RKU . 23. A notable piece of male chauvinism also slides through, in the suggestion that, in Lhe absence of more weighty moral backing, the expressed wish of a pregnant woman is morally trivial. And Sayre reports (p. 25), Cannibalism (uv0pwno~ayCa) is alleged to have been a practice of the Cynics by Philodemus and by Theophilus Antiochenus; but, if so, it must have been confined to their early history, for they had a number of critics during the Christian era who would have mentioned it if they had known of it. Both Philodemus and Theophilus were biassed and we must remember that similar stories were told of the early Christians. However, cannibalism is said to have been authorized by the Republic and Thyestes (or Atreus) attributed to Diogenes and also by the Republic of Zeno and by Cleanthes and Chrysippus (Philodemus, On the Stoics; Theophilus Antiochenus, Ad. Autolycum 3, 5; D.L. 6, 73; Ibid. 7, 188; cf. 28th Letter of Diogenes; Dio Chrysostom 8, 14). As Diogenes Laertius goes on to explain, that 'Chrysippus did countenance the eating of dead humans was one of the points brought against him by those who 'ran him down as having written much in a tone that was gross and indecent'. As regards such attitudes to the dead, times have not changed that much. The (idea of) eating "the dead" (dead humans, of course), under ~ circumstances, is still widely regarded as scandalous, and highly newsworthy (see Read, p . 296 ff). 19. Cannibalism which involves explicit killing for food is a kind of reflexive predation, but generally (cases of) cannibalism and predation only properly overlap. 20. An example would be where some of the survivors of a crash or wreck hunt other "survivors" in order to survive; cf. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies. 24. But one's life-purposes are diminished lhow can this be on Young's picture?) if they jeopDrdise those of others. Hence Young's preparedness to let Amin be killed by the stampeding horses, Yp. 527. 25 . Indeed it leads, as Young interprets it, to a more sensible vegetarianism than Singer's initial position (in Animal Liberation, not as significantly modified in Sp.153). neither culling nor predation are simply ruled out. 26. For Action and taking action should be construed in a wide, but common enough fashion, e.g. the action taken may amount to doing nothing or getting-the-hell-out-of-it. 27. It is tempting to try to prove this on the basis of a proper inclusion assumption, that where letting die is wrong so is killing, but not conversely. The assumption may, however, need qualification; e . g. killing may sometimes be preferable to letting died in a lingering way . 28. 'Predation" is a singularly unfortunate word to be stuck with to describe this universal phenomenon. It is unfortunate both because of its etymology, and because of its other meaning . At to the first, ' predation' derives from praedari, 'to plunder', which derives in turn from praedo, 'booty', As to the second, 'predation' also means a 'practice or addiction to plunder or robbery'. Both carry strong negative connotations. There is a similar damaging duality in the expressions 'prey' and 'prey upon'. 29. These defective considerations also lead to a maximisati~n of population of creatures of the base class assigned values, up to the limit - if any (on frontier philosophers there are none) where declining returns set in . Where, further, humans are typically, but erroneously, assigned greater value than other creatures, the considerations support the rapid biassing of terrestial fauna! population in favour of humans that we are witnessing. The second point does not apply, in that form, . against biol0gical egalitarianism, and the first objection fails where total value is replaced, as under some utilitarianisms (with what justification is less clear, since surely we want to maximise value so far as constraints permit: see RKU), by average value, average value per (base class) life lived, etc. �44 The argument in the text is not affected materially by switching from value analogues of total utilitarianism to analogues of some form of average utilitarianism. On some of the serious problems with these utilitarianisms, see Jamieson. 30. Drengson, following Naess and others, espouses 'biospheric egalitarianism and the intrinsic value of all life' (p. 222). According to the theory, each (living) being has intrinsic value (pp.233-4), and hence each presumably has equal worth (and is entitled, in Singer's terms, to equal consideration , if not equal treatment). In Naess and Drengson this biospheric egalitarianism is qualified by an in principle clause. According to Naess, 'The 'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression' (p.95), and according to Drengson, 'This qualification is made with the simple recognition that we cannot live without affecting the world to some degree' (the latter claim is inadequate, because it is not just 'we' who are involved). 31. Axiological approaches that are atomistic have other problems, some reminiscent of those Wittgenstein discusses for logical atomism. In particular, how do we locate the atoms to which value is supposed to adhere fundamentally. A first bad feature of this approach is invariance failure: it matters for final summations how the atoms are chosen, for different choices will assign complexes quite different values. Secondly (Wittgenstein's question), why are some things said to be atoms not complexes, and vice versa. A third group of problems, brought out in HC, concerns the choice of a base class. 32. An environmental ethic s:1oul.:l. also be an ccologic:1 I et!dc, sense of an ecologically realistic ethic. facts are certainly relevant. 32a. A detailed case for this claim 33. j:1 t lH· In this resepct too the appears in Routley and Griffin. Thus rp can be made to yield a good deal more than Young's application of his proposal (for which he offers no proper justification): A creature is entitled to kill another creature of lesser value when its life (and so all its functions, prospects, etc.) depends on it and when it does not kill more creatures than it needs for these purposes. And the dubious business of imposing such order rankings on creatures can be bypassed. 34. The qualifications are necessary. If the latter exceptional conditions clause were not adjoined, the prospe ct of finding a condition q would be wiped out by such cases of essential predation as exceptional human cannibalism. The qualifications, although they enhance the prospects of locating such a q, do not appear to make it analytic or near analytic that such a descriptive q can be found. 45 35. Not only are there many proposals for q to sift through - most of which however seem to fail for reasons already indicated in the text - but also there are apparent options to finding such a distinction, such as resetting the problem, in a less individualistic way, in the framework of (ecological) communities. �REFERENCES K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of Toronto Press, 1973, REFERENCES CONTINUED P.E, Devine, 'The moral basis of vegetarianism ', Philosophy 53 (1978) · 481-505 . (all references prefixed with 'V' are to this article) , C. Diamond, ' Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy (references hereto are prefixed by 'D'). 53 (1978) 465-77, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (edited, with English translation, by R. D. Hicks), Heinemann , London, 1925, A.R . Drengson, ' Shifting paradigms: from the Technocratic to the PersonPlanetary', Environmental Ethics 2 (1980) 221-40, R. E. Ewin, ' What is wrong with killing people? ' Philosophical Quarterly tl..<. (197;t) 126-39. M, Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches, Fontana, London , 1977 (hereafter prefixed by 'W.W.'). M, Harris, Cannibals and Kings , Collins , London, 1978 (hereafter prefixed by ' CK '), R. Henson, ' Utilitarianism and the wrongness of killing', Philosophical Review 80 (1971) :1.u,- n7. D. Jamieson,'Utilitarianis m and the value of life', typescript, University of Colorado, 1981. J, Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, Middlesex, England, 1977 . L.P. Pickering, Review of ' Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century ', Environmental£.£,.~-~ 2 (1980) 373-78 . G. Hogg , Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice, Robert Hale, London, 1958. (references hereto are prefixed by 'H'), R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism ' in Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, eds , K, E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, (Hereafter prefixed by ' AHC') . J. Langton, Cannibal Feast, Herbert Joseph, London, 1937. L, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. A. Naess, 'Self-realisation in a mixed community of humans ·, bears, sheep and wolves', Inquiry 22 (1971) 231-41 , A. Naess, ' The shallow and the deep . long-range ecology movement. Inquiry A s11mmr1ry'~ 16 (1':173) 95-100. P.P, Read, Alive, Avon, New York, 1974. R. and V. Routley, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism', typescript 1976 (hereafter referred to as ' RKU ' ). R. and V, Routley, ' Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philos~ (ed. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley), RSSS , Australian National University , 1980 (the article is referred to as ' HC' , the book as ' EP ' ), F. Sayre, Diogenes of Sinope , A study of Greek Cynicism, Johns Hopkins University , Baltimore, 1938. P. Singer, 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry 22 (1979) 146- 56, (references hereto are prefixed by ' S '). R. Tannahill, Flesh and Blood. A History of the Cannibal Complex , Hamilton , London, 1975 . Hamish M. Tooley , Abortion and Infanticide, typescript, Australian National University, 1980, R. Young, ' What is so wrong with killing people?' Philosophy 5¥ (1979) (all references prefixed with ' Y' are to this article) , 515-528 R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', available in this series , 1982. �) /.o,..,.,,,, l. ~ / , . ~ tA-- ~ <'"'1 ---- 3/ }o/t/v/~}~4--( ~~ ·~~O·\o ~ --..., \0~'203.l\. <;c..c.tt.,. ~ ~ a.I) . ~~ ~✓:. ,;,,tf �~ .r. ..... ---,(7> o-,.J /' ,,,((; 11 / c, ~ I ( _ ///,;.,/ /c/ (',.,./// 1' ,. ~ L: 1 -=y' 1/ ,/L ~ -=~ t<..,(' •.r<-- <-r-? ,r"'t, 7 ; /4... 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't ,.,. ... ~;: .. t.t..4 r~ c~ /~J I~ ~~ ,H" ._ ~t/ ~l-d_ I (' rt-lrC , I ,,I, /.,_,.. .,.,.____ /4-..- C- ,,,,_ ~ , /4,L._ '-- . ,.__,_ te(A~ / 4 ~ , , fc. ~,;,,d~ t;, ~~7Y24~ h /c r n.., ,W·r ht<I I t!l"--vv-t_. t : - ;{ c.--<- u....., ( , It ~'-? I 1 ,JKc} ~ ~-✓f ;,z.. M~ / tkl-· .:I- / 1 t.~ ,.,e1 ;,-,:. ~ ~"7 f cjrl; ~ I_;.,_ 1 L,,3:-:r;-,1 •-v->-1- • 4, pS,.,(£-.,-. . ftr~ J/4. /red-,~ , _;, ~·~/~<l ' /""= cd/7 ;/ ~<¥<- J,r 7""° 1,/,,:,A -z/1.,/h/7 /,(~ • t:i.C.1 / /d'tr 7 ;:. rJ- ~:,,1 "l j 1 ( ,"'p> '(. f (,~ 0 11/'- 1 t<~ ~ ~ 4-7/J t /2-c. ) 7 /~ ?'~J 1/)):-/. ( / ~r,,.,,__,, ~,:,,..,,...,~ . l)';•.:Z:~-e-M-;I /fa ! ") ;; ,' ~ ~~ L ' A-7~ J~j 1/ ~ ~£" v:_._i eye- ,c. y),6 7 ) \ d,; ~ 1 a,___ r/ d't .ru), Cl»,~ ' ~L �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting, Scholfield B (17 August 1988) 'A human role for the pig', The Weekly Times, 14. (1 leaf) �- / / / . -7 / <et ? -·- -·-- C:; /~ ~, u / f l ~ Jc,._ '? ~ (,, ?0_/~ c c:i--l 7 ,5'<.. / 17 -~ ,..-tt'!' . : . - - - ---- ·-- - · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ~oc-. r-c- a., r..,_,/- t .)I~ , ) / ~ ?! / . / c..rc.v ~~ //._ J �OAJ 77/c /~/?t:J/f??pvc~ c:>~ 77rr" , I /}(,ifth('i/l'J7lt>p)( ;T//VC/73 ,v - cJ,,,C ~E ./,PH/6:-J ,,f/t;I~ I �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • Typescript, with handwritten emendations and annotation. Two reference reports on Cannibalism I. (2 leaves) Cutting (photocopy) of 'Necessity as a common law doctrine? [6.40] R v Dudley and Systems', The system of criminal law: cases and materials, 544-551. (4 leaves) ��The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • Cutting (photocopy) of 20 pages from unidentified publication on Pioneers-Donner Party-The Mormons, 526-545. (10 leaves) Letter, Bill to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan's paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) Letter, Robert to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan’s paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) �I I - I :/.,, f. - - - -- ----------------- - - - - - ----- ---- ----- ___________, --------- ----------·------------- - - ----- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - -- ------ - - - - - - - - --- $ ~ /~ .2Z- - - - --- - _ _L __ /4 r<./ ...---a~ l 2, ck?- _.:., t';_.~ ~ o_ _s_ ,,. .,/:,_ ~ , {- ~ M7-e;:__ /4?-l, _:., /.: ~ / ; ~ / /--/ ,a-~~ ,4d - - ~ c 1 /dLC4'--=·- - C4--~ _,t:?~7 ,-4,-,/4._ / - /2.; ~<"F' �§5 . Raising humans and other animals for food. Humans have lit tle compuncti on, for the most part, in rearing other animals for food . Since healthy animals that are raised for food often excell humans, especially humans that are "defective " in one way or another , little , except considera tions of species , seems to stand in the way of raising such humans for food . We are in the region of Swift ' s modest proposal again . What distinguis hes creatures humans (and other creatures capable of animal husbandry) are entitled to raise for food from creatures that they are not? It is not difficult to state some constrain ts on t he solution of this problem, which also rule out usual solutions . First , the distinctio n should be independe nt of reference to particula r species , especially of reference to the human species , and also indirect reference thereto, by way of phrases such as ' standard ... ' , ' normal ... . ' 'potential ... ' . Secondly - and this furnishes the ground of the first requireme nt the basis of the distinctio n should be morally relevant i n the way that mere zoologica l distinctio ns are not: otherwise chauvinism is not avoided . ' The replaceme nt principle Singer adopts for benign farmyard husbandry fails on this score , among others (the others being that many farmyard animals seem to satisfy the requireme nts for being selfconsci ous beings) . Not being selfconsc ious , which is supposed to justify replaceme nt, under ideal farming condition s , lacks requisite moral linkage . Singer ' s move does however emphasi ze �' 31. two important things . First , the familiar objections to animal husbandry, e.g. on grounds of cruelty or deprivation to animals, are remove.e\ by considering only (ideal) free-range individualised farmyard husbandry . Secondly, some distinction (fit to take its place in the annular picture) with requisite moral linkage is what is sought . Any distinction that is going to work will have to involve the capacities of the creatures concerned , in such a way that the capacities tie with moral features . The capacities concerned are, obviously, capacities connected with being aware of being raised for food . But this is not sufficiently general, being raised for killing or for cartage or for skin or fur or feathers would be similar, and similarly bad or whatever; lacks moral connection . and it still What all the cases have in common which is general, one which has (as already noted) moral connections , is being used as a means . The sought distinction is accordingly made in terms of creatures that are capable of being aware of their case primarily as means for other, for their food , etc. U-creatures, say, as opposed to A-creatures . 21 no means all, are A-creatures: infants are not . Many humans, but Why this distinction? 21 There are probably other requir e ments as we ll: e . g. that not in midst of present worthwhile projects; e.g. Mrs. Goose is not raising young, etc. �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Photocopy of Young R (1979) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', Philosophy, 54(21):515-528, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100063531. (8 leaves) Cutting, Ewin R (1972) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 22(87): 126-139, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217540. (14 leaves) Typescript (carbon copy) of untitled paper attached to Ewin cutting. (18 leaves) Photocopy of Singer P (1979) 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 145156, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601869. (6 leaves) Photocopy of one page (157) from Lockwood M (1979) 'Singer on killing and the preference for Life', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 157-170, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601870. (1 leaf) �t . • �~ /,o.R-,4-.. ~t ~,, ,,_,;L ~ C~"'1 /C'.tt---? ,.... ,._._ ~ e.-;- __ jf1~ ~ rur 6 ""efc7'/ ~ ,,,<e,,,.,;z,r4? ~ c,,__,,,- .1 ------~ ,,-v-9"' ~ "'-<- r = c:e/4 /4--,- ~/~~-~ P.f.?4 ,..,.,,PE' r e ~ 7~~ y?f /2 ~c;k__/"7'/~ 7 ~ / 7~ / /,..,;,, ~ ,?£ / ~J" r-tr= / t:t_ ~7, /9-7 r~ o-/4-~ ,.ve- / _,/~,/ ;:7'/ /re-v -~ (~ ,,{~9 C'l<-,r /4 ~vr,, 1~ /c{. rL r ,' ~ ,~ 7-£ ~ - - ~ ~ . , , ~; / " ' - - /c~V-- ~ ~ -~ ~ L <r7J\ _0 / ~ ~~ 0 - ~ 7L 7 C-£-..,/,4c,.~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ /.? ~ ~ =,/---6-- ~ . ~(' ~ ~ cv;·n! ' To -J~ > /~&:, -6-,e> ~ ~ ~7f 7~ ~ /~~ ~,,,_7 ,;,_~ 4/ ~/ C ~~ o/· //4- ~ / ~ /~ 7~ �~ ?¼_ 11 ~ M,- '--+-€- /~1) / ~ ,~ --/?~/ 4:- ..,,.,,,, ,,./" &-"'7/<" c, /4 Ye-/ U.:.... ~ ;/ / 7'~L. . ~ ~,, i 7,2 ~ ~ .,/4 /< ; e-.,, ' ~ ;,I'£ .Y CJ/-?!' , ,_, ·/,,.r.,.-........-,. , ,,__ s « ~ ?< 0~ /~L,, ,4_._ / Cb- i,_,.__1 c-.r r~ /2 re:_ ~ h'L 7 '---71J r-"-"- 3-.. d..-. ~~:; d:....-../ ~ ~_/~ �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • • Photocopy of Diamond C (1978). 'Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy, 53(206): 465-479, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876. (8 leaves) Photocopy from The Encyclopedia Americana (1978) 'Cannibalism', The Encyclopedia Americana, 2: 543-544. (2 leaves) Photocopy from Britannica Encyclopedia (1969) 'Cannibalism', Britannica Encyclopedia, 4: 785. (1 leaf) Photocopy from Chambers's Encyclopaedia (1966) 'Cannibalism', Chambers's Encyclopaedia, 3: 50. (1 leaf) Photocopy of Naess A (1979) 'Self‐realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, Sheep, and Wolves', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 231-241, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601874. (6 leaves). Photocopy of one page (2273) from unidentified dictionary, Pre-collection to Predecree. (1 leaf) �r)I':, t; 1 ·-et I r o-f 6 ?\/ih'i I Jet ~t·.?t'cc If33 •• 11t1;,.,_4,, ;; w ; ~ ) ~,,c._! / //,,,,.---: J:~w ~ J/4 ~"~t New- f'-w1r- > ~:/~4-;-, L 1/75 /I ~-~erY �/, • ,I J �Lcz ~ ' d cc c e::es ,f c::::e.. ~ �.. . -1~ ~~ ;/w,;.,L;:;,',,,._ ,;/ a,~}:z;:__ dL-0~ " 7 1 f,t} 0 ~ ~ A. ~~ - 7'~ - . ' -f ~i,t;i,:___ ~✓~ ~~ . - - /z;j/M?!, ,<4 n/41"? r - / ·~ ·7 - Jo - ~ C:~~ - ~..,;t,J;j,,. - ... c.-C~1/~ - 7"1(~ /'<d~ ..£.... ,;:_~ 74::,,,'~ /k,,. ~~ ~ -4- . ~/17 '_ ~ �1IIE !1i l/lL/7? . ··• .,. Men have always hunted in the fields around They still do, but no • longer their own species. (K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of ~oronto Press, 1973) .,, Petigny and Falaise . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document - • 00681 ' ' {; /) f¼i:<:LL I f ~sif0l J IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM I. TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM Richard Routley Philosophy Department Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University and Environmental Studies University of Victoria Canada IN DEFENCE OF CANNIBALISM~ It is a commonplace of mainstream Western thought that cannibalism - the eating of human flesh by humans, and, more generally, the feeding of animals on members of their own species is, at least in the human case, morally outrageous. © Ri chard Routley, 1982 This repugnan cy thesis appears to be a legacy especially (but not only) of Christianity, probably derived from Jewish teaching, which went much further and excluded the eating of pig, for instance, as well as "long pig". Also in this series: It is a thesis reinforced by the substitution of Man for God of the World rainforest destruction - the social factors "Enlightenment" and consequent elevation and separation of humans Semantical foundations for value theory from other creatures. Unravelling the meanings of life substantially undermined, have for the most part been observed to Nihilisms and nihilist logics rest on a tangle of false views and prejudices about the world, its Nuclear power - ethical, social and political dimensions origin, evolution and purposes , and about the creatures that inl~bit Now that all these positions have been it, their separateness, and their order (in an a lleged chain of be in g ) Disappearing species and vanishing rainforests: wrong directions and the philosophical roots of the problem with humans at the apex, it is past time that major moral theses that these positions have sustained are re-examined and reassessed. The irrefutability of anarchism, enlarged Up for re-examination are, in particular, all theses that Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action depend essentially on the common but mistaken assumption that there is something morally very special or distinctive about simply being a human, that Homo sapiens as a species deserves special treatment. On the contrary, there is no morally relevant distinction between humans and all other creatures. Of course there are various morally relevant distinctions between things, but none concerns the biological species Homo sapiens. What holds rather is an annular 1 model which can be depicted schematically as follows:- 3 instance in removing the idea that the wrongness of such practices 2 as cannibalism is not even open to question 3 . Diagram 1: High in a list of inherited moral assumptions that are ripe ANNULAR PICTURE OF MORAL RINGS IN OBJECT SPACE (and the position of humans). of sapiens for reassessment are those concerning the almost universal ~oral prohibition of and repugnance to cannibalism, a practice that used to be extremely widespread, but that has now been almost e;.tirely extirpated 4 with the very successful cultural conquest of the world by Western thought. But instead of the re-examination that should follow the intellectual erosion of mainstream Western social thought, the growing recognition of its theoretical inadequacy, not to say ~:Notional labels for the interiors of such morally relevant rings (or ellipses), from outer to inner: Objects of value, objects of moral concern Objects having well-being Preference havers, choice makers Rights holders Obligation holders, responsibility bearers Contractual obligation makers poverty, what has followed is the often shoddy defence of many of its leading moral theses, mostly on anthropocentric grounds, but sometimes on other grounds, some of them drawn from contemporary philosophy (e.g. the conventionalistic rejection of cannibalism of Diamond, considered below). Many of the defences preferred of total prohibition of There are also more comprehensive philosophical reasons cannibalism are ludicrously weak, and withstand little examination. for the periodic intellectual review of deeper assumptions (and Consider, to illustrate, the main argument in (what was until very prejudices), reasons furnished by dialectics in combination with recently one of the few books in English on cannibalism) Hogg, the theory of objects. namely 'the innate repugnance of contemporary man to touch human According to the theory of objects there is no assumption that has to be held,that cannot be disbelieved, flesh' (p . 188, also earlier) . while according to dialectics proper every assumption is open to represented as a matter of fact, it does not appear to hold generally, questioning and reconsideration by its methods , and assumptions in and may be largely a matter of background and conditioning. order to be rationally maintained should withstand such critical scrutiny. imply 2 Naturally these (methodological) considerations do not that assumptions under examination do not (frequently) withstand critical discussion, or that there are not (or never could be) good reasons for adhering to them. But the considerations are important in opening larger moral assumptions to due reconsideration, for Insofar as the repugnance is There is no evidence that - what seems unlikely given the former prevalence of cannibalism - it is innate; and insofar as it is a matter of fact it does not support moral prohibition of eating human flesh, any more than the apparently very widespread repugnance of urban Americans 5 4 as observed, it has recently been argued, successfully, that this to eating raw snake underwrites a moral prohibition on consumption of raw snake meat. distinction will not carry very much of the moral weight that has been imposed upon it. 7 On the other hand, if the repugnance in With the breakdown of this sharp moral distinction question is (intended to be) warranted moral repugnance, then the argument is trivially circular, the premiss assuming the point at between humans and other species.orthod ox anthropocentr ic options, which sanction human consumption of animals other than humans but issue. never humans, collapse. One reason why the proferred defences look weak is that it has not been thought necessary to provide any defence; for 'Directly daylight falls on the habit it withers away' 5 - the "daylight" is that of contemporary Western civilization. appears in Langton (initial page): A similar theme cannibalism is 'a custom that of civilization' - or, one might say, before the triumph of human (pure) vegeta!ian options and on the other, cannibal(istic ) options (mixes of these options which allow some human flesh eating will it will be seen that by no means all forms of cannibalism are morally inadmissable. present exercise. Showing as much is the main object of the Though the results arrived at are part of the process of elaborating a non-chauvinis tic ethics, and accordingly have implications for policy, no policy conclusions are drawn in what no recommendatio ns for the implementation , or institution- The vegetarian options face, it certainly seems, insuperable difficulties, especially concerning such issues as animal predation (which is an important, immensely frequent, and often _<!~~rab.!!'_, What will be argued is that, on the contrary, when some daylight does penetrate to the issues concerning cannibalism, follows: (at least as regards "higher" creatures) are, on the one side fall under the latter head). must soon become extinct all over the world before the great march chauvinism. Among the important options left open ecological fact), and concerning the reduction in numbers of animals, especially introduced animals, which build up to "pest proportions" (some reduction is often required for vegetable growing to operate successfully) . But it is unnecessary to elaborate these and connected points here because there are cases where consumption of human flesh is perfectly admissible. The main argument advanced is modelled upon simple inductive arguments: a base case is argued, and this base is expanded step by step to cover other cases. alisation, of cannibalistic practices are made 6. Hardly necessary to say, better defences of the mainstream anti-cannibal istic tradition can be devised or pieced together from the literature than those so far alluded to. for example, on the assumption of sanctity Such defences - based, of all human life, on the theme that cannibalism is a brutalising experience, which puts humans in the same category as the brutes - characteristic ally rely on a sharp distinction between humans and other creatures. But, §1. The Base Cases: Eating the Dead. In setting out the first of these cases it is taken for granted that the practice in some American states and Canadian provinces of allowing accident victims (e.g. those of automobile casualties) to consent to the use of parts of their bodies for organ transplants and also for other medical purposes is admissible, and that the use itself in such cases is Restricted forms of cannibalism in the interests of 6 survival are now quite widely accepted as admissible. admissible 8. Then, is there any good reason why persons should So there is really nothing extravagant at all in contending that sometimes not similarly consent to the use of their bodies for food upon cannibalism is perfectly alright: their death? fact that the admissible cases lead, naturally and coherently, once For food transfusions, instead of blood or transfuslons · or transplants. plasma And if they do, or so bequeath their bodies, why should their bodies not be eaten? What differences human chauvinism is properly cases. any extravagance is due to the left behind, to much more controversial There are several examples of human cannibalism undertaken there are in the types of cases can be minimized, and those that for survival, which have won establishment approval, from remain seem not to make much - or any relevant - moral difference. or church hierarchies. For example, in order for human parts to be intially taken and used, of members of a Uruguayan rugby party who survived an airplane crash the bodies have to be more or less butchered; in the high Andes (dramatised by Read). but then they may be in much less pretty shape after a serious accident. Again, in each typ e of case, the parts may - or may not - be supplied to people who are in genuine need; etc. Nor does internal ingestion appear to differ, in any way that matters morally, from internal connection, from organ transplantation. It could be objected that with an organ transplant a specific organ is required, whereas with a starving or undernourished person alternative sources of food are - or ought legal A striking recent example is the cannibalism Their eating of dead companions, evidently necessary for survival, was condoned by the Catholic Church of Uruguay and by other prominent Catholic thinkers. Interestingly, Rubio, Auxiliary Bishop of Montevideo, justified such cannibalism, necessary for survival, through a medical transplant comparison 10 .•• Eating someone who has died in order to survive is incorporating their substance, and it is quite possible to compare this with a graft. Flesh survives when assimilated by someone in extreme need, to be - available. But where the parts are used for nonspecific just as it does when an eye or heart of a dead man is grafted onto a living man ••. (as quoted in Read, p. 308). medical testing, e.g. cell culture, or just disposed of (e.g. by But the Bishop tactfully rejected, except 'as a source of inspiration', incineration) without any other use, the specific need consideration the equivalence, appealed to by some members of the team, between does not work. Anyway what would it show? eating the flesh of their friends and participating in communion, as The claim staked is accordingly this:_ where the human initiated by Christ at the Last Supper, where he (figuratively) shared eaten is dead, and certain other conditions are satisfied, cannibalism his flesh and blood with his apostles (Read, p.309; is admissr e. also p. 299). The other conditions~ comprise such things as Exactly why this correlation, which undoubtedly helped the survivors, the following: that the whole thing is done decently (in ways, gets discounted, remains tantalisingly obscure. that is . LO be spelled out specifically); that the person eaten consented (or, differently, would consent) to being eaten, perhaps by the parties concerned, or more strongly that the person directed tha t he or .;he be eaten (or otherwise used); or differently again, tha t the ~onsumption was necessary for survival or well-being. etc. seems worth pursuing further. The correlation For though survival was not a problem 9 Suc h d es pi cable motives as those of the ge t-even s yndrome ("we'll 8 fix the ba s t a rd, we'll eat him") are pointl ess (as well as stup id l y for the apostles at the Last Supper (so destroying a strict correlation), survival is not the only basis justifying the eating of human flesh. As with blood, the gift relation is another v i ndi c tiv e ) wh e re the part y is already dead. It can be argued that eating certain pieces of human flesh out of respect is an exceptional case (like eating a fellow creature to avoid starvation), and that a general principle of respect for important basis. A consent or bequeathal clause 11 is important in under- the dead overrides any consent that may be given. The short cutting various objections to the consumption of dead humans, for answe r to this is, firstly, that grantin g of exceptional cases alr eady in s tance, that it is an affront to human dignity, that it is a mark allows that some cases of cannibalism are admissible, and secondly , of total d isr espec t, that the 'sanctity of the human being' is that no general principle applies in a decisive way to exclude the compl e tely disregarded (Hp. 186), that it is impious (Dp. 467). exampl es alr ea dy considered. Fo r if the person consents it can hardly be an affront to that general principles can always be thwarted, it is instructive to consider per s on's dignity, or violate that person's sanctity (as seen from one po int of view). Nor is it an affront to the dignity of creatures of an irreligious cast, for whom a dead body whether of a human or an animal is a d ead body - though perhaps a dead body of a fellow creature o r of a friend. So it is an affront only to those of particular ( religious) groups, perhaps the same groups for whom dead human bodies are sacred and their disfigurement by humans (whether for medical or 5 other purposes) impious . Just as it is legitimate for one to discount the often illfounded views of such groups - insofar as the views are int ended to have universal applicability - as regards medical use of (forme rly ) consenting humans, as regards sexual relations, abortion, e uthanasia, and so forth, so it is legitimate to discount them in the case at hand. Dev ine ' s argument against cannibalism, namely as a paradigmatic applica tion of his overflow principle. On the contrary, the eating of certain parts of the bodies of dead humans was, amon g certain tribes who used to practice cannibalism, for it was thought that in that way the eaters could acquire or participate in some of the (former) virtues o f the dead , e. g . wisdom, strength, hunting skills, etc. still be, that eating is not disrespectful: So it can what is sometimes dis- respectful is raising for food nnd killing, e.g. in order to ent. The overflow principle~ formed -chiefly to cope with the treatment of animals, is this: Act towaPds that which, while not itself a pePson, is clos ely associated with pePsonhood in a way cohePent with an attitude of Pespect fop pePsons (Vp . 503) . Instead of arguing directly for the principle, Devine suggests firstl y that it may be argued for in rule-cons equ e ntial fashion, secondly tha t it may be made plausible as part of a way of life having respect for persons at its centre, and thirdly that th e prin ciple is well ensconced in the moral consciousness of the plain man. Each of these suggestions can be faulted both in general and as regards the relevant application. For instance, plain men mostly do not object to the bulldozing of old cemeteries to make way for a development. Nor need the eating of a dead human be a mark of disrespect. an act of consider a ble res pect; To illustrate how application of suc h On the other hand, the principle can be rendered analytic by taking up the slack in "associated with" and "coherent with" appropriately - only then it won't yield the relevant substantive application. In application of the principle Devine makes two alternative moves. First, 11 It is by no means obvious, however, that a cons~n 10 is required. similarly if it is going to be incinerated and the ashes s pread, it might better be carefully composted. The point ma de does not exclude organ transplants, eating, and so ecological alternatives to burial or cremation. The most the overflow principle The suggestion that the already dead can, at least in s e ems to show, under this move, is - what does not exclude consumption, certain circumstances, be eaten without moral qualm, innocuous though and what one may well concur with - that the dead (and not merely the human dead) ought to be eaten respectfully; it is, is liable to spark off a series of protests. and even this much some ugly scenes could result i f "long pig" caught on; is not shown if the tense change, the transformation from alive to dead, destroys the requisite closeness of association. outback Australia) competing to pick up "accident" victims. ambulances or tow trucks, are readily enough avoided (by suitable body, which forms the visible aspect of the bulk of persons with whom we are acquainted, and which persists when the person ceases to exist in death. (Vp. 593) organization), and more respectful practices adopted. would, if the objection is to have force - lead to what is normally a~sumcs, overflow to the subsequently dead body (which is no longer inadmissible, for example, to a perverse lust for human flesh, and And again respectful eating be marketable commodities, if there was commerce not just in human flesh. but in bags, shoes, and belts made from human hides, decorations from human bones and teeth, glue and fertilizer from other parts and so on 12 in the way that there is commerce in animal parts? Perhaps, disre sp ec t wo uld be an outcome, but perhaps for the wrong re aso ns. What s ee ms clear is that giving human flesh to the ne edful, s ~y , i s one thing, a llowing commerce in human parts is another. More serious is the objection that such "admissible cannibalism" could - or rather ov e rflow to thl' llvlng body docs not however guarantee, what Devine Wouldn't disrespect be inevitable if human parts become But these types of scenes, which can already occur with competing ... respect for persons overflows to the human to dead bodies. e.g. the the way that refrigerated trucks follow the kangaroo shooters in some heavy assumptions as to features of persons, reveals: could, it appears, be coherent with the alleged overflow of respect It is true that spectacle of the refrigerated vans patrolling the highways (in much Devine assumes it does not, as his second move which begins to buy into the "visible aspect" of a person). so in nci cher case is value diminished, it seems, by (respectful) cannibalism or ordinary garbage (in the literal sense) is not eaten (except in desperation, etc.). A dead body does nee have the value of the person whose body it is in life; Garbage is commonly thrown away, things in these end uses are mostly not; For i f a body is going to be buried and "eat,~" by bacteria, or various carnivores, it might as well be eaten; although a dead body is not a person, still the fact that it (so to speak) was a person means that it ought not to be treated like ordinary garbage (Vp. 503). forth. clause perhaps, thereby to the deliberate killing of humans for food. Hogg makes much of the first of these points, the (unintended) impression he gives being that human flesh is so delicious that it is highly addictive. Whether this is so or not (it would seem unlikely with a preponderance of older stringier humans, though the number of "battery humans" is increasing).it appears not to matter, unless it does lead to what would be more disconcerting, e.g. the establishment of a black market or the like in human flesh, with inputs from killer or Mafia syndicates. But the problem is not substantially different 13 12 of our unwillingness to kill people for food or other purposes, from problems that already arise with the treatment of animals (e.g. traffic in rare species), and over the distribution of dangerous drugs to humans, and can be met in similar ways, i.e. through a similar range of political or organizationa l options. The usual utilitarian defence of vegetarianism based on suffering, pain, and the like caused in raising and killing creatures for food, co llapses. 13 For no direct suff~ring, pain or the like occurs, with the creatures eaten already dead; and any sorts of suffering that might be marshalled among some of the still living who are pained by the consumption can be more than compensated for by th e alleviation of suffering of the meat consumers, for a suitable and secondly not a (direct) consequence of our unwillingness to cause distress to people - not that it always would (contrary to Diamond's assumption) - but rather 'what conditions our attitude to not dining on ourselves is the view that a person is not something The argument turns however on a slide on the mi.ddl.e term 'something to eat' which is ambiguous between (i) something that may be eaten and (ii) something that is eaten; In the second sense the justification given of the fact dead people are not eaten, namely people are not eaten, while in a sense "logically adequate" is trivial, and proves no requisite grounding, and the "justification " does not imply that dead people may not be eaten. In the first sense, a nontrivial justification is offered, that it is impermissible choice of consumers. to eat people,but in this case we cend to repeat the initial question; Some vegetarians however (rightly) reject utilitarian defenses; Diamond, in particular, tries to argue that they involve 'fundamental confusions about the moral relations between people and people and between people and animals ' (Dp. 465), and introduces instead convent ionalist arguments - unfortunately of wide philosophical appea l - against eating people. Some of the reasons for not eating people, she subsequently argues, extend to grounds for not eating animals either. Diamond's argument begins from certain quite central facts ... We do not eat our dead, even when they have died in auto- mobile accidents or been struck by lightning • .. (Dp. 467) An immediate objection is that this is little more than a local fact, Why is it? Diamond has a surprising answer: in effect that it is analytic on, or at least a consequence of, our notion of what a person or human being is. ••• it is not respect for our interests which is involved in our not eating each other . These are all things which go to determine what sort of concept 'human being' is it is one of those things which go to build our notion of human beings (Opp. 469-70). But such a thing as not eating other people is certainly not part of the concept 'human being', indeed it is not merely ~ot analytic or normic (near-analytic ) of human beings,it is not even true of them - good for certain ' we ' but by no means generally, as the history of given that, on well-authentic ated evidence, cannibalism was formerly canniba lism shows. widespread, and that it still persists in isolated place s today. It is equally a fact in the context of quite extensive groups, that .EE~L2o not eat l'i~.· So either the central fact has to be morally grounded or has to have moral consequences. The second option would involve a prescriptive fallacy (deduction of an ought from an is); followin g fashion:- in any case, Diamond tries the first, in the The fact is, firstly, not a (direct) consequence The answer is, in short, radically unsatisfactory . That this is 15 Tt may s eem ... I should find myself havin g t o jus tify slav e ry. For do we not learn - if 14 we liv e in a slav e soci e ty - what slaves ar e the answer Diamond is offering is however at once confirmed by how she goes on (writing in speciesist assumptions 15 in the same revolting fashion): and what masters are through the structure of a life in which we are here and do this, and they are there and do that? Do we not learn the difference between a master and a slave that way? (Dp. 470) Diamond does not manage to escape these difficulties, though sh e And so too - very much so - [built into the notion] the idea of the difference between human beings and animals. We learn what a human being is in - among other things sitting at a table where WE eat THEM. We 16 are around the table and they are on it (Dp. 470) . While we may learn something about what some human beings - not makes various attempts (p. 470 and especially pp. 476-7): the notion of a slave or an enemy or an outlaw assumes a background of response to persons, and recognition that what happens in these cases is that we have something which ;;;;-;;,::-e not treating as what it - in a way - is ( Dp. 476). vegetarians - are like in this way, in the way we can learn what But this is to assume a background of norms, of how things morally some other human beings are like from cannibal feasts where 11 we" are, that a person is not something to enslave, etc. (and to attempt are on the table as well as around it, we learn little of the once more to build a presupposed morality into conv entional facts). notion of human being in this way. Nor does what correct information Furthermore, as this reveals, the same ploy could be worked in the we acquire in this way provide a firm basis for moral judgements case of animals, namely that in hunting them, killing them, serving about the possibility of eating humans, though Diamond appears to them up for dinner, we are ~ treating them as what - in a way think that it does; for she later says that the source of moral they are (or, more accurately, as they mora lly deserve treating). life derives from ways in which we mark what human life is (Dp. 418), Such comparisons make it evident then what Diamond is about, and that another move which involves a prescriptive fallacy, as well as he r conventionalistic approach fails. obvious anthropoce ntri cit y . However, to remove objections to eating the already dead, Indeed many of the sorts of conventional patterns of response under specified conditions, is simply to avoid, rather than face up a nd conventional facts that Diamond alludes to are a fairly direct to, the real opposition to even qualified cannibalism. For an o utcome of human chauvinism, e.g. that drivers mostly stop for important part of the real opposition to qualified canniba lism relies injured humans, not for injured animals, that humans are commonly upon illicit assimilation of cases of eating already dead people given funerals, animals mostly not. Diamond needs to say, and with killing humans for food, and, differently again, rearing some proceeds to say, that these sorts of differences are appropriate, but that is to slide to a value judgement which concedes to he rself part of what is at issue. Diamond's approach encounters serious difficulties when applied to such matters as slavery, the treatment of outlaws and enemies of them, e.g. certain infants, for food . and in an obvious sense ! .!1.~~~., Thus Devine's ambiguous, 17 what is entire l y different, permitting the killin g of humans for 16 food, or to, what is different again, the deliberate raisin g of human s for food. claim that 'a meat diet requires that animals be killed' (Vp. 483). And thus Diamond again, the cases are entirely different. involved both rearing and slaughtering Swift's "proposal" of children for food. Nor is the base position so far reached a new one, but an ancient proposition. it i s one thin g morally to eat an already dead deer, another to let a deer die and then eat it, another again to shoo t What we should be going against in adopting Swift 's "Modest proposal" is something one should be going against in salvaging the dead, more generally useful organs for transplantation, and the rest for supper or the compost heap. (Dp. 469) 17 Not a t all: animals: The differences are already clea r as rega rds For instance, Chrysippus, the Stoic, in his or otherwise kill it and then (perhaps) eat it, and yet another to eat a deer raised (in one or another of very different ways) for food. Within each of these different categories, it is important to distinguish cases. For while eating a dead human, even after it has been allowed to die (by omission), may be admissible, killing humans for food is often not, and raising a human for food (and other goods) is, it is now generally assumed by humans, certainly not. treatise On Justice, 'permitt ed eating of the corpses of the dead• 18 There are several separate issues here, in particular the So also apparently did Diogenes in his Republic, Zeno in his Republic, ~~ban~ or raising for food issue, on which much literature on and Cleanthes, all of whom may have authorised cannibalism on a the moral basis of vegetarianism has in fact focussed, and the broader scale. general l?I~'!_ati~ issue, which includes matters of killing and letting die. Limited extensions of cannibalism beyond the base cases, where humans are allowed to die or are killed . eat ing of (certain of) their parts . Eating dead humans involves But if eating such parts is (often) The issues are separate because creatures may be killed for food, e.g . in hunting, though they are not raised for food, and conversely creatures may be raised for food (or treated as slaves) without, for one reason or another, being killed. Cases of humans admiss ibl e , then so also presumably is consumption of such parts when raising humans for food have apparently never occurred, though humans they are (irrevocably or freely) severed from a living human, e.g. have sometimes been fed up for the pot (e.g. in the Aztec empire and in Fiji). ea ting the amputated limb of a friend or enemy or drinking the blood Humans are the only creatures we in fact know who might (having l ost consider- donated by another, able touch with the natural world) just adopt such a practice: These rather special cases, involving (what is no other ca lled, for s h o r t ) ~ human parts, provide a first set of extensions animals ever raise creatures for food, not did cannibalistic cu ltures of the base cases. ever apparently raise humans for food. These extensions include some bizarre cases, in particular where the part concerned is one's own. However, allowing the eating of dead humans and nonlive hum~ n parts under certai n conditions offers no slippery slide to, It is a serious and difficult question (to which moral philosophers have not sufficiently addressed themselves) why it is that if humans are not under !!.!!i'. conditions entitled to raise other humans for food, they are entitled under many 19 18 th e gene ral i ss ue as to wh e n, or wh e n prec i se l y , killin g f o r food i s jus tifiable can be largely skirt ed. For it is justifiable , it is conditions - indeed, it is often assumed, under a sweeping ra~ th e n claimed, whe n and only when killing itself i s justified, whe ne ve r of factory conditions - to raise other animals for food? that is. They can only be justified in so doing if there are significant and While one half of the italicised equivalence is uncontrover s ial - relevant differences between humans and other creatures raised, if killing for food (or for purpose P) is permissible, so is what it or that might be raised, for human or animal food. involves, killing - the converse is not. Yet there are, For consider some circum- it has already been pointed out, no such appropriate species-wide stances (assuming you can find them) where killing of person x is differences. justifie d, e.g. in war, in retribution, in self-defence, in r e ducin g g reat A fresh start can be made on the issue from a cannibalistic perspective. evil. Since it is not eating human f l e s h ~ that is Th e n killing x for these reasons is not killing for food, even if x is in fact subsequently eaten. There is an important intensional wrong, what is it that is wrong, if anything, with raising humans difference, so that being justified in killing x for some crime say , or other creatures for food? does not justify killing him for food, much as thinking of killing him or is it both? both. Is it the raising, or is it the killing, The answer is, of course, that trouble lies with for the one reason is very different from thinking of killing him for Raising of creatures frequently has one or both of two dama ging features accompanying it: first, the other purpose. deprivation of the What can be argued given the permissibility of- eating dead rai s ed creatures, and secondly, treatment of the raised animal humans, is that where killing of z is permissible, cannibalism of z merely as a means (not as an end). is also IN FACT permissible. The second, attitudinal, difference may have little or no impact beyond the first. For example, if infanticide i s alri ght under certain conditions (as Tooley contends, and others have hinted), And the first may be avoided, e.g. whe re the creatures stay by choice but then in fact cannibalism of infants is alright also under the given could depart if they wished. conditions (but the issues as regards the raising of infants for fo od Kept geese, for instance, may be in that position; they are seemingly not deprived, but may live in rather are, of course, not thereby resolved). natural conditions (except that migration and much that goes with it is permissible can, to this limited extent, be bypassed. II has been lost). Thus the issue of when killing It is worth elaborating these points, since important Killing involves something different again: extensions - not the only extensions - of cannibalism beyond the base all that goes with removing of a life, the termination of projects, purposes, cases depend upon them, and since - very differently - they furnish associations of value, etc. (and also the definitive end of con- clear cases of inadmissible cannibalism. sciousness, etc.). of situations to distinguish:- With the predation issue also, a central issue ls as to when killing an animal for food is permissible. It may be thought indeed that the killing for food issue just is, or is t a ntamount to, the general issue of killing, and that accordingly • There are several clas se s 21 survive themselves, the survivors of an aircrash in a remote area, 20 people on a life raft, etc. Such examples, where defensible, as they sometimes are, provide a further class of examples of admissible la. Killing , causing to die, is impermissible. cannibalism - what might be called exceptional cannibalism, since the lb. Letting die (passive killing, as it is sometimes misleadingly , but conveniently , called) is circumstances are, at present anyway, among higher mammals, rather impermissible . exceptional . Then, in either case , killing or letting die for eating or followed by An important and often times questionable practice, which eating is also impermissible, by preceding principles (essentially can in principle at any rate, deliver exceptional examples 20 , is ~Pp ➔ ~P (p & q)), hunting (in the intransitive form, which involves capture or killing So in particular it is where the creature is of the same species. That is, cannibalism is in these cases inadmissible . But some of these cases are clear; for instance, where creature (or if the object sought is duly located). Men continue to hunt in the French fields, and sometimes still their own species 21 , not at present human) x is leading a worthwhile nonaggressive independent and pro- in the shape of enemy soldiers , but those cast as outlaws (manhunts) . ductive life in a peaceful countryside. (Intransitive) Hunting divides into several types, according to its 2a. Killing is permissible. 2b. Letting die is permissible. end purpose, for sport , for food, for extermination, for capture. Hunting humans for sport (hunting for "sport " , so called, typically In common reckoning there are many examples of both second classes, involves killing) is a practice that has persisted well into this "passive" infanticide, suicide and gambling with life, euthanasia, century, in Australia for example . killing or allowing to die to maximise community values where there though it can be given philosophical support by chauvinistic theories are large numbers of people or choices between them, execution and such as a limited and racially prejudiced group-utilitarianism or by assassination, self-defence , killing in war (the list follows roughly appeal to the "ideal" of pure subspecies (the stud ideal). t he later chapter headings in Glover, where these well-known types such hunting is impermissible, so, for the same sorts of reasons, is of examp les are set out in some detail). the hunting of many animals for sport . In all these types of cases, It has nothing to recommend it, But if Hunting otherwise, except for death can be followed by eating, provided the base class conditions capture, is a restricted form of killing, and to what extent it is are satisfied . permissible turns on when that sort of killing is permissible . In such cases, henceforth called de facto extensions, cannibalism is also in fact admissible . The position arrived at thus far is pulled together in rhe Almost always the killing or letting die in 2a and 2b is not spec ifically for eating. conjoined: Eating the resulting dead is simply th e source of food is adventitious. Sometimes, however, in unusual circumstances some members of a party of the one species kill certain members of the party or allow them to die in order to fo ll owing diagram, which subsequent sections (and parts) endeavol1r to fil l out and render more precise:- 23 §3. 22 Unavoidable detours: when is killing a creature wrong, and when is letting a creature die wrong? It is not necessary, nor is it easy or desirable, to avoid entirely the issues of when killing Diagram 2: TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE AND INADMISSIBLE CANNIBALISM is wrong and when killing for food is wrong, and when such kinds of l( ,- killing are not wrong . Type 1 cases (exemplified e.g. in hunting for sport) - - -- ___ _] Base case I ,< conditions fail I X other than rather weak or circular principles. had seemed to be clear turn out on further reflection to be much l ess ,< obvious. \ ESSENTIAL / ,-...__ _ _ _ _ _'-! \ PREDATION..,, For example, it had seemed evident that the onus of jus tification (where this makes sense) characteristically lay with the WATERSHED J(. XCEPTIONAL EXTENSIONS Worse, things chat INADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE BASE CASES But it is not so easy to elicit or to defend action-taking party; \t 'I,( that it is the killing or removal of life that muse be justified, not the letting live. Some things, however, are clearer . 'J{ NONLIVE EXTENSIONS First and foremost, a satisfacto ry (nonchauvinistic) a c count K -J KILLING BOUNDARY of when and why killing a creature is wrong won't make exceptions for REARING FOR SLAUGHTER BOUNDARY humans and, more generally, won't contain the term 'human' or logical So far, in considering examples of killing, issue has not equivalents. This important requirement disposes of much of the been taken with enlightened conventional wisdom, with the result chat philosophical literature. a serious , and perhaps unwarranted, discrepancy between the treatment (9p. 135-9), which refer to the (contractual) conditions for human dished out to animals and that accorded humans is beginning to emerge. social life (the mixed account given should be faulted on several other So the judgements made tend to follow conventional practice: grounds as well). killing It wipes out, for example, Ewin's attempts Similarly it removes the main condition eventually humans for food is admitted but happens only in exceptional circumstances, achieved in Glover (a whole text devoted to moral issues concerning killing killing, which fails to present, or seriously address, the matter of animals for food is a pervasive practice. More generally, killing animals for food is considered permissible in a wide range of circumstances where killing humans is not , yet on what solid grounds? . As regards killing, even enlightened conventional moral wisdom returns us to the heartlands of human chauvinism. necessary and sufficient conditions for when killing is wrong) . The first main condition Glover arrives at is that ' taking human life is normally directly wrong: that most acts of killing people would be J/ To avoid it, the matter of wrong in the absence of harmful side-effects' (Gp . 42), i.e . so long killing and letting die will have (like most moral issues) to be as 'the best total outcome' does not involve killing (cf. p . 286), to reconsidered, nonchauvinistically. set down the underlying utilitarian recipe . Other conditions Glover outlines - similarly unacceptable even to their author when 'animal' replaces 'human' - are likewise faulted as damagingly cha,·vinistic, 25 24 for instance that it is wrong to kill a human whose life is worth l iv i ng (Gp . 53) , whenever that is. e . g. burning a collection of seeds (er seedlings) is one thing, burning Secondly , unremarkably, most of the recipes suggested in the a forest is another, slicing up or eating a raw egg is one thing, slicing literature are defective, first among them utili t arian proposals , which, as is well-known can sanction unjust killing. 22 up or eating an eagle is another, etc. Other (non- utilitarian) potential ys me rit the same consideration as ys, as if th ey we r e ys. recipes are also problematic, as a proposal by Young, wh i ch will he l p Call the r.esult of making the required deletio n, th e us on our way, serves to indicate: modified proposal . . . . what makes killing another person [more genera lly a considered . realisation either of the victim's life purposes or of such life- purposes as the victim may reasonably have been narrower utilitarian frameworks and induces a decided circularity, The proposa l requires some brief explanation. The term ' unjust ' , which takes the proposal outside is qualified in the final proposal (p.519) by 'maximally' , the point expected to resume or to come to have (Yp.518; repeated p.519 with 'maximally ' included). of which (though it is not fully explained) is to permit killing or The qualifying term sacrificing of one person in order to save others . 'irrevocable' is inserted to separate killing from life imprisonment I It is the modified proposal that will be chiefly creature] wrong on occasions is its characte r as an irrevocable, [maximally] unjust preventing of their I It is a popular fallacy that which may, as a matter of fact , defeat the prisoner ' s purposes . The long some members of a group (on a lifeboat or from a remote airplane crash) final disjunction is designed to delegitimize killing of sometime comatose are sacrificed for, or by, others of the group . persons (it also would include people undergoing reform programs) - -,hat is ac counled [maximally] unjust. an additional clause is required - and killing of potential future in way, and almost (but not) captial punishment. debatable judgements , such as that in the common case (on Young ' s ified' (p . 528) , ified. 23 from which it follows that abortion is commonly unjust- The disjunct should, it certainly seems, be deleted - especially since what justifies the main part of Young ' s proposal, considerations of what has value, does not justify the final disjunct, because merely potential persons do not appear to have requisite value, though they might (or might not) come to have such. Generally, potential ys do not have the same range of features (including acquired value, etc.) ll Similarly what one is entitled t o do , or feels like doing with r espect to them may differ; If , however, there are no just wars then most killing in war is wrong; and if punishment by death is sometimes just , capital punishment is sometimes not wr.ong. If, for instance, a person's life purposes are sufficiently evil~ e.g. they include genocide, then their fulfilment is certainly pro1, ~ rJ y , justly, thwarted. 0 1· Thus some proviso as to the chara c t e r or qua lit y of life purposes , such as the term 'unjustly ' obliquely supplies , is essential (but often omitted in ethical discussions) . It is not evident however that killing such a person (as distinct, e.g. from imprisonment , re-education, etc.) is permissible, exc ept perhaps in worst cases. ~ • what they become if their potential is realised . For example, Young claims (Ypp.520-1) that the proposal lets through various types of killing persons such as infants and foetl1ses - thereby writing in some very has only 'morally trivial or no moral support abortion will be unjust- But generally what the proposal permits and what it excludes depends critically upon cases already apparently covered, so that it is not obvious that such construal of 'moral') where the expressed wish of the pregnant woman The qualification makes way for certain cases of cannibalism, for instance those where I 26 Ther e is no good r eason to restrict the proposal to persons , and Young does not intend to. 27 Many killings of animals constitute , he t ells us (Yp.526), maximally unjust prevention of their realisation of life purposes, and accordingl y are wrong. ' Killing such animals for food is only justifiable when no adequate of other crea tures). acts are avoided. food supply is available and food i s needful' (Yp . 526), in which event, presumably, justice prevails. A characteris tic remnant of Further it is simply assumed - though it could no doubt be argued (rather as below) - that requisite unjust Young's proposal as applied has bite; human chauvinism also intrudes , with Young a ppealing to the ' greater eschewing killing of creatures for food. 25 range of life-purpose s normally human beings have' (Yp.527, italics that the modified proposal has bite: amended) ; 24 and thereby smuggling in a greater value assumptio n as regards humans. Here, as elsewl1ere also , the account of when killin g is wrong is progressive ly l oaded , almost manipulated , to yield the sought r esults : in particular , what is unjust - including which killings are unjust and which class of life-purpos es are more valuable relevant to det e rmining maximal injustice - are bot h open to rigging. These points help to bring out too how back of Young's accoun t and application s of his proposal lie more basic consideratio ns of justice and value (and it is to such considera tions that we should no doubt eventually turn). Consider, for instance, the route to the permissibil ity of systematic cullings of a herd. Wants , now substituting for li fe -purpose s , are simply supposed to be summed up utilitarian- fashion, except th at (somewhat as with Mill ' s utilitariani sm) a weighting is imposed to reflect the respective values of different wants (those of humans, e . g ., as opposed to those It is an illusion however the bite all turns on Young's cunning application , since the modified proposal itself reduces to near tautologous ness. purposes occur? taken. For when does irrevocable prevention of a life's When, and only when (since it is irrevocable) that life is So the modified proposal reduces effectively to AP. Killing x is wrong iff taking x's life is maximally unjust. But killing x is, according to OED, causing the death of x, which is tantamount, in terms of sense, to taking the life of x. And what is wrong is, according to OED again, what is unjust, and would be, if the OED were sharpened 1,1p a little, what is maximally unjust. Whence the adjusted proposal, AP. The proposal does not rule out killings which have the effect overall of fostering th e wants of the largest subset of some group like a wild herd where otherwise the wants of an even larger subset will be thwarted. Systematic cullings in the absence of feasible alternative s, therefore, may be morally pe rmissible. (Yp.527) for example, it would oblige most of us to adopt a largely vegetarian life-style We have come round a circle, but much was glimpsed on the way, so the circuitous route was not without its rewards. By working through other l ess chauvinistic accounts of the wrongness of killing (e.g. the nonchauvin istic base of Ewin's account) we can come a similar circular way and arrive at the same fairly stable result. Moveover, in the adjusted proposal we do have an account, not yet a hi ghly usable account, since circular, but an account nonetheless . In terms of this account clear cases where cannibalism is morally inadmissable can be distinguishe d, for example as follows: Cannibalism of x is wrong wherever it involves maximally unjust taking of x's life. Conversely, there are many cases where 28 the killing of one creature by another creature is, because not maximally unjust, quite permissible; 29 e.g. certain instances of killing in self-defenc e, exceptional cannibalism , abortion, etc . But if the creature is killed, then it is dead, so by the earli er Now let x and y be of the same species, say Homo Sapiens: argument it is permissible to eat it (under certain conditions) . CAP provides exact conditions for when cannibalism is wrong, in So there are many cases where killing a creature and then eating it, cases where cannibalism involves killing. or its then being eaten, are permissible . conditions are satisfied; If some of the many cases of permissible killing are, as they seem to be, cases of killing a then Sometimes these often they are not. Sorting out when they are, and when they are not, will occupy many a controversi al creature of the same species, then active cannibalism involving killing is, in such cases, permissible . The argument needs of course filling out in crucial respects, especially by some enumeration of types of cases where killing is permissible , and a sub-listing of cases where these are intra-specie s killings. Would this suffice? However, it of the) distinction between killing and letting die, by blurring or rejecting the distinction on which it is based~ that betweem omission and One question is whether the account determines (even in its circular way) the precise conditions under which killing for food can permissibly occur. Letting die is not the same as (active) killing . has recently become fashionable to try to remove the (moral significance The question reduces commission (or else it is pretended that it is frightfully difficl1lt to make this distinction s out, etc.). Rejection of the omission/ commission distinction appears to rest on a mix of fallacious moves:- to the logical issue of whether AP as a strong logical equivalence FMl. A some to all argument, warrants intersubsti tutivity in more highly intensional frames such FM2. A confusion of the thesis that the distinction is morally as those declaring purposes. Though I've tended to vacillate on this issue, my feeling increasingly is that substitutiv ity is warranted, important with the quite different thesis that only commi.ssions can be morally blameworthy and that omissions are morally guiltless (the the reason being that the equivalence of AP is of virtually synonymity position reportedly held by some religious groups in the past). strength, which legitimates replacement in all but quotational (type) FM3. An extensional approach to nonextensio nal differences . sentence contexts. But purpose sentence contexts, such as' ... for eating' are not quotational . FAP. Hence it follows using AP that Killing x for food purposes is wrong iff taking x's life for food is maximally unjust, heavily upon the fact that there are some cases where it is morally difficult to distinguish between certain commissions and certain and that CAP. These points are considered briefly in turn:- ad FMl. Those attempting to discredit the distinction usually rely y's killing x for (and followed by) eating is wrong iff y's taking x's life for eating is maximally unjust. omissions, e.g. that in appropriate circumstanc es exposing the baby may be little different morally from directly smothering it. (The Greeks believed it wasn't but that was because exposure gave the gods a chance to intervene and save from death those who were fated to perform especially important tasks). r JO But the fact that there a r c ~ cases where the JI distinctio n is not of great moral significan ce does not show that it is dispensabl e. In order to show that lt is dispensabl e it is extension ality assumption which removes scope. The principle necessa ry to show that there are no cases where it is needed, that appears to be that failing to provide a condition which would have for all cases failing to provide a condition which would prevent been causally responsibl e for preventing x is morally equivalent to ~x is (morally) equivalent to providing a condition for x. providing a condition which is causally responsibl e for x . But Moral it is easy to produce some cases where the distinctio n seems to be equivalenc e requires interchang eability witin deonitic contexts, essential if we are to account for what we wish intuitivel y to say. indeed it could be characteri sed in terms of such substituti bility . For example, to take a case those who wish to abolish the distinctio n The equivalenc e yielded is of the form -F-x are fnnd nf appealing to, we may wish to say that the people who did commonly falls, especially where Fis not extensiona l. not attempt to help in the Kitty Genovese case were morally culpable, moveover that the causal responsib ility functor is not extension al, perhaps to a high degree, but few of us would wish to say that their and that such a principle fails for it. moral culpabilit y was exactly the same or of exactly the same kind as that of the murderer, and that they should equally be brought to trial on murder ch~rges. Or, to take another case, placing poison in your husband ' s tea is not the moral equivalent of failing to give him the antidote when he has placed it in himself. In order to say +-> Fx. But such a principle It is clear Though letting die differs significan tly, then, from killing, conditions upon when it is wrong may be reached in similar ways. How the condition for letting die correspond ing to AP should go becomes rather more obvious if the righthand side of AP is expanded to: taking (the) action which terminates x's life is maximally unjust. what is evident in such cases, some equivalent of the omission/c ommission The parallel passive condition can th en presumably be formulated distinctio n is needed . thus:- ad FM2. But the thesis that the distinctio n is needed and is morally DP. significan t in many, or at l e a s t ~ , cases must be clearly dis- which continues x ' s life is maximally unjust. 26 tinguished from the very much stronger thesis that all omissions are blameless, and that any commission s are morally open ~o blame - or praisewort hy. This thesis is, rather plainly, indefensib le, yet has been responsibl e for much of the bad light in which appeal to distinctio n appears . ad FMJ. Then in turn, substituti on principles again yield clauses EDP and CDP, correspond ing to EAP and CAP, special cases of which yield conditions under which cannibalism is wrong where it involves letting die. Principle CDP which supplies this condition, where x and y are of the same species, runs as follows:- The principle of moral symmetry between omissions and commission s is in fact refutable. Letting x die is wrong iff refraining from taking (the) action It appears to be based on an CDP. y ' s letting x die for eating purposes is wrong iff y's refraining from taking (the) action which continues x's life, for purposes of eating x, is maximally unjust. Since letting die is, for the most 32 part, less heinous than killing, cannibalism involving letting die 33 i s more widely permissible than cannibalism involving killing . 27 §4 . The matter of predation, and important cases of l egit imat e killing and letting die for food. One tempting model that underlies the conflict picture of Paradigmatic examples of legitimate predation, of predation as basically undesirable but an unavoidable killing are provided by predation, where bis prey of a and a depen ds fact, a model that leads to human vegetarianism, is the following (essentially) for its livelihood, indeed for its survival, on eating kind of atomistic axiological theory (or utilitarianism):- bs.28 Such predat ion i s a n essential part of any su ffici e ntl y rich ecosystem . Essential pr eda tio n i s pre dation which is essent i a l to according to the initial positive value thesis, every living creature (every sentient creature , every higher animal , etc .) has an initial positive the nor,~11 livelihood of tl1e predat or , and where the prcd alor takes non-instrumental value which it retains unless it does something to for itself no more than it requires for it s livelihood. forf eit that value. carn.ivores , such as the big cats , but some humans, such traditional Eskimos, are essential predators. Not only ilS some (On the even simpler position of biospheric egalitarianism, discussed below, all living things have equal worth, The fact that humans ar e part of the natural predatory food chains should not be lost s i g ht o[ . Observe that the argument to permissibility of essential pre- in some nontrivial sense.) These positive values just sum ; and maximisation of value (or suitably averaged value) is, of course , the (or an) ethical objective . Then killing is generally undesirable , dation does ~ take the invalid form: such predation is a fact (a fact because it results in a reduction in net value, and survival is generally of life), therefore it is permissible. That arguments of this type , desirable. 29 The exceptions occur when a creature has forfeited its selectively relied upon by Diamond and (earlier) Hegel, are inval id is value, e . g . it per sists in value-reducing behaviour, so that killing well-enough known (they commit a prescriptive fallacy), and is evident it would prevent a further decline in net value or lead to increase in from such fallacious arguments as the diplomacists' argument, e.g. it is total value . a fact of life that Indonesia has occupied (absorbed) East Timar; when it leads to an overall reduction in value . the re- The underlying theme is that killing is unjustifiable The onus of proof, fore it is pe rfectly alright that Indonesia occupied (absorbed) East Timar. when it can be assigned, lies with those who make the exceptions, who Naturally it would be decidedly awkward if the fact of essential predation do or license the killing . turned out to be impermissible: since, with one item of value consuming another item of value, it trouble. the whole natural order would be in moral This brings us to another defect of the argument from· "facts", Predation now appears as an awkward fact , leads to an overall reduction in value. Since inessential preda tion that it suggests that essential predation is really, at base, something is inessential, it is ruled out as inadmissible. pretty undesirable, but nonetheless something we have to live with - in (nonindigenous) humans for whom predation is, it is plausibl~ argu ed , Thus in particular, contrast with predation, in its associated meaning, as plunder, which we iness en tial, are not entitled to kill for f ood : do n't, or rather oughtn 't to, have to live with morally, and which is usual rai si ng of animals for food, etc . are all excluded in one st r oke , commonly reprehensible. and a l eading feature of vegetarianism imposed . therewith hunting, 34 35 Essential predation is not so satisfactorily dispos ed o f, but introduces conflict. For either one creature, the prey, is sacrificed or another creature, the predator, is: value de c lines . Similar objections apply against biological egalitarianism, either way tot 8 1 In the interim, while vegetarian scientists work even when it is qualified as in Drengson and Naess by an in principle 30 on new diets and new lifestyles for predators, there is an obvious clause. recipe to be applied, which while not eliminating conflict, minimises that predation is rather suboptimal: its effe c t: is strictly ruled out as a general practice. just as steam gives way to sail, so the less valuable gives way to t h e ~ valuable. Thus if humans are reckoned to be It is not (or not only) that it is taken for granted the trouble is that predation Since each lion and each antelope is assigned one unit of whatever is assigned equally, mo re valuable than polar bears - the usual human evaluation - then there is no way of justifying the lifestyle of a lion that consumes polar bea rs are not going to be entitled to prey on humans, in the sens e several antelopes. at least that their predation is not justified. Any equalitarian approach that is E££ atomistic is liable Application of the recip e 31 presupposes a value ranking on creatures under which some are more valuabl e to further incoherence, as Drengson's holism reveals. than others: some living system of living things, e.g . the Earth as on the Gaia otherwise if all are equal, predation is never admissible, and Lets be essential predators just die out - at least that is the simple ethical pic t - hypothesis (p. 233). ure. least of the living things that comprise it, has the same value as This points up one of the many problems for biological egaltarianism. But the picture presented so far is too simple, and tl1e recipes suggested dubious. Then s, which should(?) have the value at each of them (in effect 1 = n, for n>l). Some of t~e ecological consequences of implementing the For if the matter is properly considered not at a given time, but over a time interval, dynamically and not suggested recipes, and reform of essential predators, can now be just statically, it is not so simple, and a rather different result gauged. emerges . the chains of predation are long and complex; One predator takes, over a typical lifetime, rather a lot of prey . Unless the predator ranks very much more highly than Massive environmental interference would be required, since distortions especially in lower-level prey would occur, with resulting the prey, the value of the sum of the prey will exceed that of the ecological instability and often catastrophe. predator. that is, are ecologically highly undesirable. These considerations, in combination with a positive and gross population The consequences, What this and the value thesis, suggest a very different result, that predators should summation problems begin to reveal is that the initial atomistic be allowed to, or encouraged to, die out - unless they are somehow, value distribution picture is inadequate because it leaves out systems what seems improbable for predators that remain wild, converted to and systemic connections such as a more ecological approach would vegetarianism, include, The dynamic picture resorted to is still too simple in one important respect, that over a time interval, prey, which would often exceed natural (and sometimes reasonable) population levels without predation, are replaced. Where population of a preyed-upon species of creature is at an ecological limit, and minor culling of the sort 36 natural predation induces does not, owing to replacement, reduce 37 population levels significantly below that limit, predation has no significant effect on total value, So results yet another, different, recipe, one which is a little nearer the ecologica l mark. 32 farm animals (all of them) can be appropriately filled out, to Some utilitarians, Singer in particular, have recognised exclude replacement of animals with unusual or special properties, the role of replacement a·,1d made some allowance for it (at a serious cost to Singer ' s vegetarianism , it should be added), e.g. those carrying valuable genes, and to allow slaughter, without Singer now allows for killing and replacement of nonselfconscious life, but advances a nonreplaceabllity thesis for self-conscious life. Furthermore, even if a replacement thesis for free-range shorter-term replacement, of those carrying damaging diseases or genes - as it no doubt can, in a modified replacement thesis - still For the basic division Singer appeals to 'Tooley 's distinction' between a nonreplacement thesis fails to allow even for essential predation of selfconscious creatures, and accordingly should be scrapped, beings that are merely conscious and ••• those that Since this pronouncement is likely to be disputed, at least are also self -conscious, in the sense of being able to conceive of themselves as distinct entities, existing by some vegetarians, it is worth trying to indicate why essential over time with a past and a future (Sp.151), At the same time it can be In fact most of the sorts of free-range farmyard animals that Singer predation is perfectly admissible, seems to be envisaging as nonselfconscious, and accordingly replaceable, explained what is still wrong with the tempting dynamic picture and creatures, for instance geese and hens, appear to satisfy Tooley's the initial positive value thesis. tests for selfconsciousness. what is put in as what is left out, Geese are certainly aware of themselves they value members of their own community ; trees, and inanimate such as rocks and buildings,~ have initial and they remember value, but that complexes and wholes, in particular ecosystems, may elements of their past and, in things like nest building (practice), anticipate the future. More important, what has selfconsciousness (reflex- ive consciousness), or consciousness to do with the moral dimension? Until well have initial value, The reduction assumptions underlying value decomposition thereof, itself, because by no means all consciousness of conscious life is _ 32 a to atoms fail , Singer's theses lack foundation and look, while perhaps convenient for that it cannot be duly explained; There are grounds for anticipating for instance, being too valuable to be Such wholes may have value furthermore which is not dissolvable into values of component parts, or atoms this is duly explained - it is not satisfactorily explained as valuable in some traditional farmers, rather ad hoe, What is left out is not just that objects other than living creatures, both animate such as plants and as distinct entities, and of geese as distinct from (and superior to) hens; What is wrong is not So much In terms of the value of wholes such as ecosystems, one of the arguments for essential predation is disarmingly elementary . It takes the form: (sufficiently) rich (natural) ecosystems are Predation is an essential part of these systems . simply replaced, in the sense of having irreplaceable experiences, worth- very valuable, while projects, etc., does not have the requisite linkage with self- What is an essential part of what is very valuable is admissible. consc iousness. Therefore, predation is admissible. Such predation, which may be argued for in other ways , admits of extension by the following principle : 38 EP. If something is entitled to kill for food under certain 39 conditions, e.g. respectfully and when in need, then so are others under the same conditions. §5. The argument for EP is of the same type as that for other Postscript . The paper is very incomplete . It fails to address several issues intimately connected with cannibalism, such as hunting similar indifference, or interchangeability, principles in ethics. of humans and other animals, in particular for food, and as raising It follows from EP and essential predation that, since a tiger may humans and other animals, especially defective infants, for food. when in need kill a cow to eat, then so may humans in need. If Worse, it is evasive on some fundamental issues, and it fails to penetrate very taking the cow's life is not maximally unjust in the one case, nor deeply into some of the issues it does begin to consider, such as is it in the other, since the circumstances are similar. predation, or as the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for admiss- The results reached may be alternatively argued for using principle CP. 33 Perhaps Singer is also on the right track, though he has latched onto the wrong distinction. Perhaps there is a (descriptive) condition q (or a condition qs for each sorts of agent), appropriately ible killing. position. It is little consolation that others are in the same Hopefully some of these deficiencies will be compensated for in subsequent parts. At the same time several themes will be developed that may tied with causing to die, such that while killing creatures without q not have been evident so far, e.g. that in under suitable conditions is permissible, killing creatures with q is far too much killing taken much too lightly, but far too little is not, except under special conditions . 34 general experience of killing and death when it does occur, that is Given that q is 11 modern 11 societies there appropriately morally connected such a procedure would fit into the except usually among small groups mostly of inured professionals, annular picture (given earlier: q would mark out the interior of the which "shield" most humans from the phenomena involved. dotted elipse). Nor need the distinction be chauvinistic, because it cuts across species in a morally defensible way. anything, is q? located? made good? But, what, if Can a suitable morally-unloaded category-based distinction And how disconcerting would it be if some such distinction could no Wait for the next exciting episode . 35 ' 40 FOOTNOTES 41 It was singularly appropriate that this paper should have otained its first (and only) public presentation at the Alfred E. Packer Memorial Center, University of Colorado. I am indepted to several members of the audience for comments and references, and in particular for the first extension of the base case . It is noticeable how people who have never been cannibals despise the horrible thing; and how quickly it disappears when a cannibal tribe comes into contact with a wider world than that Directly merely of their own bush village. daylight falls on the habit, it Withers away . This is remarkable when we remember the sanctity The cannibal of it in primitive man's eyes . is not necessarily a hopelessly degraded brute, but-;-man who has not yet lived out of the dark obscurity of bush tribalism, and so had bli~dly_ followed a practice deep-rooted in the sacrificial These themes are defended, and the annular model explained, in The themes are also defended in HC, p. 103ff., and in AHC. other recent work, e.g. by Tooley and Singer. As the schematic diagram shows, humans do not occupy a central ring. Thus adoption of the model does not imply, what Pickering assumes (p. 374), that 'humans are more~ntral ' or, for that matter, that 'humans are owed more extensive moral consideration Nothing in the model itself depends on humans . than plants'. The model is not species based, or biologically based, but category basect";-and designed to reflect the different sorts of things there are, e . g. things capable of entering into contracts conferring obligations, and things not so capable, things that can have preferences and make choices as opposed to things that cannot (truly, or significantly), things, including systems and Nor, therefore, organisations, with a telos and things without. does the model write in a new type of chauvinism, or confer privilege or moral advantage on things in more central rings. Indeed, things in central rings will have obligations and commitments, and be subject to limitations on what they do, in ways that things further out cannot be; so there will be some As this moral disadvantages in occupying a more central place. indicates, the categories selected are intended to have moral And different sorts of behaviour are morally linkages . appropriate with respect to the different categories of objects. 2. 3. 4. The popular view that dialectics and adoption fraction of assumption themes are dangerous is partly based on a modal fallacy, For the fallacy e.g. that what can be believed is believed . in operation in more intellectually respectable quarters see WW. the Epilogue of Harris Some dialectics are accordingly recommended for anyone convinced that cannibalism must be wrong. The investigations undertaken in this paper alwshare other features with (classic) dialectics: there are many loose ends, and in several crucial areas firm conclusions are not reached. Later parts of the paper will take care of some of these things. Thus Hogg (p. 188), Cannibalism . .. can hardly be said to exist in There may be isolated the world of today. pockets of survival in the heart of New Guinea and among some of the tribes in the remotest corner of South America or African jungles; but they will be no more than the rarest of phenomena. 5. Hopkins, given the last word by Hogg, p. 192. quote from Hopkins is of passing interest: The whole ideas common to man the world over from his earliest days. 6. Some of the advantages of institutionalisation of certain cannibalistic practices are evident, e.g. a_much enh~nced Various disadvantages if not evident should supply of protein. become so in the course of the text. 7. See again in HC and similar. Although the human/nonhuman distinction is not, so it is argued, one of moral significance, not all Other distinctions of moral importance distinctions vanish. - those of the annular model - naturally remain. 8. Of coures, this practice is (still) controversial, and But a offensive to various religious and other groups. great advantage of a pluralistic society is t~at it can acconnnodate (better than alternatives) such differences Issues such as human_ . over the morality of practices . burial and restricted cannibalism, however, make the limits of present pluralism evident . 9. Or else did not incur official establishment disapproval, though the acts strictly appeared to infringe the Every s~~ond_ra~onteur has prevailing law of the land. examples of cannibals not brought to Justice . 10. . This clearly anticipates an initial argument of this My thanks to W. Berryman for drawing my attention paper. to the attitude of the Catholic Church, as presented in Read. 11. Consent in principle will carry the requisited load, and for this it is normally enough that the person would consent. This indicates one logical route to the liberalisation, and removal, of the consent clause. 12. There would (so far) be no trophies, e.g. Z's head ~n the hall, Y's skull on a stand, because trophies involve hunting and killing (for which see below). 13. As some vegetarians would freely admit; other 11 vegetar i ans II f rther and regard the killing of certain (nonself) an1•mals for food as admissible provided no suffering u, go i conscious is incurred and that the animals are replaced. . But it s true that usually 'vegeta;ians do not touch the issue of our attitudes to the dead (D., p.9) . 42 14. 15. In a like vein it is suggested that Singer and Regan do not see that 'a cow is not something to eat; (for them) it is only that one must not help the process along' (D., p. 468). The latter incidentally would not exclude the use of dead creatures for food, leather goods, etc.; things that animal liberationists like Singer definitely exclude. 43 21. Diamond recognizes this objection, p. 471, but does not meet Pace K. Bell, according to whom, Men have always hunted in the fields around Potigny and Falaise . They still do, but no longer their it. own species. 16. 17. 18. In similar ways we are said to gain the concept of an animal; s~~ p. 476. -Diamond introduces this piece of serious confusion in the course of emphasizing why the 'assumption that we all agree that it is morally wrong to raise people for meat ... is not, or not merely, ... too weak' (D.• p . 469). Diogenes Laertius, vol. 11, p. 297. Some of the complex issues concerning hunting will be considered in subsequent parts, others elsewhere. 22. See, e.g., Henson, and also Ewin and RKU . 23. A notable piece of male chauvinism also slides through, in the suggestion that, in Lhe absence of more weighty moral backing, the expressed wish of a pregnant woman is morally trivial. And Sayre reports (p. 25), Cannibalism (uv0pwno~ayCa) is alleged to have been a practice of the Cynics by Philodemus and by Theophilus Antiochenus; but, if so, it must have been confined to their early history, for they had a number of critics during the Christian era who would have mentioned it if they had known of it. Both Philodemus and Theophilus were biassed and we must remember that similar stories were told of the early Christians. However, cannibalism is said to have been authorized by the Republic and Thyestes (or Atreus) attributed to Diogenes and also by the Republic of Zeno and by Cleanthes and Chrysippus (Philodemus, On the Stoics; Theophilus Antiochenus, Ad. Autolycum 3, 5; D.L. 6, 73; Ibid. 7, 188; cf. 28th Letter of Diogenes; Dio Chrysostom 8, 14). As Diogenes Laertius goes on to explain, that 'Chrysippus did countenance the eating of dead humans was one of the points brought against him by those who 'ran him down as having written much in a tone that was gross and indecent'. As regards such attitudes to the dead, times have not changed that much. The (idea of) eating "the dead" (dead humans, of course), under ~ circumstances, is still widely regarded as scandalous, and highly newsworthy (see Read, p . 296 ff). 19. Cannibalism which involves explicit killing for food is a kind of reflexive predation, but generally (cases of) cannibalism and predation only properly overlap. 20. An example would be where some of the survivors of a crash or wreck hunt other "survivors" in order to survive; cf. W. Golding, Lord of the Flies. 24. But one's life-purposes are diminished lhow can this be on Young's picture?) if they jeopDrdise those of others. Hence Young's preparedness to let Amin be killed by the stampeding horses, Yp. 527. 25 . Indeed it leads, as Young interprets it, to a more sensible vegetarianism than Singer's initial position (in Animal Liberation, not as significantly modified in Sp.153). neither culling nor predation are simply ruled out. 26. For Action and taking action should be construed in a wide, but common enough fashion, e.g. the action taken may amount to doing nothing or getting-the-hell-out-of-it. 27. It is tempting to try to prove this on the basis of a proper inclusion assumption, that where letting die is wrong so is killing, but not conversely. The assumption may, however, need qualification; e . g. killing may sometimes be preferable to letting died in a lingering way . 28. 'Predation" is a singularly unfortunate word to be stuck with to describe this universal phenomenon. It is unfortunate both because of its etymology, and because of its other meaning . At to the first, ' predation' derives from praedari, 'to plunder', which derives in turn from praedo, 'booty', As to the second, 'predation' also means a 'practice or addiction to plunder or robbery'. Both carry strong negative connotations. There is a similar damaging duality in the expressions 'prey' and 'prey upon'. 29. These defective considerations also lead to a maximisati~n of population of creatures of the base class assigned values, up to the limit - if any (on frontier philosophers there are none) where declining returns set in . Where, further, humans are typically, but erroneously, assigned greater value than other creatures, the considerations support the rapid biassing of terrestial fauna! population in favour of humans that we are witnessing. The second point does not apply, in that form, . against biol0gical egalitarianism, and the first objection fails where total value is replaced, as under some utilitarianisms (with what justification is less clear, since surely we want to maximise value so far as constraints permit: see RKU), by average value, average value per (base class) life lived, etc. 44 The argument in the text is not affected materially by switching from value analogues of total utilitarianism to analogues of some form of average utilitarianism. On some of the serious problems with these utilitarianisms, see Jamieson. 30. Drengson, following Naess and others, espouses 'biospheric egalitarianism and the intrinsic value of all life' (p. 222). According to the theory, each (living) being has intrinsic value (pp.233-4), and hence each presumably has equal worth (and is entitled, in Singer's terms, to equal consideration , if not equal treatment). In Naess and Drengson this biospheric egalitarianism is qualified by an in principle clause. According to Naess, 'The 'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression' (p.95), and according to Drengson, 'This qualification is made with the simple recognition that we cannot live without affecting the world to some degree' (the latter claim is inadequate, because it is not just 'we' who are involved). 31. Axiological approaches that are atomistic have other problems, some reminiscent of those Wittgenstein discusses for logical atomism. In particular, how do we locate the atoms to which value is supposed to adhere fundamentally. A first bad feature of this approach is invariance failure: it matters for final summations how the atoms are chosen, for different choices will assign complexes quite different values. Secondly (Wittgenstein's question), why are some things said to be atoms not complexes, and vice versa. A third group of problems, brought out in HC, concerns the choice of a base class. 32. An environmental ethic s:1oul.:l. also be an ccologic:1 I et!dc, sense of an ecologically realistic ethic. facts are certainly relevant. 32a. A detailed case for this claim 33. j:1 t lH· In this resepct too the appears in Routley and Griffin. Thus rp can be made to yield a good deal more than Young's application of his proposal (for which he offers no proper justification): A creature is entitled to kill another creature of lesser value when its life (and so all its functions, prospects, etc.) depends on it and when it does not kill more creatures than it needs for these purposes. And the dubious business of imposing such order rankings on creatures can be bypassed. 34. The qualifications are necessary. If the latter exceptional conditions clause were not adjoined, the prospe ct of finding a condition q would be wiped out by such cases of essential predation as exceptional human cannibalism. The qualifications, although they enhance the prospects of locating such a q, do not appear to make it analytic or near analytic that such a descriptive q can be found. 45 35. Not only are there many proposals for q to sift through - most of which however seem to fail for reasons already indicated in the text - but also there are apparent options to finding such a distinction, such as resetting the problem, in a less individualistic way, in the framework of (ecological) communities. REFERENCES K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of Toronto Press, 1973, REFERENCES CONTINUED P.E, Devine, 'The moral basis of vegetarianism ', Philosophy 53 (1978) · 481-505 . (all references prefixed with 'V' are to this article) , C. Diamond, ' Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy (references hereto are prefixed by 'D'). 53 (1978) 465-77, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (edited, with English translation, by R. D. Hicks), Heinemann , London, 1925, A.R . Drengson, ' Shifting paradigms: from the Technocratic to the PersonPlanetary', Environmental Ethics 2 (1980) 221-40, R. E. Ewin, ' What is wrong with killing people? ' Philosophical Quarterly tl..<. (197;t) 126-39. M, Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches, Fontana, London , 1977 (hereafter prefixed by 'W.W.'). M, Harris, Cannibals and Kings , Collins , London, 1978 (hereafter prefixed by ' CK '), R. Henson, ' Utilitarianism and the wrongness of killing', Philosophical Review 80 (1971) :1.u,- n7. D. Jamieson,'Utilitarianis m and the value of life', typescript, University of Colorado, 1981. J, Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, Middlesex, England, 1977 . L.P. Pickering, Review of ' Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century ', Environmental£.£,.~-~ 2 (1980) 373-78 . G. Hogg , Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice, Robert Hale, London, 1958. (references hereto are prefixed by 'H'), R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism ' in Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, eds , K, E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, (Hereafter prefixed by ' AHC') . J. Langton, Cannibal Feast, Herbert Joseph, London, 1937. L, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. A. Naess, 'Self-realisation in a mixed community of humans ·, bears, sheep and wolves', Inquiry 22 (1971) 231-41 , A. Naess, ' The shallow and the deep . long-range ecology movement. Inquiry A s11mmr1ry'~ 16 (1':173) 95-100. P.P, Read, Alive, Avon, New York, 1974. R. and V. Routley, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism', typescript 1976 (hereafter referred to as ' RKU ' ). R. and V, Routley, ' Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philos~ (ed. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley), RSSS , Australian National University , 1980 (the article is referred to as ' HC' , the book as ' EP ' ), F. Sayre, Diogenes of Sinope , A study of Greek Cynicism, Johns Hopkins University , Baltimore, 1938. P. Singer, 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry 22 (1979) 146- 56, (references hereto are prefixed by ' S '). R. Tannahill, Flesh and Blood. A History of the Cannibal Complex , Hamilton , London, 1975 . Hamish M. Tooley , Abortion and Infanticide, typescript, Australian National University, 1980, R. Young, ' What is so wrong with killing people?' Philosophy 5¥ (1979) (all references prefixed with ' Y' are to this article) , 515-528 R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', available in this series , 1982. ) /.o,..,.,,,, l. ~ / , . ~ tA-- ~ <'"'1 ---- 3/ }o/t/v/~}~4--( ~~ ·~~O·\o ~ --..., \0~'203.l\. <;c..c.tt.,. ~ ~ a.I) . ~~ ~✓:. ,;,,tf ~ .r. ..... ---,(7> o-,.J /' ,,,((; 11 / c, ~ I ( _ ///,;.,/ /c/ (',.,./// 1' ,. ~ L: 1 -=y' 1/ ,/L ~ -=~ t<..,(' •.r<-- <-r-? ,r"'t, 7 ; /4... 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't ,.,. ... ~;: .. t.t..4 r~ c~ /~J I~ ~~ ,H" ._ ~t/ ~l-d_ I (' rt-lrC , I ,,I, /.,_,.. .,.,.____ /4-..- C- ,,,,_ ~ , /4,L._ '-- . ,.__,_ te(A~ / 4 ~ , , fc. ~,;,,d~ t;, ~~7Y24~ h /c r n.., ,W·r ht<I I t!l"--vv-t_. t : - ;{ c.--<- u....., ( , It ~'-? I 1 ,JKc} ~ ~-✓f ;,z.. M~ / tkl-· .:I- / 1 t.~ ,.,e1 ;,-,:. ~ ~"7 f cjrl; ~ I_;.,_ 1 L,,3:-:r;-,1 •-v->-1- • 4, pS,.,(£-.,-. . ftr~ J/4. /red-,~ , _;, ~·~/~<l ' /""= cd/7 ;/ ~<¥<- J,r 7""° 1,/,,:,A -z/1.,/h/7 /,(~ • t:i.C.1 / /d'tr 7 ;:. rJ- ~:,,1 "l j 1 ( ,"'p> '(. f (,~ 0 11/'- 1 t<~ ~ ~ 4-7/J t /2-c. ) 7 /~ ?'~J 1/)):-/. ( / ~r,,.,,__,, ~,:,,..,,...,~ . l)';•.:Z:~-e-M-;I /fa ! ") ;; ,' ~ ~~ L ' A-7~ J~j 1/ ~ ~£" v:_._i eye- ,c. y),6 7 ) \ d,; ~ 1 a,___ r/ d't .ru), Cl»,~ ' ~L The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting, Scholfield B (17 August 1988) 'A human role for the pig', The Weekly Times, 14. (1 leaf) - / / / . -7 / <et ? -·- -·-- C:; /~ ~, u / f l ~ Jc,._ '? ~ (,, ?0_/~ c c:i--l 7 ,5'<.. / 17 -~ ,..-tt'!' . : . - - - ---- ·-- - · · - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ~oc-. r-c- a., r..,_,/- t .)I~ , ) / ~ ?! / . / c..rc.v ~~ //._ J OAJ 77/c /~/?t:J/f??pvc~ c:>~ 77rr" , I /}(,ifth('i/l'J7lt>p)( ;T//VC/73 ,v - cJ,,,C ~E ./,PH/6:-J ,,f/t;I~ I The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • Typescript, with handwritten emendations and annotation. Two reference reports on Cannibalism I. (2 leaves) Cutting (photocopy) of 'Necessity as a common law doctrine? [6.40] R v Dudley and Systems', The system of criminal law: cases and materials, 544-551. (4 leaves) The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • Cutting (photocopy) of 20 pages from unidentified publication on Pioneers-Donner Party-The Mormons, 526-545. (10 leaves) Letter, Bill to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan's paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) Letter, Robert to Richard, 7 Oct 1981 re feedback on Richard Sylvan’s paper on cannibalism. (2 leaves) I I - I :/.,, f. - - - -- ----------------- - - - - - ----- ---- ----- ___________, --------- ----------·------------- - - ----- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - -- ------ - - - - - - - - --- $ ~ /~ .2Z- - - - --- - _ _L __ /4 r<./ ...---a~ l 2, ck?- _.:., t';_.~ ~ o_ _s_ ,,. .,/:,_ ~ , {- ~ M7-e;:__ /4?-l, _:., /.: ~ / ; ~ / /--/ ,a-~~ ,4d - - ~ c 1 /dLC4'--=·- - C4--~ _,t:?~7 ,-4,-,/4._ / - /2.; ~<"F' §5 . Raising humans and other animals for food. Humans have lit tle compuncti on, for the most part, in rearing other animals for food . Since healthy animals that are raised for food often excell humans, especially humans that are "defective " in one way or another , little , except considera tions of species , seems to stand in the way of raising such humans for food . We are in the region of Swift ' s modest proposal again . What distinguis hes creatures humans (and other creatures capable of animal husbandry) are entitled to raise for food from creatures that they are not? It is not difficult to state some constrain ts on t he solution of this problem, which also rule out usual solutions . First , the distinctio n should be independe nt of reference to particula r species , especially of reference to the human species , and also indirect reference thereto, by way of phrases such as ' standard ... ' , ' normal ... . ' 'potential ... ' . Secondly - and this furnishes the ground of the first requireme nt the basis of the distinctio n should be morally relevant i n the way that mere zoologica l distinctio ns are not: otherwise chauvinism is not avoided . ' The replaceme nt principle Singer adopts for benign farmyard husbandry fails on this score , among others (the others being that many farmyard animals seem to satisfy the requireme nts for being selfconsci ous beings) . Not being selfconsc ious , which is supposed to justify replaceme nt, under ideal farming condition s , lacks requisite moral linkage . Singer ' s move does however emphasi ze ' 31. two important things . First , the familiar objections to animal husbandry, e.g. on grounds of cruelty or deprivation to animals, are remove.e\ by considering only (ideal) free-range individualised farmyard husbandry . Secondly, some distinction (fit to take its place in the annular picture) with requisite moral linkage is what is sought . Any distinction that is going to work will have to involve the capacities of the creatures concerned , in such a way that the capacities tie with moral features . The capacities concerned are, obviously, capacities connected with being aware of being raised for food . But this is not sufficiently general, being raised for killing or for cartage or for skin or fur or feathers would be similar, and similarly bad or whatever; lacks moral connection . and it still What all the cases have in common which is general, one which has (as already noted) moral connections , is being used as a means . The sought distinction is accordingly made in terms of creatures that are capable of being aware of their case primarily as means for other, for their food , etc. U-creatures, say, as opposed to A-creatures . 21 no means all, are A-creatures: infants are not . Many humans, but Why this distinction? 21 There are probably other requir e ments as we ll: e . g. that not in midst of present worthwhile projects; e.g. Mrs. Goose is not raising young, etc. The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Photocopy of Young R (1979) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', Philosophy, 54(21):515-528, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100063531. (8 leaves) Cutting, Ewin R (1972) 'What is so wrong with killing people?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 22(87): 126-139, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217540. (14 leaves) Typescript (carbon copy) of untitled paper attached to Ewin cutting. (18 leaves) Photocopy of Singer P (1979) 'Killing humans and killing animals', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 145156, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601869. (6 leaves) Photocopy of one page (157) from Lockwood M (1979) 'Singer on killing and the preference for Life', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 157-170, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601870. (1 leaf) t . • ~ /,o.R-,4-.. ~t ~,, ,,_,;L ~ C~"'1 /C'.tt---? ,.... ,._._ ~ e.-;- __ jf1~ ~ rur 6 ""efc7'/ ~ ,,,<e,,,.,;z,r4? ~ c,,__,,,- .1 ------~ ,,-v-9"' ~ "'-<- r = c:e/4 /4--,- ~/~~-~ P.f.?4 ,..,.,,PE' r e ~ 7~~ y?f /2 ~c;k__/"7'/~ 7 ~ / 7~ / /,..,;,, ~ ,?£ / ~J" r-tr= / t:t_ ~7, /9-7 r~ o-/4-~ ,.ve- / _,/~,/ ;:7'/ /re-v -~ (~ ,,{~9 C'l<-,r /4 ~vr,, 1~ /c{. rL r ,' ~ ,~ 7-£ ~ - - ~ ~ . , , ~; / " ' - - /c~V-- ~ ~ -~ ~ L <r7J\ _0 / ~ ~~ 0 - ~ 7L 7 C-£-..,/,4c,.~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ /.? ~ ~ =,/---6-- ~ . ~(' ~ ~ cv;·n! ' To -J~ > /~&:, -6-,e> ~ ~ ~7f 7~ ~ /~~ ~,,,_7 ,;,_~ 4/ ~/ C ~~ o/· //4- ~ / ~ /~ 7~ ~ ?¼_ 11 ~ M,- '--+-€- /~1) / ~ ,~ --/?~/ 4:- ..,,.,,,, ,,./" &-"'7/<" c, /4 Ye-/ U.:.... ~ ;/ / 7'~L. . ~ ~,, i 7,2 ~ ~ .,/4 /< ; e-.,, ' ~ ;,I'£ .Y CJ/-?!' , ,_, ·/,,.r.,.-........-,. , ,,__ s « ~ ?< 0~ /~L,, ,4_._ / Cb- i,_,.__1 c-.r r~ /2 re:_ ~ h'L 7 '---71J r-"-"- 3-.. d..-. ~~:; d:....-../ ~ ~_/~ The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • • Photocopy of Diamond C (1978). 'Eating meat and eating people', Philosophy, 53(206): 465-479, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749876. (8 leaves) Photocopy from The Encyclopedia Americana (1978) 'Cannibalism', The Encyclopedia Americana, 2: 543-544. (2 leaves) Photocopy from Britannica Encyclopedia (1969) 'Cannibalism', Britannica Encyclopedia, 4: 785. (1 leaf) Photocopy from Chambers's Encyclopaedia (1966) 'Cannibalism', Chambers's Encyclopaedia, 3: 50. (1 leaf) Photocopy of Naess A (1979) 'Self‐realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, Sheep, and Wolves', Inquiry, 22:1-4, 231-241, https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601874. (6 leaves). Photocopy of one page (2273) from unidentified dictionary, Pre-collection to Predecree. (1 leaf) r)I':, t; 1 ·-et I r o-f 6 ?\/ih'i I Jet ~t·.?t'cc If33 •• 11t1;,.,_4,, ;; w ; ~ ) ~,,c._! / //,,,,.---: J:~w ~ J/4 ~"~t New- f'-w1r- > ~:/~4-;-, L 1/75 /I ~-~erY /, • ,I J Lcz ~ ' d cc c e::es ,f c::::e.. ~ .. . -1~ ~~ ;/w,;.,L;:;,',,,._ ,;/ a,~}:z;:__ dL-0~ " 7 1 f,t} 0 ~ ~ A. ~~ - 7'~ - . ' -f ~i,t;i,:___ ~✓~ ~~ . - - /z;j/M?!, ,<4 n/41"? r - / ·~ ·7 - Jo - ~ C:~~ - ~..,;t,J;j,,. - ... c.-C~1/~ - 7"1(~ /'<d~ ..£.... ,;:_~ 74::,,,'~ /k,,. ~~ ~ -4- . ~/17 '_ ~ 1IIE !1i l/lL/7? . ··• .,. Men have always hunted in the fields around They still do, but no • longer their own species. (K. Bell, Not in Vain, University of ~oronto Press, 1973) .,, Petigny and Falaise .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 681: Notes and cuttings on predation (for Cannibalism II) Subject The topic of the resource Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes copies of published works by other authors and letters. Description An account of the resource Published works and letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 681 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Notes and cuttings Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:de64185">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:de64185</a> Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/751b703fda71fa9f2929cc0337db77cb.pdf 1419dad761d2e92700a8b87ce6cff449 PDF Text Text ff/(E~,r/f# . - c" : { ~7 / ~~c;.- l1fC~ / · 00682 1 �-- - t - ,...,, ..,, ? ., .. ..,,, ~ rr r,~ "4• -~11,1fL ~ • r~~ .u"1 .5 . ,...,,-,.,~ r;•_ eJry- 1V'lit .. rI .--, -.Hl,_ °",' .::_-.,"tt/,,,,- r-.:'1 ~llA~ f'r°' Iy,-~ - ~ ~•,'f _,., Y-"'" - ';,--~~J - w,f - /4- ~ r~ r --"""""""le - - ~vn,)'l - ',1 . - -,,y ""r,tiVJ~ra-n() -r- ·i 1tr'-lll#-J -- ,r ---,vv,7n - I -'- ---- -- ----~ ~- "',J,"0 --""11- - . , f ~ f' __ ,_ ,.,.,,,..,an, -; . . .-, -,,,,..,..,,,,~JKT- r,,..if,~A'F-:. - ..,·....,or--7 - = u<-1..,)"'<'1 . -r --f -- - ~ - - - ··- ~ - =-- ,...__,_...,,, "1 --- ~ CJ - r.• - C...0,7 0""1?' 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"'~ .,, ·u -- ~ » 7, ✓t:C,//,d , y ... ?..,., 1 7, r •- 'f/,, J'(_) �Brentano could hardly have reMaLned LndLscrLMi,nate apptaudLng u~ LlLtarLanLsM (such as of pte.3sures BenthaM's); Lntellectually or "posi,tLve" coMfortabLe E>nJc, Hon wLth of stLl,I, 1,ess coutd /4e ever ctLMb down to a MaterLal,LstLc eMpLrLcLsM whLch reMoved entLreLy the LdeaLLsM of CathoLLcLsM. though a strong eMpLrLcLst pas Lt Lon one. of C~ ~~ i..c eMp_i..: i..c LsM i,s .3n uns t.3b Le one_ Bren t.3no ach i,eved so Me teMporary stabi..LLty by spLrLtual So drLve Ls at work Ln Brentano, whLch Ls ManLfested especLaLLy Ln hLs exLstentLaL reductLon prograM, Lt Ls a heavLLy qualLfLed The the reaLM, where a two God world dLstLnctLon, between theoretLcaL or was the greatest good, and a practLcaL or secular reaLM, where utLLLtarLanLsM prevaLLed. 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M0 t~V7...:.7L1-.L..: . ~< VG~1/~~~ ;//;;_~ ~ ' Jf/C-?.-.Y- o/.J tiof is 1e of e- e S- e is of is 's 's 's s, re d at to re to et of is er of re id n d e in If r. / The correctness of loving and hating, like that of truly, or correctly, then the hypothetical judgment bejudging, is objective in that it' is impossible for anyone to comes: "He apodictically rejects judgers who are both correctly what anyone else hat.es correctly or to love love disjuncThe correct A-acceptors and correct B-rejectors." what anyone else hates incorrectly. incorrectly there or A's are there either that judges "He tive judgment Ethics must make use of the comparative concept bet• are B's" could then become "He apodictically . rejects ~ ;11r\ ter than, for which there is no analogue in the theory of judgers who are both correct A-rejectors and correct B1 . ~ ) knowledge. "A is better than B," according to Brentano, rej:.!ctors." h..1 ,- • means that it is correct to prefer A, as an end, to B. The philosophical consequences of this nonpropositionEvidence and truth. Brentano's views on evidence and ~___,.al theory of judgment are far-reaching. One consequence is · truth may be found in the posthumously published ~ an interpretation of Kant's dictum that "existence" is not a Wahrheit und Evidenz (Oskar Kraus, ed., Leipzig, W30). ( predicate. According to Brentano, when we say that A The distinction between judging on the basis of evidence 'exist: of attribute an exists, "it is not the conjunction of and judging "blindly" is not to be described in terms of ence' with 'A,' but 'A' itself which we affirm." The word instinct, feelings, degree of convictio.n, or impulse to be"exists" is a synsemantic tern1 that is used to express the lieve. We arrive at the general concept of being evident, act of judgment. according to Brentano, in the same way we arrive at the All of the doctrines set forth above fall within the provconcept of a correct emotion: by contemplating actual Unpsychology. ince of what Brentano called descriptive instances of the concept, in this case actual instances of and genetic ng psychology-includi experimental like evident judgments and of blind judgments. physiological psychology-descrip tive psychology, accordEvery evident judgment is either directly or indirectly ing to Brentano, is an exact science, capable of arriving at if a judgment is indirectly evident, tts evidence is evident; laws that hold true universally and not merely . "for the ultimately, by judgments that are directly eviconferred, even is and philosophy all for basis most part." It is the dent. Directly evident judgments are of two kinds. First, capable of providing a characteristica universalis of the there are the judgments of "inner perception," such as the sort that Leibniz had conceived. J)escriptive psychology is that I am now judging in a certain way, that I judgments closely related to what Husser! was to call phenomenolsuch-and-such, that I think I remember so-andsee to seem from Vienna in ogy. Husser! had studied with Brentano so. Second, there are judgments of reason or insights (Ei111884 to 1886, when Brentano used the expression besichten), such as the judgments that two things are more schreibende Phiinomenologie ("descriptive phenomenolthan one thing; that that which is red is, as such, other than ogy") as an alternative name for descriptive psychology. that ·which is green; that there cannot be a triangle with of doctrine Brentano's (Husser! later wrote that without four sides; or that a whole cannot exist if its parts do not intentionality, "phenomenology could not have come into exist. being at all.") Brentano's conception of psychology has led Every judgment that is evident is true, but not every some of his critics to accuse him of what Frege and Husthat is true is evident. Most judgments of "outer judgment does serl called psychologism. However, this accusation (of the external world), Brentano believed, are perception" his and evidence of theory Brentano's account not take into true, but all of them are "blind"; they are not evident. He moral philosophy, both of which he took to be branches of argued, howeve r, that the hypoth esis of a three-dimendescriptive psychology. sional external world , with its familiar details concerning Moral philosophy. Brentano's ethical views are set forth physical bodies, has an "infinitely greater probability" ed., 3d 1889; (Leipzig, Erkenntnis in Ursprung sittlicher than any of its alternative s. Judgments based on memory, Oskar Kraus, ed., 1934), translated by Cecil Hague as The too, are "blind"; but many of them confirm each other, and Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (London, they are worthy of our confide nce. 1902), and in Grundlegung und Aujbau der Ethik ("The In WahrheU und Evidenz Brentano characterized truth ed., Mayer-Hillebrand, . Basis and Structure of Ethics," F reference to evidence: "Truth pertains to the judgment by assumpthe upon ethics his based Bern, 1952). Brentano of the person who judges correctly ... hence it pertains tion that the members o( the third class of mental pheto the judgment of one who asserts what the person who nomena, loving and hating, may be said to be correct or judges with evid e nce would as sert" (p. 130). In addition, incorrect, just as judgments may be said to be correct or into say that A exists is to say that anyone who judged about correct. To say that something,_!\, is good is to say that it ') lrl' with evidence would accept A, and to say that A does not A ~~I , apodictiis it is, that is impossible to love A incorrectly; exist is to say that anyone who judged about A with evi / ~ .> cally to reject incorrect lovers of A Analogously, to say that dence would reject A The "measure of all things," then, is rect haters of A A is bad is apodictically to ga· the man who judges with evidence. The only way to grasp the concept of correct emotion, However, these statements, relating truth to evidence, emoof cases actual according to Brentano, is to contrast not give us the whole of Brentano's theory of truth . do emotions of cases with correct" as "qualified are tions that "Evident" is said to be predicate in the strict sense of the that are not. This is analogous to the way in which we term, but "true" and "exists" are not, being only synseunderstand, for example, what it is to be red and what it is mantic. This brings us to Brentano's theory of categories. · to be colored. Thus we learn that knowledge is good, joy Theory of categories. The basic theses of Brentano's enrichment every bad), is what in is good (unless it is joy theory of categories may be stated as (I) there is nothing within the realm of ideas is good, love of the ood is ood, IJJI other than concrete particular things, and (2) every judglove of the a is bad and the ri ht end in life is to choose prr I ..1 l __,,,..._...._4 ..-........ _...._.... .•.Jl &.t. ! .._... t...l ...... ---- _____ .i~ :hP f'C lliO.t..!l.nCP n. thP u>iP •tinn of. c;_on1P �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of title page and two pages from McAlister L L (ed) (1976) The philosophy of Brentano, Duckwort, 36-37. 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"'~ .,, ·u -- ~ » 7, ✓t:C,//,d , y ... ?..,., 1 7, r •- 'f/,, J'(_) Brentano could hardly have reMaLned LndLscrLMi,nate apptaudLng u~ LlLtarLanLsM (such as of pte.3sures BenthaM's); Lntellectually or "posi,tLve" coMfortabLe E>nJc, Hon wLth of stLl,I, 1,ess coutd /4e ever ctLMb down to a MaterLal,LstLc eMpLrLcLsM whLch reMoved entLreLy the LdeaLLsM of CathoLLcLsM. though a strong eMpLrLcLst pas Lt Lon one. of C~ ~~ i..c eMp_i..: i..c LsM i,s .3n uns t.3b Le one_ Bren t.3no ach i,eved so Me teMporary stabi..LLty by spLrLtual So drLve Ls at work Ln Brentano, whLch Ls ManLfested especLaLLy Ln hLs exLstentLaL reductLon prograM, Lt Ls a heavLLy qualLfLed The the reaLM, where a two God world dLstLnctLon, between theoretLcaL or was the greatest good, and a practLcaL or secular reaLM, where utLLLtarLanLsM prevaLLed. 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M0 t~V7...:.7L1-.L..: . ~< VG~1/~~~ ;//;;_~ ~ ' Jf/C-?.-.Y- o/.J tiof is 1e of e- e S- e is of is 's 's 's s, re d at to re to et of is er of re id n d e in If r. / The correctness of loving and hating, like that of truly, or correctly, then the hypothetical judgment bejudging, is objective in that it' is impossible for anyone to comes: "He apodictically rejects judgers who are both correctly what anyone else hat.es correctly or to love love disjuncThe correct A-acceptors and correct B-rejectors." what anyone else hates incorrectly. incorrectly there or A's are there either that judges "He tive judgment Ethics must make use of the comparative concept bet• are B's" could then become "He apodictically . rejects ~ ;11r\ ter than, for which there is no analogue in the theory of judgers who are both correct A-rejectors and correct B1 . ~ ) knowledge. "A is better than B," according to Brentano, rej:.!ctors." h..1 ,- • means that it is correct to prefer A, as an end, to B. The philosophical consequences of this nonpropositionEvidence and truth. Brentano's views on evidence and ~___,.al theory of judgment are far-reaching. One consequence is · truth may be found in the posthumously published ~ an interpretation of Kant's dictum that "existence" is not a Wahrheit und Evidenz (Oskar Kraus, ed., Leipzig, W30). ( predicate. According to Brentano, when we say that A The distinction between judging on the basis of evidence 'exist: of attribute an exists, "it is not the conjunction of and judging "blindly" is not to be described in terms of ence' with 'A,' but 'A' itself which we affirm." The word instinct, feelings, degree of convictio.n, or impulse to be"exists" is a synsemantic tern1 that is used to express the lieve. We arrive at the general concept of being evident, act of judgment. according to Brentano, in the same way we arrive at the All of the doctrines set forth above fall within the provconcept of a correct emotion: by contemplating actual Unpsychology. ince of what Brentano called descriptive instances of the concept, in this case actual instances of and genetic ng psychology-includi experimental like evident judgments and of blind judgments. physiological psychology-descrip tive psychology, accordEvery evident judgment is either directly or indirectly ing to Brentano, is an exact science, capable of arriving at if a judgment is indirectly evident, tts evidence is evident; laws that hold true universally and not merely . "for the ultimately, by judgments that are directly eviconferred, even is and philosophy all for basis most part." It is the dent. Directly evident judgments are of two kinds. First, capable of providing a characteristica universalis of the there are the judgments of "inner perception," such as the sort that Leibniz had conceived. J)escriptive psychology is that I am now judging in a certain way, that I judgments closely related to what Husser! was to call phenomenolsuch-and-such, that I think I remember so-andsee to seem from Vienna in ogy. Husser! had studied with Brentano so. Second, there are judgments of reason or insights (Ei111884 to 1886, when Brentano used the expression besichten), such as the judgments that two things are more schreibende Phiinomenologie ("descriptive phenomenolthan one thing; that that which is red is, as such, other than ogy") as an alternative name for descriptive psychology. that ·which is green; that there cannot be a triangle with of doctrine Brentano's (Husser! later wrote that without four sides; or that a whole cannot exist if its parts do not intentionality, "phenomenology could not have come into exist. being at all.") Brentano's conception of psychology has led Every judgment that is evident is true, but not every some of his critics to accuse him of what Frege and Husthat is true is evident. Most judgments of "outer judgment does serl called psychologism. However, this accusation (of the external world), Brentano believed, are perception" his and evidence of theory Brentano's account not take into true, but all of them are "blind"; they are not evident. He moral philosophy, both of which he took to be branches of argued, howeve r, that the hypoth esis of a three-dimendescriptive psychology. sional external world , with its familiar details concerning Moral philosophy. Brentano's ethical views are set forth physical bodies, has an "infinitely greater probability" ed., 3d 1889; (Leipzig, Erkenntnis in Ursprung sittlicher than any of its alternative s. Judgments based on memory, Oskar Kraus, ed., 1934), translated by Cecil Hague as The too, are "blind"; but many of them confirm each other, and Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (London, they are worthy of our confide nce. 1902), and in Grundlegung und Aujbau der Ethik ("The In WahrheU und Evidenz Brentano characterized truth ed., Mayer-Hillebrand, . Basis and Structure of Ethics," F reference to evidence: "Truth pertains to the judgment by assumpthe upon ethics his based Bern, 1952). Brentano of the person who judges correctly ... hence it pertains tion that the members o( the third class of mental pheto the judgment of one who asserts what the person who nomena, loving and hating, may be said to be correct or judges with evid e nce would as sert" (p. 130). In addition, incorrect, just as judgments may be said to be correct or into say that A exists is to say that anyone who judged about correct. To say that something,_!\, is good is to say that it ') lrl' with evidence would accept A, and to say that A does not A ~~I , apodictiis it is, that is impossible to love A incorrectly; exist is to say that anyone who judged about A with evi / ~ .> cally to reject incorrect lovers of A Analogously, to say that dence would reject A The "measure of all things," then, is rect haters of A A is bad is apodictically to ga· the man who judges with evidence. The only way to grasp the concept of correct emotion, However, these statements, relating truth to evidence, emoof cases actual according to Brentano, is to contrast not give us the whole of Brentano's theory of truth . do emotions of cases with correct" as "qualified are tions that "Evident" is said to be predicate in the strict sense of the that are not. This is analogous to the way in which we term, but "true" and "exists" are not, being only synseunderstand, for example, what it is to be red and what it is mantic. This brings us to Brentano's theory of categories. · to be colored. Thus we learn that knowledge is good, joy Theory of categories. The basic theses of Brentano's enrichment every bad), is what in is good (unless it is joy theory of categories may be stated as (I) there is nothing within the realm of ideas is good, love of the ood is ood, IJJI other than concrete particular things, and (2) every judglove of the a is bad and the ri ht end in life is to choose prr I ..1 l __,,,..._...._4 ..-........ _...._.... .•.Jl &.t. ! .._... t...l ...... ---- _____ .i~ :hP f'C lliO.t..!l.nCP n. thP u>iP •tinn of. c;_on1P The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of title page and two pages from McAlister L L (ed) (1976) The philosophy of Brentano, Duckwort, 36-37. (2 leaves) .P .f'? t__ ·-1c /'~'i.- -- 1 Z, /-,,v / Ca-e... t it(_,; ; ~ • // ce~ ,-.- fc/YYC. /; ~~ /«., /~ ~- / ~ / d ,of ✓ ~ 1 J {,:, ~ -:: ;}7 ~ - ~ 7?"/ c //p / ,,,--,-- c £.;,7 .,, u;,-< ✓c. ~ "&~ / r /2 ~ ~ / l 7~ t"~~ ,' •• •• ;Jo ;ft<J1 o -;::: 1/4 ~/~ _:; ~.✓- ~ ~2:. __., -, ft ~~; ~ ~ ~ ~ "',,,: :~ / C ~ .-/ ~ ,G;_:__ ~ ~ ~ ?~--..__ ~4/ I ?~/ -~_ _'_~  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 682: Notes and cuttings on Franz Brentano Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten and typescript notes. Includes copies of published works by other authors Description An account of the resource Published works redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Manilla Folder - Brentano - Better, = Correct Pref. RS: many v. misc ms notes on Brentano (but also other topics: including Broad on Sidgwick). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 682 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [37] leaves. 14.09 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:00cae17">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:00cae17</a> Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/9a0eaf07f4febb1ac32bde2cd9f153e1.pdf 05c51d75c317aed7f6e3c1eb1eb7d7d6 PDF Text Text UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION: Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more Kantian imperatival form: Act only in such a way that you action would serve to maximize net expected utility. or explained j The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of { pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or happiness - of members of some other base class. But the further detail s are not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are in fact corrnnon to often confused utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism, with utilitarianism. To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required . Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve. Certainly its application can still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to racism or nuclear escalation: so however can most rival ethical positions. But its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends, and not merely with ~aJ e: directions. its serious adoption forces adherents in these Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural environ- ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism. So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position: it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION: Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more Kantian imperatival form: Act only in such a way that you action would serve to maximize net expected utility. or explained j The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of { pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or happiness - of members of some other base class. But the further detail s are not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are in fact corrnnon to often confused utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism, with utilitarianism. To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required . Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve. Certainly its application can still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to racism or nuclear escalation: so however can most rival ethical positions. But its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends, and not merely with ~aJ e: directions. its serious adoption forces adherents in these Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural environ- ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism. So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position: it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 683: Draft appendix, notes and cutting on utilitarianism Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with emendations and annotations. Includes photocopy of pages from publication by Hutcheson, with a note from Charles to Richard. Hutcheson F (1755) System of moral philosophy. A System of Moral Philosophy, Volume 2, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139583688.019 Description An account of the resource Note, one of three papers digitised from item 683. Title in collection finding aid: Appendix: ts + ms draft - attached to xc from Hutcheson 'Adventitious Rights'. Published work redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 683 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [8] leaves. 1.93 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7aded01">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7aded01</a> Box 59: Nuclear https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/382a1128067b3cf4c3bcc193ab4cac7d.pdf b45dc2ea94eb2ca3936e966fc7a70ea7 PDF Text Text ETHICS PROJECTS AND ISSUES 1 l That of putting together and justifying as largely evaded Aristotelean, outside one of two . whole a svstem of ethics. ~t ask is ~ One traditions. which sets out with a 74. R where it is tackled is the conception of Man's end or uJ timate good, and ),J( / .' )(~ then endeavours to show that the virtuous life - which is what ethics concerns - wilJ 1 ff/f'O fulfil this or realise it. By contrast, Cicero begins with a fairly full-fledp-ed colJ ection of duties and makes some attempt at showing personal advantage will not clash with those. for Duty's together: sake requires a .iustification. And collections ,-e_ 9. ~ ,; ~ru.:t: there is a ~grneu-+: of coherence on ethical svstems . 21 Why want fallacies, such as those fallacies? be. J abel1ec'l have naturaJ ism and to But nuty be pulled prescriptive, RR Because if they weren't fallacies too much that is not determined would Briefly, one would not expect that is ohligatory or good to fol low from the scientific facts, because that would determine which value system to adhere to . But there is not a fina1 unique system delivered from the facts. 31 Def ea ting objections achieved by to consequentionalist objections reliance on principles ( act - ) utilitarianism is that to deontics . sometjmes a One of the frequent better outcome or like act consequentialism , that ob,jection no longer carries any weight . can be Under satisizing It is· enough , at most , that application of the principle yields a sufficiently good outcome . T � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ETHICS PROJECTS AND ISSUES 1 l That of putting together and justifying as largely evaded Aristotelean, outside one of two . whole a svstem of ethics. ~t ask is ~ One traditions. which sets out with a 74. R where it is tackled is the conception of Man's end or uJ timate good, and ),J( / .' )(~ then endeavours to show that the virtuous life - which is what ethics concerns - wilJ 1 ff/f'O fulfil this or realise it. By contrast, Cicero begins with a fairly full-fledp-ed colJ ection of duties and makes some attempt at showing personal advantage will not clash with those. for Duty's together: sake requires a .iustification. And collections ,-e_ 9. ~ ,; ~ru.:t: there is a ~grneu-+: of coherence on ethical svstems . 21 Why want fallacies, such as those fallacies? be. J abel1ec'l have naturaJ ism and to But nuty be pulled prescriptive, RR Because if they weren't fallacies too much that is not determined would Briefly, one would not expect that is ohligatory or good to fol low from the scientific facts, because that would determine which value system to adhere to . But there is not a fina1 unique system delivered from the facts. 31 Def ea ting objections achieved by to consequentionalist objections reliance on principles ( act - ) utilitarianism is that to deontics . sometjmes a One of the frequent better outcome or like act consequentialism , that ob,jection no longer carries any weight . can be Under satisizing It is· enough , at most , that application of the principle yields a sufficiently good outcome . T  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 683: Draft of Ethics projects and issues Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with emendations and annotations. Description An account of the resource Note, one of three papers digitised from item 683. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 683 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 794.1 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa52764">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa52764</a> Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b53260d8b71b1e884c7cd83c19548c36.pdf 05c51d75c317aed7f6e3c1eb1eb7d7d6 PDF Text Text UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION: Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more Kantian imperatival form: Act only in such a way that you action would serve to maximize net expected utility. or explained j The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of { pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or happiness - of members of some other base class. But the further detail s are not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are in fact corrnnon to often confused utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism, with utilitarianism. To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required . Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve. Certainly its application can still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to racism or nuclear escalation: so however can most rival ethical positions. But its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends, and not merely with ~aJ e: directions. its serious adoption forces adherents in these Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural environ- ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism. So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position: it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION: Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more Kantian imperatival form: Act only in such a way that you action would serve to maximize net expected utility. or explained j The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of { pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or happiness - of members of some other base class. But the further detail s are not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are in fact corrnnon to often confused utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism, with utilitarianism. To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required . Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve. Certainly its application can still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to racism or nuclear escalation: so however can most rival ethical positions. But its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends, and not merely with ~aJ e: directions. its serious adoption forces adherents in these Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural environ- ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism. So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position: it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 59, Item 683: Draft of Utilitarianism as supererogatory: maximizing versus satisizing in value theory Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with emendations and annotations. Description An account of the resource Note, one of three papers digitised from item 683. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 683 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 503.45 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:da9203b">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:da9203b</a> Box 59: Nuclear Como House Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3 https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/42a18a653f7af23cdf718163b4cc0a88.pdf f87fd85c0b206ea04ae5fc89ea649fcb PDF Text Text /' &*? /<^z^ V <k/ ---- ---------------------------------- ----- r>^^# x > /■ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document /' &*? /<^z^ V <k/ ---- ---------------------------------- ----- r>^^# x > /■  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 6, Item 1768: Notes on environmental ethics Description An account of the resource Note, one item digitised from item 1768. Notes housed in folder of "papers on ecology, environmental ethics etc ". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 6, Item 1768 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 798.3 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:db9559a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:db9559a</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Second Bookcase - Bottom Shelf Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Bottom Shelf Box 6: Environmental Ethics